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



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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
G-5 Section

APO 403

SUBJECT: After-Action Report, G-5 Section, Third U.S. Army.

TO : Commanding General, Third U.S. Army.

Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of G-5 Section, Third U.S. Army Headquarters, beginning with its establishment as a General Staff section, 22 April 1944, and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapters.

The mission of this Section as set forth in Memorandum Number 2, this Headquarters, 26 April 1944, was "to further military objectives." This involved a thorough control of the civil population and an employment of civilian resources in the common aim of destroying the enemy.

Success in accomplishing this mission is the result of the complete cooperation of all sections of the Army, its corps and divisions, the whole-hearted assistance of the peoples of the liberated countries and the strict enforcement of regulations prescribed for Military Government in GERMANY.

ROY L. DALFERES
Colonel, G.S.C.
Ass't Chief of Staff, G-5

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G-5 SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



In 1940, masses of bewildered refugees blocking military roads disrupted Allied defense plans, hampered troops commanders and contributed to the public hysteria which hastened the collapse of BELGIUM and then FRANCE. In SICILY and ITALY, the Germans drove civilians

placed persons, possibly numbering many thousands in the course of the Army's advance, were to be so controlled as to avoid

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Higher military authorities in WASHINGTON and LONDON had been preparing for Civil Affairs for the greater part of two years. Training schools in military government were in operation both in UNITED STATES and ENGLAND. Officers attending these schools had been selected because of their knowledge of FRANCE and its peoples, and their previous professional, business and governmental experience. Many were veterans of the First World War. Some had served with the Army of Occupation in GERMANY a quarter century earlier.

G-5 staffs were already functioning at Supreme Headquarters and at Headquarters, First U.S. Army Group. The European Civil Affairs Division had been organized and trained with an approximate strength of 1,200 officers and men, and assigned to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations.

Moreover, actual field experience of invaluable character had been gained by the operations of Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories (AMGOT) in the African, Sicilian and Italian campaigns. The new conception of Civil Affairs as an organic army service, supervised by Army, Corps and Division staff sections, was largely a result of this recent experience of AMGOT.

Organized on the conventional pattern of regiments and companies, the European Civil Affairs Division's basic field unit was the Civil Affairs Detachment. This was really a civil administrative team. Four types of Detachments were provided:

Type "A", with a strength of seventeen officers, two warrant officers and twenty-two enlisted men, was equipped for work in larger cities and on higher governmental levels, such as Regions or Provinces. It had specialists in police work and public health, fiscal experts and engineers, sanitary officers and lawyers.

Type "B", with nine officers, two warrant officers, and sixteen enlisted men, was for employment in the next lower grade of cities and governmental units.

Type "C", with five officers and nine enlisted men, and Type "D", of four officers and six enlisted men, were to supervise towns and villages -- often, in practice, as many as twenty small communities in a single jurisdiction.

Small reserves of specialists were held for emergencies at Regimental and Company headquarters, which otherwise were to function strictly as administrative units; and in each regiment one company, with a pool of forty specialist officers, was organized to serve as an Army Reserve.

The plan contemplated an equal division of the Detachment commissioned personnel between the British and United States forces. Army, Corps and Division staffs, however, were to be exclusively of the nationality of the flag under which they served.

In addition to recruiting its own staff, Army G-5 was charged with selecting the personnel for Corps and Division staffs. These totalled sixty-four officers. So far as possible, officers with prior military service were selected. Corps and Division Commanders were given the choice of appointing staff officers from their own rosters, but only seven officers were so named by Division Commanders, none by Corps Commanders. The care employed in the selection of these staffs by Army G-5, and the calibre of the officers assigned was later given striking evidence in FRANCE by the work accomplished.

Organization, training and planning were necessarily paralleling activities of Civil Affairs during this preparational phase in the UNITED KINGDOM. The exact character of the work to be done on the Continent was dependent upon the outcome of prolonged secret negotiations on the highest governmental levels. These extended through the Spring. The decision finally reached was that any semblance of military government in FRANCE would be scrupulously avoided, that the French would resume full civil authority as rapidly as conditions permitted.

Coincident with its organization, the G-5 Section had to plan for the employment of four companies and a platoon of Civil Affairs troops aggregating some 1,200 officers and men, coordinate these plans with those of other staff sections of the army, and at the same time effect fundamental changes in a program that had been the basis of all Civil Affairs training up to that time.

By 14 June, most of the changes were incorporated in a series of eighteen Instructional Guides covering as many subjects of French civil administration. Two further guides were published by the month's end, making twenty in all. These guides were to be the Bible of all Civil Affairs operations in FRANCE.

SECTION II

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

The [illegible] Administration Branch, being the first sub-section [illegible] the G-5 Section, commenced operations early in April.

Three officers and six enlisted men then composed the entire G-5 Section staff. Acquisition of competent officer and enlisted personnel proved to be a problem because of the lack of an approved Table of Organization until 21 May. Immediate steps were taken to have competent officer and trained enlisted personnel assigned to the section. Journeys were made to European Civil Affairs Division for the selection of officer personnel, and requisitions were submitted for trained enlisted personnel. Table of Organization authorized the assignment of many specialists, but it was soon apparent that trained personnel such as interpreters, sanitary technicians, etc., were not available in required quantities.

All officer personnel for Corps and Division Staffs were cleared through Army prior to reporting to their respective assignments. Enlisted personnel for Corps and Division Staffs were sent direct from European Civil Affairs Division to proper station.

Approved Table of Equipment was unavailable and had to be processed. G-5 was to operate as a self-sufficient unit and additional equipment was eventually made available. Table of Organization, however, was not increased and drivers and cooks had to be carried within Table of Organization without special allowances being made. Housekeeping and guard details necessarily had to be carried on by strength authorized.

Pre-operational phase of Civil Affairs involved establishing and filling Tables of Organization and Equipment for Corps and Division Staffs, the preparation and circulation of Instructional Guides, Directives, Bulletins, Memoranda, etc. The internal administration and training of enlisted personnel became a large problem because specialists were not Army trained but were selected by reason of civilian experience.

SECTION III

INTELLIGENCE

G-5 Intelligence was charged with the following missions:

1. To collect information on civilian conditions in uncovered areas and disseminate it to higher and lower units.

2. To compile information for the direction of policy.

3. To compile historical reports.

4. To maintain liaison with the AC of S, G-2, Counter-Intelligence Section, G-2, and Lower Civil Affairs staff sections.

5. To control Top Secret Documents and enforce security regulations.

By 6 May, a definite understanding was reached with Counter-Intelligence Section, G-2, on cooperative methods to be followed by Civil Affairs Detachments and Counter-Intelligence Corps teams in the field. Among other things, it was agreed that Detachments would be notified by Counter-Intelligence Corps in advance of any proposed arrests of local officials and [illegible] useful to Civil Affairs. An understanding was also reached with the Provost Marshal covering dual interests in handling refugees and displaced persons, and in the issuing of civilian passes in liberated areas.

Through cooperation of the AC of S, G-2, intelligence was gathered on civilian problems and attitudes in FRANCE, emphasizing evacuations of civilians that had already taken place, German stripping of French coastal area resources, and likely concentration points where civilian masses might be employed by the enemy to impede the Army's movements.

The first draft-form Civil Affairs Annex Number 10 to the Third U.S. Army's Administrative Order for the OVERLORD operation was written. Upon receipt, early in June, of an advance copy of the new "SHAEF Field Handbook of Civil Affairs, FRANCE," (Provisional First Edition), the Annex was redrafted, and coordinated with other staff sections.

Liaison with the Civil Affairs Section, First U.S. Army and with G-5 Section, First U.S. Army Group was effected 15-18 May.

Civil Affairs Bulletin Number 1 was issued on 22 May as the first of a series. An instruction to all Civil Affairs officers and men, "Intelligence in the Field," was prepared in coordination with the AC of S, G-2.

Coordinating meetings were attended in LONDON, 30 May, with G-5 representatives of First U.S. Army Group, of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, and Forward Echelon, Communications Zone, And on 31 May with officers of the U.S. Navy Task Force Support Group.

The Branch on 31 May had in charge 291 Top Secret and Top Secret Bigot documents, fully registered and catalogued. A library of approximately 1,000 maps and 700 classified documents for reference purposes had been assembled.

The Branch Chief addressed the 5 June sessions of Counter-Intelligence Corps, Third U.S. Army, at which more than 100 members of Counter-Intelligence Corps from Corps and Divisional Teams were present. Subsequent conferences developed plans for coordinated operations. These plans were later formalized by specific G-2 directives to Counter-Intelligence Corps, and by G-5 Intelligence instructions. They became the bases of paralleling operations in the field.

SECTION IV

PLANS AND OPERATIONS

Plans and Operations Branch was initially activated as a coordinating staff branch on the same level with Personnel and Administration, Intelligence and Supply. These four branches had general supervision over eight functional staff sub-sections, namely, Public Health, Relief, Fiscal, Government Affairs, Transportation, Communications, Works and Utilities, Economic Affairs, Information and Public Relations. Shortly before coming to FRANCE, the G-5 Section was reorganized and the Plans and Operations Branch became one of five equal and complete branches, namely, Personnel and Administration, Intelligence, Plans and Operations, Relief and Supply, and Government Affairs. All Civil Affairs functional activities were placed under one of the five branches.

Plans and Operations Branch was made primarily responsible for the internal organization and training of the Section and of Army Civil Affairs Reserves. It was to maintain an operations map, make a continuing study of the tactical situation in so far as it affected Civil Affairs, and prepare plans for and supervise the allocation and movement of Civil Affairs Detachments or units to Corps, in coordination with G-3. The Branch was further made responsible for supervising the functional activities involved in handling displaced persons and refugees.

Initial planning and actions included the preparation of a Civil Affairs Operational Plan and of Standard Operating Procedures for FRANCE, together with the carrying out of training programs for all assigned and attached personnel. Upon request as of 30 May, the following units were attached to Third U.S. Army:

	Personnel	Vehicles
Hq/Hq Det, 2d BCA Regt	113	36
Co A, 2d CA Regt	204	65
Co B, 2d CA Regt	204	65
Co C, 2d CA Regt	204	65
Co D, 2d CA Regt	204	65
Co I, 2d BCA Regt	192	58
2d Plat Transport Co BCAD	76	35
	1197	389

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One Civil Affairs Company was attached to each Corps as follows:

Unit	Attached to
Co A, 2d BCA Regt	VIII Corps
Co B, 2d BCA Regt	XV Corps
Co C, 2d BCA Regt	XX Corps
Co D, 2d BCA Regt	III Corps

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REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

The chief mission of the Refugees and Displaced Persons subsection was to prevent any hindrance to military operations that might be occasioned by the massing of uncontrolled movement of civilians in these categories. It was also [illegible] them which might threaten the [illegible] practicable to relieve their [illegible] an organization to effect [illegible] placed persons, which organization [illegible] course to appropriate authorities.

Steps were initiated to secure information as to the numbers, conditions and locations of refugees and displaced persons which might be encountered in the anticipated Zone of Operations of Third U.S. Army. Concurrences in all instructions were secured from the AC of S, G-5, the Provost Marshal and the Surgeon, and on 14 June an Instructional Guide concerning refugees and displaced persons was issued. This guide aimed at making the greatest possible use of indigenous facilities, agencies and government so as to place the least possible burden on the Army. Preparations were made to cope with refugees and displaced persons in the event that the enemy employed them as an obstruction to the movement of our troops.

Plans contemplated the use of Civil Affairs Detachments as operational troops, with the Army staff acting as a supervisory and coordinating agency. Refugees encountered were to be brought together at Collection points and passed backward through Transit points until finally reaching more permanent facilities known as Assembly Centers. Plans included admonitions against any more movement of civilians than was necessary for security and military freedom. Provisions were made for securing necessary supplies and rations. Two specialist officers from Company I, 2d Civil Affairs Regiment, were specially instructed so that they might be made available to Corps, Divisions and Detachments for supervising an emergency situation in which large concentrations of displaced persons or refugees might be encountered beyond the capacity of operational Detachments.

SECTION V

RELIEF AND SUPPLY

The Operational Supply Branch was activated 20 April. It began at once a study of the Army's part in the civilian relief supply plans prepared by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force for FRANCE during the first 90 days of the operation [illegible]. On 8 May, it was possible to begin coordination of the newly activated operations subsections: Relief Supply, Economics, Agriculture, Labor, Public Welfare, Communications, Transportation and Public Works and Utilities.

Working with the Army G-4 Section, Quartermaster and Medical Supply officer, complete requisitions were prepared for allocations D + 15 to D + 41, for food, clothing, sanitary and medical supplies and forwarded to the Communications Zone, which responsibility it was to meet these requirements available on the continent. About 20 May, allocation of Civil Affairs Relief Supplies were received from First U.S. Army Group for period D + 42 to D + 90.

As all Civil Affairs Relief Supplies were to be handled through the appropriate Army service it was necessary to prepare instructions for the guidance of Civil Affairs Detachments and subordinate staffs. The final draft was approved by the Army services concerned and by G-4 and was issued as "Operational Supply Instruction Number 1" -- with appendices A and B -- showing the flow of Civil Affairs supplies and a brief of the requisitioning procedure.

Conferences were held with First U.S. Army Headquarters and Advance Section Communication Zone on 21 May regarding the policy for requisitioning Civil Affairs supplies from Communications Zone Depots for delivery to the Army Depot.

At 21 Army Group, British, Section representatives met with G-5 Supply Officers representing Supreme Headquarters and First U.S. Army Various conferences of this nature were held during the period 15 May to 15 June to discuss changes in allocations and procedures.

Civil Affairs Annex Number 7 was prepared and after concurrence by G-4, was published in the Third U.S. Army Administrative Order Number 3.

Sub-allocation of credits for Civil Affairs Supplies for period D + 15 to D + 41 were forwarded to Corps 10 June. Sub-allocations for period D + 42 to D + 90 were forwarded to Corps 5 July.

After the operation Supply Instructions were completed and issued, Civil Affairs officers from Corps, Divisions and Detachments were called in to acquaint them with the procedure. A chart was prepared sectioning the flow of relief supplies from the UNITED KINGDOM to foreign shores and to Army depots.

ECONOMICS

The Economics sub-section covered the following fields: Trade and Industry, Labor, Agriculture, Fisheries, Natural Resources, Forests, Price Control and Rationing, Salvage and Animal Health and Hygiene.

Personnel of the section studied available intelligence data on economic conditions in FRANCE. Special reports were prepared which included technical economic maps showing the location of important industries, principal crop areas and natural resources. The structures of the French economic and governmental system were given attention. Indoctrination of Civil Affairs Officers in Corps, Division, and Detachment Staffs was undertaken to acquaint them with the specialized economic work that would be required in the field.

About 8 May, a Labor officer was appointed to assist in procurement of civilian labor for Army use, to establish or reorganize French employment facilities, and to aid in solving labor relating problems in general. A study was made of French labor recruiting facilities and organizations, of price control and of rationing methods and salvage practices.

The French Labor Exchange system was given special study, and plans were formulated to make it more serviceable for the needs of the Army. An essential flaw discovered in the system was that only the unemployed registered, and because of the inability of the persons of re-employment records would prove unreliable. It was recommended that French authorities obtain new labor records at the time ration cards were validated or new cards were issued.

PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES

Major items of preliminary work in preparation for operations consisted of establishing liaison with opposite numbers in the staffs of higher and parallel echelons; publication of Instructional Guides based on directives of Higher Commands; briefing of Civil Affairs officers in lower echelons staffs and in detachments; intensive study of all military intelligence reports covering the areas upon which plans of operation were based.

Briefing of all Civil Affairs officers for the coming operation was accomplished in three phases:

First, those officers designated for staff duties of lower echelons spent several days with the army G-5 staff section interviewing each branch. The Public Works and Utilities sub-section participated, discussing plans and methods for control and operation of technical installations, usually with groups of two to five officers.

Second, officers of the 2d European Civil affairs Regiment designated to participate with the Army in operations were briefed by mentions in their mess halls. Public Works and Utilities utilization plans were outlined at these meetings.

Third, certain officers of the Specialist Reserve Pool of Company I, 2d Civil Affairs Regiment spent several days with the G-5 section studying technical aspects of the planned operation.

TRANSPORTATION

Preparation for operations consisted of establishing liaison with Transportation officers in the staffs of higher and parallel echelons, briefing of the Civil Affairs officers on lower echelon staffs and in the Detachments, and study of all intelligence reports on French areas to be occupied.

COMMUNICATIONS

On the basis of instructions received from First U.S. Army Group and Supreme Headquarters, plans were prepared to meet possible communications problems. Military intelligence reports of the French and German communications systems and German plans for destruction of communications were studied extensively. Liaison was established with Signal Officer and the AC of S, G-2, and their concurrences obtained on all plans for operations.

Since practically none of the Detachments contained technically qualified communications personnel, plans contemplated that the officer in charge of Communications sub-section, assisted by the technically qualified officer from the specialist reserve pool, would enter each liberated city immediately to assist the Detachment to accomplish the mission of this sub section. Constant liaison would also be maintained with Signal officer and G-2 to make certain that French communications workmen and materials were devoted to the most imperative needs of the Army.

PUBLIC WELFARE

Studies were made of areas in which it was anticipated that the Army would operate in FRANCE. From G-2 sources an effort was made to anticipate the extent of destitution in the civilian population that might be encountered and the probable condition of French local and national agencies which would be relied upon to cope with the situation.

SECTION VI

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

Organized on 4 May, the branch was subdivided into functions as follows: Legal, Police, Fire and Civil Defense, and Displaced Persons. The branch was designed, first, to coordinate the activities of its sub-sections from the standpoint of internal organization and administration, and second, to furnish staff supervision to civilian activities having as their main concern the political functioning of public authorities so far as they affected the Army's interests.

LEGAL

The Legal sub-section started functioning on 6 June and immediately set about drafting its plans for operations in FRANCE. Its Legal Instructional Guide, published after concurrence of the Army Judge Advocate, condensed the policies set forth in the "SHAEF Field Handbook of Civil Affairs -- FRANCE" as to enactments necessary to further the military objectives of the Army, Civil Affairs relationship with the French authorities in restoring the French Courts and judicial system, and observance of judicial proceedings affecting allied interests.

To assist the legal officers in carrying out the responsibility of observing the French methods of administering justice, instructions were given at planned meetings on the organization, jurisdiction, powers and procedure of French Courts. Complete plans were made for the setting up of Allied Military Courts in FRANCE. Both General Military Courts and Summary Military Courts were contemplated to provide, if necessary, for the security of the Allied Forces, the protection of the civil population and the maintenance of law and order.

Orders were received from Supreme Headquarters prior to Embarkation for the continent that military courts would not be established in FRANCE unless directed by higher authority.

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FINANCIAL

Charged with the preparation and execution of plans to insure the adequate maintenance of French fiscal machinery, the Financial subsection commenced its task by a study of private and public finance in the indicated area of the Army's operations.

In view of the scale of invasion plans it became apparent that the financial life and economy of the liberated regions would be unavoidably disrupted. No one could accurately predict the responsibility that might be assumed by the Free French government and by local public authorities. The sub-section planned, therefore, for an active, as well as supervisory, part in the restoration of sound financial conditions. It prepared two alternative courses of action. One envisaged the assumption of almost complete responsibility by the French, and the other called for a more active participation by Civil Affairs in financial control and rehabilitation.

These courses of action, translated into specific instructions to Civil Affairs staffs and Detachments, dealt with the reopening of banks and other financial institutions, the blocking of enemy accounts, property control, the issuance of supplementary currency and exchange regulations, the terms and conditions for the advance of Civil Affairs funds, the control and accounting for Civil Affairs expenditures and receipts, the establishment of inflation controls, and the handling of municipal finance problems.

Close contact was maintained with the Currency Section for FRANCE of the French Country Mission at Supreme Headquarters. Civil Affairs Detachments of Companies were supplied francs for initial operations. C and D type detachments were given 50,000 francs each, B Detachments received 100,000 francs, and A Detachments received 250,000 francs. A reserve of 5m0,000 francs was carried by Army G-5. One officer in each Detachment was appointed a sub-accountant and received an accounting kit containing accounting forms, receipts and payment vouchers. Oral instructions were given as to accounting procedure and the use of Civil Affairs funds. Stress was laid on measures to prevent inflation in FRANCE, such as restrictions on troop spending, restrictions of bank loans, price controls, elimination of black market activities, and currency exchange controls.

Throughout this preparational phase constant liaison was maintained with the Finance Officer of the Army and concurrences were obtained from him on all matters of mutual concern. The Chief of the Financial sub-section was appointed Purchasing and Contracting Officer and Class A Finance Agent to act for the G-5 Staff in emergencies.

Toward the end of June a supply of Currency Proclamations was received from First U.S. Army Group and distributed to Detachments which were to operate under Third U.S. Army. These Proclamations informed the French people of an issue of Supplemental francs to circulate on a par with Metropolitan francs, established a rate of exchange for dollars, sterling and francs, and placed restrictions on foreign exchange transactions. Plans for the publication of the Proclamation were completed.

PUBLIC SAFETY

Public Safety was to insure by survey, inspection and recommendation that the French Civil Police and Security Agencies were adequate and competent to prevent civilian interference with military operations and security. As special tasks, it was made responsible for police functions, fire defense, passive air defense, gas defense, protection of records and archives, assistance in the regulation of civilian traffic and the movement of displaced persons.

In the study of these various functions, the importance of the sub-section's coordination with the Provost Marshal and Counter-Intelligence Corps was recognized, and immediate steps taken to exchange information and to integrate policies.

PUBLIC HEALTH

The Public Health officer was charged with seeing that healthful conditions were maintained among civilians in the Zone of the Army, placing the responsibility of local health conditions on local health officials. He was to supervise and stimulate their activities as necessary, and in emergencies to direct the civilian public health organizations. Other duties included the distribution and proper use of emergency civil medical and sanitary supplies, and maintaining close liaison with the Army Medical Services.

First weeks were utilized in accumulating data from area studies and medical and engineer intelligence reports. From this data a reasonably accurate assumption was made as to conditions and customs in FRANCE. Policies adopted were broad enough to give adequate exercise of initiative to Detachments in the field, and at the same time were in sufficient detail to give Civil Affairs officers greater confidence in handling public health problems when no Public Health officer was attached to their organizations.

Arrangements were made to use the medical officers in the Medical Detachment of the 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment as Public Health specialists. Numerous conferences were held with these officers, and with other personnel to thoroughly indoctrinate them with plans and policies outlined.

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

SECTION I

GENERAL

G-5 Section arrived in FRANCE in two echelons on 7 and 18 July. In addition to its assigned strength, the section had attached to it four officers of the U.S. Navy, a historian, a specialist on arts and monuments, and a liaison officer of G-5, Army Group. As no additional vehicles had been provided, transportation became a continuing problem.

Arrangements were made at once with First U.S. Army to permit observational missions to that Army's Civil Affairs Detachments in the field. The VIII Corps was already engaged in active operations and had accumulated a wealth of Civil Affairs experience, from which immediate effort was made to profit. At the same time French-speaking officers of the Army Civil Affairs Reserve were employed in interviewing civilians to obtain all possible information on German plans and practices in the evacuation of towns, the handling of refugees, and on civilian conditions behind the German lines.

Corps and Division Civil Affairs staffs, as they arrived in FRANCE, were advised of the developing situation. Emphasis was placed on the mounting evidence of the French authorities' willingness to cooperate, on the demonstrated efficiency of the French relief agencies and the loyalty of the Gendarmerie.

On 18 July, the first contingent of Civil Affairs troops landed at UTAH Beach. Immediately that these units were bivouacked, they were briefed by Army Staff officers. Key officers were given opportunities to make first hand observations in liberated towns. Detachments were brought to Army headquarters for special instruction.

The cardinal principle of successful Civil Affairs operation is supervision of local government to the end that it becomes an agency contributing to the military effort. It became increasingly clear during July that the local governments of FRANCE were eager to accept that role; that they only wanted the chance.

The effort was directed toward seeing that they got that chance in every town entered by a Third U.S. Army Civil Affairs Detachment.

SECTION II

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

The relatively short period between the arrival of the Section in FRANCE and the time when the Army became operational was spent in routine administrative work and bivouac training and discipline for enlisted men.

Liaison was established between Army and British Civil Affairs officers, assigned to American Detachments, by the attachment to this staff by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force of a British officer.

SECTION III

INTELLIGENCE

On 14 June, an officer was placed on temporary duty as liaison officer and observer with the AC of S, G-5, VIII Corps. He embarked with VIII Corps on D plus 18 and remained with it until 12 July. His detailed reports informed Army's Civil Affairs troops of actual field conditions in FRANCE.

First hand investigations ranging from CHERBOURG (O-11) to the front line were carried on throughout the American area in NORMANDY to obtain information to serve as a guide for the operational phase. Daily conferences were held with AC of S, G-5, in assisting in preparation of plans and orders. The bulk of all Forward Echelon correspondence and reports was handled by Intelligence. Three Civil Affairs Bulletins were published.

SECTION IV

PLANS AND OPERATIONS

Every effort was made to train and equip non-operational Civil Affairs units for becoming operational in the near future. Training programs were reviewed and changes recommended. Selected Detachments of the Army's Civil Affairs Reserve were given special instruction in refugee work and supply management. Daily briefing on the tactical and Civil Affairs situation was instituted. A large G-5 operations map was constructed and posted daily.

The VIII Corps, while attached to First U.S. Army, was furnished Civil Affairs Detachments from 1st European Civil Affairs Regiment for deployment in the Corps Area. It was the policy of the VIII Corps to send Detachments forward to its Divisions for deployment as soon as tactical conditions permitted, or wherever an emergency demanded. This policy was adopted for Third U.S. Army. It was planned that, except at important governmental seats and large cities, the assignment of a Detachment to a locality would be temporary and terminate prior to passage of the Army rear boundary forward of the locality.

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

In this period, it became apparent that the displaced persons problem, at least in the coastal areas, was negligible; that the French authorities were willing and able to care for their own refugees; that the amount of destruction and military activity which had occured in a community governed the numbers of refugees.

It was also observed that a generally stabilized condition of combat, with the necessary civilian restrictions imposed, prevented individuals from rapidly returning to their homes, increasing the problem of the care of refugees.

SECTION V

RELIEF AND SUPPLY

One Naval officer was added for liaison with Navy Civil Affairs representatives at ports to protect the Army's interests in harbor traffic and fishing regulations. Also three officers from Company F, 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment, were temporarily attached to survey and report on possible forward public utility requirements.

Detachment and Reserve officers of the Army's Civil Affairs units were brought in by groups for indoctrination and orientation. Coordination was established with the AC of S, G-4, and the supply branches of the Army as to methods of locating and transporting civilian relief supplies in the Army Zone when the Army became operational. After several days' training in procedures for handling Civil Affairs supplies, a Navy officer was attached to Communications Zone at CHERBOURG (O-11) to keep G-5 advised on imported relief supplies arriving at that port.

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LABOR

A conference with Army engineers developed that no civilian labor procurement service was to be established in the Army Zone of Operations as a military function. Consequently, a program of obtaining and coordinating labor information on a regional basis under the supervision of French authorities was laid out.

PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES

Such power lines as were readily available in the liberated area were inspected to determine seriousness of damage and amount of repair needed. Utilizing three officers of Company I, Specialist Reserve, a study was made of power needs of the territory expected to be covered in the Army's advance.

TRANSPORTATION

Talks with transportation officers of [illegible] that transportation of relief supplies to distribution points and the need for additional transport by Detachments were major Civil Affairs problems.

Through G-4, arrangements were made with Advanced Section Communications Zone for the transport of relief supplies from beaches to Army depots. Inspections were made of French railroads and canals on the peninsula.

COMMUNICATIONS

Inspections of the communications system in the liberated area showed that while cables and wires had been cut by bombs and gunfire, the German plans for destruction had not been carried out. Few switchboards had been deliberately damaged and there was no indication of deliberate damage to long distance cables. It was obvious that if this condition prevailed in the area liberated by the Army, the resources of the entire French communications system could be devoted to the Army's use as soon as repairs were made. Plans were made to achieve this objective as fully as possible with French civilian assistance.

PUBLIC WELFARE

It was learned that where the French authorities and agencies were operating in areas that had not suffered complete devastation, the originally elaborate Civil Affairs plan for operation of supplementary relief agencies was unnecessary, according to First U.S. Army experience.

SECTION VI

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

To further prepare for operations in FRANCE, public officials in the towns liberated by the First U.S. Army were visited upon the invitation of the AC of S, G-5, of that Army. Thus officers saw at first hand the ability of the French, with the encouragement of Civil Affairs specialists, to reorganise and set in motion the machinery of public administration.

LEGAL

On invitation of the First U.S. Army and of the 21 Army Group, British, the sessions of the local courts then functioning were attended and a first hand knowledge of the Juge de Simple police was obtained.

FINANCIAL

Study and observation of the operations of First U.S. Army Detachments in the NORMANDY peninsula indicated that the French [illegible]

PUBLIC SAFETY

Additional conferences were held with Public Safety officers of the First U.S. Army and an appraisal was made of the status of the Gendarmerie and of other local police organizations. Representatives of the sub-section were present at a meeting held at LA HAYE DU PUITS (T-1884), attended by Mayors of the Canton and presided over by the AC of S, G-5, VIII Corps. At this meeting, public safety problems were considered, among them being the employment of auxiliary Gendarmes, and Gardes Champetres by French authorities.

PUBLIC HEALTH

Once on French soil, an appraisal was made of the accuracy of the information that influenced the adoption of original policies. The assumption of policies proved to be substantially correct with one outstanding exception: the nutrition, general health, and sanitary condition of the population were better than had been foreseen. Prevalence of contagious diseases was less than anticipated. Number of refugees was less than expected. Sanitary utilities of the cities were extensively damaged. The total lack of repair facilities or salvage materials caused disruption of functions for a longer period of time than was anticipated, but did not produce any serious Public Health problem because of dispersement of population from cities affected.

Erroneous assumptions did not warrant the change in general policy, however, for the following reasons: The actual field experience showed conditions to be better than anticipated, and the general policy covered all the problems encountered. The region of operations was not representative of all FRANCE in that it was a purely agricultural area with small towns and scattered populations. Moreover, assistance to public health was afforded by the "standfast" regulation that held dispersed populations in place, checking the spread of disease.

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

SECTION I

GENERAL

The break through the German lines at AVRANCHES (T-21) late in July, and the swift victories of Third Army troops in BRITTANY that followed during August, changed the Civil Affairs operational picture completely.

Operations in the NORMANDY Peninsula had been paced to a relatively slow development of the liberated area. Detachments were distributed heavily through towns. Distances between headquarters were short. Most towns had been severely damaged by combat.

The very opposite situation arose in BRITTANY and in the rich Regions of ANGERS and ORLEANS as our armored divisions and infantry swept eastward in rapid conquests.

The degree of damage to towns decreased almost in exact ratio to the increase in the pace of advance. The problem now became one of spreading Detachments thinly, of a single Detachment taking over an area comparable to that previously allotted to a company of Detachments. Liaison and communications became major problems — toward the month's end, VIII Corps G-5 was more than 350 miles from Army G-5.

More and more reliance had to be placed on the French. Whereas proclamations and other notices had been posted in towns by hundreds, they now had to be provided by thousands. In a single printing at GRANVILLE (T-13), 50,000 copies of such notices were turned out to meet the demands of Corps and Division staffs.

The early forecast of French cooperation made by the Army Com-

French nationals were allowed to keep arms they had seized from the Germans or which had been dropped to them by parachute by allied air forces. This demonstration of confidence in the loyalty of the population, and in the ability of the French authorities to police their own communities, proved invaluable to French morale.

By 6 August, a total of 119 principal towns and a population normally numbering 3,500,000 was under Civil Affairs supervision, with French authorities performing all administrative functions. Though refugees in great numbers were present throughout the Zone of Operations, nowhere were they impeding military movements. No serious problems of relief had arisen. Public health was surprisingly good.

During a temporary truce on 14 August, 24,000 refugees were marched out of the besieged city of BREST (V-90) by the German commander to become the charges of French civil authorities and Civil Affairs. A special relief team of the Army Reserve was rushed to the scene. Relief supplies were carried from RENNES (T-15) in salvaged German vehicles. A refugee camp was set up at [illegible]ARENNES (R-0011). In less than a week the entire 20,000 refugees were distributed through the rural areas about BREST and ceased to be an Army problem.

A confused political situation existed at VANNES (R-1809). There was shooting in the streets. Appointment on 15 August of FFI Colonel de [illegible]IVRIA as Military Commandant for the Department of MORBIHAN, and his creation of a military court reestablished law and order in twenty-four hours.

NANTES (Q-06) reported 200,000 refugees in LOIRE INFERIEURE as a result of organized evacuations into that Department from other areas. But again, as at BREST (V-90), they were distributed among the rural population and presented no problem the French themselves could not handle.

Large quantities of captured and abandoned German supplies were uncovered by Civil Affairs Detachments and reported through Army G-5 to interested Army services. Food shortages in one district were relieved by the policy of distributing through the French the surpluses of other districts.

Much heavy wire construction was saved the Signal Corps by the prompt restoration of civilian telephone trunk lines between AVRANCHES (T-21) and LE MANS (Z-4063), and thence through MAINTENON (R-4617) to PARIS (S-04).

The great needs that developed were of coal for the operation of utilities and of oil and gasoline for motor transport and harvesting machinery. With the Quartermaster cooperating by releasing German stocks that were of too low a grade for military uses, it was possible to bridge over emergencies in most instances. Huge supplies of captured German food were made available to civilian relief agencies by this procedure.

Before the month's end, G-5 had issued for posting in French communities 1C,000 public safety circulars, 15,000 proclamations by the Supreme Commander, 15,000 posters limiting civilian circulation to six kilometers, and 8,000 RF (Republique FRANCAISE) police arm bands.

Refugees from PARIS in the Army's Zone of Operations were estimated at 100,000, the total of all refugees at 400,000. However, the major Civil Affairs mission of keeping military routes clear was being carried out as ordered.

SECTION II

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

Examination of reports from Detachments deployed in the Army Zone and routing them to staff sections and services concerned involved considerable time and effort. Initial reports were slow in arriving and voluminous in quantity. Reports from Detachments covered many subjects such as captured enemy supplies, unexploded bombs, location of graves, and civilian claims.

Many requests for specialists were received from Corps and Detachments in the field. [illegible]

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Requests for battle replacements were few, four being processed during the first month of operations.

Frequent movements of this headquarters, averaging once per week, caused delays in the receipt of morning reports and other documents, making it difficult to maintain complete and current reports.

Early in the operational phase several French liaison officers reported for duty with this section. Assignment of French officers to Corps staffs was made, their duties being to maintain liaison with civilian agencies in the Zone of Operations with relation to Civil Affairs needs.

SECTION III

INTELLIGENCE

Daily liaison was maintained with all Corps throughout August. Officers assigned to this duty from Civil Affairs Company Reserves covered from 100 to 350 miles every twenty-four hours, bringing field staffs from twenty-four to thirty-six hours in closer contact with Army Headquarters.

A liaison officer was placed with Counter-Intelligence Corps, working daily with that Corps' officers in the field. A policy was developed of keeping Civil Affairs and Counter-Intelligence Corps officers stationed in towns in close proximity to enable immediate solution to common problems as they arose. Through the same officer security regulations were enforced with the operating Civil Affairs Detachments.

More than 500 French officials and miscellaneous civilians were questioned by interviewers of specialist reserve, Company I, to determine civilian sentiment and obtain information of civilian conditions behind enemy lines. These interviews developed the following salient facts:

(1) The enemy had no concerted evacuation plan for civilians.

(2) There was no evident enemy intention to use civilians to impede our Army's advance.

(3) French agencies were prepared and able to handle refugee problems with little assistance.

(4) The service in which Civil Affairs could be most valuable was to perform liaison with the French to convey to them the wishes of the Army Commander, and to lend prestige to local governments by giving open evidence of the Army's support

Daily and fortnightly Civil Affairs Summaries were prepared for higher headquarters, two Civil Affairs Analyses and three Civil Affairs Bulletins were published, as well as Secret special reports and analyses dealing with political and religious influences in the Army's Zone of Operations. A running historical record was maintained.

An average of forty reports daily were received from Corps and Division staffs and operating Detachments; they were analyzed upon receipt, excerpted and turned over to Branch Chiefs and Specialists for action as required.

SECTION IV

PLANS AND OPERATIONS

The following Civil Affairs Detachments were left in position by VIII Corps on 1 August, while attached to First Army, and passed to control of Third Army:

Detachment	Location	Coordinates
D6I1	SARTILLY	T-2224
D5A1	LA HAYE PESNEL	T-2528
C1I1	GRANVILLE	T-1134
D4E1	BREHAL	T-1840
D3E1	MONTMARTAIN	T-1750
B1A1	AVRANCHES	Y-2716
D6F1	GAVRAY	T-3441
D7D1	BRECEY	T-4220

The normal Civil Affairs Detachments were operated in the following localities within the Army Zone of Operations during August:

ALENCON (Z-3585)	MANTES GASSICOURT (temp)(R-6061)
ANGERS (U-6279)	MELUN (S-2506)
AVRANCHES (Y-2716)	MONTARGIS (X-4745)
BLANCHELANDE (T-1986)	MONTMARTAIN (T-1750)
BRECEY (T-4220)	MONTEREAU (temp)(Y-3189)
BREHAL (T-1840)	MORTAGNE (Q-7217)
BRUZ (temp)(A-1378)	NANTES (U-0560)
CHARTRES (R-3902)	ORLEANS (A-6340)
CHATEAUBRIANT (U-2208)	PITHIVIERS (temp)(A-9367)
CHATEAUDUN (temp)(A-2361)	PONTIVY (R-3455)
CHATEAULIN (A-2375)	QUIMPER (A-2054)
CHATEAU THIERRY (temp)(S-8304)	REIMS (H-6805)
DINAN (X-7674)	RENNES (Y-1053)
DREUX (R-3136)	ST BRIEUC (U-2904)
[illegible] (temp)(T-6134)	ST HILAIRE (T-4703)
ERNEE (temp)(Y-5772)	ST MALO (S-7916)
FOUGERES (Y-3876)	ST QUEN (temp)(Y-5454)
FONTAINEBLEAU (temp)(X-2891)	ST NAZAIRE (temp)(Z-1352)
GAVRAY (T-3441)	SARTILLY (T-2224)
GRANVILLE (T-1134)	SEGRE (J-5703)
GUINGAMP (R-7511)	SENS (X-6866)
LA FLECHE (K-1805)	SILLE (temp)(Z-1757)
LA HAYE PESNEL (T-2528)	THEIL (Y-2475)
LANNION (R-7431)	VANNES (H-1809)
LAVAL (Y-6840)	VERNEUIL (temp)(F-0512)
LE MANS (Z-4063)	VILLENEUVE (temp)(X-8968)
MAMERS (Z-5589)	

To obtain earliest possible establishment of Detachments in localities as they were uncovered, one standard Civil Affairs Company including its administrative headquarters was attached to each Corps, and Corps further attached Detachments to Divisions for movement to Detachment destinations. Each Company headquarters was charged with the responsibility of supplying and administering its organic Detachments.

Company I, 2d Civil Affairs Regiment was retained at Army Headquarters as a reserve. Its Detachments were sent forward to Corps as reinforcements were needed. At the same time, specialist officers of Company I were detailed to undertake special missions in Corps areas when requested, and to prepare special analyses and reports required by higher headquarters.

Due to the extensive areas soon uncovered, Detachments were placed only at the rate of one in each Arrondissement, excluding temporary assignments. Once permanently assigned, the Detachment remained in place and became responsible to successive higher commanders as the tactical rear boundaries of Divisions, Corps and Army were successively moved forward of its locality. But when any Detachment was no longer needed in a given locality, it was removed and placed in either the Army or Corps Civil Affairs Reserve later to be sent forward and used again. Thus Detachments were placed down in front and rolled up behind.

On 16 August, on order from higher headquarters, the operational plan was essentially changed. Companies A, B, C and I of 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment were attached to 1st European Civil Affairs Regiment, which in turn was attached to Twelfth Army Group. Headquarters/Headquarters Detachment, 1st European Civil Affairs Regiment, along with Company D, 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment were attached to Communications Zone to be held for subsequent use by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. Then, on 29 August, the following Detachments were attached to Third Army:

B1I2	D5B2	D5A2	D3C2
B2I2	D6B2	D6A2	D4C2
D1I2	D7B2	D7A2	D5C2
D2I2	C1I2	A1B2	D6C2
A1A2	C2I2	B1B2	D7C2
B1A2	A1C2	C1B2	D3A1
C1A2	B1C2	C2B2	D1D1
C2A2	D1C2	D1B2	SRA2
D1A2	D2C2	D2B2	SRB2
D2A2	D3A2	C1C2	SRC2
D3B2	D4A2	C2C2	SRI2
D4B2			

All Civil Affairs administrative company headquarters were placed under control of 1st European Civil Affairs Regiment, which placed them at geographical locations considered central for supplying and administering surrounding Civil Affairs Detachments. The 1st European Civil Affairs Regiment assumed responsibility for the supply and administration of all Detachments.

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

The rapid movement of the Army resulted in the by-passing of many communities, leaving the local government and homes relatively intact in many of them so that local authorities were available and local resources adequate to care for the problem of refugees. It was both undesirable and unnecessary to establish formal Collection Points or permanent facilities for care of refugees under these conditions. Moreover, no opportunity developed for identification and separation of refugees from displaced persons and the establishment of permanent Assembly Centers for displaced persons.

On the other hand, the necessity did arise of establishing routes over which refugees could move without obstructing Army operations and supply. Beginning 8 August, Detachments C1I2 and D2I2 were detailed to plot such routes. Upon being approved by G-4 Traffic Control Section, the selected roads were posted with signs reading Route Autorisee Aux Civils. Before the month's close they extended from GAVRAY (T-3441) to RENNES (Y-15) as the southern extremity, and from RENNES to PITHIVIERS (A-9367).

In turn, Detachments were authorized to establish local refugee routes and signs were made available to them for posting. The Provost Marshal's Office was kept informed of where these routes existed.

Detachments reported in almost all communities refugees varying in number from small groups to several thousands. Operating through the Maires, Secours National and the Croix Rouge Francaise, in most instances the Detachments were able to have the refugees billeted and fed without other military assistance. Only in two instances was it necessary to furnish relief supplies.

A special problem developed in the vicinity of BREST (V-90) when the Germans expelled the city's civilian population in the probable hope of embarrassing the American forces. Detachment C1I2 was dispatched to this area and the G-5 Refugee officer, together with a French liaison officer, surveyed the area. Instructions were issued to the Maires and the Chief of Gendarmes of each community to clear the main highways and route individuals to communities where billeting facilities still existed. Six thousand refugees were entrained from LANDERNEAU (R-1305) to MORLAIX (R-4017). The refugees which came through the German lines were excellently handled by the French authorities, with the assistance of four women of the Military Liaison for Administrative Matters, through dispersal and billeting in nearby communities. Detachment C1I2 provided emergency hard rations, which included soap, codfish, pulses, biscuits, meat, milk and chocolate. Its officers coordinated the work of the Maires. The Secours National established emergency feeding stations where necessary and a total of 21,000 refugees were cared for without interference to military operations or supply, and without suffering to the individuals.

From 23 August to 25 August, a special survey was made to determine the number of refugees from PARIS located in the Army Zone and to discover what problems existed among them and possible steps to be taken for their control. If the Parisians returned in numbers to the PARIS area, they would create a supply problem there that could only be solved by use of military vehicles to transport food. This survey indicated that a minimum of 100,000 PARIS refugees were in the Army Zone. Instructions were given to all Detachments and to the local officials rigidly to enforce circulation restrictions and to issue passes to PARIS only in event of grave emergency.

Informal arrangements were made to secure the services of American Red Cross civilian personnel to relieve the use of military personnel in caring for emergency problems and destitution among refugees and displaced persons.

The total numbers of refugees estimated by Detachments in the territory covered by the Third U.S. Army's advance was as follows:

week ending 7 August	45,000
week ending 14 August	9,300
week ending 21 August	185,835
week ending 28 August	406,000

About 1,500 displaced persons were reported.

SECTION V

RELIEF AND SUPPLY

By the temporary attachment, while in coastal areas, of a United States Navy officer with Civil Affairs training for port liaison, and of Specialist officers from Company I, 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment, it was possible to handle requests from Corps and Detachments for special assistance promptly and adequately.

Difficulties arose, of [illegible] strain upon all communicati[illegible] ments was rare. The wide di[illegible] Corps, had to be overcome by [illegible] Restrictions on travel by staff members, for reasons of necessity, made contact with the operating Detachments a problem of first magnitude.

DECLASSIFIED

Just prior to the time that the Army began operations, requisitions were prepared calling forward relief supplies from advance Section Communications Zone to supply dumps of the Army Quartermaster and Medical depots. These items consisted of food, soap, emergency feeding kits, sanitary and medical supplies. The Third U.S. Army Medical depot carried one Allied Relief Board Basic Medical Unit, and had two more "ABB" Units that were brought up to a depot further forward. Due to the rapid movement, however, the Quartermaster Class II and IV forward depot was not established in time to stock Civil Affairs supplies as planned.

A Civil Affairs Operational Supply Detachment was organized 6 August consisting of two officers and two enlisted men from Company I, 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment, which was given charge of the Civil Affairs supplies stocked at the Quartermaster Class I depot #10 near RENNES (T-15) for the use of the Detachment in BRITTANY. These supplies were called forward to the RENNES (T-15) depot on the Quartermaster daily telegram.

Emergency food and soap supplies were issued in the Army Service Area, AVRANCHES (T-2716), GRANVILLE (T-13) and GAVRAY (T-3041). They were transported to Detachments from Advance Section Communications Zone supply dumps by captured enemy trucks driven by drivers from the G-5 Pool. Normally it was the responsibility of Advance Section Communications Zone to forward supplies to army depots, but due to the extreme shortage of army trucks it was necessary to use Civil Affairs transportation that had been obtained by salvaging damaged enemy vehicles.

Requisitions were approved and minimum requirements of gasoline, diesel oil and greases were furnished through Detachments for use of civilian officials, doctors and veterinarians to enable them to resume essential duties.

The operation Supply Detachment at RENNES (T-15) depot called upon the Civil Affairs Transport Platoon to forward relief supplies requisitioned by Detachments in that Region. On one occasion several truck loads of food and soap were forwarded from RENNES (T-15) depot for the emergency feeding of approximately 24,000 refugees released by the Germans from the city of BREST (T-90).

At a conference on 31 July between French National authorities and officers of Communications Zone, 21 Army Group British and Twelfth U.S. Army Group, it was agreed, and confirmed later by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, that delivery of imported relief supplies would be made to departmental directorates of the Ravitaillement General. It was further agreed that delivery of relief supplies would be made to mayors or local officials by Detachments in the combat zone only, and then only under pressure of temporary necessity. No cash payment would be demanded by the allied authorities delivering the commodities. Arrangements were made for future payment at a higher level.

Following the agreement the Regional Directors, L'Intendant des Affaires Economiques of the Regions of BRITTANY AND ANGERS, were called on for estimates of their minimum requirements of imported relief supplies. Both Regions reported a surplus of food stocks with the exception of sugar and salt. Their only requests were for immediate supplies of coal, gasoline, and fuel oil to care for immediate harvesting needs. Coal was not available but requisitions were approved for Civil Affairs gasoline and diesel oil in sufficient quantities to get the harvesting of crops under way in both Regions. The requisitions for diesel oil were furnished fully in the Region of ANGERS, and partially so in the BRITTANY area. Gasoline was not supplied from the dumps on account of the extreme shortage, but small supplies of captured enemy gasoline, diesel oil and coal were released for civilian use.

Assistance was given the French in working out non-military routes whereby civilians' vehicles could rush local food surpluses to PARIS.

The Quartermaster Class I dump #10 at RENNES (T-15) closed as of 23 August. The stock of Civil Affairs supplies had been issued in its entirety, and the Operational Supply Detachment was returned to Company I.

Plans were made to sell captured enemy food supplies released for Civil Affairs use, to French officials in lieu of relief supplies diverted for the feeding of PARIS.

ECONOMICS

During August the Army passed through three Regions — ROUEN, RENNES and ANGERS. For each a report covering all phases of economic conditions was prepared covering such information as:

1. Existence and state of rationing system in the area;

2. Surplus food products and estimate of their amount;

3. Existence of black market — cause and extent and in what products, prices charged;

4. Requirements of Civil Affairs supplies immediately needed to assist in harvesting crops, in the preservation of food and rehabilitation of food processing industries;

5. Attitude of French authorities to opening of French restaurants to military personnel.

6. List of established prices in the area.

Detachments under Army control were visited to impress them with the necessity of making out requisition forms for supplies needed to preserve food and to assist in restoring wherever possible home building and repair industries.

A special map was prepared for the Army Engineer showing the location of all important quarries and a list of all important sawmills and their locations in the Region of ANGERS. Following are some of the items reported:

1. To G-4, some 900,000 eggs near LE MANS (Z-4063). Eggs were later purchased by the Quartermaster.

2. To G-4, some seven tons of fresh pears available at ANGERS (O-8279).

3. To Signal Corps, location of a large German Signal Supply Base near ANGERS (O-8279).

4. To Communications Zone, numerous local stocks of cement.

5. Also to G-4, the existence of a battery factory near FOUGERES (Y-3878) which had a supply of raw materials, and needed only minor repairs to begin operations; two large warehouses of writing paper and office supplies at ANGERS (O-8279).

6. To Quartermaster, VIII Corps, fifty tons of frozen meat and seventy-five tons of frozen vegetables discovered at REDON (H-6805).

A report was made to Army Engineer concerning captured equipment in the railway yards at TROYES (Y-2873), including 120 carloads of construction materials of all kinds and 400 to 500 empty cars.

A large chart was developed for recording all information received from Detachments regarding the food situation. This included specific information on the estimated days food stock on hand in each Detachment area, the flour milling capacity of the area, and the status of food processing industries. Another chart was maintained on natural resources and important factories reported by Detachments, such as quarries, gravel deposits, sawmills, flour mills, captured German stores and lumber.

LABOR

Regional labor resources and recruiting facilities were investigated. The presence of large available surpluses of civilian labor were disclosed over all three regions. It was learned that unskilled and semi-skilled labor groups could be obtained from the following sources:

1. Factory workers from plants shut down by lack of power or raw material, or because of war damage;

2. Disbanded resistance forces, now returning to their homes;

3. French Todt workers returned to their previous places of residence;

4. Farm workers available after the harvest period.

The utilization of French employment facilities was found to be entirely feasible as most of these were either intact or being reorganized and both ready and willing to cooperate fully in procuring civilian labor for Army use, particularly since this would reduce unemployment caused by local war conditions.

When need for registration of all available civilian labor was emphasized to the French authorities, it was found that this was already under way. A summary of labor conditions was furnished to the Army Engineer and to BRITTANY Base Section. Individual assistance to local Detachments was given in cases where prompt procurement of civilian labor was requested by the Army Engineer.

PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES

The normal flow of power in the uncovered area was from the south and the east into the area from which the invasion began. Hence the population needing power was uncovered before the power plants that normally supplied them were taken. Water was low and hydro plants could supply very little above transformer and line losses. When uncovered, the steam plants were damaged, none of them being capable of full operation. Coal supplies were adequate for only a few days' operations. Transmission lines had been cut and some transformers were out of operation.

A conference was held in RENNES (T-15) on 18 August at which time the power companies of the BRITTANY peninsula submitted a consolidated table showing the status of generating plants as contrasted with power needs, and stating the amount of coal required by the plants uncovered as of that date. In this way a large number of uncoordinated activities were consolidated, and the channels of control were specified to the power companies. The work of these companies in pressing repairs and in meeting military and public essential needs was exemplary. The supply of delivered power by the end of August, however, had dropped to three to five percent of 1939 consumption due to lack of fuel.

On 6 August a field inspection was made of the power plant near VEZINS (T-4004). The dam was found to be of a type that only an all out air attack, concentrated in time and area, could cause a military danger. It was recommended that the lake should not be drained because of the improbability of damage from bombing and the serious need for the power. This recommendation was concurred in and the lake was not drained.

