


Secret

HEADQUARTERS
III CORPS

MARCH

1945



*After
action
report*

Secret



S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS III CORPS
Office of the Commanding General
APO #303, U. S. Army

* * * * *
* S E C R E T *
* AUTH: CG, III CORPS *
* INIT: C.J.W. *
* DATE: 1 April 45 *
* * * * *

GNNLF

1 April 1945

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After.

THRU : Commanding General, First U. S. Army, APO 230, U. S. Army.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C.

- Section I - Introduction.
- Section II - Narrative of Operations.
- Section III - Summary of Operations.
- Section IV - Intelligence Summary.
- Section V - Supply and Evacuation Summary.
- Section VI - Personnel Summary.
- Section VII - Civil Affairs Summary.
- Section VIII - Engineers Summary of Operations.
- Section IX - Signal Summary of Operations.

*Annexes:

- 1. Roster of Officers, Hq III Corps
- 2. Operations Maps.
- 3. Engineer Operations Maps.
- 4. Supply and Evacuation Maps.
- 5. Signal Operations Maps.
- 6. Map, AAA Dispositions.
- * 7. Station Lists.
- * 8. Report, Hq and Hq Btry, III Corps Arty, with
1 Incl (Incl withdrawn and forwarded separately)

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

1. Authority: This After Action Report is submitted in compliance with paragraph 10, Change 3, AR 345-105. It is the fourth report of its kind submitted by this headquarters, and covers the period 1 March through 31 March, when III Corps drove to and across the RHINE.

2. Command: From 1 March through 16 March Major General John Millikin was in command of III Corps, and on 17 March Major General James A. Van Fleet assumed command. The Corps was a part of Lt General Courtney H. Hodges' First United States Army during the entire month.

* Annexes 7 and 8 not included in this edition.

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3. Composition of the Corps: On 1 March the Corps was composed of the following units: (Major changes in attachments are discussed in Section II - Narrative of Operations. A complete record of changes in attachments and of units in support of Corps is found in Annex No. 6, - Station Lists.)

Hq and Hq Co, III Corps

DIVISIONS

1 Inf Div

103 AAA AW Bn (M)
634 TD Bn (3" SP)
745 Tk Bn
/ 193 FA Bn (25 Pdr)
/ 965 FA Bn (155 How)
/ Btry A, 987 FA Bn
(155 Gun SP)
Co A, 90 Cml Bn
Co B, 90 Cml Bn

9 Inf Div

376 AAA AW Bn (M)
746 Tk Bn
899 TD Bn
/ 254 FA Bn (155 How)
/ 987 FA Bn (- Btrys A & C)
(155 Gun SP)
Co C, 90 Cml Bn

78 Inf Div

552 AAA AW Bn (M)
774 Tk Bn
893 TD Bn (SP)(- Co B)
4 Co, 12 Bn Fusiliers
(Belgian)

9 Armd Div

482 AAA AW Bn (SP)
656 TD Bn (SP)
/ 400 Armd FA Bn (105 How)
/ 667 FA Bn (155 How)
* 3458 QM Trk Co
3600 QM Trk Co
/ 299 Engr C Bn (- Co A)
/ 1 Plat, 998 Engr Trdwy
Br Co

CAVALRY

14 Cav Gp

18 Cav Rcn Sq
32 Cav Rcn Sq
Co B, 893 TD Bn
Co A, 299 Engr C Bn

ARTILLERY

III Corps Arty, Hq/Hq Btry

817 TD Bn (T)
290 FA Obsn Bn
211 FA Gp
240 FA Bn (155 Gun)
528 FA Bn (155 Gun)
401 FA Gp
264 FA Bn (8" How)
809 FA Bn (155 How)
408 FA Gp
259 FA Bn (4.5" Gun)
742 FA Bn (8" How)

ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTY

16 AAA Gp, Hq/Hq Btry
109 AAA Gun Bn (M)(90)
563 AAA AW Bn (M)(40)
634 AAA AW Bn (M)

ARMORED

9 Armd Gp, Hq/Hq Co

CHEMICAL

90 Cml Bn, Hq/Hq Co
(- Cos A, B & C)

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ENGINEER

672 Engr Topo Co
2942 Engr TIT
Map Depot
1111 Engr C Gp
51 Engr C Bn
291 Engr C Bn
300 Engr C Bn
501 Engr L Pon Co
629 Engr LE Co (- 1 Plat)
994 Engr Trdwy Br Co
(- 1 Plat)
1 Plat, 460 Amph Trk Co
Co B, 738 Tk Bn (ME)
1159 Engr C Gp
276 Engr C Bn
284 Engr C Bn
72 Engr L Pon Co
1 Plat, 629 Engr LE Co
998 Engr Trdwy Br Co
(- 1 Plat)
1 Plat, 502 Engr L Pon Co
1 Plat, 994 Engr Trdwy Br Co

MEDICAL

187 Med Bn, Hq/Hq Det
484 Med Coll Co
662 Med Clr Co
Litter Bearer Plat, 423
Coll Co

MILITARY POLICE

MP Plat (Corps)
821 MP Co (Corps)

ORDNANCE

126 Ord Bomb Disp Sq
162 Ord Bomb Disp Sq

QUARTERMASTER

* 2d Plat, 23 QM Car Co

SIGNAL

Det A, 165 Sig Photo Co
94 Sig Bn
3259 Sig Serv Co
Det D, 3163 Sig Serv Co (-)

TANK DESTROYER

8 TD Gp, Hq/Hq Co
281 FA Bn (105 How)
2 Co, 12 Bn Fusilier (Belgian)

G-2 ATCHMTS

IPW Team 114
IPW Team 118
IPW Team 119
MII Team 413-G
MII Team 449-G
CIC Det 203
OB Unit 36
PI Team 72
PI Team 84

G-3 ATCHMTS

Air Support Party

ADM UNITS

3 Spec Serv Co
38 Fin Disb Sec
92 Fin Disb Sec
48 MRU (Type Y)
202 APU

MIL GOVT DETS

H6H2
H7H2
I11D2
H5D2
I9G2
H1B3
I1B3
H2B3

- * Denotes colored personnel
- / Attached III Corps for administration
- / Attached 1159 Engr C Gp for administration
- # Attached 90 Cml Bn for administration

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*4. a. Situation: On 25 February, the III Corps, following by two days the attack of the VII Corps on its left (north), attacked across the ROER RIVER and on 1 March had established bridgeheads in the zones of both the 1 Inf Div and the 9 Inf Div. The 311 Inf, 78 Inf Div, had crossed the ROER over 9 Inf Div bridges, and was attacking south to establish a bridgehead in the zone of the 78 Inf Div. Combat Command B, 9 Armd Div, had crossed the river and was attacking through the zone of the 9 Inf Div, and Combat Command A was crossing in order to attack through the zone of the 78 Inf Div. The advance of the Corps during the period 25 February - 28 February had met stubborn resistance, but by the end of February had begun to move rapidly.

b. At the beginning of the month the Corps was attacking under instructions contained in Operations Directive No. 4 (Ref FO 5), Hq III Corps, dated 28 February 1945. Under its provisions, the 1 Inf Div, (32 Cav Rcn Sq attached) on the north, was moving east to seize the line of the ERFT RIVER in its zone. The 9 Inf Div, in the center, was attacking to seize ZULPICH (F2333) and crossings over the ERFT RIVER in its zone. The 78 Inf Div, on the south, upon establishment of a bridgehead over the ROER in its zone, had the dual mission of continuing the attack to the east, prepared to attack in the direction of EUSKIRCHEN (WF3329), and of protecting the Corps south flank. CCB, 9 Armd Div, was attacking to the southeast in the direction of VETTWEISS (WF1938) - SIEVERNICH (WF2437) - DISTERNICH (WF2438) - NIEDERBURG (WF317378) - DERKUM (WF3435); and CCA, 9 Armd Div, was directed to attack on 1 March along the axis EMBKEN (WF1832) - WALLERSHEIM (WF1730) - LANGENDORF (WF2131), to seize crossings over the BLEI RIVER in the vicinity of DURSCHEVEN (WF2830). The 14 Cav Gp (- 32 Cav Rcn Sq) was to advance to the southeast through the zone of the 9 Inf Div.

c. With the crossing of the ROER, III Corps had surmounted the greatest natural obstacles lying to the west of the RHINE, and was operating on the COLOGNE PLAIN, whose many streams, canals, and towns formed the only obstacles to an attack. The road net was good, there were few natural defense lines available to the enemy, his observation was limited, and in general the terrain favored the attacker.


* See Annex No. 2a, Map: Situation as of 010001A March.

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SECTION II
NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

SCALE 1/250,000



1 March:

The rapid advances which had begun late in February with the crossing of the ROER continued on the first day of the new month. All divisions attacked early in the morning and advances of up to three miles were made in many places despite moderate to heavy resistance. The NEFFEL RIVER was crossed, eleven towns were captured, and a bridgehead over the ROER RIVER was established in the zone of the 78 Inf Div.

In the 9 Armd Div CCA and CCB attacked at widely separated points. CCA, having closed in DROVE (wF1337) at 0100A, moved through the zone of the 1 Inf Div and 9 Inf Div and attacked southeast from BERG (wF1433) at 0700A. Although it encountered little resistance initially, it was held up about one thousand yards west of WOLLERSHEIM (wF1730) where it encoun-

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tered tanks and SP guns, and where it was forced to fight dismounted. The 3 Bn, 310 Inf (78 Inf Div), was attached to CCA and it was planned to attack southeast early in the morning to capture WOLLERSHEIM, EPPE-NICH (wF1930), BURVENICH (wF1929) and SINZENICH (wF2329).

CCB, operating along the NEFFEL RIVER, had one small task force in MUDDERSHEIM (wF2439) and another in SIEVERNICH (wF2437) at 0045A. By 0600A DISTERNICH (wF2438) had been taken and CCB crossed the river and continued the attack to the east. By nightfall advances of up to two kilometers east of the river had been made; a bridge at SIEVERNICH had been captured intact; and one treading bridge had been placed in operation at DISTERNICH and another at MUDDERSHEIM. The 1 Bn, 310 Inf (78 Inf Div), was attached and it was planned to resume the attack in the morning. At 1515A a QM truck company was requested of First U S Army, in order that one infantry regiment might be motorized for operation with the 9 Armd Div.

The 1 Inf Div continued its attack during the night with the 16 and 18 Inf Regts. At 0145A the 18 Inf was attacking from the vicinity of NORVENICH (wF2345) toward WISSERSHEIM (wF2647), and by 0245A the 16 Inf had cleared EGGERSHEIM (wF2243). The 18 Inf was held up at RATH (wF2546), where it became engaged in a fierce fire fight for the best part of the morning, and it was midafternoon before the regiment reached WISSERSHEIM, which it was unable to take this day. The 16 Inf, however, which was moving toward ERP (wF2841), was reported at midnight as making good progress despite strong resistance. By nightfall both regiments had advanced up to three miles, and during the evening a thirty ton treading bridge was placed in operation at GLADBACH (wF2241).

The 9 Inf Div also attacked early in the morning with the 39 and 60 Inf Regts and initially met little resistance. Elements of 16 Inf during the early morning captured MULDENAU (wF1632) and the 39 Inf made advances of over three miles, in the course of which it captured GINNICK (wF1734) and FROITSHEIM (wF1735).

While these three divisions were advancing to the east and south-east, the 311 Inf, 78 Inf Div, having crossed the ROER through the zone of the 9 Inf Div, attacked south along the east side of the river to establish a bridgehead in the 78 Inf Div zone. Although the regiment was held up by bitter resistance at HAUSEN (wF1228), that place was captured late in the afternoon. By the day's end advances of over two and one half miles had been made and construction was begun on bridges over the river at BLENS (wF1129). The establishment of this bridgehead culminated a Corps river crossing operation in which three divisions seized bridgeheads without once forcing a river crossing. In each case they crossed over already established bridges and flanked enemy positions on the east side of the river.

The 309 Inf began its movement to assembly areas east of the river and planned to attack at 0400A on 2 March to take VLATTEN, EPPENICH and BURVENICH. Because these towns were also abjectives of the 9 Armd Div, close coordination and liaison was established and maintained between

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these two divisions; and because the operations of the 102 Cav Gp on the division's right were closely tied in with those of the 78 Inf Div, the CG III Corps at 1015A ordered that MARIAWALD (wF1125) be taken by the division before nightfall.

The 18 Cav Rcn Sq moved to assembly area vicinity BOICH (wF1235). Co B, 893 TD Bn, was relieved from attachment to the 14 Cav Gp and the 817 TD Bn was attached.

The 8 TD Gp, currently charged with the responsibility of protecting Corps rear areas, was informed that the 16 Bn Fusiliers (Belgian), scheduled to arrive in the Corps area in the near future, would be attached 8 TD Gp upon its arrival.

During the day instructions were issued to CG 78 Inf Div directing that he be prepared to pass one combat team 2 Inf Div (V Corps) through the 78 Inf Div bridge in the vicinity of HELMBACH (wF1126), and that he also be prepared to pass elements of the 7 Armd Div through his bridgehead. The CG III Corps and CG V Corps agreed on a tentative movement schedule which contemplated the crossing of one infantry regiment 2 Inf Div, followed by the 78 Inf Div Arty, one combat command 7 Armd Div, other elements 78 Inf Div, Corps Arty and the remaining combat commands 7 Armd Div, in that order. Co B, 893 TD Bn (SP) reverted to control 78 Inf Div at 1200A, and both the 1 and 3 Bns, 310 Inf (78 Inf Div), were attached 9 Armd Div.

Operations Directive No. 5, confirming fragmentary orders already issued, was published.

The day was cloudy with light intermittent rains, and the IX TAC, which had been scheduled to fly Air Corps cooperation for the 9 Inf Div, was able to perform armed reconnaissance only. Corps Arty continued to support the attack, primarily by counterbattery, harassing and interdiction fires.


2 March:

The Corps attack progressed according to plan against strong but scattered resistance, which consisted of opposition from pillboxes and prepared fortifications, AT, SP, mortar and artillery fire. CCA, 9 Armd Div, operating in the zone of the 78 Inf Div, made small gains during the day in the face of heavy resistance, but after heavy fighting captured WOLLERSHEIM by a double envelopment, and continued to the east to capture LANGENDORF (wF2031). CCB, attacking in the zone of the 9 Inf Div, however, advanced up to seven thousand yards to capture a bridge over the ROTH RIVER and the towns of MULHEIM (wF2935) and FRIESCHEIM (wF2430).

In the north, the 1 Inf Div advanced up to one thousand yards and reached the ERFT CANAL after attacking early in the morning to capture

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HEIMBACH LIES AMONG THE HILLS ON THE EAST OF THE ROER

ERP (WF2841) and WISSERSHEIM (WF2646). In the center of the Corps zone the 9 Inf Div attacked with the 39 and 60 Inf Regts to advance up to seven miles and clear a total of nine towns, while the 78 Inf Div, attacking with the 309 Inf, advanced some five thousand yards. The 311 Inf, after clearing MARIAWOLD and HEIMBACH very early in the morning, remained to protect the division bridgehead until relief could be effected by elements of the 2 Inf Div (V Corps).


The 14 Cav Gp (- 32 Cav Rcn Sq) on 28 February had been given a mission of protecting the Corps south flank, maintaining contact initially between the 9 Armd and 9 Inf Divs, and then, after the attack of CCB had gone off, to maintain contact with the 9 Armd Div. The 32 Cav Rcn Sq had been attached on the same date to 1 Inf Div. On 2 March the 14 Cav Gp was relieved of its previously assigned mission, and because of the large front over which the 1 Inf Div was operating, became attached to the 1 Inf Div. It assembled and began to move to assembly areas in the 1 Inf Div zone, prepared for employment to the north. The 817 TD Bn was relieved of attachment Corps Arty, and at midnight became attached 14 Cav Gp.

During the day Corps Arty crossed the ROER, and information was received which announced a postponement of the 7 Armd Div's movement. At first it had been planned that the movement of the 7 Armd Div would commence at 03100A, but at about 2045A it was announced that it would not start until sometime after midnight 3-4 March.

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INFANTRYMEN MOVE
ACROSS THE OPEN
FIELDS TO THE
ERFT CANAL



During the night 1-2 March enemy air was active in the zone of the 1 Inf Div, and in the entire Corps zone a total of eight raids by eleven aircraft was made. One plane was destroyed and one damaged. Armed reconnaissance missions were flown by friendly fighter bombers, and medium bombers attacked STADT MECKENHEIM (wf4925).

*3 March:

Despite enemy resistance which stiffened considerably as elements of the Corps reached and crossed the ERFT RIVER, good gains were made by all divisions, and a number of towns were captured. The 1 Inf Div gained up to three thousand yards as the 28 Inf, in the north, crossed the ERFT RIVER and pushed out approximately three kilometers to the east, while the 18 Inf, in the south, reached the ERFT CANAL. At 1530A the CG 1 Inf Div was informed that his south boundary had been changed to run from ERP - FREISCHEIM - WEILERWIST (all towns inclusive to the 1 Inf Div), thus increasing the width of his zone and pointing the direction of his attack due east. He was directed (1) to seize crossings over the ERFT RIVER, (2) to be prepared to advance to the southeast on Corps order, and (3) to effect relief of elements of the 9 Inf Div and 9 Armd Div in his zone prior to 032400A. The 14 Cav Gp (attached) remained in assembly areas.

* See Annex No. 2b, Map: Situation as of 032400A March

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CCB of the 9 Armd Div, still operating in the zone of the 9 Inf Div, advanced five thousand yards to the ERFT RIVER, where it seized WEILLERSWIST (WF3740) and LOMMERSUM (WF3335), and at 1415A became attached 9 Inf Div. The 9 Inf Div reached the BLEI RIVER, and the 39 Inf advanced to LOMMERSUM, where it established contact with CCB, 9 Armd Div. The 9 Inf Div was directed to seize bridgeheads over the ERFT RIVER, to continue its attack to the east, and to maintain contact with 9 Armd Div on the right. RCT 60 was attached 9 Armd Div effective 2400A.

CCA, 9 Armd Div, moved out early in the day and advanced approximately five thousand yards to capture ZULPICH (WF2333) and SINZENICH (WF2329). During this day the 9 Armd Div was given a zone of advance between the 9 Inf and 78 Inf Divs which included the town of EUSKIRCHEN, and which turned the axis of advance slightly to the southeast. The division was directed to continue the advance and seize EUSKIRCHEN (WF3329), and the CG 9 Armd Div was directed to move CCR to ZULPICH.

The new boundaries had narrowed considerably the zone of the 78 Inf Div, which continued its attack and captured a number of towns against strong resistance. By nightfall elements of the 309 Inf were abreast of the 9 Armd Div at LOVENICH (WF2430), and the 78 Inf Div was directed (1) to advance east and assist the 9 Armd Div to capture EUSKIRCHEN, (2) to protect the Corps south flank, and (3) to maintain contact with the 102 Cav Gp (V Corps) on its right. RCT 310 was attached 9 Armd Div effective 032400A.

During the day elements of the 2 Inf Div (V Corps) moved through the 78 Inf Div bridgehead and attacked to the south. Because it was found that the movement of tanks across existing 78 Inf Div bridges was slow and difficult, however, it was decided that a Bailey bridge would be built over the dam in the 78 Inf Div zone. That bridge was completed at approximately 1800A. At 1545A the 78 Inf Div reported that it was receiving fire on its right flank, and asked whether the advance of the 7 Armd Div might be hastened. Upon investigation by Corps, however, it was found that the movement of the 7 Armd Div had been postponed for another twenty four hours.

Operations Directive No. 6 (Ref FO 5), which confirmed fragmentary orders already issued, and established the boundaries previously mentioned, was published. (boundaries and objectives established by Operations Directive No. 6 are shown on Annex No. 2b, Map: Situation as of 032400A) It also directed that the 413 AAA Gun Bn, which arrived in the Corps area during the day, would be attached 16 AAA Gp.

Although visibility was only poor to good, fighter bombers flew three missions in direct support of Corps, and medium bombers attacked HEIMERSHEIM (WF4236).

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4 March:

Corps advanced up to four miles against resistance that was generally light, heavy opposition being encountered at isolated strong points only. The 1 Inf Div relieved those elements of CCB that had been in the 1 Div zone, and advanced from one thousand to three thousand yards to the east. In the north part of the division zone the 18 Inf was relieved by the 14 Cav Gp.

The 9 Inf Div established a bridgehead across the ERFT RIVER, capturing five towns as it advanced. Stubborn resistance was encountered in the DERKUM (WF3435) area, but it was overcome and the town was taken. The 39 Inf relieved CCB, 9 Armd Div, and the 9 Inf Div was instructed that CCB was to be relieved of attachment early the following morning. At the same time RTC 60 was to return to control of the 9 Inf Div.

The 9 Armd Div, attacking with CCA and CCR, advanced up to seven thousand yards to the southeast. CCR, having closed in the ZULPICH area during the night 3-4 March attacked during early afternoon through the 47 Inf (9 Inf Div) to advance four thousand yards, and at the close of the day was fighting in KESSENICH (WF3331). CCA advanced approximately seven thousand yards to capture EUSKIRCHEN (WF3229) against light resistance. At the close of the day all elements of the division were in the division zone, and were prepared to continue the advance. Instructions were given the division directing it to attack to the southeast, in the direction of RHEINBACH (WF4425) - AHRWEILER (WF5416); to coordinate with the 78 Inf Div the seizure of HILL 316 (WF298253); and to coordinate movement through the zone of the 78 Inf Div with the CG 78 Inf Div.

On the right of the Corps zone the 78 Inf Div attacked with the 309 Inf, which advanced approximately three thousand yards to seize three towns in which resistance was reported to be light. The 311 Inf moved along the Corps right to protect the flank, and during the evening a temporary boundary was established between the III and V Corps which permitted movement of the 78 Inf Div to the south, into what had been the V Corps zone. The division was directed to continue the attack to the southeast, and seize HILL 316 (WF398253), a prominent terrain feature approximately four kilometers southwest of EUSKIRCHEN. The division was further instructed to motorize one battalion of the 309 Inf, for protection of the Corps right flank and rear, and to be prepared to seize crossings over the ERFT RIVER on Corps order. (Temporary boundary is shown in Annex No. 2c, Map: Situation as of 052400A March)

Operations Directive No. 7 (Ref FO 5) was published. It confirmed instructions previously issued and established tentatively a continuation of the 78 Inf Div - 9 Armd Div boundary, to become effective on Corps order. It announced that one CT of the 2 Inf Div (V Corps) was to cross the ROER RIVER at HEIMBACH at approximately 051200A and attack south and southeast from the vicinity BURVENICH (WF1929).

Visibility during the day was poor, with intermittent snow flurries.

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Two medium blind bombing missions were flown, one on BRUHL (wF4248) and one on RHEINBACH (wF4425). Corps Arty fired counterbattery, neutralization and interdiction missions, and fired a counterflak program in coordination with the Air Corps bombing mission.

Corps advance CP opened in NIDDIGEN (wF1139) at 1300A.

*5 March:

The Corps attack progressed rapidly as all divisions struck out to make gains of from four thousand to seven thousand yards. In the south and north of the Corps zone resistance was light and scattered, and the only aggressive enemy action during the day was received in the zone of the 9 Inf Div, where two counterattacks were met and quickly repulsed. Some road blocks were encountered, and in the zone of the 1 Inf Div several groups of enemy were overrun.

The 1 Inf Div continued its attack with the 26 and 16 Inf Regts. The 16 Inf on the south advanced four thousand yards to the east, and the 26 Inf in the north of the division zone gained approximately three thousand yards. At 1700A the division reported that its left flank was in physical contact with elements of the VII Corps; and at 1850A a TWX was received from First U S Army which changed the Corps northern boundary, excluding the city of COLOGNE from the Corps zone, and causing a general turn to the east and southeast. The new boundary was a continuation of the old boundary and ran southeast to KNAPSACK (wF3751) exclusive, to VOICHEM (wF4050) (exclusive) and then due east to the RHINE. It created a bulge, or pocket, between the VII and III Corps, and it was planned that the 14 Cav Gp would move into the zone of the VII Corps, attack south and southeast toward BURBACH (wF3753), HURTH (wF3852), BUENRATH (wF3553) and then clean up to the west and southwest.

The 9 Armd Div attacked with CCA and CCB abreast and advanced east from six to seven thousand yards to ODENDORF (wF3928) and LUDENDORF (wF4030), both of which lie on the JUNG RIVER. CCB, having reverted to control 9 Armd Div at 0600A, relieved CCR which went into division reserve, and it was planned that on the 6th CCA and CCB would attack with RHEINBACH as the objective of CCA, and STADT MECKENHEIM as the objective of CCB. The tentative boundary between the 78 Inf Div and the 9 Armd Div, as established the day before by Operations Directive No. 7 (Ref FO 5), was placed in effect. (The boundary is shown on Annex No. 2c, Map: Situation as of 052400A)

The 9 Inf Div assumed command of RCT 60 at 0600A, and attacked early in the day to make gains of 3500 yards. By the day's end the division was at STRASSEL (wF3833) and MUGGENHAUSEN (wF3935), prepared to move on HEIMERZHEIM (wF4235) on the 6th.

* See Annex No. 2c, Map: Situation as of 052400A March

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The enemy chose to defend Nideggen. Little remained when the Corps moved in on 4 March



Not all civilians smiled as they displayed their white flags. This is Euskirchen

An infantryman's view of Zulpich, captured on 3 March



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The 78 Inf Div attacked to the southeast, in accordance with its instructions of the day before, seized its objective (HILL 316), and advanced from four to six thousand yards to FIRMENICH (WF2626), SATZEN (WF2725), ANTWEILER (WF2923), RHEDER (WF3425) and STOTZHEIM (WF3525), thus effectively protecting the Corps right flank. The division was directed to seize the high ground in the vicinity WF3820; to reconnoiter to the general line ARLOFF (WF3322) - HOVERATH (WF4016); and to seize HILL 411 (WF385202). It was announced that the 102 Cav Gp (V Corps) would relieve the elements of the 78 Inf Div occupying HILL 316 on 6 March, at which time the temporary boundary between III and V Corps would be removed.

Late this night a TWX received from Hq First U S Army directed a change in the III - V Corps boundary, extending it in a southeasterly direction generally to BILLIG (WF3226) - KIRCHEIM (WF3623) - DERVAN (WF5115), all inclusive III Corps. The current southern Corps boundary had run along the AHR RIVER east to the RHINE, and the advance of the Corps had been along a general west-east axis; this change, however, plus the changed northern boundary, was to cause a change in direction, and was the first indication that Corps' effort would be made to the southeast and south, instead of due east to the RHINE. It was to cause changes in division objectives and boundaries, which were established by Corps during the latter part of 6 March.

At 1820A Corps was informed by First U S Army that it was desired to move the 7 Armd Div into the Corps rear areas. Corps offered no objection, but requested that ZULPICH not be included in the area, and that no Corps troops be displaced.

Operations Directive No. 8 (Ref FO 5) was published. It directed a continuation of the attack and confirmed fragmentary orders already issued.

Intermittent rain fell during the day, and visibility was restricted by low overcasts. Blind bombing missions were flown on BONN (WF4426), RHEINBACH (WF5537) and MUNSTER EIFFEL (WF3118), and medium bombers attacked STADT MECKENHEIM, with no results observed. Corps Arty was assisted again by V Corps Arty and the 32 FA Brig.

6 March:

The war of sweeping gains and rapid thrusts continued as Corps drove to the east and southeast to make advances of from five to ten miles along the front of its entire zone. Resistance was light to moderate, although the enemy defended strongly at some points, withdrawing only after determined delaying actions.

In the north of the Corps zone the 18 Cav Rcn Sq swept rapidly to the southeast along the east side of the ERFT CANAL, clearing a number of towns and meeting little resistance. Contact was established with elements of the 8 Inf Div (VII Corps) in the vicinity of KNAPSACK (WF3752)

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and by nightfall the pocket which had existed between the III and VII Corps had been eliminated. The 26 Inf, having reached its objective the previous day, held its positions in the vicinity of DORF PINGSDORF (WF4046), but the 16 Inf, in the southern portion of the 1st Inf Div zone, advanced four to five miles to the BONN - BRUHL HIGHWAY and to a general line running south from DERSDORF (WF4540) to the division south boundary.

In the 9 Inf Div zone, the 47 Inf drove approximately three miles past HEIMERZHEIM (WF4235), a gain of five miles. The 60 Inf attacked through the 39 Inf and also advanced approximately five miles to BUSCHHOVEN (WF4631) which was captured.

Both CCA and CCB of the 9 Armd Div attacked to the southeast early in the morning and continued the attack through the day and night to advance nine to ten miles. Although CCA was held up for a number of hours at the city of RHEINBACH, it captured that place during the late morning and by midnight had taken VETTELHOVEN (WF5219) and BOLINGEN (WF5319). CCB captured NEEDERDREES (WF4238) and OBERDREES (WF4227) in the morning, and by the end of the day had driven to the east of STADT MECKENHEIM (WF4925) with elements of the 89 Rcn Sq in the vicinity of HOLZEN (WF5525).

The 78 Inf Div's 311 Inf, which had crossed the Corps southern boundary into the V Corps zone in order to perform reconnaissance and protect the Corps south flank, was relieved early by elements of the V Corps and attacked to the east. The regiment advanced up to five miles to MERZBACH (WF4322), QUACKENBERG (WF4021), LACH (WF4022) and EICHEN (WF4020).

The 23 and 38 Inf (V Corps) advanced to the line of the ESCHWEILER RIVER, and seized the towns of IVERSHEIM (WF2120), ESCHWEILER (WF2919) and NOTHEN (WF2817). The CO 102 Cav Gp (V Corps) and the CG 78 Inf Div were instructed that further movement of the 102 Cav Gp, on the Corps right flank, would be made in conjunction with and coordinated with movement of the 78 Div. The CO 102 Cav Gp was instructed by CG V Corps that so long as he had direct contact with the 2 Inf Div on his right, to assist the advance of the 78 Inf Div.

As a result of the changes in Corps boundaries that had been directed by First U S Army during the night 5-6 March, Corps issued instructions on the 6th which turned the direction of attack to the southeast, with consequent changes in division boundaries and objectives. The 1 Inf Div's southern boundary was moved south so that the city of BONN (WF5426) fell within the division zone, and the division was directed to seize BONN and cut by fire the RHINE RIVER bridge at that place. The southern boundary of the 9 Inf Div was also turned southeast so that the cities of BAD GODESBURG (WF5932) and LANNESDORF (WF6029) became its objectives, and the 9 Armd Div was directed to seize REMAGEN (WF6420) and crossings over the AHR RIVER in the vicinity of SINZIG (WF6516), HEIMERSHEIM (WF6016) and BAD NEUENAUH (WF5816). The 78 Inf Div was directed to seize crossings over the AHR RIVER at AHRWEILER and places

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to the west of AHRWEILER (WF5416), and was instructed to continue to protect the Corps right flank. All divisions were directed to clear the enemy from the west bank of the RHINE RIVER in their respective zones, and all artillery with the Corps was directed that Pozit or time fuses only would be used when firing on RHINE RIVER bridges. These instructions were confirmed late in the afternoon when Operations Directive No. 9 was published. The directive also removed the temporary boundary between III and V Corps which had been established previously, and established a tentative boundary between the 9 Armd and 9 Inf Divs, which was to become effective on Corps order.