In most cases the damage to water works was incidental to combat or to bridge demolitions where water pipes crossed beneath bridges. Being buried, the water mains were not often damaged by combat except where bombs had been dropped from planes. Excepting from heavily bombed towns, there were few requests received for water pipes.

No major sewage problems were encountered, sewers not being as extensively used as in the United States. Pipes were little damaged, except where there had been heavy bombing. Cooperation from Army authorities to permit work on blocked sewers across or along military routes was the major type of request made.

Gas plants were permitted to function where they had coal. In ST. BRIEUC (S-2304) about 400 cubic meters per day were being produced from wood for hospital use.

There had been very little road maintenance by civilian agencies as it has not been a primary need. Streets in devastated areas of towns were initially cleared by the Army Engineers along military and essential non-military routes. Further clearance was undertaken by the civilians within individual towns.

TRANSPORTATION

In an effort to assure Detachments of needed additions to organic transportation in the form of passenger cars, small trucks and motorcycles, the following steps were taken:

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1. From 1 August to 8 August the Transportation sub-section attempted to find and repair enemy vehicles, using a squad of five G-5 Section drivers. A number of vehicles, chiefly large trucks, were secured and a freight-carrying pool for Civil Affairs supplies was established.

2. On 8 August it was decided to utilize the 2d Transport Platoon to augment these salvage efforts and to activate a Transportation Pool.

3. The Transport Platoon on 14 August was moved to the city of RENNES (T-15) to operate the Civil Affairs Transportation Pool in connection with the Civil Affairs Supply Depot and to continue repairing enemy vehicles for Civil Affairs use.

During the month thirty abandoned enemy vehicles were located and repaired. Six large trucks were retained by the Transportation Pool, and the others which included sedans, small trucks and specialized vehicles were turned over to those Detachments needing them most.

A number of caches of captured parts were located for use in repairing vehicles abandoned by the enemy. Miscellaneous parts were obtained by stripping enemy vehicles which were too wrecked to salvage. A number of enemy vehicles were partially or wholly repaired and later abandoned because of defects which developed in road tests.

In searching for vehicles to salvage, reconnaissance trips were made to forty-two newly liberated towns. In addition, fifteen motor vehicles which had been found by Detachments were reconditioned and returned to Detachments after Army registration numbers had been obtained.

The Transportation Pool's fleet of six large salvaged German trucks were called upon for many services. Originally the pool was set up to haul relief supplies from depots and railheads to points of distribution, and to bring forward additional stocks to the depots. Its services were extended, however, to help meet any operational emergency that arose, to get soap and food to critical shortage areas, to move refugees and displaced persons and Detachments, to carry captured enemy supplies to central warehouses and to transport supplies needed to establish refugee camps.

Better results in salvaging enemy vehicles might have been obtained if German equipment had not been so badly worn. Almost all vehicles found in "caches" had been laid up by the enemy for major repairs. Some showed evidence of sabotage by French mechanics. Some had been wrecked by the Germans.

Reports of conditions of rails and bridges and location of rolling stock were furnished to Railway Division, Engineer Section, Advance Section Communications Zone, as received from Detachments.

Reconnaissance of railroad lines was made in BRITTANY. It established that the railway line from VITRY (T-6819) could be operated through RENNES (T-15), ST. BRIEUC (S-2304), PLOERMEL (R-9511) and MORLAIX (R-4617) to the combat area near BREST (V-99) to supply troops there. Freight cars, locomotives and crews were located in quantities sufficient for the immediate operation of four or five trains daily. The availability of spur lines was also confirmed. Repairs by the French were requested, and obtained, wherever the lines were needed. Many sections of the RENNES (T-15) -- LAVAL (T-6846) railway were cleared and repaired for the Army by civilian railway labor.

Another reconnaissance revealed that because of the neglected condition of the waterways and absence of boats, the BRITTANY canal systems could not be utilized effectively during the combat phase.

COMMUNICATIONS

It became imperative to direct all efforts to repairing lines required immediately for the Army, rather than for all liberated territory, a necessity made urgent by the Army's rapid advance.

The open wire toll lines along the coast road from ST. JEAN (T-1732) to GRANVILLE (T-13) were inspected. All PTT, (Post, Telephone, Telegraph) buildings and equipment were found intact and able to operate as soon as power was available. The open wire toll lines were broken by bombs in two places. Repairs were started immediately through the cooperation of the French PTT Receveur. This made circuits, requested by Advance Section Communications Zone, available from GRANVILLE to JOUILLEVILLE (T-1327). A representative of the French Government also consented to cutting the local cable at the outskirts of GRANVILLE to enable the Army to splice the GRANVILLE -- AVRANCHES (T-21) German cable directly to the GRANVILLE telephone exchange.

The main toll cable was inspected from AVRANCHES (T-21) to RENNES (T-15), with the Chef-de-Station, AVRANCHES, who had been in charge of large French sabotage on German communications in this section. This official traced the route and located not only the existing breaks, but pointed out those that had been repaired by the Germans prior to liberation. This latter information saved a great deal of time by making it unnecessary to excavate recently covered bomb holes to inspect the cable.

A crew of French cable splicers was obtained through the cooperation of the Regional Chief Engineer at RENNES (T-15) and his assistant. These started the following morning to repair the cable from AVRANCHES (T-21) to MIXIAC (A-9174) to RENNES. They also initiated the repair of the repeater station at AVRANCHES and at MIXIAC which had been damaged by German demolition bombs and grenades. The Advance Section Communications Zone Signal Corps undertook the supervision and supplied technicians for this work.

The main French underground cable system to PARIS paralleled the Third U.S. Army axis of communications fairly closely from VITRY (T-6819) to MOGENT (X-8817), and it was apparent that the system would be of great value in communications for obtaining supplies when the Army moved east of PARIS. For these reasons, the work on restoration of this system was continued.

The main cable from RENNES (T-15) to LE MANS (Z-4063) was inspected by an officer of G-5 Section. There were only five positive breaks in this section, and upon report of them an officer of the 34th Signal Construction Battalion was assigned with personnel to obtain circuits for use of the Army from VITRY (T-6819) to LE MANS (Z-4063). He worked untiringly on this mission and the circuits were obtained.

The repeater stations at RENNES (T-15), LAVAL (T-6846) and LE MANS (Z-4063) were demolished almost completely by the Germans, but work on the salvage of usable material was started immediately, in each case by the local French PTT officials upon G-5 request.

At RENNES (T-15) an officer was assigned to coordinate repair work and assignment of circuits in the cable. This Civil Affairs Detachment officer performed outstanding work in restoring communications in RENNES and on the long distance system.

The Army Chief of Staff approved the restoration of telephone service for military personnel and essential civilian activities and postal service for all civilians in RENNES (T-15), LAVAL (T-6846) and LE MANS (Z-4063) and the cities under the jurisdiction of the Civil Affairs Detachments in those cities as soon as the Detachments, with the concurrence of the Counter-Intelligence Corps and local French authorities believed the situation warranted it. Both postal and telephone service were limited to intra-city usage only, but it helped considerably in local administration.

The Nineteenth Tactical Airforce was assisted in obtaining communications for four airfields. In this work the knowledge and energy of the Controleur Station Cables, LE MANS (Z-4063), was invaluable. This official had an intimate knowledge of the German cable bypasses around the city and how the Germans had terminated sections of the cables in bloodhouses at each entrance to the city. This knowledge saved important time in establishing communications for both the Nineteenth Tactical Airforce and the Army in LE MANS. Assistance was also given in obtaining communications for Advance Section Communications Zone in LE MANS through the efforts of the local French PTT officials.

In cooperation with the Ninth Airforce, which had been assigned the duty of repairing the entire cable from RENNES (T-15) to the German border, an inspection was made of the section from LE MANS (Z-4063) to CHARTRES (R-30). This section from LE MANS to MOGENT (X-8817) had been previously inspected in cooperation with an officer of Advance Section Communications Zone. Personnel from Advance Section Communications Zone repaired breaks between LE MANS and MOGENT, making eight circuits available for Third U.S. Army axis of communications on its move eastward.

The repeater station at MOGENT (X-8817) was almost completely demolished, but such salvageable equipment remained. Salvage was started immediately by French authorities. The provisional mayor of MOGENT arranged for cleaning an adjacent Gergia sausage factory for a temporary repeater station.

Since neither Civil Affairs nor the Counter-Intelligence Corps had representatives in MOGENT (X-8817), and the city was being administered largely by the Free French, the Receveur was authorized to restore telephone service for essential civilian activities, and postal service for all civilians, limited to intra-city usage. Army G-2 and Signal officer concurred in this informally.

On 17 August, an officer from the Specialist Reserve Pool, Company I, 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment, was authorized to assist this sub-section. He inspected the cable from CHARTRES (R-30) to MAINTENON (R-4617) with the officer in charge of this sub-section, and later, the section of cable from MAINTENON to PARIS.

The repeater station at MAINTENON (R-4617) was found intact, due to the heroics of the Chef-de-Station who cut the wires connected to demolition bombs, removing the bombs as the Germans left the city. This official also prevented the Germans from igniting inflammables they had placed in the building. There were no observable breaks in the cable from CHARTRES (R-30) to MAINTENON (R-4617), except in the city of CHARTRES. Repairs on these lines were started by French authorities.

Assistance was again given the Ninth Airforce in obtaining communications necessary to airfields.

The open wire long distance lines were inspected from BROU (R-1378) to CHATEAUDUN (R-2361) to ORLEANS (R-64). The Receveur agreed to repair lines essential to the Army from BROU to the boundary of his area; The Directeur to repair the open wire lines as far as necessary toward CHATEAUDUN. Steps had already been taken by PTT officials to salvage material in the demolished repeater station.

The three PARIS-BORDEAUX (O-89) toll cables were inspected from a point just north of ORLEANS (R-64) to the repeater station at ETAMPES (R-8896) with two representatives of Twelfth U.S. Army Group. All three cables were undoubtedly damaged in the city of ORLEANS (R-64), but there was no evidence of damage along the highway. The repeater station at ETAMPES was demolished but some material was salvageable.

The open wire toll lines from PITHIVIERS (R-9367) to MELUN (S-2506) and the cables from MELUN to FONTAINEBLEAU (X-2891) and MONTEREAU (X-4788) were inspected. The Receveur Principal, and Conducteurs-de-travaille, agreed to repair the open wire to meet the circuits from ORLEANS (R-64) to PITHIVIERS (R-9367). These French authorities also started to repair the cables in MELUN where they had been destroyed when the bridges were blown out. These cables are important links in the PARIS to LYONS (X-99) and PARIS to the east systems. The repeater station at MEAUCRS (X-2676) was badly damaged, and much material was unsalvageable.

In all cities, the Communications officers of the Civil Affairs Detachments under G-5 supervision worked closely with the local PTT officials to restore telephone and postal communications with the cities as rapidly as possible. All reported that the cooperation of the French officials was excellent, and that they needed only advice as to the Army priority needs before starting active work.

All work on communications for Third U.S. Army was accomplished by close liaison with the Army Signal officer and his staff. The cooperation was complete and the coordination effective. Close liaison was also maintained with the AC of S, G-2, Security Section, in all matters relating to military security.

Almost every large city had one or more German telephone exchanges. Many of these contained plans of the German and French cable distribution system and were of great value in establishing Army and other military communication. All maps and charts of this type were turned over to the Army Signal officer.

A large German dump discovered in the vicinity of CHARTRES (R-30) which contained a number of anti-aircraft searchlights, mobile power units, photo projection machines and other miscellaneous items, was reported to the AC of S, G-4.

Large quantities of material of use to the Signal Corps both for repair of existing facilities and for the extension of new lines were discovered. Each repeater station had from 200 to 300 meters of cable in the storage yard. This was always of the type needed for the cables passing through the repeater station. At a warehouse in MELUN (S-2506) the following material was found and reported:

86,000 meters of German fourteen pair armored cable.

9,000 meters of German fourteen quad jute-covered cable.

4,500 fir poles, twenty-one feet in length, and quantities of hardware for aerial cable and open wire.

Civil Affairs Detachments reported many freight cars and storage rooms containing radio, telephone, motor generator and other Signal Corps equipment, all of which were reported to the Army Signal officer.

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PUBLIC WELFARE

The lack of widespread devastation in the army's path eliminated many problems which would have created obstacles to military operations, since the agencies for s[illegible], private [illegible] religious welfare agencies, chi[illegible] institutions remained intact and [illegible] of functioning after the [illegible] had passed. The attention of the French [illegible] was nevertheless directed to specific situations wherever action [illegible] to forestall future trouble.

DECLASSIFIED

One real problem developed wherever the lines of the army cut off the Arrondissement and Department from the headquarters which were the normal sources of their funds. This situation was quickly remedied by the French authorities, and at no time were reports received of stoppage of work of the various agencies because of the lack of money.

In the area traversed the problem of furnishing feeding stations and relief agencies with adequate supplies required that arrangements be made to supply local authorities with sufficient gasoline and oil to move their available transport. In most instances arrangements were made to utilize captured enemy gasoline for this purpose.

From analysis of Detachments' reports, and observation of the work of local national relief and welfare agencies, it can be said that the French agencies for assistance and welfare functioned in a manner which made it unnecessary for the military authorities to operate relief programs or provide financial assistance to such agencies. The agencies operating in this field were: Secours National, Croix Rouge Francaise, Bureau de Bienfaisance, Bureau d'assistance, the local religious institutions, welfare agencies, the Parish Abbe, and the mayors of the various communities. No real destitution was left in areas traversed by the Third U.S. Army. The hardship and suffering which occurred as a result of enemy activity and combat conditions was adequately handled by local authorities.

SECTION VI

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

As rapidly as conditions permitted, the French assumed responsibility at all levels of government. On 6 August, the French Military Commander of the 10th Military Region issued a proclamation, under the Law of the State of Siege, ordering that no arrests be made in the Department of ILLE-et-VILAINE except for flagrant offences, without the mandate of the Military Authority for the 10th Military Region. Thus the Provisional Government quickly asserted its authority over the area involved. The practical value of the action to Civil Affairs and the Army lay in the prompt exercise of jurisdiction by the French over offences which concerned the security of the Allied forces. The action also clarified the position of Les Forces Francaises Interieures (FFI) already recognized as a component part of the Allied forces, and increased their activity and aid to Civil Affairs Detachments. Soon, throughout the Army Zone, "FFI" members were assisting in traffic control and public safety functions. They gave information of enemy stragglers and concentrations, enemy supplies, native collaborationists, which was forwarded by Civil Affairs to proper Army authorities.

On the civil side, Regional Commissioners (Commissaires Regionaux de la Republique) exercised the powers given under the Laws of the State of Siege, and the power to appoint and remove officials, an end desired by Supreme Headquarters policy. The Prefect, Sous-Prefect, and Mayor at RENNES (T-15), and the mayors at DINAN (X-7694) and FOUGERES (T-3878) were removed.

French officials at all levels with whom Civil Affairs Detachments were required to deal, quickly resumed ordinary functions, and demonstrated initiative in meeting extraordinary problems. Public safety, relief, money and banking required a minimum of aid and supervision by Civil Affairs personnel. The movement and care of refugees, anticipated as a difficult problem, was satisfactorily handled by local officials and agencies in the main.

The early announcement of Civil Affairs objectives and the tact and judgment displayed by Civil Affairs personnel played an important part in reassuring the French as to Allied aims and in encouraging the resurgence of French authority in civil administration. The

appropriate action was taken. For example, an Army order was issued on 16 August permitting the movement of civilians, under Civil Affairs control, to harvest crops. Further examples are found in the release of captured medical and other supplies for civilian uses.

LEGAL

A continuous study of legislation enacted by the French authorities was made by the Legal sub-section, and Civil Affairs Detachments and staff sections were advised as to that which might affect the Army's interests. Checks were made with the highest civil officials covering matters such as curfew, travel restrictions, civil defense and water conservation, and changes suggested in current regulations where necessary to conform with Army policy.

It was soon found that French courts resumed functioning usually with personnel and buildings intact shortly after the passage of combat. This obviated the necessity for the operation of Military Courts. The courts and functioning of the judicial system were observed to insure that persons committing offenses against Army personnel were properly tried, and that sentences commensurate with the offense were imposed. During August, no serious crimes committed by French nationals against our troops were reported. The Juge de Simple Police and Gendarmerie enforced those necessary regulations usually by the imposition of fines.

Many questions involving the handling and disposition of captured and abandoned enemy war material arose. These were clarified on 16 August by an Army order that defined the Civil Affairs responsibility to the Army in securing, reporting and disposing of enemy materials of war. As a result, a conference was held with the Commissioner of the ANGERS Region on 19 August at which he agreed to issue a public notice as to the status of all abandoned and captured enemy material in the Region. This was done through the press on 21 August.

FINANCIAL

Reports to the Financial sub-section within a few days of 1 August set the pattern for the fiscal and financial situation as it unfolded through the month. French banks either had not closed or were immediately able to reopen with ample cash to meet any anticipated withdrawals. Enemy accounts were blocked by the French, the supplementary franc was freely accepted everywhere, local authorities had sufficient resources for payroll and relief expenditures. No advances were requested from Civil Affairs. Prices were being maintained at levels equal to or below those current before liberation.

On 2 August sub-accountants were appointed on all Detachments of Company I, 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment. They were issued accounting kits and an initial supply of currency. Visits were made within the next few days to the Detachments in COUTANCES (T-2465), GRANVILLE (T-13), LA HAYE PESNEL (T-2528), GAVRAY (T-3041), VILLIDIEU (T-3833), and AVRANCHES (Y-21). Currency proclamations had been handed to local officials, banks had reopened except in AVRANCHES which was still under bombardment, and in general there were no pressing financial problems. In no case had the banks been looted; premises were intact and the banks were in liquid condition. Sub-accountants and financial specialists were interviewed in the towns visited and it was made clear to them that their missions could best be served by encouraging the French to proceed with their own financial rehabilitation, by rendering such assistance as might be requested in the way of passes and transportation, and by intervening only in the case of a financial crisis.

Throughout August, items of interest in the fiscal field were extracted from Detachment reports and entered in the Daily Summary. Bi-weekly reports were prepared summarizing developments during the period covered. Again, uniformly, all information received indicated a minimum of financial problems with the French capably taking care of their own needs.

Visits were made to Detachments in RENNES (T-15) and DINAN (X-7694) where also it was found that the situations were favorable. Cash in the Banque de France, RENNES amounted to 1,400,000,000 francs. At DINAN the Banque de France had 176,000,000 francs. At ST. MALO (S-7916), when the citadel was taken, cash of over 200,000,000 francs was intact in the vaults of the Banque de France. Near DINAN was found a depository of the Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et L'Industrie in whose vaults were accumulated French securities comprising

The sub-section reported to Currency Section for FRANCE small amounts of seized or captured currency found by Civil Affairs Detachments and temporarily commingled with Civil Affairs funds. No call was made upon Currency Section for additional funds and receipts from sale of Civil Affairs supplies during the month (estimated at two million francs) by far exceeded the relatively small amount of Civil Affairs expenditures.

Pursuant to authority delegated by the Commanding General, Twelfth U.S. Army Group, an amendment was made to Civil Affairs Instructional Guide covering finance, authorizing the opening of bank accounts by Civil Affairs sub-accountants, limiting emergency advances to 50,000 francs to any one borrower, and setting a maximum amount of cash to be retained by the various type Detachments.

Contact was maintained with the Chief Finance Officer, Third U.S. Army, who was kept informed as to Civil Affairs activities affecting his operations. He in turn reported figures on troop spending, which were passed on to higher authority.

The sub-accountant for G-5 Section commenced operations on 1 August with funds of 640,000 francs. During the month receipts amounted to 251,740 francs, while disbursements totalled 448,857 francs. Of these receipts and disbursements, 250,000 francs and 430,000 francs respectively represented routine transfers of funds between sub-accountants. Balance on hand at the end of August was 442,883 francs.

In certain fields related to finance for which plans had been prepared it was found that the French initiative had been adequate and that no action was required on the part of Civil Affairs. Continuation of government pensions and property control measures, reopening of post office savings facilities, and the blocking of enemy accounts fell into this category. In a similar manner, in very few cases were Detachments called upon to provide guards for banking premises as such steps had already been taken by local public authorities.

PUBLIC SAFETY

Eighty thousand proclamations, posters and printed forms were distributed in August by the Public Safety sub-section to Corps and Division Staff Sections and to Civil Affairs Detachments. Great numbers of these were printed locally to meet urgent demands from the field. The public notices included the Proclamation of the Supreme Commander, civilian circulation restrictions, warnings against pillage, blackout and curfew regulations, currency proclamation and orders to turn in carrier pigeons. In turn, standard exemptions forms or "passes" enabling essential civilian services to continue in limited degree were supplied, as well as identification passes, police and prison warrants, arrest reports, and receipt forms for surrendered articles.

Eight thousand white police arm bands bearing the inscription "RF Police" (Republique Francaise) were obtained largely by local manufacture for the purpose of identifying emergency police appointed to reinforce the Gendarmerie.

The Gendarmes proved very satisfactory. The vast majority were men who remained loyal to the French Republic. While few in number in the rural areas, they were strong in the large centers. This was because the enemy, too, had been forced to rely upon the traditional law enforcement agency of the country. The mobility of the Gendarmes was limited. In rural areas their sole method of travel was by bicycle. Motorcycles, automobiles and bicycles were available in the larger centers, but the motor equipment was of little use because of the lack of fuel. As the Germans had confiscated all weapons and ammunition, the Gendarmes in some cases were armed only with clubs.

Auxiliaries wearing the "RF Police" arm band were appointed in the first emergency by the mayors and used mainly in helping the Gendarmes handle traffic, circulation and civilian defense measures. Later the authority for these appointments was taken from the mayors and given to the Prefectures of Police, upon request of the Forces Francaises Interieures. As rapidly as possible, both auxiliaries and Gendarmes were armed. The civil police aided materially in preventing civilians from interfering with the movements of the Army.

Crime on the part of the civil population was so small [illegible]

CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I

GENERAL

Confidence in the French and understanding of their views and methods grew during the Army's rapid advances in the first half of September. This was fortunate. Civilian problems multiplied as the Army drew nearer to the German border. Perfect coordination with the French authorities was mandatory if confusion was to be avoided.

The Relief and Supply Branch assumed a major role, serving as the intermediary in the disposal of thousands of tons of captured German foodstuffs and a wide variety of other materials. These ranged from lumber and coal to blankets and brooms. The goods jammed warehouses, filled the cars of abandoned trains, and in some instances were hidden in underground caverns. Excavated storage tunnels at TOURS (P-7668), containing many thousands of tons of enemy goods, were more than twenty-five miles in length.

Large quantities of the enemy stocks were useful to the Army, but larger portions were released by the Quartermaster and other services to G-5 for sale to civilian authorities. These sales aggregated millions of francs. They were usually consummated on the spot without an instance of friction.

At the same time, the Relief and Supply Branch became an exchange agency for the shifting of large stocks of goods from one part of the country to the other. The Prefect at ORLEANS (N-64), needing 40,000 gallons of diesel oil for his Department's harvests, was referred by Civil Affairs to the Prefect at SENS (X-6866). FONTAINEBLEAU (X-2891) was referred to SENS for flour. SENS shipped 100 carloads of coal to PARIS under Civil Affairs supervision. Another 153 carloads of coal, sold to REIMS (T-38), went likewise for the relief of the French capital.

Lacking inter-city wire communications and facilities for the prompt exchange of information, French authorities would have been seriously handicapped in their relief efforts but for this assistance by Civil Affairs supply officers. The Army also profited by prompt liaison between Civil Affairs Detachments and G-5 supply. At ORLEANS (N-64), for example, 7,000 gallons of high-test gasoline was discovered by the Detachment Supply officers in a weed-overgrown underground tank. Through G-5, the gasoline was reported to the Army Quartermaster in time to turn over the entire cache to the 6th Armored Division then moving through the city.

Displaced persons loomed as an increasing problem with the approach to the border. On the night of 12-13 September, 150 homeless men and a few women and children were housed and fed at VERDUN (U-26) by Civil Affairs personnel. The number was 1,500 by the fifteenth, 2,200 by the seventeenth, and hundreds more were moving in scattered groups along the roads toward safety in the rear. Dirty, poorly clad and hungry, they were of thirty nationalities but chiefly Ukranian Russians. The bulk of them had been forced workers in German war industries. Many had been German prisoners of war.

Detachment D3 of Company C, 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment, was dispatched to HAYANGE (U-7783), in the THIONVILLE (U-88) industrial district, on 13 September to control the rearward flow of these victims of war. It was the first Detachment ordered to duty in ALSACE-LORRAINE.

By 20 September four centers housing 1800 displaced persons were in operation at HAYANGE (U-7783), 400 persons were being cared for at ETAIN (U-4770), and 150 at BRIEY (U-6873). Three days later, a center for 1200 was opened at LANDRES-PIENNE (U-5983), and still another at FAGNY-sur-MOSELLE (U-7444). On 24 September, 6000 displaced persons were receiving emergency feeding. Fifteen truck loads of food, soap and cleaning equipment were dispatched from G-5 warehouses on that day.

At VITTEL (Z-6757), an unusual problem arose. More than 2200 Allied nationals had been interned there in wire-barricaded hotels since early in the war. Of these, 361 were United States citizens, 1150 were British and the others claimed citizenship in twenty-nine nations. A Detachment was placed in charge at VITTEL.

Transportation by now was an acute Civil Affairs need. It was met by the attachment to G-5 Relief and Supply Branch of 100 U.S. Army trucks of one ton capacity and 100 one ton trailers. Manned by 220 uniformed Frenchmen under ten French Army officers, the truck train reported at VERDUN (U-26) on 22 September loaded with 225,000 pounds of imported foodstuffs hauled from NORMANDY beaches. The train was organized into two evenly sized transport companies, one for general relief work directly under G-5 supervision, and the other for allocation as needed to Civil Affairs Detachments in the field.

The entry of Civil Affairs Detachments into ALSACE-LORRAINE, long a region of contention between FRANCE and GERMANY, presented the prospect of problems in government not encountered before on the continent. Three Departments of the region -- HAUTE-RHIN, BAS-RHIN and MOSELLE -- had been incorporated into the REICH and German governed since 1940. Most of the loyal French population had been driven out, German immigrants moved in. Then, with the approach of the Americans, the Germans had been evacuated in large numbers.

Conferences with French liaison officers attached to G-5 developed that, as a policy, it would be necessary to set up wholly new governments in the three departments, which were to be regarded as still being an integral part of the French Republic.

Ahead was GERMANY. Seventeen Military Government Detachments of the 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment, each trained for duty in a specific German locality, were attached to Third Army on 21 September. An additional nine Detachments reported 24 September. The total strength of these twenty-six Detachments of Military Government troops destined for GERMANY was 133 officers, seven warrant officers and 235 enlisted men.

SECTION II

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

Experience in the field led to the reduction of the G-5 Staff to twenty officers by the transfer of five specialists to European Civil Affairs Division for reassignment.

Rapidly changing Army boundaries, plus the difficulties inherent in making technical surveys in an active Zone of Operations, proved that specialist officers have neither the time nor opportunity to operate effectively with an Army Staff and belong more properly in rear areas that are becoming stabilized. The exceptions are those specialists, such as public health, safety, fiscal and legal officers, capable of immediate action in emergencies threatening the health or security of troops, and involving decisions on property and government.

Numerous directives, ordinances, proclamations and handbooks relating to Military Government in GERMANY were distributed. Preparations for movement into GERMANY were largely completed.

SECTION III

INTELLIGENCE

More than 1,200 reports from Civil Affairs Detachments and staffs operating in the field were funnelled through the Intelligence Branch in September, analysed, excerpted, and routed to responsible Army staff officers for their information or action.

Intelligence, in turn, issued thirty Daily Summaries of Civil Affairs operations, six weekly bulletins and analyses, two fortnightly reports to Twelfth U.S. Army Group, four memoranda for the information of the Chief of Staff, a running historical narrative for G-5 of Supreme Headquarters, and a complete two-volume review of operations from activation to 30 September.

SECTION IV

PLANS AND OPERATIONS

Detachments operated in the following localities in September:

ANGERS (O-8279)	NANCY (U-8512)
BAR-le-DUC (U-1122)	NANTES (O-0560)
BRIEY (U-6873)	NEUFCHATEAU (Z-4975)
CHALONS (T-5445)	ORLEANS (N-6340)
CHARMS (Z-9476)	FAGNY (U-7444)
CHAUMONT (Z-0709)	PONT-a-MOUSSON (U-7635)
CHATEAULIN (A-2375)	PONTIVY (K-0455)
CINQ-MARS (P-5864)	QUIMPER (A-2054)

Notices restricting civilian travel were posted on all highways and in all towns and villages. They were signed by the Regional Commissioner and generally limited civilian travel to a radius of six kilometers outside of Division areas, where the Division Commander fixed the limit. Enforcement was effected through the Military Police, Civil Affairs Detachments, the civil police, and French courts. Passes permitting wider travel were issued, with few exceptions, only to physicians, clergymen, and French officials on vital missions.

In the Army Area, refugees were permitted on non-military roads to return home. Civilian vehicular traffic was kept off all military routes that had been designated as of primary importance.

Curfew hours were set by the Area Commanders. The population obeyed whole-heartedly, feeling the curfew liberal as compared to the German restriction. Blackout was rigidly enforced through the civil police.

PUBLIC HEALTH

There were no opportunities for procurement of exhaustive public health data. Stress was placed upon meeting problems as they arose and assisting the French to restore their own services.

Only twenty-eight cases of diphtheria and ten cases of typhoid fever were reported in a population area of 225,486 people. These were sporadic cases reported from rural areas. A flare-up of diphtheria occurred in OUZOUER LE MARCHE (N-3642) where fifteen adult cases were reported. Diphtheria anti-toxin was provided from Army and local sources. The situation was quickly placed under control. Cutaneous anthrax was reported as a result of spreading disease amongst the animals in the area of ST BRIEUC (G-2304). An attempt to provide prophylactic serum for the animals was made.

The disease most commonly reported, especially among refugees, was scabies. Control was usually adequate in the hands of Civil Affairs Detachments and local medical personnel. Assistance in Public Health problems uncovered by Civil Affairs Detachments was facilitated by Public Health surveys and epidemiological reports submitted by them.

There was no marked depletion of professional personnel. Damage or depletion of medical facilities was not serious. In instances where hospitals were damaged or destroyed alternative arrangements were adequate to meet the needs. In most places there was a surplus of bed space in hospitals and clinics.

On the whole the expected drastic shortage of medical supplies never materialized. Demands upon Civil Affairs were for small quantities of medicinals only. Supplies most commonly sought included antiseptics, anesthetics, syringes, bandages and dressings, narcotics, barbiturates, insulin, biologicals and soap. These calls for supplies were occasionally met by requisition from captured enemy stocks.

Only one Allied Relief Board (ARB) Basic Medical Unit was issued, and that for the Department of FINISTERRE, the distribution point for which was located at QUIMPER (A-2054), and this unit contained many items not needed by the Department. Arrangements were made to meet requirements for biologicals by storing them in a hospital in RENNES (Y-15).

As of 31 August, 890 civilians had been admitted to military hospitals, thirty-six remaining for further treatment. Most of the cases were fairly serious and due to accidents, gunshot wounds and land mines. As rapidly as was feasible, these patients were transferred to civilian hospitals in accord with the policy of utilizing them to their fullest extent.

The nutritional status of the people was excellent. No evidence of deficiency disease was discovered. Food was plentiful. Refugees were fed, with few exceptions, from local food supplies by local officials.

Water supplies were damaged to varying degrees, the distribution lines in towns suffering most. All but a few plant installations escaped damage entirely, but the lack of electrical power made it necessary to improvise ways for pumping water. Sewerage systems were damaged severely but it was difficult to evaluate the destruction because of the curtailed water consumption. Public Health Specialists assisted in the reconstruction of these utilities wherever possible serving in advisory capacities and helping to locate materials for repairs.

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COMMERCY (U-4320)
COURTISOLS (T-6247)
DINAN (X-7694)
DOMBASLE (U-9804)
ETAIN (U-4770)
FONTAINEBLEAU (X-2891)
FOUGERES (T-3878)
GUINGAMP (R-9511)
HAYANGE (U-7783)
LANNION (R-7431)
LAVAL (T-6266)
LANDRES (T-6819)
LE MANS (T-[illegible])
LORIENT (T-[illegible])
LUNEVILLE (T-[illegible])
MONTARGIS (X-2763)
MONTEREAU (T-3209)
MORLAIX (R-4617)
MOYEUVRE (U-7577)
REDON (R-6805)
REIMS (T-3080)
RENNES (T-1053)
ST. BRIEUC (R-2304)
ST. DIZIER (T-9408)
ST. MALO (3-7916)
ST. MIHIEL (U-3934)
ST. NAZAIRE (R-5864)
SENS (X-6866)
THIONVILLE (U-8681)
TOUL (U-6419)
VERDUN (U-26)
VIENNE (T-2863)
VILLE-SUR-YRON (T-[illegible])
VIONVILLE (U-6957)
VITTEL (Z-6757)
VITRY (T-6819)

DECLASSIFIED

Change over to the new operational plan was accomplished as directed. Approximately nine Civil Affairs Detachments were made currently available to each Corps. Any Detachment, deployed and left to come directly under Army control with a change in Corps rear boundaries, was, as soon as practicable, returned to the Corps under which it previously operated. It was directed that Detachments, once deployed, were not to be moved without authority of this headquarters.

By orders of Twelfth U.S. Army Group, Army was directed to leave Detachments in all Departmental and Regional Capitals as the army rear boundary moved forward. The following seven Detachments were designated, also as per orders from Army Group, for displaced persons duty along the French border and in GERMANY: C2C2, C2B2, C1I2, C2D2, D1B2, D2B2 and D2D2.

By General Order, Headquarters, European Civil Affairs Division, dated 12 September, Detachment designations were not changed but companies of the 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment were redesignated as follows:

Old designation	Redesignated as
Co A, 2d ECA Regt	Co G, 1st ECA Regt
Co B, 2d ECA Regt	Co B, 1st ECA Regt
Co C, 2d ECA Regt	Co M, 1st ECA Regt
Co D, 2d ECA Regt	Co E, 1st ECA Regt
Co I, 2d ECA Regt	Co I, 1st ECA Regt

On 21 September, the following Military Government Detachments and administrative company headquarters, all specially trained for duty in GERMANY, reported to this Headquarters and were bivouacked in the vicinity of ETON (V-5175):

Detachment	Predetermined Destination
Hq Co A, 2d ECA Regt	SAARBRUCKEN (Q-4570)
HIA2	SAARBRUCKEN (Province)
I1A2	SAARBRUCKEN (Q-4570)
	OTTWEILER (Q-5888) and
I2A2	SANKT WENDEL (Q-6998)
I3A2	SAARLAUTERN (Q-2878)
	HOMBURG (Q-7179) and
I4A2	SANKT INGBERT (Q-5576)
H2A2	MERZIG (Q-2092)
I5A2	KAISERLAUTTERN (R-0392)
I6A2	KIRCHHEIMBOLANDEN (R-2017)
I7A2	ZWEIBRUCKEN (Q-7370)
I8A2	KUSEL (L-7603) and ROCKENHAUSEN
H1F2	PIRMASENS (Q-9065) and BERGZABERN
	RASTATT (R-3528) and
I1F2	BADEN-BADEN (R-3818)
I5G2	BUHL (R-2911)
	MERZIG-WADERN (Q-2094) and
I1IG2	SAARBURG (L-1412)
I1DG2	BIRKENFELD (L-5915)
I1TG2	KREUZNACH (M-0936)
	SIMMERN (L-8454) and SANKT GOAR

The following additional Military Government and administrative company headquarters reported on 24 September and were also bivouacked near ETON (V-5175):

Detachment	Predetermined Destination
Hq Co B, 2d ECA Regt	DARMSTADT (M-6641)
F1B2	DARMSTADT (M-6641)
G1B2	LUDWIGSHAFEN (R-5298)
G2B2	MAINZ (M-4095)
G3B2	OFFENBACH (M-7267)
H1B2	NEUSTADT a. d. W. (R-2984)
I1B2	FRANKENTHAL (M-4301)
I4B2	DARMSTADT (M-6641)
I5B2	WORMS (M-4415)
I6B2	BENSHEIM and GROSS-GERAU (M-5447)
I7B2	ALZEY (M-2727) and BINGEN (M-1152)
I8B2	DIEBURG (M-7945) and ERBACH (M-9115)

Subsequently, all twenty-eight Military Government Detachments and company headquarters were moved to billets at JOUDREVILLE (U-5878).

Toward the end of the month, the boundary between First and Third U.S. Armies, on Third Army's left, was moved to the north to include part of the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG, where were located the following Detachments which had been deployed by First U.S. Army:

Unit	Location
A1C1	LUXEMBOURG (P-8413)
H1F1	LUXEMBOURG (P-8413)
B1B1	ESCH (P-7301)

Though still formally attached to First U.S. Army, these Detachments were instructed to submit reports to Third U.S. Army through AC of S, G-5, XV Corps.

The XV Corps, operating on the Third U.S. Army's right flank, passed to the control of the Sixth U.S. Army Group on 28 September. Of the nine Detachments available to XV Corps, five were ordered returned to Third U.S. Army and four were left available to XV Corps, although still formally attached to Third U.S. Army. The AC of S, G-5, Twelfth U.S. Army Group, was requested to adjust this situation.

G-5 Rear Echelon, now constituting all of G-5 Section except three officers and three enlisted men with the Forward echelon, had now moved through FRANCE as follows:

MEMOU (O-1898)	15 July
BEAUCHAMPS (Y-1093)	3 August
POILLEY (J-3391)	10 August
ST SABINE (Z-3352)	17 August
COURCY (R-8811)	27 August
L'EPINE (T-6147)	6 September
ETAIN (U-4770)	18 September

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

Displaced persons were reported in the following numbers for the weeks indicated:

Week Ending	Number of Displaced Persons Reported
4 September	950
11 September	1,232
18 September	8,081
25 September	13,274

The refugee problem, on the other hand, diminished during the month. Local French authorities showed an increasing ability to absorb such French civilians into towns and to provide for them.

In accord with the objective of keeping civilians off military routes, Displaced Persons Centers were established during the month at VITTEL (Z-6757), VERDUN (U-26), BRIEY (U-6873), HAYANGE (U-7783) and PIENNES (U-5983). Displaced persons were hauled to these camps where food and shelter were provided. VITTEL differed from the usual Displaced Persons Center in that the [illegible]

The number of displaced persons at the various centers at the end of the third week was as follows:

Displaced Persons Center	Number of Displaced Persons
VERDUN (U-26)	2,336
BRIEY (U-6873)	550
HAYANGE (U-7783)	2,201
VITTEL (Z-6757)	2,087
PIENNES (U-5983)	Being established

The number of camp residents fluctuated from day to day. The nationality grouping, aside from VITTEL, showed a preponderance of Russians, Ukranians, Poles and Jugoslavians. Other nationalities represented were Spanish, Italian, Czech, and Dutch. Many of the residents, particularly at HAYANGE and BRIEY, formerly had worked in the mines in those areas.

The organization of these camps followed, in the main, the pattern recommended in "Guide to Assembly Center Administration" Civil Affairs/d9, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, with certain adaptations to suit local conditions.

Civil Affairs Detachments were assigned the task of establishing, organizing and supervising these centers, with the expectation, however, that the French authorities would eventually assume full responsibility.

A French Liaison officer (Ministere des Prisonniers de Guerre Refugies et Deportes) was sent to each of the camps to assist Civil Affairs Detachments in linking the camps with the local authorities. In addition, French teams, (Mission Militaire de Liaison Administrative) each consisting of five French women specially trained in refugee and displaced persons work, and a male driver were deployed to assist in the supervision of the camps at VERDUN (U-26), BRIEY (U-6873), HAYANGE (U-7783) and PIENNES (U-5983). These French teams are also under Third U.S. Army control. Similarly, five American Red Cross representatives were attached at BRIEY and eight to VITTEL (Z-6757).

Food and supplies for the camps were furnished from local sources, supplemented where necessary by German captured stocks and by imported relief supplies.

The camps proved of assistance in stabilizing what would otherwise have constituted a moving population. Moreover, Civil Affairs Detachments supervising the camps learned valuable lessons applicable in handling similar problems in GERMANY.

Preparatory to future operations, the sub-section requested that space for Displaced Persons Centers be reserved at ERROUVILLE (U-6728), MORFONTAINE (U-6197) and DONCOURT (U-6962). Military barracks existed at each location capable, if necessary, of accommodating about 3,000 persons. Space also was requested at LERRAYON (U-4697) where there were a Gendarmerie barracks, hospital building and military barracks with a combined capacity of about 3,000 persons. Possible camp sites investigated at COMMERCY (U-4320) where the Caserne Oudinot and Quartier Marguerite combined were capable of housing 4,000 persons. A need was indicated for a center in or near METZ (U-85).

SECTION V

RELIEF AND SUPPLY

Due to the rapid movement and the consequent priority on transportation required for the tactical forces, it was not possible to bring forward to Army depots imported relief supplies held in Communications Zone dumps. As a result relief supplies sold to French authorities in areas of need, during the first three weeks of September, were obtained solely from captured enemy supplies released by Army G-4 and Quartermaster to Civil Affairs for this purpose. Transactions were made by Civil Affairs Detachments on the spot with French authorities, who arranged for equitable distribution through civilian agencies with civilian transportation.

The release of these supplies by Army G-4 and Quartermaster for Civil Affairs use was coordinated by the Relief Supply sub-section. On 5 September the branch issued an Operational Supply Instruction entitled "Disposition of Captured Enemy Materials." This instruction outlined a uniform system [illegible]

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The following list of supplies and quantities represents such transactions carried out by Civil Affairs Detachments with French authorities in the Zone of the Army during the month:

Diesel Oil	49,000 gals.	
Gasoline	90,750	"
Kerosene	750	"
Coal	13,400	tons
Wood, fuel	220	"
Foodstuffs, assorted	10,352	"
Bread, loaves	13,600	"
Grain and Oats	15,000	"
Cement	1,175	"
Cement	1,875	bags
Stoves	2,500	each
Shovels	1,000	"
Beaverboard	2,500	pieces
Fire extinguishers	1,400	each
Buckets, galvanised	8,000	each

In anticipation of supplies needed for Refugee Centers and Displaced Persons Camps, a request was made 15 September to G-5 Section, Twelfth U.S. Army Group and requisitions were submitted to Commanding General Communications Zone; for 225,000 pounds of imported relief supplies to be brought forward from the beaches. A Civil Affairs Supply Depot was established in the Citadel, VERDUN (U-26), 18 September and was activated 22 September with the arrival of the 100 trucks and trailers carrying the following:

Flour	134 lbs.	bags	100
Pulses	114 "	"	50
Fats	75 "	case	100
Biscuits	76 "	"	50
Canned Meats, assorted			
Milk, evaporated			
Vitaminised Chocolate	90 "	bags	250
Sugar	62 "	"	200
Fish	66 "	case	250

In addition to the imported relief supplies in the Civil Affairs Supply Depot, the following captured enemy supplies were stocked:

Flour	175 bags
Soups, dehydrated	250 cases
Biscuits	320 cases
Pulses	140 bags
Soap	200 cases
Brushes	1,500 each
Brooms	500 each
Kitchen utensils, assorted	90 each

Civil Affairs Detachment D602 was assigned to handle the Supply Depot and Transportation Pool. Food supplies were forwarded from the Civil Affairs Depot to the Displaced Persons Centers at VERDUN (U-26), VITTEL (Z-6757), BRIEY (U-6873), FLEVILLE (U-5983), PAGNY (U-7444), and the five Centers in MATANGE (U-7783).

Transportation of local surplus supplies from areas of plenty to areas of need was accomplished by agreement between Civil Affairs Detachments and French authorities. At the end of the month trucks from the Civil Affairs Transportation Pool moved 370 tons of civilian-owned flour from VERDUN (U-26) to NANCY (U-81) where a critical shortage existed. In another area where a shortage of bread existed, a Civil Affairs Detachment arranged with bakers in surrounding communities to bake extra quantities to help the needy areas.

Civil Affairs Detachments at Displaced Persons Centers, with transportation furnished by the Civil Affairs Transportation Pool, built up stocks of local food resources in their respective areas for feeding their charges. Supplementing these local resources were the relief supplies furnished from the Civil Affairs Supply Depot.

Reports of captured enemy supplies received from Civil Affairs Detachments in the forward areas were forwarded to G-4 for distribution to the interested army services. Vast quantities of such materials were taken over and used by the Army Engineers, Signal Corps, Quartermaster, Medical Corps and Ordnance. Several carloads of new German airplane motors and parts and various other air Corps items, reported to G-4 were passed on to the Air Forces. Approximately 9,000 tons of engineer and construction material was reported. The larger part of these materials now needed in any army operations were turned over by G-4 to the Communications Zone for salvage and rehabilitation or utilization in the rear areas.

In sixty-nine cases farms owned and operated by the Germans, each with crops, cows, horses and farm equipment, were reported to G-4, which forwarded the reports to Communications Zone for action.

At CIREY-sur-MAUX (Z-5864) enormous quantities of enemy supplies, including foodstuffs, cigarettes, wines, and clothing were found in caves that covered an area of approximately thirty-five kilometers. Civil Affairs Detachment D322 was assigned to provide adequate guard and take a complete inventory of all stores. During the stay of this Detachment 5,780 tons of food supplies were issued to combat forces of the army, and 5,012 tons were issued to units of the French Army. On 21 September CIREY-sur-MAUX reverted to the Local base section of the Communications Zone, and the Detachment was relieved. It was estimated there were sufficient foodstuffs alone stored in these caves to feed a United States Army Division for a full year.

TRANSPORTATION

Activities for the month included the establishment of Civil Affairs Transport Pool, execution of hauling missions, salvage of captured enemy vehicles, supervision and operation of 24 European Civil Affairs Division Transport Platoon, supply of equipment and drivers to Corps liaison officers, and liaison with French rail and water transport systems.

During the first three weeks, care and transport of refugees and displaced persons became a major concern. Supplies of food, beds, clothing, stoves and other necessities for the establishment of five Displaced Persons Centers required collections from widely separated sources and movements to selected locations. This was accomplished almost entirely with five captured German trucks rehabilitated by the Civil Affairs Transport Platoon, and by drivers from the G-5 motor pool. By this means more than 2,000 refugees and displaced persons were collected from towns, villages, roads and collection points and transported to camps; in addition for five days a continuous road patrol was maintained in the vicinity of CLAIR (U-4770), to round up civilian stragglers.

Likewise captured enemy food supplies were picked up at various points and transported to the VERDUN (U-26) Civil Affairs Supply Warehouse from which all Civil Affairs Detachments and Civil Affairs Displaced Persons Centers in the area could draw. Following the establishment of the Displaced Persons Centers, they were entirely supplied by Civil Affairs transport.

The Civil Affairs Transport Pool was established 22 September with 100 one-ton trucks and 100 one-ton trailers. Two companies of French troops, commanded by ten French army officers, comprised an enlisted personnel of 220 drivers, assistant drivers, guards and repair men. Quarters for the Civil Affairs Transport Pool were obtained by taking over the Citadel in VERDUN (U-26) which also housed the Civil Affairs Relief Supply warehouse, and direction of both was assigned to Detachment D602.

In eight days following their arrival the trucks performed twenty-eight missions, ranging in size of convoy from a single truck and trailer to fifty trucks and trailers. Over 600 tons of supplies were transported into and out of the Civil Affairs warehouse; 121 displaced persons, american and british citizens, were transported from VITTEL (Z-6757) to PARIS. Thirty-seven trucks and trailers were loaned to Displaced Persons Centers for periods varying from two to seven days to move displaced persons and refugees and to haul local food supplies from surrounding areas. More than 370 tons of flour were moved from VERDUN (U-26) to NANCY (U-81).

The salvage of enemy vehicles continued, although at a somewhat slower pace, as fewer abandoned vehicles were found and those located were badly stripped. However, reconnaissance trips for the purpose of locating enemy vehicles were made to twenty-three towns. Sixty assorted tires and twenty tubes were obtained for use on enemy vehicles through the efforts of the Detachment at VERDUN (U-26). A total of twenty-four enemy vehicles were located and salvaged, including four trailers.

Five large captured enemy trucks were salvaged and added to the G-5 Headquarters pool. United States registration numbers were obtained on sixteen captured enemy vehicles which had been previously salvaged and turned over to Civil Affairs Detachments. Registration numbers were requested for fifteen more, some of which had been salvaged by the Civil Affairs Detachments themselves.

The 24 European Civil Affairs Division Transport Platoon was attached to G-5 early in September. It was moved to the vicinity of Army G-5 Section and given three major functions: repair and maintenance of Civil Affairs vehicles, salvage and rehabilitation of captured enemy vehicles, and maintenance of a rendezvous point for unassigned Civil Affairs Detachments attached to Army, including their messing and billeting.

During September the Platoon boarded and billeted nine Civil Affairs Detachments for periods ranging from two days to the entire month; it gave 1,000 and 5,000 mile checks to twenty-seven vehicles, repaired thirty-six vehicles, rehabilitated nineteen captured enemy vehicles, and also supplied occasional transportation and drivers to liaison officers, Detachments and Army G-5 Section.

Large quantities of rolling stock were located and reported to G-4, including one railway car repair shop, more than 1,600 freight cars of all types in usable condition, nineteen usable locomotives, and forty engines damaged but repairable.

Continuing the effort to make water routes available to the Army, numerous canals were surveyed by Civil Affairs Detachments and staff officers to see if they could be used or repaired for movement of Army, Civil Affairs or civilian supplies. Without exception the waterways were found unusable and it was estimated six months to a year would be required to put them in operation. The poor condition was due to neglect of banks and silting-up of channels, damage to locks by sabotage and bombings, debris of bridges and buildings and sunken barges blocking channels, and in many cases failure of the water supply because of lack of power for pumps. There was a definite lack of boats. Less than twenty barges were located, the great majority in poor condition and without motive power.

Railroad transportation also was given attention. Working through French authorities, and using local labor and materials, large stretches of railway right-of-way were repaired and put in use: NEUFCHATEAU (Z-4975) to RAINCOURT (Z-7869), BAR-le-DUC (U-1122) to PAGNY (U-7444), BAR-le-DUC to TOUL (U-6410), TOUL to NANCY (U-81) and many small stretches of track between neighboring towns.

COMMUNICATIONS

Telephone service in the Army net was provided through the Signal Corps for the Detachments at BRIEY (U-6873), CHALONS (T-5445), COMMERCY (U-4320), NANCY (U-81), ST. DIZIER (T-9408), VERDUN (U-26), the refugee centers at BRIEY and VERDUN, the Civil Affairs Transportation Pool at VERDUN, and Civil Affairs Companies A and B scheduled for GERMANY. These were the only organizations accessible to military switchboards.

French PTT (Post, Telephone and Telegraph) long-distance circuits, damaged by military action, were found connecting several cities in which military communications centers were located. Local French labor, with passes from Civil Affairs Detachments permitting circulation, repaired many such circuits needed by the Army. Six circuits, stretching approximately sixty-five miles from VALMY (T-9578) to JOINVILLE (Z-0861), and six more from NANCY (U-81) to LUNEVILLE (Q-0801), were restored by "PTT" workmen. Work progressed on the repair of an additional six from NANCY (U-81) to ARNAVILLE (T-7647).

The restoration of communications for essential civilian activities became necessary to obtain effective assistance from the French civilian authorities. At the instance of G-5 Section, with the cooperation of the Army Engineer, G-2 and Signal Corps, measures were put into effect to expedite the resumption of civil enterprises essential to the Army, such as banks, highway repairs, railroads, civil administration and power distribution.

On 9 September Civil Affairs Detachments, with the assistance of the Counter-Intelligence Corps and local French authorities, were authorized to restore intra-city telephone service for essential civilian activities, and intra-city postal service for all civilians as soon as local conditions permitted. Previously, authority from Army level was required for each individual case. Civil Affairs Detachments, with the same cooperation, restored postal and telephone service within the following cities:

BAR-le-DUC	(U-1122)	EPERNAY	(T-1268)	REIMS	(T-3080)
BRIEY	(U-6873)	ETAIN	(U-4770)	ST. DIZIER	(T-9408)
CHALONS	(T-5445)	MATANGE	(U-7783)	ST. MIHIEL	(U-1934)
CHAUMONT	(Z-3709)	NANCY	(U-8512)	TROYES	(T-2873)
COMMERCY	(U-4320)	NEUFCHATEAU	(Z-4975)	VERDUN	(U-2865)

Inter-city telephone communications and wire signal systems for railroads were authorized on 11 September. These were permitted for official use only, to make it possible to handle dispatching, routing and other functions necessary to operations.

Certain telephone circuits were authorized from the office of the "PTT" Chief Engineer, CHALONS-sur-MARNE Region, to specified "PTT" officials throughout the region. These circuits were to be used to

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coordinate the repair and maintenance of circuits required for military use and to prevent work on civilian lines that might interfere with Army circuits.

To coordinate the distribution of power throughout the French electric grid, power companies were authorised to use voice carrier systems on high tension wires, supplemented by circuits leased from the "PTT" when necessary.

Courier service between cities [illegible] essential civilian [illegible] exclusively service was handled by the "PTT" and Civil [illegible] The the assistance [illegible], of the Counter-Intelligence [illegible] with French officials responsible for insuring the maximum security.

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The security of electric power facilities used by the Army became increasingly a problem as the Army moved into areas at least where parts of the population were possibly hostile. In view of this, discussions were held with the Army Engineer, G-2 and Army Signal Officer, and with the AC of S, G-5 and Signal Corps of Twelfth U.S. Army Group, concerning the personnel and methods to be used in assuring military security on power grid voice carrier systems in the area bordering GERMANY.

SECTION VI

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

Upon the establishment of the French Provisional Government in PARIS, control of French civil administration again came from the Capital of FRANCE. The government was very active in appointing new officials and disposing of those who served the Germans.

In forward areas the Forces Francaises Interieures (FFI) was of great assistance in removing collaborationists and replacing them with trustworthy officials. Many collaborationists were incarcerated by the "FFI" but in general, their disposal was expedited by the national administration and presented no problem.

During this period a small portion of the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG came under control of the Army. Officials were quickly installed to replace those with Nazi tendencies. The Supreme Headquarters Mission for LUXEMBOURG entered the Duchy soon after its liberation and assumed responsibility for Civil Affairs.

On 25 August Supreme Headquarters issued a "Revised Directive for Civil Affairs Operations in FRANCE," which made Civil Affairs policies conform with the agreements concluded by the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN with the French Provisional Government, and established clearly the powers of each in zones of operation.

LEGAL

Study was continued of all legislation enacted by the French authority to insure that the policies of the Supreme Commander were carried out. Many claims against the UNITED STATES were investigated and recorded for action by the Claims Section of the European Theater of Operations.

The sub-section was confronted with cases involving escaped allied prisoners of war who had committed offenses against the French civil authority. Investigation was made and reports rendered to Army Group in furtherance of the French Allied Agreement to the effect that French Courts would have no jurisdiction to place on trial members of the Allied Forces.

As the Army approached German soil, various proclamations, laws, ordinances and notices setting up Military Government in GERMANY were distributed to Corps and Division Staffs. Military Government Detachments assigned to the Army were instructed as to the procedure in Military Government Courts and the function of legal officers in supervising the German courts and their officials, if and when the German courts were allowed to function.

FINANCIAL

As of 1 September an order was transmitted to Civil Affairs Staffs and Detachments to discontinue the issue and posting of Currency Proclamations in French territory. This was a further indication that French authorities were assuming full responsibility for currency issue in line with agreements among respective governments.

The outstanding development during September was the uncovering of territory in ALSACE-LORRAINE which had been annexed by the REICH in 1940. All banks were branches of German institutions and the German mark circulated exclusively as the medium of exchange in the Departments of MOSELLE, BAS-RHIN, and HAUT-RHIN. Under authority from higher headquarters, the Financial sub-section arranged for distribution to local public officials, and through them to the population, of a proclamation issued by the French Government. This proclamation announced that Allied troops would be spending French francs in these areas and that they should be accepted by the population at the provisional rate of fifteen francs equal one mark. This rate tended to cause some confusion when an announcement was made subsequently that UNITED STATES finance officers were prepared to exchange dollars for marks in German territory at the rate of ten marks for one dollar, roughly equivalent to five francs per mark. It was recognised, however, that the French were acting within their rights in the interest of inhabitants of ALSACE-LORRAINE whose liquid resources were expressed entirely in marks.

Reports were received from Civil Affairs Detachments continuing to reflect satisfactory financial conditions in towns uncovered, with the exception of those in the German section of ALSACE-LORRAINE where no banks were able to operate both because their assets were entirely in marks and because in many cases they had been looted by the departing Germans.

The Financial sub-section reviewed August accounting reports from thirty-seven Civil Affairs Detachments and forwarded them with appropriate comments to the Controller of Finance and Accounts at Twelfth U.S. Army Group. Expenditures of Detachments were small whereas substantial amounts were realized from the sale of imported or captured supplies. The sub-section chief, in his capacity as sub-accountant for G-5, Third U.S. Army, distributed 250,000 francs to Detachments going into operation and withdrew surplus funds of other Detachments of 1,140,000 francs. This sub-section's balance on hand at the end of the month was 1,332,773 French francs, in addition to 200,000 Allied Military marks to be held as a reserve for the operations of Detachments in GERMANY.

The arrival in the Army Area of twenty-eight Detachments destined for points in GERMANY necessitated preparations for their further training and coordination for activities in the financial and property control field. Technical manuals and accounting forms were delivered to these Detachments and meetings were arranged with financial specialists and sub-accountants to outline their duties and responsibilities.

Close contact was maintained with the Army Finance Officer, with special emphasis on the currency and rate of exchange problem in ALSACE-LORRAINE, LUXEMBOURG and GERMANY which might be expected to affect American troops.

PUBLIC SAFETY

The state of law and order continued good. No complaints were received of riots, disturbances or offenses against the armed forces by civilians.

A uniform curfew hour at 2130 was ordered, and all Detachments were notified. At LUNEVILLE (G-0801), 108 members of the Forces Francaises Interieures were assigned to assist in the control of civilian circulation. Forty additional rifles were obtained by Civil Affairs to arm these men.

No serious fires were reported.

A French Passive Air Defense team, with transportation and ... ment was formed at ...

The large concentration of displaced persons of varied nationalities in the Assembly Center at VERDUN (U-26) and the presence of alleged collaborationists in some of the groups, developed friction and threatened disorder. Public Safety arranged, through the Provost Marshal, for forty armed guards to police the center. At HAYANGE (U-7783), the Gendarmerie and Forces Francaises Interieures were used to maintain order among unemployed steel workers.

PUBLIC HEALTH

Public Health problems were mainly concerned with Displaced Persons Assembly Centers. A French medical liaison officer was attached to the G-5 Section to assist in Public Health problems, particularly in relation to displaced persons. It was arranged to have French medical supervision of all Displaced Persons Centers as they were established in the Army Zone.

The principal problem of the centers was the hygiene of the inhabitants and sanitation of the establishments. Corrective measures were directed toward organization of sanitary details, provision of sanitary and medical supplies. A preliminary survey showed that there were only three percent louse-infested persons in these camps, necessitating no disinfestation procedures. "DDT" powder, however, was not available for general issue, but was procurable for delousing only when typhus fever was reported. Communicable disease problems were negligible.

Local health facilities continued to be adequate. No shortage existed in medical supplies which were furnished through requisitions on the Army Medical Supply Depot and charged to Civil Affairs. Critical items, such as biologicals were requisitioned from Communications Zone to replenish supplies furnished in emergencies by these depots.

Allied Relief Board (ARB) Units proved too large for meeting emergency medical supply needs. Therefore a drug sub-unit was augmented by dressings and other items and small "dispensary units" were set up. When a Displaced Persons Center was established, the dispensary was furnished with one of these units. Depletions were met from the medical depot established by the G-5 Section. Requests for small amounts of medical supplies from civil health agencies were also met from this depot.

Although emergency requests for biologicals were honored by the Army Medical Depot, the Pasteur Institute in PARIS had sufficient stocks to meet civilian demands.

From 1 August to 1 October, 1,374 civilians were admitted to military medical establishments. During September, admissions numbered 469 but as of 30 September only 64 civilians remained in military hospitals. Commanding officers of military establishments were requested to inform the nearest Civil Affairs Detachment concerning civilians admitted to their hospitals so that transfer to civilian hospitals might be expedited. To facilitate the location of wounded civilians and to gather statistical data, a compilation of all civilian wounded in the Army Zone was initiated from reports submitted by medical installations to the Casualty Section of the Adjutant General's office.

There was no nutritional deficiency as far as could be ascertained.

Diphtheria and typhoid fever continued to be endemic. Twenty-three cases of diphtheria and twenty-three cases of typhoid fever were reported during the month for a population of 1,666,997 people. Other diseases being reported, without alarming significance, were poliomyelitis, scarlet fever, dysentery, paratyphoid fever, syphilis and gonorrhea.

Epidemiological data regarding typhus fever was uncovered that was of possible scientific value. A small ...

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CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

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SECTION I

GENERAL

The generally stabilized Zone of Operations occupied by the Army in October presented a difficult problem in civilian government. The Zone embraced the most heavily populated portion of the Region of NANCY. It included the city of NANCY (U-81), the Regional Capital. However, about one-half of the Region, geographically, was in the Zones of three other military commanders. Nore of the three Departments of the Region, all politically administered from NANCY, lay wholly in the Third Army's Zone.

The Department of the MEUSE was almost evenly divided between the Third Army Zone and the Communications Zone, with a small segment in the north jutting into the First U.S. Army Zone. The Department of MEURTHE-et-MOSELLE, lying chiefly in the Third Army Zone, had its northern extremity in the First U.S. Army Zone and its southern extremity in the Seventh U.S. Army Zone of the Sixth U.S. Army Group. The Department of the VOSGES was wholly in the Seventh U.S. Army Zone, except for a corner embracing the important center of REMIREMONT (2-4975) that was in Third Army territory.

In the administration of NANCY Region, therefore, seven general headquarters had an interest, as follows:

Third U.S. Army
First U.S. Army
Communications Zone
Twelfth U.S. Army Group
Supreme Headquarters
Sixth U.S. Army Group
Seventh U.S. Army

All of these headquarters were concerned in such matters as rail and bus transportation, civilian passes, wire communications, and official courier and postal services, which, to serve the Region, had to cut across all of their boundaries.

An eighth factor became involved when Allied authorities drew yet another boundary, separating the NANCY Region, as a Military Zone, from the nationally administered French Zone of the Interior. Privileges permitted in the interior were denied to Frenchmen just east of this line because of their nearness to the battle front.

At the same time, the Third U.S. Army was undergoing a transition from bivouacs to billets, involving the moving of thousands of officers and men from tents to French-owned buildings. Large quantities of coal and other material had to be requisitioned. The Army was dealing with the civilian population for the first time both intimately and on a huge scale; each was getting acquainted for the first time with the other's methods.

The fact that this transitional period, difficult for both Allies, was passed without a serious incident of disagreement was tribute to the diplomacy and tact of each. AC of S, G-5, reported as follows to the Chief of Staff on 17 October:

> "Two distinguished French educators were appointed to the chief political posts in NANCY. M. PAUL CHAILLEY-BERT, Professor of Medicine at the University of NANCY, is the Regional Commissioner. M. JULES BLACHE, another professor of the same university, a former soldier and hero of VERDUN, is the Prefect. Both speak English. M. BLACHE was an exchange professor at HARVARD in 1935.
>
> "These men are giving all assistance in their power to the American Army. The problems they face are not easy ones. With only the most limited official telephone communications and no postal service, they are forced to rely chiefly on bicycle couriers to carry on the administration of a large district. Restrictions on civilian travel, especially to PARIS and other large centers in the rear, and [illegible] in the lack of communications, make it extremely difficult to restore regional industries and insure the employment of large numbers dependent on them. The authorities are frankly worried about the possible economic consequences of a long stabilization of the front and the continued isolation of the Region for military reasons.
>
> "They expect the food and black market situation to be adjusted rapidly, largely because the American Army is feeding itself, thus freeing great quantities of produce formerly requisitioned by the Germans. Ways of overcoming the transport shortage and of getting in supplies from farms are being worked out, in cooperation with Civil Affairs."

Efforts to relieve the administrative situation without sacrificing military security were continued in numerous conferences between civil officials and officers representing the Commanding General, Provost Marshal, G-2, G-5 and the NANCY Civil Affairs Detachment. The Commanding General interested himself directly in the matter. As a result, freer civil communication for official purposes was gradually established.

The railway liaison passenger service for military officials running from PARIS to BAR-le-DUC (U-1122) was extended to NANCY (U-81), with daily service except Sundays, and use of this service for necessary business of the government was authorized.

Couriers appointed by the Regional Commissioner were given authority to carry official mail in the army Zone. Allocations of gasoline and oil were made for essential civilian services.

Operation of a daily train for supplying NANCY (U-81) with food was begun on 24 October, and means developed whereby farmers could deliver produce into the city.

Meanwhile, the evacuations of refugees from front line areas, and of displaced persons from forward centers to VERDUN (U-26) and thence rearward into the Communications Zone, were carried on for the dual purpose of reducing security hazards and relieving the emergency supply problem in the Army's Zone.

As the month closed, the political situation was stable with no apparent internal or external disturbances. The civil administration was proceeding as smoothly as could be expected under the conditions of a Combat Zone.

SECTION II

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

The early part of October was spent in interviewing Military Government Detachment Commanders in order to ascertain availability of personnel and existing shortages.

The return of British officers on duty with Civil Affairs Detachments, to 21 Army Group British, was completed during October.

Nine French Army officers, natives of or otherwise well acquainted with ALSACE-LORRAINE, were attached to this headquarters, replacing an equal number of French liaison officers with Army, Corps and Divisions.

New Tables of Organization were received from higher headquarters for Army, Corps and Division staffs, including authority for promotion of Army, Corps and Division Staff personnel, without requiring submission to higher headquarters for final action. This authority made possible the promotion of several staff officers long deserving of promotion. The new Tables of Organization authorized the following grades:

Officers	Army	Corps	Inf Div	Armd Div
Colonel	2	1	0	0
Lt Colonel	7	1	1	1
Major	10	1	3	2
Captain	5	0	1	1
Warrant Officer	1	0	0	0

Enlisted Men				
Grade 1	3	0	0	0
Grade 2	10	1	1	1
Grade 3	16	1	0	0
Grade 4	11	1	1	1
Grade 5	10	1	3	2
Grade 6	0	0	1	1

SECTION III

INTELLIGENCE

Close observation over civilian sentiment and the political situation in the Zone of the Army was maintained through personal investigations by staff members, daily checks of newspapers, and regular contacts by liaison officers with Detachments and Corps ACs of S, G-5.

Except for the activity of the younger Communist group in recruiting new members and aggressively presenting its case, the public was generally apathetic toward political issues. Formal recognition of the DE GAULLE government by the UNITED STATES was enthusiastically hailed in NANCY (U-81) political quarters as removing the last barrier to full French participation in the war.

An army-wide survey determined in advance that the celebration of All Saints' Day and Day of the Dead on 1 November, while assuming the character of a wartime memorial to fallen French heroes, would have no political significance. A similarly rapid review of plans for meetings and processions on this day, showed that none of these was likely to interfere with military traffic or jeopardize security.

In a series of meetings with G-2 and Counter-Intelligence Corps officers, plans were coordinated for intelligence operations in GERMANY with a view to cementing the closest of relationships between Military Government and Counter-Intelligence Corps. Agreement was reached on common aims.

SECTION IV

PLANS AND OPERATIONS

Early in the month, the G-3 sub-section on accommodations requested G-5 section to assist in obtaining information on the number and types of covered accommodations available for use in towns in the Army Area. Detachments within the area were requested to forward such information to Plans and Operations for routing to G-3. Later, the Branch was made responsible for all billeting problems of G-5 Section.

Upon instructions of Twelfth U.S. Army Group, one "B" and four "D" Detachments, which were only lightly employed at the time, were released for return to European Civil Affairs Division to be reformed and trained for Military Government duties in GERMANY.

Boundary changes were few during the month. The northern boundary changed slightly to the south and the three Detachments supervised by the Army in the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG passed to control of Ninth U.S. Army.

On the movement of the Section to NANCY (U-81), the Military Government Detachments were ordered to move forward also, but it was not until the last of the month that suitable billets could be found for them. A training program was instituted for these Detachments covering subjects of Military Government. The AC of S, G-5, XX Corps, was able to use some of the officers and men on Civil Affairs problems in the Corps Area, but this training was abandoned upon movement of the Detachments to NANCY and because of the desirability of keeping them together for quick deployment in the event of a sudden need.

Based on a study of the projected Zone of the Third U.S. Army in GERMANY, fourteen additional Military Government Detachments were requisitioned, together with proportionate administrative company headquarters.

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Because of the fewer number of Civil Affairs Detachments now attached to the Army, it became necessary to revise their operations to keep nine available to each Corps. Seven Detachments were retained in the Army Area. Later another [illegible] Detachment was placed on temporary assignment to XX Corps to assist in civilian security controls on that Corps' front.

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

The most significant development during the month in handling refugees and displaced persons was the opening of [illegible] through which displaced persons could be moved from the Army Area into the Communications Zone. During the month 2,155 such persons were moved. This movement was in accord with the objective of preventing any uncontrolled mass movement of displaced persons along military routes. It also had the effect of using the Displaced Persons Centers as Transit Centers and not as Assembly Centers.

The actual number of refugees and displaced persons in the Army Zone was fairly constant from week to week, however, because of accessions. The figures by weeks follow:

	Refugees	Displaced Persons
2 October	7,178	7,105
9 October	7,501	9,351
16 October	13,998	10,601
23 October	13,429	10,351
30 October	13,733	9,964

The BRIEY Displaced Persons Transit Center was vacated late in the month to provide quarters for the Rear Echelon, XX Corps. A skeleton force of displaced persons was left in the camp. The understanding with the Corps was that this Center would revert to use as a Transit Point when and as the Corps Headquarters troops moved out.

Two plans were drafted looking toward operations in GERMANY. One concerned the handling of a possible influx of 50,000 displaced persons into FRANCE, the other the care and control of refugees and displaced persons along the Franco-German border and in GERMANY.

Three additional teams of the Mission Militaire Liaison Administrative, each composed of five French women specially trained in refugees and displaced persons work, were attached to the Army in October making a total of eleven such teams assisting in displaced persons work in the Army Zone. In addition, fifteen American Red Cross representatives were similarly engaged.

A meeting was held of representatives from each of the four Detachments earmarked for displaced persons work in GERMANY and of six officers from the Military Government Detachments. Problems arising in camp administration were discussed and the most effective methods of solving them were outlined.

SECTION V

RELIEF AND SUPPLY

Demands for supplies in mounting quantities for refugees and displaced persons made it necessary to increase the stock levels maintained at the Civil Affairs Supply Depot at VERDUN (U-26). On 2 October requisitions were made on the Communications Zone for 150 tons of essential foodstuffs, twenty-five tons of winter clothing and blankets, and twenty-five tons of sanitary supplies. Although these relief supplies were to be furnished from Civil Affairs stocks in Communications Zone depots, Army G-4 approval was necessary as the tonnage lift would have to come from total allocations made to the Army. On 6 October the supplies were called forward on the Quartermaster daily telegram, thus constituting the first movement of Civil Affairs relief supplies via the Army services from the Communications Zone to the Army's Civil Affairs Depot.

As imported relief supplies are intended to supplement local resources and to make up deficiencies in essential foodstuffs, Civil Affairs Detachments were urged to search the countryside and utilize local resources to the utmost. Large quantities of fresh vegetables, potatoes and other items were made available through this source.

In addition to normal relief supply functions an issue of 1,500 pairs of shoes was made from Civil Affairs supplies to the Secours National for emergency use in the Region of METZ. Also at the request of French military authorities, 13,700 pounds of foodstuffs were furnished the French Gendarmerie as an emergency supplement to their ration requirements.

Upon the request of Civil Affairs, a daily issue of 1,400 gallons of gasoline was initiated by G-4 on 17 October to take care of essential civilian needs for the NANCY Region, principally for moving foodstuffs and for harvesting. Approximately 9,000 gallons of captured enemy diesel oils and kerosene were also turned over to the Region, together with 2,000 gallons of oil from Civil Affairs stocks.

The Civil Affairs Supply Depot was moved from VERDUN (U-26) to a more convenient location at ST. NICOLAS (U-9504), and Detachment B212, operating in this town, was placed in charge. The Army Quartermaster furnished warehousemen and labor gangs to inventory and store the supplies, totalling 125 tons. Another 150 tons of Civil Affairs foodstuffs shipped by the Communications Zone to TOUL (U-6410) were also moved to the new depot and stored. Eight tons of clothing, blankets and sanitary supplies were received 31 October.

It was arranged to have future shipments of supplies coming via railroad from the Communications Zone forwarded direct to freight yards at VARANGEVILLE (U-9708), one kilometer from ST NICOLAS (U-9504). Trucks arriving at the Quartermaster depots at TOUL (U-6410) with Civil Affairs supplies were to be dispatched direct to the ST. NICOLAS depot.

Conferences were held with the Regional Food Director and the Supply Officer of Detachment A1D2 at NANCY (U-81) to determine the city's unfilled food requirements. As a result, the Transportation officer of this branch arranged with G-4 to start daily food trains into the city carrying supplies from the surrounding countryside. Other essential food stocks, not available locally, were brought in by Civil Affairs trucks. For example, an issue of evaporated milk was made and plans were consummated to supply food, milk and soap from Civil Affairs stocks upon receipt of requisitions from the Regional Food Director the first week in November. Assistance was given city authorities in working out additional milk routes through the Army area to meet minimum requirements for the sick, infants, pregnant mothers and the aged; gasoline for milk delivery vehicles was made available from supplies of POL set aside for such purposes.

Sale to French authorities of captured enemy materials was curtailed by Army Administrative Order Number 62, directing that all captured supplies be turned over to the Communications Zone before being released to Civil Affairs for sale. Prior to receipt of this order the following releases were received and turned over to French authorities against quantitative receipt:

Frozen beef	26 long tons
Barley	60 long tons
Hay	45 long tons
Straw	60 long tons
Oats	525 long tons
Blankets (Displaced Persons Centers)	300 each
Mattress Covers	1400 each
Clothing (Undergarments)	8325 each
Refrigerators	12 each
Wrecked or Old Motor Vehicles	130 each
Flour	25 tons
Medical Supplies	3 tons
Building Material	300 tons

Anticipating a gradual influx of 50,000 to 100,000 displaced persons in the Army Zone, plans were made for a stock of 500 tons of relief supplies in the Civil affairs Depot, made up of 350 tons of foodstuffs, fifty tons of sanitary supplies, including soap, and 100 tons of clothing, blankets and emergency feeding units. It was estimated this stock would care for 20,000 persons for thirty days.

To maintain a stock level of 500 tons, request was made to G-4 for a daily tonnage allocation of twenty-five tons.

Relief supplies on hand in the Civil affairs Depot, as of 31 October were as follows:

Food	173.5 tons
Clothing	3.2 tons
Blankets	2.1 tons
Sanitary Supplies	9.2 tons

The following items were due from Communications Zone on requisitions forwarded 6 October:

Sanitary Supplies	24 tons
Clothing and Blankets	23 tons

Another requisition upon Communications Zone 27 October included the following items:

Food	220 tons
Clothing and Blankets	65 tons
Sanitary Supplies	20 tons
Emergency Feeding Units and tentage	36 tons

Relief supplies issued to French authorities in October for emergency needs, refugees and displaced persons were as follows:

Food	129,680 pounds
Soap	10,080 pounds
Shoes	3,850 pairs
Gas, Oil, etc.	33,000 gallons
Clothing (undergarments)	2,546 each

TRANSPORTATION

Trucks of the Civil Affairs Pool travelled a total of 108,800 kilometers, and hauled over 6,500 displaced persons and more than 5,634,000 pounds of food, clothing, medical supplies, fuel, beds and other essentials in October.

Noteworthy activities included: Fifty trucks and trailers assisted the Army Quartermaster in moving Class II and IV Depot from VERDUN (U-26) to TOUL (U-6410); 370 tons of flour were moved from VERDUN to the city of NANCY (U-81); 350 steres of wood were brought into the city of VERDUN to avert a fuel crisis; assistance was given to a number of communities in transporting the year's harvest, especially potatoes, from field to storage. Trucks were loaned to Displaced Persons Centers for periods of two to five days to bring in food, fuel and other essentials from the surrounding areas.

Salvage of enemy vehicles was practically abandoned during the month due to lack of material to work on. Three enemy ambulances were recovered, reconditioned by mechanics of the G-5 motor pool, and presented to the Army Medical Corps. The five enemy trucks that had been reconditioned earlier were employed continuously in moving refugees and displaced persons, hauling crops, field workers, supplies and refuse.

The 2d Platoon, Service Company gave repair service to forty-seven Civil affairs vehicles. The work included second, third and fourth echelon maintenance and ranged from 6000-mile checks to complete rebuilding of one truck, several frame straightening operations and one motor exchange job. The paint shop of the Platoon turned out 524 signs for Civil Affairs use and repainted eleven vehicles. Eight vehicles and drivers were loaned to Detachments for periods of from one week to one month. A Maintenance Patrol was established to inspect and service the organic vehicles of all staffs and Detachments in the Army Zone.

In railroad transportation, major attention was centered on the needs of NANCY (U-81). Permission was obtained to run two food trains per week into the city. Permission also was secured for civilian officials, making official trips, to ride trains between PARIS and NANCY.

A total of 475 freight cars and eleven locomotives were reported as available to Military Railway Service. Through civilian agencies essential rail traffic for the supply of LUXEMBOURG was started and the whole rail system put into order. Trolley service, operating on a fifteen minute schedule during daylight hours, was begun between the three adjoining towns of KNUTANGE (U-8586), HAYANGE (U-7783) and FLORANGE (U-8582). Railroad facilities between BAR-le-DUC (U-1122) and LIGNEY (U-2814) were rehabilitated and permission sought to operate local trains.

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Largely due to civilian efforts prompted by Civil Affairs a railroad line was opened between NEUFCHATEAU (Z-4975) and VITTEL (Z-6757) via the junction north of MERAUT (Z-4132). Other lines in the vicinity were inspected and reported to be in good condition.

A survey of all civilian transportation facilities including motors, in Third U.S. Army Zone, was initiated to gain a complete picture of the French transportation situation.

LABOR

In labor, major emphasis was placed on supplying needed workers for Army projects and maintaining sufficient local farm labor in rural areas to take care of harvests.

In NANCY (U-81) and SORCY (V-7525), the 150th Ordnance Battalion requested more than 200 laborers to unload trains. These were supplied through Civil Affairs Detachments. In a similar manner thirty men needed in the 33d Medical Depot, were found and put to work at TOUL (U-6410) and ninety civilian laborers were obtained for the 249th Engineers for the construction of a bridge near POMPEY (U-8020).

Largely through Civil Affairs efforts, civilian laborers from the highway department of MEURTHE-et-MOSELLE were put to work cleaning up dangerous mud conditions on roads in the vicinity of NANCY (U-81).

At BRIEY (U-6873) a question of jurisdiction arose in which civilian laborers were being hired without the knowledge of the French Labor Exchange. Civil Affairs assisted in settling the matter to general satisfaction.

During the early days of the month some trouble was experienced in the BRIEY (U-6873) region because of rumors of high wages being paid at CHERBOURG (O-11) and BRITTANY ports by the Allies. Many workers wanted to quit and go to these regions. The rumor was thought to be enemy inspired, and was quieted largely through Civil Affairs efforts.

AGRICULTURE

October was harvest month. Normal crops were satisfactory. Lack of transportation and labor shortages in some localities were the major problems.

Near PIENNES (U-5983), BRIEY (U-6873), ERROUVILLE (U-6782) and LUDELANGE (U-7391), Russian and Polish Displaced Persons were employed to dig and transport potatoes from German planted fields. Much transportation was supplied to local communities by the Civil Affairs Transport Pool.

During the month it developed that, due to military travel restrictions, farmers were unable to bring their produce into NANCY (U-81) and other towns but were being turned back at restraint lines. A special plan was worked out at NANCY, to meet the situation whereby farmers brought produce to a designated spot in the outskirts where they could contact produce buyers from the city.

Several agricultural specialists from Detachments destined for GERMANY visited the section for briefing on problems to be encountered.

At BAR-le-DUC (U-1122), a threatening shortage developed from competitive Army bids for both skilled and unskilled labor. By way of an attempted solution Civil Affairs arranged for local authorities to prepare a wage scale for use by Army units in the area.

COMMUNICATIONS

The following telephone circuits were repaired by French "PTT" workmen for military use:

Circuits	Cities
4	ARNAVILLE (Y-7647) - NANCY (U-8512)
4	NANCY (U-8512) - TOUL (U-6410)
4	TOUL (U-6410) - FOUG (U-5911)

Courier service and telephone service for essential civilian activities were authorized in LUXEMBOURG.

Telephones on the army net were installed for Detachments D5C2 and A1D2. A special installation from NANCY (U-81) to ST. NICOLAS (U-9504) was made for the Civil Affairs Warehouse and Transport Pool at the latter location. A private telephone line from NANCY to PONT ST VINCENT (V-7903), used to coordinate the electric power supply for the city of NANCY, was repaired. Technical telephone circuits from the "PTT" Regional Chief Engineer, NANCY, to specified "PTT" officials throughout the Region in the Army Zone were authorized to facilitate the repair and maintenance of civilian circuits used by the Army.

Arrangements were completed for work on power transmission lines from BUISSONCOURT (U-9709) to SAULXURES (U-9001), and for a branch line to CHAMPENEUIL (U-9411).

Through cooperation with the Army Transportation Corps arrangements were made to ship a sixty ton stator from a turbogenerator unit in VINCEY (Z-9673) to PARIS for repairs making it possible later to generate an additional 25,000 kilowatts for use in the NANCY Region.

The rehabilitation of the coal mining industry in FRANCE was expedited by enabling companies to obtain equipment from the Communications Zone.

A factory which manufactures shoe nails was assisted to resume operations, thus enabling the shoe industry in MEURTHE-et-MOSELLE to start production again after near prostration.

Reports on the industrial potential of the NANCY Region were forwarded to the General Purchasing Agent, Twelfth U.S. Army Group.

PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES

In ETAIN (U-4770) a survey of the water system was made and the city was assisted in making repairs to insure an adequate water supply and prevent pollution.

SECTION VI

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

The area over which the Army exercised Civil Affairs responsibility during October was essentially industrial. The disruption of industry and transportation facilities had been accompanied by shortages of food, fuel, and basic supplies. Resources were further taxed by Army needs. The impact of these factors upon an industrial society, geographically adjacent to GERMANY, provided a new test for gauging the capabilities of French civil administration. However, in the Region of NANCY it demonstrated the same stability, resourcefulness and capacity for cooperation observed in other areas traversed by the Army.

Recognition of the French Provisional Government by the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN undoubtedly increased the desire of the French authorities for further participation and cooperation in the war effort. The agreements concluded between the French Provisional Government and the Allies with respect to zones of authority, supplies, enemy property and related subjects removed points of local conflict and established a basis for mutual aid and effort.

The action of Colonel GRANDVAL, Chief of the French Army for the district, making it unlawful for anyone except members of the French Army to wear French uniforms, and the disbanding of Les Forces Françaises Interieures (FFI), promoted order by settling the question of constituted and legal French police authority.

At local levels, several meetings were held with French officials, including the Regional Commissioner, the Prefet of the Department MEURTHE-et-MOSELLE, Sous-Prefets, and police officials, at which military and Civil Affairs objectives were emphasized and French problems considered. At these conferences it was firmly established that all liaison between French officials and the Army would be effected through Civil Affairs. Largely as a result of these meetings, French authorities throughout the Region took effective steps toward assisting military operations, by the establishment of security patrols, enforcement of curfew, blackout, traffic and circulation restrictions and by the organization of their own resources.

The NANCY Region presented new and complex problems but they were met by close liaison between French Civil Administration and Civil Affairs and by the experience gained in prior operations. French authorities gave active assistance in the apprehension of civilians charged with the commission of offenses against the Army. French Courts, after being notified of their position under French-American agreements, assumed proper jurisdiction over displaced persons charged with the commission of offenses against French civilians.

Questions with respect to the ownership and disposition of captured enemy property were satisfactorily settled upon the basis of agreements concluded between the French Provisional Government and the Allies.

FINANCIAL

The financial situation changed little in October. Little new territory was uncovered and financial problems were further minimized when the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG passed out of Third U.S. Army control.

The Financial sub-section continued its preparations for military Government in GERMANY by holding a number of conferences with Finance and Property Control officers of Detachment E1A2, 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment. Instructional guides were prepared based on directives from higher authority, but modified to meet the conditions to be expected in a combat area prior to GERMANY'S complete collapse.

As a result of appeals from Detachments a letter was sent to Twelfth U.S. Army Group requesting authority to expend Civil Affairs funds for the preparation of food for enlisted personnel of Detachments.

On 9 October a meeting was arranged between Army finance officers and the officials of the Banque de France, NANCY (U-81). The Banque agreed to accept mutilated currency for exchange at par provided that sixty percent of each note was intact. It reserved for future decision the question of accepting deposits on transfers from Civil Affairs sub-accountants of supplementary francs, based on its own interpretation that such francs might not have been "in circulation" under terms of the latest monetary agreement between the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITIAN and the French Committee of National Liberation.

During October, surplus funds of Detachments of approximately 375,000 francs were transferred to the sub-accountant of this G-5 Section who had on hand at the end of the month 1,706,430.60 French francs and 200,000 German marks.

PUBLIC SAFETY

The temporary stabilization of the Army in a region adjacent to GERMANY made it imperative to secure the full and effective cooperation of the French police in the enforcement of all security measures. Meetings were held of French officials, Military Police, Counter-Intelligence Corps and Civil Affairs Public Safety officers. As one important result of these conferences, the Prefet of the Department MEURTHE-et-MOSELLE issued a decree requiring civil police to arrest all unidentified or suspicious civilians in the forward area of the XII Corps. Strict enforcement of restrictions against civilian traffic upon military routes was aided by the use of the Gendarmerie.

No fires affecting military operations or military personnel occurred in the Army Zone.

A meeting was held in the office of the Civil Affairs Detachment A1D2 at NANCY (U-81) on 30 October attended by Passive Air Defense officers of Supreme Headquarters, Twelfth U.S. Army Group, Third U.S. Army, Public Safety officers of G-5 Section Third U.S. Army and of Civil Affairs Detachment A1D2 and civil defense and fire officials of NANCY, for the purpose of discussing immediate passive air defense requirements. Enforcement measures were explained and procedures adopted for the protection of military operations and civilians.

PUBLIC HEALTH

Public Health problems of the month were emphasized by the appearance of a suspected case of typhus fever in a Displaced Persons Assembly Center, a continued endemic incidence of enteric diseases, such as typhoid fever and diphtheria, and provision for medical and sanitary supplies of displaced persons.

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Communicable d[illegible] a flare-up of dis[illegible] gation into a few sporadic c[illegible] dwindled to three cases.

A suspected case of typhus fever was reported at the Displaced Persons Center in VERDUN (U-26). It occurred in a young Russian woman, who was immediately isolated until further examination. Clinical and serological examination later proved that it was not typhus fever. In the meantime, however, insecticide powder of French origin was flown in from PARIS and about 2,000 persons were deloused.

Local health facilities were adequate. A survey revealed that civilian medical agencies were anticipating shortages of the following items: vaseline, liquid petroleum, glycerine, lanoline, iodine, alcohol, ether, opium, codeine, morphine, heroin, strychnine, santonin, silver nitrate, caffein, theobromine, camphor, peanut oil, ferrous ammonium citrate, chloral, sodium perborate, bismuth, subnitrate, quinine and atropine.

Medical supplies on hand at the Civil Affairs Supply Depot were of two categories. Displaced Persons Centers could requisition initial emergency supplies from the depot in the form of dressing, drug, and instrument kits which were made up from captured enemy stocks, while for the civil population Allied Relief Board Units were available for use in large areas. Small amounts of medical supplies for civilian medical institutions were also met by requisition to the depot, and were filled from items included in Allied Relief Board Unit of drugs and dressings.

A nutritional survey revealed a gradual improvement in the food supply. However, children especially were found to be suffering from a state of poor nutrition. This was probably due to an excess of carbohydrates, lack of milk, fats and meat in their diet. Food rations were most adequate to cover needs of children up to six years of age. The growing children and adolescents felt the restrictions most. There was everywhere a latent vitamin deficiency among children but no real avitaminosis.

Public Health officers assigned to the 2d Medical Detachment, 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment were available to the Public Health Section for duty on special problems. This pool of officers and a Red Cross Public Health nurse proved of value in making special surveys.

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I

GENERAL

Three widely different types of G-5 operations developed as a result of the Army's resumption of its advance.

First, in the Army Area and especially in the communities along the Rear Boundary that were farthest from the front, more and more problems arose having to do with the restoration of normal life. Here, combat had passed on. Not even the sound of guns could be heard. Tradesmen, producers and local officials found it difficult to understand why Combat Zone restrictions should be continued that far in the rear. Civil Affairs became essentially an interpreting and adjusting agency between civilian and military needs to the end that the vital requirements of both could be satisfied. It succeeded well enough in this role that no differences arose that were not speedily reconciled, and that French cooperation in enforcing necessary restrictions continued unbrokenly.

Second, in the forward areas of the Army's Zone a totally different situation existed. The closeness of combat was all too evident here. Towns and villages were badly damaged. The bare necessities of civilian life dominated all demands. At the same time, the preserv[illegible] tion of military security was acutely a problem. Most [illegible]

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of LORRAINE had been incorporated in the REICH, provided with a thoroughly German officialdom and a vigorous effort had been made to Germanize it. Both French and German were spoken. German nationals were actually present, though territorily the country was still a part of FRANCE and was to be so treated administratively. Thousands of refugees and displaced persons, the latter mostly Russians and Poles, added complications to problems that shortly were absorbing all the personnel that G-5 could muster for the task. These included workers of the Secours National, of the French and American Red Cross, relief teams of the Mission Militaire de Liaison Administrative, French medical workers, and Military Government Detachments awaiting assignment to GERMANY. In this newly liberated area that had been fought over for centuries, whose people were tired of war, Civil Affairs set up new local governments to replace those that had fled with the enemy, it helped bury the dead and clear the rubble from the streets, it assisted in weeding the disloyal from the loyal, and handled many thousands in the inevitable movements of people that always take place during combat.

The third type of operation involved the establishing of Military Government in GERMANY itself. This occurred when Military Government Detachment I5G2 (I5, Company G, 2d Civil Affairs Regiment) made up of three officers and eight enlisted men, crossed the French-German border with the 10th Armored Division of the XX Corps and took over the administration of the villages of PERL (Q-0298), WOCHEN (L-0202), BORG (L-0601), EFT (Q-0698), BUESCHDORF (Q-0797) and TUENSDORF (Q-1108) just south of the LUXEMBOURG border. The first proclamations of Military Government in the Zone of the Third U.S. Army were posted in the German villages on 24 November. The Detachment, however, temporarily maintained its own headquarters at SIERCK-les-BAINS (U-9994), FRANCE, moving to BORG on 29 November.

At the end of his first week of Military Government, the Commanding Officer of I5G2 reported to Army AC of S, G-5, that the German villagers had begun to show an "attitude of friendliness and cooperation" to American troops. He added: "Some of the inhabitants have openly expressed their anti-Nazi feelings. Consensus of opinion is that GERMANY is doomed and that the quicker the Allies overthrow the NAZIS the quicker GERMANY will be able to begin reconstruction."

SECTION II

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

Four additional French liaison officers were attached to the Army Civil Affairs Staff late in the month, making possible the further attachment of one French liaison officer to each Corps and Division of the Army.

Several changes were made in assignments to Division Staffs, one because of casualty, others because of activations. Staffs were formed for the 10th Armored Division and the 26th and 95th Infantry Divisions.

A Polish liaison officer was attached to this Section, by higher headquarters, for duty in connection with displaced persons and refugees. Additional Polish personnel was requisitioned.

SECTION III

INTELLIGENCE

Courier-liaison officers of the Intelligence branch, operating on daily schedules between Army and Corps headquarters and between Army G-5 and Detachments in the Army Area, were employed increasingly for intelligence purposes and the rapid procurement and dissemination of information by informal message and word-of-mouth.

By directed inquiries made through these four officers, it was possible to obtain facts from any part of the Army Zone within twenty-four hours, where use of the telephone might have jeopardized security or where reliance upon formal reports might have meant a delay of several days. By the same officer, urgent information was sent to Corps Staffs and to Detachments.

The liaison service was used most successfully in getting out word that no parades and outdoor assemblies would be permitted on Armistice Day, and in quickly checking some plans for those that were already underway. Again, upon the reopening of the Army's offensive on 8 November, and the complete prohibition of civilian travel on highways during the first forty-eight hours, the courier-liaison officers carried prompt instructions to Detachments to enlist local police in assisting to enforce the order.

Later, upon receipt of information that large coal mines in the Army's front might be highly dangerous because of the presence in the shafts of methane gas that a lighted match or cigarette could ignite, the courier-liaison officers took forward the warning to Corps G-5s.

Serving also as couriers, they expedited the delivery of all written reports, carried special material forward to Corps, and brought back captured enemy documents, text books and trade forms requested by higher headquarters. A total of 24,000 miles was travelled by the courier-liaison service during the month.

A security threat arose in the FENTSCH River Valley near HAYANGE (U-7783) where the population was largely German nationals. Information was reaching the enemy from suspected civilian sources there. The branch acted as the coordinator between G-2 and G-5 in arrangements that resulted, on 10 November, in the sudden arrest and internment by French authorities of 444 of the enemy nationals in a single action wherein the French, Counter-Intelligence Corps and Civil Affairs cooperated.

The possibility of the enemy using the advertising columns of newspapers to transmit messages was brought to the attention of local publishers through Allied Press Censorship officers. The publishers agreed to limit their advertising columns thereafter to recognized commercial organizations and to others who had been cleared by the French Bureau of Military Security.

Using enlisted personnel, investigations into French attitudes and opinions were continued among working people and small shopkeepers. They produced no evidence of resentment because of the restrictions imposed upon civilians in the Army Zone but on the contrary indicated a feeling that existing restrictions should be more strictly enforced.

Preparatory to operations in GERMANY, a three months' supply of maps covering the territory of interest to the Army was procured.

The ever growing numbers of refugees and displaced persons in forward areas added to the problem of maintaining security checks. Temporary assistance in screening and controlling these thousands was given the Counter-Intelligence Corps at the request of AC of S, G-2. For this work, seven teams of one officer and three enlisted men each were organized from the personnel of Military Government Detachments awaiting assignment to duty. As far as possible, team members were selected for ability in speaking the Russian, Polish and German languages. Each team was made completely mobile with one one-quarter-ton truck and trailer.

Three of the special teams spent eight days assisting Counter-Intelligence units of the 5th, 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions in the vicinity of METZ (U-85), a fourth team was employed by the XX Corps in the Corps Area, and the other three teams were used to augment Counter-Intelligence units in the Army Area.

By executive order on 15 November, supervision of civilian communication matters was made the responsibility of the Intelligence branch, because of the increasing importance of maintaining security in this field and the constant coordination necessary with AC of S, G-2. Accordingly the Communications sub-section, formerly operating under the Relief and Supply branch, was transferred to Intelligence branch. In addition to posts, telephone and telegraph, the sub-section continued its supervision of industrial matters and of public works and utilities.

COMMUNICATIONS

Constant liaison between military and civil authorities continued successfully the policy of enlisting French technical knowledge, personnel and facilities in the Army's service at a saving of military personnel and material. Simultaneously, French authorities were given assistance in extending essential communications to expedite the civil administration of the Region.

Utilizing French technicians and labor, eight additional civil telephone circuits were restored between NANCY (U-81) and TOUL (U-61) for Army use. Immediately after the capture of METZ (U-85), former telephone installers there were recruited, cleared through Counter-Intelligence Corps, and put to work repairing circuits in that area. Arrangements were made to restore the dial PBX system for necessary Governmental purposes.

Through the Army Provost Marshal, a labor crew of forty German Prisoners of War was obtained to dig up buried telephone cable, enabling the Signal Corps to locate and repair sabotage damage done to telephone lines between METZ and [illegible]

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A German radio transmitter and receiver were found in METZ and turned over to the Enemy Equipment Identification Service. German maps showing intercity telephone cable facilities in ALSACE were discovered for the Army Signal officer.

On behalf of the French, authorization was obtained for resuming official telephone service between NANCY and BAR-le-DUC (U-1122) and principal points in the Army Zone. Intercity postal service limited to non-illustrated postcards and open letters not exceeding twenty grammes was permitted. A plan was worked out that enabled the Regional Commissioner to telephone daily to Departmental Prefects over military lines. Telephone service for a French meteorological station at REMILLY (U-9215) was authorized.

To help implement the expansion of these civilian services, censorship stations were established by Allied Censorship officers and the Service des Controles Technique, closely in cooperation with Army G-5 and G-2. Large quantities of civilian mail that had been impounded since 15 September were censored and released.

PUBLIC WORKS

Assistance was given the Army Engineer in obtaining from French officials of the Region information concerning dangers to bridges and highways from flood waters and winter weather. Preliminary conferences were held on snow removal and the sanding of icy roadways. The Regional Bureau of Bridges and Highways was given permission to make repairs on certain bridges where the interruption of military traffic would not prove serious.

Engineer Mine Detectors were procured for checking the NANCY water supply system for enemy mines. The water system at REMILLY (U-9215) was examined and repairs got underway to restore normal operation. Sealed telephone service was authorized to permit NANCY to effect necessary control of the city's water sources.

SECTION IV

PLANS AND OPERATIONS

Renewal of the offensive placed heavy demands upon all Civil Affairs and made necessary the emergency employment of a large number of the officers and men of Military Government Detachments with the Army.

Upon request, the Twelfth U.S. Army Group suspended an order requiring the return to European Civil Affairs Division of those Detachments not regularly assigned to towns in FRANCE, and all twenty-five Civil Affairs Detachments attached to the Army were permitted to continue under its control during the advance to the German Border. Use of these Detachments was determined as follows:

1. Nine were to be left in as many key French cities and pass to the control of the Communications Zone when the Army's Rear Boundary moved forward. The nine cities were:

VERDUN (U-2865)	THIONVILLE (U-4667)
BAR-le-DUC (U-1122)	BOULAY (U-4565)
TOUL (U-4210)	FORBACH (U-3966)
NANCY (U-8612)	SARREGUEMINES (U-4155)
METZ (U-6757)	

2. Five Detachments were to establish and operate Transit Points for the control of refugees and displaced persons at five designated points during the Army's advance to the German Border, but once the border was passed, they were to proceed with the Army into GERMANY for similar work there, while another set of five Detachments took over the Transit Points that had been established. The designated Transit Points were:

THIONVILLE (U-4667)	BOULAY (U-4565)
METZ (U-6757)	FORBACH (U-3966)
SARREGUEMINES (U-4155)	

3. Military Government Detachments were to be brought up to their authorized strengths, if necessary, by transfers of best qualified officers and men from the Civil Affairs Detachments scheduled for eventual return to European Civil Affairs Division.

The month opened with the entire group of Military Government Detachments assembled for training in a single location at MAXEVILLE (U-9213), a suburb of NANCY (U-8612). However, as the Army's advance uncovered fought-over areas in urgent need of assistance, twelve of the Detachments were dispatched to the most badly damaged villages to direct the efforts of hard pressed local committees. They assisted in clearing streets of debris, restoring essential services, and in transporting refugees back to their homes, where they ceased to be a military problem. A total of fifty-seven small communities were thus aided.

Other Military Government Detachments were used to supplement Civil Affairs personnel at Displaced Persons Centers, thus gaining valuable experience in this work. Eight Detachments were sent forward to Corps preparatory for assignment to localities in GERMANY.

Staff officers of Army G-5 were briefed daily in the tactical situation. A week's course of instruction in Military Government staff problems was conducted, at which chiefs of G-5 branches and sub-sections gave twelve half-hour talks on their plans and objectives for GERMANY.

On 30 November, twenty-nine Detachments were operating in the following towns:

VERDUN (U-2865)	DOMBASLE (U-9804)
BAR-le-DUC (U-1122)	ST MIHIEL (U-2456)
NANCY (U-8512)	JEAN MOUPET (U-9804)
TOUL (U-4210)	CHATEAU SALINS (U-1025)
METZ (U-6757)	MARSILLY (U-6991)
LUNEVILLE (U-1936)	HAYANGE (U-7783)
DIEUZE (U-252.)	90th Div Area (U-7577)
REMILLY (U-0116)	5th Div Area (U-4442)
ST JEAN KOURTZERODE (U-3526)	BOULAY (U-4565)
PONT-a-MOUSSON (U-7635)	LES ETANGS (U-0161)
THIONVILLE (U-8687)	BOLEY (U-4473)
FORBACH (P-7901)	METZ (U-6961)
CITRY-des-CHAMBOURCIS (U-1552)	

Military Government Detachments were engaged in emergency refugee work under Army control in the following communities:

ATTILONCOURT (U-0622)	AUBOUE (U-9418)
BLENOD (U-9922)	FLEURY en CHARIOTS (U-0527)
ST NICOLAS (U-9404)	CHATEAU SALINS (U-1025)
MOMERY (U-8933)	AUTREVILLE (U-9731)
MARVILLE (U-9926)	

Three Detachments were en route, three awaiting assignment in forward areas, and seven were under training.

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

Evacuation of 10,984 displaced persons from the Army Zone into Communications Zone was effected in November under G-5 direction. Assembly Centers in the Communications Zone were established under the administration of French authorities and made possible the rapid reception and rearward movement of displaced persons uncovered in new territory liberated by the Army.

The numbers of displaced persons in Transit Centers, the total numbers in Army Zone, and the numbers evacuated by train and G-5 truck transport are shown below:

DATE	DPs IN THIRD ARMY ZONE	DPs IN TRANSIT CENTERS	NUMBERS OF DPs EVACUATED WEEKLY
6 Nov.	7,391	4,304	2,620
13 Nov.	5,850	4,347	301
20 Nov.	8,680	5,359	1,699
27 Nov.	10,117	4,[illegible]4	4,035
30 Nov.		1,897	[illegible]
		TOTAL	10,984

The following Transit Centers were in operation or available for use during the month of November:

	CAPACITY
VERDUN (U-2865)	1,500
PIENNES (U-4983) Headquarters	
PIENNES No. 1	250
PIENNES No. 2	350
ERROUVILLE	2,000
LUDELANGE	800
HAYANGE (U-7783) Headquarters	
ST JACQUES	600
MARSPICH	400
SUCKAYE	400
FLORANGE	400
TENCTILLE	2,000
DOMBASLE (U-9804) Headquarters	
LEMONCOURT	300
ECROLVES	450
PONT-a-MOUSSON	500
CHATEAU SALINS	500
MAIZE	450
MORHANGE	1,000

Plans were completed to divide the Army Zone into Northern and Southern zones of operation for the control of displaced persons and refugees. The plan placed Detachment C2C2 in charge of the Northern Zone and Detachment C112 in charge of the Southern Zone. Each team was given overall responsibility for problems in its zone. However, regular Detachments continued their responsibility and obligations toward displaced persons and refugees. Only when the problem of displaced persons and refugees exceeded the ability of the local Detachment to cope with it, or in the overall administration of large centers, were the specialized displaced persons Detachments to assume control.

The eleven teams of the Mission Militaire de Liaison Administrative, composed of French women, were shifted during the month to displaced persons centers where they were most needed. Ten American Red Cross representatives were similarly employed. One male Polish liaison officer was accredited to Army and was attached to Detachment C112 in the Southern Zone. The sub-section staff was also implemented in its work by the full use of four displaced persons officers on temporary loan from Detachment E1A2, the regional Military Government team earmarked for WESTMARK and LOWER HESSE, GERMANY.