Following receipt of these instructions, G-3 9 Armd Div called G-3 III Corps and stated that the 9 Armd Div at the present time was attacking east with the main effort direction RHEINBACH - STADT MECKENHEIM - MEHLEM (WF6129), and that the division had intended to push to the AHR RIVER as a secondary effort. The division was instructed that the main effort would be made toward the towns of REMAGEN and BAD NEUENAHN, and that closing to the RHINE RIVER at MEHLEM was of secondary importance. Although it was known that the enemy would blow, or attempt to blow, the RHINE RIVER bridges, it was hoped that one might be seized, and the CG III Corps instructed the CG 9 Armd Div to attack aggressively in an effort to seize the AHR RIVER bridges and possibly the RHINE RIVER bridge intact.

At 1900A it was requested of First U S Army that neither BONN nor BAD GODESBERG be bombed. It was also requested that all the RHINE RIVER bridges in III Corps zone be excluded from bombing, although no objection was made to attacking ferry sites, ponton bridges, boats or barges being used to ferry men and equipment across the RHINE RIVER.

Intermittent rain fell throughout the day and visibility was poor to fair. No missions were flown by the IX TAC, and Corps Arty continued to support Corps operations by counterbattery, neutralization and interdiction missions, some of which were on crossing sites of the RHINE RIVER. Corps Arty was assisted by V Corps Arty and the 32 FA Brig.

The Corps CP opened at ZULPICH (WF2333) at 1200A.

*7 March:

Corps continued its rapid advance of the preceding day and drove from five to twelve miles along its entire front to seize the railroad bridge across the RHINE RIVER at REMAGEN (WF6420), as well as a number of crossings over the AHR RIVER in the vicinity of SINZIG (WF6516), BAD NEUENAHN (WF5816), HEIMERSHEIM (WF6016) and AHRWEILER (WF5416). On this day enemy resistance appeared to collapse and opposition was scattered, with no apparant organized lines of defense. The little resistance encountered was confined to towns, where small groups defen-

* See Annex No. 2d, Map: Situation as of 072400A March

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
INFANTRYMEN RIDE TANKS DURING THE RAPID ADVANCE TO THE RHINE

ded with small arms fire, although at HEIMERSHEIM and BAD NEUENNAHR the enemy defended stubbornly.

At 1400A the Corps was assigned a new mission, as had been anticipated, when Maj Gen W. B. Kean, Chief of Staff First U S Army, visited the Corps CP at ZULPICH with instructions directing the Corps to advance south along the west bank of the RHINE and effect a junction with the 4 Armd Div (Third U S Army), which was driving north toward the RHINE at a point only a few miles south of the Corps right flank. At this time no actual plans had been made for a crossing of the RHINE at REMAGEN, and it was not until news of the seizure of the bridge had been received by First U S Army that this new Corps mission to the south was cancelled. The message cancelling the mission was received at Corps Hq at approximately 1845A when Brig Gen T. C. Thorsen, G-3 First U S Army, in a telephone message directed that Corps seize crossings on the AHR RIVER, but that it not move south of the road HESSELING - STAFFEL - RAMERSBACH - HONIGSFELD, except on First U S Army order. A second telephone call from First U S Army at approximately 2015A informed Corps that it had been relieved of its mission to the south, but that the Corps was to secure its bridges over the AHR RIVER, where it would be relieved as soon as possible by elements of the 2 Inf Div (V Corps).

At the time of receipt of these instructions, all four divisions comprising the Corps were attacking in accordance with existing instructions.

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In the north of the Corps zone, elements of the 1 Inf Div attacked to the east early in the morning and captured BRUHL (wF4148), while other elements attacked and captured BERZDORF (wF4448), SECHTEN (wF4443), BARHEIM (wF4740) and ROISDORF (wF4939), thus placing the division from two to three kilometers west of the river. It was planned that the 18 Inf would pass through the 60 Inf (9 Inf Div) to attack BONN (wF5437), and the two division commanders made the arrangements necessary for the operation.

In the zone of the 9 Inf Div the 60 Inf attacked in the direction of BONN, while the 39 Inf continued to attack toward BAD GODESBERG. By midnight, after advances of several miles, elements were in position to attack BAD GODESBERG and objectives to the south along the RHINE. At 1430A the boundary between the 9 Inf Div and the 9 Armd Div, as shown in Operations Directive No. 9, became effective. (Boundary is shown in Annex No. 2d, Map: Situation as of 7 March)

To the south, in the zone of the 78 Inf Div, the 309 Inf attacked through the 311 Inf, advanced from eight to ten miles against light resistance and seized crossings over the AHR RIVER so that the Corps right flank lay on and across the AHR from the point where the Corps boundary joined the AHR RIVER to the RHINE.

The 9 Armd Div, having been given the mission of seizing REMAGEN and crossings over the AHR, moved out in the morning with CCA on the right and CCB on the left. The mission of CCA was to seize crossings at BAD NEUENAHN and HEIMERSHEIM while CCB was to take REMAGEN and KRIPP (wF6718) and seize crossings over the AHR at SINZIG and BODENDORF (wF6317). CCB consequently attacked in two columns, one in the direction of each of its objectives. Although CCA met stiff opposition at BAD NEUENAHN, CCB met practically none and by late afternoon had captured REMAGEN, against light opposition. Upon finding the bridge at REMAGEN intact, Lt Col Leonard Engaman, CO 14 Tk Bn, who had received instructions from Brig Gen Hoge, CG CCB 9 Armd Div, to seize the bridge should the opportunity present itself, sent infantry and engineer elements of his task force to the east side of the river. Although the enemy had prepared the bridge for demolition, only two small charges (or perhaps two detonators) were fired, and the bulk of the explosives failed to go off. Superficial damage was caused, and planking which the enemy had laid across the railroad tracks was splintered; but structurally the bridge remained intact, although suitable for one way traffic only. One company was sent across the river initially, and by midnight the entire 27AIB, supported by tanks, had crossed.

First news of the seizure of the bridge arrived at the Corps CP at approximately 1630A when Col James H Phillips, Chief of Staff, received a telephone message from Col Harry Johnson, Chief of Staff 9 Armd Div. Col Phillips was informed that the bridge had been taken intact, and was asked for instructions. At that time the Corps Commander was at the CP of the 78 Inf Div, and although First U S Army had given no instructions regarding the capture of the bridge, Col Phillips instructed the 9 Armd Div to exploit the bridgehead as far as possible but to hold SINZIG.

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He then relayed the information to Maj Gen Millikin, who confirmed these instructions and immediately made plans to motorize the 47 Inf (9 Inf Div) and dispatch it to REMAGEN. The General then alerted RCT 311 of the 78 Inf Div for movement to the bridgehead.

Perhaps the biggest problem which presented itself at this time was the limited number of troops available for immediate employment in the bridgehead, for the greater part of each division was currently engaged, and would have to be relieved before plans could be made for commitment on the east side of the RHINE. Such reliefs required time, and while it would have been more desirable to employ one complete infantry division in order to maintain integrity of organization and command, the only expedient was to commit the infantry troops that could be made available at the time. Consequently, elements of all divisions attached to Corps were moved to the bridgehead as they became available, and in order to achieve effective control and unity of command, Maj Gen Millikin decided to attach all units initially, as they crossed the river, to CCB, 9 Armd Div, for securing the initial bridgehead.

As a result, RCT 47, having been motorized by Corps, became attached to CCB, 9 Armd Div, at 2100A, and the 78 Inf Div was instructed to have the CO 311 Inf, with necessary staff officers, report to the CG 9 Armd Div. The 78 Inf Div was told that Corps would furnish trucks to the regiment at 0100A on 8 March, and that movement would be upon call from the CG 9 Armd Div.

While these instructions were being issued and plans being made, Hq First U S Army was notified of the day's developments, and First U S Army immediately confirmed the decision of the Corps Commander to exploit the bridgehead. The telephone call received at 2015A from First U S Army included information that the 7 Armd Div was attached to Corps immediately, for use in relieving the 9 Armd Div; that elements of the 2 Inf Div (V Corps) would relieve the 78 Inf Div and CCA of the 9 Armd Div as soon as possible; that a new V - III Corps boundary was placed in effect immediately; and that First U S Army was sending a 90mm gun battalion, a treadway bridge company and a DUKW company to Corps. This information answered the most pressing of the Corps' immediate problems -- how to effect the relief of the troops necessary to exploit the bridgehead.

The CG 7 Armd Div was instructed immediately to move one combat command, reinforced by one battalion of infantry, to an area MIEL (WF4230) - MORENHOFEN (WF4530) - BUSCHHOVEN (4632) - DUNSTEKOVEN (WF4333) where it would become attached temporarily to the 9 Inf Div, and where it would begin relief of the 60 Inf. The division was also instructed to be prepared to take over the entire zone of the 9 Inf Div as soon as possible. Instructions were then issued to the 9 Inf Div, informing it of these arrangements, and directing that the 60 Inf, upon relief by CCA 7 Armd Div, go to control of the 9 Armd Div upon request of the CG 9 Armd Div. It was further ordered that upon movement of the 9 Inf Div CP east of the RHINE, elements of the 9 Inf

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Div remaining west of the river would become attached to the 7 Armd Div. RCT 47 (- Arty) began its movement across the river during the night and closed in the bridgehead area early the following morning.

Through the evening, in telephone conversations with the 9 Armd Div, Corps reminded the division that in planning for the expansion of the bridgehead it was desirable to assign units zones of operation so that the assumption of command by divisions, when the situation permitted, would be facilitated. Corps also instructed the 9 Armd Div to relieve elements of CCB in the SINZIG portion of CCB's zone, in order to free these elements for in the bridgehead. The CG 9 Armd Div, however, had anticipated that order and had already begun the relief, which was completed this night. All Corps units were instructed to capture or destroy all river barges and boats as soon as possible.

Other considerations given immediate attention were the need for artillery support, the protection of the bridge against enemy air action and sabotage, the construction of additional bridges, and the problems of signal communications, which were greatly increased by the sudden turn of events. The signal plan had been built around an axis of the advance to the south, and it had been impossible to envisage the need for extensive communications to the REMAGEN vicinity. Although work was begun on the installation of wire communications to the bridgehead, the heavy artillery and great volume of traffic were to interrupt communications frequently.

Artillery plans, prior to the seizure of the bridge, also called for a general turn of the axis of advance to the south, and when news of the crossing reached the Corps, the Corps FDC and all the battalion CPs were displacing forward. Upon receipt of the new information, however, all battalions were contacted by radio and were ordered to proceed to new locations from which they would be able to support the Corps operations east of the RHINE. By 2230A one 4.5 gun Bn, one 155 gun Bn, and one 8" How Bn were in position, ready to deliver fire. It was planned to place heavy interdiction fires around the entire bridgehead.

Plans for AA defense of the bridgehead were begun during the night, and at about 0300A, 8 March, the 482 AAA AW Bn (SP) (atcd 9 Armd Div) was instructed to establish and maintain defense of the bridge with all available armament. Arrangements were made to provide air cover over the bridge, and assurances were received from First U S Army that planes would be provided from any base on the continent or in the United Kingdom from which planes were able to leave the ground.

Visibility during the day was fair, with low clouds and scattered rains throughout.

The 987 FA Bn (155 Gun) (SP) was attached III Corps during the day, and First U S Army was requested to furnish a smoke generator company to be used during the construction of the bridges.

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8 March:

Activity on the 8th was concerned primarily with the feeding of troops across the river as rapidly as possible, expanding the bridgehead, and clearing the enemy from the west bank of the RHINE. On the west side of the river the 1 Inf Div reached the RHINE and entered BONN. In the zone of the 9 Inf Div (which became the zone of the 7 Armd Div late in the day) the attack was continued toward the RHINE in the face of several small counterattacks, and elements of the 39 Inf captured BAD GODESBERG. The AHR RIVER was cleared of enemy small arms fire early in the morning, and WESTUM (WF6415), LOHNDORF (WF6214) and VHEN (WF6114) were captured.

East of the RHINE the enemy took no concerted action. No counterattacks were launched, little organized defenses were encountered, and opposition was centered in small towns where stubborn defensive action from small groups was met. KASBACH (WF6620), UNKEL (WF6322) and RHEIN-BREITBACH (WF6424) were captured, and at the day's end the 1 Bn, 310 Inf, (atcd CCB 9 Armd Div) was fighting in LINZ (WF6718). The 47 Inf attacked in the direction of the high ground vicinity BRUCHHAUSEN (WF6523) and OHLENBERG (WF6721) and by nightfall had taken its objective.


At 1100A the 1 Inf Div was relieved of attachment III Corps and was attached VII Corps, and at that time the Corps north boundary became the old 9 Inf Div - 1 Inf Div boundary. During the morning VII Corps requested that the 1 Inf Div be allowed to retain temporarily the 14 Cav Gp, which at the time was attached 1 Inf Div, and it was decided that the 1 Inf Div would retain temporary control over the 14 Cav Gp, 193 FA Bn, (25 Pdr), 965 FA Bn (155 How), 817 TD Bn (T), and A and B Cos 90 Cml Bn, all of which were to return to Corps control when the enemy had been cleared from west of the RHINE. The division was to retain permanent control over the 103 AAA AW Bn, the 634 TD Bn and the 745 Tk Bn.

The 78 Inf Div, at approximately 0200A, was directed to cancel all attacks which had been scheduled for this day, but to hold the AHR RIVER bridgehead until relief had been effected by the 2 Inf Div. Corps was informed that the CG 2 Inf Div had already visited the 78 Inf Div CP, and had stated that the relief could be completed no earlier than 0815A of that day.


At this time the 309 Inf was the only regiment under control of the 78 Inf Div which was actually engaged. The 310 Inf had previously been attached 9 Armd Div, with whom it was currently operating, and RCT 311 (- Arty), having been alerted for movement on the preceding night, had been assembled and was prepared to move by 0500A. Movement of RCT 311 began during the morning, and by late afternoon that RCT (- Arty) closed in the bridgehead area where it became attached 9 Armd Div.

At 0945A RCT 309 (- Arty) was alerted for movement to the bridgehead, when instructions were issued to CG 78 Inf Div directing that the 309 RCT (- Arty), upon relief by 2 Inf Div, be assembled and marched on secondary roads to an area designated by CG 9 Armd Div. CG 78 Inf Div

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THE LUDENDORF BRIDGE AT REMAGEN

was instructed that control of his regiments would be returned to him as soon as he was prepared to assume command of his zone of action in the bridgehead area. At 1755A the relief of the infantry elements of the 309 RCT was completed, and at that time control of the zone of the 78 Inf Div passed to CG 2 Inf Div. At 1815A two battalions RCT 309 were ordered to move within seven hours, and the RCT began crossing during the night, closing in the bridgehead area on the following day.

Movement of the 7 Armd Div into the zone of the 9 Inf Div continued throughout the day, and at 1235A CCA had closed in the area and became attached 9 Inf Div. Relief of RCT 60 (- Arty) was begun, and although the 2 and 3 Bns 60 Inf continued to be engaged repelling counterattacks during the greater part of the day, the 1 Bn by afternoon had been assembled and had crossed the river by early morning of the 9th. CCR became attached 9 Inf Div at 1100A, and was directed to move during the afternoon to relieve RCT 39. At 1715A the CG 7 Armd Div assumed command of the zone, and all 7 Armd Div elements, plus those units of the 9 Inf Div remaining in the zone, passed to his control. The 7 Armd Div was directed to use all possible speed in closing on the RHINE.

The 52 AIB, 9 Armd Div crossed during the night 7-8 March, and closed in the bridgehead at approximately 0300A.

During this entire day Maj Gen Millikin was at the bridgehead and issued his instructions from there. In order that unity of command and

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effective control might be exercised and because of restricted space in the bridgehead, he directed that the CG 9 Inf Div, upon opening his CP east of the river, would assume control over units in the bridgehead in order to secure the division bridgehead and until such time as the other division commanders were prepared to assume command of their zones.

Although this appeared to be the most effective way to exercise his command east of the river, it did not solve the problem of how to insure a steady flow of troops to the bridgehead area. The anticipated attachment of the 99 Inf Div made it doubly important that some agency be given the responsibility of staging and moving troops west of the RHINE. Consequently the CG 9 Armd Div was directed to continue to perform this function. It was planned that the CGs 9 Inf and 9 Armd Divs would operate as a team, the one furnishing troops to the other as called for. Corps set up the priority for movements of troops available west of the RHINE as rapidly as they could be disengaged, and established a TAC CP at REMAGEN, to (a) expedite information to Corps, (b) give advice for solution of arising problems, (c) supervise closely engineer operations, and (d) supervise traffic and control of roads. A traffic circulation plan was placed in effect in which eastbound traffic moved on northerly roads, which were not under enemy observation, and westbound traffic moved on southern routes. Thus loaded vehicles ran less risk of receiving artillery fire. In order that bridge traffic would not be interrupted by westbound ambulance traffic, it was decided that casualties would be returned by LCVPs, DUKWs and ferries, which were soon placed in operation.

Because of the difficulty of maintaining continuous wire communications -- the communications problem was to be tremendous for several days because of the great volume of vehicular traffic and the intense artillery fire -- it was arranged that four radio stations, operated by personnel of the 14 Cav Go, would be established: one at the Corps CP; one at the bridge; one at the CP 9 Inf Div; and one at the CP 9 Armd Div. These stations were separate from the normal Signal Corps plan. The Corps Signal Officer requested submarine cable from First U S Army, but was informed that none was available. Consequently wire was run across the bridge but it was impossible to keep it in operation continuously. Radio link was employed but because of security considerations was not so effective as wire would have been. Another attempted solution to the communication problem was the use of many liaison officers -- Corps sent officers to the divisions, and the 9 Armd Div was directed on the 10th to employ as many as might be required to maintain a continuous flow of information from the bridgehead to Corps.

Because of poor weather conditions -- the day was cold with rain and low overcast -- fighter bombers were grounded and were unable to furnish cover protection for the bridge. Medium bombers flew in support of Corps, however, and the enemy attempted ten raids over the bridge with ten aircraft, eight of which were Stukas. By afternoon, however, the 482 AAA AW Bn (SP) had three batteries at the bridge site, with three platoons on the east and three platoons on the west bank of the river. The 413 AAA Gun Bn (90mm) went into positions on the west bank, and of the ten attacking aircraft eight were shot down. It was anticipated that two additional

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battalions would be moved into position on the 9th.

Because of the air attacks and the artillery fire which was certain to come, the engineers at the bridge site requested that smoke be employed, and requests were again made of First U S Army for a smoke generator unit. Because none was available at this time, however, smoke pots were gathered from all available sources. The 9 Armd Gp was ordered to furnish CDLs (searchlights mounted on tanks) to assist in protecting the bridge against floating mines, swimmers, river boats, etc., and depth charges were dropped into the river nightly, at five minute intervals, to discourage swimmers bent on demolishing the bridge.

On the Corps right, the exposed flank and the presence of enemy on the west bank of the RHINE, upstream from the bridge, was a source of concern. Consequently, it was requested of First U S Army at about 1945A that the 2 Inf Div, then moving east to the RHINE, be given the mission of relieving CCA, 9 Armd Div, and assuming responsibility for the bridgeheads over the AHR at AHRWEILER, BAD NEUENAHN, HELMERSHEIM and SINZIG. The request was approved, and Corps was informed that the 2 Inf Div was moving with all possible speed, that it planned to cross the AHR at approximately 0700A, 9 March, that it would then push to the RHINE, and take over the aforementioned bridgeheads. This not only would secure the west bank of the RHINE on the Corps' south, but would also free elements of CCA for employment in the bridgehead. It was planned that elements of the 310 Inf attached CCA would move across the river as soon as possible after being relieved.

During this day a number of attachments were made. At 0915A information was received that Co C, 738 Tk Bn, and the 2 Plat, Btry C, 226 AAA SL Bn would become attached III Corps upon arrival in the Corps zone. Corps in turn planned to reattach these units to 9 Armd Gp, to assist in accomplishing its mission of protecting the bridge from river borne objects. The 987 FA Bn was attached 408 FA Gp, and the 193 FA Bn (25 Pdr) and 965 FA Bn (155 How) were attached 401 FA Gp; effective 1800A the 32 FA Brig, consisting of the 79 FA Gp, 551 FA Bn (240 How), 268 FA Bn (8" gun) and 552 FA Bn (240 How) were attached III Corps.

By the end of the day the forces in the Corps bridgehead consisted of the 27 Armd Inf Bn, the 52 Armd Inf Bn, RCT 47 (- Arty), RCT 311 (- Arty); 1 Bn, 310 Inf; C Tr, 89 Cav Rcn Sq; C Co, 656 TD Bn; and one and one half batteries, 482 AAA AW Bn. RCT 309 (- Arty) and the 1 Bn, 60 Inf, were enroute.

Operations Directive No. 10 was published, confirming fragmentary orders already issued. It established tentative divisional boundaries in the bridgehead and established three objectives, known as lines "Red," "White," and "Blue." (Annex No. 2e, Map: Situation as of 10 March shows boundaries and objectives) The seizure of line "Red" was to prevent small arms fire from being delivered on the bridge area; when line "White" had been reached observed artillery fire would be eliminated; and the seizure of line "Blue" would prevent ordinary artillery fire from being delivered on the bridge sites.

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9 March:

On the third day of the Corps bridgehead enemy opposition east of the RHINE stiffened considerably, as elements of the 11 Panzer Div were contacted on the Corps front. Although the 311 Inf made good progress to the north, where it made gains of from two to three thousand yards, strong resistance was met in the south and center of the bridgehead, and the enemy attacked with infantry, tanks and aircraft. Fire of all types was received and heavy artillery fire landed in the vicinity of the bridge. During the early afternoon a direct hit on an ammunition truck which was crossing the bridge caused considerable damage, placing the bridge out of operation for several hours, and it was reported that the average rate of enemy artillery fire throughout the Corps zone for the day was twenty rounds of light, and six to ten rounds of medium, per hour.

On the west of the RHINE all organized resistance ceased, and at 1125A the 7 Armd Div was able to report that its zone had been cleared of the enemy from boundary to boundary and to the river. Relief of RCT 60 was completed early in the afternoon and at 1300A that RCT was relieved of attachment 7 Armd Div. The RCT (- 1 Bn, which had crossed to the east of the RHINE the preceding day) crossed into the bridgehead area, closing there during the early morning hours of the 10th. RCT 39 having captured BAD GODESBERG, was relieved by elements of the 7 Armd Div by 1800A, and prepared to move into the bridgehead on the following day. The 7 Armd Div was directed to outpost islands in the RHINE RIVER at WF627270 and WF632270 and prevent movement of enemy upstream toward bridge sites.

Of the 78 Inf Div, all but the 309 Inf and elements of the 310 Inf attached to CCA, 9 Armd Div, had crossed the RHINE on 7 and 8 March. RCT 309 (- Arty), having begun its movement across the river on the 8th, closed in the bridgehead late in the afternoon and at approximately 0930A elements of the 2 Inf Div were moving into position to relieve the 310 Inf (-) in the AHR RIVER bridgeheads. That relief was completed at approximately 1600A. By 0400A on the 10th, the 310 Inf had crossed completely, and the only elements of the 78 Inf Div remaining west of the RHINE at that time were the division artillery and spare parts. Co B, 90 Cml Bn, attached III Corps effective 10 March, was in turn attached 78 Inf Div, as was the 76 FA Bn (25 Pdr).


During the morning the CP, 9 Inf Div, opened at ERPEL, and in accordance with CG III Corps instructions of the day before, all units in the bridgehead became attached to the 9 Inf Div. The CG 9 Inf Div was directed that elements of the 78 Inf Div currently attached 9 Inf Div would revert to control of CG 78 Inf Div at a time and place agreed upon by the two division commanders, and that the CG 78 Inf Div would assume control of the north sector of the bridgehead. The CG 9 Inf Div was instructed early in the morning to continue the attack to seize line "White."

At 1015A the 99 Inf Div became attached III Corps, and during the late afternoon the division began to move into an assembly area in the vicinity of STADT MECKENHEIM. By midnight RCTs 394 and 393 had closed into the area, and RCT 395 was enroute. Co A, 90 Cml Bn, was attached

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
Enemy air came close to destroying the Remagen Bridge, but failed to stop the flow of traffic into the bridgehead



Soldiers walk to the Remagen Bridge post the smoking ruins of American trucks caught by enemy shellfire



This near miss on the railroad bridge was scored on 10 March



The trestway bridge was almost completed when enemy artillery knocked out several pontoons

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to the division, and instructions were issued directing (1) that the division (- Arty) (535 AAA AW Bn (SP), 629 TD Bn (SP) and 786 Tk Bn atchd) would cross the RHINE commencing at 2030A on the 10th; (2) that the division would pass through elements of CCB, 9 Armd Div, and attack to the south; and (3) that one infantry regiment (minus one battalion) was not to be committed except on Corps order. This regiment (the 395) was to move to an assembly area within one hour's marching distance of the bridge site, and was to close there by evening of 11 March.

The 9 Armd Div, which had been holding its bridgehead across the AHR RIVER, was directed (1) to be prepared to move east of the RHINE on Corps order; (2) to continue to protect bridges over the AHR RIVER; and (3) to maintain contact with the 2 Inf Div (V Corps) on the Corps south flank.

The Corps Engineer was directed to assume control of all engineer activity at the bridge site, thus relieving division engineers of that responsibility, and the Corps Engineer from that day until completion of all bridging operations remained in his CP at the bridge. At the time two ferries were already in operation; and a third was nearing completion. Construction had been started at 091030A on a treadway bridge at wF64,8202, which was scheduled to be completed during the morning of the following day; and it was planned that a heavy ponton bridge would be built upstream at wF62,4186. A Contact boom, a log boom and a net boom, designed to protect the bridge from water borne objects, were under construction upstream from the bridge.

Wire communications continued to be a problem because of the great volume of artillery fire falling on the bridge, and again reliance had to be placed on radio and liaison officers. On this day a German officer was found operating a radio in REMAGEN, and it was believed that enemy agents in the town were directing artillery fire.

The enemy continued his air attacks on the bridge, making a total of eleven raids in which seventeen aircraft participated. Of these, twelve were destroyed and one damaged.

Early in the day the 16 AAA Gp was directed to employ all AAA units for protection of the bridge, and consequently the AAA defense of the bridge site was strengthened by the arrival of two additional AAA Bns. The 109 AAA Gun Bn became operational on the west bank of the RHINE and the 634 AAA AW Bn (- Btry D) crossed and went into position on the east bank.

The 965 FA Bn was relieved from attachment 1 Inf Div and reverted to Corps control, and the 193 FA Bn (25 Pdr) was relieved from attachment III Corps. The 14 Cav Gp, still operating with the 1 Inf Div (VII Corps), lost the 817 TD Bn (T), which was attached III Corps Arty effective 10 March.

Operations Directive No. 11 (Ref FO 5) was published. It confirmed fragmentary orders previously issued.

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The Corps CP opened at RHEINBACH at 1200A.

At the close of the day the forces in the bridgehead had been strengthened by the arrival of RCT 309 (- Arty), the remainder of RCT 310 (- Arty), RCT 60 (- Arty) and additional AAA protection. The TD defense of the bridgehead had been bolstered by the TDs accompanying the regimental combat teams, as had the tank forces, and the pending movement of the 99 Inf Div and RCT 39 across the river meant that three full divisions plus one combat command would soon be operating in the bridgehead.

In the employment of troops in the bridgehead an effort had been made to commit troops in such a manner that the assumption of command by the parent division would be facilitated. This had not been altogether possible, however, inasmuch as the tactical situation and the needs of moment dictated the requirements. Consequently it was to be several days before units could be returned to their respective commands.

Although no artillery -- or at best an occasional battery -- had as yet moved east of the RHINE, the artillery of the divisions, as well as Corps Arty, supported the operation from positions on the west side. It was to be several days before movement of artillery to the east became necessary.

The day was cold, with visibility restricted by a low overcast which continued throughout the day. No fighter bombers flew in support of Corps, but medium bombers flew several missions.

*10 March:

Corps continued to expand its bridgehead as the enemy continued his stubborn defense. Very heavy resistance was encountered in the area northeast of BRUCHHAUSEN (WF6522), and in the entire zone strong points, which delayed the advance, were encountered. Fire from small arms, self-propelled weapons, mortar and artillery was received.

In the north, the 311 Inf cleared HONNEF (WF6427), and advanced from five hundred to one thousand yards to the northeast. The 309 Inf in the northeast portion of the Corps zone advanced some two thousand yards to the east, after repulsing one counterattack, and in the center sector the 47 Inf received sharp counterattacks which forced a slight withdrawal. The regiment, assisted by the 2 Bn, 310 Inf, repulsed these counterattacks, however, and during the afternoon the 3 Bn, 310 Inf, followed by the 52 Armd Inf Bn (atcd 310 Inf), attacked through the 47 Inf and advanced up to one thousand yards, capturing DATTENBERG (WF7817). The 60 Inf, in the southeast, attacked and gained about 1500 yards, while CCB, 9 Armd Div (1 Bn 310 Inf, 27 Armd Inf Bn) plus elements of the 60 Inf, attacked south and reached a point about 700 yards south of LINZ (WF6718).

* See Annex No. 2e, Map: Situation as of 102400A March

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The last elements of RCT 310 (- Arty) closed in the bridgehead area at about 0400A, and at 0830A the CP of the 78 Inf Div opened at ERPEL, where the CG 78 Inf Div prepared to assume control of the northern portion of the Corps zone. During this day, however, the 309, 310 and 311 RCTs remained attached to 9 Inf Div.

The movement of the 9 Inf Div across the river was completed at 1815A, when RCT 39 (- Arty) closed in the bridgehead. Movement from the zone of the 7 Armd Div was begun at about 0700A, and the RCT upon crossing, went into an assembly area vicinity of BRUCHHAUSEN (wF6522). The CG, 9 Inf Div requested that he be relieved of responsibility for security of the railroad bridge and bridging operations at REMAGEN, and consequently the 14 Cav Gp was directed to assume that responsibility. The 14 Cav Gp (- 32 Cav Rcn Sq) had been relieved by 1 Inf Div early in the morning, and the 32 Cav Rcn Sq was to be relieved by 2200A. Instructions were issued directing the group to move to an assembly area vicinity STADT MECKENHEIM (wF4925) - ARZDORF (wF5423) - RINGEN (wF5419) - GELSDORF (wF5021) on the 11th.

The 99 Inf Div closed in its assembly area west of the river early in the morning, and at 1530A one regimental combat team was directed by Corps to move into the bridgehead. RCT 394 began to cross the RHINE during the night, and at about 2100A Corps directed that the remaining two regimental combat teams plan to arrive at the bridge on the following morning. The 99 Inf Div planned to establish an advance CP east of the river, in anticipation of the arrival of the division, in order to prepare to assume responsibility for its zone. Corps directed that the 99 Inf Div plan to take over in the southern sector of the bridgehead.

Both the railroad bridge and the treadway bridge received continuous attention from the enemy, whose artillery and air activity increased markedly. Work on the treadway bridge was interrupted several times, and artillery hits and punctured pontoons caused by bombing and strafing made frequent repair necessary. Although construction was completed by 2300A, it was the following morning before the treadway was opened to traffic. The railroad bridge, having been closed to traffic during the night 9 March because of artillery hits, was opened at about 092300A only to be closed at 2400, and its use became extremely hazardous during the 10th when artillery fire during the night and morning was falling at an estimated rate of two

The TREADWAY BRIDGE, BEGUN AT 091030A AND COMPLETED AT 102300A, MEASURED 1032 FEET - ONE OF THE LONGEST TACTICAL BRIDGES EVER BUILT. 11,140 MAN HOURS WERE REQUIRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION AND 13 HOURS AND 30 MINUTES WERE LOST BECAUSE OF ENEMY ACTION. THE BRIDGE WAS BUILT BY THE 291 ENGR C BN, WITH EQUIPMENT AND TECHNICAL ADVICE FURNISHED BY THE 998 AND 988 ENGR TWY COMPANIES.