Three special displaced persons Detachments with attached American Red Cross personnel and allied liaison personnel were now operating in METZ (U-05), THIONVILLE (U-68) and BOULAY (U-0965), three of the five cities originally selected as Border Control Stations.

The problem of refugees increased materially the past month. The advance of the Army and the establishment of the "no passage" line at the MOSELLE River, creating a huge "no man's land" between the MOSELLE and SEILLE Rivers, resulted in a congestion of refugees, many of whom had been recently evacuated, anxious to return to their homes west of the MOSELLE.

The total refugees in the Army Zone was as follows:

DATE	NUMBER OF REFUGEES
6 Nov.	15,580
13 Nov.	14,232
20 Nov.	23,885
27 Nov.	32,735

To cope with the urgent refugee problem, approximately 575 French mayors and auxiliary police were returned to their towns through the use of G-5, Quartermaster, and Military Government Detachment Transportation. The general plan of the mayors was to make possible the return of the town populations by reviving local government administration, gathering livestock and food, and repairing and securing homes, a work in which Military Government Detachments gave assistance.

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SECTION V

SUPPLY

Increasing demands for [illegible] stocks available for issue [illegible] resulted largely from the [illegible] thousands of refugees and displaced persons into the [illegible]. The fall of METZ (U-85) created a substantial civilian supply problem, as the city had undergone a considerable period of siege.

A total of 2830 tons of Civil Affairs supplies (1876 tons Class I and 954 tons Class II and IV) was requisitioned and placed on Quartermaster daily telegram. The only incoming stock, however, consisted of thirty-six tons of foodstuffs received from the Quartermaster Class I dump at TOUL (U-61), the balance due on a requisition of 2 October. At the end of November only forty-six tons of stock were on hand as compared to 195 tons at the beginning of the month. Issues thus totalled 185 tons (168 tons Class I and 17 tons Class II and IV).

Continued efforts to have those supplies on requisition brought forward resulted in assurances that items in critical need were being sent at once by rail, identified as Civil Affairs supplies and shipped directly to Civil Affairs Depot, ST NICOLAS (U-9504).

The urgency of the civilian supply problem at METZ was relieved by the capture of large enemy stocks of food, including: 150 tons frozen beef, twenty tons frozen pork, and 650 tons flour, as well as a large quantity of canned foods.

Within several hours release of these foodstuffs was effected through Army and Advance Section Communications Zone so that they were made immediately available for civilian use. Toward the month's end the Detachment at METZ reported that the city had sufficient food supplies for a fourteen to twenty-one-day period and that the emergency was sufficiently in hand to "give the French authorities time to organize an adequate system of civil food supply."

Plans were laid, with the assistance of AC of S, G-5, XX Corps, for the establishment of another Civil Affairs Supply Depot in XX Corps Area. This action was decided upon because the area was largely industrial and expected to be in serious need of relief supplies. A desirable depot site at HAYANGE (U-7783) was submitted for G-3 approval.

At ST NICOLAS (U-9504) Detachment B2I2 was relieved and moved to METZ. However, the Detachment officer in charge of the Civil Affairs Depot remained at the Depot with three enlisted men to continue to administer its operations.

A modification of supply accounting procedure became effective in November. The French government designated the Service des Importations et Exportations as its agency for dealing with imported relief supplies. This agency introduced the République Française receipt form to be used for supplies turned over by the United States Army to French authorities.

POL distribution for civilian use continued satisfactorily, the authorities at NANCY (U-81) drawing 1820 gallons and those at BRIEY (U-6873) 450 gallons of gasoline per day, in addition to other POL products.

Close cooperation between Civil Affairs Detachments in the field, Army G-5 and the Army Supply Services resulted in approximately 10,000 pairs of Class X shoes being allocated to AC of S, G-5, XX Corps for distribution to refugees; the discovery reported to the Army Quartermaster of several serviceable fuel storage tanks of 80,000 gallons capacity each; the release to XII Corps tactical units of eight tons of captured potatoes near ST NICOLAS.

TRANSPORTATION

The Civil Affairs Transport Pool, aided by trucks from the G-5 Transportation Pool and the 2d Platoon, Maintenance Company, performed 193 hauling missions and covered 258,000 miles during the month. Transport of refugees and displaced persons was handled, each from one to three times as they were moved first to collection points, then to displaced persons centers and finally to shipping points or to camps to the rear of the Army Zone. About 32,000 displaced persons were thus actually handled on all trips.

Assistance was rendered to the French Red Cross and French welfare organizations in eleven instances. These included the transport of workers to points where they were needed, evacuation of wounded and sick civilians from front areas and transporting civilian emergency patients from military hospitals to their homes.

Early in the month the French harvest was at its height, and in parts of the Army Zone the crops were threatened by frost damage due to lack of civilian transport facilities. In some instances, where food shortages threatened, Transport Pool trucks were loaned to communities to replenish their supplies. The amount of produce — chiefly potatoes, flour, grain, root vegetables and fuel — thus transported totalled more than 7,883,200 pounds for eighty-seven communities.

Transport Pool trucks delivered 370,000 pounds of food and relief supplies requisitioned by Civil Affairs Detachments and displaced persons centers. Trucks also hauled incoming supplies from the railhead at TOUL (U-61) to the warehouse at ST NICOLAS (U-9504).

Because the registration of captured enemy vehicles had been discontinued by order, maintenance of existing Civil Affairs vehicles became of first importance. The 2d Platoon, Maintenance Company handled sixty-four maintenance assignments, including twenty third and fourth echelon jobs. Fourteen of the Company's vehicles were loaned out, together with drivers to augment or relieve Detachment vehicles.

The Maintenance Patrol visited every Detachment in Army and Corps Areas twice during the month. It handled many small maintenance, adjustment and corrective jobs at Detachment headquarters. In addition to Civil Affairs organic maintenance, the platoon also serviced captured enemy vehicles assigned to Detachments, vehicles of the Mission Militaire de Liaison Administrative teams, trucks of the Civil Affairs Transport Pool and vehicles belonging to French liaison officers attached to staffs and Detachments.

More railroad transport was made available for civilian use during November. Details of shipments and routings were worked out by G-5 Transportation so that civilian supply movements would not conflict with military supply movements. Permission was obtained for subsistence trains to enter NANCY (U-81) daily instead of twice a week. By the end of the month trains were hauling more than 5000 tons of food, fuel and other essentials into NANCY alone. A total of twenty-three train movements involving food and fuel were arranged for other portions of the Third Army Zone. Large quantities of timbers, much needed for coal mine props, and salt were shipped out of the NANCY Region and schedules were approved for future shipments.

Eight railroad movements of displaced persons from centers to camps in the Communications Zone were handled that approximated 7,000 persons.

The work of reconditioning the canal system was slowed up by the abnormal amount of rainfall which flooded streams and made difficult the clearing of canal beds and the repair of locks and gates. In several cases, arrangements were made to change existing military bridges in order to remove pilings in the middle of the waterways.

AGRICULTURE

Fall harvesting of crops formed the major agricultural activity of the month. The most important problems which complicated the task were the lack of civilian transportation and, in some localities, lack of labor. Civil Affairs furnished transportation in many instances where crops were threatened with damage by freezing.

Crops planted by Germans were turned over to local authorities to harvest and distribute where most needed to relieve food shortages and care for refugees. Special efforts were made to recruit labor for harvesting the sugar beet crop. The towns of ST MAURICE (U-5049) and FAGNY (U-7444) solved mutual problems, the former exchanging flour mill facilities for a share of the latter's wheat, the details being worked out by Civil Affairs.

LABOR

Civil Affairs channels were used to recruit [illegible] problems arising in combat areas, such as burial [illegible] cleaning up of essential damaged buildings in [illegible] gangs of twelve men each were recruited to harvest crops in abandoned fields near devastated villages in the area of the 35th Infantry Division. Refugees and displaced persons continued to be used where necessary to relieve acute labor shortages.

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SECTION VI

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

Political events which followed the liberation of the Department of MOSELLE and its capital, METZ (U-85), were interesting and significant. In 1940, MOSELLE was annexed by Hitler as a part of the REICH, and incorporated in the Reichsgau of WESTMARK. Strong measures were taken to bring the population and institutions into the greater REICH. The chief offices were filled by Germans, immigration from GERMANY into the area was promoted and military conscription ordered. The German language was designated as the official language, and schools and other institutions were brought into the German regime. The liberation of the area provided an unusual opportunity for testing the effect and influence of German measures, the ability of the French government to reassert its authority, and Civil Affairs operations under new conditions.

French and American troops were welcomed as liberators, and at METZ (U-85), French officials and religious dignitaries were received with enthusiasm. The visit of General Henri Giraud, the last French Military Governor before annexation, symbolized the change of authority.

The French government quickly reestablished its authority, by naming General Dody as Military Governor of METZ (U-85). For the purpose of civil administration the Department of MOSELLE was provisionally designated as a part of the Region of NANCY, under M. Chailley-Bert, Commissaire de la Republique, and M. Rebourset, Prefect of the Department. Subordinate officials assumed the exercise of their various administrative functions and, at the close of November, it could be assumed that French government was successfully established. Relations with the Army and coordination with G-5 Section were immediately effected.

In the Departments of MEURTHE ET MOSELLE, VOSGES and MEUSE, French authority broadened its scope. Its central organization was strengthened by changes of officials at several places. At NANCY (U-81) the Commissaire de la Republique announced the removal of the President, Vice President and Secretary-Treasurer of the NANCY (U-81) Chamber of Commerce and at BRIEY (U-67) the sub-prefect was removed. As an indication of its widened activities schools were opened as tactical units vacated billets, and railroads, canals and viaducts were repaired, technical advice being given by Civil Affairs specialists.

Active steps were taken to implement the provisions of the agreements between the French Military Government and the governments of the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN. On 1 November it was announced that the French government had assumed the payment of wages of all civilian labor employed by the United States Army within the Region of NANCY. Upon the recommendation of the AC of S, G-5, two Civil Affairs officers were designated to meet with representatives of the French government to adjust conflicting claims with respect to the ownership and disposition of fuel stocks held by the Army as German war material. This committee functioned throughout the month. An increase in the formulation and expression of political opinion was reported by various Civil Affairs Detachments, which was indicative of an awakened interest in government and the resurgence of traditional French individualism.

LEGAL

Numerous meetings were held with French authorities to clarify interpretations of the Anglo-French agreements, particularly as they affected requisitions by the Army of some 4500 tons of coal, coke and briquettes needed for heating hospitals and other installations. The usual factors involved in the determination of title were investigated and decision rendered as to status of property, i.e., captured enemy material or property owned by the French.

Numerous claims were presented for processing and forwarding to Communications Zone, for appropriate action. It was noted that instructions issued by this branch to Detachments in the field resulted in prompt investigation of alleged claims, and preserved for claims officers evidence upon which the validity of such claims

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Due to a widespread illegal market in property of the UNITED STATES involving gasoline, rations, clothing, and other items of equipment, many conferences were held with the officials of the French Military Tribunal and the Procureur General de la republique. At these conferences, legal officers explained the importance of this equipment to our troops and the need for appropriate legal action to deter those parties found guilty, and to take severe further traffic in property of this type. The Anglo-French agreements were fully explained at these meetings, and an officer detailed to assist the French officials at every stage of the prosecution. This action resulted in speeding up the trial of civilian offenders and secured appropriate sentences for those found guilty.

To prepare for the operation and supervision of Military Government Courts in GERMANY, Military Government legal officers were further instructed as to their duties and were promptly informed of changes affecting jurisdiction of the courts. A close liaison was maintained with legal officers of the First and Ninth U.S. Armies in order to coordinate instructions to legal personnel and to provide a uniform system of court procedure throughout occupied GERMANY.

In order to maintain a complete record of legislation promulgated in occupied GERMANY, orders were prepared requiring a complete record as to time, place, and date of promulgation. To insure that the laws of Military Government would receive a widespread circulation in GERMANY, a request was made to Twelfth U.S. Army Group for facilities containing extracts of the most important provisions of all laws and notices.

FINANCIAL

Accounting reports from Detachments deployed in Army Zone reflected little change in cash positions as a result of the agreements whereby Civil Affairs relief supplies and captured enemy supplies were sold to the French on a deferred payment basis, and whereby the French took over payment of civilian employees of Detachments. The latter arrangement functioned well in the NANCY Region, but not in forward areas where the French had not sufficient time to set up the required administrative procedure.

A number of Detachments leaving FRANCE turned over their francs in excess to the Sub-Accountant of the G-5 section. Sub-accountant's balances at end of month was 1,846,509.30 French francs and 193,360 German marks.

Conferences were held with officials of the French Treasury and of the Bank of FRANCE, and assistance was rendered in connection with the conversion program of the French Government conducted in the section of METZ-VILLE Department liberated prior to 17 November. Forty-six exchange offices were opened and special arrangements made for refugees outside the Department of METZ-VILLE. German banks were demolished by civilians between 20 and 26 November and fifteen francs per mark were exchanged for the first 500 marks deposited. Unconverted balances were to be paid at the same rate in early 1945. Preliminary estimates indicated that between six and seven hundred million francs had been paid out in exchange for marks.

New areas in METZ-VILLE liberated in the latter weeks of the month were devoid of banking facilities. Every effort was made by the Financial sub-section to facilitate the work of French banking officials in reestablishing branches of French banks in these areas, and in preparing for conversion operations to be conducted in January 1945.

A report was received from officials of the Bank of FRANCE that the Germans had deposited checks and cash in the Bank of FRANCE, BELFORT (U-093), to cover cash taken from the Bank of FRANCE, NANCY (U-81).

The Financial sub-section cooperated with the Army Finance officer in the preparation of a directive covering the exchange of francs for marks for military personnel entering German territory. This directive (Subject: "German Money and Exchange Procedure," AG 123.7-"MARK, dated 22 November) included a description of the Allied Military Mark and a statement as to the types of money in GERMANY which would be accepted by Army Finance Disbursing Offices.

PUBLIC SAFETY

The importance of security measures in the Third Army Area was accentuated by the acceleration of military operations.

Before the attack of 8 November, an order was prepared by G-5 Section and issued by the Provost Marshal, prohibiting all civilian circulation in the Army Zone. Civil Affairs Detachments reported to the sub-section that certain necessary civilian traffic should be permitted. Following a conference, the order was relaxed by the Provost Marshal to permit civilian traffic in rear areas on non-military routes, and certain essential civilian traffic, including the movement of doctors, ambulances, and food supplies on military supply routes, upon issuance of an Army identifying sticker. Civil Affairs Detachments were directed by this sub-section to give full information of circulation restrictions to all recipients of passes.

In the Army Area, security measures were retained including the curfew from 2000 hours to 0600 hours. Frequent conferences were held with the Provost Marshal and Counter-Intelligence Corps with respect to traffic, circulation, and security problems.

After coordination with the Passive Air Defense Section of G-3, and conferences with French officials, air warning systems were organized in NANCY (U-81), SARRE-UNION (U-1122), and TOUL (U-61).

In NANCY (U-81), French authorities requested permission to resume street car service. This request was conveyed to the Provost Marshal by this sub-section and permission was granted.

Printing of proclamations and other legislation was ordered for the needs of Military Government Detachments.

PUBLIC HEALTH

Matters of sanitation and medical supply to displaced persons assembly points, together with the care of civilian sick and wounded, became acute problems in the wake of destruction of towns in forward areas.

Aided by additional French personnel, however, there were sufficient public health officers available to meet mounting needs. Two public health teams were assigned to cover XX Corps and VIII Corps Zones. Each team included one medical corps and sanitary corps officer, one medical supply officer, a dog veterinarian and typhus control officer. One of the medical corps officers acted as an employee of the operational staff. A French medical liaison officer was attached to the Army G-5 section, and six French medical officers were assigned to various displaced persons centers.

Typhoid fever, diphtheria, scarlet fever, dysentery, and scabies were the diseases principally reported. But, they were still endemic, and their incidence was insignificant in relation to their spread to the armed forces and to the civilian population. Another case of "typhus" was reported in the civilian hospital at THIONVILLE (U-A681), which proved to be another case of typhoid fever. Civil Affairs personnel were again cautioned in the difference between typhus exanthematique and typhoid fever.

Investigation revealed that a typhus fever epidemic had occurred in METZ (U-85) among foreign labor during the period 21 February to 10 July 1944. There were a total of sixty-one positive cases, seven doubtful cases, and four deaths. Cases were divided among six camps which harbored laborers from POLAND, GREECE, ITALY, RUSSIA and FRANCE. From the records of the health office in METZ, it was ascertained that immediate delousing was performed and that all camps were put under quarantine. Disinfection was performed by the steam method and the epidemic was effectively curtailed.

The typhus control officer visited all Detachments earmarked for displaced persons work in border-control centers and GERMANY for the purpose of organization and instructing dusting teams in each Detachment.

The Civil Affairs Supply Depot, under the guidance of an experienced medical supply officer, operated satisfactorily. An ASF basic medical supply unit was placed in the city hospital at NANCY (U-81). Request for medical supplies from civilian health agencies were directed to this source. Requirements for displaced persons camps were met from the Civil Affairs depot.

A letter of instruction on medical and sanitary [illegible] was published and distributed to Civil Affairs organizations. This letter explained methods of supply procurement and listed medical stocks available at Civil Affairs Supply Depot.

Two mobile medical teams were available in this Army's Zone of Operations through the Service de Sante. Each consisted of two doctors, three nurses etc are also drivers, and one ambulance complete with first-aid equipment. Their activities consisted of the care of civilian sick and wounded in combat areas and their evacuation to civilian hospitals. The Army Surgeon was advised of their availability, and he informed combat commanders that such service could be obtained through this headquarters.

A team was already on duty at MONTMEDY (G-1936). Another team serviced the DIEULOUARD (G-2524) area, and one was assigned to the XX Corps forward areas.

Maintenance of sanitation in displaced persons camps was extremely difficult. Facilities were usually inadequate, some not even approaching pre-occupied standards. These camps, however, were often the only ones available in emergency that could be utilized to get displaced persons and refugees out of the mud and rain. Because of pressure of evacuation from the front line, the camps were overcrowded. The constant movement to the rear every two to three days of occupants and the absence of discipline among them, made sanitary control a constantly recurring demand. To improve the situation, good internal organization was repeatedly emphasized and sanitary corps officers were appointed to camp operating Detachments to assist in the correction of defects. Considerable improvement resulted.

CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I

GENERAL

With the swift shift in the tactical situation in mid-December, G-5 was confronted simultaneously with the civil problems of four nationalities under the stress of combat conditions. Approximately fifty Civil Affairs and Military Government Detachments were deployed in portions of FRANCE, GERMANY, BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG. The entire Zone of the Army was being subjected to enemy action. It was sweet by a rising wave of fear of continued enemy successes. Civilian panic, with thousands of refugees clogging roads and hindering troop movements, might easily have developed had a hesitant policy been adopted.

No such panic occurred and at no time did civilians get out of hand, first, because of the confident attitude of Third U.S. Army troops, and second, because of the direct and positive nature of the civilian control measures that were inaugurated.

For more than two months, G-5 had maintained a heavy deployment of Detachments throughout the NANCY region against a possible emergency. Restrictions had been relaxed as the situation had stabilized, but nowhere had they been lifted despite a growing civilian insistence in the Army Area. This machinery was at once set in motion in coordination with AC of S, G-2, and the Provost Marshal.

Orders were issued cutting the granting of all civilian circulation permits to the absolute minimum and freezing the population in place. Detachments were directed to suspend all circulation permits not of an emergency category and to have anyone employ auxiliary police for the strict control of travel and the guarding of vital installations against sabotage. The Gendarmerie was brought out in force.

Certain public work that had been authorized on bridges and civilian communications lines was halted. Detachments were dispatched to METZ (U-67) and to ETAIN (U-47) to control from those important highway centers all civilian movements in the northern part of the Army Area. Other Detachments were regrouped to suit the new disposition of Corps.

Both the XII and the III Corps moving into LUXEMBOURG and BELGIUM carried reserve Detachments to augment quickly the efforts of Detachments that were already in place there. The control policy which was proving effective in FRANCE was continued without change in these new portions of the Army's Zone of Operations, as well as in the Zone of the VIII Corps. The AC of S, G-5, of VIII Corps needed no instructions in this policy, in view of the earlier service of this Corps with Third U.S. Army in FRANCE.

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At no time through this period were national [illegible] consideration in executing the primary objective, na[illegible] clear of civilians. The methods adopted were emp[illegible] every instance with the full cooperation of local [illegible] ritory was recovered, G-5 Detachments moved in alo[illegible] establish government. They also assisted in the billeting of troops. At VIRTON (P-41), BELGIUM, for example, billets were procured for 5,000 officers and men, and surveys were made for an additional 8,800.

In occupied German territory in the SAAR Basin, on the front of the XX Corps, the month opened with Military Government Detachments engaged in restoring order to a largely desolated countryside that was still under enemy fire. For tactical reasons this work was abruptly abandoned and wholesale evacuation of the scattered population was begun to concentration points further to the rear of regimental lines. French-driven trucks of the G-5 Transport Pool, the Military Government staffs of combat divisions and troop commanders cooperated in this task. By the month's end it was largely completed.

Meanwhile, on the front then occupied by XII Corps but later relinquished to the Seventh U.S. Army, G-5 Public Health officers and trucks carried medical relief and food to several thousand French refugees trapped in a quarry between the lines near SARREGUEMINES (Q-55). A sound truck sent forward by G-5 Intelligence was instrumental in rounding up ninety-six German deserters there. Ten French drivers of the G-5 Transport Pool stood off an enemy attack against a temporary Civil Affairs storehouse until infantry help arrived, killing eight Germans and capturing eighteen.

At METZ (U-85) and elsewhere toward the rear, life in the Region of NANCY returned steadily nearer to normal with the resumption and expansion of the public services, improvement in the food supply, and returning efficiency of government.

SECTION II

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

Organization of the 87th Infantry Division Staff during the month constituted the most important accomplishment other than routine administrative duties.

Civil Affairs and Military Government personnel appeared in casualty lists as follows:

1 Detachment missing
2 Individuals missing
5 Individuals wounded
1 Individual killed

The Croix de Guerre was awarded to the AC of S, G-5, XX Corps, and eight Bronze Star Medals were awarded to other Civil Affairs personnel for meritorious service.

SECTION III

INTELLIGENCE

The industrial importance of the SAAR River Valley to the enemy, the presence of a number of fairly heavily populated areas there, and the fact that the Army was invading German territory for the first time, made the SAAR of more than usual interest for intelligence purposes. Reports from Detachments, followed by first hand surveys made while the communities were still under fire, rapidly developed the pattern of the enemy's civilian policy through the valley.

Territory occupied on the German side of the SAAR River had been largely evacuated before the arrival of American troops. Complete evacuation had been ordered by NAZI leaders, but hundreds had stayed behind, hidden in cellars and elsewhere, upon assurance of German Army officers that the Americans would treat them fairly. Military Government staff officers found these people badly frightened, docile and tired of war. They willingly obeyed orders. However, all NAZI officials and Party leaders had fled, there was extensive combat damage and lack of all constituted authority. The countryside had been stripped of everything of military value excepting unthreshed grain and crops still in the ground. Displaced persons were few and presented no immediate problem.

On the French side of the river, only the German nationals had fled. An estimated 10,500 persons, chiefly French, were found in the city of SARREGUEMINES (Q-55) out of a normal population of 15,000. Some had been hiding in cellars under shell fire for almost three weeks. Some 3,500 were trapped in a quarry between the fighting lines. People were badly undernourished, many were ill, but there was no evidence of epidemic. Use of a sound truck procured by the Intelligence branch resulted in the turning over of ninety-six prisoners of war to the American military authorities.

An underground airplane parts and liquid air factory at WITTRING (Q-5650) had been emptied of all movable machinery and dynamited. Modern telephone equipment in larger centers had been moved out with the Germans. But the important coal mining and electric power center near ST AVOLD (Q-2456) was less seriously sabotaged than anticipated. Some of the mines had evidently been worked to the last hour.

Further steps were taken to coordinate more closely the displaced persons work of Civil Affairs and Counter-Intelligence Corps. The location of all displaced persons camps, changing frequently with the flow of operations, were posted daily on the Counter-Intelligence Corps central map in G-2 Section. At the same time, locations both of Counter-Intelligence teams and displaced persons camps were periodically published for distribution to all interested personnel of both sections. Regular liaison was maintained with AC of S, G-2 to keep him informed as far as possible in advance of plans for moving displaced persons out of the Army Zone rearward.

COMMUNICATIONS

The Department of MEUSE was included in Zone B for communications. This permitted open post cards and letters to be sent to most Allied nations.

Telephone service for essential activities was restored in METZ (U-85), PONT-a-MOUSSON (U-7635) and THIONVILLE (U-88). An air-raid alarm system was installed in METZ. Telephone circuits for official intercity use were installed from NANCY (U-81) to BAR-le-DUC (U-1122), BRIEY (U-67), JARNY (U-6565), PONT-a-MOUSSON (U-7635) and TOUL (U-61). Important industries in the suburbs of NANCY were given telephone service from the NANCY switchboard.

PUBLIC WORKS

Arrangements were made with the French Bureau of Ponts et Chaussees for sanding military roads in icy weather and for removal of mud from roads. Reconstruction of the bridge at FROVILLE (U-8219) was started by the French.

Electric power generators in CARLING (Q-2562), KREUZWALD (Q-2467) and MOSELBACH (Q-3361) with a capacity of 50,000 kilowatts were repaired and placed in operation. Repair of the generators at KREUZWALD made it possible to resume coal mining operations. Power lines were repaired from KREUZWALD to METZ (U-85), thus restoring electricity to METZ and also from KREUZWALD to FAULQUEMONT (Q-1749).

Use of the military bridges at MALZEVILLE (U-8675), ST MAX (U-8713), TOMBLAINE (U-8810) and CHAMPIGNEULLES (U-8416) was authorized for gas lines from NANCY (U-81) to those communities, making gas available for the first time since liberation. Water pipes from NANCY to MALZEVILLE and ST MAX were repaired at the temporary bridges connecting the communities.

SECTION IV

PLANS AND OPERATIONS

Continuation of the Allied winter offensive placed a heavy burden on Civil Affairs, particularly in the Zone of this Army. The zone of advance was generally through Germanized ALSACE-LORRAINE.

When the Germans withdrew, they evacuated the civil authority and police agencies, took most of the food, and damaged utilities. This situation required the use of Civil Affairs [illegible] every little commu-

On 11 December, the III Corps was placed on an operational status with a Zone between the XII and XX Corps. For this operation, the following Detachments were placed under their control:

C2I2 H1A2
D3B2 D6D2
B1C2

With the build up of Sixth Army Group and resultant movement of their Zone to the North, seven Detachments were transferred to that organization. I6A2 and I1B2 went directly to XV Corps on 15 December, and G1B2, H2A2 and H1B2 departed for Sixth Army Group on the next day.

Six Detachments scheduled for return to European Civil Affairs Division had been retained for operational reasons, but because of a more pressing need elsewhere, Twelfth U.S. Army Group relieved them from attachment to this headquarters and they departed on 19 December.

The Germans launched their expected counter-offensive in the Zone of the VIII Corps, First U.S. Army on 16 December. The Third U.S. Army moved north immediately to attack the flank of the German salient.

Initially there was unrest among the civil population of LUXEMBOURG, BELGIUM and Northern FRANCE, but all Civil Affairs and Military Government Detachments immediately enforced a standfast policy with the result that rapid military movement was not impeded by refugee circulation.

The VIII Corps was assigned to the Third U.S. Army to meet this counter-offensive, and as a result, eighteen Civil Affairs and Military Government Detachments passed to control of this Army.

On 31 December, thirty-nine Detachments were operating in the following towns:

Third U.S. Army Control

ANGEVILLERS (U-7899)
BRIEY (U-6973)
CHATEAU SALINS (Q-1026)
CLERVAUX (P-7663)
DELME (Q-0132)
DOMBASLE (U-9804)
ESCH (P-7301)
ETAIN (U-4770)
HAYANGE (U-7783)
LOMENY (P-5704)
MAIZEVILLE (U-8713)
MERLEBACH (Q-3261)
MONTMEDY (U-7774)
NANCY (U-8512)
SARREGUEMINES (Q-4155)
SCHIFFLANGE (P-7502)
TOUL (U-6410)
PONT-a-MOUSSON (U-7635)

XX Corps Control

BOULAY (Q-0965)
KREUZWALD (Q-2467)
DIEUZE (Q-2524)
HEMMERSDORF (Q-1885)
METZ (U-8757)
MERZALTDORF (Q-1783)
PERL (Q-0298)
SAARLAUTERN (Q-2981)
SIERCK (Q-0094)
THIONVILLE (U-8687)

XII Corps Control

CAPELLEN (P-7418)
LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-8413)
MERSCH (P-8285)
MOUTFORT (P-9311)

III Corps Control

ARLON (P-6222)
REDANGE (P-6732)

VIII Corps Control

BERTRIX (P-2242)
CARIGNAN (P-1418)
FLORENVILLE (P-2525)
NEUFCHATEAU (P-3541)
ETALLE (P-4622)

Detachments D4D2 and D5B1 awaited orders for transfer to Sixth Army Group for border control duty at SARREGUEMINES (Q-4155) and FORBACH (Q-3966) respectively, in accordance with the Plan for Disposition of Civil Affairs Detachments, dated 22 November.

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REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

The continued mass movement of displaced persons rearward into Communications Zone, the uncovering of sizeable numbers of refugees in caves and quarries near the front, and the evacuation to and segregation of German civilians in towns near [illegible] (Q-5981), were among the more noteworthy developments during December.

The total number of displaced persons in Transit Points and the numbers evacuated by train and G-5 truck transport are shown below:

DATE	DPs IN TRANSIT POINTS	NO. DPs EVACUATED WEEKLY
4 December	3,988	2,487
10 December	2,459	668
17 December	2,718	224
25 December	4,274	1,752
31 December	2,735	1,624

The following Transit Points were in operation or available for use during the month:

[illegible] (U-1904)	[illegible] (U-7 [illegible])
[illegible] (U-[illegible])	[illegible] (U-7489)
[illegible] (U-[illegible]93)	[illegible] (Q-157)
[illegible] (U-[illegible])	[illegible] (U-465)
[illegible] (U-[illegible])	[illegible] (U-[illegible])
[illegible] (U-7635)	[illegible] (U-8413)
[illegible] (U-7783)	[illegible] (U-[illegible]1)
[illegible] (U-7783)	[illegible] (U-[illegible]7)

The total number of refugees and displaced persons reported as of 31 December was as follows:

FRANCE	REFUGEES	DPs
HAUTE RHIN	120	
MEURTHE ET MOSELLE	13,029	1,845
MEUSE	1,110	
MOSELLE	22,906	1,224
VOSGES	26	
NO. AT DP TRANSIT POINTS		1,330
GERMANY	6,346	277
LUXEMBOURG	3,885	466
NO. AT DP TRANSIT POINTS		1,405
BELGIUM	3,540	
GRAND TOTAL	50,962	6,547

Thirty-two hundred refugees, mainly former residents of SARREGUEMINES (Q-55), but including a small number of German civilians and displaced persons, were uncovered in a quarry near that town. The entrance was under enemy shell fire but the Civil Affairs Detachment, aided by personnel from a tactical unit, succeeded in delivering food and medical supplies to the group.

Nine hundred sixty-seven German civilians were evacuated from a large cave in [illegible] (Q-2495), 400 were moved to IHN (Q-1881) and the remainder to [illegible] (Q-1885). Other concentrations of evacuees were at [illegible]-HEMMERSDORF (Q-1885) and NIEDALTDORF (Q-1783) with approximately 1,112.

Border control Detachments were moved to THIONVILLE (U-8681), METZ (U-85), BOULAY (Q-0965), and SARREGUEMINES (Q-55). These Detachments performed regular Civil Affairs duties in their respective towns, including some work with displaced persons and refugees. It was clear, however, that border control work as originally conceived would come at a later date.

The work of returning mayors and auxiliary police to towns begun in November was continued. Assistance in rehabilitating the towns and return to them of former residents was also continued by the Military Government Detachments deployed for this purpose.

All the displaced persons teams were activated. After careful consideration, it was decided to remove American Red Cross representatives from such teams and with two exceptions, these representatives were attached to Military Government Civil Affairs Detachments in the larger towns. Four Polish liaison officers reported for duty and were immediately deployed to Displaced Persons Detachments.

SECTION V

RELIEF AND SUPPLY

Efforts made during November to have supplies shipped forward from Communications Zone bore fruit. The following supplies, with additional quantities due in, were received during December at the Civil Affairs Depots:

ITEMS	TONS
Food	197.66
Clothing	91.67
Blankets	49.43
Soap	120.2

In addition, 7,500 "C" rations were received from the Army Quartermaster as reimbursement for food supplied to Prisoners of War during the month.

Operations involved the issuance of:

ITEMS	TONS
Food	63.3
Clothing	10.52
Blankets	15.33
Soap	13.6

leaving the following balance on hand:

ITEMS	TONS
Food	171.07
Clothing	81.65
Blankets	34.1
Soap	109.1

A total stock of 1,000 tons was set as a desirable reserve to be available for future operations. An additional warehouse at HAYANGE (U-7783) was occupied, and further attempts were made to secure dead storage space.

Captured foodstuffs played an important role in meeting civilian relief needs. Quantities of grains and potatoes turned over to civilian authorities in this zone were large, that for the METZ area alone totalling about 350 tons. Of more permanent significance were the many measures taken both by military and civilian authorities toward the rehabilitation of grain processing plants.

The distribution of POL products to civil authorities was modified to meet the requirements of newly uncovered areas in the Department of MOSELLE. The POL allocation at BRIEY (U-67) was discontinued and transferred to NANCY (U-81) so that there would be a completely centralized distribution for the entire Army Zone. The NANCY Regional authorities continued making regular distribution through departmental authorities of the 2,270 gallons of gasoline and 540 gallons of other POL products drawn daily from the Army.

Indicative of the frequent supply activity carried on with units outside of Civil Affairs were arrangements made to secure eleven tons of captured Plaster of Paris through the Seventh Air Depot Group of the Army Air Forces for the repair of government buildings at BRIEY (U-67) and the supplying of clothing and blankets for 2,300 Allied Prisoners of War in an understanding with the Quartermaster.

For the guidance and assistance of subordinate units, a supply circular was issued giving current information on Civil Affairs stocks available at the depots and the most recent modifications of procedure. Study was made of supply policies and procedures to be followed in GERMANY, with the intention of issuing a concise letter of instructions on these matters to Corps and Detachments under Army.

TRANSPORTATION

The Civil Affairs Truck Pool Number 2 was established in connection with the new Civil Affairs Supply Warehouse at HAYANGE (U-7783). The 1st Company of the French Provisional Truck Unit, consisting of fifty trucks, five officers and 110 men was moved to HAYANGE to operate Pool Number 2. The 12th Company remained at ST NICOLAS (U-9504) to operate Pool Number 1.

The second pool materially increased the efficiency of transport as it shortened hauls of supplies and made possible quicker service to Detachments. As a result, more hauls were made with a substantial decrease in total mileage. Bad weather conditions, cold, ice and rain - handicapped truck movements and caused a substantial proportion of trucks to be deadlined for minor repairs. In spite of this, 145 missions involving 556 separate trips were performed.

Refugees and displaced persons accounted for an important proportion of the truck movements. In all, over 4,000 refugees and more than 20,000 displaced persons were carried in Civil Affairs Transport Pool vehicles, including individuals who were carried two and three times.

Transport Pool trucks carried a total of 635,800 pounds of Civil Affairs supplies. Food and clothing to establish Warehouse II were carried by the Pool trucks. Several trips were made to depots in the Communications Zone to bring up needed medical and sanitary supplies to the warehouse at ST NICOLAS (U-9504).

Assistance to local Detachments continued to be a major function. Trucks were loaned for periods of three to five days to be used in local hauling, such as bringing in local food to centers and damaged towns, evacuating sick and wounded civilians and transporting other essential and badly needed commodities. One hundred and thirty tons of clothing were hauled for the Red Cross. In all, the Civil Affairs Transport Pool trucks carried more than 5,331,000 pounds for Detachments and communities.

With the resumption of activity on all fronts, Transport Pool drivers were called upon to evacuate civilians from front lines and to deliver supplies under fire. Ten drivers of the 12th Company assisted in repelling a German attack on the Civil Affairs supply distribution point in SARREGUEMINES (Q-55). Special commendation, was expressed both by the XII Corps and Army AC of S, G-5 for the drivers "courage, indefatigable efforts and willingness to carry out assignments despite the risks involved." Two drivers were wounded by shrapnel while removing civilians at [illegible] (Q-0298). Both truck companies were commended for meritorious service by AC of S, G-5, of the Third U.S. Army.

The Second Section, Service Platoon, though losing twenty men, performed 174 repair operations on Civil Affairs and Military Government vehicles. The Maintenance Patrol checked vehicles of all Detachments twice during the month.

Railroad transportation continued heavy and every effort was made to obtain shipment of necessary civilian goods without interfering with essential military traffic. During the month clearance was obtained to bring 13,792 tons of food, 15,823 tons of fuel and 2,545 tons of medical supplies and essential merchandise into NANCY (U-81). In other portions of the Army Zone, arrangements were made for the shipment of 12,310 tons food, 14,916 tons fuel and 12,623 tons of miscellaneous merchandise. Outgoing shipments which were cleared totalled 11,202 tons of salt and soda, and 1,752 tons of timber for use in coal mines.

Arrangements were made for the resumption of rail service to additional communities and population centers. In all, sixteen trains were authorized to make one trip and return each week between various towns and cities. The trains were to carry food and essential commercial items, but no passengers or mail.

Authorization was obtained for the passenger express previously operating between PARIS and BAR-le-DUC (U-1122) to extend its service from BAR-le-DUC to NANCY (U-81). Only passengers who had received clearance from the Counter-Intelligence Corps and Civil Affairs were permitted to use the train after entering Third Army Zone.

Arrangements were completed to permit two cars per week of medical supplies and clothing to enter NANCY (U-81). Special train movements were authorized for the transport of 500 tons of railroad supplies, 6,000 tons of coal, 2,024 tons of food, and 1,200 tons of steel, in addition to the regular subsistence train shipments.

Five train movements were arranged to transport displaced persons from displaced persons camps to centers in the Communications Zone. Approximately 5,000 displaced persons were moved by rail.

Permission was given for the resumption of street car service in NANCY (U-81) on three important routes which did not interfere with the main military supply routes. Later permission was also given to extend tramway service as far as FROUARD (U-8219). Trolley service was allowed to be reopened between HAYANGE (U-7783) and THIONVILLE (U-88) and resulted in eliminating much foot and bicycle traffic on military roads.

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Rehabilitation of canals in the Army Zone was prevented by lack of some essential materials and shortage of labor. Cold weather and the floods caused by unusually heavy rainfall also contributed to the slowing down of repair efforts.

LABOR

A complete survey of available labor was made at THIONVILLE (U-68). French labor offices were functioning and unemployed factory workers were being employed on clean-up and rehabilitation work.

A new registration of labor was held at ST AVOLD (Q-2456) to find men for essential civilian and military work.

More than 1,000 laborers were obtained by Civil Affairs for the 72d Quartermaster Base Depot at ESCH (P-7301).

SECTION VI

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

Governmental affairs requiring the consideration of the branch arose in great part in FRANCE.

As the area occupied in GERMANY was small and those in BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG were subject to battle conditions, it was difficult to assay the quality and permanence of governmental organizations established locally. The chief interest of the branch with respect to GERMANY related to the accumulation of Military Government laws and the establishment of Military Government courts for their enforcement.

French administration in the Army Zone was marked by the progressive reestablishment of its functions in the Department of MEURTHE and the enlargement of functions in the Department of MOSELLE-et-MOSELLE. In the latter Department, active cooperation with the Army Legal subsection was noted in matters relating to suppression of the black market and with the Public Safety sub-section in the enforcement of security restrictions.

At the beginning of the German offensive, the French authorities gave great aid to the Army by strict enforcement of security measures and in the reassurance of the apprehensive French population.

LEGAL

Cases involving possession, theft, and illegal traffic in property of the UNITED STATES such as gasoline, rations, clothing and equipment, were reduced to a minimum. An effort was made through the French officials concerned to impress the civilian population with the seriousness of the situation. In line with this, a newspaper editorial was published explaining to the people that it was an offense against French law to take possession of American property even though such property was received as a gift. It was further explained that soldiers of the Allied Forces had no authority to dispose of any property of the UNITED STATES.

To coordinate the activities of Army agencies and the law enforcement agencies of the French administration, a legal officer was placed on special duty with the Civil Affairs Detachment in NANCY (U-81). This officer was thus able to receive reports of violations, prefer charges, and follow the trial to its completion. This action resulted in prompt trial of offenders and more severe penalties.

For some time the French had been under the impression that the civil courts and the French Military Tribunals had concurrent jurisdiction with respect to civilians in cases involving offences against persons and property of the Allied Governments. The resulting confusion led to delayed trials and sentences incommensurate with the offence. A conference was held with the Inspector of French Military Tribunals, as a result of which the French Military Tribunals sitting in the Region were instructed to exercise sole jurisdiction over all cases involving the interest of the [illegible]

There was a marked decrease in the number of claims presented for processing and forwarding to Communications Zone for action. Civil Affairs Detachments were instructed in Army Procurement procedures. This removed a potential source of claims arising out of improper requisitioning by units unfamiliar with directives on that subject.

The status of all controverted property rights were investigated and reports rendered to the sections concerned for disposal under the agreements between the Allied Governments. The reports of these investigations were forwarded to higher headquarters for settlement under existing agreements for balancing of accounts.

The occupation of portions of German territory necessitated the promulgation of the laws for the government of GERMANY under Military Government in the Supreme Commander's Area of Control. These laws, ordinances and notices were published in all towns of the occupied area. A complete distribution of pertinent legislation was made to all Corps, Divisions and Military Government Detachments for use in the areas under control.

On 1 December the Army Commander's authority to appoint Military Government Courts was delegated to the Corps Commanders with authority to redelegate the authority to Division Commanders. As a result eight Summary Military Courts were appointed in the Army Zone. These courts tried a total of twenty-three persons charged with such offences as violations of circulation and curfew restrictions, crossing the frontier, and failing to declare weapons in the appointed time. Sentences ranged from seven days imprisonment to one year imprisonment and $500.00 fine.

FINANCIAL

Detachment receipts and expenditures of Civil Affairs funds continued to decline as labor, supplies and services, in all but extreme forward areas in FRANCE, were furnished through local authorities or Army channels. Payments due Detachments were handled on a deferred basis at national levels. The bulk of the French francs held by the Sub-Accountant, G-5 Section, was transferred to Currency Section for FRANCE. Balances at the end of the month were 119,237 French francs and 193,350 Allied Military marks.

To conform with Procurement Directive Number 23, this headquarters, 23 December, arrangements were initiated to secure appointment of Purchasing and Contracting officers on all Military Government Detachments. This directive prescribed that all supplies, services and facilities required by Military Government Detachments in GERMANY would be secured only by duly appointed Purchasing and Contracting officers.

A reluctance on the part of shopkeepers in NANCY (U-81) to accept supplementary franc notes in denominations of 500 and 1,000 francs developed during the month as a result of a counterfeit scare. At the request of this headquarters, French authorities inserted notices in local papers to calm the population. At the same time, arrangements were made with the Bank of FRANCE to exchange 500 and 1,000 franc Allied Military notes held by Army Finance Sections for metropolitan francs. Within a few days these measures proved successful and there were no further reports of trouble.

Entry of French financial and banking officials into liberated areas of FRANCE west of the MOSELLE River was facilitated to reopen banking and financial services and to prepare for the conversion of marks into francs scheduled for the second week of January 1945. Additional copies of the French proclamation on the exchange rate were posted by Civil Affairs Detachments in areas affected. Despite efforts of Finance officers, some Allied Military marks found their way into circulation in frontier sections in the Department of MOSELLE. At the request of this Section, the Army Finance officer reported this matter to the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, so that arrangements could be made with the French Government to redeem Allied Military marks in the hands of civilians.

Authority was obtained for the Bank of FRANCE, NANCY (U-81), to use certain important telephone circuits. Their operations had been hampered by lack of adequate facilities for [illegible]

The rapid extension of operations into LUXEMBOURG and BELGIUM, toward the end of the month, resulted in a renewed appearance of military personnel in these countries who had been unable to exchange their French francs for the appropriate local currency. This situation was brought to the attention of the Finance officer and steps were taken to place Finance Disbursing Sections at key points to exchange currency for military personnel.

In Luxembourg and Belgian cities, where the German counter-offensive threatened the safety of treasury and banking funds, Civil Affairs Detachments issued instructions for removal or safeguard of these funds in case of emergency.

In occupied territory Military Government Detachments had little to report in the financial and property control field because of the suspension of most normal civil functions.

PUBLIC SAFETY

Prior to the German offensive, Public Safety activities were concerned chiefly with the consideration of passes requested for forward areas and conferences with the Provost Marshal, the Public Safety officer of Civil Affairs Detachment A102, and French authorities with respect to security measures.

The offensive led to additional emphasis upon security control. The French Police were warned of the possibility of infiltration by German spies and saboteurs and requested to exercise stricter enforcement of circulation, blackout and curfew controls. During the Christmas season, additional guards for NANCY (U-81) were requested, and furnished by the French authorities. The policy was adopted of refusing approval of passes into Corps and Division areas except in cases of great urgency and necessity. In all of these measures, full cooperation was received from the French authorities.

A single relaxation of control was permitted for Christmas Eve, when at the request of this sub-section, the curfew hours were changed from 2000 hours 24 December to 0100 hours 25 December in that part of the Army Zone west of the MOSELLE River. This relaxation had been requested by Monsieur P. Chailley-Bert, Commissioner of the Republic, and the Bishop of NANCY to permit the celebration of the traditional midnight mass.

French authorities in NANCY (U-81) were requested to hold a practice air-raid alert with fire guards and watchers at their posts. The alert was held on 30 December and was carried out quickly and successfully.

PUBLIC HEALTH

Care of civilian sick and wounded, especially in the devastated forward areas, developed into an important activity. However, there was no unusual rise in communicable disease incidence in the Zone of Operations, and no great demand was made for medical supplies from civilian agencies.

An Allied Relief Board basic medical unit was established in METZ (U-85) to supply the needs of civilian installations in the MOSELLE area. One thousand pounds of DDT powder, 250 hand dusters, and one power duster were stocked in the Civil Affairs Supply Depot.

Three mobile civilian medical teams were operating in the Army's Zone. They serviced the entire forward areas, giving first-aid to the civilian sick and wounded and evacuating the serious cases to civilian hospitals. The principal towns served included THIONVILLE (U-68), SIERCK (Q-0095), BOUZONVILLE (Q-1378), METZERVISSE (U-9581), BOULAY SARREALBE (Q-4845), SARREGUEMINES (G-55) and MORHANGE (Q-193A).

An ambulance service was also attached to this headquarters by arrangement with the Ambulance Assistance Sanitaire. Their service involved the evacuation of sick and wounded from forward areas to civilian hospitals on call from Civil Affairs officers and Army Commanders. This service filled a definite need. From [illegible]

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Arrangements were made through Twelfth Army Group for hospitalization of chronically ill patients from displaced persons camps and civilian hospitals to civilian hospitals in rear areas in order to provide more bed space in forward areas for acute illnesses. The ambulance service transported thirty-eight tuberculosis patients from AUBANGE (U-7748) to a civilian hospital at SERMAIZE-les-BAINS (T-9325).

On duty with this headquarters, a Public Health officer arranged a relief party to bring food and medical supplies to French refugees in a cave at WELFERDING (Q-4956). The party was under fire while carrying out this mission.

Several hospitals were rehabilitated in the forward areas. Medical supplies, equipment, and blankets were furnished the hospitals at SARREGUEMINES (Q-55) and MERLEBACH (Q-6361).

With the reduction of the number of refugees and displaced persons, public health problems at these camps diminished. The camps possessing worst sanitary facilities were abandoned. The other camps improved considerably in sanitary standards and a few were exemplary.

CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

SECTION I

GENERAL

Destruction and destitution were widespread in the wake of the German Army as it was forced backward out of the ARDENNES. This was agricultural country on which the more populated areas to the south depended heavily for their food supply. The Germans practically denuded most of it, seizing large quantities of food and clothing to support their troops in the field and taking hundreds of head of livestock back into GERMANY. More hundreds of head were killed by the military action or died of starvation and lack of care. The result was that the civilian relief problem in January extended throughout the Zone of the Third US Army. It was made acute by severe winter weather and a general shortage of fuel.

Approximately 180,000 garments donated by the American Red Cross were distributed among 90,000 destitute persons in the Grand Duchy of LUXEMBOURG, the Province of LUXEMBOURG in BELGIUM, and in the French Departments of MOSELLE and MEURTHE-et-MOSELLE. The clothing was hauled in G-5 Section trucks and its distribution, chiefly through civilian agencies, was supervised by American Red Cross personnel attached to Civil Affairs Detachments.

The Relief and Supply Branch issued approximately 1,040,000 rations of imported emergency foodstuffs and 187,040 gallons of gasoline and lubricants. The petroleum products were employed in large part to get local mills in operation grinding wheat, loss of which was threatened through spoilage, and in enabling local trucks to collect fodder for starving farm animals.

G-5 Transport Pool trucks carried more than 1,000 tons of materials. They rushed twenty tons of food into BASTOGNE (P-55) upon the relief of that town, evacuated 3,000 persons from combat areas, and over icy roads carried 750 Polish displaced persons to CHALONS-sur-MARNE (T-4445) without an accident. Fifty tons of salt was carried into LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81) to relieve a serious shortage there.

The relief policy followed was one of furnishing purely emergency supplies for the first few days until the regular civilian agencies could take over the burden. Every assistance was given in assisting Belgian and Luxembourg state authorities in surveying their devastated areas and determining the needs. Generally, the large numbers of refugees who had fled from the German attack to the south were held in place there, only picked groups of men being allowed to return to their towns for salvage and clearance operations where this work was desirable.

The growing threat of epidemic, especially of diphtheria, was met by providing emergency medical supplies where needed, and avoiding overcrowding of civilian hospital facilities. In all instances reported outbreaks of disease were brought quickly under control.

SECTION II

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

With the steady change from Civil Affairs to Military Government and the deployment of additional Detachments, the volume of reports and correspondence increased greatly.

Non-table of organization grades listed below were allotted to this Headquarters for Civil Affairs/Military Government activities only, by Headquarters European Theater of Operations:

Officers		Warrant Officer	Enlisted	
Colonel	- 2	1	Grade 1 -	3
Lt. Colonel	- 7		Grade 2 -	7
Major	- 10		Grade 3 -	13
Captain	- 5		Grade 4 -	9
			Grade 5 -	8
	24	1		40

Aggregate - 65

The Theater Commander directed that upon transfer of this Headquarters from the theater or in the event that it should become non-operational, the allotted grades would be withdrawn and assigned personnel would be reassigned to the European Civil Affairs Division. Army G-5 Staff was reduced from fifty to forty enlisted men in compliance with the order.

The 76th Infantry Division, assigned to Third U.S. Army during the month, arrived without a Civil Affairs/Military Government Staff. Competent officer and enlisted personnel from other staff sections, possessing several months of operational experience, were assigned to this new division.

Instructions of new procedure for processing recommendations for promotion of Civil Affairs/Military Government Detachment personnel were received from European Civil Affairs Division. Because of an overstrength in grades, few promotions of qualified and deserving Detachment personnel had been made up to this time.

Three Civil Affairs/Military Government personnel were wounded as a result of enemy action.

Seventeen Bronze Star Medals were awarded to Staff and Detachment personnel during January for meritorious service.

SECTION III

INTELLIGENCE

Surveys made through Civil Affairs personnel in the recaptured areas of BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG indicated that necessity was probably the chief reason for the enemy's wholesale seizure of foodstuffs, clothing and other materials in the "break through." Few atrocities against civilians and little wanton damage were reported. However, property was seized indiscriminantly, usually without requisition. Actual looting appeared to have varied according to the degree of discipline maintained by enemy unit commanders.