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rounds per minute. Because it was believed that enemy artillery observers equipped with radio were operating from REMAGEN, approximately four thousand civilians were removed from that town on 10 and 11 March.

The traffic load on the bridge was eased somewhat by the construction of a third ferry site and by the operation of the 819 DUKW Co. LCVP Unit No. 1 went into operation, work was begun on the heavy ponton bridge, and the contact boom was nearing completion. The engineers again requested smoke on the bridging operations, but again no smoke generator companies were available, and although it was requested of the supporting air that smoke missions be flown, the weather by this time had closed in over the bases, and planes were unable to leave the ground.

By 1000A three squadrons of fighter bombers had taken to the air, and during the morning P-38s flew continuous cover over the bridge. Poor weather which closed in early in the afternoon, however, prevented air operations for the rest of the day. The enemy, during the day, made twenty one raids, in which he employed twenty eight planes. Of these nine were destroyed and one damaged.

The 563 AAA AW Bn moved to the vicinity of the bridges to make a total of two gun and five automatic weapons battalions protecting these installations, and a message from Hq First U S Army, indicating a possibility of attempted enemy crash landings on the bridge, directed that "at bridge sites minimum fire angle prescribed by SOP First U S Army (is) suspended for all automatic weapons where fire will not hit bridge or other vital installations. Fire will be continued until aircraft (has) definitely crashed."

Another message from First U S Army established the Corps south boundary as the AHR RIVER from AHRWEILER (exclusive) to the RHINE. The 9 Armd Div, however, continued to provide security for the AHR RIVER bridges, and maintained an outpost line along the west bank of the RHINE. The 7 Armd Div likewise patrolled along the western bank of the river in its zone, occupied the western RHINE RIVER island, and its tanks and tank destroyers reconnoitered for indirect firing positions.

Corps Arty, reinforced by V and VII Corps Arty, fired heavy interdiction and counterbattery missions.

At the close of the day two complete infantry divisions were operating in the bridgehead, with a third enroute. The CG 78 Inf Div was prepared to assume control of his zone; the CG 99 Inf Div, upon the completion of the crossing of the 99 Inf Div, would assume responsibility for a zone in the south of the bridgehead; and the remainder of the 9 Armd Div was prepared to move across the river. It was planned that CCB, as its elements were relieved, would become Corps reserve, and it now appeared, unless something unforeseen developed, that the bridgehead was firmly established.

Operations Directive No. 12 (Ref FO 5), confirming fragmentary orders previously issued, was published during the day.

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The DUKW proved to be a versatile vehicle. Although used primarily to haul C1 III and V supplies, these amphibians were also used to haul casualties from the bridgehead, and on one occasion carried raiding parties of the 2 Inf Div (V Corps) to a Rhine River island.


These ferries, operating from three ferry sites, supplemented the bridges by transporting vehicles, tanks and tank destroyers across the river.



A series of booms was constructed above the bridges, to intercept water borne objects. This contact boom has broken loose from its moorings on the far side of the river.

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T H E
TREADWAY BRIDGE
WAS OPENED TO
TRAFFIC DURING
THE MORNING OF
11 MARCH



11 March:

The attack to enlarge the Corps bridgehead progressed slowly against continued stubborn resistance, and few gains were made in the north and central sectors, although the 394 Inf, which had completed crossing early in the morning, attacked to the south through CCB, 9 Armd Div, and gained up to three thousand yards, capturing LEUBSDORF (WF7816) and ARIENDORF (WF6814). Elsewhere in the bridgehead some local objectives were taken and a number of counterattacks, supported by tanks, were repulsed.

RCT 394 (- Arty), the first of the 99 Inf Div units to move into the bridgehead, completed its crossing early in the morning and became attached 9 Inf Div at 0730A. At 0830A the Asst Div CG, 99 Inf Div, opened an advance CP with the CP 9 Inf Div, and by noontime RCT 393 (- Arty) had closed east of the RHINE. RCT 395 (- Arty) moved out during the early morning hours to an assembly area in the vicinity of BODENDORF (WF6317) and at approximately 1230A its 1 Bn had crossed the RHINE, to be followed during the day by the 2 and 3 Bns. The Div CP opened at LINZ (WF6718) and at 1400A the CG 99 Inf Div assumed control of a sector in the south, at which time he assumed command of the 393 and 394 Inf Regts. As the attack of the 393 and 394 progressed to the south and southeast, elements of CCB became relieved in the line and began to assemble, preparatory to becoming Corps reserve. The 27 Armd Inf Bn assembled in the vicinity of UNKEL (WF6322), and the 1 Bn, 310 Inf, was detached CCB and reverted to control 9 Inf Div at 1200A. Co A, 656 TD Bn, was attached to CCB, 9 Armd Div, as was the 6 Armd Inf Bn. RCT 395 (- Arty) was attached 9 Inf Div effective 1200A, to be employed as bridgehead reserve.

The CG 78 Inf Div assumed control of a zone in the northern portion of the bridgehead at 0900A, and at that time assumed command of the 309

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The HEAVY
PONTON BRIDGE,
969 FEET IN LENGTH
AND SECOND TO SPAN
THE RHINE, WAS BEGUN
AT 101630A AND COM-
PLETED AT 112200A.
SEVEN HOURS WERE
LOST WHEN AN LCVP
CRASHED INTO THE
EASTERN HINGE SPAN.
CONSTRUCTION OF
THE BRIDGE REQUIRED
A TOTAL OF 12,600 MAN
HOURS--- PROVIDED
BY THE 51 ENGR C BN,
WITH EQUIPMENT AND
TECHNICAL ADVICE
FURNISHED BY THE
552 AND 181 ENGR
HVY PON BNS.

and 311 Inf Regts, both of which were attacking. The 310 Inf, however, remained attached 9 Inf Div, in whose zone it was heavily engaged. RCT 39 (- Arty) (9 Inf Div), which was operating in the zone of the 78 Inf Div, became attached to the 78 Inf Div, and effective 1100A Co C, 90 Cml Bn, was attached RCT 39. Corps directed that 78 Inf Div units currently operating in the zone of the 9 Inf Div, and 9 Inf Div units operating in the zone of the 78 Inf Div, be relieved and returned to their respective divisions as soon as operational conditions permitted. It was directed that details of relief would be agreed upon by the division commanders concerned. Operations Directive No. 13 (Ref FO 5), which confirmed fragmentary orders already issued, and which established new boundaries, was published. (Boundaries are shown on Annex No. 2f, Map: Situation as of 13 March)

The 60 Armd Inf Bn, which had been attached CCB, 9 Armd Div, remained on a two hour alert on the west side of the river.

The 9 Inf Div, having turned over control of the greater portion of the bridgehead to the CGs 78 and 99 Inf Divs by 1400A, continued its operations with


the 47 and 60 RCTs, plus RCT 310, 78 Inf Div. CCB, 9 Armd Div remained attached, as did RCT 395, but it was planned that on the following day both of these units would be detached and revert to Corps control.

West of the river activity was confined to maintaining observation posts and patrolling. The artillery of both the 9 and 7 Armd Div fired in support of the bridgehead, and the 7 Armd Div occupied the island in the RHINE at WF628270. On the east side, the 78 Inf Div discovered a highway bridge leading to the island at WF632270, and sent patrols to that island, whereupon the 7 Armd Div was relieved of that mission. During the morning the 7 Armd Div was directed to make a thorough search of the southern portion of its zone in an effort to flush out any enemy, civilians or military, who might be operating as espionage agents. The 14 Cav Gp closed in assembly areas.

In the vicinity of the bridging sites the enemy again made desperate attempts to knock out the railroad bridge and prevent operations of the treadway. The treadway was opened to traffic at about 0700A, but because

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THE HEAVY PONTON BRIDGE

of damaged pontoons was able to handle only light traffic initially. Artillery fire was heavy throughout the day, and especially during the night 10-11 March and morning 11 March. At approximately 0515A the railroad bridge was placed in operation after having been temporarily closed because of artillery hits, and although it remained in operation throughout the day the movement of traffic was hazardous because of the heavy interdiction fires received. During the night 11 March an enemy non-commissioned officer with radio was apprehended near the bridge.

The heavy ponton bridge at wf673186 was ready for operation at 1700A, but was damaged by an LCVP which had gotten out of control, and it was 2400A before the bridge was opened. It was planned to divert traffic to the bridge beginning at 120500. The DUKW Co and three ferry sites continued to be employed.

During the period 110600 and 120600 the enemy made seven raids on the bridging sites, with thirteen aircraft. Five of these airplanes were shot down and two damaged. The antiaircraft defenses of the bridges were strengthened this day with the attachment of the 134 AAA Gun Bn to Corps, which became operational on the west of the river, and the arrival of the 376 AAA AW Bn, three batteries of which went into position on the west and one on the east side of the RHINE. On this day, also, in compliance with instructions from First U S Army, the antiaircraft battalions currently attached to the III Corps divisions were placed under operational control of the 16 AAA Gp, and instructions were given them to occupy

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positions from which they could protect the bridge sites. This affected five battalions, one of which was the 376 AAA AW Bn, already arrived. The other four were scheduled to arrive on the following day.

Corps Arty continued to support the attack by delivering heavy interdiction fires east of the RHINE, and by breaking up several counterattacks. Because of poor weather conditions -- the day was cool with intermittent rain -- no tactical reconnaissance was performed, only one blind bombing mission was carried out, and one group of P-38s flew cover over the bridge sites.

12 March:

All three divisions attacked to expand the Corps bridgehead in the face of very aggressive and determined enemy resistance. Opposition was encountered from tanks, infantry, self-propelled guns, and fire of all types, and a number of counterattacks was repulsed. In the north, the 309 Inf was forced to defend in position, and the 311 Inf received two counterattacks. When at 1400A the 1 Bn, 310 Inf, was detached 9 Inf Div and reverted to control of 78 Inf Div, it was attached 311 Inf; and at 2300A the 60 Armd Inf Bn was also attached 311 Inf because of the strong pressure in its zone. The 39 Inf (atcd 78 Inf Div) attacked but made little progress.

In the central sector the 9 Inf Div made slow progress, and although the 60 Inf entered HARGARTEN (WF7120), where heavy fighting took place, the 310 Inf (- 1 Bn), after reaching its objective received a counterattack and was forced to withdraw. The 52 Armd Inf Bn attacked to restore the position.

In the south, however, the 99 Inf Div met lighter opposition initially, and the 394 and 393 Inf Regts advanced up to three thousand yards to the high ground north of HONINGEN (WF6913). At HONINGEN strong resistance, consisting primarily of self-propelled weapons and small arms fire, was encountered, and friendly artillery fire was placed on that town. RCT 395 remained in assembly areas under operational control of the 9 Inf Div until 1800A, at which time it came under Corps control as Corps reserve. The 399 Inf, after receiving a counterattack during the latter part of the day, buttoned up temporarily, but at about 1700 the division was ordered to continue the attack and secure its objective -- the high ground north of the STAIER RIVER.

At 1800A CCB left the 9 Armd Div and came under Corps control and at that time the 60 Armd Inf Bn became attached to it. The 60 Armd Inf Bn, however, upon closing in the bridgehead area at 2300A, was dispatched to the 78 Inf Div where it became attached 311 Inf. CCB received Co A, 656 TD Bn, which was relieved of attachment 9 Inf Div.

On the west side of the RHINE patrolling and operation of observation posts continued in the zone of both the 7 and 9 Armd Divs. The 7 Armd Div Arty, reinforced by fire from the division tanks and attached tank destroy-

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ers, fired in support of the 78 Inf Div, and the 9 Armd Div Arty supported the operations of the 99 Inf Div. Up to this point in the operations division artillery had been able to support the division operations from the west of the river with excellent results, and by remaining west of the river had eased the supply problem across it. On this day, four field artillery battalions, two belonging to the 9 Inf Div, and one each of the 78 Inf Div and 99 Inf Div, crossed the river; and a schedule which contemplated the crossing of six artillery battalions was set up for 13 March.

A marked decrease in enemy artillery activity commenced during the night 11-12 March and continued throughout the entire day. Although it was impossible to determine precisely the cause, Brig Gen P. V. Kane, Corps Arty Commander, expressed the belief that it might have been one or a combination of these factors: (1) the heavy interdiction fires fired by Corps for the past several days and nights had made ammunition supply impossible; (2) the enemy was displacing his artillery to the east; (3) the counterbattery program fired by Corps had caused serious losses to the enemy; or (4) his loss of observation, occasioned by the advance of the 99 Inf Div to the southeast, had made accurate firing impossible.

The antiaircraft protection of the bridge area was strengthened by the arrival of five additional antiaircraft battalions, four of which came from the divisions and one of which, the 110 AAA Gun Bn, arrived in the Corps area at 1330A where it became attached 16 AAA Gp. The 110 Bn occupied positions on the west bank of the river, as did the 639 AAA AW Bn and the 203 AAA AW Bn (one battery). The 552 AAA AW Bn and the 535 AAA AW Bn crossed the river to occupy positions in the bridgehead. At the close of this day, therefore, the antiaircraft defense picture was as follows: sixteen 90mm batteries on the west bank; eleven and one half automatic weapons batteries on the west bank; and thirteen and one half automatic weapons batteries on the east bank. In addition, on the west bank there were two batteries of the 563 AAA AW Bn giving incidental protection to the bridge.

The 134 AAA Gun Bn became attached 11 AAA Gp, which arrived in the Corps area at 1400A, and which was to be placed under operational control of 16 AAA Gp. All units were instructed that antiaircraft personnel only would fire at enemy aircraft in the vicinity of the bridge because of reports that friendly aircraft had been fired on the preceding day.

During the period 120600A to 130600A the enemy greatly stepped up his efforts to destroy the bridges by aerial assault. A total of fifty eight raids were made by ninety one planes, twenty six of which were shot down and eight of which were damaged. During the afternoon the enemy bombed and strafed the 310 Inf.

Because of poor visibility, blind bombing was resorted to, and continuous air cover was flown over the bridge area by P-38s. Lt Col John W. Walton, G-3 Air III Corps, who had on the preceding day visited the CP 9 Inf Div, remained there in order to maintain close personal contact and supervise more closely the Corps air activities. Because of poor communications between the bridgehead and the Corps CP, he found he could operate far more effectively from this location and consequently remained there

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until 13 March, by which time wire communication with the Corps CP had been vastly improved.

The three bridges remained open to traffic throughout the day, and damaged floats in the treadway were replaced. Eight ferries at three ferrying sites, the DUKW company and the LCVP unit continued to operate. The LCVP unit, consisting of sixteen LCVPs and the necessary navy personnel to operate them, were proving extremely valuable, both as work boats and in the ferrying of supplies.

Additional steps were taken to safeguard the bridge when instructions were issued by Corps to insure proper emplacement and coordination of guns and searchlights along the river. The 14 Cav Gp took over the responsibility of guarding the bridge and controlling traffic in the bridging area. The 16 Bn Fusiliers (Belgian) scheduled to arrive in the Corps area on the 13th, were attached 8 TD Gp, which had been charged with the responsibility of guarding rear areas. The 400 Armd FA Bn was attached 9 Inf Div.

Operations Directive No. 14 (Ref FO 5), confirming fragmentary orders already issued, was published.

At 1315A the Corps CP moved from RHEINBACH to BAD NEUENAHNR, in order to be nearer the scene of operations. Although such a move had been contemplated several days before by the CG III Corps, his decision to postpone the move until this date was based primarily on two factors: (1) the congested traffic of the first few days would be aggravated by the movement of the Corps Hq; and (2) the physical presence of the Corps Hq a few miles nearer to the bridge would be of little value, because the wire communications bottleneck was at the bridge itself, and communication to the west of the river did not present a major problem.

*13 March:

Expansion of the Corps bridgehead continued slowly because of stubborn and aggressive enemy resistance which included several infantry counterattacks supported by armor, and because of extremely difficult terrain. In the south-central sector the enemy employed an estimated fifteen tanks, and in the northern area approximately 2100 artillery rounds were received. The steep slopes, heavily forested areas, and restricted road net made advances extremely difficult, and gains were restricted to approximately two kilometers.

The 78 Inf Div's 311 Inf made the day's greatest gains -- approximately two kilometers -- after repulsing a counterattack of battalion strength. The 309 and 39 Inf Regts made some progress, and by dusk the 39 Inf had secured observation into the town of KALENBORN (WF7024). In the center of the Corps zone the 9 Inf Div attacked along its entire front and made small advances. The 60 Inf cleared HARGARTEN and continued to advance toward ST. KATHERINEN (WF7221), but the 310 Inf (- 1 Bn) (52 Armd Inf Bn atchd) met heavy resistance from tanks, mortars and artillery and was unable to take its objective.

*See Annex No. 2f

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The 99 Inf Div moved out early in the morning with the 393 and 394 Inf Regts. Both received counterattacks early in the afternoon, and at 1300A the 2 Bn, 395 Inf, was released from Corps reserve and reverted to control of the division. When at 1715A Corps was informed that the 393 Inf was being held back because of the fear of overextending its lines, Corps directed that the attack be pushed to secure objective. The division was informed that an advance on the part of the 393 would assist the advance of the 60 Inf (on its left), and that should the need arise the remainder of the 395 Inf would be released from Corps reserve and returned to the division. This was done at 1800A, although it was directed that one battalion not be committed except by authority of the Corps Commander.

During the morning, prior to the release of the 395 Inf from Corps reserve, both the 395 Inf and CCB, 9 Ard Div, were directed to prepare counterattack plans for employment in any portion of the Corps zone. Routes and assembly areas were to be reconnoitered, and CCB was further ordered to be prepared for attachment of any infantry through which it might pass. In the morning Corps established coordinated antitank defense in the bridgehead. The CO 8 TD Cp was charged with that task and departed for the bridgehead with the necessary headquarters.

In an effort to further protect the bridge against enemy waterborne attack, the V Corps was informed at 1700A that it was vital to use the utmost vigilance along the river to prevent enemy swimmers, mines, boats or midget submarines from moving downstream. To the zone of the 7 Arm'd Div, where construction of a cable across the river was under way, Corps dispatched technical experts to assist in converting that cable into a torpedo boom. One platoon (four CDLs) Co C, 738 Tk Bn, was attached to the division, and the division was instructed to maintain observation and protection on the river and boom twenty four hours per day. It was directed that automatic weapons and guns of 75mm caliber or over would be employed to cover the division zone of protection, which was established as extending from the horizontal 22 grid line along the RHINE to the Corps north boundary. Similar instructions were given to the 14 Cav Gp, whose zone of responsibility was established as extending from the 22 horizontal grid line along the RHINE to the 16 horizontal grid line. Co C, 38 Tk Bn (less one platoon CDLs), was attached to the group at 1800A.

The two tactical bridges remained in operation throughout the day, but the railroad bridge was closed in order to make permanent repairs necessitated by the damage caused by the initial attempt to blow the bridge, and subsequent damage caused by enemy artillery fire and heavy traffic. The ferry sites, DUKWs, and LCVPs remained in operation, and three heavy ponton battalions were relieved of attachment III Corps over the objection of the Corps Engineer, who requested that Corps be permitted to retain at least one.

At 2300A the 9 Inf Div requested "artificial moonlight" for its operations on the night 14-15 March, and after conferring with the 78 and 99 Inf Divs, who made no objection, Corps arranged to have four

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lights move to control of 9 Inf Div on the following morning.

The enemy again made a desperate bid to knock the Corps bridges out, when he sent ninety nine planes to make forty seven raids between 130600A and 140600A. Twenty six were destroyed and nine damaged. Enemy artillery activity continued light, but Corps artillery, assisted by V and VII Corps Arty, fired heavy counterbattery programs. The 400Armd FA Bn and the 667 FA Bn were relieved of attachment 9 Armd Div, and were attached, respectively, to the 9 Inf and 99 Inf Divs. The 9 Armd Div was directed to reinforce the fires of the 99 InfDiv, and the 7 Armd Div was directed to reinforce the fires of the 78 Inf Div.

The day was cool and clear with good visibility, and six missions were flown in close support of Corps. P-38s again flew continuous cover over the bridge sites.

Operations Directive No. 15 (Ref FO 5), confirming fragmentary orders already issued, was published.

14 March:

The attack to expand the bridgehead continued but progress was again slow because of stubborn enemy resistance and rugged terrain. Although there was no appreciable lessening of resistance, counterattacks were fewer in number and smaller in size than during the past several days; and while resistance in the north was generally light during the first part of the day, opposition became increasingly heavier during the afternoon. The central sector showed a marked decline in small arms fire although artillery and mortar fire was particularly heavy and in the south progress was also slowed by what was described as moderate to heavy artillery fire. One counterattack of about forty to fifty enemy was broken up by friendly artillery fire.


In the zone of the 78 Inf Div the 39 Inf attacked at 0630A with KALENBORN (wF7024) as its objective. It was planned that upon taking this place the regiment would return to control 9 Inf Div, but the objective was not taken and the regiment remained attached to the 78 Inf Div throughout the day. The attack of the 311 and 309 Infs progressed slowly. The 309 Inf reached its objective and was driven off, but resumed the attack to reach its objective again, where hand-to-hand fighting took place. The 2 Bn, 310 Inf, reverted to control of the 78 Inf Div during the day.

In the center, the 9 Inf Div attacked toward NOTSCHEID (wF7122), LORSCHIED (wF7221) and KALENBORN. Although LORSCHIED was entered and some ground was gained toward NOTSCHEID, extremely stiff resistance, which included tank, rocket and automatic weapons fire, prevented extensive gains. The 52 Armd Inf Bn received counterattacks during the night by infantry and approximately ten tanks.

In the south the 99 Inf Div attacked with the 393 Inf which advanced about one thousand yards; and at 1620A Corps released the 2 Bn, 395 Inf, to which it had tied strings the previous day, to division control. That

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AN ENEMY BOMB FALLS ON LINZ

battalion began the relief of elements of the 393 Inf, continued to attack, and at 1700A, the 2 Bn, 393 Inf, passed to Corps reserve. Patrols from the 394 Inf, which was situated on the high ground north of HONINGEN, entered the north edge of that town.

On the west side of the river the 7 Armd and 9 Armd Divs continued their previously assigned missions and the 7 Armd Div completed construction of a double cable across the RHINE. CCB, 9 Armd Div, remained in Corps reserve and the 89 Cav Rcn Sq continued to maintain observation posts on the west bank of the river.

At 0750A the heavy ponton bridge which had been damaged during the night by artillery fire had been repaired, but at that time could carry only about twelve tons. By noontime, however, it had been completely repaired and was returned to normal operation. The railway bridge which was reported to be in poor condition, remained closed for repairs and operation of the LCVPs, DUKWs and ferries continued.

In order to better coordinate the river defense between the III Corps and 2 Div (V Corps) permission was secured from V Corps to have the 14 Cav Gp deal directly with the 2 Inf Div. The 14 Cav Gp was directed to request the 2 Inf Div to emplace tank destroyers considerably upstream, and it was also suggested that telephone communication be established between observation posts maintained by the Cav Gp and the Inf Div. At 1750A the CO 23 Cml SG Bn reported to the Corps CP and

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stated that his two companies now located at SPA would become available to III Corps in a few days. The Battalion Commander was directed to contact the Corps Engineer, to send reconnaissance parties to the REMAGEN area, to move his companies into position, but to take no action regarding smoke until instructions had been received from CG III Corps. Although the Corps Engineer desired the use of smoke both the Antiaircraft Officer and the Corps Arty CG objected to its use because of the interference with observation.

At 2200A information was received that SHAEF was sending a barrage balloon unit to the Corps to afford further protection against attacks by aircraft. The unit was schedule to arrive on the 15th, and it was planned to dispose it for protection of the railroad and treadway bridges. The twenty five balloons and eighty men which comprised the unit were not sufficient to afford protection to all three bridges.

Although enemy artillery activity in the vicinity of the bridge sites was light, he increased his effort to destroy the bridges by air attack and sent a total of ninety eight planes to make fifty seven raids between 140600A and 150600A. The majority of the planes on this day were identified as being ME-262s, jet propelled, and consequently only eight were destroyed and seven damaged. The 413 AAA Gun Bn moved to the east bank of the river and the 11 AAA Gp, operating under control of the 16 AAA Gp, became operational at 0600A. The AAA build up on this day reached its maximum strength -- a total of four gun battalions and nine automatic weapons battalions.

Although visibility was poor for the greater part of the day fighter bombers flew eleven missions in direct support of Corps. STRODT (wF7325), LORSCHIED (wF7221) and ITTENBACH (wF6732) were bombed and strafed with excellent results. P-38s continued to fly bridgehead cover.

Corps Arty continued to support the operations, principally by firing counterbattery programs, assisted by V and VII Corps Arty. Three additional field artillery battalions of division artillery crossed the river.

At approximately 1800A the 16 Bn Fusiliers closed in the Corps area, and became attached 8 TD Gp. The 4 Co, 12 Bn Fusiliers, were relieved of attachment III Corps; the 817 TD Bn (T) was relieved from attachment Corps Arty and attached 8 TD Gp; and the 656 TD Bn (SP) came under operational control of 8 TD Gp at 1200A.

During this day information was received from First U S Army which directed that the 1 Inf Div (VII Corps) cross the RHINE through the III Corps zone commencing on 15 March. It was decided that foot troops would be ferried across the river in LCVPs while other elements of the division would cross on the bridges and ferries. First U S Army further directed that at 1200A on 16 March command of the 78 Inf Div would be transferred to the VII Corps, and at that time a boundary between III and VII Corps would be established in the bridgehead.

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Instructions were issued to the 78 Inf Div directing it to select assembly areas for two combat teams of the 1 Inf Div, which would be occupied on 15 and 16 March.

15 March:

As the Corps attack continued and the 78 and 9 Inf Divs neared the AUTOBAHN, enemy resistance in the central sector continued stubborn, although decreasing somewhat in the north and south. The 78 Inf Div attacked early and its 311 Inf made advances of up to two thousand yards, while the 39 Inf at the close of the day had advanced more than one thousand yards to capture SCHWEIFELD (WF7026), where it received several counterattacks. The 310 Inf by the day's end had advanced to within one mile of the AUTOBAHN, and had observation on that road.

The 9 Inf Div cleared NOTSCHEID and LORSCHIED, although the 60 and 47 Infs encountered strong opposition throughout the day, as the enemy strove bitterly to resist advances to the AUTOBAHN with tanks, self-propelled weapons, automatic weapons and small arms fire. In the zone of the 99 Inf Div, however, he showed signs of weakening, as the division made good gains and reached its objectives. HAHNER (WF7318) and HESSELM (WF7317) were cleared, and advances of more than 1500 yards were made. At 1200A the 2 Bn, 393 Inf, was released by Corps to division control and the 2 Bn, 395 Inf, became Corps reserve. Corps directed that the battalion be motorized and moved to a position from which it could be readily employed.

The 7 Armd Div continued to maintain its defense of the RHINE and its artillery, assisted by the tank battalions and attached tank destroyer battalion, fired in support of the 78 Inf Div. Instructions were received from First U S Army that the 7 Armd Div was not to be employed in the bridgehead. The 9 Armd Div maintained observation posts along the RHINE; its artillery fired in support of the 99 Inf Div; and CCB remained in Corps reserve. The 14 Cav Gp maintained defenses of the bridge, and controlled traffic at Corps crossing sites.

Both tactical bridges remained in operation throughout the day, and repair work was continued on the railway bridge. It was determined that a sag of from six inches to one foot had taken place, and that extensive work would have to be done before the bridge would be ready to be used. The ferries, DUKWs and LCVPs continued to operate.

Enemy air activity over the bridge decreased sharply, as only seven raids by twelve aircraft between 150600A and 160600A were reported. Of the twelve planes, two were destroyed and two damaged. Supporting aircraft flew two missions for Corps, armed reconnaissance was conducted to the Corps front, and P-38s flew continuous cover over the bridge.

During the day RCT 26, 1 Inf Div (VII Corps), completed its crossing, closing in the bridgehead at about 1500A. The RCT moved north, and it was planned that RCT 18 would cross the river on the 16th.

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First U S Army's Letter of Instruction dated 15 March was received, establishing a boundary between VII and III Corps, and designating three objectives: the initial objective; initial bridgehead; and final bridgehead. (These objectives shown in Annex No. 2g, Map: Situation as of 162400A March) Corps was directed to continue the attack to secure the initial bridgehead, but no advance was to be made past that point except on First U S Army order. The boundary between VII and III Corps was to become effective at 161200A, at which time command of the 78 Inf Div (with normal attachments) was to pass to VII Corps. The 76 FA Bn (25 Pdr) was relieved III Corps and attached VII Corps with the 78 Inf Div.

As a result of these instructions, Corps published Operations Directive No. 16 (Ref FO 5), which confirmed fragmentary orders already issued, announced the new boundaries and objectives (shown on Annex No. 1g, Map: Situation as of 162400A) and directed a continuation of the attack to secure the initial objective. It contained instructions concerning the changes in attachment occasioned by First U S Army's Letter of Instructions, and in addition directed: (1) that the 60 Armd Inf Bn would be detached 78 Inf Div effective 161800A and revert to control CCB, 9 Armd Div, in Corps reserve; (2) that Co B, 90 Cml Bn, was relieved of attachment 78 Inf Div and was attached 9 Inf Div; (3) the 170 FA Bn (105 How) was attached 99 Inf Div effective 16 March; and (4) that the 7 Armd and 9 Armd Divs continue their present missions.

*16 March:


Although enemy resistance continued stubborn in the central sector, where he resisted bitterly the Corps advance to cut the AUTOBAHN, lighter resistance in the south permitted the 99 Inf Div's 393 Inf to advance some four thousand yards to the WEID RIVER, while the 394 Inf advanced approximately two thousand yards to the south and entered HONNINGEN, where house-to-house fighting took place during the night. The 395 Inf (- 2 Bn, which remained in Corps reserve) attacked to the east to secure the high ground west of the WEID RIVER, and captured three small towns. At the close of the day, therefore, the 99 Inf Div on its south had reached the initial objective established by Army and at one point had crossed it to secure dominating terrain.

In the zone of the 78 Inf Div the advance to cut the AUTOBAHN continued. At approximately 0200A the CG 78 Inf Div requested the use of two tank platoons, to be employed in his attack to the north in the vicinity of ITTENBACH, and the 9 Armd Div consequently was ordered to send two tank platoons to control 78 Inf Div. The attack was successful and at approximately 1100A the 309 Inf was astride the AUTOBAHN. At 0930A RCT 39 reverted to control of 9 Inf Div, at which time the VII - III Corps boundary became effective. Although the 60 Armd Inf Bn was also to have been returned to command of CCB, 9 Armd Div, its employment during the day prevented, and permission to retain the battalion temporarily was requested by CG 78 Inf Div. Permission was granted by Corps, and the

* See Annex No. 2g, Map: Situation as of 162400A March

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SITUATION AS OF 16 MARCH

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BEFORE THEY TURNED TO "WATCH THE BIRDIE," THESE CIVILIANS WERE TRYING TO SALVAGE THEIR BELONGINGS FROM THE WRECKAGE OF RHEINBROHL.

20 March:

The front of the Corps zone was comparatively quiet as the 9 Inf Div closed on its objective early in the day, after meeting opposition from artillery and mortar fire which fell in moderate amounts. JOHANNESBERG (WF7427) and HUNGSBERG (WF7427) were cleared, and during the latter part of the day the division confined its activities to patrolling to the river. The 99 Inf Div attacked with the 394 Inf (18 Cav Rcn Sq attached), and advanced against light opposition to seize the high ground east and south of ROCKENFELD, and east and southeast of HAMMERSTEIN. These attacks completed the accomplishment of the Corps mission to seize the "initial bridgehead" as established by First U S Army.