Detailed claims filed with mayors of nine communes in the area around ST HUBERT (P-3061) showed that every available kind of portable property was seized, though otherwise enemy troops were said to have been "quite correct in their attitude and actions." They took more than 85,000 kilograms of potatoes, 53,000 kilograms of cereals, 78,000 kilograms of straw, 50,000 kilograms of coal, 800 head of livestock, 4,300 chickens, and 14,000 bottles of wine, liquor and beer. They made large hauls of bedding, clothing and white goods for camouflage and practically cleaned the country of tobacco and hand tools. Looting was indicated by claims for 263 watches and clocks, 395 pieces of jewelry, 13 musical instruments, 1,492 books, 236 radios, and 518 pieces of furniture. Citizens claimed to have been robbed of 3,050,000 Belgium francs in cash. The "POL" loss was only 4,500 liters, about half of which was kerosene.

Other villages of the salient had experiences and losses very similar to those of the ST HUBERT communes. Civilians said that livestock, especially pigs, were sent back into GERMANY by the hundreds of head. HOUFFALIZE (P-6172) was thoroughly pillaged during the seven air raids that destroyed it, the enemy's first interest being in blankets and clothing.

The Courier-Liaison Service was maintained under difficulties with all Corps and Army Area Detachments, troop movements and winter roads prolonging schedules. Close liaison with the AC of S, G-2, resulted in ready coordination of G-2 and G-5 mutual interests for operations in GERMANY.

COMMUNICATIONS

Intracity mail for civilians and intercity courier service for official business (including postal money orders) were resumed in the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG and the section of BELGIUM in the Army Zone. These services had been suspended coincident with the German offensive in December. Civilians of the Department of MEURTHE-et-MOSELLE were authorized to send letters up to twenty grammes to that section of FRANCE in Zone B.

Repair of overhead telephone wires by employees of the Luxembourg, Belgium and French "PTT" was resumed.

PUBLIC WORKS

Army Engineers removed mines to permit repair of the UCKANGE (U-8679)-CARLING (Q-2562) high tension electric power line.

Electric power was restored in fifteen communes in the vicinity of NEUFCHATEAU (P-3541), nine communes in ETTANGE Canton and also in the following localities:

BISSEN (P-7933)	NAMOUSSART (P-3940)
FELS (P-9132)	NEUFCHATEAU (P-3541)
GRAFFONTAINE (P-3238)	PERLE (P-5837)
HESPERANGE (P-8509)	RUMELANGE (U-7798)
MARTELANGE (P-5639)	ST AVOLD (Q-2456)
MERSCH (P-8328)	

An electric power generator of 25,000 kilowatt capacity was put in service at CARLING (Q-2562). This made more power available for METZ (U-85) and the coal mines in the Department of the MOSELLE.

The power line from METZ (U-85) to WOIPPY (U-8563) was repaired. This permitted operation of an additional water pumping station for METZ.

SECTION IV

PLANS AND OPERATIONS

Regrouping of Detachments was effected so that each Corps would have nine Detachments available if needed. Those Detachments under operational control of Corps were engaged in securing covered accommodations for troops, organizing groups of civilians to bury dead civilians and animals, providing for movement of refugees and cattle out of devastated areas and general rehabilitation.

Because of increase in the Army frontage, the number of specialist Detachments for handling displaced persons and refugees was increased from five to ten. Five very mobile Detachments designated as Collection Detachments were organized to handle movement of civilians from forward areas to camps in the rear. In addition, five Detachments designated as Transit Camp Detachments were organized. One of each type of Detachment was placed in each Corps Zone and one of each type was retained in the Army Area.

On 31 January, Detachments were operating in the following towns:

ARLON (P-6222)	LONGWY (P-5704)
BASTOGNE (P-5558)	LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-8413)
BISSEN (P-7933)	MARTELANGE (P-5639)
BOUZONVILLE (Q-1377)	MERSCH (P-8228)
BRIEY (U-6973)	METZ (U-8757)
CAPELLEN (P-7318)	MONDORFF (P-9402)
CLERVAUX (P-7663)	NEUDORF (P-8615)
KREUZWALD (Q-2468)	NIEDALTDORF (Q-1783)
DENTING (Q-1266)	NEUFCHATEAU (P-3541)
ESCH (P-7301)	PEPPI (Q-0298)
ETAIN (U-4770)	REDANGE (P-6732)
ETTELBRUCH (P-8240)	HAGELANCE (U-7697)

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FELS (P-9132)
GISINGEN (Q-2184)
HAYANGE (U-7783)
HEFFINGEN (P-9271)
HOUFFALIZE (P-6172)
HOLDINGEN (P-7775)
JUNGLINSTER (P-9325)
LIBRAMONT (P-3148)

ST [illegible] (P-[illegible])
[illegible]
[illegible] (P-5571)
VECKRING (Q-0283)
VIRTON (P-4110)
WALFERDANGE (P-8519)
WILTZ (P-7054)

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REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

Destruction of homes in the area of the German offensive forced thousands of refugees southward, filling many towns to the point of congestion. Thus, although the shift in the Army Zone resulted in the elimination of many refugees in territory previously under the Army's control, it added many others in the new territory taken over.

The displaced persons problem decreased in intensity. As the result of a long static period, the majority of displaced persons had been evacuated and very few continued to come through the lines. The period was employed to collect small scattered groups of displaced persons who had up to this time presented a relatively small problem until the farm work ended. These groups were evacuated to the rear.

New operating instructions were prepared and issued during the month. This plan established ten Displaced Persons Teams. One team was made available to each Corps for the collection and evacuation of displaced persons and refugees in forward areas, and one to each Corps for establishment and operation of a Transit Center in the Corps Zone and for other service in the specialized field of displaced persons and refugee work. The Detachment operated camps in the Army Area and handled evacuations into the Communications Zone.

Conferences were held with Corps G-5s and Detachment Commanders of the teams involved for the purpose of orientation in the new plan.

The numbers of displaced persons in Transit Points and the numbers evacuated during January were as follows:

	Displaced Persons in Transit Points	Evacuated
7 January	1,006	1,300
14 January	2,455	0
21 January	4,[illegible]	1,076
31 January	4,600	714

The following Transit Points were available or in operation during the month:

Location	Capacity
DOMMASLE (U-[illegible])	800
BOUZONVILLE (U-[illegible]93)	2,000
[illegible] (P-[illegible])	1,500
CLAIREFONTAINE (P-65[illegible])	200
[illegible] (U-[illegible])	450
[illegible] (P-[illegible])	600
[illegible] (P-[illegible])	800
MAR[illegible] (U-[illegible])	400
PONT-A-MOUSSON (P-7635)	500
ST JACQUES (U-7783)	600

The total number of refugees and displaced persons reported as of 31 January was as follows:

	Refugees	Displaced Persons
FRANCE	1,316	27,150
GERMANY	156	[illegible]
LUXEMBOURG	434	25,456
BELGIUM	227	[illegible]
Total	2,133	60,124

SECTION V

RELIEF AND SUPPLY

The change in Army Zone boundaries resulted in the decision to move the Civil Affairs Supply Depot at ST NICOLAS (U-[illegible]) to HAYANGE (U-7783). [illegible] Civil Affairs [illegible] Company A, [illegible] Civil Affairs Regiment, responsibility for depot [illegible] all [illegible]

Close telephonic liaison with Supply sub-section of G-5, Communications Zone, made for a mutual understanding of Civil Affairs Supply problems and produced a more regular flow of supplies from the rear than had been attained at any time in the past. The quantities received necessitated the acquisition of additional storage space in FLORANGE (U-8482) near HAYANGE.

The following tabulation summarizes the movement of relief supplies during the month:

(All Figures in Net Long Tons)

	Food	Clothing	Blankets	San. Sup. & Soap	POL
On hand 1 Jan.	201.83	74.84	16.78	109.10	0.00
Received during Jan.	1026.[illegible]	7.49	41.83	85.22	668.97
Issued during Jan.	825.35	5.77	11.44	45.22	668.97
On hand 31 Jan.	995.09	76.56	47.17	149.10	0.00

In order to improve the working relationships between Detachments and Army and to inform Detachments and Staffs of the current supply situation, a supply informational letter was issued. In addition, the instructional guide for GERMANY was amended to conform with the most recent directives.

The change in the Army boundary brought within Army jurisdiction for the first time the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG and the Province of LUXEMBOURG, BELGIUM. Both of these areas brought new problems of supply and supply accounting. LUXEMBOURG's supply situation had been severely aggravated by the German counter-offensive which resulted in the temporary loss of the best food producing area of the Duchy. Substantial relief was shipped into the Duchy from imported food stocks with the help of prompt shipments made to Army by Communications Zone. In order to meet the Duchy's needs more efficiently, supply requisitioning and accounting for its entirety were centralized in Civil Affairs Detachment B1F1 at LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81). In BELGIUM, Civil Affairs stocks supplemented civilian food relief brought forward by the Office of Belgian Relief.

The Army's operations in GERMANY necessitated issues to enemy nationals for the first time. Both food and POL were issued, the latter to make possible production such as threshing and milling which would decrease the need for future imports of food.

Upon the inclusion of new areas in the Army Zone, monthly POL allocations were improved for them as had previously been arranged for FRANCE, so that drawings for civilian use could be made from Army supply points. At the end of the month, however, a change in POL distribution seemed to be imminent as plans were underway for supplying POL to the national civil authorities at BELGIUM, and FRANCE directly by Communications Zone. Apportionment and distribution for local civilian uses would then be made through existing governmental machinery. The supply of POL to LUXEMBOURG, however, was to continue as at present through Army channels.

The problem of the supply of coal became critical in both the Province of LUXEMBOURG, BELGIUM, and the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG as stocks available for industrial, transport and public utility uses ran extremely low. The combined efforts of the Civil Affairs Detachment of LUXEMBOURG and this Branch resulted in arrangements with the Solid Fuels sub-section of Supreme Headquarters for the immediate shipment of 1,[illegible] tons for use in the Duchy. The Civil Affairs Detachment at ARLON (P-62), BELGIUM, made similar arrangements with Belgian national authorities for substantial quantities to be brought into LUXEMBOURG Province.

Clearance with the Army Supply Services made available for Civil Affairs use over 1[illegible],000 gallons of low octane gasoline and approximately 8,000 tinel parts for the rehabilitation of civilian transport. A significant contribution to the combat forces of the Army was made by the Civil Affairs Section of the Xth Infantry Division in securing white snow clothes for the troops.

During the month, the American Red Cross Unit attached to the Army G-5 Section received from its own sources ninety tons of clothing for distribution to needy refugees in the Army Zone. Temporary facilities were provided by the Civil Affairs Supply Depot at HAYANGE (U-7783) for this [illegible] percent of the stock was distributed before [illegible]

The XX Corps Zone was faced with a critical situation as the month drew to a close. Inability of the civil authorities to effect adequate plans for the processing and distribution of food had created a serious need in several localities. Efforts of the XX Corps G-5 Staff and a French Liaison officer from Army G-5 Section, in addition to the shipment of forty tons of flour from the Civil Affairs Supply Depot stocks, relieved the crisis.

TRANSPORTATION

Civil Affairs Transport Pool No. 1, which had been operating in connection with Civil Affairs Supply Warehouse No. 1 at ST NICOLAS de PORT (U-9504) was discontinued early in the month. The trucks of the 112th French Provisional Truck Company were brought to HAYANGE (U-7783) where the 101st French Provisional Truck Company was located and the two companies were thereafter operated out of a single pool. All parts of the Army Zone could be effectively serviced out of HAYANGE.

During January the Pool performed a total of 112 missions involving 772 separate trips. Over 800,000 pounds of relief supplies were carried, and hauling for Detachments, transport of indigenous supplies, carrying of fuel, food and other necessities for needy communities brought the total amount of cargo hauled to 2,465,000 pounds.

Displaced persons transported totalled 9,088, refugees 6,760. However, in the majority of cases the same individuals were carried two or three times, being hauled from collection points to displaced persons centers and from centers to evacuation points. In addition, Transport Pool trucks evacuated many civilians from areas threatened by the German counter-attack. An estimated total of 3,030 persons were thus carried.

When the Army was shifted northward, the Pool trucks gave major assistance to G-5 Rear, and to the many Detachments and the French Mission Militaire Liaison Administrative teams which moved to new headquarters. The entire equipment of the Displaced Persons Center at PAGNY-BASIS (U-9804), including a large stock of food and clothing, was moved to the new location.

Several outstanding hauls were made by the Pool's French drivers. Twenty-five trucks rushed more than fifty tons of salt from DIEUZE (Q-2524) to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81) to alleviate a serious deficiency. Ten trucks, during the height of the Battle of the ARDENNES, dashed through the narrow corridor into BASTOGNE (P-55) with twenty tons of food for destitute civilians.

More than 750 Polish displaced persons were transferred from BOUVILLE (U-6493) to CHAUMONT (Z-0709) by a convoy of twenty trucks in a week of shuttling back and forth over icy roads without accident.

Bad roads, icy pavements, snow, freezing temperatures and enemy action took a heavy toll of all transportation. A large number of Civil Affairs Transport Pool trucks were immobilized for varying lengths of time but the total laid up for serious repairs never exceeded fifteen percent of total trucks. One truck struck an enemy mine and was destroyed. Two others were put out of commission by shrapnel while evacuating civilians under fire. One driver was wounded, one badly bruised.

An important feature late in the month was the re-equipping of the 101st Company with three-ton trucks. As one of the chief disadvantages of the Company's former one-ton trucks was their lack of capacity, the new and larger trucks increased the hauling efficiency of the Pool. The forty-eight one-ton trucks thus replaced were assigned to the Pool as a whole to be used as auxiliary transports.

Clearance and registration of fifteen captured enemy vehicles was obtained from the Army Ordnance Section. All of these vehicles were uncovered by Detachments and were released to them to augment their organic transportation.

The Second Section, Service Platoon had a very busy month because of low temperatures and icy roads which brought many Civil Affairs vehicles in for repairs. The Platoon handled eighty-four repair jobs. Damage to water systems by freezing, due to inability to obtain sufficient anti-freeze, contributed the major portion. The next heaviest demand was the straightening of fenders and axles and replacement of parts damaged through skidding accidents.

The Maintenance Patrol visited all Detachments, including the new ones serving in the territory of the VIII Corps. Vehicles were [illegible] and minor repairs made [illegible]

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Repairs were held up on all vehicles because of the difficulty in obtaining parts needed, but toward the end of the month badly needed radiators and motors were obtained for Transport Pool trucks. Arrangements were completed to obtain necessary parts for Civil Affairs/Military Government organic vehicles from European Civil Affairs Division Motor Pool.

Major efforts in rail transportation were devoted to arranging for and expediting coal trains into the Army Zone to relieve a bad shortage. More than 7,000 tons of coal were brought in by rail. Over 800 tons of salt were shipped out and 7,520 tons of food, fuel and miscellaneous necessities were brought into the NANCY (U-81) area before it passed out of Army control.

Arrangements were completed to permit three passenger trains to operate daily between PARIS (S-04) and NANCY (U-81). One of these was later withdrawn when the acute need of motive power caused the removal of all steam powered engines from passenger service.

Final repairs were made on the rail lines leading into METZ (U-85) and 600 people were returned to that city by rail.

Clearance was obtained for the shipment of surplus meat from VIRTON (P-4110) to ARLON (P-62) and for the extension of service from PETANGE (P-6507) to NOERTANGE (P-6928) for carrying food supplies and workers in steel mills working for the Army supply services.

Several trains were arranged to remove displaced persons from camps in the Army Zone to the Communications Zone. A total of 2,627 were transported on these special rail movements.

LABOR

Civil Affairs and Military Government Detachments played an important part in obtaining badly needed civilian labor for Army units. A large number of civilian interpreters and laborers were obtained in VIRTON (P-4110). A civilian construction crew was recruited to repair a damaged railroad bridge near IMW (Q-1981). Fifty laborers were secured in HAVADIFTIE (P-4164) for employment by the VIII Corps. Detachment D2D2 organized crews of civilian laborers to clear and repair the military route through ARLON (P-62). More than 200 laborers were obtained to clean and rehabilitate the Caserne in BASTOGNE (P-55).

A large number of workers were put on duty in all parts of the Army Zone sanding bad hills, curves and icy stretches during the month.

Few of the steel mills and other factories in Army territory were working but employees were being paid by the companies in accordance with local laws and many were being employed in rehabilitation work.

SECTION VI

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

Conditions imposed by the German offensive were reflected in governmental administration throughout the Army Zone. Before the offensive began, a gradual resumption of normal functions had been observed, but the necessities of the military situation arrested this movement. Supply and transportation difficulties were increased by Army requirements; some schools were closed as troops requisitioned billets; local supplies were diminished by seizures of the enemy and necessary requisitions by the Army; and stricter security controls were imposed throughout the Army Zone. Fear of German success was evident in some areas. Against this background governmental authority in each country maintained high morale, encouraged the people, complied with Army controls, and took active measures to give assistance. At local levels, officials remained at their posts and provided auxiliary police for security measures. At higher levels, governmental authorities suspended civilian services where necessary, enforced and gave publicity to security measures. In the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG, additional assistance was given by the publication of Grand Ducal decrees authorizing representatives of the Government to requisition property and services, empowering Juges de Paix to try civilians violating security restrictions, and making the unlawful acquisition of Allied property a crime.

In FRANCE and LUXEMBOURG military classes were called up for training.

A notable improvement in relations between the Army and civil administration was observed, as the need for military restrictions which had appeared burdensome, was demonstrated.

LEGAL

Efforts were continued to reduce civilian participation in illegal traffic in property of the UNITED STATES. In FRANCE, the Military Tribunal appointed in NANCY (U-81) to hear these cases was advised of the action taken by Army Courts Martial in punishing soldier offenders, in order to emphasize the necessity of meting corresponding sentences to equally guilty civilians. Legal officers of this sub-section attended all trials and insisted on stern penalties for those brought before the Tribunal.

In order to assist the Army in preventing the loss of supplies through civilian channels, the LUXEMBOURG Government published a decree dated 14 December 1944 which stated: "All persons who shall destroy or damage any mobile property destined or intended for the use of the LUXEMBOURG or Allied arms, or as rations for the civilian population, as well as those who shall steal, take, destroy, receive, buy, exchange, receive as stolen goods, or hide materials of war, or provisions belonging to the LUXEMBOURG or Allied Armies, will be punished by imprisonment of six months to three years or by a fine of 1,000.00 to 10,000.00 francs, or both." This enabled the enforcement agencies of the Army, and the LUXEMBOURG Government, to arrest civilians found dealing in property of the UNITED STATES.

The Government of LUXEMBOURG, at the request of the Army, published a decree, dated 8 January, empowering the Juges de Paix to try curfew, circulation and unauthorized entry into prohibited areas violations. Prompt trial of offenders resulted and penalties commensurate with the offense were given. As a result, such violations were held to a minimum and the state of law and order was the best encountered during the campaign.

Military Government courts in GERMANY tried and convicted twenty civilians charged with such offenses as violations of curfew restrictions, crossing the German-Franco border, circulation restrictions and violation of German laws involving the private slaughtering of cattle. Sentences given ranged from seven days imprisonment to six months at hard labor.

Due to sentences of confinement imposed by Military Government courts, it was necessary to establish a prison in the HEMMERSDORF (Q-1885) area. The prison, established in an old German work camp, had facilities to accommodate eighty prisoners and was under the supervision of Military Government Detachment I2A2.

The chief of this sub-section attended a meeting at VERDUN (U-26) arranged by the Legal Section, G-5, Headquarters Twelfth U.S. Army Group. Legal officers of the Third, First and Ninth U.S. Army, G-5 Sections, and of the LUXEMBOURG Mission were present. Changes and proposed changes in Military Government legislation, review procedure, and problems arising in operations were considered.

FINANCIAL

Accounting reports for the previous month were received from fifty-one Detachments operating in FRANCE, LUXEMBOURG, BELGIUM and GERMANY. These reports were reviewed at this Headquarters and forwarded with appropriate remarks to the Accounting Section of the country concerned. Seven additional French Detachments turned in their franc balances to the Sub-Accountant, G-5 Section. The Sub-Accountant, after transferring 260,000 francs to the Currency Section for FRANCE, had on hand at the end of the month 223,780.95 francs and 193,350 German marks.

Field reports containing items of financial interest were forwarded to higher headquarters.

A form was prepared and sent to all Corps, Divisions and Military Government Detachments to simplify accounting reports when no receipts or disbursements occurred during the report period. With further insistence that Detachments exhaust all other means of procurement, notably local authorities and the Army services, a further decline took place in expenditure out of Civil Affairs and Military Government funds.

Purchasing and Contracting officers were appointed on some of the larger Military Government Detachments. In a number of cases the Purchasing and Contracting officer, G-5 Section, acted on procurements for Detachments.

No BELGIUM or LUXEMBOURG funds were drawn by the G-5 Section, and Detachments requiring such funds were referred to the Currency Section for BELGIUM, LUXEMBOURG Branch.

A further supply of Laws 51, 52 and 53 were printed for distribution to Military Government Detachments. Several cases arose during the month where fines from Military Government courts were improperly turned in to Army Finance Sections. A directive was prepared indicating the correct procedure for handling such receipts.

The Financial section of the Instructional Guide was revised to conform with latest directives from higher authority.

Toward the end of the month it was announced that the conversion of marks into francs would occur in the Department of MOSELLE, east of the MOSELLE River, during the week 29 January through 5 February. Arrangements were made by the French Government to pick up any Allied Military marks which had found their way into civilian hands. Exchange offices were established in as many towns as possible consistent with the exigencies of military operations. The need for exchange facilities in displaced persons centers was brought to the attention of the French Government.

As little German territory had been occupied by the end of the month, and as this area had been almost completely evacuated by the normal civilian population, reports on financial and property control matters by Military Government Detachments were largely negative.

One banker, the vice-president of the WADGASSEN (Q-3174) Volksbank, turned over the funds of his bank to the Detachment at DIFFLIPPEN (Q-3171) for safekeeping as the bank was in danger of being destroyed by shell fire. The Detachment in turn deposited the money with the Finance officer of the 95th Infantry Division. Steps were taken to return the funds to the bank as soon as the tactical situation permitted.

In LUXEMBOURG the problem of French francs finding their way into civilian hands was no longer acute since ample exchange facilities were established for troops by Army, Corps and Division. No further opportunity was given to civilians to exchange French francs for LUXEMBOURG or BELGIUM currency since the prescribed period in the latter part of November 1944.

PUBLIC SAFETY

Military operations directed continuous attention and emphasis to the enforcement of security restrictions. Local authorities and police assisted Army personnel in the control of circulation and in the inspection of the adequacy of blackout measures. Compliance with restrictions was excellent. This cooperation was attributed to strict enforcement of restrictions by Army and civilian police personnel and to an increased appreciation of their necessity by the civilian population.

In the Grand Duchy of LUXEMBOURG, violators of circulation restrictions were delivered to the gendarmerie for trial before local courts. The Provost Marshal notified the sub-section of all arrests of civilians. The notices were sent to the nearest Detachment with the request to follow the progress and disposition of cases in the local court.

Ten thousand French, 10,000 Luxembourg and approximately [illegible],000 German laissez-passer forms were delivered to Corps, Divisions and Detachments.

Detachments were requested to survey and report as to the adequacy of passive air defense and fire fighting facilities in their areas.

The Public Safety officer attended a meeting called at PARIS (S-04) by Supreme Headquarters to discuss Public Safety problems in LUXEMBOURG. It was decided that local movement from LUXEMBOURG to adjacent countries would be controlled by regular laissez-passer procedure, but that movement into other countries for visits of extended duration would not be permitted except on visa of the representative of the country of destination. Agreement was reached for the supply of uniforms to the LUXEMBOURG gendarmerie as quickly as shipments could be made. Arrangements were made for the issuance of special passes to men reporting for duty in the LUXEMBOURG Army.

A request to renew bus service between ESCH (P-7301) and LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81) received through Detachment C2I2, was recommended and sent to Provost Marshal and G-2 Sections for action.

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At a meeting called by the [illegible] Section, G-1 Section, the [illegible] Corps and this subsection [illegible] Section in order to [illegible] sections thereto were discussed.

PUBLIC HEALTH

The Public Health items of importance during this period were the continued incidence of diphtheria and dysentery, especially in the former areas, and the arrangements for foot and mouth disease.

In the wake of the German counter-offensive in Northern [illegible] and LUXEMBOURG, there was an increase of diphtheria incidence. There were [illegible] cases reported to fifty-two for last week. The towns affected were [illegible], WILTZ (P-2944), CLERVAUX (P-2914), [illegible] (P-[illegible]), [illegible] (P-[illegible]), [illegible] (P-[illegible]

The friendly nationals (displaced persons) uncovered in such camps were the responsibility of G-5; plans had to be made in advance for their housing, feeding and eventual repatriation. With the information at hand, planning by all G-5 agencies was possible well in advance.

Similar information from many sources coordinated the plottings of the prisoner of war camps and the camps where foreign workers were held. The prisoner of war camps, expected quickly to be evacuated, were planned for use in handling masses of displaced persons; foreign workers' camps could expect a "stand fast" order until more normal conditions prevailed.

Further studies of population figures were made, revised and published in the light of current available information. Studies of specific cities to the forward of Third U.S. Army were made and issued to the Detachments affected, detailing as nearly as possible current conditions in the towns, the extent of the bomb damage, the industries still existing, the billeting facilities, the railheads, the laundries, the storage warehouses, refrigeration facilities, dump parks, etc.

Detachments in the forward zones (there were ten in GERMANY by 1 March) relayed back much information of value through daily and special reports and through word-of-mouth interviews with Intelligence Branch couriers who visited them daily. Division Civil Affairs-Military Government Staffs and Corps G-5s added to the fund, and the constant co-operation of G-2 and Counter-Intelligence Corps, Army, provided the rest.

The information was disseminated throughout the Army. As a result, the plan for the occupation of GERMANY beyond the RHINE was not the bare framework of two months previous; Detachments pin-pointed for the region beyond the RHINE had their work cut out for them and they knew what that work was.

The month saw, too, an innovation which apparently proved of worth. Through agreement with Publicity and Psychological Warfare, a stock issue of its paper DIE MITTEILUNGEN was printed in large quantities for use of Military Government Detachments entering German towns. The stock issue contained the proclamations of the Supreme Commander and the laws and ordinances which the people were expected to obey. In this way wide circulation of these all-important statements was had immediately. Other issues of the paper followed with straightaway news reports. The people, familiar with the official tenor of the first copy, knew that the forthcoming copies were American too and treated the news as gospel.

The Daily Summary and courier service of the Intelligence Branch aided materially in the saving of thousands of cattle in the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG. The AC of S, G-5, XII Corps was appealed to directly by LUXEMBOURG farm interests to help them rather fodder to save the starving cattle. The AC of S, G-5, XII Corps called upon his Detachments informally to go all out in the effort to round up suitable fodder and asked the Daily Summary and the couriers to spread the word. The campaign became almost a contest; more than 1,000,000 pounds of fodder was brought in. Detachment I5A2, JUNGLINSTER (P-9325), easily won the honors with 579,000 pounds. But thousands of cattle were tided over until the snow melted from the pastures.

COMMUNICATIONS

Intracity mail was authorized in LUXEMBOURG (P-81), ESCH (P-7301) and PETANGE (P-6407).

Two circuits between METZ (U-85) and NANCY (U-81) in the Postes, Telegraphes et Telephones long distance cable were released to the Societe Nationale Chemin de Fer. These were used to coordinate railroad operations.

Circuits for control of electric power were arranged from BRIEY (U-67) to PONTOY (U-7588) and SAULNES (P-6105).

UTILITIES

Land mines were cleared from the high tension electric power line between UCKANGE (U-8679) and CARLING (Q-2463). Repair of the 65,000 volt line was well under way at the end of the month.

Electricity was restored at RUMELANGE (U-7798), HOMBOURG (U-9879), KEDANGE (U-9889), ELZANGE (U-9485), BUDING (U-9782), METZERWISSE (U-9480), VOLSTROFF (U-9280), MONNERE (Q-0681), MENANGE (U-9179), DISTROFF (U-9382), RILANG (Q-0080), KEMPLICH (Q-0282), TEXTING (Q-0182), DALSTEIN (Q-0379), BOUZONVILLE (Q-1377), GROSRAUS (P-7337), WAHL (P-6839), MERSCH (P-4532), PRETANGE (P-4632), LIBRAMONT (P-3143) and all but two communes of KEDANGE Canton, LUXEMBOURG.

Power supply to the southern half of the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG was greatly improved through renewal of operation of the SAULNES (P-6105) power plant.

Water systems which had been damaged were repaired at WILTZ (P-75), SIERCK (U-9[illegible]) and RUMELANGE (U-7798).

SECTION IV

PLANS AND OPERATIONS

As the front lines of VIII and XII Corps moved into GERMANY, the following Military Government Detachments were attached to this Headquarters and placed in readiness to go into their pinpointed towns:

I8G2 PRUM (L-0679)	I13G2 MAYEN (L-6393)
I15G2 AHRWEILER (F-5516)	I16G2 ZELL-MOSEL (L-6058)

Four Detachments and Headquarters, Company A, 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment were in turn transferred to the Sixth Army Group since their pinpointed locations lay in the projected zone of that Army Group.

Upon receipt of notice that eight Civil Affairs Detachments would return to European Civil Affairs Division on 17 February, an additional company of Detachments was requested. Company A, 3d European Civil Affairs Regiment was attached to this Headquarters and ten of the thirteen Detachments were immediately deployed, the remaining three being placed in the Army Reserve.

On the 22d of the month, Headquarters Company G, 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment was placed in the Zone of VIII Corps and arrangements were made for one company headquarters to service the Detachments in each Corps and to furnish courier service in addition.

On 28 February, Detachments were operating in the following towns:

GERMANY

ARZFELD (P-9566)	LEIDENBORN (P-9271)
BLEIALF (P-9783)	NEUERBURG (P-9758)
EPT (Q-0798)	NIEDALTDORF (Q-1783)
GISINGEN (Q-2182)	CUTSCHEID (L-0156)
PERL (Q-0298)	

FRANCE

BOULAY (Q-0965)	LONGWY (P-5704)
BOUZONVILLE (Q-1377)	METZ (U-8757)
BRIEY (U-6973)	SIERCK (Q-0094)
HAYANGE (U-7783)	THIONVILLE (U-8687)

LUXEMBOURG

BETZDORF (L-0022)	JUNGLINSTER (P-9325)
CLERVAUX (P-7663)	LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-8413)
DIEKIRCH (P-8742)	MERSCH (P-8228)
ECHTERNACH (L-0535)	REMICH (Q-0106)
ESCH (P-7301)	RUMELANGE (U-7697)
ETTELBRUCK (P-8240)	TROIS VIERGES (P-7571)
FELS (P-9132)	VIANDEN (P-9049)
GREVENMACHER (L-0721)	WALFERDANGE (P-8418)
HEISDORF (P-8420)	WILTZ (P-7053)

BELGIUM

ARLON (P-6222)	NEUFCHATEAU (P-3541)
BASTOGNE (P-5558)	ST HUBERT (P-3061)
HOUFFALIZE (P-6172)	ST VITH (P-8584)
LAROCHE (P-4677)	SCHONBERG (P-9588)
MARTELANGE (P-5639)	TAVIGNY (P-6570)
VIRTON (P-4110)	

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

The month was spent largely in preparation for a possible influx of displaced persons and refugees which would come with a military advance. Late in the month as the Army began a steady push forward, the number of displaced persons and refugees needing care and control showed a sharp rise.

The previously agreed upon plan was put into effect under which in each Corps Zone a Collecting Team operated in Division areas, a Transit Point operating team to the rear, and in the Army Service Area a team for operation of all camps in that area. This involved movement of personnel, both United States and attached, to their assigned stations. The number of Corps in the Army Zone was reduced during the month from four to three, necessitating some realignment in team operation.

Four new camps were set up and began operation. One camp was closed. Two additional camps were being made ready at the close of the month. A determined effort was made to locate and reserve new camp sites and this resulted in the reservation of two sites with a third in process.

The numbers of displaced persons in Transit Points and the numbers evacuated during February were as follows:

	Displaced Persons in Transit Points	Evacuated
7 February	1,068	530
14 February	927	52
21 February	354	508
28 February	593	275

The following Transit Points were available or in operation during the month:

Location		Capacity
BOULAY (Q-0965)		100
DENTING (Q-1267)		1,500
METZ (U-8757)		500
LUDELANGE (U-7391)		800
MARSPICH (U-7783)		500
VAL-de-FOIX (P-2560)		500
GUIRSCH (P-6426)		500
CLAIREFONTAINE (P-6520)		200
HOLLENFELS (P-7925)		350
ST SOPHIE (P-8413)		400
PERL (Q-0298)		350
ANDENBOURG (P-7824)	Reserved	-
ARNEVILLE (U-8474)	Reserved	-

The total number of refugees and displaced persons reported as of 28 February was as follows:

	Refugees	Displaced Persons
FRANCE	14,061	872
GERMANY	11,534	407
LUXEMBOURG	29,913	476
BELGIUM	7,564	76
TOTAL	63,072	1,831

SECTION V

RELIEF AND SUPPLY

The supply of the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG was a major activity during the month. Whereas both FRANCE and BELGIUM were already beginning to put into operation their own machinery for the distribution of civilian supplies through normal civilian channels, LUXEMBOURG was still largely dependent upon the military for imports. This situation was the result of the fact that FRANCE and BELGIUM were able to resume normal importing through their ports while LUXEMBOURG'S flow of supplies depended upon overland transportation still largely under military control.

In order to simplify the handling of LUXEMBOURG'S supplies, efforts were made to arrange for shipments from Communications Zone to come directly to the Duchy's receiving points. This involved making a distinction between the Duchy's requirements and those of the rest of the Army Zone. Such a procedure would speed shipments to the Duchy, remove a burden of receiving, culling and redistributing from the Civil Affairs Supply Depot and lay the groundwork for a smooth flow of supplies from the rear to the Duchy that might continue without interruption when this area had passed out of Third U.S. Army control.

The procedure for handling of Civil Affairs supplies for FRANCE and BELGIUM was placed on a new basis when the national authorities of those countries were made completely responsible for the receipt and distribution of all Civil Affairs supplies, including those required for the use of refugees and displaced persons. These supplies were to be turned over to the civil authorities at portside, thus relieving this Army of any part of their handling.

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DECLASSIFIED

The prospect of early operations in GERMANY and increased estimates of the numbers of displaced persons likely to be encountered there resulted in the decision to increase the reserve of foodstuffs at the Civil Affairs Supply Depot stockpiled for such emergency. The goal was now a reserve stock of 2,000 tons of Class I supplies. To this end, requisitions already submitted to Communications Zone were being revised at the close of the month.

In the meantime, those Detachments operating on German soil were meeting all their needs for feeding the German population out of local resources and captured stocks. Only soap and sanitary supplies were provided out of imported stocks to help prevent disease.

During the month, the American Red Cross representative at Army received a total of 100 tons of clothing for distribution to needy civilians. Of this, eighty-five tons had been put into distribution channels at the end of March. Accordingly, requests for clothing out of Civil Affairs stocks were held to a very low level.

Detachments in the field continued to play a vital part in the flow of essential supplies into their areas. The transportation of 550 tons of coal by rail into METZ (U-85) for civilian use and the movement of 1,000,000 pounds of fodder from forward areas to feed evacuated cattle were two outstanding examples of such activity.

The administrative structure and personnel of the Civil Affairs Supply Depot was modified by the detailing of a Military Government Detachment to operate at the warehouse under the supervision of the Commanding Officer. One officer of this Detachment was ordered to work with the Second Section, Service Platoon which was given complete responsibility for the dispatch of trucks from the Civil Affairs Transport Pool in addition to its previous duties.

The following tabulation shows the movement of supplies at the Civil Affairs Supply Depot during the month:

(All figures in net long tons)

	Food	Clothing	Blankets	Soap & Sanitary Supplies	POL
On hand 1 Feb.	995.09	76.56	46.20	149.10	.00
Rec'd during Feb.	2,262.40	22.81	.00	101.90	191.90
Issued during Feb.	1,829.20	11.00	7.00	123.35	191.90
On hand 28 Feb.	1,428.29	88.37	39.20	127.65	.00

Of the above quantities 1,275 tons of food and ninety-two tons of soap were supplied to the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG. Medical supplies going to the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG consisted of thirty-six vials of tetanus anti-toxin, sixty vials of triple typhoid vaccine, 2,500,000 units of diphtheria anti-toxin and one forty-bed hospital unit.

TRANSPORTATION

The Civil Affairs Transport Pool was again increased in size during the month by the addition of another fifty three-ton trucks brought in from Communications Zone. These trucks were acquired without additional personnel. However, the disposition of a large number of one-ton trucks promised to make sufficient personnel available.

In an effort to alleviate the shortage of civilian transportation in the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG, it was decided to turn over permanently to those authorities a total of thirty-five of the Civil Affairs Transport Pool one-ton trucks and trailers. Before the transfer was consummated, however, all of these trucks were inspected and repaired to put them in the best possible condition. At the end of the period fourteen trucks had been transferred in this transaction. The entire deal was accounted for on a quantitative receipt basis.

Another reduction in the number of one-ton trucks retained at the Civil Affairs Transport Pool was the result of a decision to establish sub-pools of ten trucks with each of the Corps. This was expected to effect substantial savings in time and fuel by keeping a number of trucks close to the usual area of their operations. With the same economy in mind, eleven were assigned on the basis of one per Mission Militaire Liaison Administrative team.

A thorough inspection of the one-ton trucks revealed that at least ten of them were in such poor condition as to make it advisable to cannibalize them and salvage their usable parts for the repair of the others. During the repair period, the three-ton trucks bore the brunt of the operations insofar as dispatches emanating from the Civil Affairs Transport Pool were concerned. It also corrected the excess of trucks over driving personnel which had resulted from the receipt of 100 trucks without drivers during the previous two months. The one-ton trucks transferred to the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG, and those sent to the Mission Militaire Liaison Administrative teams were [illegible]

Trucks assigned to Corps were assigned drivers on the basis of one per vehicle, plus one officer per Corps. The vehicles assigned to Corps and Detachments with Mission Militaire Administrative teams were issued on memorandum receipts as opposed to the permanent transfer of vehicles made to the LUXEMBOURG Government.

The administration of the Civil Affairs Transport Pool also was modified. One of the officers of the Detachment newly assigned to the Civil Affairs Supply Depot was detailed to assist in the administration of the Transport Pool. Furthermore, the truck dispatching responsibility was removed from the Supply Depot and made part of the activities of the Service Platoon so as to have it organically a part of the Transport Pool operation.

The month's operations of the Civil Affairs Transport Pool included making a total of 782 truck dispatches, hauling a total of 900 tons of supplies, 3,259 displaced persons and 2,160 refugees. In their maintenance functions the Service Platoon performed a total of 217 separate jobs.

The re-establishment and expansion of rail and bus transportation throughout the Army Zone continued with the assistance of this subsection and that of the Detachments in the field. Detachments arranged for many large rail movements among which were a cattle movement from ETAIN (U-47) to LOMMEY (P-4704), and a 500 ton coal movement from MERLEBACH (O-3361) to THIONVILLE (U-88). The tracks from ETTELBRUCK (P-83) to DIEKIRCH (P-84) were cleared for Army operations.

The rehabilitation of bus service was advanced with the authorization for a line from BETTEMBOURG (P-7934) to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81) and the opening of a few lines from VIRTON (P-41) to its environs.

SECTION VI

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

The reliberation of sections of LUXEMBOURG and BELGIUM, which were run over by the German offensive, necessitated the reestablishment of local government. Officials resumed their posts quickly and measures in support of military operations were taken.

In LUXEMBOURG, local forces in the forward areas were augmented by officials of the government who had been given emergency powers of procurement and summary court jurisdiction. Maintenance and repairs of military roads were facilitated by the coordination of military and civilian repair units, and other necessary civilian labor was made available as required. Local police cooperated in security measures and in salvaging military equipment.

LEGAL

There were few material changes in the legal situation in LUXEMBOURG. The courts were functioning regularly and were gradually disposing of a backlog of cases.

Trials for offenses involving illegal traffic in supplies such as gasoline, clothing, rations, cigarettes and similar items decreased during this period, but there was an increase in violations of circulation and curfew restrictions. The latter were brought to the attention of the LUXEMBOURG Government which cooperated by severely punishing offenders in the courts.

There was placed in operation on suggestion of Civil Affairs a procedure whereby a Juge de Paix Circuit operated, providing a means by which the presence of a Juge de Paix could be requested for trials in outlying communities.

The occupation of more populated places in GERMANY brought many more enemy civilians under the jurisdiction of Military Government Courts. Divisions and Corps appointed Military Government Courts for the trial of offenses against the laws of Military Government.

Eight courts were appointed during the period for the trial of offenders. A total of thirty cases were tried resulting in punishments ranging from small fines to five years imprisonment for such offenses as violation of travel restrictions, larceny of property of American forces, failure to report presence of German soldiers and transportation of mail over the frontier.

There were eight [illegible] Courts. [illegible] view of cases tried by [illegible]

FINANCIAL

January cash accounting reports of forty-one Civil Affairs and Military Government Detachments were received and forwarded to appropriate country accounting sections. Receipts and expenditures were negligible as most Detachments were able to meet their needs through regular Army channels or by making demands on local authorities in accordance with arrived upon procedures. Two additional Detachments turned in French franc balances to the Sub-Accountant, G-5 Section, who ended the month with balances of 355,364.55 francs (French) and 186,700 marks (German).

The conversion of marks into francs in the Department of MOSELLE (FRANCE) was completed during the month. Final totals were not available because banks in outlying districts were hampered by lack of communications and transportation. Up to 15 February, one billion francs had been exchanged. Regardless of the amount of marks turned in to exchange offices, individuals received only 500 marks worth of francs (one mark equalling fifteen francs) with some concession being made for dependents. The remaining marks were kept in deposit accounts for exchange at a later date, permitting an investigation as to whether the marks were obtained legally or through black market channels. Financial officials expressed the opinion that some persons were withholding marks in their possession, but that on the whole the exchange had been satisfactory with the majority of people cooperating with the government program.

A copy of Verzeichnis fur die Finansamter des deutschen Reiches, 1 January 1942, corrected through August 1944, was located in the city of LUXEMBOURG (P-81) and forwarded to Twelfth Army Group which had requested such a copy as soon as located. A report on black market activities in the city of METZ (U-85) along with miscellaneous Detachment field reports concerning fiscal matters was likewise passed on to higher authority.

No serious financial problems developed in liberated countries where the national governments involved capably handled the reopening of institutions in cities reoccupied by the Germans in the December-January counter-attack.

In the Cantons of LUXEMBOURG and CAPELLEN all commercial banks showed a steady increase in deposits over withdrawals.

As of 20 February 1945, LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81) had on hand and on deposit 13,637,226 francs to meet current obligations. Monthly estimated expenditures for wages, pensions and relief amounted to 2,200,000 francs. Taxes and other revenues were still slow in being collected, but in general the financial position of the city improved.

Property control serial numbers were assigned to fifteen Military Government officers responsible for property control functions. At the end of the month no reports had been received of properties taken into control.

Information on three properties belonging to nationals of LUXEMBOURG located in the area northwest of TRIER (L-22) was forwarded to Twelfth Army Group.

Though a number of additional Military Government Detachments became operational in German territory toward the close of the month, indications were that areas occupied were almost completely evacuated and no reports were received of financial activities of any sort.

A requisition for laws, orders, forms and letters of instruction was submitted during the month to Twelfth Army Group covering ninety-day requirements of Detachments under control of this Headquarters.

PUBLIC SAFETY

The thorough enforcement of security restrictions and effective publicity of their provisions resulted in uniform observance throughout the area. There was some difficulty in stemming the flow of refugees attempting to return to their homes in the northern section, however, the new circuit system of Juges de Paix was expected to improve the situation as violators were to be given a speedy trial.

During February local police [illegible]

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A civilian bomb disposal squad formed at LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81) was made available for use throughout the area. A similar group comprising sixty Belgian engineers was organized in the Province of LUXEMBOURG, BELGIUM, for the same purpose and did effective work; four of their number were killed and two injured during operations. More men were available for this group if additional equipment could be procured. This was being done on a priority basis.

Forty German rifles and ammunition were issued to Detachments for use of the Gendarmerie, these being used mostly in guarding prisons in the Grand Duchy of LUXEMBOURG.

An inspection was made of the prison in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81), and it was found to be overcrowded. On 9 February there were 791 male and 800 female inmates, of which number 1,312 were held as political prisoners. The screening of prisoners with dispatch would relieve recurrence of this situation.

PUBLIC HEALTH

Items of importance during this period were the continued increased incidence of diphtheria, the complete lack of civilian medical facilities in some sections of forward areas in enemy occupied territory, and the health problems inherent in the presence of large numbers of dead animals.

There was a continued increased incidence of diphtheria in the area of the VIII Corps Zone occupied formerly by the enemy. Belgian and Luxembourg Red Cross personnel were active in locating cases, administering anti-toxin and immunizing children. Twelve hundred children in the BASTOGNE (P-55) area, which included thirty towns, were immunized against diphtheria. One hundred twenty-three cases and four deaths occurred in the Third U.S. Army Zone, mostly in the VIII Corps Zone. Sufficient anti-toxin was available and was freely used by civilian physicians and Army Medical Corps officers in the control of the disease. Reports during the latter part of the month indicated that the incidence was declining and the situation under control.

In the same area, dysentery continued to be prevalent, but with diminished incidence. The epidemic reported in January in the refugee center at ARLON (P-62) abated abruptly following improvement of sanitary conditions.

A survey of the endemic area of foot and mouth disease was made in CLERVAUX Canton of LUXEMBOURG. Seventeen villages were visited and 248 or eleven percent of 2,270 cattle were found to be infected. The infected cattle were concentrated in five small villages. Burgermeisters were directed to restrict movement of cattle until they had been examined and found free from disease. Three civilian veterinarians were also assigned to this area to effect proper control of the disease.

In BETTEMBOURG (P-8103), LUXEMBOURG, forty animals out of one hundred were found to be infected with foot and mouth disease as a result of contamination with an infected truck brought down from the northern endemic area. The healthy animals were immunized with convalescent serum procured from ETTELBRUCK (P-84) with apparently good results. The infected animals were quarantined and the farm disinfected.

Following arrangements made between the LUXEMBOURG and SWITZERLAND Governments, 100 liters of foot and mouth vaccine were procured. About 2,000 animals were immunized in the vicinity of infected areas.

Typhus fever was again erroneously reported at WOLFSHALZE (P-6172) and SIEBENALLER (P-7758). Approximately 3,600 displaced persons and refugees and about 2,000 civilians were deloused with DDT powder.

Requisitions for medical supplies from displaced persons camps and from civilian institutions were adequately met. Basic Medical Units located in large governmental areas met most of the demands from civilian agencies. Detachments were notified of the availability of Basic Medical Units in BRUSSELS (J-65) for civilian health authorities in BELGIUM.

The greatest problems in liberated areas lay in Northern LUXEMBOURG and contiguous Belgian territory. The Belgian and Luxembourg Red Cross were actively engaged in these areas, utilizing teams made up of doctors, nurses and ambulances. Civil Affairs/Military Government officers were acutely aware of medical situations in their jurisdictions and facilitated the procurement of medical supplies and, in many instances, transportation for the doctors in the care of the civilian sick and wounded. Medical teams were located at ST VITH (P-9688), CLERVAUX (P-76) and WILTZ (P-75). Civilian doctors were stationed in towns where most needed.

In occupied territory in the VIII Corps Zone there was a complete civilian medical vacuum. There were no doctors, no hospitals and no medical supplies. All medical aid to German civilians was given unstintingly by Medical Corps officers. The only other medical attention was given by two or three nuns with nursing experience at AUW (L-0190) and a nurse at SCHWEILER (P-9584). Drug, dressing and instrument kits were located with Military Government officers for the use of these nurses. In the meantime, in order to relieve the burden of care of civilian sick and wounded from the Medical Corps officers, two German doctors were procured, one who had been wounded and found at ST VITH (P-88) and the other borrowed through First U.S. Army from AACHEN (K-84). These doctors, with the assistance of a Public Health officer from this Headquarters, were located in AUW (L-0190) and BLEIALF (P-9783), and a hospital was improvised. Arrangements were made also for the reception of German wounded nationals to be accepted in hospitals at AACHEN.

In occupied territory in the XX Corps Zone medical facilities had not been depleted as in the VIII Corps Zone. In fact, they were considered adequate for immediate needs. A hospital at SAARBRUTTEN (O-28), one at WALLERFANGEN (O-2681), a hospice at NIEDALTDORF (O-1783), and doctors scattered in this locality met the medical needs for the care of German sick and wounded.

In BELGIUM, hospital facilities were adequate, although considerably hard pressed. Auxiliary hospitals had been set up at ARLON (P-62), BERTRIX (P-2242), and LIBRAMONT (P-3149). All sick and wounded in BELGIUM north of LUXEMBOURG were transported to MARLOUY (P-70) where space in the hospital was made available by further evacuation of those present to the hospital at VERVIERS (K-6723). In LUXEMBOURG, hospitalization of wounded civilians was a difficult problem. Due to the influx of wounded civilians from occupied territory, hospitals in LUXEMBOURG were being continually over-crowded. Difficulties were also encountered due to the absence of civilian ambulances, the burden of this service being directly placed on the facilities of the Army.

The battle of the ARDENNES brought death to many cattle in the forward areas. Cattle that could not be evacuated were left to the mercy of artillery, wanton slaughter, mines, booby-traps and starvation. With the melting of the snow, the burial of dead animals became extremely important due to possible contamination of the water supplies. The problem presented a great many difficulties due to lack of civilian labor, difficulty in procuring bull-dozers because of urgent need elsewhere, congestion on the roads, muddy terrain, location of animals within enemy fire, and the advanced state of putrefaction of the animals. With the assistance of prisoners of war and trained burial crews, and the efforts of Civil Affairs/Military Government Detachments, considerable progress had been made in their burial. There were about 3,000 dead animals in the VIII Corps Zone and about 1,500 in the XII Corps Zone. It was estimated that about ninety percent of the animals were buried.

CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

SECTION I

GENERAL

Following close on the heels of the ever-advancing Third U.S. Army, Military Government Detachments crossed the RHINE en masse during the month. At the beginning of the month, but nine Detachments had reached GERMANY; at its end forty-five of the forty-seven Detachments assigned to Third U.S. Army were established in enemy territory, twenty-three of them in their pin-pointed positions. The whole picture had changed. Civil Affairs had become Military Government.

Devastated GERMANY, rocked by air raids, beaten by bombardment, civilians evacuated, without water, electricity, gas, was a far different problem than FRANCE or BELGIUM or LUXEMBOURG. The Military Government Detachment moving into the Rhineland found no government ready-made and waiting its arrival. It was hard to find anyone who knew anything about government. A number of the burgermeisters who remained behind were discovered, upon screening, to have been ardent Nazis. They were immediately removed. Military Government found its most cooperative officials by studying old civil lists dating back to 1927-1933. XII Corps, uncovering such lists, found old burgermeisters willing to serve who had been removed from office in 1933 by the Nazis. Close cooperation between Counter-Intelligence Corps and Military Government prevented the appointment of officials outwardly compliant but inwardly hostile.

Following its directives, Military Government looked first to those things in GERMANY which would be of help to the Army. Burgermeisters were instructed to clean up the streets and highways. Water, light, telephone and gas systems were repaired with German labor, as rapidly as possible.

Every German over twelve years of age was registered by Military Government Detachments and the names were checked against the black and white lists provided by Counter-Intelligence Corps.

German food fed thousands of displaced persons, French, Dutch, Belgian, Luxembourgers, Serbs, Russians, and Poles who had for four years done the German's work. Some 83,000 of them were in Military Government centers at the end of the month. 18,000 French prisoners of war and forced laborers had been returned to their homes through the repatriation center at LONGUYON (U-4596) FRANCE.

The first of these repatriation trips came on 12 March when fifteen Military Government trucks, decked with French and American flags, carried the first 750 French prisoners of war out of GERMANY and back to FRANCE. The prisoners themselves had written in chalk on the bodies of the trucks and on the windshields "Vive le Troisieme Armee!" "Vive le general Patton!" They were singing their own version of "The Star Spangled Banner" as they passed through LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81). After four years of imprisonment, they were going home.

Plunging finally into the heart of GERMANY, G-5 left behind it the satisfaction of knowing that LUXEMBOURG, the friendly little Duchy where Third U.S. Army stayed nearly three months, was finally on the way to food sufficiency. By arrangement with Communications Zone authorities, food came direct from the ports to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81)--and in March there were 6,500 tons of it, enough to set the ration at a satisfactory level for the first time.

But GERMANY was a difficult problem. GERMANY had to be ruled. The people, always subservient to authority, had to be told what to do, when and how to do it. The posting of our laws and ordinances told them how Military Government was going to operate, and the summary courts set up by Military Government gave them a quick and decisive answer to the question, "How tough are the Americans?"

The first sentences handed down by the Military Government Summary Courts were sufficiently severe to convince the Germans that they were not dealing with the 1918 Americans. In KOBLENZ (L-99), for instance, where Germans had known the American in 1918, the citizens were certain that the Americans had not changed since the last occupation. They read the proclamations with a grain of salt. But they discovered, before very long, that the proclamations meant what they said.

The month marked the first outbreak of typhus in Third U.S. Army area. Thirty-four cases were reported in the zone of operations and quick action by G-5 medical men isolated the cases in civilian hospitals, dusted the "contacts" and posted the towns "off limits" to troops.

Vast quantities of food and supplies fell to the Military Government Detachments as they advanced into GERMANY. This was as it should be for directives call for the feeding of Germans with German food. No imported food was called forward for feeding Germans. Displaced persons were fed principally with German food, provided by the German authorities.

SECTION II

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

Military Government staff sections were formed for the 65th and 69th Infantry Divisions, newly assigned to this command during the month. Authorization to secure enlisted personnel from within the divisions was received from Twelfth Army Group because of the acute shortage of trained personnel in European Civil Affairs Division.

Numerous publications were dispatched to all Military Government Detachments, including Instructional Guides covering all phases of Military Government operations in GERMANY.

An increased allotment of 647 officers for Military Government activities in conquered territory was received for the theater. Army Commanders were requested to assist in the furnishing of these officers. In view of the urgency for obtaining qualified Military Government personnel, all units under this command were requested to forward recommendations to this Headquarters for processing.

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Three Military Government personnel appeared on casualty reports as wounded in action.

Four Purple Heart [illegible], [illegible] Bronze Star Medals and [illegible] French Croix de Guerre Medal [illegible] were awarded to Military Government personnel of staffs and Detachments.

SECTION III

INTELLIGENCE

The G-5 Intelligence Branch estimate of things to come proved accurate as the Army moved out of friendly LUXEMBOURG and into a docile but hostile GERMANY. Displaced persons appeared in the expected numbers. Camps to house them were readily discovered, having been mapped previously by the Intelligence Branch. The German people behaved as expected. They readily obeyed the proclamations and ordinances posted in their towns. Only among the younger, Nazi-indoctrinated youth, was there defiance of the Allied rule.

To guide Military Government teams who were thrown into GERMANY without previous operational experience, the Intelligence Branch began on 6 March the publication of Information Bulletins which were distributed to the Detachments. These bulletins contained the latest intelligence relating to Army's Zone and the area ahead of Army. They contained, too, instructions from G-5 Army on the handling of unusual situations which were forever developing. The initial reports of Detachments entering newly uncovered cities were also reported for the guidance of other Detachments.

As more and more of GERMANY was uncovered, the Intelligence Branch went into the newspaper business with a vengeance. Charged with the distribution of Psychological Warfare's weekly DIE MITTEILUNGEN, the Branch found, as of 31 March, it had attained a circulation of 100,000 copies in the Army Zone. Detachments, divisions and corps discovered that the publication was highly popular with the people and increased their orders from week to week.

COMMUNICATIONS

A survey of the Reichspost telephone installations in the Third U.S. Army area west of the RHINE revealed that the following switchboards were intact: PERMASENS? (L-4317) 250 line dial board, four position, toll board; WADERN (L-3806) 250 line dial board, three position, toll board; ST WENDEL (Q-5996), KUSEL (L-7606), KIRCHHEIM-BOLANDEN (M-1919), ALZEY (M-2727), and BAD KREUZNACH (M-0938).

In TRIER (L-22), the local telephone equipment had been removed, but the toll switchboard located in a bunker, was intact.

The normal telephone equipment in NEUNKIRCHEN (Q-5982) had been bombed, but an emergency 200 line switchboard in the basement of the Finance Building suffered only about ten percent damage.

The local dial apparatus at KOBLENZ (L-99) was severely damaged, but the toll board located in the basement of the building was unharmed.

PUBLIC WORKS

A high tension power line with 10,000 kilowatt capacity was completed from FAILLY (U-9264) to AMANVILLERS (U-7665) FRANCE. This was used to supply electric power to METZ (U-85) and to furnish additional power to the industrial section of FRANCE near the LUXEMBOURG border.

Restoration of electric power to FALCK (Q-1970) FRANCE made possible the continuous operation of the water supply system.

A hydro-electric plant in excellent condition was found in SAARBURG (L-1413) GERMANY. With minor repairs, the equipment was capable of supplying power for the entire city.

With the aid of a civilian bomb disposal unit, mines were removed from an area at REMICH (L-0106) LUXEMBOURG, thus enabling repairs of the power line to be made.

A 2,000 kilowatt thermal station at TRIER (L-2[illegible]) together with cables necessary to operate the water [illegible] power for two army hospitals.

Electricity was supplied to hospitals and military installations in ANDERNACH (F-7606) on a part time basis from a 350 kilowatt thermal generator located in a manufacturing plant.

A hydro-electric plant in RAUSCHER MUHLE (L-7699) GERMANY in good condition supplied power to that town, together with PLAIDT (L-7599), MAYEN (L-7898), MIESENHEIM (F-7700), KRUFT (L-7298) and OBER-MENDIG (L-6798).

A 10,000 volt power line from NIEDERHAUSEN (M-0833) to BAD KREUZNACH (M-0938) was repaired. This supplied one-third of the latter city with electricity.

SECTION IV

PLANS AND OPERATIONS

The month of March marked the changeover from Civil Affairs to Military Government. Military Government Detachments were inspected and found to be in readiness for Military Government duties in GERMANY. Likewise, Civil Affairs Detachments engaged in displaced persons work, too busy to return to European Civil Affairs Division for orientation and refitting for Military Government, were refitted and redesignated in the field without interruption to their duties.

The beginning of the month found only two Military Government Detachments in their pinpointed destinations in GERMANY, but by the end of the month, the number had increased to twenty-three. The situation was moving so rapidly that plans were made to procure personnel and equipment from Army troops to form emergency Military Government Detachments in the event of enemy collapse.

Four provisional Detachments of two officers and three enlisted men were activated from personnel of Detachment E1G2. These Detachments were attached to Military Government Detachments I7G2 and I8G2 for the purpose of speeding registration of civilians in the area.

To simplify the administration and command channels employed in the control of Military Government Detachments, Company G, 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment, was designated as the administrative agency with the Army and all Military Government units in the Army were attached to the company for administration.

On the 27th of the month, the 558th Field Artillery Battalion was attached to the Provost Marshal Section to enforce Military Government and guard Military Government installations in the Army Service Area. Headquarters and Service Batteries were stationed in TRIER (L-22), Battery A at LEBACH (Q-4990), Battery B at BAUMHOLDER (L-7113) and Battery C at WITTLICH (L-3954).

At the end of the month, Civil Affairs/Military Government Detachments were deployed in the following towns:

ALZEY (M-2727)	MOTSCH (L-1552)
ARLON (P-6222)	MUNSTERMAIFELD (L-7483)
BAD KREUZNACH (M-0938)	OBERSTEIN (L-7123)
BAUMHOLDER (L-7113)	OBERWESEL (L-9967)
BERNKASTEL (L-5246)	OFFENBACH (M-7368)
BITBURG (L-1353)	OPPENHEIM (M-4539)
BOUZONVILLE? / BOULARD (L-8981)	RHEINBOLLEN (L-9557)
BRAUBACH (L-9486)	ROSSDORF (M-7340)
COCHEM (L-5972)	SAARBURG (L-1413)
DROMERSHEIM (M-1647)	SAARBRUCKEN (Q-4570)
ESCH (P-7301)	SAARLAUTERN (Q-2879)
GEROLSTEIN (L-2381)	SIMMERN (L-5454)
GONSENHEIM (M-3356)	STEINHEIM (M-8468)
GROSS GERAU (M-5447)	STROMBERG (M-0349)
HAYANGE (U-2783)	ST GOAR (L-9873)
KOBLENZ (L-9095)	ST WENDEL (Q-5996)
KUSEL (L-7605)	THIONVILLE (U-8687)
LANDSTUHL? (L-8872)	TREIS (L-6975)
LEBACH (Q-4990)	TRIER (L-2129)
LONGWY (P-5704)	UNDENHEIM (M-3539)
LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-8413)	WALLDORF (M-6056)
MAINZ (M-3858)	WEITERSHOF? (M-2114)
MERZIG (Q-2094)	WIESBADEN (M-3564)
WINNINGEN (L-8591)	

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

Rapid military advance into GERMANY made during the month uncovered large numbers of displaced persons--principally Russians, Poles, and French. At the close of the period, approximately 53,000 displaced persons were in collection and transit points in Army Zone. The care and control of this large number of displaced persons placed a severe strain on existing personnel and transportation facilities.

During the latter half of March, eleven trainloads of French Displaced Persons were shipped from TRIER (L-22) to a French processing center at LONGUYON (U-4596) FRANCE. Each trainload carried about 1,000 individuals.

An important change which occurred was the stoppage of all movements of Eastern European Displaced Persons from GERMANY into the interior of FRANCE. Western European Displaced Persons continued to be moved to FRANCE and other Allied liberated countries.

At the end of the month, the following Transit Points were in operation:

	Displaced Persons In Transit Points
KASTELLAUN (L-7964)	144
TRIER (L-2129)	7,200
BITBURG (L-1353)	1,000
SAARBRUCKEN (Q-4570)	6,500
MUNSHEIM? (M-7622)	1,200
WITTLICH (L-3954)	3,722
MOTSCH (L-1552)	1,838
THOLEY (L-4940)	500
BAUMHOLDER (L-7113)	7,963
LEBACH (Q-4990)	5,686
ST WENDEL (Q-5996)	4,000
GROSS GERAU (M-5447)	1,700
RHEINBOLLEN (L-9557)	100
GEROLSTEIN (L-2381)	327
KIRCHBERG (L-7649)	1,667
NEUNKIRCHEN (Q-5982)	10,000
	53,547

SECTION V

RELIEF AND SUPPLY

In order to facilitate the flow of imported supplies into the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG, arrangements were completed for direct shipments of such supplies from Communications Zone into the Duchy. The quantities brought into LUXEMBOURG reached a new monthly high, totaling 6,360 tons of food and 72,000 gallons of POL. Through G-5 efforts, it was therefore possible to provide for the first time an adequate civilian food supply. In addition to these, approximately 1,000 rifles were secured for the Duchy Gendarmerie and substantial quantities of hides and tanning supplies and equipment and several hundred draft horses were exported from GERMANY into LUXEMBOURG.

Relief supplies for BELGIUM and FRANCE were handled almost entirely through their own civilian governmental agencies so that only very small quantities, made necessary by emergency situations, were issued those countries through Army Civil Affairs channels.

Issues, other than those for LUXEMBOURG, were almost entirely made to meet the needs of displaced persons in GERMANY. Military Government Detachments secured varying quantities of local foodstuff for the feeding of displaced persons, depending upon the local supply and minimum needs of the German civil population. Supplies locally were limited because of combat-destroyed crops and food stores, the flight of local administrators and a lack of labor and transportation.

Prime consideration was given to the problem of increasing agricultural production. Toward this end appropriate directives were sent to all Detachments and discussions were held with the food and supply officers of key Detachments and with the Corps Military Government officers. Representatives of the Allied Control Commission, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force and Twelfth Army Group came into the Army Zone to secure information concerning the food and agricultural situation and to make provision for seeds and supplies for the spring planting.

Planning beyond immediate needs was also begun in the industrial field. As plants and facilities were uncovered they were reported by Detachments and then to Army G-4 and/or higher echelons. Special attention was being [illegible]

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During the month, the goal of a 8,000 ton food reserve previously set by Twelfth Army Group for G-5, Third Army, was reached. The possibility of an early collapse in GERMANY, however, led to a further increase of estimated food requirements to 8,000 tons. Since negotiations were in progress with the Army Quartermaster for a consolidation of the Civil Affairs/Military Government depot with the Quartermaster depots, a decision was reached in conjunction with the Quartermaster to request Advance Section, Communications Zone, to take responsibility for this reserve.

The movement of the Armies out of the liberated countries led to an effort by the War Department to bring accounting for Civil Affairs supplies up to date, so that bills could be presented to the national governments concerned. Several directives and War Department representatives came to this headquarters in connection with this project.

The following tabulation is a summary of Civil Affairs/Military Government Supply Depot activity for the month, quantities in net long tons:

	Food	Clothing	Blankets	Soap and Sanitary Supplies	POL
On Hand 1 March	1428.99	88.37	39.2	187.65	.0
Rec'd During March	7405.22	.0	46.5	17.9	233.1
Issued During March	7150.72	19.1	26.4	6.55	233.1
On Hand 31 March	1685.22	69.27	59.3	139.0	.0

TRANSPORTATION

The Civil Affairs/Military Government Transportation Pool moved from MAYANCE (U-7983) FRANCE to TRIER (L-22) so as to be more strategically located for its operations. The arrival of the 103rd French Provisional Truck Company with its fifty three-ton trucks and a full complement of personnel increased the efficiency and usefulness of the Pool.

The plan for the dispersal of the three-quarter ton trucks to Corps sub-pools was cancelled. Centralized maintenance and dispatch of trucks from the Transport Pool remained in effect throughout the month. The transfer, however, of thirty-five of these vehicles to the LUXEMBOURG Government was completed after the necessary repair work on them was accomplished.

Military Government Detachments made progress on the task of rehabilitating civilian transport through the collection and overhauling of remaining civilian vehicles and by securing captured enemy vehicles not required for military uses. The repair of rail facilities was being handled by the Army services. The restoration of transport facilities in the liberated countries was further advanced by the resumption of street car and bus services in several localities.

The following figures summarize the Civil Affairs/Military Government Transport Pool activities for the month:

Number of Trucks Dispatched	533
Number of Separate Missions	170
Approximate Number of DP's Hauled	60,000
Approximate Tonnage of Supplies Hauled	1,000

LABOR

As of 28 March, 5,217 civilians in the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG, their services obtained through Civil Affairs in cooperation with local authorities, were directly employed by Third U.S. Army units. After screening by Civil Affairs and Counter-Intelligence Corps, several hundred of them will continue as employees of the Army during the conquest and occupation of GERMANY.

SECTION VI

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

Military Government Detachments moved quickly to attain the immediate objectives of Military Government, the establishment of law and order. Proclamations, laws, ordinances and notices were posted; curfew and travel restrictions were imposed and the surrender of arms required. Military Government Summary Courts established for the trial of civilian violations, gave quick and adequate punishment.

Reports received from corps, divisions and Detachments operating west of the RHINE, described a docile people, amenable to law and regulation. Exceptions were noted at KOBLENZ (L-99) and COCHEM (L-5972), where the people were described as "sullen and uncooperative" and Detachments moving east of the RHINE observed a similar attitude.

In the establishment of local German Government difficulty arose in finding eligible and competent officers. Many of those who had not fled were ineligible because of Nazi connections. In many of the Kreis (City and Land counties), non-Nazis who had been removed from office by the German Government in 1933 were reinstated. In some of the smaller communities within the Kreis (Gemeinde) non-Nazi officials were found, who had not been removed because of their long service to the community and a part of these were retained.

At the next higher level of government, the Regierungsbezirk, and at the higher level of Provinz, it was more difficult to secure proper officials, and only in the Regierungsbezirk TRIER was Military Government able to install officers. There Dr. Wilhelm Steinlen, native lawyer and non-Nazi, was made Regierungspresident, and a small staff selected.

At all levels where Chief Administrative Officers were appointed they were able to organize police and other essential services upon a limited scale. All appointments were on a temporary basis, and some appointees were dismissed after screening by Counter-Intelligence Corps.

With these beginnings, the organization of Military Government took shape. Order was effected, controlled food distribution was resumed, farming was encouraged, clearing, repair and rebuilding of homes and essential utilities initiated. Its value to military operations could be found in the fact that no incident of civilian opposition to or interference with the military was reported.

In FRANCE and LUXEMBOURG, contact between Civil Affairs and local government was reduced as active military operations passed to GERMANY. Enforcement of security measures against civilians continued but emphasis moved to the internal needs of the liberated nations. In FRANCE, local government was efficiently organized and the resurgence of political expression continued. In LUXEMBOURG, Brigadier H.R.H. Prince Felix returned, the Consultative Assembly met, and the people awaited the return of the Grand Duchess Charlotte.

LEGAL

Legal action in GERMANY began with the posting of proclamations, laws and notices which established Military Government, abolished Nazi laws and organizations, suspended courts, imposed security restrictions upon the German population, and imposed penalties for violations. The machinery for enforcement was provided by the appointment of courts composed of Military Government personnel. A Board of Review was appointed and charged with the review of all cases in which the punishment exceeded imprisonment for one year or a fine of one thousand dollars, and all other cases tried by courts appointed by the Army in which a petition for review was filed. One case was reviewed by the Board of Review.

Records of all cases were received by the Legal sub-section. Those in which review was required were submitted to the Board of Review. For the purpose of supervision of the courts, and as basis for advice to them, all other cases were administratively reviewed for procedural errors, and when necessary, corrective instructions were given to courts. All records were sent to Twelfth Army Group for filing.

In the study of case records received, a lack of uniformity of sentences was noted. For information and guidance, an extract of all cases tried in the Twelfth Army Group Zone was sent to Corps, Divisions and Detachments. In other cases, letters were written to courts pointing out the inadequacy of sentences in cases involving serious offenses, and the necessity of adjudging sentences commensurate with their gravity.

Eighty-eight case records were received by the Legal sub-section, eighty-seven being reported from Summary Military Courts and one from an Intermediate Military Court. The greater part of the offenses charged were violations of curfew and travel restrictions. Two cases charging illegal possession of arms and one case charging the harboring of a German soldier and the giving of false information were reported. Severe punishment was imposed in the three cases.

In FRANCE and LUXEMBOURG, local courts continued to try civilians charged with offenses against UNITED STATES Forces. Civil Affairs Detachments in the locality of the commission of the offense were required to report the action taken by local authorities.

FINANCIAL

Accounting reports were received from thirty Detachments covering operations during the month of February. These reports were reviewed and forwarded to the appropriate country section. Statements reflected little movement in Civil Affairs/Military Government funds.

In the current month all French francs in the hands of Detachments under control of this headquarters were turned in to the Sub-accountant, G-5 Section, who showed a balance at the end of the month of 512,948.50 French francs. Initial consignments of Allied Military marks were made to seventeen additional Detachments who were provided with necessary accounting forms and instructions. Sub-accountant, this headquarters had on hand 116,700 RM on the thirty-first of the month. Of forty-five Detachments operating in GERMANY on that date, only three Detachments were without Military Government funds. Preliminary reports as to the activities of Sub-accountants indicated relatively few expenditures, with receipts consisting mainly of fines collected in Military Government Courts and the taking into temporary custody of abandoned funds of post-offices, and local authority treasuries. A number of Detachments successfully turned over their civilian payrolls to German local authorities, whereas the majority were paying such payrolls through Army channels.

Under new directives requiring Army Finance to refer all cases of abandoned funds to this sub-section for a decision as to whether such funds were to be considered "captured enemy funds" or funds returnable to owners when located, five cases arose and appropriate decisions were rendered by indorsements to the basic reports of the Finance Disbursing Sections.

Because of the nature of tactical operations during the month two distinct patterns became evident as to the possibilities of rapid financial recuperation in the areas of occupied GERMANY under control of this headquarters. On one hand, areas where the fighting was bitter and the material damages great were found to be largely evacuated, with bank buildings destroyed, vaults looted, records scattered and little immediate hope existing for the reopening of financial institutions and services. On the other hand, areas by-passed by combat troops were in relatively good condition and in many instances awaited only the decision of Military Government for the resumption of local financial services.

By the month end insufficient time had elapsed to organize activities in this field on any other than a Kreis basis, although a number of pinpointed regional Detachments had begun to coordinate their areas of responsibility.

General comments discernible from Detachment reports indicated a sufficiency of cash in the occupied area for a period of at least sixty days. Five banks were reopened with or without restrictions on old accounts by the month end and the inflow of new deposits demonstrated that individuals had substantial amounts of cash on their persons. In general, it was found that Kreissparkasses were in the best position to reopen in the area and could be used for Military Government purposes to better advantage than the Reichsbank system where personnel was not available and cash and records had been removed in many cases.

Instructions and report forms were distributed by Detachments to financial institutions upon arrival in pinpointed areas, as well as to government financial officials. Such documents appeared to be clear and easy of interpretation and were well received. An insufficient volume of Allied Military marks had been placed in circulation by the month end to get a clear reaction as to their acceptance by the population, but indications were that they would go to a premium because of the average civilian's fear of inflation and lack of confidence in his government.

No evidences appeared as to the development or existence of a black market. What little price data came to light showed no change from previously existing official prices, though many transactions were being conducted on a barter basis.

Agreement was reached by this sub-section with G-3 Accommodations and with the permanent Town Majors attached to this headquarters, and a letter was sent to all Detachments outlining fully the duties of Acting Town Majors in connection with the acquisition of the use of real estate in GERMANY.

On the 19th of the month a conference was held at Army Group where the head of this sub-section had an opportunity to discuss and compare experiences and problems with financial specialists of the First, Ninth and Fifteenth U.S. Armies. Questions were raised for decision by higher authority among which were the inadequacy of the German wage scale for civilian employees of Army coming from liberated areas, and the problem of currency exchange for these same employees.

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In the field of property control, the only activities reported were the taking into custody of Nazi party headquarters and the taking into protective custody for safekeeping purposes of abandoned funds later to be returned to owners.

PUBLIC SAFETY

The rapid advance of our troops into German territory made security measures of prime importance. All Corps furnished tactical troops to Military Government to be used as security guards. These troops proved invaluable in keeping main supply routes clear of displaced persons and refugees. Displaced persons found on roads were either taken to the nearest displaced persons collecting point or re-routed over secondary roads. Guards picked up Prisoners of War (French) in addition to displaced persons, and thousands of these soldiers were repatriated. In many instances arms have been picked up from civilians by the security guards who patrolled their assigned areas, posted proclamations and ordinances and interrogated suspicious individuals. At the same time local civilian police forces were organized to relieve tactical units of the burden of maintaining large numbers of fixed security guards to enforce Military Government regulations.

After conferences with the Provost Marshal, the Chief of Staff authorized the assignment of a battalion of Field Artillery to the Provost Marshal for the use of G-5 as a security guard to control the circulation of displaced persons, refugees and civilians.

In some instances, broadcasting teams of the Psychological Warfare Branch were used with good effect in transmitting information to the civilians concerning laws, ordinances, curfew and circulation.

Former officials who had spent considerable time in Nazi prisons were found to be a good source for obtaining information of value and recommending civilian police. The civil population was generally docile and readily obeyed the laws and ordinances of Military Government.

Arrangements were made whereby the Luxembourg Hospital authorities notified the Luxembourg Mission of the receipt of German civilian wounded and the Mission passed on the information to Counter-Intelligence Corps.

Numerous Military Government Detachments and various units entering GERMANY requested passes for allied civilians to accompany those units as interpreters, laborers, mechanics, etc. These employees were screened by Counter-Intelligence Corps for entry into GERMANY regardless of previous screenings. All passes were issued by the Public Safety Branch.

The closest liaison with Counter-Intelligence Corps resulted in the removal of several burgermeisters with Nazi backgrounds before they had had time to consolidate themselves and their party friends in office. Several ardent Nazi Officials have been arrested and turned over to Counter-Intelligence Corps for eventual imprisonment in concentration camps awaiting trial.

PUBLIC HEALTH

March marked the first appearance in the Army Zone of the dread typhus fever. Thirty-four cases were reported among civilians.

Prior to the occupation, there were six cases of typhus in WORMERSWEIL (L-4318) which had developed in February while this area was in enemy hands. All were Russians. During March, nineteen Russian foot workers contracted the disease in BAUMBACH (L-9428) and were placed in the hospital at MEISENHEIM (L-9525). Four were confirmed by laboratory tests. Four died. The 800 civilians in BAUMBACH (L-9425) were deloused with DDT powder and the towns of MEISENHEIM (L-9523) and BAUMBACH were placed off limits to troops.

Six cases in the hospital at FISCHBACH (Q-4878) also came from a Russian workers camp. All contacts were deloused. Three of the cases were confirmed by laboratory examination. Two Poles, brothers, were found isolated in a house in ROCKENHAU (L-9638) and their cases were confirmed as typhus by the Army Medical Laboratory. One case was discovered as the sufferer was about to enter a Displaced Persons Camp at BAUMHOLDER (L-9713). He was isolated immediately in a local civilian hospital. Another confirmed case developed at GUTTENBERG (L-3926); three others were reported from FURSTENFELD (Q-5079) and laboratory-confirmed. A single case was confirmed at BEURON (L-4025), another at ST. [illegible] (Q-5696).

Diphtheria and dysentery continued prevalent during the period of the report. There was an increased incidence in the VIII Corps Zone. These diseases did not, however, present any danger of spread to the armed forces. Adequate quantities of diphtheria antitoxin were supplied to local doctors in an effort to control the disease.

With twenty-one Detachments reporting for an area involving a population of 613,989, the following communicable diseases among civilians were noted: diphtheria 172, scarlet fever 78, tuberculosis 98, typhoid fever 13, para-typhoid fever 3, dysentery 38, gonorrhea 110, syphilis 35, scabies 809, cerebrospinal meningitis 4, typhus fever 34.

During the early part of March, there were in many areas of the VIII and XII Corps Zones a total lack of hospital facilities. Severely sick and wounded civilians had to be evacuated to ARLON (P-6282) and LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81) hospitals. As a partial solution in the reestablishment of medical facilities in occupied territory, improvised hospitals were set up in WEIDINGEN (L-0258), MEURSBURG (P-9756), BITBURG (L-1353), SCHWEICH (L-0975), WAXWEILER (L-0267), STADTKYLL (L-1495) and MOTSCH (L-1552).

Nuns, nurses and an occasional doctor were found to manage these hospitals. Drugs, dressings and instrument kits were provided by Military Government to meet basic needs.

After 15 March, however, with the more rapid movement of the Army, adequate hospital facilities were uncovered. A civilian hospital at TRIER (L-88) was requisitioned for civilian use. This was the only hospital for a time capable of coping with the large numbers of civilian wounded being picked up by the Army Medical Service. However, this hospital was deficient in beds and personnel, both of which were later procured elsewhere in the city and in neighboring towns. Subsequently civilian patients were evacuated from military medical establishments to the hospital at TRIER (L-88). An auxiliary hospital was established in BETTEMBOURG (P-7409) LUXEMBOURG.

To meet the demand for doctors to handle civilian cases, arrangements were made by VIII and XII Corps to procure German medical men from Prisoner of War channels after they had been cleared by CIC. Several doctors were procured in this manner and placed where most needed.

The thousands of displaced persons liberated by the advance of our troops presented grave problems in housing, sanitation and medical care. Sanitary Corps officers were deployed in the larger camps to assist in improving sanitary conditions. French medical officers and some doctors found among the displaced persons provided medical care. During the month, there were available to the section ten French medical officers, each attached to a team of the Mission Militaire Liaison Administrative. All displaced persons in occupied territory and those moved into liberated countries were deloused with DDT powder. Sick and wounded displaced persons were hospitalized in local Germany civilian hospitals or at improvised hospitals at the Displaced Persons Camps.

CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

SECTION I

GENERAL

April was the busiest month on the G-5 calendar since its activation as a General Staff section on 30 April 1944. On its first anniversary, G-5 took into camp its 1,000,000th displaced person. There were more than 250,000 in camps that day, 76,336 Western Europeans had been returned to their homes during the month, 12,049 of them during the two days 10 and 11 April, a record for the Armies. And during the month G-5 instituted a repatriation service that did much to redouble the enthusiasm with which the French had long regarded les Americains. Transport planes which had been flying westward empty were employed in carrying several thousand French prisoners of war straightaway to PARIS (9-04). 625 of them made the first trip from FRANKFURT (M-67) to PARIS on 11 April and, scattering widely to their homes, soon set all FRANCE to talking of the amazing Americans who liberated their men after nearly five years imprisonment and had them back in their homes with their families thirty-six hours later. From reports in the French newspapers, this practice, which was continued for liberated prisoners of war by G-1 when lift was available, did much to assuage French feelings, ruffled by YALTA and ALGIERS.

There was an urgent need to return Western Europeans to their homes as quickly as possible for still another reason. The capacity of the fifty-two camps in the Army Zone was limited to some 250,000 persons. It was not possible to repatriate any Eastern Europeans to their homes during April. No juncture had been effected at that time by the Third U.S. Army with the Russians, the Czechoslovakians or the Jugoslavians. Hence G-5 was forced to provide housing and food for the Eastern Europeans who comprised the bulk of the forced labor uncovered in GERMANY.

With supply lines stretched thin, hundreds of miles long, supplying these camps was another Third U.S. Army miracle. But the Quartermaster, who had undertaken G-5 supply along with his other heavy burdens, came through with some supplies. Local Detachments, scrounging on the countryside——by directive——turned up vast quantities of indigenous supply and supplies left behind by the Wehrmacht in its haste rearward. This combination allowed displaced persons Detachments throughout the Army Zone to feed their clients well while they awaited repatriation. German civilians got the minimum of 1,050 calories per day.

Security bulked large as a G-5 problem during the month and here too G-5 was forced to improvise. Troops for Military Government had long been talked of but never a reality. Faced with a teeming situation where the security of the Army was at stake, G-5 made a plea for the assignment of troops backed up by case and incident. Corps broke the ice. Heavy Field Artillery battalions no longer needed in the race across GERMANY were turned over to Corps G-5 for security guards. Antiaircraft troops were also used. On 6 April, the 558th Field Artillery battalion was attached to the Provost Marshal Section to enforce Military Government and to guard civil installations in the Army Zone. The entire 70th Infantry Division was deployed in the rear areas for security purposes and the 16th Armored Division performed the same function in NURNBERG (G-40), to be succeeded by the 4th Infantry Division. A disordered GERMANY needed guarding. Displaced persons frequently celebrated their liberation. The German populace watched its chance to break into Wehrmacht food stores when guards were withdrawn or moved.

Civil control, due to the closest liaison with Counter-Intelligence Corps, was adequate and burgermeisters who were found to have any connection with the Party were summarily removed. Sentences for crimes against the Army were sufficiently severe to deter repetition. Everywhere the German public was learning that this was not 1918-1919. 79% German civilians were tried with fines totalling over $6,000 and sentences totalling 3,142 days imprisonment. The Legal sub-section also had control of approximately 90,000 prisoners in concentration camps and prisons in the Army Zone.

G-5 was in on one of the most spectacular finds of the war——the uncovering of a vast cache of gold, believed to have been the bulk of the reserve of the Reichsbank. Found at the same time was a great collection of art loot, gathered by the Nazis from their victim-countries and "sold" to the Nazis on their own terms. These finds were handled by G-5, Army, until taken into charge by G-5, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force and the Currency Section of European Civil Affairs Division. These and other notable finds were uncovered by the Arts, Monuments and Archives officer of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, attached to this Headquarters.

Tragic to the extreme but highly typical of Nazi "efficiency" was the now-notorious Death March of approximately 15,000 political prisoners and forced laborers who were removed from the FLOSSENBURG (P-3260) concentration camp and marched for three days and three nights by SS guards who shot or clubbed those who were too weak to follow. It was reported that approximately 3,000 were killed in this way before the 35 guards fled before the oncoming UNITED STATES forces. Fifteen tons of food were sent immediately in Military Government trucks, three emergency hospitals were set up by Military Government and the Army Surgeon and searchers sought out survivors of the march who had been able to escape the SS in the fields and woods.

Other horror stories came out during the month from the slave camps at BUCHENWALD (J-5270) where as many as 30,000 political prisoners and forced laborers were forced to work on meager rations until they died of starvation or beatings. In all camps uncovered where atrocities were discovered, Military Government commanders followed the example that was set at BUCHENWALD (J-5270)——the German people of the vicinity were "invited" to view the horrors perpetrated by the SS and Gestapo.

It was pointed out at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force that the sights of concentration camp horrors, uncovered by Military Government as the Nazis were near surrender, did much to quiet all talk of a "soft" peace. The press gave the camp full coverage and the stories they sent back to the States——and the [illegible]

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SECTION II

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

In the early part of the period Third U.S. Army advances carried well into territory which was later to become Russian occupied. This command never had sufficient Military Government personnel for deployment within its own zone of operations and, consequently, provisional Military Government and Displaced Persons Detachments had to be organized. Authority was received from higher headquarters and twenty-two Detachments were organized, for emergency deployment within this Army's zone, by drawing personnel from service units under this command.

A Military Government School was instituted for the training of personnel for the Provisional Detachments. Officers of this Staff lectured on their particular functions and a complete set of directives, instructional guides and other publications of a policy-forming nature were supplied to all Detachments. Upon completion of instruction, the Provisional Detachments were immediately deployed.

A change in Army boundaries in the middle of the period resulted in a shift of Divisions and Corps. Staffs of the 13th, 14th and 16th Armored Divisions, the 70th, 71st, 86th, 89th and 99th Infantry Divisions were briefed as to their Military Government mission under Third U.S. Army. III Corps, which had at one time been assigned to this Army, rejoined the command. Directives and other pertinent publications were furnished these newly assigned organizations. Several changes in personnel assignments were made.

Assigned officer strength at Army G-5 was increased to eighteen with the addition of specialist legal, transportation, relief and supply officers.

Numerous applications for assignment to Military Government activities were processed during the month. Many qualified applicants were placed on temporary duty with Military Government Detachments. A Board of Officers met at this Headquarters to interview enlisted applicants for commission as Second Lieutenants, AUS, for duty with Military Government, in an effort to assist in filling existing shortages in Military Government units. During the entire period of operations on the Continent, Detachments had been as much as fifty percent under strength.

Five Bronze Star Medals, two Oak Leaf Clusters to Bronze Star Medals and one Purple Heart Medal were awarded to personnel of Staffs and Detachments.

SECTION III

INTELLIGENCE

During a fast-moving situation that was unpredictable because of its complete shift of objectives during the month, the Intelligence and Information Branch was forced to cover, in its releases of information, all of the southern and part of the eastern provinces of GERMANY as well as portions of AUSTRIA and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. This required considerable improvising as little informative material was at hand from higher headquarters concerning Eastern GERMANY, AUSTRIA or CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The task was made more difficult because new Detachments which arrived had to be briefed on Third U.S. Army procedure in Military Government. Twelve temporary Detachments were instructed in the preparing of reports to this Headquarters, outfitted with Military Government manuals and instructional guides, and Intelligence officers of the Detachments were briefed on their particular mission. Six special Intelligence Bulletins were published, in addition to the regular Daily Summary, the Weekly Bulletin, semi-monthly report to Twelfth U.S. Army Group and the monthly "after action" report to Third U.S. Army. Some 3,000 reports were read, collated and distributed to the branches chiefly concerned during the month.

The shift in Corps during the month also necessitated the forwarding of intelligence material to those arriving Military Government Staffs. III Corps, however, required little education in Third U.S. Army Military Government procedure. When first it arrived in Third U.S. Army Zone, its Military Government Staff had a thorough indoctrination by G-5, Army, late in 1944.

Security was a difficult problem. The Intelligence and Information Branch aided where it could by rushing Psychological Warfare Branch sound trucks to the scenes of disorder to aid in dispersing the crowds, and by guiding Detachments with policy tips and preventative precautions.

Public relations in GERMANY [illegible] far more difficult to handle than in friendly FRANCE. Each move [illegible] be weighed as to its effect on the people who were never to be made to feel that Military Government was softening up its treatment of a conquered people. After long consideration, for example, it was decided that the people of [illegible] ([illegible]-9968) could safely be allowed to hold their traditional Good Friday processional along outdoor stations of the cross from the town to a nearby chapel on a hill overlooking the [illegible]. This ceremony had been banned for several years by the Nazi Government; its re-institution by Military Government, in the interests of religious freedom, had excellent results. Yet people in BAD [illegible] (M-2371), more hostile to the invading armies, were reported to have walked out of a Protestant church when the minister told the congregation they should be glad that the Nazis had been driven out and religious freedom restored. In such a town, gatherings of any size might easily become Nazi meetings; the Detachment was ordered to tighten up its restrictions against public gatherings.

Under the guidance of Military Government, FRANKFURT (M-67) formed a committee to alleviate suffering caused by discriminatory laws against Jews. New and complete ration cards were issued, impartiality in hiring policies was pledged by the Chamber of Commerce and two Jews were appointed to the local Labor Board. FRANKFURT (M-67) was de-Nazifying rapidly.

Another move that made for inter-Allied good will was the hiring, after screening, of Allied personnel by Military Government. Military Government provided a score of Russian girls as waitresses in the officers' mess at Army Headquarters. And Detachments throughout the area followed suit, hiring Hollanders as interpreters, French as culinary employees and others.

To disseminate the news and the announcements of the Supreme Commander and local authorities, G-5 Intelligence and Information circulated at the month's close some 200,000 copies of the Psychological Warfare Branch's FRANKFURTER PRESSE, a weekly paper. The papers, picked up at the press at FRANKFURT (M-67), were distributed to each of the Military Government Detachments who in turn handed them over to burgermeisters for distribution. The arrival of the PRESSE was eagerly awaited by the people; its coverage of the news was factual and, in the closing days of the war, the only true story of the collapse available to the Germans.

COMMUNICATIONS

All telephone and postal communications were suspended by Military Government immediately upon entering a city. All mail was impounded for later examination by AC of S, G-2. Reichspost personnel, under supervision of Military Government, were immediately set to work repairing open wire lines and telephone equipment for the ultimate use of the Army.

To enable Military Government Detachments to administer the areas under their jurisdiction, intracity telephone service for civilian activities essential to the attainment of military objectives was authorized in Third U.S. Army area from the RHINE east to [illegible] (M-9089). Courier service between communities was also authorized for activities essential to community welfare. Personnel of Civil Censorship Group were deployed in the area to insure security by monitoring telephone lines and spot checking courier material.

PUBLIC WORKS

Electric power for the area occupied by Third U.S. Army was produced in a few large generating stations and distributed over the complex German high tension power network. The generating stations had suffered little damage from either sabotage or battle action, but the power lines had been cut badly by bombs and artillery fire.

Two power specialists from the Regimental Reserve Detachment, European Civil Affairs Division, made complete reconnaissance of the main lines in low flying planes and spotted breaks in the lines and located broken towers. All efforts were then directed in the restoration of those lines that could be made operative in the shortest possible time. Military Government Detachments, using German personnel and equipment, quickly repaired the 110,000 volt lines connecting the 75,000 kilowatt generating station at [illegible] (M-0872) and the 10,000 kilowatt station at [illegible] (G-7701) with the two 4,500 kilowatt hydro-stations in FRANKFURT [illegible]. Other German personnel under Military Government supervision [illegible]ired the local distributing systems.

Thirteen 2,000 kilowatt hydro-stations along the MAIN River near WURZBURG (N-5936) were found intact and the large 75,000 kilowatt steam plant near NURNBERG (O-40) was undamaged but had only a limited supply of fuel.

As a result of these efforts, electric power was made available in the following localities:

ALSFELD (M-0840)	MENGSHAUSEN (M-3344)
BAD SCHWALBACH (M-2371)	NIEDERAULA (M-3146)
Landkreis BERNKASTEL	NIEDER JOSSA (M-2942)
DARMSTADT (M-6642)	NURNBERG (O-4200)
FRANKFURT (M-6770)	OFFENBACH (M-7368)
[illegible] (T-3797)	OTTWEILER (Q-5889)
HANAU (M-8740)	Landkreis ROTENBURG
KAHLA (J-7152)	ST GOARSHAUSEN (L-9872)
Landkreis KREUZNACH	[illegible] (M-3142)
KRONACH (G-5688)	VIECHTACH (U-7666)
LAUTERBACH (M-1728)	WURZBURG (N-5936)
Landkreis MELSUNGEN	

Under saturation bombing, water mains had been shattered in all large cities and many smaller communities. German civilians were immediately put to work repairing the damage. With electric power available for pumping and the breaks mended, water was restored in the following localities:

ANSBACH (T-0622)	Landkreis MELSUNGEN
BLANKENHAIN (J-5557)	NURNBERG (O-4200)
FRANKFURT (M-6770)	OFFENBACH (M-7368)
[illegible] (J-1108)	OTTWEILER (Q-5889)
IDSTEIN (M-3880)	Landkreis ROTENBURG
KAHLA (J-7152)	[illegible] (J-0415)
KRONACH (G-5688)	VALLENDAR (L-9199)
KUSEL (L-7605)	VIECHTACH (U-7666)
LIMBACH (K-5263)	

In some cases the pumping equipment was damaged beyond repair and improvisation was necessary. Fire engines, small gasoline and even hand-operated pumps were pressed into service to give the populace the needed minimum requirements.

SECTION IV

PLANS AND OPERATIONS

The Eastward drive, now deep into GERMANY, placed the Army in an area for which there were no pinpointed Detachments. To meet the existing shortage, Corps were authorized to form emergency Detachments from troops under their command. Assistance was given by providing directives, handbooks and materials for their training.

At Army level, emergency Detachments were also formed and a Military Government School was organized. Instruction in Military Government was given by officers from the various branches of this Section and at the end of the training, twelve provisional Military Government Detachments were activated and allotted to Corps for deployment.

Personnel from a Field Artillery and Anti-aircraft Battalion were also requisitioned for Military Government training, but a change in the Army's objective from directly East to South and South East, placed the Army again in an area for which there were pinpointed Detachments available and the request was withdrawn.

As the Army moved forward, Fifteenth U.S. Army was given the mission of controlling the rear area. By the 2nd of the month, eighteen Military Government Detachments west of the RHINE had come under its operational control.

By the end of the month the Army was entering AUSTRIA and a request was initiated to procure a battalion for activation and deployment as Military Government Detachments in this area until Military Government Detachments, pinpointed for AUSTRIA, could be made available.

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On 30 April, Detachments were deployed in the following locations:

AMBERG (O-9802)	BRUCH (U-3967)
ANSBACH (T-0682)	BUDINGEN (M-9889)
ASCHAFFENBURG (N-0155)	CHAM (U-5981)
BAD HOMBURG (M-6382)	DARMSTADT (M-6642)
BAD KISSINGEN (N-6781)	DIEBURG (M-7946)
BAMBERG (O-2749)	DIEZ (M-2197)
BAYREUTH (O-7455)	EGG (U-8044)
BENSHEIM (M-6521)	ERLANGEN (O-3617)
FISCHBACH (U-2580)	MOOSBURG (Z-1094)
FLOSSENBURG (P-3236)	NEUHAUSER (P-1589)
FORCHHEIM (O-3930)	NEUMARKT i. O. (T-7082)
FRANKFURT (M-6770)	NEUSTADT a.d. AISCH (O-0713)
FRONBERG (U-1992)	NEUSTADT a.d. SALLE (N-7694)
FRIEDBERG (M-7394)	NURNBERG (O-4200)
FREISING (Y-9786)	OBER RAMSTADT (M-7237)
FREYUNG (Q-2639)	OFFENBACH (M-7368)
FURTH (O-3402)	PFAFFENBERG (U-3029)
GELNHAUSEN (N-0479)	REGEN (U-9455)
GONSENHEIM (M-3356)	REGENSBURG (U-1855)
GRAFENWOHR (P-0132)	RODING (U-4777)
HANAU (M-8471)	SCHIERLING (U-2336)
HASSFURT (N-9863)	SCHWABACH (T-3886)
HOFHEIM (M-5166)	SCHWEINFURT (N-7964)
INGOLSTADT (T-7125)	STRAUBING (T-9932)
KELHEIM (U-0344)	ST GOARSHAUSEN (L-9973)
KITZINGEN (N-7529)	VIECHTACH (U-7666)
LAUF (O-5607)	WEIDEN (P-1929)
LIMBURG (M-2398)	WEISSENBURG (T-3653)
LOHR (N-3156)	WIESBADEN (M-3564)
MAINBERG (T-9813)	WUNSIEDEL (P-0568)
MILTENBERG (N-1024)	WURZBURG (N-5835)
ZWIESEL (Q-0161)	

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

April witnessed the uncovering of the long anticipated displaced persons problem and the breakdown of German controls over these slave laborers. The displaced persons were "walking until they met the Americans." They were being caught in the enveloping movement of the thrusting armor. No longer could the German continue to evacuate his labor, being too preoccupied with getting his own columns out of the clutch of the Third U.S. Army. The saturation point had been reached in the interior of the country. The flood gates opened. The roads became alive with every conceivable vehicle, "borrowed" to aid the trek to the centers and toward home.

The limited displaced persons facilities were taxed to the utmost. In many locations there was no water due to destruction, sanitary conditions were primitive, and, with the overcrowding and rapid movement, there were health and security hazards. In some instances camps or collecting points were established in the morning and had received several thousand persons by nightfall. Many of the camps were repeatedly evacuated sometimes as often as daily.

The Army Zone was extended during the month from LUXEMBOURG to beyond the RHINE and the displaced persons plan designed for an Army Zone of normal depth became stretched out thinly over hundreds of miles. Detachments went forward with the Corps and Divisions while other Displaced Persons Teams were pinned down far to the rear, leaving gaps in the operations between the two elements. Displaced Persons Detachment personnel and supporting groups worked at a heroic pace. Excellent cooperation and assistance was received from G-4 Truck and Rail Transportation.

During the month of April, concentrations of displaced persons were reported at the following locations:

LOCATION	COORD.	DPs PRESENT	LOCATION	COORD.	DPs PRESENT
ANSBACH	N-3648	2150	ARZBERG	P-1971	853
ASCHAFFENBURG	N-0155	8165	BAD HOMBURG	M-6382	1000
BAD KISSINGEN	N-6780	3367	BAD NAUHEIM	M-7197	1000
BAMBERG	O-2750	3011	BICKENBACH	L-8570	1200
BOBBENHAUSEN	M-9298	2700	CHAM	U-5890	3000
DARMSTADT	M-6442	11500	EICHSTATT	T-5338	8000
ERLANGEN	O-3617	1144	FISCHBACH	U-[illegible]	1440
FORCHHEIM	O-3930	500	FRANKFURT	M-6770	27050
GELNHAUSEN	N-0479	500	[illegible]	N-8746	5000
GONSENHEIM	M-3356	2696	[illegible]	M-5347	1700
GROSS OSTHEIM	M-9648	939	[illegible]	M-5471	5000

HANAU	M-8471	6795	HARBURG	O-7006	544
HASSFURT	N-9863	555	HEDDERNHEIM	M-6573	4250
HOF	C-9799	8000	IDSTEIN	M-3880	1000
KARLSTADT	N-4653	500	KASTEL	M-3956	700
KULMBACH	O-6574	2156	LAUF	O-5607	2400
MARKLEUTHEN	P-0478	600	MULHEIM	M-7870	722
MUNCHBERG	O-8984	700	MUNSTER	M-5270	768
NEUHAUS	O-5051	1023	NEUSTADT	O-0813	767
NURNBERG	O-4200	20000	OFFENBACH	M-7368	2162
REHAU	P-0692	600	ROTTENBACH	O-5404	2030
ST GOARSHAUSEN	L-9973	1378	SCHWARZENBACH	C-9988	729
SCHWEINFURT	N-7964	4080	SEIDENHOF	O-6273	950
SELB	P-1383	1200	WIESBADEN	M-3564	14395
WURZBURG	N-5835	6510	AMBERG	O-9802	714
BAD SCHWALBACH	M-2474	500	BUDINGEN	M-9889	400
GEDERN	N-0404	670	GRAFENWOHR	P-0132	900
HIRZENHAIN	O-9900	600	HOCHEIM	M-4457	500
DIEZLBORN	N-7948	450	KOBLENZ	L-9095	400
KRONACH	O-5788	990	MARKTREDWITZ	P-1165	600
MICHELBACH	M-2381	626	ALSFELD	N-0840	1561
GERA	K-0562	15000	SONNEBERG	J-4401	5000
RODACH	O-1697	2200	EISFELD	J-2508	1360
COBURG	O-3090	10300	BAYREUTH	O-7455	2100
HEPPENHEIM*	M-6516	575	WEIDEN	P-1929	5000
ARNSTADT*	J-2653	4000	EISENACH*	N-8267	8500
FULDA*	N-3719	6500	GOTHA*	J-0965	7500
MEININGEN*	N-8921	1500	MUHLHAUSEN*	N-9094	5500
ERFURT*	J-3169	9000	SCHMALKALDEN*	N-9139	2000
SUHL*	J-0927	9000	WALTERSHAUSEN*	N-9859	2600
WEIMAR*	J-5270	21000	ZELLA MEHLIS*	J-0633	4550
ARTERODA*	N-6359	2500	BEBRA*	N-4565	1190
DANNHARHAUSEN*	N-6061	1200	ESCHEASTRUTH*	J-3594	528
ESCHWEGE*	N-6290	1000	HEIDERSBACH*	J-1230	800
HELSA*	N-3698	580	HERINGEN*	N-5956	1064
LAUTERBACH*	N-1728	1292	LICHTENAU*	N-3391	2000
NESSELRODEN*	N-6772	2200	OHRDRUF*	J-1152	1000
ROSSDORF*	N-7537	600	SPRINGEN*	N-6655	1200
STEINBACH-HALLENBERG*	J-0037	670	THEMAR*	J-0516	575
			TREYSA*	N-0158	500

* Locations transferred due to boundary change.

Repatriated during the month: 61,367 French, 7,462 Belgians and 1,027 Luxembourgers.

UNRRA Teams came forward to assist. Two teams arrived initially and at the end of the month seven teams were in the Army Zone with forty-three people.

Twelve provisional Displaced Persons Detachments of four officers and eight enlisted men each were organized, trained, equipped and deployed during the latter part of the month.

SECTION V

RELIEF AND SUPPLY

The feeding of displaced persons was the most important of the several activities of the Supply Branch for the month. This necessitated strict control over all captured enemy food stocks in the Army Zone. Responsibility for the collecting, warehousing and issue of all captured enemy food stocks was centralized under the Army Quartermaster who set up such consolidated warehouses at key points. Military Government Detachments drew several hundred tons from these stocks for displaced persons' feeding.

Imported supplies were not drawn upon to any substantial extent during the month because of the adequate stocks of captured material. The Military Government imported stocks which had been consolidated with the Quartermaster Class II and IV Depot Number 12 were moved at the close of the month to the Quartermaster Class II and IV Depot Number 13 at ZIRNDORF (T-3497).

Five truckloads of so-called mountain rations were rushed on 24 April from ERLANGEN (O-3617) to WEIDEN (P-1929) to relieve acute distress among an estimated 10,000 political prisoners uncovered by combat forces in that vicinity.

Civilian food stocks continued to constitute the chief source for the feeding of displaced persons. German civil authorities were required to supply quantities of food to displaced persons centers, but increasing attention was paid to the problem of assuring minimum food requirements for civilian consumption so as to prevent diseases or unrest that might impede military operations.

As the Army Zone moved eastward during the month, civilian food stocks were found to vary. The MOSELLE region being a wine growing section showed deficits in every category. East of the RHINE the situation progressively improved until in BAVARIA considerable local surpluses of potatoes, wheat, butter and cheese were uncovered. Salt, sugar, seeds and fertilizer were everywhere in short supply. Agricultural specialist officers were attached for special regional surveys to Military Government Detachments at FRANKFURT (M-67) and WURZBURG (N-5835) and on their recommendations Military Government trucks were dispatched to the ERFURT (J-3170) area to collect seeds needed for spring planting in the RHINELAND and HESSEN-NASSAU.