A new assignment for Corps was in the making, however, and this new assignment was outlined at 1500A by the CG III Corps when, upon his return from a conference at Hq First U S Army, he held a conference with his staff officers, division and unit commanders. He informed the group that shortly after 24 March (at which time the Twenty First Army Group was scheduled to cross the RHINE) the First U S Army would launch an attack to the southeast, with the mission of driving east between the SIEG RIVER on the north and the LAHN RIVER on the south to capture the road center at LIMBURG (WM2398) and the high ground generally to its north. Upon completion of this phase, First U S Army was to be prepared

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to attack northeast in the direction of KASSEL (rc2003). First U S Army planned to attack with the VII Corps on the left (north), the III Corps in the center, and the V Corps on the right (south).

The III Corps, consisting of the 9 Inf Div, 99 Inf Div, and 7 Armd Div (the 9 Armd Div was to pass to V Corps) was to launch a coordinated attack with the mission of seizing LIMBURG and the high ground extending generally north thereof to NEUNKIRCHEN (wg2616), and upon completion of this mission Corps was to be prepared to resume the attack to the northeast in the direction of GIESSEN - KASSEL on Army order.

On 21 March elements of the V Corps were to begin the relief of the 99 Inf Div and 18 Cav Rcn Sq (atchd). Those elements of the 9 Armd Div which were at present east of the RHINE were to move south, and the 2 Inf Div was to cross the RHINE using III Corps bridges. The V Corps was scheduled to begin construction of a bridge on 21 March. It was announced that III Corps Arty was at present moving to the east of the river, and that some First U S Army Arty currently attached III Corps was to return to First U S Army this day.

These new instructions occasioned a number of problems concerning the reliefs to be effected, and the boundaries to be established. After discussion in which all concerned commanders and staff officers participated, Operations Directive No. 20 (Ref FO 5) (confirming fragmentary orders) was published. It established new III - V Corps and III - VII Corps boundaries, to become effective on Corps order; it established a new 9 Inf Div - 99 Inf Div boundary to become effective at 202400A (boundaries are shown on Annex No. 2h, Map: Situation as of 212400A March); it directed that certain limited objective attacks be made; and it ordered preparation of positions for all around defense, with aggressive patrolling.

The 99 Inf Div was ordered to take the high ground generally in the vicinity of KURTSCHIED (wf8115) - BREITSCHIED (wf7920), and the 9 Inf Div was directed to attack in coordination with the attack of the 99 Inf Div, to seize the high ground in the vicinity of AMMERICH (wf7822). It was felt that the ground thus taken would place the Corps in a more favorable position from which to launch the coordinated attack on D day and H hour. Both divisions were directed to maintain contact with flank units, and for purposes of the relief it was decided that the 18 Cav Rcn Sq (atchd 99 Inf Div) would pass to temporary control 9 Armd Div effective 211200A. The 170 FA Bn (105 How) was attached 99 Inf Div effective 202400A.

The 7 Armd Div was returned to control III Corps as of 201200, but it was agreed by III and VII Corps that the division would remain in position to perform its present mission until 221800A. The 9 Armd Div was to become attached V Corps as of 21 March, and the III and V Corps agreed that the V Corps would assume the responsibility of guarding AHR RIVER bridges, which had been a responsibility of 9 Armd Div. The 9 Armd Div was relieved of the mission of reinforcing the artillery fires of the 9 Inf Div effective 210800A, and Co C, 656 TD Bn, passed from control 8 TD Gp to control 9 Armd Div effective 202400A.

Co B, 738 Tk Bn, was relieved from attachment III Corps effective

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202400A, as was the 994 Engr Twy Br. Co.

The day was clear with excellent visibility, and three direct support missions were flown by IX TAC. Corps Arty supported the operation with counterbattery and interdiction fires, and five artillery reconnaissance missions were conducted on enemy artillery and personnel.

The enemy made nine raids of one aircraft each. One airplane was destroyed by antiaircraft fire.

At 1800A the Bailey bridge at wF644203 was completed and opened for operation.

*21 March:

Activity this day was concerned almost exclusively with the reliefs directed on the preceding day, although during the morning the 394 Inf, 99 Inf Div, received one small counterattack which was quickly repulsed. Otherwise the enemy confined his efforts to intermittent artillery fire and several bombing and strafing attacks. Of eighteen raiding planes - each attacking singly - five were destroyed and four damaged.

Elements of CCB, 9 Armd Div, moved south according to plan and relieved the 394 Inf, the operation being completed by 1700A. RCT 38 (2 Inf Div, V Corps) crossed to the east of the RHINE to complete relief of elements of the 393 Inf by 2100A, and at 1200A the 18 Cav Rcn Sq came under operational control of the 9 Armd Div. The squadron was directed to move to assembly area vicinity DATTENBERG (wF7017) upon relief by 9 Armd Div, where it would revert to control 14 Cav Gp.

At 1300A Corps consented to a temporary change in boundary which had been agreed to by the CGs 9 Inf Div and 99 Inf Div. The new boundary gave to the 9 Inf Div the high ground in the vicinity of and south of WEISSENFELS (wF7620), which was encompassed on the west and south by a bend in the WEID RIVER, thus making the WEID the right (north) boundary of the 99 Inf Div and the left (south) boundary of the 9 Inf Div. The boundary change gave to the 9 Inf Div the high ground in the vicinity of BREITSCHEID (wF7920), which was bounded on the west and north by a crook in the MAAS RIVER, thus making that river, for a short length, the boundary between the two divisions. (The boundary is shown in Annex No. 2h, Map: Situation as of 21 March)

During the early afternoon First U S Army's Letter of Instructions dated 20 March was received at Corps Hq. It confirmed the information and instructions which the CG III Corps had given on the preceding day, but the boundary which it established between III and V Corps was at variance with the one agreed upon by the CGs III and V Corps. The tentative boundary which had been agreed to the day before and which had appeared

* See Annex No. 2h, Map: Situation as of 212400A March

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on III Corps Operations Directive No. 20 (Ref FO 5), ran from HONNINGEN to the road junction (WF746155), with the road inclusive to V Corps. Army's boundary, roughly, cut off the triangle road junction (WF746155) - HONNINGEN - DATTENBURG and gave it to V Corps. Because III Corps already had troops in that area it was requested of V Corps that the boundary first agreed upon be allowed to remain. V Corps, however, preferred the boundary established by First U S Army, but gave III Corps permission to continue to use the area in question. The boundary became effective at 212400A.

In telephone conversations with VII Corps, it was decided that the boundary between III and VII Corps would not go into effect until conference between the two commanders concerned had ironed out some minor points that had not been clarified by the First U S Army letter. (After adjustment of this boundary, it was placed into effect 222400A March.)

At 1900A a TWX from First U S Army relieved the following units from attachment III Corps, effective 212400A: 9 Armd Div, 482 AAA AW Bn, 656 TD Bn, 3458 QM Trk Co, and 3600 QM Trk Co.

The day was again clear with excellent visibility. Continuous armed reconnaissance was flown throughout the day, and two large tank concentrations were attacked with good results. Corps Arty fired counterbattery and interdiction missions, and targets of opportunity were taken under fire with maximum use of aircraft observers. All Corps Arty units completed displacement to positions east of the RHINE RIVER.

At 1924A, when the TAC CP opened in LINZ (WF6818), III Corps became the first American Corps Hq in history to be established east of the RHINE. It was planned by the CG III Corps that prior to the attack on H hour and D day all combat elements of Corps, as well as ASPs, would be moved east of the river.

22 March:

The date of the coordinated attack having been set for the morning of 25 March, the 9 Inf Div and 99 Inf Div were directed to make the limited objective attack, as directed in Operations Directive No. 20, on the night 22-23 March. The two divisions jumped off at 2200A and 2400A respectively, crossed the WEID RIVER against little opposition, and by midnight the 9 Inf Div had advanced approximately five hundred yards.

Otherwise the Corps front was inactive during the day, as elements of the Corps regrouped and prepared for the 25 March operation. The 18 Cav Rcn Sq was relieved and released from operational control 9 Armd Div at 1400A, and moved to an assembly area north of HONNINGEN, where it was returned to control 14 Cav Gp. At 1500A the 14 Cav Gp was relieved of the responsibility of guarding the RHINE RIVER bridges and controlling traffic in the REMAGEN area, but was to remain in position until relieved. The 8 TD Gp assumed those responsibilities, and at that time Co C, 738 Tk Bn passed from control 14 Cav Gp to the 8 TD Gp.

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The 7 Armd Div, in compliance with instructions issued by Corps during the day, reconnoitered for assembly positions east of the RHINE, and was directed to be prepared to move east of the RHINE during the nights 23-24 and 24-25 March.

During the evening, after CG III Corps had consulted with CG 9 Inf Div, it was agreed by CGs III and VII Corps that the new VII - III Corps boundary would become effective at 2400A. Corps announced the supply plan for the pending operation, in which it was stated that those supply installations not already east of the RHINE would be moved across as soon as operating areas became available. It was planned to request of First U S Army that the Corps rear boundary be moved to the east of the RHINE effective approximately 26-27 March, thus relieving Corps of the responsibility of bridge operations, maintenance, and traffic control west of the river.

Operations Directive No. 21 (Ref FO 5), confirming fragmentary orders already issued, was published.

The day was again clear with excellent visibility. The enemy made two raids of one plane each, one of which was damaged. Six missions, in which six towns were bombed, were flown in direct support of Corps. Corps Arty supported the night attacks by neutralizing towns with heavy artillery fire and by firing an extensive counterbattery program.

23 March:

That the attack launched during the night 22-23 March had caught the enemy by surprise was evidenced by the very light and disorganized resistance encountered initially and by the rapid progress of the attack. Before the end of the day the 60 Inf, 9 Inf Div, and the 393 and 395 Infs, 99 Inf Div, had advanced from four to five thousand yards to seize their objectives and capture a number of towns, the easternmost of which were GERHARDSHAN (wF7722), FERNTAHL (wF7922), BREITSCHIED (wF7920), HOCHSCHEID (sf7918), GOLDSCHIED (wF8017) and HURTSCHIED (wF8015). Although resistance stiffened somewhat during the afternoon, and although small groups sometimes defended tenaciously from high ground and towns, the operation was concluded rapidly and at little cost.

By 1100A the 8 TD Gp had completely taken over protection of the RHINE RIVER bridges and traffic control in the REMAGEN area, and the 14 Cav Gp was assigned an assembly position in the general area LUEDSDORF - RJ (wF745145) - HONNINGEN. The CO 14 Cav Gp prepared to move the group (- 18 Cav Rcn Sq) east of the RHINE, as did the CG 7 Armd Div. CCA of the 7 Armd Div, and the 7 Armd Div Arty began to cross the river during the night, and the 32 Cav Rcn Sq closed in its assembly area at 1940A.

Clear weather and excellent visibility permitted the fighter bombers of the IX TAC to fly in direct support of Corps, but the enemy sent only one plane over the Corps area. Corps Arty continued to fire counterbattery, neutralization and interdiction missions.

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Field Order No. 6, which announced the plan for the forthcoming operation, was published. It announced LIMBURG (WM2398) and the high ground extending generally north thereof to NEUNKIRCHEN (WG2616) as the Corps objective; it further announced that elements crossing the LAHN RIVER in the vicinity of LIMBURG would be withdrawn north of the river as Third U S Army assumed responsibility for the area south of the river; it directed an attack with two infantry divisions abreast, the 9 Inf Div on the left, making its main effort on the south, and the 99 Inf Div on the right, making its main effort on the north. The 7 Armd Div was to be initially in Corps reserve, prepared for early commitment generally along the axis of the AUTOBAHN, and both infantry divisions were directed to be prepared to pass elements of the 7 Armd Div through their respective zones on Corps order. Both infantry divisions were further directed to be prepared to motorize one combat team, to be used in conjunction with the 7 Armd Div, to exploit enemy weakness. The 7 Armd Div Arty was instructed to reinforce the fires of the 9 Inf Div initially, and then fire in general support of the Corps.

The order directed that the 14 Cav Gp be prepared for employment on the Corps right (south); that the 8 TD Gp continue its present missions; that the 16 AAA Gp give priority to protection of RHINE RIVER bridges until relieved by First U S Army, and that it (16 AAA Gp) provide protection for Corps Arty with one AAA AW Bn. Fighter bombers of IX TAC were to fly close cooperation missions, planned missions, and armed reconnaissance over the Corps tactical area. Paragraph 3x, in addition to instructions concerning air security and air identification panels, emphasized the importance of aggressive action and rapid advance, in order that surprise might be achieved and an early breakthrough effected for immediate exploitation by the 7 Armd Div. Paragraph 3x also directed that as towns were captured a burgomeister would be appointed at once, and that civilians would not only be kept off main roads but would be used for road maintenance.

The Corps Arty was organized as follows: the 205 FA Gp in general support; the 390 FA Obsn Bn in general support; the 211 FA Gp, consisting of the 240 FA Bn and the 523 FA Bn (both 155 Gun) in general support; the 401 FA Gp, consisting of the 809 FA Bn (155 How), 965 FA Bn (155 How), and 1001 FA Bn (8" How), in general support; the 408 FA Gp, consisting of the 259 FA Bn (4.5" Gun), 742 FA Bn (8" How), and the 987 FA Bn (-) (155 Gun, SP) in general support.

The Corps axis of signal communication was established as LINZ (WF6819) - WILBROTH (WF8519) - SELTERS (WG0114). Normal radio operation was ordered, excepting for those elements of the 7 Armd Div and 32 Cav Rcn Sq east of the RHINE, who were ordered to maintain radio silence until committed.

24 March:

Activity on the Corps front was light during the morning although in the zone of the 9 Inf Div patrols entered BORSCHIED (WF8022) and finding it lightly defended entered and captured the town. Elsewhere the divisions consolidated their positions, regrouped and planned for the pending attack. CCA, 7 Armd Div, closed in its assembly area east of the RHINE

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at 0115A and the 7 Armd Div Arty closed at 0630A. At 1200A the 7 Armd Div was directed to reconnoiter routes from assembly area through RHENS and FARNTHAF, and through WALDBREITBACH and KURTSCHIED.

At 1400A the CG III Corps held a conference which was attended by staff officers and by division and unit commanders. At this conference the CG III Corps pointed out that because the road net in the southern portion of the Corps zone was very poor it might become necessary for the 99 Inf Div to push to the northeast in order to secure better roads. In discussing the road net he pointed out that the Corps main effort would be made approximately in the center of the Corps sector, where the road net parallel to the AUTOBAHN is developed to a better degree, and he expressed the hope that the two infantry divisions would move fast enough to permit early employment of the 7 Armd Div. The CG III Corps discussed occasional instances of overcautiousness and emphasized the need for pushing the attack. He stated that if the attack were to "button up" the enemy would withdraw and he insisted that troops keep fighting throughout the night of D day to prevent an orderly withdrawal. He stated his intention of committing the 7 Armd Div during the night if need be, to take advantage of the brilliant moonlight. He informed the group that the CG First U S Army had been given permission to pursue and destroy the enemy wherever he found him, but that it was not the purpose of First U S Army to go south and take FRANKFORT since Third U S Army would have that well under control.

The CG 9 Inf Div stated that the division attack would jump off at 0630A but that during the night before D day the 39 Inf would make a limited objective attack to the northeast and then get pinched out. It was planned that the 9 Inf Div would try to secure the high ground overlooking the area of advance of the 99 Inf Div.

The CG 99 Inf Div announced that the attacking elements of the 99 Inf Div would be moved up during the night preceding D day in order that they might jump off and be on their objective by daylight. He further stated that although there was no road across the FOCKEN RIVER in the 395 Inf sector, arrangements had been made with the 9 Inf Div for movement across the river.

The CG 7 Armd Div announced that when the time came to commit the 7 Armd Div he would attack with two combat commands abreast, one combat command (CCA) in one column and the other combat command (CCR) to the north, in two columns. It was anticipated that resistance would be bypassed.

At 1830A the divisions were informed that D day would be 25 March and that H hour would be at the discretion of the division commanders. At 1910A the 7 Armd Div was instructed that its plan with reference to the attack should include the following provisions: (1) seizing communications centers LIMBURG (wM2398) - OBERTIEFENBACH (wG2706) - HECKHOLZHAUSEN (wG3010) - crossroad wG2814 - NEUNKIRCHEN (wG2616) - LONGENDERNBACH (wG2215); (2) seizing and clearing LAHN RIVER bridges from LIMBURG inclusive to STOCKHAUSEN (wG4116); (3) continuation of the advance northeast in the direction GEISSEN (wGo721) - KASSEL (rC2203). At 1910A the CO 14 Cav Gp was directed that his plan for the forthcoming attack

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should include the following provisions: (1) a rapid advance on the right (south) of the 7 Armd Div, bypassing enemy opposition, seizing and clearing crossings over the LAHN RIVER from DEIZ (wM1997) - OBERNHOF (wM0891); (2) the protection of the Corps right flank; and (3) reconnaissance of the southeast from LIMBURG to DAUBORN (wM3192) - road DAUBORN - KALTENHOLZHAUSEN (wM0786) - NASSAU (wM0590). At 2025A the CO 8 TD Gp was instructed that he was to plan for attachment of one company of the 817 TD Bn to the 14 Cav Gp.

In accordance with the plans outlined during the conference of 1400A, elements of the 9 Inf Div attacked at 2200A, and by midnight had advanced up to two thousand yards, clearing the towns of NDR ETCHEID (wF7525) and OBR ETCHEID (wF7626). The 99 Inf Div attacked at 2000A to an objective in the vicinity of HUMMERICH and by midnight had advanced some five hundred yards. Resistance was reported as being light. The remainder of the 7 Armd Div began its movement to the east of the RHINE shortly after darkness.

Corps Arty supported the attack by counterbattery, neutralization and interdiction missions. The day was clear with excellent visibility and fighter bombers of the IX TAC flew one mission in support of Corps. The enemy made two raids of one plane each but no damage was done.

The CP, III Corps Main closed BAD NEUENAUH at 1200A, and joined the CP III Corps TAC at LINZ (wF6818).

25 March:

The enemy offered light to moderate resistance to the Corps attack which had begun the previous night, and although he defended stubbornly during the morning with small groups fighting from towns and key terrain, steady pressure forced him to withdraw, and a number of strongpoints were overrun. By the end of the day gains of from three to four miles had been made, and positions from which the 7 Armd Div could launch its attack had been secured.

In the zone of the 9 Inf Div the 39 Inf attacked, and was pinched out by the 47 Inf as planned. The 47 Inf advanced up to four miles, captured ALTENBURG (wF8026), and reached the high ground north of PETERSLAHR (wF8223). The 60 Inf, in the south of the division zone, also advanced about four miles and seized the high ground north of WILLROTH (wF8518), as well as objectives to the northwest of that place.

The 99 Inf Div also made good progress, and the 395 and 393 Infs advanced approximately three miles along the division front to seize OBR RADEN (wF8616), and NDR RADEN (wF8616), both on the AU RIVER. The seizure of these objectives by the two infantry divisions had carried the Corps through the greater part of the mountainous terrain which had presented the major obstacle to the employment of armor, and had made available the comparatively good road net paralleling the AUTOBAHN, which existed in the southern portion of the 9 Inf Div zone. During the late morning, therefore, as it became apparent that the infantry divisions

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would reach their objective this day, the 7 Armd Div was ordered to displace to forward assembly areas east of the WEID RIVER in the zone of the 99 Inf Div, and to attack at 260400A through the zones of the 99 and 9 Inf Divs in accordance with the instructions of Field Order No. 6. The 7 Armd Div was directed to advance rapidly by bypassing enemy opposition, and effective 1200A the 300 Engr C Bn (plus attachment), the 400 Armd FA Bn, and the 987 FA Bn (155 Gun) (SP) became attached 7 Armd Div.

Both infantry divisions were directed to continue the attack vigorously during the night 25-26 March to secure a breakthrough for the 7 Armd Div; both were directed to advance rapidly in zone, mopping up all enemy resistance bypassed by the 7 Armd Div; and both were directed to be prepared to relieve elements of the 7 Armd Div in their zones on the Corps objective, on Corps order.

The 99 Inf Div was also directed to sweep for mines and clear the Class 1 road BONEFELD (wF8214) to cloverleaf (wF8518) and thence AUTOBAHN to crossroad (wF891168).

At 1300A Brig Gen T. C. Thorsen, G-3 First U S Army, informed Corps that First U S Army was anxious to have the 7 Armd Div committed as soon as possible. It was pointed out by Corps that the road net in the 99 Inf Div area was very poor, and that a suitable road net would not be reached until the night; that in the 9 Inf Div zone all culverts and overpasses on the AUTOBAHN had been blown by the enemy, and that commitment of the 7 Armd Div would be difficult until further advances had been made by the 9 Inf Div. First U S Army was informed that it was planned to commit the 7 Armd Div during the coming night and that CCA and the Div Arty were at the time moving to forward assembly areas.

The remainder of the 7 Armd Div had closed in assembly areas east of the RHINE by 0600A, CCR and the division trains having crossed over VII Corps bridges, and the division trains, CCB, and the reconnaissance troop having crossed over the floating Bailey bridge in the III Corps zone. By 1630A CCA had closed in its forward assembly area vicinity wF820175, and CCR had been alerted for movement after 260200A.

Effective 1800A, Co A, 299 Engr C Bn was attached 14 Cav Gp, which had remained in assembly areas. Although Co B and Co C, 817 TD Bn, were at this time in HONNINGEN, being converted into self-propelled units, the 8 TD Gp CO stated that Co A, 817 TD Bn would be sent with the 14 Cav Gp should Co C be unprepared when the cavalry group moved out.

At 1545A First U S Army informed Corps that in a few days the 32 AAA Brig would take over the AAA defense of the bridge sites, and also offered to relieve Corps of the responsibility of all other bridge protection. At approximately 2400A, just after publication of Operations Directive No. 1 (Ref FO 6), which confirmed fragmentary orders issued during the day, a telephone message was received from First U S Army which was to alter both the plans and missions of the Corps, and necessitate rapid changes. The message announced a change in both the north and south Corps boundaries, to take effect at 260400A, which removed the originally assigned objective of LIMBURG from the Corps zone, and pointed the Corps direction of attack almost due east. The new boundary between the III - VII Corps as estab-

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THE WAR IS ENDED FOR
THESE PRISONERS OF WAR,
A FEW OF THE 33,795 CAP-
TURED DURING THE MONTH.

lished by First U S Army, ran from HOSTENBACH (wG0026) - HACHENBURG (wG0629) - thence along the railroad to GUNTERS DORF (wG3628) and thence to MERKANBACH (wG3928). The south boundary ran from EBERHAHN (wG0208) - WIRGES (wG0408) - STAUDT (wG0607) - STEINEFREN (wG1306) - WEROTH (wG1506) - HADAMAR (wG1205) - OBERTIEFENBACH (wG2706) - WEILBURG (wG3709), all inclusive to V Corps. This boundary was seven kilometers north of the old Corps objective, which was to be taken subsequently by elements of the 9 Armd Div (V Corps).

Immediately upon receipt of these instructions, the information was given to the three divisions, and a tentative new boundary was established between the 9 Inf and 99 Inf Divs. This boundary ran from the current division boundary to NILDERHOFEN (wF9018) - DIERDORF (wF9416) - GODDERT (wG0016) - MAXSAIM (wG0316), and thence along the old III - VII Corps boundaries. (The new Corps and division boundaries are shown on Annex No. 1h, Map: Situation as of 262400A) No change was made in the attack plans, but during the morning 27 March new objectives were assigned 7 Armd Div.

The day was clear, with excellent visibility, and armed reconnaissance was flown along the Corps front.

26 March:

At 0420A the 7 Armd Div, attacking with CCA on the right and CCR on the left, broke through enemy resistance and advanced up to thirty miles against little opposition. Although initially delayed by road craters, blown bridges and mines, the Armd Div roamed the roads almost at will, bypassing some small centers of resistance and overrunning others, while the two infantry divisions, mopping up in its path, advanced from seven

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to thirteen miles. By nightfall the 7 Armd Div had reached a point only a few kilometers west of WEILBURG (wG3709) and was prepared to move to the east to seize crossings over the DILL RIVER.

At 0915A, the 7 Armd Div had been informed that its new mission was to seize and secure crossings over the DILL RIVER between SINN (wG4120) (inclusive) - WETZLAR (wG5417) (exclusive) and to be prepared for further advance to the northeast on Corps order. Because of the rapid advance and the original direction of the 7 Armd Div's attacks, elements of the division by 1130A had moved outside the new southern Corps boundary and were directed by Corps to return to the Corps zone as soon as possible. III Corps requested of the V Corps running rights for the 7 Armd Div on the SIERSHAHN (wG0309) - WIRGES (wG0408) - MOSCHEIN (wG0708) road to permit the return of the 7 Armd Div to the Corps zone. In the north, elements of the 7 Armd Div also had crossed into the zone of the VII Corps and III Corps requested of VII Corps running rights on the road which ran from wG290247 east through MADEMUHELEN and then southwest back into the 7 Armd Div zone. Both requests were granted, and by afternoon the division had completely returned to the Corps' zone and was driving to the east.

Because it was impossible to lay wire behind the rapidly advancing armor, communications between the 7 Armd Div and Hq III Corps were to be extremely poor throughout the day. Liaison officers with radios were sent to the CP 7 Armd Div, CCA and CCR, and the 7 Armd Div was directed to submit special radio situation reports periodically, but even these expedients failed to supply a flow of timely information to the Corps Hq. Once the attack had jumped off, therefore, control of the movement was difficult and Corps staff officers were sent to the division in an effort to expedite the flow of information and the issuance of instructions.

Both infantry divisions, having been passed through by the armor, followed rapidly in its path, in some cases with the infantry riding on tanks or in trucks. By the day's end the 9 Inf Div's 39 Inf had reached MUNDERSBACH (wF9922) and FREIRACHDORF (wF9820), while its 60 Inf had reached MARIENHAUSEN (wF9618). The 47 Inf, having been passed through earlier in the day, was prepared to pass through the 39 Inf. In the zone of the 99 Inf Div, the 394 and 393 Infs were at BRUEKRACHDORF (wF9615) and MEUSCHEID (wF9200) respectively, while the 395 Inf, having been passed through earlier in the day, was enroute to MOGENDORF (wG0210), motorized. It was planned that early on 27 March the 395 would move east from MOGENDORF and continue to mop up in zone. Each division, advancing with two regiments abreast, continuously had one regiment on a four hour alert, prepared for motorization.

During the day General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lt Gen Omar N. Bradley, and Lt Gen Courtney H. Hodges visited the Corps CP.

The morning was cloudy with light rain, but clear weather during the latter part of the day gave excellent visibility. Column cover was flown for the 7 Armd Div throughout the day, and armed reconnaissance was flown to the front of the Corps zone. Although Corps Arty supported the attack early in the day, the rapid advance made support impossible later on and displacement forward was begun.

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At 0230A, 27 March, the following message was received from First U S Army: "Effective at once right boundary III Corps extended as follows: WEILBURG (wG3709) (exclusive) - LAHN RIVER to wG640200 - GIESSEN (wG6621) - wG730218 - wG770243 (all inclusive III Corps). Effective at once boundary between VII and III Corps is extended as follows: MERKENBACH (wG3928) (inclusive VII Corps) - ALTENKIRCHEN (wG510317) (inclusive III Corps) - WEIDBACH (wG528342) (inclusive VII Corps) - wG560373 - wG702400 - thence along railroad to wG73045a."

Operations Directive No. 2 (Ref FO 6) was published. It confirmed fragmentary orders already issued.

27 March:

The 7 Armd Div, continuing its advance through a routed and disorganized enemy, drove more than twelve miles to cross the DILL RIVER where it seized four bridges intact, and at 2130A, having been relieved by infantry elements of the Corps, continued the attack to the east. Infantry elements, mopping up in the path of the armor, advanced up to twenty to twenty two miles and relieved elements of the 7 Armd Div on the DILL RIVER.

During the morning both divisions were directed: (1) to reach the road EMMERICHENHEIM (wG2323) - HODAMAR (wG2205) by 1900A; (2) to be prepared to relieve the armored division of the responsibility of holding the DILL RIVER bridges; and (3) to be prepared for further advance to the north-east. The 99 Inf Div, advancing with the 394 and 395 Infs abreast, accomplished its mission by reaching FRICKHOFER and NEIDERZEISHEIM by the end of the day, and at 1400A the 393 Inf was motorized and began movement to assembly area in the vicinity of WILSENROTH (wG2104). The 9 Inf Div also accomplished its mission when the 60 Inf, having passed through the 39 Inf, reached KUTZENFURT where it relieved elements of the armored division, and when the 47 Inf reached SINN, where it also relieved elements of the armored division. At 1055A it was directed that the 32 Cav Rcn Sq be attached to the 9 Inf Div effective 1200A.

At 1605A, as the advance of the 7 Armd Div progressed, that division was directed to continue the attack to seize crossings over the LAHN RIVER between MARBURG and GIESSEN, and communications centers in its zone along the vertical grid line 77, prepared for advance on Corps order. The division was further instructed to capture GIESSEN this day, but because of poor communications the message was not received by the division in time to carry out these orders.

At 1845A the CO 14 Cav Gp was directed to move his group to the vicinity of LAHR (wG2712) on the following day. At 2230A Corps was ordered by First U S Army to halt upon reaching the 77 grid line, to remain on that objective for a period of twenty four hours, but to dispose the Corps forces generally toward MARBURG (wG7346). The Corps was directed to continue mopping up in its zone and was told that a continuation of the Corps boundaries would be established before the end of the twenty four hour period. These instructions were given to the three divisions immediately.

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During the day Operations Directive No. 3 (Ref FO 6) was published. It confirmed fragmentary orders already issued during the day and it further directed: (1) that the 14 Cav Gp be prepared to attach one cavalry reconnaissance squadron to the 99 Inf Div; (2) that the 8 TD Gp was relieved of its mission of protecting the RHINE RIVER bridges effective 280001A, but that it would continue on this mission until relieved by the 49 AAA Brig; (3) that the 8 TD Gp would continue to operate the REMAGEN traffic headquarters; (4) that Co C 738 Tk Bn was relieved from attachment 8 TD Gp effective 280001A; (5) that the 16 AAA Gp was relieved from the mission of protecting the RHINE RIVER effective 280001A; and (6) that the following units were relieved from attachment 16 AAA Gp effective 280001A: Hq and Hq Btry 11 AAA Gp, 109 AAA Bn (M), 110 AAA Bn (M), 134 AAA Bn (M), 413 AAA Gun Bn (M), 581 AAA AW Bn (M), 839 AAA AW Bn (M), and "A" Flight 974 Sq (RAF).

Visibility during the day was restricted by low overcast, with fog in the early morning and late afternoon, and as a result no missions were flown during the period by the fighter bombers of the IX TAC. The Corps Arty continued to displace forward to keep pace with the rapid advance of Corps units.

28 March:

In accordance with the instructions issued on the preceding night the 7 Armd Div, closely followed by the two infantry divisions, continued its attack and advanced approximately thirteen miles, captured GIESSEN, seized two bridges intact over the LAHN RIVER, and then completed its mission by seizing a number of places in the general vicinity of the 77 vertical grid line. During the advance the division encountered a number of small islands of resistance, where small arms and high velocity fire was received, and was opposed by fairly strong resistance at GIESSEN and in the LAHN RIVER crossings.