Uncovered industrial productive facilities of interest to our forces included tire plants and clothing factories. These, as well as other productive potentials, were brought to the attention of Twelfth U.S. Army Group and Advance Section, Communications Zone so that plans could be made for an early resumption of operations. A large soap factory at SCHLUCHTERN (N-2796) resumed production.

The problem of fuel supply came to the fore as captured stores of POL ran low and coal stocks ebbed. Liquid fuels were supplied to some towns from Army stocks for essential civilian, administrative and agricultural uses. Coal stocks in cars were earmarked for operations in the military railway service leaving essential civilian installations with very little or no solid fuels. The extremely limited rail facilities made the importation of coal for civilian uses impossible, as a result of which many bakeries were closed as a fuel conservation measure.

The following tabulation is a summary of Military Government Supply Depot activity for the month, quantities in net long tons:

	Food	Clothing	Blankets	Soap and Sanitary Supplies	POL
On Hand 1 April	1685.22	69.27	83.5	139.0	.0
Rec'd during April	1661.3	.0	.0	.0	80.0
Issued during April	1733.42	.0	5.2	2.0	80.0
On Hand 30 April	1613.1	69.27	78.3	137.0	.0

LABOR

The functioning of the Arbeitsamter (labor offices) was completely disrupted by the wholesale destruction of basic records and office facilities and the flight of labor officials. During the month, however, some resumption of labor office activity got underway as new officials were named. A few offices were already in a position to assist the recruitment of labor required for military use or essential civilian projects. The TRIER (L-22) labor office referred several thousand civilian workers to jobs during the month.

Labor registration was planned to start shortly in most localities with the intention of consolidating this process with the general civilian registration to be made primarily for security reasons.

TRANSPORTATION

Early in the month two acute problems faced Army Military Government Detachments. One was the inadequacy of Detachment organic transportation. The other was the need for accumulation and salvage of sufficient civilian transportation in each area to provide minimum essential administrative, utility and food distribution services.

A long step was taken toward a solution of both by the adoption, in concurrence with the Army Provost Marshal, of a vehicle registration system set up by this sub-section whereby all civilian vehicles reported by Detachments received a windshield sticker showing a red, white and blue Military Government shield on one side and a statement of purpose, engine number and Detachment stamp on the reverse.

This identification and registry served at once to regularize ownership, provide statistics as to numbers of vehicles in each Landkreis or Stadtkreis, identify otherwise questionable vehicles to the Military Police and provide a pool from which Mil[illegible]

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Among the first Military Government detachments to establish such pools were: ERLANGEN (G-3617), FRANKFURT (M-67), WIESBADEN (M-36), NUREMBERG (G-40), BAMBERG (G-2749), OFFENBACH (M-76), MAINZ (M-35) and KRONACH (G-5688).

During the month the Civil Affairs Transport Pool became the Military Government Transport Pool. Comprising four French companies, the 1st, 3d, 6th and 12th, a battalion headquarters, a repair section and a medical detachment, it was moved successively from MAYANCE (U-7793), FRANCE, to TRIER (L-22) to FRANKFURT (M-67) to PURCHEIM (G-3936), GERMANY.

Despite all these moves, the 195 three-ton trucks were nevertheless able to perform 135 missions, from a single truck up to convoys of sixty. In addition the pool moved a total of 697 tons of supplies and approximately 71,533 displaced persons and Allied prisoners of war, performed such diverse tasks as transporting seeds needed for spring planting to delivering 300,000 German language newspapers for the Psychological Warfare Branch to thirty-five cities throughout the Army area.

During the month two additional French Truck Companies were sent to this Section by Communications Zone. Both of these, the 302d and 304th, were turned over to the Provost Marshal for transporting prisoners of war, Allied and German, as well as displaced persons, from forward areas to collection points. Eight of the three-quarter ton trucks, formerly attached to the Transport Pool, were turned over to the LUXEMBOURG Government, thus completing the transfer to the Grand Duchy of thirty-five such trucks. The remaining three-quarter ton trucks were distributed among Displaced Persons Teams as organic transportation needed for camp supply and housekeeping purposes.

The Second Section, Service Platoon, followed the Military Government Transport Pool in all its moves and continued its work of vehicle repair and maintenance, battery exchange and re-charging and tire inspection, repair and replacement for Detachment organic transportation. The Section also repainted vehicles, painted direction signs for Detachments and displaced persons centers and drew rations, fuel and lubricants for the French Truck Companies.

SECTION VI

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

Advances of tactical troops required the establishment of Military Government in large areas of GERMANY and AUSTRIA and the organization of Civil Affairs functions in CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Military Government operations in AUSTRIA were exercised in Division and Corps areas and were limited to the posting of proclamations and notices, enforcement of curfew, circulation and arms surrender measures and the control of displaced persons, activities essential to military security. Fraternization was forbidden throughout AUSTRIA.

In CZECHOSLOVAKIA, the area of control was too small to supply definitive information regarding the character and strength of local government. Reports from G-5 Sections of Corps and Divisions and Military Government officers and Detachments indicated a stable situation. Fraternization was permitted.

The variety of Military Government problems in GERMANY during the month of April was indicated by the areas under its jurisdiction, the phases of military operations in which it operated and the political character of the populations encountered. During part of the month the RHEINPROVINZ was under the Army. In this political sub-division, cessation of active military operations gave opportunity for the development of local governmental authority. Screening and selection of trustworthy and efficient officials and staffs, organization of food, transportation and utilities and the promotion of agriculture were emphasized. Limited movement of refugees to their homes was permitted when approved by the Detachment having authority in the place of destination. Signs of the assumption of responsibility by officials were observed. At TRIER (L-22), the Regierungs-president called a meeting of the Landrats to explain the Military Government program and to coordinate their activities; and Dr. Franz Rudolph Bornewasser, Archbishop and anti-Nazi, returned to his diocese and pledged his support to Military Government. In the Kreise of KUSEL and ROCKENHAUSEN, the Landrat directed all youths between twelve and twenty years of age to work in the fields to insure production of food and to combat possible werewolf activities.

East of the RHINE, in the Province of HESSEN-NASSAU, substantial progress was made in the organization of government. In THURINGIA and BAYERN, where Nazi influence was more evident, the chief emphasis was placed upon security measures. Many officials had fled with the German Army, several attempted to defend their cities, and a few committed suicide. Detachment commanders reported the people to be docile and dependent, but with some expressing continued belief in Nazi principles. When the crimes of the concentration camps at HERZOGF (J-1152) and BUCHENWALD (J-4875) were exposed, it was evident that the bulk of the population felt no sense of responsibility for the commission of the crimes.

The rapid movement of the Army and lack of trained Military Government Detachment personnel made it necessary for tactical commanders to assume temporary responsibility for Military Government in forward areas. This action was necessary under the circumstances, but variations in orders and procedures and assumption of authority by commanders in rear areas weakened the program of Military Government in many instances. Steps were taken to secure a clarification of the situation.

Progress was made in the organization of local government, but it was clear that security measures were still of primary importance in the Army area.

On 2 April, the functions of the Public Health sub-section were transferred to the office of the Surgeon.

LEGAL

Throughout the month the primary legal problem was the supervision and control of Military Government Courts. Calls for legal advice on other problems were still of minor importance. Emphasis was placed throughout the period on the necessity for sentences sufficiently stringent in character to have a real deterrent effect. The few tendencies toward extreme leniency were corrected.

Records of all cases tried during the period were administratively reviewed by the Legal sub-section. A total of 610 cases such cases were considered in which 64,265 marks in fines were collected and prison terms of 3,142 days imposed for the 794 persons tried. In the month of April 109 Summary Courts were in operation in the Army Area, an unusually large number of courts because of the constantly shifting boundaries. Ten Intermediate Military Government Courts and four General Military Government Courts were appointed. All Corps and Divisions were requested to forward copies of orders appointing Military Government Courts to this Headquarters.

As had been the case previously, the majority of Summary Court cases were concerned with curfew and travel violations. After the initial trials, a definite decrease in violations was noted by each Detachment. In DARMSTADT (M-64), for example, the first four days of trials produced a reduction in violations from over two hundred to six. Of five cases of illegal possession of arms the maximum sentence imposed was one year, the maximum fine 10,000 marks. Seven persons suspected of underground activity were held on charges of illegal possession of arms. All these cases were referred to General Military Government Courts.

With the forward movement, several concentration camps and prisons were uncovered. Prison screening teams were secured from Twelfth U.S. Army Group and proved invaluable for the limited time they were available. Two prison teams from Third U.S. Army personnel, of four officers and six enlisted men, were organized to operate prisons and act as screening personnel. Five additional teams of similar size were requested. A total of 28,711 political prisoners and criminals were found in the two concentration camps and six prisons.

International attention was centered on the notorious concentration camp at BUCHENWALD (J-4875). Conditions of unbelievable misery and degradation prevailed throughout the camp. Correspondents and news cameramen secured complete coverage of the conditions existing in BUCHENWALD. Prison officials from Third U.S. Army secured food, medical care, bedding and clothes for the 20,000-odd prisoners and began the screening prior to the time a boundary change passed responsibility to the First U.S. Army.

PUBLIC SAFETY

The rapid movement over a large area made security and aid to military operations the most important functions of Public Safety. This problem was made more serious by stragglers from the Wehrmacht in isolated areas, members of the German army out of uniform, large numbers of displaced persons, prisoners escaping from prisons when overrun by tactical troops, and the movement of Detachments from one location to another without sufficient opportunity to organize and put into effect adequate safety measures.

As a result there occurred offenses against the civilian population by displaced persons, offenses against the German population by German civilians who looted property and places of business, offenses by civilians against Military Government of a minor nature (curfew and circulation) and a few incidents of more serious offenses such as failure to surrender arms. Movement of displaced persons interferred with military traffic in a few instances.

The Public Safety sub-section took steps to promote security through close liaison with the Provost Marshal. Following requests for security guards, the 70th Infantry Division was placed in the rear area and artillery, anti-aircraft and other units in the forward area, were employed for the same purpose. Detachments were instructed regarding the importance and necessity of keeping all civilian and displaced persons traffic off Main Supply Routes and to enforce strictly regulations treating with curfew, circulation and surrender of arms.

Prompt execution of categorical arrests and security threats and their movement to Army Interrogation or Internment Centers was effected. Boards were selected to review cases of prisoners at BUTZBACH (P-5665), FRANKFURT (M-67) and HAMBURG (G-2749) and concentration camps at BUCHENWALD (J-4875) and FLOSSENBERG (P-3336).

The situation was further improved by the arrival of Detachments to pinpointed areas, assuring opportunity for organizing public safety on a more permanent basis.

FINANCIAL

Accounting reports for the month of March were received from thirty five Military Government Detachments, reviewed and forwarded with appropriate comments to Twelfth U.S. Army Group. Expenditures from Military Government funds were at a minimum. Receipts consisted largely of fines and abandoned money taken into temporary protective custody in accordance with paragraph 5 d. (3), G-5 Operational Instructions Number 9, Twelfth U.S. Army Group, 1 March 1945.

The sub-accountant of this sub-section had on hand 229,432 marks at the first of the month. During the month 453,529 French francs were transferred to the Currency Section for France through the medium of a spearhead deposit. Balance of French francs remaining were 60,000, consisting of twelve 5,000 franc notes which were not acceptable to Army Finance because of denomination of the bills.

Numerous cases arose during the month calling for decisions as to the status of funds turned in to Army Finance purporting to be "captured enemy funds." In all cases where money was to be returned to owners it was found that the particular Finance Disbursing Section involved was located far from the area to which the money was to be returned. In such cases this sub-section had such funds transferred by spearhead deposit to this Headquarters where they held for disposition at a later date.

This sub-section participated in the training of twelve Third U.S. Army Detachments formed to supplement Detachments pinpointed for specific areas. One sub-accountant was appointed to service these twelve Detachments.

Purchasing and Contracting officers were not appointed on any Detachments under control of this Headquarters as it was possible to transfer all necessary expenditures, particularly payrolls, to local authorities. In one case only, the hiring of thirty-eight interpreters for Counter-Intelligence Corps screening teams at displaced persons centers, was the service of an Army Finance Disbursing Section used. These latter payments were made by the Purchasing and Contracting officer, this sub-section.

With the rapid advance of Allied Forces during the month, it was natural that important elements of the German Financial machinery would be uncovered by troops of this Headquarters.

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Reichsbankhaupt... DECLASSIFIED ... uncovered at FRANKFURT ... 41,000,000 Reichsmarks ... marks immediately av... at the end of the month under strict control of Military Government. As evidence of the thorough-going nature of the de-Nazification program at FRANKFURT (M-67), 110 bank officials were suspended or removed out of 239 cases examined.

The central German army and navy finance office (OKW Finance Command) was uncovered at ARNSTADT (J-5344) along with important records, personnel and accounting machines. At UMHAUSEN (R-0568) there was uncovered a branch office of the Reichskommissar fur die Behandlung Feindlicher Vermogen (comparable to U.S. Alien Property Custodian). Employees who were interrogated furnished information which was forwarded to Twelfth U.S. Army Group.

Elements under this Headquarters discovered approximately 220 tons of gold, 2,750,000,000 Reichsmarks in currency, German State art treasures and suitcases of loot buried in a salt mine at MERKERS (H-6849). All of these objects were moved during the month to vaults in FRANKFURT (M-67) and placed under the custody of the European Civil Affairs Currency Section for GERMANY. Later, gold and foreign exchange held or hidden by the Reichsbanks in COBURG (O-3090), NURNBERG (O-40) and WURZBURG (N-5835) were sent to the same depository. The gold at COBURG amounted to approximately 100 kilograms; at NURNBERG about 1,500 kilograms. At NURNBERG it was ascertained that the director of the Reichsbank had burned 750,000,000 French francs prior to the entry of the American troops. These francs had been sent from WURZBURG (N-5835) where they had in turn been received from the Reichsbank in FRANKFURT (M-67).

In the course of the month banks were reopened and banking services were resumed in the following main locations: ALZEY (M-2727), BAD KREUZNACH (M-0938), BAMBERG (O-2749), WITTLICH (L-3954), DARMSTADT (M-64), FRANKFURT (M-67), HANAU (M-87), HASSFURT (N-9863), JENA (J-66), LIMBURG (M-2398), MAINZ (M-35), NEUNKIRCHEN (Q-5982), NEUSTADT (C-7140), NURNBERG (O-40), OFFENBACH (M-76), SCHWEINFURT (N-7964), TRIER (L-22), WADERN (L-3805), WIESBADEN (M-36) and WURZBURG (N-5835).

About fifty percent of the banks elected to reopen without restrictions on withdrawals and there seemed to be ample cash resources available throughout the area. In two cases where restrictions on withdrawals were in effect, it was the opinion of the bankers that the terms of General License No. 1 were too liberal, (General License No. 1 permitted persons whose property was blocked pursuant to Military Government Law No. 52 to withdraw from their accounts for living expenses up to 300 Reichsmarks in any one calendar month). This view was confirmed by several Military Government officers. Authority was granted from this Headquarters to lower the limits of General License No. 1 to fit particular situations.

Public finance functions were gradually resumed during the month, but usually only after banks had been reopened. It was not expected that collections on account of taxes would be sufficient to finance local public authorities for several months. In the meantime, however, Military Government Detachments were instructed to order, where necessary, that loans be made by the banks to cover the needs of local authorities.

Other than the preparation of surveys there was little activity in the field of Property Control. The automatic freezing and blocking provisions of Law No. 52 were sufficient to cover most situations. Where Nazi party headquarters were not destroyed they were used for the most part by the Army for the housing of military personnel. Detachments were instructed to use the banks, when open, for the deposit of Nazi party funds, placing such funds in accounts blocked under the provisions of Law No. 52.

Preparations were made for entry into AUSTRIA through the distribution of available financial decrees, orders and licenses to Corps and Divisions. Letters to the population and to the banks regarding the temporary use of Allied Military Marks were prepared and arrangements were made for printing them. Handbooks on AUSTRIA were distributed to Detachments covering the few differences that existed in the handling of financial and property control matters as against their treatment in GERMANY.

All reports received by this sub-section indicated that there were no noticeable price increases in occupied areas of GERMANY. Black market activities were at a minimum, and troop purchases ... cause of existing non-fraternization policies.

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CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

SECTION I

GENERAL

With Third U.S. Army spearheads deep into CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA, G-5 was forced once more to train and deploy quickly Detachments in the newly-won territory. Twenty-five such teams were constituted, equipped, trained and sent forward during the final week of the European conflict, another tribute to the flexibility of the Section's operation and its ability to improvise rapidly in an emergency. Sixty-five teams were in the field at the close of operations. Several Detachments placed by Third U.S. Army in HESSEN-NASSAU were lost to the Ninth U.S. Army on boundary changes.

Another vast horror camp——the establishment for political prisoners at LINZ (V-8587), AUSTRIA——was uncovered during the period. Emergency foodstuffs, medical supplies and personnel were rushed to the scene to aid the sick and the hungry and to bury the dead. The 16,000 prisoners at LINZ, however, were but a fraction of the now huge problem of handling displaced persons in the Third U.S. Army Zone. When the war ended there were 200,000 of them living in fifty-nine camps and another estimated 70,000 living in villages and rural areas. Only fifteen percent of them were Western Europeans; as yet no firm plans had been made for the repatriation of the great mass of Eastern Europeans. Some 15,754 Western Europeans were repatriated from WURZBURG (N-5835), a collection point.

With the war close to an end, the emphasis upon security and military expediency veered to the real mission of Military Government, the de-Nazification and reorganization of the German government. German officials with any of the odor of Nazidom about them were removed and replaced.

SECTION II

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

Authority was received from higher headquarters for the assignment to Military Government activities of fifty officers, five warrant officers and seventy-five enlisted men from Provisional Military Government Detachments organized by and deployed in Third U.S. Army Area.

Numerous applications for assignment to duty with Military Government were processed during the period. Qualified applicants were placed on temporary duty with active Detachments pending final action by higher authority.

Letter, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, subject: "Establishment of Civil Affairs Sections," dated 23 April 1945, was amended to include a statement that in the event an organization was transferred from the theater or that it became non-operational, grades and ratings would be withdrawn and re-allotted to European Civil Affairs Division. Personnel assigned against these grades would be reassigned to European Civil Affairs Division.

A survey was made of the many new Military Government Detachments deployed in Third U.S. Army Area and shortages of fifty-eight officers, twenty-five warrant officers and 107 enlisted men were noted. Immediate steps were taken to assign personnel against these existing shortages.

Distribution of instructional guides and other pertinent directives was made to more than twenty-five Military Government Detachments newly attached to this command.

Machinery was started for the forming of additional ... Detachments ...

SECTION III

INTELLIGENCE

Long range planning for the crucial period when hostilities came to an end and the occupational phase began occupied the attention of the Intelligence Branch during the period. Twenty-five new teams, slated for locations in AUSTRIA and CZECHOSLOVAKIA had to be instructed in their intelligence mission, briefed on the system of reporting back to G-5 at Corps and Army, furnished with the publications and handbooks necessary to their operation and linked into the communications and courier system of G-5.

Plans were made for a more comprehensive courier service connecting up the various echelons of Military Government.

Closing chapters of the After-Action report and other reports for the history of the Third U.S. Army were prepared and forwarded. One information bulletin was published in the period as well as a weekly and a semi-monthly report to Twelfth U.S. Army Group.

Outstanding events of an intelligence nature for the period were the capture of three German corvettes complete with their naval crews by a Military Government Detachment in a rowboat on the DANUBE near LINZ (V-8587) and the capture of the German general of the Second Panzer Division by a Military Government Public Utilities officer at BAMBERG (O-2749).

A doctor was discovered working in a BAMBERG (O-2749) hospital who had treated Hitler from July to November 1944 for injuries received during the bomb attempt on the Fuehrer's life. The injuries were to the side of the head and affected Hitler's hearing, the doctor said.

COMMUNICATIONS

The telephone equipment at BAMBERG (O-2749) and REGENSBURG (U-15) were found intact, while the equipment at BAYREUTH (O-75) was ninety percent destroyed by a direct bomb hit.

The telephone repeater station at REGENSBURG (U-15) was not damaged. This was one of the key points in the communications from GERMANY to AUSTRIA.

PUBLIC WORKS

In the closing days of the war, work progressed rapidly on the repair of high tension power lines in the German grid. The line from the hydro-electric station in the vicinity of WURZBURG (N-5835) was extended to SCHWEINFURT (N-7964) and thus provided power to it as well as surrounding communities.

Electric power was also restored in DEGGENDORF (U-8340), FREISING (Y-9786), GRAFENAU (Q-1544), SCHWARZENFELD (U-1997) and VIECHTACH (U-7666).

With the renewal of electric power, and the repair of breaks in the water mains caused by bombing and battle action, it was possible to restore water to DEGGENDORF (U-8340), FREISING (Y-9786), GRAFENAU (Q-1544), SCHWARZENFELD (U-1997), VIECHTACH (U-7666) and KELHEIM (U-0344).

SECTION IV

PLANS AND OPERATIONS

By the beginning of the month, the bulk of Detachments were operating in their pinpoint locations. It was felt, since they were operating in many instances far from tactical units, that a weekly information bulletin should be published showing locations of available security guard and Military Police forces in the Army Area, should a situation arise warranting their need. In accordance with this plan, the first of these bulletins was published on the second of the month.

The Army's objective again turned from the ...

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Detachments pinpointed for AUSTRIA reported and were deployed in their pinpoint locations, after a short orientation by various branches of the Section.

On 8 May, Detachments were deployed in the following towns:

AMBERG (O-9802)	[illegible] (C-5688)
ANSBACH (T-6682)	KULMBACH (O-6674)
ASCHAFFENBURG (N-0155)	LANDAU (U-6520)
BAD KISSINGEN (N-6781)	LANDSHUT (U-2663)
BAMBERG (O-2749)	LINZ (V-8587)
BAYREUTH (O-7455)	LOHR (N-3156)
COBURG (O-3090)	MAINBURG (T-9813)
CHAM (U-5880)	MILTENBERG (N-1024)
DEGGENDORF (U-8340)	MOOSBURG (Z-1894)
EGGENFELDEN (Z-7291)	MUEHLDORF (Z-5572)
ERDING (Z-0976)	[illegible] (O-8925)
ERLANGEN (O-3617)	[illegible] (O-6856)
[illegible] (P-3236)	[illegible] (U-3793)
FORCHHEIM (O-3930)	NEUSTADT a. d. AISCH (O-0713)
FREISING (Y-5786)	NEUSTADT a. d. SAALE (N-7494)
FREYUNG (?-2689)	NEUSTADT a. d. WALDNAAB (P-1935)
[illegible] (Q-1129)	NUERNBERG (O-4200)
FUERTH (O-3402)	PARSBERG (T-9070)
GRAFENAU (Q-1444)	PASSAU (?-2213)
GRIESKIRCHEN (V-5178)	[illegible] (U-3029)
HASSFURT (N-4863)	PFARRKIRCHEN (Z-8595)
HERSBRUCK (O-6707)	[illegible] (U-7068)
HOF (O-9798)	REGENSBURG (U-1855)
HOHENFELS (T-9975)	[illegible] (U-4877)
INGOLSTADT (T-7125)	ROHRBACH (V-6016)
KELHEIM (U-0344)	ROTH (T-4478)
KITZINGEN (N-7529)	[illegible] (V-2773)
SCHAERDING (V-2100)	VIECHTACH (U-7066)
SCHWABACH (T-3486)	VILSBIBURG (Z-4294)
SCHWEINFURT (N-7964)	WALDKIRCHEN (?-3131)
STRAUBING (U-5542)	WEISSENBURG (T-3653)
TIRSCHENREUTH (P-3052)	WUERZBURG (N-5835)
	[illegible] (T-0161)

DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES

The flow of displaced persons into camps throughout the Army Zone continued during the period. Over 30,000 displaced persons were living in fifty-nine camps and an estimated additional 70,000 were living in villages and rural areas. Figures indicated that approximately fifteen percent were Western Europeans. These were evacuated from WURZBURG (N-5835) as follows:

			TC
1 May	1600	French	LONGUYON (U-4596)
2 May	3200	French	LONGUYON (U-4596)
3 May	1215	Belgians	LIEGE (K-4126)
3 May	400	Dutch	MAASTRICHT (K-5456)
3 May	1572	French	LONGUYON (U-4596)
4 May	1600	French	LONGUYON (U-4596)
4 May	570	Dutch	MAASTRICHT (K-5456)
4 May	960	Belgians	LIEGE (K-4126)
5 May	1578	French	LONGUYON (U-4596)
6 May	1559	French	[illegible] (Z-2685)
8 May	1500	French	LONGUYON (U-4596)

Increased efforts were being made to segregate displaced persons by nationality groups. Camps were set up respectively for Russians, Poles, Yugoslavs and Czechs. Three camps were set aside exclusively for the trans-shipment of Western Europeans including French, Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourgers.

Three UNRRA teams, after a brief orientation, were deployed to assist in camp operation under the supervision of UNITED STATES military personnel.

SECTION V

RELIEF AND SUPPLY

Continuing with their task of stimulating agricultural production, the two agricultural specialists attached to G-5 remained on duty with the Regierungsbezirk Detachments at WURZBURG (N-5835) and ANSBACH (T-3682). In the province of HESSEN-NASSAU a considerable boost was given to planting by the discovery of 385 tons of seed and 1,500 tons of fertilizer at FRANKFURT (M-67). An additional 219 tons of seeds were brought into the FRANKFURT region from surpluses in the seed producing area at ERFURT (J-37).

In furtherance of the agricultural effort, the 14th Armored Division and the 90th Infantry Division released over 1,000 captured Wehrmacht horses to the civil authorities in their respective areas for utilization in farm operations.

The problem of fuel supply for essential civilian transportation and mechanized agricultural activity loomed larger as existing German stocks were drained. Requisitions totalling 4,100 gallons of gasoline and 4,300 gallons of diesel oil were approved for drawing and distribution by Detachments throughout the Army Zone.

The coal shortage was even more serious for there were no Army stocks from which requirements could be met. The difficulty in this respect was the lack of rail transportation because, though millions of tons of coal were above ground in the mining areas of GERMANY, none of it could yet be brought into the Army Zone. A requisition for coal for essential civilian uses was placed with the Army Quartermaster, upon request of that Section, for delivery in June and July. On 8 May 1945 Detachments were directed to submit their normal monthly coal estimates by areas for essential civilian services. Indicative of the critical fuel shortage was the stoppage of the ERLANGEN (O-3617) water supply for lack of fuel. It was necessary to rush diesel oil from Army stocks to provide the necessary power.

The collection, storage and issue of captured enemy supplies continued to be the responsibility of the Quartermaster. Displaced persons were supplied mainly from civilian stocks but also from the two captured enemy material depots at WURZBURG (N-5835) and FURTH (O-3502). Among other deliveries, clothing from the latter point was dispatched to provide for 6,000 of the former political prisoners quartered at CHAM (U-5880).

A new approach to the problem of industrial production was developed with the establishment of a Production Control Agency within G-4. This Agency was made responsible for the harnessing of all German industry to the demands of the Allied Forces. In the meantime some essential production had been resumed under the guidance of Military Government Detachments, including a shoe factory at NURNBERG (O-40).

LABOR

An important development, with possible widespread ramifications, was the discovery of a complete microfilm of the labor registration records of the ANSBACH (T-0622) Arbeitsamt. Indications were that this filming was accomplished under the direction of the National Ministry of Labor and that similar records might be uncovered elsewhere.

The NURNBERG (O-40) Arbeitsamt completed its preliminary registration by consolidating this process with the general security registration. The standard registration card was revised to include entries essential to the control of labor.

TRANSPORTATION

As of the ending of hostilities the strength of the Military Government Transport Pool comprised four French Truck Companies (101st, 103d, 106th and 112th) equipped with fifty three-ton Canadian Dodge trucks each, a Battalion Headquarters, Maintenance Repair Section and a Medical Section. Personnel totalled 465 enlisted men, fifteen officers and two nurses.

In line with plans for redeploying the tactical units designated to serve as occupying forces in the Army Area, the French Truck Companies were allocated one each to the III, XII and XX Corps, with the fourth company to be retained as Army G-5 reserve and the Battalion Headquarters to go to the III Corps.

Missions executed from 1 May to 8 May comprised the usual collection of displaced persons of many nationalities from towns, villages, roads and collection points and their transportation to camp centers. Captured enemy food and clothing supplies were picked up at various captured enemy supply warehouses and transported to the several displaced persons centers in the Army Zone.

The following statistics indicate the volume of work accomplished by the four French Truck Companies in the Army Zone during the period:

Truck Company	Displaced Persons	Supply Tonnage	Kilometers Travelled
101st	16,940	2,839	45,752
103d	24,350	128	66,310
106th	5,933	240	28,790
112th	6,463	1,521	40,938
Total:	53,686	4,728	181,790

In the performance of the above the Military Government Transport Pool completed 112 different missions and hauled 29,000 gallons of gasoline.

On 5 May the Second Section, Service Platoon moved from FRANKFURT (M-67) to [illegible] (O-4117), near ERLANGEN (O-3617). In addition to the normal activities carried on in April, plans were perfected and approved for establishment of a system of mechanical inspection for all Military Government unit vehicles at regular intervals.

SECTION VI

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

As the cessation of hostilities approached, a chief objective of Military Government, the de-Nazification and reorganization of the German governmental system was brought into relief. Security measures received first consideration, but it was recognized that the retention of German officials could no longer be generally approved upon the ground of military necessity or expediency.

Clarification made it possible to begin the complete de-Nazification of official personnel and the selection of non-Nazi successors.

Progress was made in the selection of Burgermeisters and Landrate. Detachments were directed to organize the Regierungsbezirke of Land BAYERN.

LEGAL

Instructions for Austrian and Bavarian Military Government Detachments newly attached to this Headquarters prior to movement to pinpointed areas occupied much of the time. The emphasis was placed primarily on matters pertaining to jurisdiction, procedure, fines, imprisonment and appointment of courts. Summary Military Government Court officers were appointed for all of these Detachments, if none had been previously appointed.

A new policy was initiated to correct minor errors in form. All errors not sufficiently important to prejudice the rights of the accused, yet indicating a tendency to laxness were collected and published with proper corrections for all Military Government Detachments. Some of the most often repeated mistakes were: reading charges to the accused without giving him a copy, failure to draw charge sheets in both German and English, but relying on a verbal translation, omission of a commitment form for imprisonment, repeated use of Section 21, Article II, Ordinance 1 when the violation of a law or ordinance itself provided a penalty. Many courts neglected serial numbering and in some instances the prescribed rate of one day for each ten Reichsmarks default in payment of fines was neglected.

Review of cases of political prisoners in the concentration camps at MAUTHAUSEN (?-0283), FLOSSENBURG (P-3336) and in prisons at AMBERG (O-9802), BAYREUTH (O-75), BAMBERG (O-2749), BUTTENBACH (O-6704), NURNBERG (O-40) and STRAUBING (U-5542) necessitated the deployment of three prison teams and the supervision of Detachments performing that function. A mobile Counter-Intelligence Corps team assisted in screening United Nations nationals, and political prisoners were released upon its approval.

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PUBLIC SAFETY

The last days of the war found the enemy in complete rout and disorder. Thousands of civilian prisoners in concentration camps and [illegible] were released [illegible] in camps and installations [illegible] safety officers [illegible] while Allied [illegible] Counter-Intelligence officers for re-[illegible] were sent to prisoner of war enclosures [illegible] documents.

Military Government Detachments and Security Troops uncovered many categorical arrests and security threats who were sent to Counter-Intelligence Corps for interrogation and detention. In order to devote the maximum number of hours to cultivation and raising of crops, the curfew was extended from 2000 hours to 0700 hours to 2100 hours to 0600 hours.

FINANCIAL

Thirteen banks of REICHSBANK (B-15), including a Reichsbankstelle, were officially opened for business on the seventh of the month. A number of Detachments reported shortages of small notes in their areas and arrangements were consequently made to make change with Reichsbanks in different areas who were better situated.

Expenditures of troops in the liberated territory of CZECHOSLOVAKIA provoked the question of monetary exchange. During the German occupation, units of exchange in CZECHOSLOVAKIA were the Reichsmarks and the Kronen. Upon liberation the Czechoslovakians refused to accept Reichsmarks, and since troops had Marks, though Allied issue, the Czechoslovakians hesitated to accept their currency. Reports were received of increasing dissatisfaction on the part of both troops and natives with great confusion as to exchange rates.

At their request, G-5 Section, XII Corps was advised, with the agreement of higher authority, that the promulgation of a rate of exchange between Kronen and Allied Military Marks was the responsibility of the Czechoslovakian Government as a sovereign liberated territory. It was suggested that American Army finance specialists advise Czechoslovakian authorities to ascertain a rate at which exchange would be satisfactory to both troops and Czechoslovakians.

Reports were received of gold and treasure in the custody of the National Bank of [illegible], evacuation from the capital city of [illegible] to SPITZ am DONAU (V-9018) in Landkreis [illegible]. The Fiscal Officer accompanied by a specialist from Twelfth U.S. Army Group proceeded to the locality to arrange the transportation of this gold and treasure to a central depository at [illegible] (U-467).

Officers of Detachments going into AUSTRIA were briefed on fiscal procedures. A sub-accountant was appointed on each Detachment. Wherever possible, the Local officer was appointed as sub-accountant since receipts of Detachments were largely fines from Military Government Courts.

CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. Lessons Learned.

a. Throughout the entire military operation there existed a serious shortage of officers and enlisted personnel within Civil Affairs/Military Government Detachments in Third U.S. Army Zone.

b. "I" type Military Government Detachments (three officers and six enlisted men), which exercised governmental control over an area of from two to four Kreise, did not have sufficient personnel for efficient operation.

c. Enlisted personnel possessing excellent linguistic abilities were of prime importance to the operation of Detachments.

d. During the combat phase Military Government Detachments were required to prepare many reports and surveys. Detachments did not have the time nor sufficient personnel to comply expeditiously with these requirements. Reorganization of the German government, reconstruction of public utilities, and providing for displaced persons required the full time of Detachment personnel.

2. Conclusions.

a. Full strength Detachments should be furnished initially and a pool of officers and enlisted personnel maintained on call by Armies to make up shortages.

b. The authorized strength of "I" type Detachments should be increased to four officers and eight enlisted men.

c. Reports and surveys should be held to an absolute minimum until civil government and communications have been restored.

COMMUNICATIONS

1. Lessons Learned.

a. Civilian communications personnel and facilities were not employed with maximum effectiveness because military units made independent uncoordinated demands on civilians and valuable communications charts, vehicles, material and tools were removed for other than communication work or thoughtlessly destroyed.

b. The return to normal civil administration was delayed by lack of communications assigned to purely civil use and the [illegible] of adequate censorship personnel to check security.

2. Conclusions.

a. More effective use of civilian personnel and facilities could be obtained by assigning a trained Military Government Communications specialist to each Military Government Detachment controlling a key city in order to coordinate military requests on civilians and safeguard civilian charts, vehicles, material and tools.

b. Certain intercity circuits should be reserved for civil administration and adequate censorship personnel, available on demand, should be provided to check security at key points.

ELECTRIC POWER

1. Lessons Learned.

a. There was an immediate need for electric power and high tension circuits should be repaired without delay.

b. Security was occasionally jeopardized when high tension lines from enemy territory continued to operate through the combat lines. Most high tension lines were provided with carrier operated telephone communications, so that communications were available as long as electric power continued to flow.

2. Conclusions.

a. High tension electric power repair teams should be organized and assigned specific missions prior to the operation. They should remain until missions are completed, using civilian personnel and material to the maximum.

b. Tactical forces should include specially trained personnel to disconnect but not destroy carrier communications systems. Censorship personnel should be placed at key substations to safeguard security when power grids are repaired.

OPERATIONS

1. Lessons Learned.

a. Military Government units and individuals with a long period of theoretical training took considerable time to reach maximum [illegible]

b. Civil Affairs and Military Government Detachments in many cases were less effective from lack of training in military subjects in general.

c. Military Government Detachments attached to Armies for deployment were often late in arriving at "pinpointed" locations due to changes in the tactical situation.

2. Conclusions.

a. Units and individuals should be given only the fundamentals of military government in schools and placed in the field for practical training as soon as possible.

b. Scope of training for military government personnel should be widened to include military subjects of value in the field or officers with general experience selected for military government duties.

c. Emergency Military Government Detachments must be formed to take the place of pinpointed Detachments which are delayed due to changes in the tactical situation.

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

1. Lessons Learned.

a. There was insufficient trained personnel to care for and control displaced persons who left their respective locations as soon as German troops withdrew and before our troops gained control.

b. Those charged with the care and control of displaced persons soon found out that there were not enough facilities and transportation available to care adequately for the troops, Allied prisoners of war, German prisoners of war and displaced persons.

c. CIC personnel to screen displaced persons expeditiously was inadequate.

d. It was found necessary to have train commanders, medical officers and guards for movement of displaced persons by train.

2. Conclusions.

a. Prior to an operation sufficient Displaced Persons Teams must be organized, equipped and trained. Troops for guarding camps and collecting displaced persons must be provided. Displaced Persons Detachments are better for displaced persons operations than local Military Government Detachments because of the specialized nature of the work. Where Displaced Persons Teams are used, their status should be clarified with the local Military Government Detachment. Armies or service units following Army must be ready to relieve the camps as Army moves forward, otherwise Displaced Persons Detachments are pinned down and gaps develop between forward and rear units. To conserve administrative personnel and to avoid dispersal of guard units, camps of large size, ten to fifteen thousand capacity, are desirable. Armed guards in ample numbers must be available to Detachments to control displaced persons and conserve supplies. Reliance cannot be placed on local units to secure troops during a moving phase as these units shift rapidly and are not oriented in their job.

b. Sufficient transportation to handle the movement of displaced persons should be made available. Wherever possible, evacuation of displaced persons should be by returning convoys which necessitates complete integration with G-4 and planning in advance of operations. The available facilities must be carefully allocated to see that displaced persons are properly housed and fed.

c. Screening teams should be provided at an early date so that adequate screening may be had before displaced persons are moved rearward.

d. In view of the limited size of a Displaced Persons Detachment, train crews consisting of a train commander, a medical officer, and one guard for each car should be provided by service areas. They should come forward as a unit. Trains for evacuation should be equipped with supplies. Feeding stations should be established through the service areas at approximately 100-mile intervals for returning convoys and trains. The type food provided locally and by relief supplies is not proper for feeding badly undernourished persons as found in concentration camps.

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SUPPLY

1. Lessons Learned.

Many tactical and service units, unaware of the plans for conservation or rehabilitation of the essentials of a civilian economy, allowed the German people and others to seize or destroy public and private property, especially food, without regard to economic consequences.

2. Conclusions.

All military units, down to companies, should be briefly instructed in the salient Military Government functions and responsibilities of the Army Commander, particularly conservation of economic resources.

TRANSPORTATION

1. Lessons Learned.

a. Field experience, particularly when Military Government Detachments had reached their pinpointed locations, soon demonstrated the organic transportation authorized for such Detachments was inadequate.

b. Many vehicles not authorized by T/E were needed to equip emergency Military Government and Displaced Persons Detachments.

c. Foreign Liaison Officers attached to Army for various special Civil Affairs/Military Government assignments appeared in increasing numbers as V-E day approached, all on competent orders, but most without adequate personal equipment or transportation.

2. Conclusions.

a. Military Government Detachments should initially be authorized vehicles on a basis of one vehicle per officer in "I" and "H" Detachments and one vehicle to each two officers in "E", "F" and "G" Detachments, with one enlisted driver for each vehicle.

b. In granting authority for emergency Military Government or Displaced Persons Detachments, adequate government issue transportation or captured vehicle equivalents should be authorized to provide necessary mobility. In addition, not less than one three-ton truck per thousand displaced persons should be provided for camp housekeeping requirements.

c. All personnel attached to a lower unit for special missions should be sent forward equipped and with authorized transportation.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT COURTS

1. Lessons Learned.

Eighty percent of the cases tried by Military Government involved curfew and circulation violations and were tried by Summary Military Government Court. The effectiveness of these courts in deterring violations was found to depend on immediate establishment of Summary Courts by Detachments, quick trial, and adequate punishment. Summary Courts in large cities, such as FRANKFURT (M-67), were delayed by the preparation of prescribed case records and by the necessity of providing counsel when requested. It was found that some courts were not familiar with the preparation of required forms.

2. Conclusions.

a. Commanding officers of Detachments should be given authority to appoint Summary Military Government Courts and required to report appointments to the Headquarters to which they are responsible and to Army G-5.

b. Simple case records should be provided for the trial of circulation and curfew violations.

c. The appointment of defense counsel in circulation and curfew cases should be left to the discretion of Summary Courts trying cases.

d. Instruction should be given to all Summary Courts as to the necessity of adequate punishment and in the preparation of prescribed forms.

PRISONS

1. Lessons Learned.

Personnel for the control of prisons was inadequate, and while initiative and resourcefulness was shown by Military Government Officers in emergency problems, the review of cases of political prisoners and the need for trained prison officials for the larger prisons were evident.

2. Conclusions.

It is recommended that one highly trained prison official be assigned to Army and to each Corps to reorganize and supervise administration of prisons.

PUBLIC SAFETY

1. Lessons Learned.

a. Displaced persons and Allied prisoners of war proved to be the greatest immediate threat to Public Safety. German civil police could not control these elements.

b. Security troops moved to new locations without giving notice to Military Government Detachments, leaving important installations unguarded. In the interval of time before the arrival of other security troops, opportunity for looting, destruction and damage was given to displaced persons, Allied prisoners of war and civilians.

2. Conclusions.

a. Sufficient military police or security guards must be provided to control displaced persons and Allied prisoners of war.

b. Security troops should not be moved from a location until such time as they are relieved by other security forces.

ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT

1. Lessons Learned.

The organization of a competent non-Nazi Government, particularly at the Regierungsbezirk level and the reorganization of important functions such as the courts, police and food services could have been furthered if Special Branch teams charged with the responsibility of searching out and vetting proper German personnel and aiding Detachments in the organization of government had been available.

2. Conclusions.

A Special Branch team should be assigned to each Regierungsbezirk Detachment to assist and supervise in the organization of a non-Nazi competent government.

FINANCE

1. Lessons Learned.

a. Especially in occupied enemy territory it was desirable that constant visits be made to Detachments which too often had been transferred from other Army areas where non-uniform procedures had been employed.

b. In forward areas, where Military Government Officers were not functional specialists, inaction in the fields of Finance and Property Control would have been preferable, rather than the accidental measures often pursued.

c. In no countries entered was there found to be a shortage of currency though occasionally there was some maldistribution of existing stocks and shortages of bills of small denominations.

d. Advances of Military Government or Civil Affairs funds were not requested. The uses of such funds were restricted by directives requiring the exhaustion of all other procurement channels.

e. A satisfactory control of registered receipt vouchers could not be instituted at this Headquarters because of the constant shifting of Detachments. The accounting procedure for Military Government funds became a burden requiring a needless expenditure of time.

f. Banks, in general, were reopened within two to three weeks of their uncovering. Despite existing directives stressing the importance of the de-Nazification program, all Nazis or ardent sympathisers were not removed from positions of influence or trust in the German banking system.

2. Conclusions.

a. Transportation and personnel should be made available to permit frequent visits by staff functional officers to operating Detachments.

b. Forward Detachments should confine their financial activities to security measures.

c. Upon occupation of an area, immediate attention should be devoted to the proper distribution of existing stocks of indigenous currency.

d. A separate fund for the use of Military Government Detachments should not be provided. Arrangements should be made for turning in fines or abandoned currency to Army Finance Disbursing Sections.

e. Registered receipt vouchers should be controlled by higher headquarters such as European Civil Affairs Division. They should be issued initially in liberal quantities in order to obviate the necessity for Detachments to print up their own supplies with consequent loss of control of the system.

f. Constant checks should be conducted to see that programs for the elimination of undesirable personnel are carried out. Directives on this subject should be clear and specific.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX NO. 1

MONUMENTS, FINE ARTS and ARCHIVES.

As of 1 August, 1944, when Third United States Army went operational, there was deployed from Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force Headquarters, a Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives officer on detached service with the G-5 Section.

An account of his activities follows:

Inspection visits were made during October to the United States St. Mihiel Cemetery 1914-1918 at THIAUCOURT (U-6442) and the Memorial Monument of the same battle at MONTSEC (U-7334). It was found that German soldiers had entered the cemetery and had broken down all the grave-markers bearing the Star of David. These were raised into place, dowelled and cemented in their bases. The memorial, situated at the crest of MONTSEC, which commands the countryside, had been used as a temporary fortress by a German infantry platoon. In ousting them, Third U.S. Army troops had used nothing heavier than fifty caliber machine guns, but many holes and spallings were found in stone columns and friese. The caretaker was summoned from a nearby village and set to work gathering fragments.

The cathedral of TOUL (U-61) was found closed because of the serious damage inflicted by vengeful German attacks in 1940. Only slight damage had occurred to it in liberation fighting, and to other monuments, such as the Eglise St. Gengoult, Porte de Metz, and the old houses along Rue Michatel. The many fine eighteenth century monuments of NANCY (U-81) were found intact. The Places Stanislaus and de la Carriere were being used as parking areas for military vehicles. In view of continued enemy shelling, the presence of these vehicles endangered the entire historical section of the city. At the request of this sub-section the Provost Marshal changed the parking area to a less important section. A nearby chateau de Fleville at LUDRES (U-9403) was evacuated by a Third U.S. Army unit, after a similar request, even though it had just finished ousting a German combat force from the chateau.

Operations were carried out in the southern part of the Department of MEURTHE-et-MOSELLE during November. At ST NICOLAS du PORT (U-9405) the great fifteenth century masterpiece of flamboyant architecture, Eglise St. Nicolas, still not fully restored after damage in 1917, had received more direct hits. The departmental architect for historical monuments and a contractor were taken to the site to plan for resumption of work as soon as possible.

The University of PONT-a-MOUSSON (U-7635), for two months between the opposing armies, was found in ruins. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries this had been the largest university in EUROPE with more than 3,000 students. It was decided to put a protective watershed over the still-standing exterior walls. Materials were located, their release obtained from Third U.S. Army Engineers, and trucks loaned to civil authorities to get them to the site. The necessary work was accomplished before severe cold weather set in. Temporary repairs were also carried out on other monuments of the town, notably Eglise St. Martin and Eglise St. Laurent. Neither of these churches had heavy damage.

Inspection was also made during November of Chateau de CRACN at HARAUCOURT (Z-4480) built in 1720 by Boffrand, the Memorial to Maurices Barres at the summit of the Hill of SION-VAUDEMONT (U-1464), the twelfth century church at MAVILLE (U-6340) and the Romanesque churches at LAITRE sous AMANCE (U-9431) and NOMENY (U-8234). All these monuments were posted for protection.

Inspections, photographs and reports were made of the historical monuments surrounding DOMREMY la PUCELLE (Z-4080), the birthplace of Jeanne d'Arc. Due to the rapid advance of Third U.S. Army troops during December the enemy was not able to make a stand in the area. It was found that as a consequence there was no war damage to the little house in which Jeanne was born, nor to the village church beside it. The costly new memorial Basilique also escaped untouched. These buildings were posted with signs reminding visiting soldiers of their historical significance and requesting respect.

The fifteenth to sixteenth century Chateau de BOURLEMONT at NEUFCHATEAU (Z-4975) had been occupied by German troops. A suspiciously loosed stone in the chapel floor was lifted out, giving access to the tombs below. Inspection revealed that a sixteenth century coffin had been opened and robbed of whatever wealth in jewels or costume ornaments it may have held. Considerable damage had been done to furnishings, paneling and wall decorations within the chateau. Notices were placed on the building to insure good maintenance if occupied by Allied troops.

Other inspections included the twelfth century Romanesque church at BERCOUVES (U-6410) and Chartreuse de BOSSERVILLE at BOSSERVILLE (U-9111). The foundations of this monastery were built from stone taken from the ancient walls at NANCY (U-81). The preliminary inspection was made at METZ (U-85) during December.

For the first time contact was made with the blundering activities of the German Government in its newly annexed territories. Seventh and eighth century manuscripts were found to have been removed from the historical archives of METZ (U-85) to Fort St. Quentin where two-thirds of them were burned in the German evacuation panic. The priceless Tresor of the Cathedral, including the Cloak of Charlemagne, had been carried off into GERMANY. Great stores of furniture sequestered from politically undesirable civilians were found in chateaux. Price tags were still on some of the heirlooms. More than eight hundred thousand seised books were found in the bomb-damaged Franciscan Monastery. Because of exposure to the January weather some were moved to other parts of the building. Valuable information for later operations was obtained from two German officials who were caught in METZ. First aid repairs were given to architectural masterpieces that had all been spared in Allied air-attacks, but were hit by German shelling during their long hold-out in the surrounding forts. Boarding and waterproof covering was put over the completely destroyed east window of the Chapelle du Sacre Coeur of the Cathedral. The former French director of the museums was returned from NANCY (U-81) to METZ (U-85).

At THIONVILLE (U-88) evidences of crude, uncertain policies were also found. French patriots had sent all of the city archives to the Charente in the south of FRANCE, but the Germans returned them to the cellars of the Hotel de Ville. They were found to have been destroyed by flood waters from the MOSELLE. Portunately photographic copies were found in the possession of a scholarly priest of a nearby town. First-aid repairs were started on the damaged ceiling of Eglise St. Maximus and the civil government was urged to make temporary repairs to Tour aux Puces, last remains of the thirteenth century chateau.

It was found during February that fighting in the northern part of the Grand Duchy of LUXEMBOURG and eastern BELGIUM had seriously damaged many buildings and sites on the Official List of Protected Monuments, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. The Romanesque tower of Eglise St. Pierre at BASTOGNE (U-55) had been hit and badly shaken by concussion as had the rest of the church. The shattered main entrance was boarded up in order to protect valuable sculpture and furnishings in the church. Temporary waterproof coverings were put on broken windows and roof holes.

Grand Duchy of LUXEMBOURG villages along the German frontier were found deserted with no building escaping serious damage. At CLERVAUX (P-76) the restored twelfth century castle was found to be again in ruins, but the finest works of art were safe in the Chapel of Notre Dame de la Lorette. This chapel was placed under Civil Affairs protection, and its broken windows and roof were temporarily repaired. Representatives of this sub-section went into REMTFNACH (L-0536) with the Engineers who were to clear the still-smoking rubble from necessary highways. Fragments of the old town market-cross, town-hall sculpture, and wood carvings in the thirteenth century Parish Church were saved. The head of the Abbe Bertels statue was retrieved from the River SURE where it had fallen when the ancient bridge on which it stood was demolished by retreating Germans.

The eleventh century Priory Church of MONT SAINT MARTIN (P-5907), though internationally known as a fine example of Rhenish Romanesque architecture, was fired upon and damaged by the Germans in May 1940. As a result of the long period of dampness a small plaster spalling on the chancel wall indicated to members of this sub-section that a mural painting might have been covered over centuries ago. Removal of a larger area of the loose outer coating of plaster revealed a fourteenth century painting of the Annunciation. The local mayor, cure, and Civil Affairs Detachment were immediately notified of the discovery. Particulars were taken to PARIS (S-04) and complete restoration by experts arranged for. A copyist was sent to MONT SAINT MARTIN (P-5907) to record the walls for the national fresco museum, Palais de Chaillot, PARIS.

Operations in March covered that portion of the RHEIN PROVINZ centering around TRIER (L-22). Fighting in this area was found to have left many cultural institutions badly damaged, but the oldest ones, those of Roman times, had escaped. A civil commission was set up to save fragments, barricade destroyed doorways to prevent spoilation and to care for the collection of archives and works of art which were found to have escaped through intelligent dispersion outside of the city. Temporary covering was put over a large shrapnel hole in the roof of the great Baroque Paulinuskirche at TRIER.