At 0840A the 9 Inf Div had been directed to follow rapidly in zone behind the 7 Armd Div, and to relieve the 7 Armd Div on the LAHN RIVER. Consequently the 39 Inf moved up to relieve the 47 and 60 Infs on the DILL RIVER, and the 47 and 60 Infs then moved on to reach and cross the LAHN. At about 0850A the 99 Inf Div was also directed to advance rapidly in zone behind the 7 Armd Div; to assemble between the DILL and LAHN RIVERS; to relieve the 7 Armd Div of security of bridges over the DILL RIVER; to take over the mission of capturing GIESSEN if not already captured by the 7 Armd Div; and to relieve the 7 Armd Div of responsibility for the security of GIESSEN if that place had been captured. Consequently, as the 393 and the 395 Infs advanced in their zones, the 394 Inf was motorized during the afternoon and began to move to GIESSEN where it began the relief of the armor during the night. Effective 1200A the 18 Cav Rcn Sq was attached 99 Inf Div.

During the afternoon Operations Directive No. 4, which confirmed fragmentary orders previously issued, was published. It stated that upon reaching the Corps objective no further advance would be made except on First U S Army order, and that the 9 and 99 Inf Divs would relieve the

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7 Armd Div on its objective generally along the vertical grid line 77. It further directed that the 14 Cav Gp (- 32 Cav Rcn Sq) move to the vicinity of LAHR (wG2717) on 28 March.

At approximately 1100A information was received from First U S Army that the 28 Inf Div, then with the V Corps and west of the RHINE, was attached III Corps effective 281200A. At the time the division was minus its tank destroyer and tank battalions, as well as the three infantry battalions, 109 Inf, which were currently engaged in guard duty. The division (-) was instructed to begin movement to assembly areas east of the RHINE on the night 29 March.

At 1710A the Corps direction of attack and mission were again changed when Hq First U S Army instructed Corps that the advance might be continued but that new Corps boundaries were to be established effective 290300A. The new boundaries as given in these instructions pointed the Corps direction of attack almost due north, and upon reaching the EDERSTAU SEE (a lake formed by the dam at wG926880) pinched out III Corps while the VII Corps (left) and the V Corps (right) continued the attack. Consequently the 7 Armd Div was instructed at approximately midnight to complete its dispositions in accordance with prevailing instructions, and was directed to advance to the north with the EDERSTAU SEE as its objective. The division was further instructed to seize intact the dam at wG925882, and the time of attack was left to the discretion of the division commander.

Operations Directive No. 5 (Ref FO 6) was published, and issued at approximately 0100A on the morning of 29 March. It confirmed instructions already issued, announced the new boundary, and directed an attack whose ultimate objective was the EDERSTAU SEE. The 7 Armd Div was instructed to seize the line generally along the railroad COLBE (wG7350) - KIRCHAIN (wG8358) and then attack north on 29 March to seize the Corps final objective. The 9 Inf Div was directed to complete relief of the elements of the 7 Armd Div up to and including the SALZBODE RIVER and then to assemble in zone between the DILL and SALZBODE RIVERS prepared for further advance on Corps order. The 99 Inf Div was directed to complete relief of the 7 Armd Div in zone, to turn over to elements of V Corps the town of GIESSEN and to assemble in the new zone in an area between the DILL and LAHN RIVERS, prepared for further advance on Corps order. The division was further directed to protect the Corps right flank. The 28 Inf Div was directed to secure all towns in its area with a minimum detachment of one platoon to each town.

The Corps CP opened at SELTERS (wG0114) at 1000A.

The morning was cool with visibility restricted by low overcast and fog, but during the afternoon the weather cleared considerably and limited fighter bomber operations were conducted. Corps Arty continued to displace forward and maintain daylight air patrols.

29 March:

During the morning the 99 Inf Div's 394 Inf completed the relief of elements of the 7 Armd Div in GIESSEN, and the armored division assembled in preparation for the attack ordered on the night 28-29 March. The

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attack was launched during the early afternoon, but strong resistance from elements of the enemy's 166 Inf Div, newly arrived from DENMARK, was encountered in KIRCHEIN. Although the 7 Armd Div did seize KIRCHEIN as well as the railroad line and some towns to its immediate north, the sweeping gains of the past three days were temporarily halted, and the division prepared to continue the attack at first light on the following morning.

The 9 Inf Div continued its movement to the east, mopping up isolated pockets of resistance, and at the close of the day was closing in its assembly areas between the SALZBODE and DILL RIVERS. The 99 Inf Div also continued its advance, clearing the town of WETZLAR, which it occupied until relieved by elements of the V Corps. The 394 Inf continued to occupy and outpost GIESSEN, and at the close of the day the division was moving into assembly areas between the DILL and LAHN RIVERS.

The 28 Inf Div during the day reconnoitered assembly areas in the zone of the 99 Inf Div, and at 1800A began crossing the RHINE.

Both the 9 and 99 Inf Divs during the day were directed to be prepared to furnish one infantry battalion (motorized) to the CG 7 Armd Div on call, and at 2400A the 3 Bn, 39 Inf, was attached 7 Armd Div. Operations Directive No. 6 (Ref FO 6), confirming fragmentary orders already issued, was published. It directed a continuation of the Corps attack, made adjustments in the Corps boundary (a radio message received in the morning from First U S Army confirmed the boundaries given by telephone on the night 27 March, but included some minor changes), and directed that all units not engaged in combat improve and maintain roads in and adjacent to their assembly and bivouac areas. (Corps boundaries are shown in Annex No. 1j, Map: Situation as of 312400 March)

The Corps CP opened in ERDA (WG5530) at 1200A.

Corps artillery continued to displace forward to keep pace with the rapid advance. The day was cool, with light scattered rain and low overcast, and no missions were flown by supporting aircraft.

30 March:

Corps completed its mission at approximately 1545A when the 7 Armd Div, advancing against scattered resistance which consisted primarily of bazooka and small arms fire reached the EDERSTAU SEE and seized the dam at WG925882 intact, as well as ten bridges, and then sent patrols and outposts to the north of the lake.

At approximately midnight of 29-30 March a message was received from First U S Army which instructed the Corps to seize the dam on the EDER RIVER which formed the EDERSTAU SEE, and although those instructions had already been given to the 7 Armd Div, two messages were sent to the 7 Armd Div during the early morning reaffirming the order. At 0930A word was received from the division, which was attacking with CCR and CCB abreast, that elements of CCR would seize the dam and remain there until relieved by CCB. This it did and by 2000A the entire division had been moved to the north.

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The 9 and 99 Inf Divs continued to mop up in their zones and moved to assembly positions: the 9 Inf Div in an area between the DILL and SALZBODE RIVERS; and the 99 Inf Div, after having been relieved in GIESSEN by elements of the V Corps, between the DILL and LAHN RIVERS. The 28 Inf Div continued its movement into the Corps zone and during the day RCT 110, RCT 109 (- three Inf Bns and cannon Co), 28 Recon Tr, 28 Signal Co, Hq and Hq Co 28 Inf Div, Hq and Hq Btry Div Arty, 108 FA Bn, and elements of the 103 Engr C Bn closed in the division zone. Instructions were received from First U S Army that the 28 Inf Div would move from its assigned area on First U S Army order only.

At approximately 2230A Corps was informed by First U S Army that the 9 Inf Div was to become attached VII Corps. The division was immediately given this information, and told that it was to move at approximately 0800A in the morning, using transportation furnished by III Corps. It was explained that the purpose of the move was to block a possible enemy thrust from the west in the general area between BURLBERG (wG4673) and WINTERBURG (wG5689). The division was told that it would take its normal attachments but would not take Corps artillery or the 32 Cav Rcn Sq, which was to revert to control 14 Cav Gp. The division was told that its rear elements might remain in place and that the CG 9 Inf Div would receive instructions from the CG VII Corps.

At 0007A Corps received a TWX from First U S Army which confirmed instructions given in the telephone conversation. At approximately 0200A Operations Directive No. 7 (Ref FO 6) was published. It confirmed the instructions already given to the 9 Inf Div and also directed the following: (1) that the Corps Hq, with units which usually accompany it, assemble in Corps zone between the east-west grid lines 56 and 52 (general vicinity RAUCHENBERG) on 1 April; (2) that the 7 Armd Div assemble by 311200A in a zone between the EDERSTAU SEE and the horizontal grid line 69, prepared for further advance to the northwest or northeast on Corps order; (3) that the 99 Inf Div concentrate south of the 7 Armd Div between the east-west grids 69 - 56, the movement to begin 311200A March. Reconnaissance was permitted prior to that time but travel through the zone of the 9 Inf Div was prohibited; (4) the 28 Inf Div was directed to continue its present mission; (5) the Corps Arty was directed to concentrate on Corps order in zone between the east-west grid 52 and the LAHN RIVER. Reconnaissance was permitted but movement through the zone of the 9 Inf Div was prohibited; (6) the 18 and 32 Cav Rcn Sqs reverted to control of the 14 Cav Gp effective 310800A. The 14 Cav Gp was directed to concentrate in the Corps zone between the LAHN RIVER and the north-south grid line 53. It was further directed to assume responsibility for that portion of the Corps zone now occupied by the 9 Inf Div effective 0800A, and to assume responsibility for the zone currently occupied by the 99 Inf Div at a time to be agreed upon by the CG 99 Inf Div and the CO 14 Cav Gp; (7) the 8 TD Gp was directed to concentrate the 817 TD Bn in the northern portion of Corps Arty zone on Corps order, and to secure the rear areas in Corps zone west of the north-south grid 53, exclusive of the area assigned to the 28 Inf Div; (8) all units were directed to secure the towns in their zones, to continue aggressive mopping up of the enemy and to insure strict compliance with instructions to the occupation forces concerning protection of property, fraternization, control of civilians, displaced persons and Allied prisoners of war; (9) Cos A, B, and C, 90 Cml Bn, reverted to control of the

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90 Cml Bn, and that battalion was directed to be prepared to move to a concentration area between the east-west grid lines 56 and 52; (10) the 254 FA Bn (155 How) and one section 987 FA Bn (155 Gun) (SP) were relieved of attachment 9 Inf Div effective 310800A.

The weather was cool and cloudy with light rains, and no missions were flown in direct support of Corps during this day. Corps Arty remained in place and a continuous daylight air patrol was maintained to collect information and intelligence.

*31 March:

Having accomplished its mission on the previous day, Corps awaited further instructions and regrouped according to the instructions of Operations Directive No. 7 (Ref FO 6), published during the night 30-31 March.

All divisions continued to mop up in their zones and the 7 Armd Div closed in its area, south of the EDERSTAU SEE. During the evening, in a telephone message, Brig Gen Thorsen, G-3 First U S Army directed that one combat command of the 7 Armd Div be placed on a three hour alert for employment in the VII Corps zone, and these instructions were accordingly given to the 7 Armd Div. By 1000A the 99 Inf Div had been relieved at WETZLAR by elements of the V Corps, and by the day's end one battalion of each of the 99 Inf Div's three regiments closed in the division assembly area. The 28 Inf Div (- 3 Inf Bns and cannon Co, 109 Inf) closed in its assembly areas, and the 9 Inf Div began movement from the Corps zone.

The 14 Cav Gp, having assumed control of the 18 and 32 Cav Rcn Sqs at 0800A, relieved the 9 Inf Div of responsibility in the 9 Inf Div zone, and in turn was relieved of its mission of guarding the DILL RIVER bridges by the 8 TD Gp. At 1700A the 187 TD Bn was relieved of attachment III Corps.

During the day the First U S Army Commander visited the Corps CP.

The day was cool and cloudy with visibility poor to fair. No operations in support of Corps were flown during the day.

* See Annex No. 2j, Map: Situation as of 31 March

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SECTION III

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

Of the many highly significant and critical operations which the European theatre has produced since the Allied landings on the NORMANDY beaches, the seizure by the 9 Armd Div of the Ludendorf bridge ranks second to none. Climaxing a swift advance across the COLOGNE plain, the capture of the bridge had a profound influence on the conduct of the war east of the RHINE, and may be said to be one of the greatest single contributing factors to the subsequent early successes of the Allied forces. While the armies to the north lay poised on the western banks of the RHINE, and several days before the armies to the south had reached the river, III Corps unexpectedly hurdled that great water barrier, secured a foothold on its eastern banks, and not only drew troops from the front of the Ninth U S Army, but opened the door through which the First U S Army was later to pass. Consequently, and understandably, that one incident not only overshadowed other Corps activities but dictated the course of Corps operations subsequent to 7 March. Prior to that date the Corps had advanced rapidly across the COLOGNE plain, initially expecting to drive east to the RHINE and then later expecting to turn south and effect a junction with the Third U S Army. This latter plan was upset by the capture of the bridge, and the second phase of the Corps operations -- the slow struggle to secure and expand a bridgehead -- was begun.

While it is true that luck played an important role in the initial seizure, it must be remembered that the bold advances of 6 and 7 March made the incident possible; and that the possibility of the capture had not been overlooked. To the contrary, precautions had been taken to prevent the destruction of the bridges by friendly aerial bombardment and artillery fire. It had been sound military thinking to direct, as the CG III Corps did, that the bridge was to be seized and exploited should the opportunity present itself. Conversely, it was the soundest of sound assumptions to believe that the enemy would blow the bridge; so that when the unpredictable happened it found the Corps engaged in fulfilling its mission to the south, with most of its troops committed and disposed so as best to accomplish that mission.

The great task which confronted the Corps, therefore, was the establishment and expansion of a bridgehead. It would have been desirable to commit a complete infantry division in the bridgehead but no such division was available, and the situation permitted no delay in moving troops across the river. Consequently, units were ordered across as rapidly as they could be disengaged, and by 9 March a total of seventeen battalions of infantry, with supporting weapons, had been moved to the far side. First U S Army and Corps artillery was emplaced to support the Corps in its assigned missions, and artillery from the V and VII Corps fired in support of the bridgehead operations.

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During these early days of the bridgehead the railroad bridge was operated to capacity, and the flow of men and material was halted only for short periods, when enemy artillery activity placed it out of operation. With the completion of the treadway bridge on 10 March, and the ponton bridge on 11 March, the problem of movement across the river was somewhat alleviated, although another problem -- traffic control -- was ever present.

There are no figures available on the amount of traffic which poured over the railroad bridge initially; but during the twelve day period 16-28 March, a total of 58,262 vehicles crossed over all three ponton bridges -- an average of 4,855 per day. These tremendous amounts of traffic funneling over one road into the bridge area, especially during the initial stage of the operation when enemy artillery was interdicting the bridge, approaches, and roads, were bound to cause a certain amount of congestion despite the most rigid traffic control. Initially the 9 Armd Div controlled traffic and later the 32 Cav Rcn Sq was used. A Corps traffic headquarters was established at REMAGEN, which regulated the flow of vehicles over the bridges as the direction of traffic, weight of vehicles, or condition of the bridges warranted; and because road discipline was initially poor a traffic control post was established at GELSDORF, fourteen kilometers west of REMAGEN. Here traffic was halted and proper interval between vehicles established. Five other control posts insured the maintenance of that interval, and not only congestion but casualties resulting from interdicting fire were greatly reduced.

Two other problems, closely related, demanded immediate and continuous attention; (1) the security of the bridge, and (2) the need for supplementary bridges and means of transport across the river. It was known that the enemy would employ every means available to attempt to destroy the bridge, and the steps taken to frustrate his efforts have been called the most thorough and complete of their kind ever established. Within a few days time a total of nine antiaircraft automatic weapons battalions and four antiaircraft gun battalions had been emplaced for protection of the bridge site -- one of the greatest, if not the greatest, concentration of antiaircraft artillery ever assembled in so small an area. Barrage balloons were brought in and continuous air cover was flown over the bridge. Contact, log, and net booms were constructed across the river to intercept water-borne objects; depth charges were dropped at an average rate of twelve per hour each night, to discourage under water swimmers and submarines; radar was employed to detect under water craft; river patrols were maintained; shore patrols were on the alert twenty four hours per day; high velocity guns were emplaced along the river to fire on any suspicious object; at night powerful lights, supported by guns, illuminated the surface of the river; coordination was effected with adjacent Corps, which assisted by river and shore patrols; and steps were taken to round up all suspicious appearing persons in the vicinity of the bridge to prevent artillery spotting and sabotage. That these precautions proved their worth is evidenced by the failure of the many enemy air attacks to destroy the bridges and by the failure of enemy saboteur swimmers to accomplish their missions. When the railroad bridge finally collapsed it had already

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served its primary purpose, and had survived the most desperate attempts to destroy it.

The construction of the treadway bridge -- first tactical bridge to be thrown across the RHINE since Napoleon's day -- was begun two days after the seizure of the railroad bridge, while the bridge site was under heavy and continuous artillery fire and air attack. DUKWs, ferries and LCVPs were used to augment the bridges, and before the Ludendorf bridge collapsed both the heavy ponton and treadway bridges were in operation, so that the loss did not affect troop or supply movements. With the construction by First U S Army of the floating Bailey bridge, the movement of troops and materials across the river was no longer a major concern, and the earlier menace to the bridgehead's lifeline was eliminated.

Another serious problem confronting the Corps on 7 March -- and one which was to plague the Corps for days to come -- was the problem of communications. Submarine cable was not available initially; and although wire was strung across the bridge it was virtually impossible to maintain continuous wire communication because of the artillery fire and heavy traffic. Radio link was employed, but even this was not dependable, and for security reasons was often undesirable. Radio nets whose sole purpose was to transmit tactical information from the scene of operation to Corps were established, but this method was unreliable because of the limitations of the radios available, the nature of the terrain, and the distances involved. Liaison officers were used in large numbers, and several Corps staff officers operated from the bridge site, to expedite the flow of information and to settle problems and difficulties as they arose. The communications problem was not entirely solved, however, until it became possible to maintain unbroken wire communication. This was accomplished by the installation of submarine cables and by the laying of wire on the tactical bridges.

For the first eighteen days the expansion of the bridgehead was relatively slow, with advances made on foot and measured in terms of yards and feet. It has been said that no poorer place could have been selected for crossing -- the mountainous country was not only impenetrable for armor, but it defied assault by infantry. The rugged, forested hills gave the enemy good observation, and formed a natural fortress which he used skillfully. Although his forces were weak initially, the arrival of several divisions, beginning with the 11 Panzer Div on 9 March, enabled him to conduct an aggressive defense in which numerous and determined counterattacks played a large part. (It is interesting to note that it was the intention of the 11 Panzer Div to cross the RHINE at BONN, and attack south on the west of the river.) It was not until many days of hard fighting had driven the enemy across the AUTOBAHN that the 7 Armd Div was able to break through to make the spectacular advances of the last days of the month, in which the armored division gained a total of sixty two miles in fifty two hours.

This breakthrough was the third and last phase of Corps' operations during the month of March. Although it was somewhat similar in nature to the advances of the first seven days of the month, there are certain marked differences in the situation and in technique employed, both of which are interesting enough to warrant comment.

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In the beginning of the month advances were made against a withdrawing enemy, and while resistance was moderate to light it was on the whole organized and orderly. In this situation the armor and infantry elements of the Corps were employed together, attacking on a wide front, and at times infantry was attached to the armor while in one instance a combat command was attached to an infantry division. These tactics were partly a result of the terrain, which permitted the employment of the armor at the very outset; and partly so that the armor might exploit immediately the first indication of enemy weakness.

In the latter part of the month, however, the armored division was committed after the two infantry divisions had secured a line of departure and a road net which favored the employment of armor, and only after the crust of enemy resistance had been broken. The deep thrusts through a routed and disorganized enemy into his rear areas constitute a classic example of the strategic employment of armor. The infantry, following by bounds the swift advance of the armor, mopped up in its path, prepared to move up quickly to support the armor should the situation so require. Close liaison was maintained between the armored and infantry divisions, so that the infantry, while following closely, did not interfere with the advance by becoming entangled with the "tail" of the armored division.

During the entire month a total of 33,795 prisoners of war was captured by Corps, the greater part during the first and last weeks. 9,321 were taken between 1 and 9 March, and 16,834 between 26 and 31 March. Great numbers were picked up individually or in small groups many days after the attack had swept by. These small isolated groups were a continuous menace and a threat to the security of Corps rear areas, and it became necessary to maintain constant patrols and to conduct active searches for these enemy troops. The operations of the latter part of the month were further marked by the release of approximately 100,000 displaced persons, forced laborers, and Allied prisoners of war. Because a number of these persons were undoubtedly enemy deserters and enemy agents capable of sabotage and espionage, the task of sifting this large group became a serious problem. In order to accomplish this task, troops and military government personnel operated in close cooperation.

From the beginning of the month, when the attack swept across the COLOGNE plain to the time that it was halted at the EDERSTAU SEE, III Corps advanced over one hundred and fifty airline miles, and seized approximately fifteen hundred square miles of GERMANY. It captured or destroyed huge amounts of enemy material, supplies and factories; captured the equivalent of more than two and one half American divisions; and freed an estimated 7,500 to 10,000 Allied prisoners of war who had been interned in enemy prisoner of war enclosures.

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SECTION IV

SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY

- PART ONE : Narrative
PART TWO : Enemy Order of Battle
PART THREE: Analysis of Prisoners of War

PART ONE -- Narrative

1. General

In March disaster followed disaster for the enemy. The Allied offensive between the ROER and the RHINE Rivers was drawing to a successful ending when the campaign east of the RHINE began, as III Corps troops crossed it at REMAGEN 7 March. The Remagen bridgehead was the first Allied bridgehead over the RHINE; by the end of the month other Allied armies crossed the river, and the armor of each had made a complete breakthrough.

2. From the ROER to the RHINE (25 Feb--7 Mar)

Beginning 25 February divisions of the Corps crossed the ROER River successively from North to South, each through the bridgehead of its northern neighbor. By 1 March all were east of the river and meeting moderate resistance from the German 12 Volksgrenadier Division, 353 Volksgrenadier Division, 3 Paratroop Division and 272 Volksgrenadier Division.

The manner of our crossing and direction of attack outflanked and unhinged the German ROER River defense line. The enemy fought stubbornly at all times, but not strongly after he was once peeled back from the ROER. In the north by 1 March this forcing back had already taken place, and 1st US Infantry Division thereafter met resistance principally in towns, along river lines and at critical terrain features; the resistance was spotty, strong in some places, more often light to moderate, and had a character of improvisation. The process was somewhat delayed in the south, due to the timing and direction of our attack; and for the first few days of March our troops in the center and south met fairly heavy resistance from stubbornly fighting enemy infantry supported by numerous assault guns. Throughout the action along the east bank of the ROER, the enemy seemed much more sensitive to our advances to the south than to our advances to the east. This was because our initial attacks in the case of each division were to the south and southeast, and met the full strength of the enemy in his defensive positions,

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although in flank; generally by the time one of our divisions turned east in its attack toward the RHINE River, the enemy forces opposing it had been defeated and forced to withdraw, and our continuous attack gave him no time to form another strong defensive line.

Although overall enemy resistance was not strong except initially, still the enemy troops on the whole defended stubbornly to the very bank of the RHINE; and many hotly contested small battles were fought principally in towns, along river lines, and along roads and highways in which the enemy was liberally supported by direct tank and self-propelled gun fire. Our pressure was constant, and forced the enemy to alternate between retreating and fighting, giving him little chance to reorganize.

Enemy counterattacks effected some delays, but failed to halt our advance, or to threaten any serious penetration. On 1-2 March a single small infantry counterattack each day, unsupported by artillery or armor was all the enemy could muster. March 3 the Germans made a stand of sorts along the RHINE River line, where some demolitions were encountered, and two strong counterattacks were made, one against LIBLAR (F3546) supported by 5-6 tanks, and the other against LOMMERSOM (F3334) supported by 10-12 tanks and assault guns. Both attacks were repulsed.

The ERFT was crossed 4 March against relatively strong resistance in the north; later resistance slackened in all sectors. ZULFICH (F2333) and EUSKIRCHEN (F3229), the largest towns in the Corps zone, were taken with little resistance 3 and 4 March. In the south resistance noticeably slackened on the fourth, despite the arrival of 62 Volksgrenadier Division that day, and of the 26 Volksgrenadier Division on the fifth.

The period 6-9 March saw the complete elimination of enemy forces west of the RHINE in the Corps zone. Withdrawal was in full swing 6 March, and rapid advances were made that day against scattered delaying forces, not very eager to fight; one attempted counterattack in the north was broken up by our artillery fire before contact was made, and 2 of the 5 tanks participating destroyed. On March 7 enemy resistance on the south collapsed as our troops reached the AHR River on the south flank, capturing bridges intact, and most important, captured intact the Railroad bridge over the RHINE River at REMAGEN; elsewhere resistance was light as patrols of 9th US Inf Div reached BADGODESBURG (F5632), and patrols of 1st US Inf Div approached to within one kilometer of BONN (F53) on the north, without enemy resistance. Next day BADGODESBURG was captured, and with it the Commanding General of 3 Para Div; BONN was entered from the north and south, though stiff resistance was encountered in a barracks area southwest of the city. Organized resistance west of the RHINE ceased early 9 March. BONN was cleared later in the day by 1st US Inf Div, then under control of VII Corps.

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Enemy support for his infantry during this phase was not impressive. Initially artillery and mortar fire were fairly heavy, but tanks and self-propelled guns early took over the artillery mission. Enemy air was fairly active in the north part of the zone 1 and 2 March, but weather eliminated this support later. Few reinforcements were received by the enemy, and but little equipment; this niggardly policy was probably due to lack of reserves as well as to the desire to save replacement units for rebuilding the beaten divisions behind of the RHINE barrier. This rebuilding never took place.

3. The REMAGEN Bridgehead (7-22 March)

March 7, 1945, was a black day for the Wermacht and for GERMANY. LUDENDORFF railroad bridge over the RHINE at REMAGEN (F6520) was captured intact at 1550A by alert troops of the 9th US Armored Division. Earlier that day enemy resistance had collapsed in the south of III Corps zone under the attack of the 9th US Armored Division and 78th US Inf Div. The enemy was in full and disorganized flight across the RHINE. According to prisoners of war, the bridge was to be blown at 1600; the enemy thought to salvage as much of his equipment from west of the river as possible, without running too great risk of its capture. US infantry, engineers and tanks of the 9th US Armored Division arrived ahead of schedule. The bridge was thoroughly wired and mined with explosives for destruction, and on the appearance of our troops, an attempt was made to destroy it. But the demolition was only partially successful, due to a variety of circumstances--our artillery and tank fire had apparently cut some of the wires leading to the explosives; US troops advanced without hesitation and crossed the bridge, ripping out wires and dumping explosives into the river. At the time enemy anti-aircraft units were displacing; guns still present were prevented from going into firing position by our tank fire and by the rapid advance of the foot troops across the bridge.

Clearly it was unthinkable to the Germans that the bridge should not be blown; there were no defensive preparations on the east bank. Once in our hands the bridge was never seriously threatened by the enemy.

The importance of the REMAGEN bridge capture cannot be fully assessed until the German tale is told. At the least it was a dangerous distraction, which required commitment of all the armored reserves of Army Group B, yet continued to grow from a foothold to a bridgehead to an armored breakthrough. At the most, however, it hastened and made easier the inevitable. The western German armies had suffered defeats from which they never recovered--in the ARDENNES, the EIFEL, the COLOGNE Plain, and the SAAR-PALATINATE. As was clearly demonstrated later, they could not prevent an Allied crossing of the RHINE at any point. At any rate, the watch on the RHINE ended before it had fairly begun, and the enemy never recovered from the paralysis which seized him at the time of the REMAGEN bridge capture.

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The short life of the REMAGEN Bridgehead was a full one. The ten day period 7-17 March saw the hasty commitment against the bridgehead of 11 enemy divisions, one panzer brigade, and countless anti-aircraft, engineer, supply, and replacement units; the bridge itself was shelled with every weapon available. 372 enemy aircraft made 223 raids in nine days on the bridge. At the last, SS swimming saboteurs made an inglorious attempt to blow it up.

After seizing the bridge, our troops pushed out rapidly against stubborn resistance from small groups of rear-area engineer, anti-aircraft, and miscellaneous units, which lacked organization, defensive plans and heavy weapons, but not determination. By dawn 8 March the enemy had been driven from the surrounding high ground, and thereafter was denied ground observation of the bridgehead. Enemy counter-attacks expected that day did not materialize, however, enemy resistance was stubborn, particularly against our advances to the east; although no prepared defensive positions were encountered, the terrain was very difficult, and the enemy made fortresses out of his villages.

Enemy reaction to the bridge capture was not slow, considering the disorganization caused by his recent withdrawal across the RHINE. The 11 Panzer Division, the strongest panzer formation in the west, had been coming down from the critical northern area to recross the river at BONN and delay our advance west of the river. Because of our rapid advances, it arrived too late for that mission, but in time to show up on the east and northeast of the bridgehead area on 9 March. Its presence was indicated that day by heavy pressure on the east and by numerous tanks sighted by tactical reconnaissance and artillery observation planes; on the tenth it participated in three strong tank-supported counter-attacks on the east part of the bridgehead. The 106 Panzer Brigade and two battlegroups of the 130 Panzer Division probably arrived at the same time to take up positions to the north and south of the 11 Panzer Division, and under its control, but these were not identified by prisoners of war until 11 and 12 March respectively.

Heavy resistance on the north and east began with the arrival of these units, and 13 counter-attacks were mounted by the enemy 10-12 March, most of them supported by up to 10-12 tanks and self-propelled guns. Enemy artillery fire gradually increased, and, after the arrival of the first enemy division, battery concentrations on the bridge increased, and artillery fires began to show some organization.

In the south of the bridgehead reinforcements of division size were slower to arrive. The north and east initially had priority, in order to protect the RUHR and the Autobahn, which approaches REMAGEN closest on the northeast. Good advances were made in the south against non-divisional units, which put up a very stubborn, but inadequate defense. Resistance stiffened on 12 March as our troops seized the high ground north of HONNINGEN (F6913) late in the day. Identification next day of 272 and 277 Volksgrenadier Divisions in that area explained the increased resistance; these

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units joined in an unsuccessful counter-attack by estimated 250 men north of HONNINGEN 13 March.

March 13 was a day for reinforcements, as 62 Volksgrenadier Division and 9 Panzer Division were identified in the extreme north near HONNEF (F6427), replacing 106 Panzer Brigade, which shifted southeast, still attached to 11 Panzer Division. These two new divisions had their artillery with them, and used it heavily on our troops in HONNEF; one infantry counter-attack in that area was easily repulsed. The 11 Panzer Division continued to be aggressive on the east, using its armor in two counter-attacks, and losing five tanks to our ground action, and several to fighter bombers. Resistance throughout this day was stiff, from the 4 newly arrived divisions and the still aggressive 11 Panzer Division and its attachments.

March 14 was a turning point. Resistance continued very stiff, especially in the north and east, but only one of the 4 counter-attacks were supported by enemy armor. Except for this counter-attack, near KALENBORN (F7024), which was supported by 10-12 tanks, enemy armor shifted to a defensive role, firing in support of enemy troops, but not advancing to attack. Although some armor supported two counter-attacks on 15 March, this was the last. Also on 14 March the enemy artillery, which had been concentrating its attention on the bridge-sites, shifted the bulk of its fires onto our advancing troops. Likewise enemy air activity changed, as jet-propelled craft took over the attacks on the bridges; on the 15 air attacks showed marked decrease, and ceased altogether on the 16. Thereafter only eleven bombing attacks were made on the bridges, on 20 and 22 March. The shift to jets probably was caused by our anti-aircraft, which shot down 80 of 372 planes attacking the bridge 7-14 March; the jets were harder to hit, but by the same token their bombing was even less accurate.

On 14 March the bridgehead was one week old; enemy air and artillery had failed to damage the bridges appreciably; enemy ground troops had been unable to launch a large scale attack on the bridgehead, and unable to prevent its expansion over impossible terrain to a depth of about 5 miles and length of 8 miles. The 11 Panzer Division had exhausted its offensive force in repeated counter-attacks, and generally the attrition in other enemy units caused a weakening in their defense a day or two after commitment. Other divisions continued to arrive, but they melted away with less and less effect on the situation. The 3 Para Division came in on the north on 14 March; on the south and southeast 340, 326 and 26 Volksgrenadier Divisions arrived on 15-16-17 March. Even so, resistance moderated on the north and south, although very stiff resistance was encountered by 78th US Inf Div as it advanced northeast to cut the Autobahn vic (F6831) on the morning of 16 March, and by 99th US Inf Div in clearing HONNINGEN 17 March.

At noon 16 March VII US Corps took command of US troops in the

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north part of the bridgehead. Enemy units opposing III Corps in the southern part of the bridgehead were as follows: from north to south: 11 Panzer, 340, 277, 326, 26, and 272 Volksgrenadier Divisions. The hard core of defense by 11 Panzer Division, supported by numerous self-propelled guns and tanks, continued against our 9th US Inf Div.

Ground, artillery and air action having failed to destroy our bridges, the enemy attempted other, less orthodox means. The tank-mounted 540mm KARL Garaet dropped a few shells in the general vicinity of the bridges; according to a prisoner of war, this ponderous weapon received a personal visit from Field Marshall MODEL, who upon the objection of its commander that the valuable gun was too far forward, stated that sacrifices had to be made to stop the Americans. However, KARL was not sacrificed on the battle-field, but became a non-battle casualty, and was ingloriously evacuated to the rear for repairs on 18 March. Apparently not trusting KARL's questionable accuracy, the enemy used another weapon of even less accuracy; on 17 March six V-2s fell on German soil, in the very general vicinity of the bridges. Our operations were not impeded, and no damage to the bridge resulted; however, one small German town was destroyed, and some US casualties resulted.

Finally, on the night 17-18 March, seven SS, GAMM-SWIMMERS donned their rubber suits and webbed feet and hands, and floated down the RHINE with demolitions carried on rafts to destroy our bridges. They were discovered and fired on in the water about two miles from the nearest bridge; one was killed, four were taken prisoners, one escaped to enemy lines, and the fate of the seventh is not known.

The SS was too late. The principal object of all this attention, the LUDENDORFF bridge, weakened by demolitions, artillery fire, near misses of bombs, and by heavy traffic, collapsed at 1500 March 17. It had served its purpose, and had been closed for repairs for several days; other bridges carried the traffic.

In the bridgehead area, stiff resistance continued 17 March in the north of the III Corps zone, where heavy defensive fire from tanks and self-propelled guns was received, and in the far south, where enemy troops fought house-to-house in HONNINGEN. Elsewhere, on the southeast, resistance was scattered and disorganized as our troops reached the WIED River. The job was nearly done; on the 18 and 19th the 9th US Inf Div advanced well against slackening resistance, cleared the last high ground west of the WIED; and on 20 March our troops held the line of the WIED except in the far south.

Troops of the V US Corps relieved our troops in the south 22 March; the III Corps bridgehead had become the Army bridgehead--in fact, was no longer a bridgehead, but a front in the heart of Germany, soon to become very active.

4. The Breakthrough (23-31 March).

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On March 23 our infantry attacked across the WIED River against light resistance; the attack continued that night, and made good progress. Another night attack 24-25 March met light resistance which, however, stiffened with daylight; late 25 March the enemy defense showed signs of breaking.

The 7th US Armored Division attacked early 26 March and advanced 30 miles by nightfall; resistance until noon was light, from a few defended roadblocks and anti-tank mines. After midday resistance was negligible from surprised and disorganized enemy rear-area troops. Resistance to our infantry, mopping up behind the armor was negligible that day. The breakthrough of the first day was complete. On the second day, the armor crossed the DILL River on intact bridges. On the third day advances of 20 miles were made, although approximately thirty 88mm dual-purpose anti-aircraft guns which had been protecting the railroad yards at GIESSEN (G6620) caused some delay before being overrun. Thereafter, GIESSEN was cleared with little trouble. On the fourth day the division swung north, cleared NIEDERWALD (G8048) and SCHONSTADT (G7959) and reached (G7959) after overrunning elements of two regiments of the German 166 Infantry Division near KIRCHHAIN (G8348). At no time did our infantry mopping up in the rear meet strong resistance, though small groups of enemy here and there engaged in brief fire fights.

On March 31 the 7th US Armored Division was effectively stopped by a water barrier which was the assigned Corps objective--the EDERSTAU SEE. The dam and several bridges over the EDER River were taken intact.

Junction of First US Army units with Ninth US Army troops was imminent. The REMAGEN Bridgehead had become the southern half of a nearly complete Allied circle around the RUHR and the German Army Group B.

PART II - Enemy Order of Battle

The crossing of the ROER River on the entire III Corps front 1 March brought identifications of all enemy units known to have been lined up on the east bank of the river. While 3 Para Div in the center had recently be reorganized, and its strength and morale were sufficient to offer stubborn resistance, 272 VG Div on the south was caught in the process of a sketchy reorganization behind the ROER dams. The 353 VG Div, on the north flank of 3 Para Div, had 941 and 943 Regiments in fairly good shape, but 942 Regiment had not been reformed. This Division was hit hard early in our crossing, and by 2 March had to be reinforced by 183 Regiment, 62 VG Div, which had been reforming in the MUSKIRCHEN area. The remaining regiment of 62 VG Div, 164, remained in line against V US Corps on our south until 6 March, when it, too, shifted north, and was contacted on III Corps front.

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The 89 Regiment of 12 VG Div was identified on our north boundary the last two days of February. During the first few days of March, this division was pushed out of VII US Corps area into increasing contact on our front.

The principal surprise in enemy identifications west of the RHINE was the contact with 39 and 78 Regiments of 26 VG Div on 5 March. The Division occupied the status of an old enemy, having received a severe beating at our hands in the ARDENNES campaign. After the enemy's defeat there, however, 26 VG Div had been identified on V US Corps front up to 4 March. Apparently the reason for the northward shift of this division was to commit it in defense of its home ground, in the COLOGNE area. It never got there. The 77 Regiment was identified on our front 7 March.

As our advance shifted slightly southeast in approaching the RHINE, elements of 277 VG Div and 89 Inf Div, fighting on V Corps front, were identified.

The surprise crossing of the RHINE created a new situation. No divisional units were in position on the east bank, and the first 36 hours of the bridgehead saw commitment of miscellaneous engineer, anti-aircraft, and replacement units. The 11 Pz Div arrived 9 March and was committed against the bridgehead. This division had been fighting west of the RHINE far to our north, then was withdrawn east of the river about 5 March. It proceeded south with orders to re-cross the river at BONN and attack our north flank, but arriving after the seizure of the REMAGEN bridge, it was instead committed against the bridgehead. The 106 Pz Brig accompanied it on the same mission. A few days later two battlegroups of 130 Pz Div were attached to 11 Pz Div and committed on its south flank, in the middle of the bridgehead.

The next divisions to be committed against the bridgehead were identified 13 March. On the south 272 VG Div, which had suffered severely in the retreat across the RHINE was reinforced by some salvaged elements of 326 VG Div and by 80 Replacement Bn from COBLENZ and committed in defense of HONNINGEN. On its right flank 277 VG Div came in the same day, also in very bad straits from its retreat across the RHINE on V US Corps front. On the north the 62 VG Div and 9 Pz Div took over defense of the HONNEF area on the same day. Both were relatively weak after their withdrawal across the river.

These reinforcements enabled 11 Pz Div to narrow its zone, and with 106 Brig and elements of 130 Pz Div attached, it remained the strongest division opposing us; the division received 300 men from the HEIDELBERG NCO School 11 March, and 450 reinforcements from 139 Mountain Replacement Bn 17 March.

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On 14 March 340 VG Div was identified on the southeast of the bridgehead. This division arrived in poor condition from Third US Army front on the south, but it early received the largest single group of replacements to arrive in the area—DENMARK Battalions I, II, and III, a regimental-size unit from 160 Training Division in DENMARK. The DENMARK units soon melted away, as did later arrivals from several replacement battalions from WESTPHALIA; KG HAI a battle-group from the reforming 14 and 15 Parachute Regiments of 5 Parachute Division, which arrived 22 March, also failed to affect the situation materially.

On the same day 3 Parachute Division came back on our north, this time without General SCHIMPF (captured by 9 US Inf Div earlier in the month), and without much of its old strength.

On 17 March 26 VG Division, an old enemy from the ARDENNES and the ROER River battles, arrived on the south, under Genmaj KOKOTT, an experienced straggler collector. This acquisitive officer had partially filled out his command with remnants of 277 Replacement Regiment of BONN, 253 Replacement Battalion of AACHEN, and elements of 18 VG Div and 89 Inf Div; and he continued to wield his old influence with higher headquarters (and at straggler collecting points) to receive a steady flow of replacements.

The last ten days of the bridgehead, prior to the breakthrough of 14 US Armored Division, saw the arrival of numerous replacement units from the populous Wehrkreise north and south of the bridgehead, and from as far away as AUSTRIA.

After the armored breakthrough 26 March, identifications were of rear elements of divisions opposing the bridgehead. The rear of 11 Pz Div, enroute to meet the threat of Third US Army in the south, was overrun. Strong elements of 5 Para Div, reforming in the LIMBURG area, failed to get out of the way, and were scattered and captured. Substantial elements of 167 VG Div, engaged in withdrawing from Third US Army front, suffered a similar fate. Two regiments of 166 Training Division, from DENMARK, were hastily committed as our troops closed on the EDER Lakes, but were able to resist only a short time before being scattered. The month ended with the Corps on its objective, with no enemy in contact.

PART III - ANALYSIS OF PRISONERS OF WAR

Our surprise crossing of the RHINE River caused the hasty commitment of many non-divisional enemy units against the bridgehead; and approximately one-half of the total catch of prisoners was taken in the last few days of the month during the armored break-through into

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German rear areas. Therefore, of the month's prisoners, 68 percent were from non-divisional enemy units.

A total of 33,795 German soldiers were processed through our cages during the month, and on 31 March 1,514 remained in Division cages making a total of 35,309 prisoners taken during March. Break-down by enemy units is as follows:

| | |
|-----------------|---------------|
| 11 Pz Div | 1,576 |
| 9 Pz Div | 127 |
| 130 Pz Lehr Div | 97 |
| 106 Pz Brig | 83 |
| 272 VG Div | 1,838 |
| 340 VG Div | 1,666 |
| 277 VG Div | 1,594 |
| 26 VG Div | 1,461 |
| 326 VG Div | 926 |
| 5 Para Div | 905 |
| 167 VG Div | 300 |
| 89 Inf Div | 416 |
| 18 VG Div | 119 |
| 62 VG Div | 81 |
| 3 Para Div | 57 |
| 166 Inf Div | 500 |
| Miscellaneous | <u>23,563</u> |
| Total PW | 35,309 |

The following table breaks the total down by capturing unit and by periods of operation. The prisoners of March 1-7 were all taken between the ROER and RHINE Rivers. The figure for March 8-25 includes a few hundred enemy taken west of the RHINE up to 9 March, and stragglers rounded-up after that date, but the bulk of the prisoners taken in that period were captured by our infantry in the bridgehead. One-half of the total catch for the month was taken in the last 5 days, during the armored breakthrough.

| | 1 - 7 | 8 - 25 | 26 - 31 | March Total |
|--------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|----------------|
| 1st Inf Div | 1428 | ----- | ----- | 1428 |
| 78th Inf Div | 1521 | 940 (1) | ----- | 2461 |
| 9th Armd Div | 3727 | 34 (2) | ----- | 3761 |
| 9th Inf Div | 1798 | 3202 | 1233 | 6233 |
| 99th Inf Div | ----- | 3827 (3) | 3200 | 7027 |
| 7th Armd Div | ----- | 765 | 12589 | 13354 |
| Corps troops | 472 | 113 | 460 | 1045 |
| <u>TOTAL</u> | <u>8946</u> | <u>8881</u> | <u>17482</u> | <u>35309</u> |

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- (1) To 16 March
- (2) 8 March only
- (3) From 9 March

A number of the prisoners taken during the period were of special interest. Genmaj SCHIMFF, commanding the 3rd Para Div, took literally the order to hold the west bank of the RHINE to the last; so did Lt Col MARTIN of the 941st VG Regt, 353rd VG Div and Col FROMBERGER of the 78th VG Regt, 326 VG Div. The breakthrough of our armored columns led to the capture of Lt Col DREYER, CO of the 981st VG Regt, 272 VG Div, and Lt Col DREWES, CO of the 106th Pz Brig "Felderrnhalle".

An officer formerly publishing the "Skorpion", German propaganda leaflets for the Wehrmacht, as well as English-language propaganda leaflets for British and American consumption, was apprehended before he could get back across the RHINE. An officer and an enlisted man in the same business, but broadcasting in English to Allied troops, were overrun by our advance at the end of March. A German war correspondent surrendered himself to our bridgehead troops. Two groups of trained saboteurs fell into our hands; five of a squad of seven highly trained swimmers were driven out of the water by our defenses before they could attempt to blow the REMAGEN bridges; twenty-five French-speaking saboteurs, mainly forced volunteers, failed in their first mission of mining a village behind the American lines and became not unwilling captives.

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SECTION V, AFTER ACTION REPORT

SUPPLY AND EVACUATION SUMMARY

1. SUPPLY

a. Class I (Rations)

- (1) During the period 1 March through 31 March, rations were issued from First Army supply points in the following proportions:

"B" Rations - 83%
Operational - 17%

- (2) Ration stocks were maintained at a satisfactory level throughout the period. During the last ten days of the month, however, Class I truckheads operated on a day-to-day basis without maintaining reserves because rapid tactical advances made necessary the frequent displacement of supply points forward and transportation to lift reserves was not available.

b. Class III

(1) Gasoline and Oil

- (a) The average daily issue of V-80 gasoline for the month was approximately 96,000 gallons. During the last twenty days of the month, because of the intensified operations, the daily issue increased markedly and averaged 123,000 gallons. Adequate stocks of gasoline were maintained throughout the period to meet requirements.

- (b) Adequate stocks of allied products were maintained during the period except for the last five days. During the last five days priority was given to the shipment of gasoline to supply points and as a consequence, the stocks of certain grades of oils and greases were depleted. This shortage was met, however, by a special shipment of fifteen truck loads of these items by First United States Army.

(2) Solid Fuel

- (a) Because of the warm weather, negligible quantities of solid fuel were drawn during the period.

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c. Class V

(1) Ordnance

- (a) During the period four ASPs were established to serve III Corps. ASP No 144, established in the Remagen bridgehead on 21 March, vicinity of DATTENBERG, was the first ASP to be established by United States forces east of the Rhine River.
- (b) The average expenditure of ammunition for the month was moderate. Expenditures were heavy for a short period preceding the attack launched from the bridgehead and then dropped considerably during the rapid advance to the East. Artillery ammunition expenditures during some days of the advance were nil.
- (c) In the period when the bridgehead was being secured, from 7 March to 16 March, the expenditure of anti-aircraft ammunition was unusually heavy. Antiaircraft expenditures during this period were:

| | | |
|---------|---|---------------|
| 50 cal. | - | 1,962,699 rds |
| 37mm | - | 15,000 rds |
| 40mm | - | 47,684 rds |
| 90mm | - | 633 rds |

- (d) No critical ammunition shortages developed during the period.

(2) Chemical

- (a) During this month, for the first time since the operations in the ARDENNES, the availability of all types of chemical mortar ammunition was more than ample to meet requirements.

(3) Engineer

- (a) Supply was normal; no critical shortages were experienced.

d. Class II & IV

(1) Quartermaster

- (a) Shortages of certain quartermaster items continued to be critical. Among items critically short were:

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Outfits, cooking, 1-burner
Combat clothing

- (b) During the last ten days of the period there was little activity in Class II & IV supplies because of the rapid advance of the troops and the excessive distances to the Class II & IV Depot.

(2) Ordnance

- (a) During the period five hundred allocations were issued for 3,135 major items of equipment. Among items issued were:

| | |
|--------------------------|-------------|
| Fire control equipment | 1,254 items |
| Small arms | 393 |
| 105mm & 155mm How | 6 |
| Self propelled guns | 34 |
| Light tanks | 14 |
| General purpose vehicles | 248 |
| Special purpose vehicles | 32 |
| Tires and tubes | 2,279 |

(3) Chemical

- (a) A survey was made of Corps troops, exclusive of divisions, to determine the quantity of gas masks on hand in excess of authorized allowances. Results showed a total excess of 38 masks, gas, service, lightweight; ten unserviceable masks, gas, service, lightweight; and two assault masks. These were turned into the Army CWS Depot.
- (b) Chemical supplies were adequate to meet requirements.

(4) Medical

- (a) Medical supplies were adequate and no critical shortages were reported.
- (b) Medical supply points were displaced forward rapidly in order to give continuous close support to combat troops.

(5) Signal

S E C R E T

- (1) During the month a new problem encountered was the taking over of and exploitation of commercial telephone exchange installations. At BAD NEUENAHN, telephone and telegraph facilities with emergency power system were found intact. Trunk circuits were opened by removal of heat coils and all local circuits opened by cutting of jumpers on the main frame.
- (2) Underground circuits were tested from the BAD NEUENAHN terminal to points in the direction of the Corps advance. These circuits were utilized to the fullest extent by Corps and Army.
- (3) When it became necessary for Army to temporarily suspend issue of cable and wire because of heavy withdrawals from depots, intensified recovery activities possible during the slower advances while consolidating the bridgehead resulted in the recovery of over 900 reels of spiral four cable and approximately 100 miles of fixed wire.

e. Medical

- (1) The crossing of the Roer River and the rapid advances through ZULPICH, EUSKIRCHEN, and BAD NEUENAHN to the Rhine presented no particular medical problems. During this period operations progressed normally.
- (2) After the seizure of the Rhine River crossing, it became necessary to provide means for the evacuation of wounded from the bridgehead. On 13 March, the 1st Hospital Unit of the 13th Field Hospital opened east of the Rhine River at UNKEL. Evacuation during the period was effected by LCVP's across the Rhine at UNKEL and LINZ, by motor ambulance across the treadway bridge, and by L5 plances from an airstrip near UNKEL.
- (3) In rapid advance during the late part of the month very few casualties resulted, and although evacuation hauls were long (40 to 50 miles), all patients arrived at hospitals in very good condition.
- (4) At the end of the period the problem confronting the Medical Service was caring for and supplying liberated Allied PW camps and overrun German military hospitals.
- (5) For a summary of admission and dispositions see Inclosure No 1.

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- (a) In the early part of the period during the advance to the Rhine, it was necessary for First United States Army to suspend temporarily the issue of cable and wire because of the large withdrawals from depot stocks.
 - (b) Large stocks of captured signal equipment were uncovered during the month at:
 - 1. BAD NEUENAHHR - radio repair parts, hook-up wire, radio tubes.
 - 2. UNKEL - German spiral four, open wire, line tools.
 - (c) When it became necessary to establish a switching central on the east side of the Rhine, First United States Army furnished III Corps a TC-4 switchboard for the purpose.
- (6) Engineer
- (a) During the rapid advance and the extension of supply lines, transporting of bridging became a critical problem.
 - 1. Although requests made to First United States Army for 100% replacement of Heavy Ponton bridging was disapproved, 50% replacement was approved and was kept at bridge sites on the Rhine River.
 - (b) Critical items of engineer supply.
 - 1. Foot bridge equipment and items for infantry support rafts were short, however, because amounts on hand were strictly controlled, operations were not critically impaired.
 - 2. Some items of erection gear for construction of Bailey bridges were not available the first part of the period. Necessary tools were improvised.
 - 3. During the Rhine River crossing the supply of certain items, such as power boats and cranes, was very critical and items destroyed or lost due to enemy action could not be replaced.

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4. Reserve supplies of Treadway and Heavy Ponton bridging were not available because of requirements for the bridging operations of other Corps and the crossing of the Rhine River at a date earlier than anticipated.

(c) Lumber, rope and cable equipment were secured for the most part, from captured stocks.

2. OPERATION

a. Quartermaster

(1) Laundry

- (a) During the month a Quartermaster Laundry Company operated in support of III Corps. Three platoons serviced the Divisions and Corps troops while the other platoon operated with the Quartermaster Fumigation and Bath Company.
- (b) During the rapid movement of the Corps after the breakout of the Remagen bridgehead the volume of laundry received was considerably reduced. The laundry platoons were displaced forward during this time so as to be ready for operation in close support as soon as tactical units were able to utilize laundry service.

(2) Fumigation and Bath

- (a) One Fumigation and Bath Company supported III Corps. Platoons were placed in support of Divisions and Corps troops and schedules were arranged directly with the Fumigation and Bath Officer.
- (b) During the rapid advance east of the Rhine River, virtually no requests for shower service were received. During this time the company followed the advance without setting up for operation and forward reconnaissance was made for locations in order to place the Fumigation and Bath units in operation as quickly as possible when units again requested service.

(3) Salvage

- (a) During the month of March, organized salvage activities on the part of all units decreased during the crossing of the Roer and Rhine Rivers because of the speed of

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advance. In addition because all the transportation available to Corps was used to haul troops and supplies, it was not possible for Corps to conduct as extensive a recovery program as during previous months.

- (b) About 15 March a critical shortage of gasoline cans developed. III Corps provided four trucks to the 619 Quartermaster Battalion to conduct gasoline can salvage operations in rear of the Corps area. On 27 Mar two additional trucks were made available. During this program 6,112 gasoline cans were recovered.
- (4) Burial and Graves Registration.
- (a) During March, 1,753 American and 657 enemy dead were evacuated through Corps and Division Graves Registration Collecting Points.
 - (b) Of the total American dead evacuated during March, one body remained unidentified.
 - (c) On 5 March a Corps Graves Registration Collecting Point was established in order to reduce the distance necessary for the Divisions to transport dead. During the advance to the East the Corps Graves Registration Collecting Point displaced forward so as to keep within 10 miles of division collecting points. Personnel and transportation from Corps was used to evacuate dead to the Army Military Cemetery at HENRI-CHAPELLE, Belgium.
 - (d) In order to reduce the turn around Army was requested to establish an intermediate Graves Registration Collecting Point. On 14 March, Army established a Graves Registration Collecting Point at EUSKIRCHEN.
 - (e) On 29 March the Graves Registration Company supporting III Corps established, at the request of Army, a cemetery at ITTENBACH, Germany.

b. Ordnance

- (1) The 83d Ordnance Battalion with seven maintenance companies, together with three maintenance companies and one depot company of the 47th Ordnance Battalion, had the mission of supporting III Corps.
- (2) Ordnance units gave satisfactory support to combat units throughout the period.

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- (a) In some instances difficulty was experienced in securing sites suitable for operation. Hard standing required by ordnance companies during rainy seasons was available only in limited quantities in the areas most suitable for ordnance support. In addition priorities necessarily established to control the large amount of supply traffic and troop movements into the Remagen Bridgehead over the limited road net hampered the movement of ordnance companies forward.
- (b) When it was not possible to place ordnance companies in close support of using units, contact teams were formed and sent forward to remain with supported units. This system operated satisfactorily as evidenced by the fact that during the period no artillery piece was out of operation for more than twenty four hours because of maintenance difficulties.

c. Engineer

(1) Bridging

- (a) Bailey: During the period thirty-five fixed Bailey bridges, a total of 2,890 feet, was constructed. In addition, one floating Bailey bridge of 1,060 feet was constructed across the Rhine River.
 - (b) Treadway: During the period thirty-seven fixed Treadway bridges, a total length of 1,320 feet, was constructed. In addition, 1,140 feet of floating Treadway bridge was constructed.
 - (c) Heavy Ponton: One Heavy Ponton bridge, 969 feet in length, was constructed across the Rhine River.
 - (d) Special Bridges: Two 72 feet Foot bridges and one 72 foot Infantry Support bridge were committed during the period.
 - (e) Fixed timber: No fixed timber bridges were constructed.
- (2) Instruction and assistance in camouflage technique was furnished by the engineer camouflage company in support of III Corps. This unit also furnished camouflage material when and where needed.

d. Signal

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3. TRAFFIC & TRANSPORTATION

a. Traffic clearances.

- (1) During the period Corps operations included the advance from the Roer River to the Rhine River, the crossing of the Rhine River, the breakout from the bridgehead, and a rapid advance deeper into Germany. During all these operations there was considerable shifting of troops within the Corps area and movement of troops into and through the Corps area in addition to the heavy supply traffic necessary to support these operations. Although some traffic into the Corps area, especially during the period of the Rhine River crossing and the subsequent build-up in this bridgehead, was not cleared, the system of scheduling and routing of convoys made possible maximum utilization of limited road nets with congestion and delay reduced to a minimum.
- (2) Two hundred and eight six convoys involving 30,433 vehicles were scheduled and routed by the Traffic Section, G-4 Office.
- (3) The following divisions or elements moved into, through, or out of the Corps sector: 1st Infantry Division, 2d Infantry Division, 3d Armored Division, 7th Armored Division, 9th Infantry Division, 9th Armored Division, 28th Infantry Division 78th Infantry Division and 104th Infantry Division.
- (4) Of 229 clearances for movement of service and supporting units, 74 (32%) were issued to field artillery units, 55 (24%) to antiaircraft artillery units, 49 (21%) to engineer units, 14 (6%) to ordnance units with the remaining (17%) issued to tank destroyer, signal, quartermaster, cavalry, tank, chemical, medical and other miscellaneous units.
- (5) The 286 clearances issued were requested as follows:

| | <u>Number</u> | <u>Percentage</u> |
|------------------|---------------|-------------------|
| First U. S. Army | 65 | 22.7 |
| Corps units | 149 | 52.1 |
| Other Corps | 24 | 8.7 |
| Divisions | 47 | 16.4 |

b. Circulation and Control

- (1) The principal problem during the period was the control of traffic circulation to and across the Rhine River bridges.

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(2) Plan

- (a) Up until the time when responsibility was assumed by III Corps on 12 March, traffic control over the river was exercised by the 9th Armored Division. Prior to assuming control of traffic over the river, III Corps established a circulation plan for traffic moving to the river. Traffic approaching the Remagen crossing was fed into the site on a one-way traffic loop with counter-clockwise circulation. The western end of the traffic loop was established at ESSIG with the eastern end at REMAGEN. The roads were adequate for one-way traffic but were not capable of carrying full two-way traffic.
- (b) Traffic moving over the approach roads were controlled through clearances issued by G-4, Traffic Headquarters.
- (c) The supervision and regulation of traffic on roads and bridges was exercised by the REMAGEN Traffic Headquarters, staffed and operated by the 14th Cavalry Group.
- (d) The capacities and limitation of bridges were determined by the Corps Engineer who in turn kept the Remagen Traffic Headquarters fully informed at all times as to condition of bridges, boats and ferries.
- (e) The Provost Marshal maintained close liaison with G-4 Traffic Section and The Remagen Traffic Headquarters.
- (f) The following communication system was established to control the flow of traffic at critical points.
 - 1. Full period telephone from G-4 Traffic Section to Remagen Traffic Headquarters.
 - 2. Radio and telephone communication between Remagen Traffic Headquarters, traffic control posts at the ends of each bridge, and traffic control posts on roads leading to bridges and ferries.

(3) Volume of traffic over bridges

- (a) Although bridge traffic was heavy throughout the operation, bridge capacity exceeded capacity of the road net leading to the bridge sites.

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(b) During the period 160500 March to 280500 March (12 days) a total of 58,308 vehicles passed over the bridges with 36,754 vehicles traveling eastward and 21,554, westward.

(c) For additional data see inclosures 2, 3, 4 and 5.

5 Incls:

- #1 - Summary of Casualties: Admissions and Dispositions
- #2 - Traffic Density Data - Remagen Bridgehead
- #3 - Graph - Total Traffic, Rhine Bridges
- #4 - Graph - Traffic - East and West Bound, Rhine Bridges
- #5 - Graph - Average Hourly Traffic, Rhine Bridges

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ADMISSIONS AND DISPOSITIONS
for month ending 31 March 1945

| UNIT | DATES | DISEASE | | | | ADMISSIONS | | | | DISPOSITIONS | | | | | |
|---------------|---------------|---------|-----|----|-------|------------|--------|------|-------|--------------|-------|------|------|-------|--------|
| | | TF | B | EX | N.P. | OTHER | N.B.I. | F.B. | SIA | LIA | TOTAL | ADM | DUTY | EVAC | DIED |
| III Corps Ctr | 1 to 31 Incl: | 3 | 8 | 0 | 114: | 37: | 0 | 0 | 18: | 180: | 5 | 117 | 0 | 58: | 180: |
| 1st Inf Div | 1 to 8 " | 1 | 29 | 0 | 190: | 82: | 0 | 57 | 359: | 718: | 2 | 711 | 2 | 3: | 718: |
| 7th Armd Div | 14 to 31 " | 0 | 15 | 0 | 232: | 100: | 0 | 33 | 178: | 558: | 81 | 395 | 0 | 82: | 558: |
| 9th Inf Div | 1 to 31 " | 10 | 235 | 0 | 1151: | 302: | 4 | 944 | 1014: | 3660: | 62 | 3399 | 11 | 188: | 3660: |
| 9th Armd Div | 1 to 21 " | 37 | 119 | 1 | 286: | 166: | 18 | 136 | 959: | 1722: | 71 | 1522 | 18 | 111: | 1722: |
| 78th Inf Div | 1 to 16 " | 33 | 184 | 0 | 326: | 186: | 9 | 250 | 1524: | 2512: | 33 | 2138 | 7 | 334: | 2512: |
| 99th Inf Div | 10 to 31 " | 5 | 152 | 0 | 438: | 223: | 0 | 257 | 836: | 1911: | 182 | 1401 | 13 | 315: | 1911: |
| TOTAL | | 89 | 742 | 1 | 2737: | 1096: | 31 | 1677 | 4888: | 11261: | 436 | 9683 | 51 | 1091: | 11261: |


Explanation of Abbreviations:

| | | | | | |
|--------|----|---------------------|------|----|----------------------------|
| TF | -- | Trench Foot | B.I. | -- | Battle Injuries |
| B EX | -- | Battle Exhaustion | F.B. | -- | Frost Bite |
| N.P. | -- | Neuropsychiatrics | SIA | -- | Severely Wounded in Action |
| N.B.I. | -- | Non-battle Injuries | LIA | -- | Lightly Wounded in Action |
| | | | REM | -- | Remaining |

S E C R E T


TRAFFIC DENSITY DATA - REMAGEN BRIDGEHEAD

| <u>Period</u> <u>0500-0500 hrs</u> | <u>Hvy Pon</u> <u>(24T)</u> | <u>Tdy(40T)</u> | <u>Floating</u> <u>Bailey</u> <u>(40T)</u> | <u>Total</u> <u>EB</u> | <u>Total</u> <u>WB</u> | <u>Total</u> <u>Vehs</u> | <u>Difference</u> |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------|--|---------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|
| | | 55E | | | | | |
| 16-17 Mar | 2729 | 414W | | 2784 | 414 | 3198 | 2370E |
| | | 542E | | | | | |
| 17-18 | 2109 | 1687W | | 2651 | 1687 | 4338 | 964E |
| | | 26E | | | | | |
| 18-19 | 2435 | 1626W | | 2461 | 1626 | 4087 | 835E |
| | | 60E | | | | | |
| 19-20 | 2088 | 1719W | | 2148 | 1719 | 3867 | 429E |
| | | 66E | | | | | |
| 20-21 | 2602 | 1588W | | 2668 | 1588 | 4256 | 108E |
| | | 500E | 415E | | | | |
| 21-22 | 3539 | 194W | 1749W | 4454 | 1943 | 6397 | 2511E |
| | | 660E | 63E | | | | |
| 22-23 | 2523 | 24W | 2330W | 3246 | 2354 | 5600 | 892E |
| | | 897E | 888E | | | | |
| 23-24 | 2368 | 186W | 1751W | 4153 | 1937 | 6090 | 2216E |
| | | 1403E | 738E | | | | |
| 24-25 | 2165 | 234W | 1818W | 4306 | 2052 | 6358 | 2254E |
| | | 423E | 436E | | | | |
| 25-26 | 2279 | 1367W | 976W | 3138 | 2343 | 5481 | 795E |
| | | 758E | 32E | | | | |
| 26-27 | 1634 | 10W | 2024W | 2424 | 2034 | 4458 | 390E |
| | | 607E | 139E | | | | |
| 27-28 | <u>1575</u> | <u>193W</u> | <u>1664W</u> | <u>2321</u> | <u>1857</u> | <u>4178</u> | <u>464E</u> |
| Totals | | 5,997E | 2,711E | | | | |
| (12 days) | 28,046 | 9,242W | 12,312W | 36,754 | 21,554 | 58,308 | 15,200E |
| Average | | 500E | 226E | | | | |
| Per Day | 2,337 | 770W | 1,026W | 3,063 | 1,796 | 4,859 | 1,267E |
| Average | | 20E | 10E | | | | |
| Per hr | 97 | 32W | 43W | 127 | 75 | 202 | 52E |




RHINE BRIDGES
(0500-0500) COMMENCING

INCL # 3



RHINE BRIDGES

INCL #4



RHINE BRIDGES

NO. VEHICLES
 AVERAGE HOURLY TRAFFIC FOR PERIOD 16-28 MARCH
 INCL #5
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SECTION VI, SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, HEADQUARTERS III CORPS

PERSONNEL SUMMARY

1. Battle and Non-Battle Casualties: During the month, units under III Corps suffered a total of 7274 battle casualties and 3481 were hospitalized for illness and non-battle injuries. The following table indicates these casualties by major component and type:

Table No. 1

| | KIA | WIA | MIA | Total BC | Sick & Non BC | Total Casualties | Days in Corps |
|--------------|-----|------|-----|----------|---------------|------------------|---------------|
| Corps Troops | 44 | 407 | 28 | 479 | 426 | 905 | 31 |
| 1st Inf Div | 50 | 334 | 61 | 445 | 218 | 663 | 7 |
| 9th Inf Div | 321 | 1621 | 308 | 2250 | 1395 | 3645 | 30 |
| 28th Inf Div | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 49 | 50 | 2 |
| 78th Inf Div | 94 | 1036 | 186 | 1316 | 339 | 1655 | 13 |
| 99th Inf Div | 210 | 1151 | 86 | 1447 | 647 | 2094 | 22 |
| 7th Armd Div | 27 | 193 | 4 | 224 | 239 | 463 | 31 |
| 9th Armd Div | 157 | 934 | 21 | 1112 | 168 | 1280 | 20 |
| Total | 903 | 5677 | 694 | 7274 | 3481 | 10755 | |

Of the above figures, only 82 killed, 724 wounded and 97 missing can be directly attributed to the crossing of the Rhine River and subsequent action between the inclusive dates 7 to 11 March 1945.

2. Prisoners of War Captured: A total of 33795 prisoners of war were captured by III Corps units during the period. See Table No. 2 for the breakdown of captures by major components and by date.

3. Reinforcements and Hospital Returnees: The reinforcement situation was never particularly acute at any time during the period. A shortage of Engineer and Field Artillery trained personnel does exist, however, to the extent that within divisions it was necessary to effect transfers from other branches to fill existing enlisted vacancies. 7949 reinforcements were received during the period, and 2645 former members of units were returned from hospitals. See Tables 3 and 4 for the breakdown by major components.

4. Graves Registration: Burials were made in the following cemeteries:

U. S. Military Cemetery - Henri-Chapelle, Belgium.
American, Allied and German dead.

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U. S. Military Cemetery No. 1 - Ittenbach, Germany.
American dead.
German Military Cemetery No. 1 - Ittenbach, Germany.
German dead.

5. Awards and Decorations: The following awards were made by this headquarters: 14 Silver Stars, 105 Bronze Star medals and 18 Air Medals. In addition to the above, recommendations for 2 Medals of Honor, 6 Legions of Merit and 22 Distinguished Service Crosses were approved and forwarded to the Army Commander.

6. Special Service: Approximately 280000 troops received Special Service benefits of one type or another through the medium of 12 civilian shows, 39 USO shows, 24 Soldier shows, 24 orchestra appearances, loaned motion picture films, and similar forms of entertainment. Publications distributed through this service included 708750 copies of Stars and Stripes, 58200 copies of Yank, 130250 copies of Tomorrow, 125500 copies of Warweek, 40000 copies of Army Talks and 6975 copies of Flash.

7. American Red Cross: The Corps Field Director handled 144 new welfare cases, closed 133 cases and at the close of the period had 61 cases unfinished. Comfort items were distributed as follows through medical channels, the Corps Rest Center and directly to troops in the field: 2400 packs of chewing gum, 2500 packs of cigarettes, 1800 candy bars, 600 bars of soap, 500 combs, 750 tubes of toothpaste, 1300 packs of tobacco and numerous other items such as magazines, home town newspapers, playing cards and stationery. The clubmobile section served doughnuts and coffee to approximately 66000 troops during the period.

8. Leaves, Furloughs and Passes:

a. To the United States: Under the provisions of Circular 124, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army, 1944, a total of 634 officers and enlisted men were returned to the United States for 30 day periods of leave or furlough. Not more than 8 percent of this total were officers and priority of selection was given to those with long periods of service overseas and whose duties required them to be habitually in front line company areas. Allocations to major components were as follows:

| | |
|------------------------|-----|
| 1st Infantry Division | 242 |
| 9th Infantry Division | 179 |
| 78th Infantry Division | 18 |

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| | |
|------------------------|-----|
| 99th Infantry Division | 26 |
| 7th Armored Division | 43 |
| 9th Armored Division | 17 |
| Corps Troops | 109 |

b. III Corps Rest Center, Huy, Belgium: The capacity of the Center was increased to 1000 for each 72 hour period and numerous recreation facilities were added during the month. The nature of the tactical operation during the latter half of the month prohibited many units from availing themselves of its services. In spite of this, however, a total of 162 officers and 3198 enlisted men visited the Center.

c. To Paris, France: The privilege of visiting Paris, France for 72 hour periods of informal leave or pass was extended to 377 officers and 1834 enlisted men from elements of the Corps.

d. To Brussels, Belgium: A total of 67 officers and 567 enlisted men were granted 72 hour leaves or passes to visit Brussels during the month.

e. To Great Britain: Two plans were in operation which permitted personnel of the command to visit the United Kingdom. One of these plans permitted a limited number of field grade officers to make the journey by air for 72 hour periods of temporary duty or on 7 day leave, as they desired. Twenty nine officers availed themselves of this privilege during the period. The second plan permitted all grades to travel by surface transportation for 7 day periods of leave and furlough. Under this plan 37 officers and 445 enlisted men visited the United Kingdom.

f. To the Riviera Recreational Area: The initial quota for 7 day periods of leave or furlough to the Riviera was received late in the period. On 27 March the first group, consisting of 3 officers and 21 enlisted men departed for the Recreation Area by plane.

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S E C R E T

PRISONERS OF WAR CAPTURED

Table No. 2

| Date | Corps | 1st Inf Div | 9th Inf Div | 28th Inf Div | 78th Inf Div | 99th Inf Div | 7th Armd Div | 9th Armd Div | Total |
|--------------|------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| 1 | 15 | 145 | 177 | * | 60 | * | * | 106 | 503 |
| 2 | 1 | 217 | 348 | * | 343 | * | * | 78 | 987 |
| 3 | 0 | 171 | 387 | * | 278 | * | * | 392 | 1228 |
| 4 | 20 | 257 | 210 | * | 158 | * | * | 136 | 781 |
| 5 | 8 | 164 | 311 | * | 248 | * | * | 381 | 1112 |
| 6 | 0 | 223 | 335 | * | 211 | * | * | 334 | 1103 |
| 7 | 11 | 251 | 94 | * | 254 | * | * | 600 | 1210 |
| 8 | 92 | * | 113 | * | 75 | * | * | 700 | 980 |
| 9 | 229 | * | 0 | * | 0 | * | 188 | 1000 | 1417 |
| 10 | 1 | * | 758 | * | 0 | 0 | 205 | 0 | 964 |
| 11 | 0 | * | 300 | * | 285 | 59 | 183 | 0 | 827 |
| 12 | 1 | * | 178 | * | 24 | 50 | 66 | 9 | 328 |
| 13 | 0 | * | 58 | * | 88 | 224 | 22 | 4 | 396 |
| 14 | 0 | * | 160 | * | * | 37 | 40 | 3 | 240 |
| 15 | 0 | * | 323 | * | * | 215 | 3 | 0 | 541 |
| 16 | 0 | * | 110 | * | * | 333 | 5 | 0 | 448 |
| 17 | 29 | * | 343 | * | * | 352 | 21 | 18 | 763 |
| 18 | 1 | * | 340 | * | * | 223 | 0 | 0 | 564 |
| 19 | 0 | * | 278 | * | * | 332 | 0 | 0 | 610 |
| 20 | 67 | * | 34 | * | * | 256 | 3 | 0 | 360 |
| 21 | 2 | * | 0 | * | * | 174 | 0 | * | 176 |
| 22 | 0 | * | 20 | * | * | 9 | 20 | * | 49 |
| 23 | 0 | * | 40 | * | * | 40 | 2 | * | 82 |
| 24 | 0 | * | 173 | * | * | 133 | 3 | * | 309 |
| 25 | 0 | * | 323 | * | * | 659 | 1 | * | 983 |
| 26 | 0 | * | 303 | * | * | 144 | 2000 | * | 2447 |
| 27 | 0 | * | 0 | * | * | 620 | 1000 | * | 1620 |
| 28 | 14 | * | 326 | * | * | 301 | 1001 | * | 1642 |
| 29 | 14 | * | 327 | * | * | 1078 | 4868 | * | 6287 |
| 30 | 172 | * | 280 | 36 | * | 678 | 2552 | * | 3718 |
| 31 | 162 | * | * | 109 | * | 463 | 386 | * | 1120 |
| Total | 839 | 1428 | 6649 | 145 | 2024 | 6380 | 12569 | 3761 | 33795 |

* Not assigned to III Corps on this date.

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REINFORCEMENTS RECEIVED

Table No. 3

| : Date : | Corps Troops | 1st Inf Div | 9th Inf Div | 28th Inf Div | 78th Inf Div | 99th Inf Div | 7th Armd Div | 9th Armd Div | Total: |
|----------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------|
| 1 | 12 | 2 | 5 | * | 2 | * | * | 0 | 21 |
| 2 | 18 | 0 | 0 | * | 0 | * | * | 0 | 18 |
| 3 | 8 | 0 | 5 | * | 0 | * | * | 1 | 14 |
| 4 | 2 | 138 | 0 | * | 266 | * | * | 11 | 417 |
| 5 | 31 | 1 | 323 | * | 34 | * | * | 0 | 389 |
| 6 | 3 | 51 | 0 | * | 7 | * | * | 156 | 217 |
| 7 | 6 | 0 | 215 | * | 2 | * | * | 0 | 223 |
| 8 | 19 | * | 0 | * | 490 | * | * | 0 | 509 |
| 9 | 40 | * | 0 | * | 0 | * | 0 | 0 | 40 |
| 10 | 2 | * | 0 | * | 0 | 123 | 0 | 401 | 526 |
| 11 | 2 | * | 0 | * | 143 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 146 |
| 12 | 9 | * | 100 | * | 0 | 196 | 0 | 116 | 421 |
| 13 | 15 | * | 27 | * | 0 | 18 | 0 | 13 | 73 |
| 14 | 71 | * | 74 | * | * | 91 | 0 | 169 | 405 |
| 15 | 30 | * | 187 | * | * | 116 | 0 | 47 | 380 |
| 16 | 27 | * | 36 | * | * | 28 | 3 | 20 | 114 |
| 17 | 32 | * | 343 | * | * | 335 | 25 | 133 | 868 |
| 18 | 19 | * | 243 | * | * | 398 | 6 | 110 | 776 |
| 19 | 20 | * | 259 | * | * | 197 | 0 | 15 | 491 |
| 20 | 48 | * | 0 | * | * | 2 | 1 | 42 | 93 |
| 21 | 25 | * | 42 | * | * | 3 | 0 | * | 70 |
| 22 | 21 | * | 43 | * | * | 31 | 0 | * | 95 |
| 23 | 23 | * | 123 | * | * | 141 | 0 | * | 287 |
| 24 | 13 | * | 199 | * | * | 317 | 9 | * | 538 |
| 25 | 50 | * | 89 | * | * | 156 | 0 | * | 295 |
| 26 | 50 | * | 0 | * | * | 131 | 0 | * | 181 |
| 27 | 19 | * | 0 | * | * | 1 | 0 | * | 20 |
| 28 | 0 | * | 225 | * | * | 0 | 0 | * | 225 |
| 29 | 0 | * | 8 | * | * | 0 | 0 | * | 8 |
| 30 | 4 | * | 0 | 0 | * | 5 | 0 | * | 9 |
| 31 | 79 | * | * | 1 | * | 0 | 0 | * | 80 |
| Total: | 698 | 192 | 2546 | 1 | 944 | 2289 | 45 | 1234 | 7949 |

* Not assigned to III Corps on this date.

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HOSPITAL RETURNNEES (RTD's)

Table No. 4

| Date | Corps | 1st Inf Div | 9th Inf Div | 28th Inf Div | 78th Inf Div | 99th Inf Div | 7th Armd Div | 9th Armd Div | Total |
|--------------|------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|
| 1 | 0 | 124 | 144 | * | 41 | * | * | 0 | 309 |
| 2 | 8 | 0 | 0 | * | 2 | * | * | 6 | 16 |
| 3 | 6 | 1 | 0 | * | 0 | * | * | 4 | 11 |
| 4 | 52 | 50 | 0 | * | 7 | * | * | 6 | 115 |
| 5 | 6 | 1 | 93 | * | 64 | * | * | 0 | 164 |
| 6 | 5 | 108 | 1 | * | 5 | * | * | 0 | 119 |
| 7 | 6 | 0 | 45 | * | 1 | * | * | 0 | 55 |
| 8 | 4 | * | 48 | * | 1 | * | * | 0 | 53 |
| 9 | 4 | * | 0 | * | 0 | * | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| 10 | 0 | * | 2 | * | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| 11 | 2 | * | 2 | * | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 9 |
| 12 | 4 | * | 238 | * | 69 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 322 |
| 13 | 9 | * | 113 | * | 4 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 136 |
| 14 | 2 | * | 19 | * | * | 0 | 0 | 44 | 65 |
| 15 | 14 | * | 1 | * | * | 28 | 0 | 10 | 53 |
| 16 | 1 | * | 36 | * | * | 43 | 1 | 7 | 88 |
| 17 | 11 | * | 87 | * | * | 2 | 64 | 21 | 185 |
| 18 | 5 | * | 52 | * | * | 29 | 20 | 15 | 121 |
| 19 | 7 | * | 91 | * | * | 49 | 3 | 26 | 176 |
| 20 | 10 | * | 0 | * | * | 2 | 0 | 7 | 19 |
| 21 | 10 | * | 77 | * | * | 32 | 0 | * | 119 |
| 22 | 5 | * | 30 | * | * | 12 | 55 | * | 102 |
| 23 | 9 | * | 35 | * | * | 13 | 0 | * | 57 |
| 24 | 13 | * | 26 | * | * | 6 | 21 | * | 66 |
| 25 | 17 | * | 160 | * | * | 30 | 0 | * | 207 |
| 26 | 7 | * | 0 | * | * | 4 | 0 | * | 11 |
| 27 | 0 | * | 0 | * | * | 0 | 0 | * | 0 |
| 28 | 1 | * | 0 | * | * | 7 | 0 | * | 8 |
| 29 | 0 | * | 0 | * | * | 17 | 0 | * | 17 |
| 30 | 8 | * | 0 | 0 | * | 2 | 0 | * | 10 |
| 31 | 10 | * | * | 0 | * | 14 | 0 | * | 24 |
| Total | 236 | 284 | 1300 | 0 | 199 | 295 | 170 | 161 | 2645 |

* Not assigned to III Corps on this date.

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SECTION VII

MILITARY GOVERNMENT SUMMARY

1. Situation

a. Military operations conducted by the III Corps during the month of March may well be characterized as "fast and furious". Fast advances made during the period permitted the Military Government Officers on Division Staffs or Detachments spearheading the Divisions, to accomplish only what is known as the "initial phase" of Military Government functions, and this only in about one half of the towns and communities embraced by the Corps area. The initial phase functions comprised the the appointment of new or temporary retention of present burgermeisters, posting of proclamations and ordering the civilians to turn in weapons, ammunition and radio sending apparatus. As quickly as new territories were uncovered, regular Military Government Detachments, "pin-pointed" for the area, were called forward and deployed, leaving to them the setting up of full scale Military Government Operations.

b. Many towns and villages, especially on the west bank of the Rhine River, were badly damaged and some completely destroyed and in such instances most of the population, including all the officials, fled or were evacuated by the Nazis before our advance. Many dead civilians were uncovered in the ruins of their homes and public buildings. The premises of financial institutions, public utilities and factories were found destroyed by bombing and shellfire, and there is virtually nothing of value remaining in such areas. Among the larger towns, on the west bank of the Rhine, uncovered during the first ten days of period was Bad Godesberg. The town is the birthplace of Beethoven, is known as a health resort, and in 1939 was the seat of the meeting of the appeasers, Hitler, Chamberlain, et als. This town was only 10% damaged and investigation revealed that out of normal population of 32,000, not 50 persons complied with Nazi evacuation order.

c. Despite the extensive damage and destruction to life and property, the reaction and attitude of the populace in areas west of the Rhine, to Military Government, was that of docility and anxiety to oblige and conform to orders and restrictions. They appeared to be well fed and much better clothed than the people of England: that was true of rural areas particularly. On the east side of the Rhine a marked increase in the total number of rabid members of the Nazi Party was observed, which seems to indicate that this condition will be accentuated as we enter deeper into Germany.

d. The people appeared to adopt an opportunistic policy of cooperation with the American Forces, and they showed evidence of war weariness

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and a desire for a period of peace. There was also evidence of dread of the Russians, undoubtedly the result of the Nazi propaganda about the Russian "beast".

e. Reports from Military Government Officers in the field indicate that local civilian food resources were sufficient for periods varying from one to six months. Considerable early spring farmwork was in evidence everywhere. Requests for manual laborers for military units, particularly road work, are being only in part, filled. Military Government Officers report 100% cooperation from Burgermeisters and civilian labor, in the removal of road blocks, street repair, burial of dead animals, and general clean-up.

f. Surveys made by Military Government Detachments indicated a general shortage of drugs, and a rather serious shortage of doctors and other medical personnel. There was a noticeable decline in public health. During first three weeks of March, 160 cases of typhus were reported in the Corps area, of which number, 100 were in Bad Godesberg. Cases were reported to Military Government Public Health Officials who carried out control program, furnished supplies, immunized personnel, deloused and isolated suspects. Approximately 50 cases of diphtheria were reported.

g. Operations of Military Government Courts, in Corps area, were conducted with scrupulous fairness. Two petitions for Review of two sentences by Summary Courts for violation of Law No. 53 (Foreign Currency) were considered by Corps Commander and sentences quashed. Remaining cases were of minor nature involving violations of curfew restrictions and unauthorized possession of United States Government Property. Violators were fined, and fines paid.

h. Military Government Officers report that the problem of observance of SCAFF's policy forbidding troops to fraternize with civilians in occupied Germany has to date presented no difficulty. Although the Americans are known to be "poor haters" the anti-fraternization order is being adhered to commendably.

i. Coordination between tactical troops and Military Government Detachments has enabled tactical restrictions on civilian circulation to be modified, generally within three to five days, so as to allow civilian workers to travel to and from work and to permit the handling and distribution of food stuffs within tactical areas, to allow farmers to go about their chores and to allow normal church services. Commanding Officers of tactical units have, in innumerable instances, carried out the "initial phase" of Military Government functions in areas not yet reached by Military Government Officers, thereby rendering services of inestimable value.

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j. It is estimated that during subject period approximately 100,000 Displaced Persons, forced laborers and Allied Prisoners of War have been uncovered in III Corps Area, the largest number being Russians. These people present many problems, not the least of which is a potential security problem. Many of them are of military age and therefore capable of sabotage and espionage. Undoubtedly amongst them are many German Soldiers, deserters and enemy agents. Many of them of other than German Nationality were brought into Germany as forced laborers, Todt Workers, or on their own accord to work or fight in battalions composed of foreigners with Nazi ideals. Military Government Officers, together with CIC personnel, are doing a splendid job of sifting through this mass of humanity and if some slip through, it will be due to the overwhelming numbers of these people and the impossibility of handling the problem under present set-up.

k. Many disturbances are constantly reported, most of them alleged to be committed by the Russians. Military Government Detachments have been forced to call tactical units for troops to prevent or to stop looting, pillage and unjustifiable terrorizing of women and children. Due to preoccupation with tactical operations and lack of facilities and personnel, no organized or systematized program of evacuation and repatriation of this assorted mass of humanity has so far been initiated. For the time being, Military Government Detachments are instructed to hold the displaced persons in place and charge the local German authorities with responsibility of sheltering and feeding them.

2. Assignment of Detachments and Operations

a. During the period 1 March to 31 March 1945, Military Government Detachments were assigned as follows:

| <u>Detachment</u> | <u>City</u> | <u>Coord</u> | <u>Period</u> |
|-------------------|------------------|--------------|---------------------|
| I11D2 | Zweifall | K9536 | 1 March - 5 March |
| | Gymnich | F3049 | 7 March - 9 March |
| | Brühl | F4132 | 9 March - 10 March |
| | Linz | F6819 | 11 March - 28 March |
| H7H2 | Vicht | K9639 | 1 March - 5 March |
| | Stadt Meckenheim | F5025 | 8 March - 14 March |
| I9G2 | Rott | K9332 | 1 March - 4 March |
| | Zulpich | F2333 | 4 March - 14 March |
| H5D2 | Erp | F2941 | 4 March - 10 March |
| | Brühl | F4132 | 10 March - 15 March |
| | Bad Neuenahr | F5816 | 15 March - 27 March |
| | Bad Neuenahr | F5816 | 27 March - 28 March |
| | Giessen | G6621 | 28 March - 28 March |

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| <u>Detachment</u> | <u>City</u> | <u>Coord</u> | <u>Period</u> |
|-------------------|------------------|--------------|---------------------|
| I1B3 | Roetgen | F9229 | 1 March - 5 March |
| | Rheinbach | F4425 | 12 March - 23 March |
| H2B3 | Lammersdorf | F9727 | 1 March - 5 March |
| | Flammersheim | F2538 | 7 March - 9 March |
| | Remagen | F6420 | 9 March - 12 March |
| | Erpel | F6521 | 12 March - 14 March |
| | Honnef | F6421 | 14 March - 19 March |
| H6H2 | Roetgen | K9229 | 1 March - 5 March |
| | Wollersheim | F1731 | 5 March - 8 March |
| | Durscheven | F2831 | 8 March - 8 March |
| | Flammersheim | F2538 | 8 March - 9 March |
| | Bad Godesberg | F6032 | 9 March - 17 March |
| I4H2* | Euskirchen | F3329 | 6 March - 14 March |
| G1H2 | Euskirchen | F3329 | 7 March - 9 March |
| | Bonn | F5537 | 9 March - 9 March |
| I4D2 | Zulpich | F2333 | 13 March - 14 March |
| H3B3 | Stadt Meckenheim | F5025 | 14 March - 23 March |
| | Erpel | F6521 | 26 March - 31 March |
| I6D2 | Bad Godesberg | F6032 | 17 March - 20 March |
| | Linz | F6819 | 25 March - 26 March |
| H3D2 | Erpel | F6521 | 13 March - 23 March |
| I3B3 | Zulpich | F2333 | 7 March - 12 March |
| | Bad Neuenahr | F5816 | 12 March - 28 March |
| F1D2 | Erpel | F6521 | 23 March - 25 March |
| H4D2* | Westerburg | G1718 | 27 March - 31 March |
| I10D2 | Bad Neuenahr | F5816 | 24 March - 28 March |
| I5D2* | Wetzlar | G5418 | 28 March - 31 March |
| I5B3 | Bad Neuenahr | F5816 | 27 March - 28 March |
| | Selters | G0214 | 28 March - 28 March |
| | Erda | G5631 | 29 March - 31 March |

b. During first half of period, three Displaced Persons Centers, operated by Army controlled Detachments, were available for transfer of Displaced Persons from Corps area: these were at Brand, Rheinbach and Duisdorf, and it is estimated that 5,000 DPs were evacuated to these centers during first half of period.

c. Detachments reestablished local government under Military Government control, posted proclamations, set up Military Government Courts, established law and order; called in weapons, ammunition and radio sending apparatus, issued orders "freezing" local population in place.

d. Carried out registration of Nazis, removed many Nazis holding local positions, and effected the surrender of many hundreds of German

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Soldiers in and out of uniform, delivering them to PW Cages.

e. Uncovered and reported very large stocks of German Army and Nazi Party materials, ammunition, foodstuffs and other items of war booty.

f. Surveyed the areas for available accommodations and assisted in billeting of troops.

g. Assisted tactical units in procurement of necessary civilian labor.

h. Supervised evacuation of civilians from areas in immediate vicinity of military operations to provide security from attack by land, air or water and to prevent enemy counterintelligence activities.

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SECTION VIII, AFTER ACTION REPORT

ENGINEER OPERATIONS


Engineer operations for the month of March 1945, began with the normal engineer support of the Corps attack, following the crossing of the Roer River, and ended in a normal support mission when the Corps was pinched out in front of the Eder Dam, 110 miles farther to the east. Between these two normal support missions, the Corps Engineer troops took part in an engineer operation which had not been performed since the days of Napoleon and which is the ambition of every professional military engineer - the crossing of the Rhine River.

At the beginning of the month, the two Corps engineer groups each consisted of three combat battalions, a light ponton company, and a treadway bridge company. In addition, the Corps had one light equipment company and a mine exploder company from the tank battalion. One of the engineer battalions was removed from group control and placed in the direct support mission with the 9th Armored Division in order to assist this division as closely as possible in its dash from the Roer River to the Rhine. Engineer operations during this phase were routine in nature and consisted mainly of filling shell holes and craters and other hasty road work necessary to move the divisions forward. The situation moved so fast there was no time for more deliberate engineer work.

After seizure of the Remagen Railway Bridge by the 9th Armored Division on 7 March, the Corps engineer groups were immediately assigned the task of providing more crossings in order to build up and support the Corps bridgehead. Initially, two tactical bridges and a series of ponton rafts were planned in order to provide continuous two-way traffic, while the railway bridge was taken out of operation for necessary repairs. The 1111th Engineer Combat Group was assigned the mission of constructing a treadway bridge downstream from the railway bridge and of constructing and operating nine heavy ponton rafts at three sites, two upstream of the bridge and one downstream. The 1159th Engineer Combat Group was assigned the mission of constructing a heavy ponton bridge and of providing sites for and operating LCVP's and DUKW's. For this operation, one heavy ponton battalion and three treadway bridge companies, including the two normally attached to Corps, were attached to the 1111th Engineer Combat Group. Two heavy ponton battalions, one amphibious truck company, and a Naval unit, equipped with sixteen LCVP's, were attached to the 1159th Engineer Combat Group.

Crossing sites were selected by the Corps Engineer on the night of 7 March and equipment was moved down to the sites commencing that evening. A schedule of operations was prepared and issued with Operations Instructions No. 19, which was issued on 8 March. A copy of this schedule is reproduced on the next page. The copy reproduced in this report differs from the original schedule only in that actual starting and completion times have

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Heavy Ponton Ferry in operation.



Treadway bridge after being hit by artillery fire.



Construction of the impact boom.

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been filled in. This schedule was followed completely, except that sites 1 and 2, and 6 and 7, were interchanged in order that the ferries might operate downstream from the bridges. Site 9 was not used.

The treadway bridge was begun first and was constructed amid heavy artillery fire and continuous air attacks, intended by the enemy not only to destroy the railway bridge which had been captured intact, but also to prevent the construction of tactical bridges.

The Corps Engineer established a forward command post at the bridge site in Remagen, and having been instructed by the Commanding General III Corps that he was in complete charge of all engineer operations, he remained at the sites and directed the entire operation. After inspecting the sites, the Corps Engineer strongly considered changing the site of the heavy ponton bridge from site 2 to site 8. Construction had already begun at site 8 on heavy ponton rafts, and apparently the enemy believed that the bridge was being constructed at this point, for he shelled site 8 continuously throughout the entire operation. After seeing this, it was decided to leave the heavy ponton site where it was originally scheduled and construction proceeded on this bridge almost without interruption by enemy activity. Construction and operation of ponton rafts at site 8 served as an excellent decoy in drawing fire away from the actual bridge site.

The assistant Corps Engineer kept a diary of events at the forward command post, which shows in detail the progress of construction and the events that occurred. This diary is reproduced at the end of this section.

In addition to the units mentioned above, an engineer battalion was provided by First Army for the construction of booms upstream of the bridges to protect them from swimmers, submarines, or floating mines. Original plans called for an impact boom, a log boom, and a net boom, but after these were completed, two additional booms were constructed farther upstream.

The treadway bridge which was completed on 10 March, was 1032 feet long and required 11,140 man hours for construction. The ponton bridge, completed the following day, was 969 feet long and required 12,600 man hours for construction.

After the construction had been successfully completed, the railway bridge was closed on 12 March in order that much needed repairs could be made. Repair work was carried out on this bridge by elements of the 276th Engineer Combat Battalion and by the 1058th Port Construction and Repair Group, which had been sent up by Adsec. On the 17th of March, the railway bridge suddenly collapsed without warning, causing many casualties among the engineer personnel who were then working on it.

Although the two tactical bridges which had been constructed were

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Captured German Gamm Swimmer.



Treadway bridge with Railway bridge in background.



Construction of the Treadway Bridge.

HEADQUARTERS III CORPS
Office of the Engineer

BRIDGING OPERATIONS OVER RHINE RIVER, VICINITY OF REMAGEN 640200

| Site No. | Coordinates | Type | Equipment furnished by | Constructed by | Time | | | |
|----------|-------------|-----------------------------|---|--|--------------------------------------|--------|-----------|--------|
| | | | | | Estimated | Actual | Estimated | Actual |
| 1. | 673186 | Ferry #1 | 86 Hv Pon Bn | Co 299 Engr C Bn. | 082000 | | 082200 | |
| 2. | 672187 | Hv Pon Br. | 181 Hv Pon Bn 552 Hv Pon Bn | 51 Engr C Bn. | 091800 | 101630 | 101800 | 112200 |
| 3. | 665196 | Dukw Ferry LCVP Ferry | 819 Amph Trk Co Naval Unit | Co 276 Engr C Bn. Co 276 Engr C Bn. | Continuous beginning about 082400 | | | |
| 4. | 661198 | Dukw Ferry LCVP Ferry | 819 Amph Trk Co Naval Unit | Co 276 Engr C Bn. Co 276 Engr C Bn. | Continuous beginning about 082400 | | | |
| 5. | 652201 | R.R. Bridge | Existing | Kaiser Wilhelm II | ----- | | | |
| 6. | 646202 | Ferry #2 | 86 Hv Pon Bn | Co 299 Engr C Bn. | ----- | | | |
| 7. | 643203 | Treadway Br. | 988 Tdwy Br Co | 291 Engr C Bn. | 082400 | 091030 | 092400 | 102300 |
| 8. | 628224 | Ferry #3 Ferry #4 | Location and construction depends on tactical situation. | | ----- | | | |
| 9. | 665196 | Booms Floating Bailey | 164 Engr C Bn Army | 164 Engr C Bn Army | 081800 | ? | | ? |

TASKS: 1111 Engr C Gp, Ferrries #1 and 2, Treadway Bridge and road area.
1159 Engr C Gp, Hv Pon Br., Dukw and LCVP Ferrries and road area.

Inclosure to Engineer Operations Instructions #19, 8 March 45.



Treadway Bridge.

Ponton Bridge.



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
sufficient to support the operations on the east side of the river, they provided no factor of safety in the event the enemy's continued attempts to destroy the bridges were successful. Consequently, First Army placed the 1120th Engineer Combat Group under operational control of III Corps and this group constructed a floating bailey bridge downstream from the treadway bridge.

In addition to the enemy's attempt to knock out the bridges by artillery and air bombardment, he also attempted to destroy them by sending in Gamm swimmers, equipped with rubber suits and plastite explosives. Their possible use had been foreseen, however, and effective measures had been taken to prevent them from accomplishing their mission. In addition to the booms mentioned above, security guards were posted along both banks far upstream, CFL search lights were in place to shine on the water, and explosive charges of 50 pounds of dynamite were dropped in the water upstream of the bridges every five minutes. That these measures were successful, is proved by the fact that four Gamm swimmers were captured and on interrogation stated that the defensive measures were extremely effective and that they had been deterred by the fear of the concussion caused by the explosive charges.

After completing the Rhine River crossing, the Corps Engineer units resumed their normal functions in support of the Corps attack and at the same time maintained the tactical bridges on the Rhine. After the breakthrough from the bridgehead was begun, one engineer battalion and a platoon of treadway bridge was attached to the 7th Armored Division to provide them with close support in their dash from the bridgehead to Giessen and thence northward to the Eder See. The remaining Corps Engineer troops performed normal support missions with the infantry divisions, their principal task being the replacement of blown bridges on the autobahn which was used as the Corps main supply route.

The maps contained in Annex 3 to this report show engineer work boundaries, CP locations, and main roads maintained during the month.

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A direct hit at one
of the assembly
sites.

Railway bridge
after it col-
lapsed.



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DIARY OF EVENTS

- 080100 Mar - Capt. Dowling left Zulpich for Remagen to check Railway Bridge condition and explosives. Arrived at bridge site approximately 0800. 9th Armd Engr Bn of 9th Armd Div had found 14 charges and removed 8 and cut wires leading to the charges. The upstream side of the east end of the arch span had one charge detonated. This charge severed all members at this panel point, resulted in the top rib of the arch on the upstream side carrying all loads.
- 081000 Mar - Left bridge site to return to Zulpich.
- 090930 Mar - Col. Lyons and Capt. Dowling left Zulpich for bridge site at Remagen. Arrived at Bridge site at 1430. Delayed by traffic at Euskirchen and at Stadt Manheim.
- 091030 Mar - Work started on treadway bridge approaches.
- 091100 Mar - One 2½ ton truck and 7 men hit by artillery fire at west approach of treadway bridge.
- 091230 Mar - Actual construction of floating elements began. Progress about 50' per hour. Being hindered by artillery fire. The 291st Engr C Bn, 988th and 998th Engr Tdwy Br Cos doing actual construction. The 988th Engr Tdwy Br Co and 86th Engr Heavy Pon Bn were delayed 6 hours by traffic. Actually arrived vic of bridge site at 0600.
- 091400 Mar - Boom construction began. Was slow due to delay in equipment arriving, sabotage of equipment and observed artillery fire in the vicinity. Construction being done by 164th Engr C Bn.
- 091432 Mar - Railway bridge bombed and strafed, one plane down.
- 091432 - 091500 Mar - Inspected ferry sites.
- 091500 Mar - Met Colonel Carter, Army Engineer, and discussed bridge situation. Asked that he keep floating bailey equipage off the road. Traffic on main Railway Bridge blocked by vehicle hit by artillery fire and interdicting artillery fire.
- 091515 Mar - Met Colonel Anderson, CO, 111th Engr C Gp, at treadway bridge site. Discussed bridge and ferry construction.
- 091630 Mar - Met General Leonard, 9th Armd Div, discussed engineer situation and engineer priority traffic. General Leonard stated that General Millikin requested hourly reports on the bridge and ferry progress. (Note: Requested this report to come from CCB sub R and not us). In regard to traffic, he was informed that we would need a special

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traffic priority to get one section of treadway bridge company reloaded and back to bridge site.

- 091645 Mar - AAA ammunition truck hit by enemy artillery fire on road under east railway bridge approach span. Truck was set afire and ammunition exploded, blocking the road. Was finally pushed off the road by an angle-dozer.
- 091700 Mar - Engineer advanced CP opened at river bank in cellar, 300' north of west treadway bridge approach.
- 091755 Mar - Ferry in operation at site 7.
- 091800 Mar - Treadway out 200 feet.
- 091900 Mar - Made radio report to Century CG. Railway bridge reopened for light traffic. It was open at all times to foot troops except during frequent periods of enemy artillery concentrations.
- 092000 Mar - No communications with Century as yet. It was requested 081200 Mar.
- 092030 Mar - Col. Coker, 9th Armored Division and Col. Kirkland, 1111th Engr C Gp called. Col. Coker requested we take over the work on the railway bridge entirely. One platoon of the 276th Engr C Bn was working on the bridge at this time. Gave instructions to Col. Fields of the 1159th Engr C Gp to take over all work on the railway bridge.
- 092300 Mar - The liaison officer of 310th Infantry, and an officer from division engineer office, 78th Infantry Division called at CP. Requested information on bridging situation. The 310th Infantry wished to pass a CT on the 10th, time unknown. Wanted to know what would be available at that time. He was informed that the railway bridge would be open and a 3 raft ferry at site 2 at approximately 100800; the treadway bridge at 101200; a 3 raft ferry was now operating at site 7; and a three raft ferry at site 8 at 101000. All this to be available, barring enemy artillery action, or barring enemy action. Traffic priority would have to be obtained from 9th Armored Division.
- 092400 Mar - Capt. Langley and Lt. Harvie arrived at CP with the following message from CG of Century: The Corps Engineer would be in charge of all bridging and ferrying. The Corps Engineer was to contact General Craig immediately, and send radio when contact was made. Make report to General Craig hourly of bridging progress and to include progress of Army boom.
- 100001 - 100300 Mar - All work discontinued at all sites due to enemy artillery

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action. Raking fire of several guns was sweeping treadway construction area. Great deal of air burst artillery shells being used. Appeared to be direct fire with close in observation. One compressor and two cranes knocked out; 26 floats completely assembled with tread attached were hit, which required that they be removed from the water, disassembled and patched. (this means that 312' additional bridging will have to be constructed and a delay in the progress of the bridge of about 5 hours).

- 100300 - 101205 Mar - Enemy artillery continues interdicting railway bridge with observed artillery fire, approximately 1 round every 30 seconds on east abutment and east tower. Infantry crossing on foot having large number of casualties.
- 101205 Mar - Work stopped by enemy observed artillery fire. Railway bridge and east tower and abutment and approach catching hell. 1 round of heavy stuff every 5 minutes on treadway site.
- 101225 Mar - Railway bridge bombed and strafed.
- 101230 Mar - Enemy artillery scored direct hit on treadway bridge at west end. 15 floats ruined. Going ahead and building bridge to far shore as treads are holding damaged portion in place. Damaged floats will be replaced when bridge has been completed. One Brockway knocked out.
- 101330 Mar - Col. Orsinger, Century G-4, called to talk over supplying of units on the far shore.
- 101400 Mar - Lt. Erwin, 9th Infantry Div gave us information that all enemy OP's were being smoked by the artillery and that rope supplies were at west approach of treadway bridge. Ferry site #3 read for foot troops. 7 LCVF's available.
- 101500 Mar - Artillery representatives called at CP, Col. Williams, III Corps and Col. Perry of Army. Sent message to Army Engineer by Col. Perry for additional ponton and treadway materiel for reserve.
- 101545 - 101730 Mar - Bombed and strafed.
- 101600 Mar - Ponton bridge started.
- 101710 Mar - Treadway bridge reached far shore. Total length 1032'. 17 casualties for the day and 3 air compressors.
- 101830 Mar - Bombed. Had 6 rounds of heavy artillery at ponton bridge site. Continuous shelling of west bridge approach.

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- 101930 Mar - 2 trestles and hinge span raft on both banks and have begun assembling of rafts and construction of bridge.
- 110600 Mar - Heavy Ponton Bridge 2/3 completed. No enemy action at the site except for sniping during the hours of darkness.
- 111200 Mar - Heavy Ponton Bridge 3/4 finished. Has a bow in it which can be corrected.
- 111500 Mar - Heavy Ponton bridge completed to far shore. In attempting to take the bow out by using an LCVP, the LCVP broached in the swift current and carried out the hinge span on the east bank. Artillery fire throughout period. Requested again that civilians be removed. Enemy artillery fire still on all sites. Several bombing and strafing attacks.
- 112300 Mar - Heavy Ponton Bridge opened for traffic at 112300 Mar. Bridge was constructed by 51st Engr C Bn, 181st and 552d Engr Hv Pon Bns.
- 120600 Mar - Enemy artillery on railway bridge, believed to be railroad gun. Army has disapproved of setting up of near and far shore DUKW supply points. This means DUKW'S will have to make long road hauls and will not be used to the maximum efficiency. Army also refused to allow building of an additional heavy ponton bridge below Unkel. (This would be very desirable for us).
- 121600 Mar - Debris net in place across Ahr river.
- 121800 Mar - Railway bridge closed to traffic.
- 121900 Mar - Anti-mine net progress as follows: All anchors in place, 75% of jackstays in place. All jackstays estimated in place by 122100. This will give effect of cable boom to intercept floating objects. Work begun on impact boom upstream of mine net. River security remains in effect.
- 122200 Mar - River lighted upstream of railway bridge and heavy ponton bridge. .50 Cal. MG's and 75mm guns placed to fire on suspicious floating objects in river. River work proceeding more smoothly.
- 130900 Mar - Steel scow came down stream, slightly damaged heavy ponton bridge. Two other scows intercepted by 164th Engr C Bn. Vehicle count, Heavy Ponton Bridge, 120800 - 130800 Mar, 2,361.
- 131020 Mar - Sea mules on the way.
- 131000 - 131500 Mar - Heavy ponton bridge has had 5 strafing and bombing attacks. Major Tompkins, Commanding Officer of 552nd Engr Hv Pon Bn

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killed, and an undetermined number of casualties during the 1500 air attack. Some boats and floats damaged. 1159th Engr C Gp initiated reconnaissance of crossing sites between Oberwinter and Rolandseck and road reconnaissance for detrucking point east of Corps return traffic route.

- 131730 - 131900 Mar - Bridge sites bombed and strafed again. Col. Lyons requested Century 5 to secure permission to retain one complete ponton battalion. It is felt necessary that a complete battalion with all equipment and a full load of bridge be held in reserve in view of strong enemy action at the bridge sites. Col. Lyons stated that he wished to go on record for this as this is a command responsibility. Usual artillery action.
- 140230 - 140700 Mar - Enemy artillery, two or three rounds every 30 minutes during period. 4 boats and 9 floats damaged of the ponton bridge. Sniping from Linz and Kripp. Vehicle count, Heavy Ponton Bridge 130800 - 140800 Mar, 2,118.
- 140930 Mar - Called Col. Edwards, Century G-3 Section, regarding civilians infiltrating back to cleared towns.
- 141000 Mar - 1 Company of the 51st Engr C Bn to operational attachment to 552nd Engr Heavy Pon Bn and 4 LCVP's to 1111th Engr C Gp at site 8. 1111th Engr C Gp to have everything in the area north of the railway bridge. 1159th Engr C Gp to have everything in the area south of the railway bridge, including the railway bridge. The 299th Engr C Bn will operate all ferries in the 1111th Engr C Gp area, and the 552nd Engr Hv Pon Bn in the 1159th Area.
- 141400 Mar - Army stated that three more booms would be constructed upstream from the present booms, and three booms would be established down stream in Workshop area.
- 141530 - 141800 Mar - Bombed and strafed. One near miss at heavy ponton bridge.
- 141820 Mar - One platoon of 4 Armored lights to Workshop. The attachment routing will be accomplished by 32nd Cav Gp.
- 141900 Mar - Army requires that 50 lb. charges be fired every 5 minutes upstream of boom. Requested 50 tons of explosives be furnished as a 7 day supply.
- 141910 Mar - Sea mules arrived.
- 141915 Mar - 460th Amphb Dukw Co crossed to east bank with no difficulty.

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- 150800 Mar - Checked the ferry site at Oberwinter in preparation for the passing of one RCT of the 1st Inf Div across Rhine river in LCVP's.
- 151000 Mar - 50 lb explosive charges being dropped upstream of booms discontinued due to lack of explosives.
- 151145 Mar - Boom cable parted.
- 151200 Mar - Railway Bridge shelled approximately 6 rounds, heavy caliber artillery, several direct hits, west abutment, approaches, and on west truss span.
- 151300 Mar - All personnel of the RCT passed. It is highly recommended that LCVP's be used whenever possible for the crossing of Infantry foot troops. It is more efficient and can be done much more rapidly than by the use of foot bridges or assault boats.
- 151400 Mar - One DUKW sank on east side after crossing. Cause unknown. On request of Col. Carr, 341st Engr GS Regt, requested 75 bottles of oxygen, and 35 bottles of acetylene for railway bridge repairs. Col. Carr stated that he had ordered these from Army but as yet they had not arrived and that it was slowing repairs on the bridge and that no repair to the ruptured panel point could be made until the gas arrived. Col. Stann obtained several bottles from the Corps battalions to be used in the meantime.
- 151630 Mar - 4 rounds of artillery on the railway bridge, hitting west span, and west abutment tower.
- 151640 Mar - Approximately 8 rounds of heavy artillery at the same place.
- 151700 Mar - Two leaking floats repaired on the treadway bridge. Work progressing on impact booms.
- 151840 Mar - Released 505th Engr L Pon platoon to its parent unit. Detached 4 DUKW's from G-4 and attached to 164th Engr C Bn.
- 151930 Mar - Bombed. 4 large bombs strung along from the railway bridge to the heavy ponton bridge. Vehicle count on heavy ponton bridge from 140800 - 150800 Mar, 2,293.
- 160030 Mar - 5 rounds of heavy artillery on railway bridge, 4 rounds treadway bridge.
- 160042 Mar - 1 round of artillery, road junction center of Remagen.
- 160210 Mar - 1 round of artillery, 50 yards south of treadway, one round hit railway bridge.

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- 160215 Mar - 20 rounds of artillery vicinity of railway bridge and treadway bridge, medium artillery.
- 160400 Mar - 6 rounds of heavy artillery, railway bridge.
- 160932 - 161200 Mar - Passed one combat team of the 1st Inf Div across the Rhine River on LCVP's. Work progressing on mine boom and impact boom. Railway bridge being shelled. Railway bridge work is progressing satisfactorily. Flooring for one way traffic. North side complete. New approach to bridge being constructed north of east end of bridge. Col. Lyons visited by a correspondent of engineer news. Gave him the story on the Railway Bridge.
- 161700 Mar - Closed Corps Engineer forward CP (returned from Remagen to Bad Neuenahr). Vehicle count on Heavy Ponton Bridge from 160800 - 170800 Mar, 2,162.
- 170530 Mar - Ponton bridge damaged at approximately 0530. Impact boom failed and drifted down into it. Bridge was held and repaired, open for traffic at 0930.
- 171030 Mar - Reports that enemy firing V-2's in attempt to destroy the bridge. Good progress being made on booms.
- 171155 Mar - 1 Officer and 4 men killed and 33 men evacuated for wounds due to enemy V-2 (or some similar missile launched by the enemy).
- 171505 Mar - Railway bridge collapsed. Cause undetermined. Check revealed two companies of the 276th Engr C Bn were working on the bridge at the time. As far as can be determined, approximately 90 casualties. It was known that Major Carr, 341st Engr GS Regt, and Major Foley, Executive O, 276th Engr C Bn were killed. There was no heavy equipment on center span at the time it collapsed. The following information was obtained from witnesses who were on the bridge at the time: Center span started to vibrate, carried on to the two truss spans, then the center span slowly rolled to the south, revolving around the ruptured panel point, on the south side of the east end of the arch span. As the center span turned, it dragged the two truss spans off the abutments, causing the entire bridge to collapse. Instrument checks made by the 341st Engr GS Regt detail showed that no further settlement had occurred over the initial deflection. Several of the tension members of the arch had been damaged and three completely severed due to enemy artillery action. At the time of the collapse, there was no enemy action in the area.
- 171510 Mar - Treadway bridge almost carried away by debris from railway

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bridge. Closed to traffic from 1510 to 1700. Was held in place by 2 LCVP's until the debris could be passed.

171600 Mar - Enemy artillery fire in the vicinity of the railway bridge and treadway bridge. One officer and 6 men of the 291st were evacuated because of wounds. Casualties to date of the 291st Engrs on the treadway bridge, 40.

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SECTION IX

SIGNAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

1. Signal activity for the month of March can be divided naturally into two periods: (1) the advance from the Roer River to the Rhine and (2) the advance beyond the Rhine. During the first of these periods normal signal communication was maintained through the use of all means and agencies, but the rapid advance that characterized the III Corps penetration of trans-Rhine Germany made the installation of wire lines to the 7th Armored Division impossible and brought the emergency means into everyday use.

2. The first major event of the month was the opening of the Corps TAC Headquarters at Nideggen 041300 March. No difficulties were presented by this move. However, the next three moves of the Corps Headquarters to Zulpich, 7 March, to Rheinbach, 9 March and to Bad Neuenahr, 12 March, presented a wire problem of increasing importance owing to the fact that in no case was there enough advance warning of the move to prepare a local installation and tie it into the corps wire net before the headquarters itself moved. Physical fatigue on the part of wire installation and operation personnel was becoming an important factor by the time the corps headquarters arrived at Bad Neuenahr.

3. The unexpected crossing of the Rhine over the Remagen Bridge and the rapid establishment of subordinate headquarters on the opposite bank of the Rhine brought radio communication to the fore. Several special radio nets were established to provide communication to the corps engineer who was personally directing the construction of bridges over the river, and for the control of traffic to the bridge sites. The difficulty experienced in maintaining the wire circuits across the river, especially early during the bridgehead phase of the river crossing was accentuated by the reluctance of division signal officers to move their VHF link radio over the river and expose it to enemy fire. To obviate the resultant congestion on the corps command radio net, it was re-established as a series of point to point nets, one to each division. Difficulty was experienced in convincing the corps and division staffs that radio afforded a rapid and sure means of communication and this operation revealed that staffs needed training in writing concise, easily cryptographed, radio messages. Amplitude modulated radio carried an especially heavy burden during this period because the terrain and a series of equipment difficulties prevented the full use of VHF radio link.

4. The corps signal battalion had difficulty effecting and maintaining a cable crossing of a river the size of the Rhine. The original crossing was made by laying three spiral four cables under water, but the swiftness of the current kept opening these cables. Therefore two more cables were installed on the ponton bridge and these cables provided adequate and permanent communication to subordinate headquarters located

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on the east bank of the Rhine. Meanwhile, army established a cable crossing; the circuits were at first used to provide direct communication between division headquarters and army headquarters, as well as supplementary channels from division headquarters to corps headquarters.

5. During the early days of the river crossing a corps switch was established on the west bank of the Rhine to most effectively utilize the river crossing cables. In order to insure against the effect of enemy artillery and friendly traffic on the lines to this switch, a VHF radio link was established between the switch and corps headquarters. As soon as the bridgehead was definitely secured, the switch was discontinued and a corps advance switch opened at Linz on the east bank of the Rhine in anticipation of the move of the corps headquarters to this city. Thus III Corps became the first corps to establish a switch on the east bank of the Rhine.

6. The III Corps TAC Headquarters was moved to Linz and opened 211924A March 1945, thus becoming the first Corps Headquarters established on the east bank of the Rhine.

7. For a short time the maintenance of wire communication to the corps divisions on the east bank of the Rhine remained possible but by 26 March, the long anticipated breakthrough was an actuality and except for short periods the corps wire teams were not able to connect corps and division headquarters.

8. On 28 March the corps headquarters opened at Selters and on 29 March it opened at Erda. These rapid moves were possible because of the fact that local installations were held to a minimum and the bulk of the communication was confined to radio.

9. Throughout the month message center operation was continuous. Extensive use was made of motor and airplane messengers. Cryptographed traffic increased owing to the more extensive use of radio.

10. Pigeon and facsimile services were not employed.

11. Signal photographic coverage continued good with especially fine results obtained when the railroad bridge over the Rhine at Remagen collapsed. The Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Detachment at corps was scarcely able to keep up with the many sources of enemy equipment captured during the corps rapid advance.

12. During the month the 3259th Signal Service Company assumed full responsibility for providing G-2 with signal intelligence.

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13. The end of March found the corps headquarters again linked to its divisions by wire circuits, almost superhuman efforts on the part of the wire teams having produced, within 12 hours, a sixty mile circuit to the 7th Armored Division, spearhead of the corps attack. Thus with wire, VHF radio and AM radio circuits again available to the corps staff, March ended, as it began, with the signal agencies in complete control of the communication situation.

For the Commanding General:


J. H. PHILLIPS,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

7 Incls:

- #1 - G-1 Journal.
- #2 - G-2 Journal
- #3 - G-3 Journal
- #4 - G-4 Journal
- #5 - Engr Journal
- #6 - Ltr, Special and General Orders
- #7 - Journal, Hq and Hq Btry, III Corps Arty

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ANNEX NO. 1

ROSTER OF OFFICERS ON DUTY AT HEADQUARTERS III CORPS

COMMANDING GENERALS

Major General John Millikin 1 March - 16 March
Major General James A. Van Fleet 17 March - 31 March

PERSONAL STAFF TO MAJOR GENERAL JOHN MILLIKIN

Major Benjamin B. Fowler, ADC Capt Philip R. Calder, ADC

PERSONAL STAFF TO MAJOR GENERAL JAMES A. VAN FLEET

Capt Donald P. Kaade, ADC Capt Philip R. Calder, ADC

CHIEF OF STAFF

Colonel James H. Phillips, GSC

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

Colonel Henry E. Sanderson, GSC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-1

Colonel Robert L. Christian, GSC

Lt Col Kenneth P. Jones, GSC / Major Charles A. Fleming, CAC
Major Howard H. Chase, Inf / 1st Lt Richard D. Knight, FA

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-2

Colonel Bernard J. Horner, GSC

Lt Col John E. Boyt, GSC Capt Ross B. Lea, Cav
Major Reuben B. Johnson, Inf / Capt Albert B. Landis, Cav
Major Wm. E. Minshall, Jr., Cav / Capt Eric C. Hulmer, FA
Major Lawrence J. Reiner, Inf CWO Benjiman J. Thompson

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-3

Colonel Harry C. Mewshaw, GSC

Colonel Burton C. Andrus, Cav Major Richard W. Harrison, Cav
Lt Col Norman B. Edwards, GSC Capt Charles F. Watkins, Inf
Lt Col John W. Walton, Inf Capt James M. Cummings, AGD
Major Harold J. McAlister, Inf # Capt Roderick W. Pannell, Brit Army
Major Thomas J. Sharpe, FA # Capt Martin R. Laborde, French Army
Major Louis F. deLesdernier, Inf CWO Paul Behee

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LIAISON OFFICERS

Major Howard E. Hamilton, Inf Capt Gilmore Stott, Inf
Capt Robert G. McLendon, Inf / Capt Roland W. Lashinske, Inf
Capt John S. Hower, Inf / Capt David E. Lamb, Inf

AIR GROUND COOPERATION CREW

Major Rush M. Shortley, AC # Capt Bernard N. Thompson, AC
Major Anthony A. Lozga, AC # 1st Lt Alfred B. Castel, AC
1st Lt Elmer E. Thorp, AC

2ND INFORMATION & HISTORICAL SERVICE

Captain Kenneth W. Hechler, Inf Capt John S. Howe, Inf
1st Lt Robert E. Maxwell, Inf

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-4

Colonel Remington Orsinger, GSC

Lt Col Patrick W. Harrington, GSC / Major Robert W. Runmelle, Inf
Major Glenn S. Sutera, Inf Capt Berthold W. Broemmel, QMC
Major Irwin A. Dahl, Inf / 1st Lt Harold C. Fischer, Inf

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-5

Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Andrews, GSC

Lt Col Stanley W. Wisnioski, CE Capt Paul C. Snyder, AC
Mr. Chalmers K. Lane, ARC

ADJUTANT GENERAL

Colonel Howard R. Moore, AGD

Lt Colonel Joseph A. Pongonis, AGD / Major Arthur I. Grossman, FA
Major James C. Walker, AGD Capt John F. Orend, Jr., AGD
CWO Stewart W. Freyberger

BATTLE CASUALTY DIVISION AG SECTION

/ 1st Lt Nelson Lovely, BI

CHAPLAIN

Colonel Patrick L. Cronin, Ch C

Lt Col Frederick W. Cropp, Jr., Ch C WOJG Robert C. Jones

CHEMICAL OFFICER

Colonel George W. Wannamaker, CWS

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ASSISTANT TO CHEMICAL OFFICER

Major Karl D. Luedtke, CWS

ENGINEER OFFICER

Colonel F. Russel Lyons, CE

Lt Col Eugene J. Stann, CE
Capt John E. Langley, CE

Capt George E. Dowling, CE
/ 1st Lt Earl A. Dufenhorst, FA

FINANCE OFFICER

Colonel Marion B. Fowler, FD

Capt Allen J. Graham, FD

INSPECTOR GENERAL

Colonel Frederic A. Metcalf, IGD

Lt Col John F. Hunter Speer, IGD
Major Henry H. Moore, Jr., Inf

Major Peter B. Wells, Jr., IGD
CWO George D. Russell

JUDGE ADVOCATE

Colonel James E. Godwin, JAGD

Major William D. Radcliff, JAGD

ORDNANCE OFFICER

Colonel George W. Vaughn, Ord Dept

Lt Col Frank Poulsen, Ord Dept
Major Norman E. Parnell, Ord Dept
CWO Jack L. Brown

Major Harry J. Doyle, Ord Dept
Capt George P. Salm, Jr., Ord Dept

QUARTERMASTER

Colonel William A. Smith, QMC

Lt Col Horace E. Harwood, QMC
Major Norman D. Savinar, QMC

Capt Joseph G. Lauer, QMC
Capt Martin H. Bridges, QMC

SIGNAL OFFICER

Colonel Eugene M. Link, Sig C

Major J. R. Woodfill, Sig C

Capt Karl F. Limbacher, Sig C
Capt Robert M. Speights, Sig C

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SURGEON

Colonel Cecil S. Mollohan, MC

Major Walter P. Jones, MAC
Major Edward J. Vandercar, MC
Major Robert E. Barnett, MAC
2nd Lt Alex B. Davidson, Sn C
WOJG Bernard P. Flood

SPECIAL SERVICE OFFICER

Major Donald A. Carmel, QMC

/ 1st Lt William A. Bush, Inf

III CORPS REST CENTER

Major Arnold R. Mozisek, Inf
/ Major Victor G. Baddock, FA
/ Capt C. Walter Smallman, Inf
/ Capt Paul E. Mayo, Inf
/ 1st Lt Richard A. England, Inf
/ 1st Lt Gustave C. Gehr II, Inf
Chap (1st Lt) Edwin C. Miller, Ch C
/ 2d Lt Alfred D. Shrago, QMC

PROVOST MARSHAL

/ Major Richard E. Barrett, CMP

/ Capt Stephen W. Guzy, CMP

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

Major Edgar R. Poole, Inf

/ 1st Lt Noel R. Poirer, Inf

PRISONER OF WAR EXECUTIVE

Major Harry F. Teese, QMC
Capt Claude P. Merry, French Army

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY III CORPS

Capt George R. Bennett, Inf
1st Lt Herman F. Cannon, Inf
1st Lt Ray W. Fellows, Inf
1st Lt Herman Scott, Inf
/ 1st Lt Ralph R. McAtee, Inf
/ 2d Lt Alvin S. Siff, Inf

MED DET HQ CO III CORPS

Capt Harry Rhodes, Jr., MC
Capt Alfred B. Miller, MC
Capt Adolph G. Goehring, Jr., DC

MP PLATOON III CORPS

Capt Raymond B. Lark, CMP
1st Lt Norman J. Romaguera, CMP
/ 1st Lt Stuart A. Weldon, AUS (TD)
/ 1st Lt Harry R. Morris, AUS (TD)

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2D PLAT 23D QM CAR CO

1st Lt Oscar Ball, Jr., NO

IPW TEAMS

1st Lt Henry H. Cook, NO # 1st Lt Richard G. Gleue, Inf
1st Lt Erich P. Mahlgut, NO

MII TEAMS

Capt Henry A. Mohr, CAC # 2d Lt Harry Lindauer, TC

CIC DET NO 203

Major Hilliare P. Wardwell, Inf
Capt Clyde T. Nissen, Inf 1st Lt Joe C. Hubbard, CMP
1st Lt Edgar R. Miller, Inf # Lt R. M. L. Geormans, Belg Ln O

OB UNIT NO 36

1st Lt Louis Schein, CAC

PI TEAMS

Capt Edward A. Fischetti, Inf ## Capt Edmund J. Spillane, CAC
1st Lt William A. Watkins, Inf ## 1st Lt Arthur J. Weber, AGD

38TH FINANCE DISBURSING SECTION

Major Elmer C. Thalke, FD
Capt Harvey C. Wright, FD CWO Willis E. Larson

92D FINANCE DISBURSING SECTION

Lieutenant Colonel Rudolph P. Olsen, FD
1st Lt Robert P. Coutard, FD WOJG Stanley C. Alfrey

2942D ENGR TECH INT TEAM (C)

1st Lt Everett M. Harvie, CE

DET A, 165TH SIG PHOTO CO

1st Lt Edward N. Stiso, Sig C

202D ARMY POSTAL UNIT

1st Lt Arthur L. Stein, AGD

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48TH MACHINE RECORDS UNIT

Captain Stanley M. Prout, AGD
1st Lt Marshall B. Wilmot, AGD 1st Lt Michael Cherwek, AGD

AMERICAN RED CROSS

Mr. John R. Brady, FD
Mrs. Effie H. Hazlett, ARC Miss Eileen O'Leary, ARC


- * - Officers DS at other stations.
- / - Officers atchd unasgd this Hq
- # - Officers atchd this Hq.

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01 MARCH THRU 31 MARCH
DISTANCE COVERED 150 AIRLINE MILES
TERRITORY CAPTURED 1500 SQUARE MILES







Path of Avars

 COI

01 MARCH THRU 31

 DISTANCE COVERED 150

 TERRITORY CAPTURED 150