A high German official in PARIS (S-04) during the occupation was found hiding in a small village near TRIER (L-22) in March. Through his cooperation enough fresh, authoritative information was obtained to design a plan for operation throughout the rest of the country. Location of depots of works of art and names of officials who were able and willing to cooperate were plotted on a map. Letters dealing with the complicated intrigue of German seizure of great private collections were found in his files. These were taken over, photographed and held for later study.

Books from the city libraries of BERLIN and DUSSELDORF (P-39) and the University of MARBURG were located at HATTORF (H-5350); this cache contained more than one million books. Another one hundred thousand books from the reference library of the German Foreign Office were found at GROSSENTAFT (H-5040). Eight large deposits full of Jewish books, archives and ritual objects were confiscated by the Germans in occupied countries, and placed in HUNGEN (U-8309), were placed under protection. Guards were placed upon materials from the BERLIN Prussian State art collections which had arrived at MERKERS (H-6850) just two days ahead of American troops. A military guard was also placed upon Schloss Veldenstein, the country home of Reichsmarschal Hermann Goring. In his haste to flee, early in the month, he left behind part of his fabulous collection of paintings, tapestries, sculpture, libraries and jewels.

During the period, 1 May to 8 May, this sub-section uncovered the important Kinsatzstab Rosenberg depots at Schloss COLMBERG (S-9488) and at Schloss KOGL, near ST. GEORGEN (V-2643). The former, a twelfth century castle, contained looted religious paintings from POLAND and RUSSIA. Schloss KOGL contained a considerable collection of paintings, furniture, bric-a-brac and books, mostly taken from French Jewish nationals by the Rosenberg organization. While there were some interesting paintings and good rugs, this was of secondary importance compared with other depots.

The greatest located art collection of all the Nazi takings was also uncovered in the same period. Following weeks of sifting scraps of information, and after three difficult days of tunneling through demolition barriers, the 600-year-old salt mine at ALT AUSEE (V-5212) yielded material intended for the so-called Fuehrer Museum to be constructed in LINZ (V-88), AUSTRIA, as a memorial to Hitler, after the war. In the mine were 6,577 paintings, 230 drawings and watercolors, 954 prints and engravings, 137 pieces of sculpture, 128 pieces of arms and armor, seventy-eight pieces of furniture, seventy-nine baskets of decorative arts, 484 cases, the contents of which are unknown, 122 tapestries, 181 cases of books, and between 1,200 and 1,700 other marked cases of books and periodicals.

The depot at ALT AUSEE (V-5212) formed the hub for twenty-one others of great importance. A provisional

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PART 7





ADJUTANT GENERAL

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

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

Subject: After Action Report of the Adjutant General's Section.

To : Commanding General, Third U. S. Army, APO 403, U. S. Army.

1. There is submitted with this letter, the After Action Report of the Adjutant General's Section, Third U. S. Army Headquarters, beginning with 21 March 1944, and continuing at the designated intervals by chapters.

2. The history of the Adjutant General's Section during the operation "OVERLORD" is largely concerned with the organization and detailed operations of the Casualty Subsection, the Machine Records Unit, and the Army Postal Service. These activities have been selected for lengthy treatment for the reason that these are the sub-divisions of the Adjutant General's Section with functions most radically differing during operations from routine procedures in non-operational situations. The remainder of the Adjutant General's Section, consisting of Executive, Miscellaneous, and Personnel Subsections, functioned throughout the operation, both in method and tempo, in a manner most similar to the routine functioning of these activities in non-operational situations.

R. E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

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3rd Army APO US ARMY 405

ADJUTANT GENERAL SECTION

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Organizational and Functional Chart



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CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

SECTION I

GENERAL

Actual administrative planning for the "OVERLORD" operation was initiated by the Adjutant General's Section on 21 March 1944.

Previous operations had demonstrated that the normal peace time organization of an Army Adjutant General's Section was not adequate or suitable for combat operations. To function rapidly and efficiently in combat, certain sections required augmentation while other sections, such as Top Secret Control and Casualty, had to be created in order to handle those administrative matters peculiar only to combat.

The organization for both planning and operational phases, as finally adopted, is indicated in the chart on the preceding page.

It was not anticipated that the change-over from peace time operations to combat would materially affect the organization of the Miscellaneous and Personnel divisions. An increased volume of work was expected in the Cables and Distribution Sections and this was provided for by augmenting the sections with additional personnel. Provisions were also made to take care of the additional administrative work incident to Awards and Decorations and Battle Field Promotions and Appointments.

The highly secretive nature of the "OVERLORD" operation and its allied plans made it imperative that special measures be adopted for the processing and security of the voluminous amount of highly secretive documents, directives, and papers pertaining to these plans. Consequently, in compliance with instructions from Headquarters European Theater of Operations, a Top Secret Control Section was organized under the jurisdiction and supervision of the Adjutant General.

Security Memorandum No. 2 was issued by Third U. S. Army to all of its attached and assigned units on 26 March. This memorandum set forth the necessary regulations for the operation of the Top Secret Control Section, not only for Headquarters Third U. S. Army but also as a guide for all Third U. S. Army units.

According to this directive, The Adjutant General was designated Top Secret Control Officer for the Headquarters. Two officers and four enlisted men from the Adjutant General's Section were selected to operate the Top Secret Control Section. Each staff section of the Headquarters appointed two Assistant Top Secret Control Officers to be responsible for the handling of documents within its jurisdiction. Officers authorized to be fully informed of operational plans and others authorized to have only partial knowledge (designated "complete" and "limited" knowledge officers respectively) were appointed in each staff section in order that information relating to operational plans (such as "OVERLORD") and cover and deception plans, code names, destinations, dates, special equipment, target areas, and geographical locations would be limited to as few personnel as possible.

The office operated on a twenty-four hour basis as a "sealed room", under guard of Military Police. Entrance was given to designated officers and personnel approved by the Secretary to the General Staff upon the showing of a "Complete" knowledge card to the guard posted at the door.

The Top Secret Control Office cleared all incoming and outgoing correspondence which contained Top Secret information.

Documents were received, registered, distributed, dispatched, filed, and records maintained. Each document was logged in a Top Secret Control Journal and a record of its location noted in a Cardex file. A receipt file was carefully maintained so as to keep a record of all documents. Periodically an inventory of Top Secret documents was made in order to establish accountability.

Periodic reviews of documents originating in the Headquarters were made for the purpose of recommending the earliest possible downgrading. At no time during the operation of the Top Secret Control Office was a Top Secret document lost. The strictest adherence to security regulations was maintained.

Casualty Section — A Casualty Section was organized to process all Battle Casualty Reports expected during the operation. It was placed under the command of an officer obtained from the Seventh U. S. Army who had been in charge of battle casualty reporting in other organizations during two previous campaigns. This section originally consisted of two officers and eight enlisted men. Since battle casualty reporting is considered to be one of the most important functions of an Adjutant General's Section during combat, this subject is treated separately in Section II of this report.

Machine Records Unit — The Machine Records Unit in combat assumes additional duties and responsibilities. It is absolutely essential that accurate strength reports be furnished promptly to interested staff sections and tactical commanders. The processing of battle casualty reports must be rapidly and accurately handled so that casualty information can be furnished to the War Department and to relatives. The operation of a Machine Records Unit during rapid displacements forward and constant work under field conditions presents additional problems. All these are considered of sufficient importance to be treated under a separate Machine Records Unit sub-section.

Postal Section — During the planning phase, the Postal Officer was mainly concerned with determining the Theater policies and plans for postal operations, and with promulgating them to all Army units with certain modifications made to fit the Army tactical plan. Early request was made for sufficient army postal units to service the Army efficiently. One unit for each 10,000 troops was considered the minimum required. The postal service, because of its effect on morale, was considered of sufficient importance to warrant a separate section.

Past operations had shown that it was necessary to move administration to the rear to relieve subordinate commanders of administrative details during combat. It had been found impossible for front line troops to prepare essential administrative papers such as morning reports and casualty reports when actually engaged in combat. Consequently, a personnel administrative plan was prepared prescribing the organization and functions of Administration Centers and Control Sections in all divisions of the Army. The details of the plan as announced were as follows:

PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION PLAN FOR THIRD U. S. ARMY

I. Purpose

1. To relieve Corps, Regimental, and other subordinate commanders of administrative details by moving administrative work to the rear, and,

2. To insure simplicity, accuracy, flexibility, speed, and uniformity in the preparation of personnel reports and records.

II. The Plan

1. An Administration Center will be established at each division rear echelon composed of the Unit Personnel Sections of all assigned or attached units. Supervision, control, and jurisdiction over this section will be the responsibility of the Division Adjutant General.

2. An Administrative Control Section will be established in the forward echelon of each division composed of a small control and liaison group from the Division Adjutant General's Section.

III. The Administration Center -- The functions of the Administration Center will be as follows:

1. Act as a clearing house for all personnel matters between units of the command and higher authority.

2. Supervise the work of the Unit Personnel Sections to insure accuracy, uniformity, and promptness in the preparation of records and reports.

3. Establish a system of control to insure that all Unit Personnel Section reports and returns are submitted when required.

4. Effect rapid distribution of directives and disseminate information to Unit Personnel Sections.

5. Maintain locator card files of all personnel of the command. (This will meet the "Directory Service" requirements of FM 12-105.)

6. Prepare prompt and accurate Battle Casualty Reports and Morning Reports.

7. Complete promptly and accurately the administrative procedures relative to Awards and Decorations and Battlefield Appointments and Promotions.

8. Maintain statistics and casualty status files for ready reference.

IV. The Administrative Control Section -- The functions of the Administrative Control Section will be to control the submission and disposition of summaries of morning report remarks in the following manner:

1. By having one or more officers and sufficient clerical personnel who are familiar with morning report control on duty at the division forward echelon.

2. By receiving from each organic and attached element of the division located in the forward area, a daily summary of morning report remarks on which a control will be maintained to insure that a summary is received from each unit for each morning report "Day".

3. By forwarding by the most expeditious means the daily summaries to the Administration Center.

4. By maintaining liaison with units under division control to secure the daily summary when none is received.

V. Procedure -- The following procedures in the application of this plan will obtain:

1. The Division Commander will have those units of his command which are located in the forward areas submit daily summaries of morning report remarks to the Division Administrative Control section where the control described in Section IV will be maintained. Units remaining in the division rear areas will submit their summaries direct to the Administration Center.

2. The Division Adjutant General will secure reports of admission and disposition from medical installations under division control, secure reports of stragglers and apprehensions from the Provost Marshal, reports of burial from Chaplains and Graves Registration personnel, and information on replacements. This information will be disseminated daily to the Unit Personnel Sections under his control.

3. From the information contained in the summaries of morning report remarks received from the units of the command, and from the information furnished by the Division Adjutant General, the Unit Personnel Officers will prepare battle casualty reports and morning reports. After check to insure accuracy of name spelling, serial number, and other pertinent information entered on these reports, they will be authenticated by the Unit Personnel Officer and forwarded to the Division Adjutant General for disposition as follows:

a. Morning reports to be forwarded to the Machine Records Unit servicing the division.

b. Battle casualty reports to be forwarded in duplicate to the Commanding General, Third U. S. Army, Attention: AG Casualty Division.

VI. Procedure for Corps and Army Troops.

1. Battle Casualty Reports of Corps Troops will be prepared in the Unit Personnel Sections and forwarded to this Headquarters through corps headquarters, where a control will be maintained to insure that reports are expedited. Machine Records Unit servicing corps will not process battle casualty reports.

2. Morning reports of Corps Troops will be forwarded daily by Unit Personnel Officers direct to the Machine Records Unit servicing the corps.

VII. Administration of Detachments -- Detachments, teams, and individuals operating in the combat area because of a specialty or special function will be attached to an organization under control of a division or corps for administration. Changes in status of personnel of this category will then be reported on the morning report of the organization to which attached.

The foregoing plan was issued on 12 April.

In order to make administration procedure uniform for all units of Third U. S. Army and to teach inexperienced personnel those

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administrative matters -- especially casualty reporting -- necessary in combat and not taught during peace time or practiced on maneuvers, a series of administrative schools were organized. A schedule was prepared and corps commanders were notified to provide facilities for the schools. Administrative instructors with combat experience were detailed from the Third U. S. Army Staff to conduct the schools. All Unit Personnel Officers, Sergeants Major, and Personnel Sergeants Major from all corps and division units and army troops, and representatives from the Corps and Division G-1 and Adjutant General's Sections were required to attend. The school schedule was:

First Day

0900 - 0950	Introduction to school Responsibilities of administrative personnel The Personnel Administration Center and the Administrative Control Section
0950 - 1130	Battle Casualties and Battle Casualty Reports Reports of Non-battle Casualties
1130 - 1200	Discussion
1330 - 1500	The G-1 Report
1500 - 1600	Awards and Decorations
1600 - 1700	Discussion

Second Day

0900 - 1130	Personnel Records of Casualties; preparation and submission
1130 - 1200	Discussion
1330 - 1400	Personnel Replacement Procedures
1400 - 1500	Battlefield Appointments and Promotions
1500 - 1530	Reclassification, Reassignment, and Demotion of Officers
1530 - 1600	Prisoners of War and Graves Registration
1600 - 1700	Final Discussion Period

Nine schools were held and all corps and divisions (except one) and practically all corps and army troops units sent representatives to one or another of the schools. Attendance was as follows:

Units Represented	Location	Dates	Number of Attendants
5th Infantry Division XV Corps Troops	Newcastle, North Ireland	10 and 11 May	350
8th Infantry Division XV Corps Troops	Enniskillen, North Ireland	12 and 13 May	330
83d Infantry Division VIII Corps Troops Army Troops	Hanley, England	16 and 17 May	620
79th Infantry Division Army Troops	Warbury Hall, England	19 and 20 May	200
VIII Corps Troops Army Troops	Knutsford, England	22 and 23 May	310
9th Armored Division 28th Infantry Division XX Corps Troops Army Troops	Marlborough, England	26 and 27 May	440
4th Armored Division 6th Armored Division Army Troops 7th Armored Division (Advance Detachment)	Moreton-On-Marsh, England	29 and 30 May	480
35th Infantry Division	Tavistock, England	12 and 13 June	70
XII Corps Headquarters Army Troops	Stourport, England	15 June	600 3,400

SECTION II

CASUALTY SECTION

Upon assignment to the Adjutant General's Section of an officer from the Seventh U. S. Army who had been in charge of casualty reporting in two previous operations, a study was immediately initiated on casualty reporting procedures in effect in the Theater on which the Third U. S. Army casualty reporting system would be based.

Battle casualty reporting is not taught during peace time nor practiced on maneuvers. Plans had to provide for teaching this important subject to the troops and to include the preparation of a complete reference guide that would answer all questions concerning casualties for all personnel responsible for these reports.

The reference guide was prepared, and after approval by the European Theater of Operations, was published on 2 May as Circular No. 8, Headquarters Third U. S. Army. In scope, this circular embraced the entire field of casualty reporting and allied matters. Although too lengthy for reproduction in its entirety here (forty-two pages), it was issued because it had been found that inexperienced troops particularly needed a complete document quickly giving the answers to all questions concerning casualties without the necessity of referring to numerous circulars, directives, and memorandums issued by Army and higher headquarters and generally found to be not at hand when needed.

Section I, Circular No. 8, covered battle casualty reports. Because of general unfamiliarity with this subject, Section I is quoted in its entirety in the following paragraph. For convenience, quotation marks are omitted.

* * * *

1. Purpose. Battle Casualty Reports, ETO-Cas Form 1, are rendered for the purpose of providing the War Department with complete and accurate data regarding casualties which occur as a result of enemy action. Wounded Progress Reports, ETO-Cas Forms 3, are rendered for the purpose of providing the War Department with the progress and ultimate recovery or death of wounded and injured personnel previously reported. From the information contained in these two reports, the War Department notifies the next of kin or emergency addressee of the fact of the casualty and the progress of wounded and injured.

2. Definitions of Battle Casualties.

a. Injury or death is due to enemy action when incurred as a direct result of engagement with an enemy force, or as a direct result of enemy action during an engagement or otherwise; when an injury or death occurs while immediately engaged in, going to, or returning from a combat mission, whether or not due directly to enemy action; when injury or death is the result of any act of the United States or Allied Forces while engaging the enemy. Battle casualties are divided into the following types:

(1) Killed in action.
(2) Died as result of wounds received in action.
(3) Died as result of injuries received in action.
(4) Seriously wounded in action.
(5) Seriously injured in action.
(6) Slightly wounded in action (requiring hospitalization over 24 hours).
(7) Slightly injured in action (requiring hospitalization over 24 hours).
(8) Missing in action.
(9) Captured as a result of enemy action.
(10) Interned in a neutral country as a result of enemy action.
(11) Seriously ill, gas casualty.

b. Killed in action. Individuals will be reported "Killed in Action" only in those cases where there is reasonably conclusive evidence of death or where there are circumstances that lead to no other logical conclusion. Where evidence of death is lacking, the individual will be reported "Missing in Action".

(1) When a date of death is to be reported under circumstances permitting the selection of date or when death has been confirmed but the exact date of death is unknown, the organization commander who is in a position to have or secure records bearing on the case, will select the date on which death could reasonably be presumed to have occurred, consistent with the circumstances, which will be used as official on all records.

c. Wounded or Injured in Action. Wounded or injured in action casualties are those resulting from the piercing of the body by a projectile, a fragment or shell or bomb, an object set in motion by enemy weapons or by weapons of the United States or Allied Forces while engaging the enemy, the piercing of the body by any weapons in the hands of, hurled or thrown by the enemy, torn flesh or broken bones received from a moving object propelled directly or indirectly by the United States or Allied Forces while engaging the enemy, any disabling contact with gas or flames released or propelled by the enemy, or by the United States or Allied Forces while engaging the enemy. Wounds or injuries sustained by paratroopers jumping from aircraft on a combat mission will be classified as "Wounded in Action" or "Injured in Action." "Injured in Action" casualties, as distinguished from "Wounded in Action," are abrasions, sprains, fractures, lacerations, concussions, frost-bite, etc., which are incurred while going to, returning from, or during a combat mission. In those cases where a wound as well as an injury is present, the casualty will be classified and reported as "Wounded in Action." Psychoneuroses and mental diseases developing under battle conditions, commonly but improperly designated "battle neurosis," "anxiety," "hysteria," "shell-shock," etc., will not be classified as battle casualties nor reported on Battle Casualty Reports.

(1) The decision as to whether or not a wound or injury was incurred in action and whether or not the case should be classified as a battle casualty rests with the commander concerned.
(2) All concerned will be on the alert to detect malingering or self-inflicted wounds and to prevent such cases from being reported on battle casualty reports.

d. "Missing in Action," as distinguished from "Missing" (See paragraph 15b, Section II, this circular) are those known to have engaged the enemy on land, on the sea, or in the air, and who are not accounted for after termination of the engagement, flight, or voyage. Personnel will be reported "Missing in Action" and dropped by organizations after a minimum of seventy-two (72) hours from the establishment of the absence. During this period, every effort will be made to secure further information or locate the individual. If, after a report of "Missing in Action" has been made, further information discloses that the person so reported is dead, wounded, injured, or in a different status, a "corrected" Battle Casualty Report will be submitted promptly.

e. Captured by the enemy casualties are those positively known to have fallen into the hands of the enemy. Casualties believed to have fallen into the hands of the enemy, but without positive proof thereof, will be reported "MIA."

f. Interned casualties are those detained by a foreign government under international law. There are two types of "Interned" casualties, "Battle" and "Non-battle." Internments caused by enemy action are "Battle" casualties and will be reported on Battle Casualty Reports. Internments from any other cause are "Non-battle" casualties. Instructions for reporting "Non-battle" casualties are contained in paragraph 15, Section II, of this circular.

3. Notification of Next of Kin and Releases to the Press.

a. Notification to Emergency Addressee and Next of Kin will be made only by The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington 25, D. C., based on official casualty reports rendered through this Headquarters. No other notification as such will be made direct by commanders or others in this command except when the emergency addressee or next of kin resides within the theater. The notification will then be made by the Theater Commander, acting for the War Department.

b. When commanders, chaplains, or personnel officers desire to send letters of sympathy, such letters will be prepared in triplicate and forwarded to this Headquarters, through channels, [illegible] envelope addressed to the emergency addressee. [illegible] will be taken in regard to the [illegible]

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(1) That the full name and serial number of the casualty is stated,
(2) That the letter contains the same categorical description of the casualty as does the official casualty report,
(3) That the letter does not magnify the subject's condition and does not indicate that there is or is not the possibility of return to duty,
(4) That security and censorship regulations are strictly observed, and that information regarding the location of graves, disposal of remains and effects, photographs of graves are not included or inclosed, and,
(5) That whom letters of inquiry from relatives and other interested parties are answered, the writer has assured himself that an official casualty report has been rendered, and that letters so written are forwarded through channels.

c. In no case will casualty information be released, outside of official casualty reports, until thirty (30) days have elapsed since the rendition of an official report.

4. When submitted. Battle Casualty Reports will be submitted as expeditiously as possible after casualty occurs. reports on wounded and injured will not be delayed pending the investigation of other types of casualties. In no event will accuracy be sacrificed for speed.

5. Security Classification. Battle Casualty Reports and correspondence relating thereto will be classified "CONFIDENTIAL."

6. Preparation.

a. By Whom Rendered. Battle Casualty Reports will be prepared by regiments, separate battalions, companies, detachments, and similar units. These reports will be prepared in the Administration Centers of divisions for all troops assigned or attached to the division, and in the Unit Personnel Sections of corps and army troops. (See Circular 3, this Headquarters).

b. Accuracy. Accuracy is essential in the preparation of Battle Casualty Reports. It is inexcusable to report erroneously an individual killed. Names and serial numbers must be carefully checked and verified to insure that correct identity is established. Reports must be clear and legibly prepared. All sources of information and verification must be used to insure that the correct casualty status is reported. The authentication of a report by the Unit Personnel Officer or his representative is a certification that name spellings, army serial numbers, etc., have been checked and verified with personnel records.

c. Form to be used. Battle Casualty Reports will be rendered on ETO-Cas Form 1 only. This form will be supplied to units upon requisition, but in the event they are not available, they may be reproduced.

d. Information required.

(1) Organization. The official organization number or title designated by the War Department will be used, e.g. 17th Inf., 4th Inf., 3d Bomb Gp., etc. Combat teams, landing groups, shipment numbers, force numbers and codes will not be given as the organization on Battle Casualty Reports. Reports may be consolidated by parent units and one complete report forwarded daily.
(2) Army Serial Number. Must agree with that shown on service or other personnel records.
(3) Name. Full name and middle initial, if any, must be shown thus: "Smith, John P." or "Smith, John (NMI)," or "Smith, J. P. (IO)." Officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men will be reported on the same report regardless of grade or type of casualty. Names need not be arranged alphabetically.
(4) Grade. Grade must agree with that shown on Service Record and/or other personnel records on date of casualty.
(5) Arm or Service. The arm or service of each casualty will be entered in the "Arm or Service" column, i.e., "Inf," "AC," "FA," etc. Where the arm or service of all casualties appearing on the report is the same, one remark may be entered to indicate the fact, i.e. "All CAC," "All FA," etc.
(6) Type of Casualty Codes.

KIA - Killed in Action.
DOW - Died of Wounds received in Action.
DOI - Died of Injuries received in Action.
SWA - Seriously Wounded in Action.
SIA - Seriously Injured in Action.
LWA - Slightly Wounded in Action. (Hospitalized)
LIA - Slightly Injured in Action. (Hospitalized)
MIA - Missing in Action.
SIC - Seriously ill, gassed. (Hospitalized)
CAP - Captured by the Enemy.
INT - Interned as a result of Enemy Action.
RTD - Returned to duty from a previously reported casualty status.
ALW - Alive and Well.

(7) Date of Casualty. Show dates as follows: "6 Feb 44," "IC Oct 44."
(8) Flying or Jump Status. A separate column will be used on ETO-Cas Form 1 which indicates the flying or jump status of all casualties. Under no circumstances will this coded information be entered in the "Type of Casualty" column. In the case of ground forces and paratroops, one remark may be entered on the face of the form thus: "All not on flying or jump status," or "All qualified paratroops on jump status." The following codes will be used:

A - Pilot, Co-pilot, Command Pilot
B - Navigator
C - Bombardier
D - Observer
E - Flight Surgeon
F - Photographer
G - Radio Operator Gunner
H - Engineer Gunner
I - Armorer Gunner
J - Qualified paratroops on jump status
K - Gunner
L - All others on flying or jump status not included above
Z - Not on flying or jump status

(9) Place of Casualty. Show the territory, country or state where the casualty occurred. If all casualties on the report occurred in the same place, enter one remark, thus: "All casualties occurred Tunisia."
(10) Race. Casualties other than "White" will be so indicated after the name.
(11) When the emergency address of a casualty resides in the theater, the casualty report will include the emergency addressee's name, address, and relationship, in parenthesis, on the line following the name of the casualty.
(12) BCK Control Numbers will be assigned to reports by this Headquarters. Units will make no entry in the space indicated "BCK CONTROL NO._____" on ETO-Cas Form 1.
(13) Under column headed "MOS", the correct military occupational specialty code for enlisted men will be entered from WD AGO Form 20, Qualification Card (AR 615-26, as amended). For officers, the codes listed in TM's 12-406 and 12-407 will be used without the organizational level fifth digit, i.e. 1542, 1034, 1203. Entries on WD AGO Forms 20 and 66-1 must be kept current in this respect.

e. Authentication. All Battle Casualty Reports will be signed by an officer or warrant officer whose name, grade, and title will be legibly stamped, typed, or printed under the signature.

f. Date. Each Battle Casualty Report will be dated.

g. Copies Required. The original and duplicate copy will be forwarded to this Headquarters, both copies will be signed. Sufficient copies will be prepared so that one may be retained at each Headquarters through which the report passes.

h. Non-battle Casualties, i.e., normal illness or accidental injury, deserts, missing or interned non-battle casualties will not be reported on Battle Casualty Reports. See paragraph 13, Section II, this circular.

i. Separate Reports. U. S. Army battle casualties and casualties of the several U. S. and Allied military and naval services will be listed on separate reports. The services concerned will be clearly typed or printed in bold characters on the first line of the report, thus: "U. S. Marine Corps," "Royal Navy," etc.

j. Wounds and Injuries not Reported. Light wounds, injuries, and gas casualties that do not require hospitalization for more than 24 hours will not be reported on Battle Casualty Reports. This in no way affects the right of the individual to a Purple Heart award for wounds received in action. All wounds received in action, however slight, that require medical attention, will be recorded in the service record of enlisted men and on WD AGO Form 66-1 for officers or warrant officers.

k. Classification of Wounds and Injuries. Wounds and injuries will be carefully classified as "Slight" or "Serious." Previous reports indicate that many wounds are incorrectly classified. Many individuals have died of reported "Slight" wounds and other individuals who were reported "Seriously wounded" have been reported as returned to duty within a few days after the initial report. Wounds and injuries will not be reported as "Serious" unless the gravity of the wound or injury imperils the life of the individual or indicates permanent disability.

l. Corrected Reports. When it is discovered that an erroneous casualty report has been rendered, a correction must be submitted immediately. Previous report will not be corrected by retyping the entire original report minus the names of those erroneously reported and labeling it a "CORRECTED" report. Battle Casualty Reports will be corrected or amended by the procedure used to correct an erroneous entry in the Morning Report. The name of the individual whose status is to be corrected will be included with other initial casualties, with a remark after or on the line below his name showing the change in casualty status. Examples: "From MIA to RTD," "From MIA to KIA," "From SIA to DOI," "From SWA to LWA," "Correcting date of casualty from MIA 2 May to MIA 3 May 43," etc. Enter in the "Date of Casualty" column, the date of the new or corrected status. Corrections to previously submitted Battle Casualty Reports will be made on ETO-Cas Form 1 only. If letters of explanation are necessary, they will be securely stapled to the report, arranged so that the Form 1 is on top.

m. Returns to Duty. Personnel returned to a duty status with any organization, including replacement installations, from a previously reported battle casualty status, will be reported on Battle Casualty Reports. Separate reports are not required; names may be included with other initial reports of battle casualties. The code to be used in the "Type of Casualty" column will be "RTD" and "Date of Casualty" column, will show the date soldier returned to a duty status. The effective "Date of Casualty" for escaped prisoners of war and interned personnel will be the date the individual first returned to allied military control.

n. Reports on Personnel of other Units. Individuals attached to and carried on the morning report of the reporting organization will be included on the Battle Casualty Report of the organization when they become casualties while serving with that organization. Commanders having knowledge of casualties from other organizations will furnish the commanders thereof, in writing, all information available. A copy of such notification will be forwarded to the next higher headquarters.

o. Check and Consolidation. Battle Casualty Reports will not be consolidated beyond the regiment. Each Division Headquarters must maintain a file of battle casualties reported through their headquarters. All sources of casualty information such as Reports of Burial, Admission and Disposition Reports from hospitals and other medical installations, and reports of stragglers, apprehensions and shootings will be checked against this file to prevent an individual from being reported as "Missing in Action" where a parallel report reveals a different status.

p. Battle Casualty Reports rendered by Hospitals. Commanders of hospitals assigned or attached to this command will submit Battle Casualty Reports, ETO-Cas Form 1, on personnel of the hospital, the Detachment of Patients, and on other personnel, not members of the Detachment of Patients, when such personnel become casualties while

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undergoing treatment at the hospital. In the latter case, the hospital commander will furnish copies of Battle Casualty Reports to the individual's organization commanders.

7. Routing of Battle Casualty Reports.

a. Unit Personnel Sections and Administration Centers will secure accurate casualty information from unit commanders and prepare typewritten reports.

b. Attached units will forward Battle Casualty Reports through the headquarters to which attached except that U. S. Army troops, attached to Allied forces, will forward Battle Casualty Reports through the headquarters to which assigned.

c. Battle Casualty Reports prepared in the Administration Centers of Divisions will be forwarded by Division Adjutants General daily for all assigned and attached troops. Reports will be forwarded direct to this Headquarters marked for the attention of the AG Casualty Division.

d. Battle Casualty Reports prepared in the Unit Personnel Sections of Corps troops will be forwarded to this Headquarters, addressed as above, through the Corps Headquarters to which assigned or attached.

e. Battle Casualty Reports of Army troops will be forwarded direct to this Headquarters by Unit Personnel Officers.

f. All reports forwarded to this Headquarters will be in duplicate.

8. Action Taken at Army Headquarters. The Army Machine Records Unit will maintain a set of Casualty cards from which any type of casualty statistic or tabulation, based on the information contained in the Battle Casualty Report, can be quickly reproduced on request. A reproduced set of Battle Casualty cards will be forwarded daily to each Corps Machine Records Unit for the purpose of furnishing casualty data requested by organizations serviced by that Machine Records Unit.

9. Hospital Reports. The provisions of Paragraph 11d, ETOUSA, Circular 46, dated 22 April 1944, concerning the preparation of reports by medical installations, will govern, except that reports prepared by units of this command will be submitted in accordance with the following supplementary instructions.

a. Immediate Action Letters. The commander of each active U. S. Army hospital will submit an immediate report where the condition of any non-battle casualty patient, who is a member of the U. S. Army, or a non-military person accompanying or serving with the Army of the United States, is such that recovery is questionable and notification should be made to the next of kin. Reports will be classified "CONFIDENTIAL" and rendered by radio or teletype if facilities permit. When such facilities are not available, the report will be submitted in letter form conspicuously marked "IMMEDIATE ACTION," and dispatched by the most expeditious means available, to this Headquarters, addressed to the attention of the AG CASUALTY DIVISION.

(1) In preparing reports, information regarding the full name, grade, serial number, organization, name of reporting installation, and date of admission, diagnosis, circumstances surrounding casualty if accidental, and condition, i.e., seriously or dangerously ill or injured. Reports may contain any number of individuals. An example of a radio report follows: "ROBERT L JONES MAJOR 0967854 NINETEENTH ENGR BN ADMITTED 8 EVAC HOSP 11 JULY 44 SUFFERING FROM FRACTURES AND INTERNAL INJURIES ACCIDENTLY INCURRED AUTO ACCIDENT SERIOUSLY INJURED," or "JAMES M GOODLAND SGT 21364578 79 RECON SQUADRON ADMITTED 87 STATION HOSPITAL 11 OCT 44 PNEUMONIA DANGEROUSLY ILL."

(2) After such initial report has been made, the individual will be carried as seriously or dangerously ill or injured until dropped on the Daily Disposition Report, ETO-Cas Form 4.

(3) When an individual who has once been reported as seriously or dangerously ill or injured is transferred to another hospital, a statement will accompany him with other medical records giving his casualty status, "Battle" or "Non-battle" and a resume of any reports rendered. The commander of the hospital to which evacuated will then pick up and report the [illegible] progress or disposition of the indiv[illegible]

b. Daily Disposition Report, ETO-[illegible] report will be rendered on all patients ("battle" and [illegible]) are dropped by a hospital under one of the categories listed on the reverse of ETO-Cas Form 4. On all evacuations and transfers, destination and hospital will be indicated if known.

(1) Daily Disposition Reports prepared by hospitals of this command will be forwarded in triplicate to this Headquarters addressed to the attention of the AG CASUALTY DIVISION.

c. Progress Reports, ETO-Cas Form 3. This form will be prepared on all battle casualties who are present as of midnight of the last day of each reporting period. Reports will be submitted on the 10th and 25th of each month, and the periods covered by the reports will be as follows;

(1) Report submitted the 10th of the month--from 0001 hours 25th day of the month to 2400 hours the 9th day of the reporting month.

(2) Report submitted the 25th day of the month--from 0001 hours on the 10th day of the month to 2400 hours on the 24th day of the month.

d. The following will govern in connection with the preparation of these reports;

(1) Progress of casualty will be reported by one of the symbols listed on the reverse of ETO-Cas Form 3.

(2) Initial reports will be submitted by all newly activated hospitals or hospitals newly arrived in the theater.

(3) Negative reports will be submitted by all active hospitals in appropriate cases.

(4) Final reports will be submitted when hospitals are inactivated or leave the theater. Remarks will show date of inactivation or departure and status or disposition of patients.

(5) Cases in which type (battle or non-battle) of casualty is questionable or undetermined will be reported.

(6) Redesignated hospitals will show both old and new designation on the first report submitted subsequent to the date of redesignation.

(7) Evacuation hospitals will report only return to duty cases, deaths, those admitted dead, evacuations to another theater or direct to the United States, and the progress of those casualties present at the expiration of each report period who have been retained over ten days.

(8) All reports prepared by Hospitals assigned or attached to this command will be forwarded through channels to this Headquarters marked for the attention of the AG CASUALTY DIVISION.

e. Check and Consolidation. At each administrative headquarters through which the Daily Disposition Report or the Progress Report passes, the names entered thereon will be checked against casualty files to insure that all battle casualties have been reported on official Battle Casualty Reports, ETO-Cas Form 1.

10. Allied and Enemy Dead. Casualty Reports on allied and enemy dead will be rendered in accordance with the following instructions;

a. Casualty Reports on U. S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard personnel will be forwarded by the unit preparing the report direct to the Staff Medical Officer, COMNAVEAU, LONDON. Casualty Reports on allied army personnel will be forwarded direct to the agency previously designated by such allied army. If correct agency cannot be ascertained, such reports will be forwarded to the CO, ETOUSA, APO 887, "Attention; AG Casualty Division."

b. Casualty reports on enemy dead will be made on Graves Registration Form 1 only. This form, prepared in quintuplicate, [illegible] all pertinent data and including nationality will be forwarded [illegible] nearest Graves Registration Unit together with the personal property including money and duplicate identification tag. Care will be [illegible] to avoid separating Graves Registration Form 1 from the personal property of enemy dead until delivery to the Graves Registration Unit.

This is the end of Section I, Circular No. 8.

Sections II to IX of this circular dealt with allied matters usually covered in Army Regulations and other directives of general availability. These sections are synopsized below to show the scope of instructions desired to be issued on battle casualty reporting.

SECTION II -- Reports on Non-battle Casualties -- Deceased, Missing, Interned -- (Definitions of non-battle casualties -- Reports to be rendered -- Non-battle deaths -- Missing or interned personnel -- Statements surrounding disappearance of missing personnel -- Reports required on non-military personnel.)

SECTION III -- Settlement of Pay Accounts of Casualties -- (Action taken on deaths -- Duties of commanding officer -- Duties of disbursing officer -- Action taken on casualties other than deaths -- Duties of commanding officer -- Duties of disbursing officer.)

SECTION IV -- Preparation and Submission of Personnel Records -- (Records of enlisted men -- Records of officers -- Preparation of final statement -- Entry of medals, decorations, and citations on records -- Check list of common errors -- Letters of condolence.)

SECTION V -- Disposition of Effects -- (Deceased and missing in action -- Sick and wounded -- Deserters -- Unknown owners -- U. S. Navy and British military and Naval personnel -- Enemy.)

SECTION VI -- Casualty Mail -- (Action by organization commander upon receipt of mail addressed to men who have been listed as casualties -- Differentiation between first class mail and second, third, and fourth class mail -- Mail not bearing return address.)

SECTION VII -- Army Burials and Graves Registration -- (Designation of unit graves registration officers -- Responsibilities of company commander -- Burial reports.)

SECTION VIII -- Reports of Investigation -- Deaths and Injuries -- (Deaths -- When post mortem examination and coroner's inquest held -- Disposition of reports of investigation -- Injuries -- Evidence required -- Disposition of reports.)

SECTION IX -- Disposition of Hospitalized Personnel -- (Transfer of individuals from units -- Morning report entry -- Disposition of individuals by hospitals -- Action taken when returnees from hospital create overstrength.)

The Administration Schools which were held during the period 10 May - 15 June were utilized to the fullest extent to familiarize all administrative personnel of Third U. S. Army with the details and importance of casualty reporting. The schedule and scope of these schools were given in Section I, Chapter 1, of this report.

It had been the experience of the Seventh U. S. Army in Sicily and the Fifth U. S. Army in Italy that, due to the frequent moves of Corps Headquarters and the frequent transfers of Divisions between Army Corps, the processing of casualty reports thru Corps Machine Records Unit resulted in unnecessary delay. Authority was obtained from the Theater Commander to establish Army Headquarters as the central processing and control agency for casualty reporting.

Coordination of all agencies from which casualty information was available was effected and necessary action taken to insure;

That hospitals would furnish this Headquarters information regarding casualties received and disposition by name, date, and diagnosis.

That prompt and accurate information would be received from the Army Graves Registration service regarding burials; and

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That a system of transmission of casualty reports pertaining to units and a system of dissemination of casualty information relating thereto would be established to insure more rapid delivery than normal message center facilities provided.

Admission and Disposition Reports (a copy is attached as Annex 1) were prescribed for preparation by all medical installations and submission daily.

Coordination with the Army Graves Registration Officer insured that Reports of Burial required by the Casualty Section would be received as promptly as possible after burial, and that every effort would be made to complete the report in all details.

Plans were made for the establishment of a courier system to be adopted at the beginning of operations.

After issuance of the directive, completion of schools, and final coordination of associated activities and agencies, internal training of the Casualty Section began. Only two officers and eight enlisted men could be made available for training during this phase because the Army Headquarters Tables of Organization made no provisions for a Casualty Section, and no allowance of personnel therefor.

After attachment of the French 2d Armored Division to Third U. S. Army for operation, plans were expanded to include instructions and procedures for the processing of French Army casualties. On 9 June, after several conferences with staff officers from the French Division, a directive was issued by this Headquarters which contained substantially the following provisions with reference to battle casualty reporting:

Battle Casualty Reports were to be submitted to this Headquarters on a special form meeting the needs of both the French authorities and the Adjutant General's Casualty Section.

Reports were to be submitted as promptly as possible after occurrence of casualty and every effort was to be made to insure that the report was complete and accurate and that all available sources of information, such as reports from the medical battalion showing battle casualties being treated, Reports of Burial from the Chef D'Etat Civile, and any other available information were checked to insure accuracy. A death certificate (French, Acte de Deces) would be prepared in each case of death within the division and a carbon copy thereof forwarded to the Adjutant General's Casualty Section. In reciprocity, all American hospitals were required to complete the French Acte de Deces form wherever a member of the French 2d Armored Division died in an American hospital, the original copy of this certificate to be submitted to Headquarters, French 2d Armored Division for the Chef D'Etat Civile, and a carbon copy to the Adjutant General's Casualty Section, Headquarters Third U. S. Army.

Burials of American dead made by the French 2d Armored Division were to be reported to this Headquarters by name, grade, serial number, organization if known, date of death, and date and place of burial. Reports were to show cause of death, if known.

Wounded Progress Reports were to be prepared by Third U. S. Army hospitals on personnel of the French 2d Armored Division hospitalized for wounds or injuries received in action and submitted to the higher agency of the French Army charged with notifying the next of kin of the progress of those wounded in action. Copies of these reports were to be furnished to the French 2d Armored Division.

An officer and two enlisted men of the French 2d Armored Division were to be placed on duty in the Casualty Section at this Headquarters to process and coordinate reports of French casualties. At least one of the three individuals so detailed was to be able to speak English.

To assure uniformity in reporting, definitions of categories of casualties published in Section I, Circular No. 8, (quoted above) were to be observed by the French 2d Armored Division.

Planning was now considered complete. Although the equipment and personnel was still insufficient, upon movement of the Third U. S. Army Rear Echelon to the Staging Area, the Casualty Section was prepared for its mission.

SECTION III

MACHINE RECORDS UNIT

Prior to 26 March (when the 39th Machine Records Unit was assigned to Third U. S. Army), the European Theater of Operations had developed the General Machine Records System that would be adopted in all Corps and Armies operating in this Theater. The general system prescribed the assignment of a machine records unit to each Army and Corps Headquarters, provided that certain routine reports would regularly be rendered, prescribed the distribution of such reports, and outlined the channels for procurement of machine records supplies, spare parts, and equipment.

The 39th Machine Records Unit arrived at Toft Camp on 1 April and immediately busied itself in rounding out the organization of the unit in preparation for field operations, in obtaining supplemental equipment that would be required, and in developing special reports that would be helpful to Third U. S. Army Staff in the forthcoming operation as well as in coordinating the detailed plan of machine records administration within units of the Army.

The following special reports were developed to facilitate the work of the General and Special Staffs in planning movements of troops, requisitioning filler and replacement personnel, and obtaining necessary supplies and equipment:

Weekly Strength Returns of all Third U. S. Army Units.

Weekly Station List with daily changes thereto.

Inventory of Specialists in tabulation form.

Listing of Unit Serial Numbers assigned to each sub-unit.

Alphabetical listing of officers assigned to Third U. S. Army.

Suspect Report for G-2 Section showing names, locations, descriptions, and type of suspect (dangerous, suspect, unclassified.)

In addition to the above special reports, the following routine operations were carried on:

Daily changes to the organization master file were prepared and forwarded daily to Central Machine Records Unit, European Theater of Operations.

Weekly strength cards, W.D., A.G.O. Form 519 were prepared and forwarded to Central Machine Records Unit, European Theater of Operations, on the 7th, 14th, 21st, and last day of each month.

Monthly strength cards, W.D., A.G.O. Form No. 320 were prepared and forwarded to the War Department through Central Machine Records Unit, European Theater of Operations.

Monthly reports of absentees without leave were prepared for the Theater Provost Marshal.

Locator cards on units newly gained from the United States were prepared for Base and Army Post Offices.

Monthly officer personnel rosters were prepared and forwarded to the War Department.

Monthly enlisted personnel rosters for all Units assigned or attached to Third U. S. Army were prepared.

Embarkation rosters were produced for units embarking for movement to the Continent.

Officers status file was reproduced each month for Central Machine Records Unit, European Theater of Operations.

It was foreseen that the forthcoming operation would be one of extreme fluidity in which the frequent displacement of headquarters elements over long distances would be necessary. To prevent the suspension of operations within Machine Records Units for excessive periods during such movements, it was considered highly desirable to provide additional transportation, the minimum necessary being one tractor-truck for each semi-trailer van, plus sufficient auxiliary transportation to enable the unit to move without shuttling. This transportation was obtained for the 39th Machine Records Unit during this period.

Because of the close relationship between the Casualty Section and the Machine Records Unit (growing from the inter-dependence of their work), it was planned to merge these groups for movement and operations. In order to lend sufficient flexibility to the Machine Records and Casualty groupment to enable it to operate independently of the remainder of the Adjutant General's Section both as to distance and as to time schedule, it was planned to provide a separate mess to be operated by the 39th Machine Records Unit.

It was apparent that Machine Records Units would occupy a vital place in battle casualty reporting during operations, and much attention was given to planning Machine Records participation in the battle casualty reporting system. As finally approved for Third U. S. Army, the plan required that battle casualty reports be first checked by the Third U. S. Army Battle Casualty Section to assure accuracy, and then submitted to the Machine Records Unit, which would produce battle casualty cards for transmission to Theater Headquarters. In processing battle casualty reports, the Army Headquarters Machine Records Unit was charged with the task of processing reports of all troops of Third U.S. Army, including divisions. It was a vital part of the system that Corps Machine Records Units should be prevented from processing battle casualty reports on their way backward from fighting units to Army Headquarters.

The plan required that completed battle casualty reports be in the form of International Business Machines' punch cards. Since the report was required in quintuple, five decks of such cards were to be produced by the Army Headquarters Machine Records Unit; three decks to be mailed immediately to Theater Headquarters, one deck retained for files in the Machine Records Unit, and the fifth deck to be sorted by corps and transmitted to Corps Machine Records Units for mechanical processing against corps status files to maintain such files in current condition and to detect any errors that might exist in the Battle Casualty Report.

Attachment of the French 2d Armored Division raised the question of machine records services to troop units of armies of Allied Nations when such units were operationally attached to our forces. It was felt that records of individual soldiers of Allied Nations would have no operational value, but that strength returns of organizations in this category would be necessary for operational purposes. Consequently, it was decided that status files for troops in this classification would not be maintained, but that special strength returns would be submitted from which Machine Records Units would be able to compile the necessary consolidated returns. To implement this decision, the following directive was issued on 9 June to the Commanding General, French 2d Armored Division:

"Machine Records Requirements

"A daily report . . . will be submitted to the Commanding General, XII Corps, attention: 14th Machine Records Unit (M), showing the strength and location of each Brigade, Regiment, Battalion, separate Company and separate Detachment.

"The report will show the strength of each separate organization as follows:

Number of officers assigned and present for duty.
Number of officers assigned but absent, i.e., on leave, sick in hospital, assigned not yet joined, and otherwise not present.
Total number of officers present and absent.
Number of enlisted men, including non-commissioned officers, assigned but absent, i.e., on leave, sick in hospital, assigned not yet joined, and otherwise not present.
Total number of enlisted men, including non-commissioned officers, present and absent.

"Locations will be entered below the name of each organization and will give the name of the town and map coordinates in two places alphabetically and four places numerically. British Grid System will be used. In the event the organization is not in a town, reference may be made to the distance from the nearest town, i.e., Glasgow, five (5) Kilm West Of LL85."

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Postal plans for Continental operations provided for the location of one Postal Regulating Section at each of the two principal debarkation points and one for each Army. In addition to their normal duties, these shore installations were to perform Base Post Office functions until a Base Post Office was established on the Continent. Incoming mail destined for the Continent was to be cleared through the Base Post Office in the United Kingdom and dispatched to "Red" or "Black", as the two beachheads were designated. Outgoing mail would reverse this channel.

Army Postal Units and Army Post Offices were given specific instructions as to technical operating procedures on the Continent. Eighteen of these units were attached to Third U. S. Army and instructions were promptly issued that they maintain reserve postal stocks at a thirty day level and have necessary equipment available for immediate movement. Each Army Post Office was to provide mail service for troops located in its vicinity regardless of Army Post Office address used. A 1½-ton 6x6 vehicle was allotted to each Army Postal Unit by special War Department authorization.

Army postal plans provided for the attachment of two Army Postal Units to each corps. Others were to be controlled and located by Army Headquarters according to postal requirements. Collection, distribution, and delivery of mail was to begin as soon as practicable after arrival on the Continent. So far as possible, separate transportation was to be provided for mail. The Army Post Office and cable address to be used by an organization was to be determined by command assignment, and was not affected by either higher echelon attachment or geographic location of the organization.

The attachment of the French 2d Armored Division to Third U. S. Army necessitated special postal plans which included continuance of the French postal procedures where practicable. This division continued use of its money order system, but American postage and rates were used. The free mailing privilege to North Africa and the Near East was included. All mail was transported by the U. S. Army Postal Service, and that for delivery in North Africa and the Near East was delivered to the French Base Post Office in Algeria.

Based on the experience gained in the United Kingdom and the quality of service rendered there, Army postal installations were prepared to render postal service with maximum efficiency under combat conditions.

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

SECTION I

GENERAL

This phase was a transition period between planning and operations. Additional personnel and field equipment were obtained to meet unforseen deficiencies. Plans were revised where necessary and actual combat training obtained by attaching members of the Casualty Section to Third U. S. Army units engaged in combat under the First U. S. Army.

Officers from the various sub-sections of the Adjutant General's Section visited most of the Third U. S. Army units operating under other headquarters and also those units preparing for the coming operation. These semi-official visits proved extremely helpful.

During this phase, the Adjutant General's Section was consolidated and began to function as one unit with the exception of the Top Secret Control Sub-section which operated with the office of the Secretary General staff until 12 July, when this group was moved to the Adjutant General's bivouac in the Rear Echelon.

SECTION II

CASUALTY SECTION

This period was devoted to training the personnel of the Casualty Section by attaching one officer and four enlisted men to Third U. S. Army units actually engaged in combat under First U. S. Army.

It was anticipated that unreported casualties and correspondence on uncompleted cases would be received from Third U. S. Army units when they reverted to control of Third U. S. Army Headquarters on 1 August. In order that this correspondence (changes in status of casualties previously reported through First U. S. Army and initial casualties on which no action had yet been taken) could be processed by the Casualty Section, it was necessary that a complete casualty file be obtained from the First U. S. Army. To accomplish this, two machine trailers from 14th Machine Records Unit (Twelfth Corps Headquarters) were dispatched to First U. S. Army and reproduction of the cards effected.

In order to insure the rapid transmittal of Battle Casualty Reports, the following directive was issued on 31 July to all Corps and Division Commanders.

"1. In order to expedite the transmission and processing of Battle Casualty Reports, WD-Cas Forms 1, and Morning Reports, W.D., A.G.O. Forms 1 and 2, commanders concerned will institute the following procedure immediately upon reverting to control of or becoming operational under the Third U. S. Army.

"a. A daily courier will be dispatched by each Division to the Corps of attachment to deliver all Battle Casualty Reports and Morning Reports for all organic and attached troops prepared for the preceeding twenty-four (24) hour period.

"b. Corps Commanders will institute daily courier service between Corps and Army in order to relay the Battle Casualty Reports received from the Divisions and Corps troops to the Army A-G Casualty Section.

"2. Every effort will be made by Division Commanders to insure that the courier dispatched to Corps leaves at the earliest possible time each day and that all Battle Casualty Reports and correspondence pertaining thereto destined for the Army are forwarded by this method, and that Morning Reports, destined for the Corps Machine Records Unit, are dispatched in the same manner.

"3. Corps Commanders will not delay the relay of Division shipments of Battle Casualty Reports or allied matters. Immediately upon receipt of all Division shipments, the following action will be taken;

"a. Morning Reports will be turned over to the Machine Records Unit.

"b. Battle Casualty Reports and correspondence pertaining thereto, received from Divisions, will be placed in the Corps' Courier pouch.

"c. Corps Troops Battle Casualty Reports, Corps Medical Installations Admission and Disposition Reports (ETOUSA MD Forms 32½a), Corps Hospitals' Daily Disposition Reports (ETO-Cas Forms 4), will be placed in the Corps' Courier pouch.

"4. The courier dispatched from Corps will leave in sufficient time to arrive at Army not later than 1600 daily, and each Corps Commander will maintain a control to insure that a daily shipment or negative report is received from each Division under his control. Couriers will not be utilized for other purposes which would tend to delay the receipt of the reports at either Corps or Army.

"5. Upon arrival of the Corps Couriers at Army, delivery of the pouch will be made direct to the Adjutant General Casualty Section and receipt taken. Casualty correspondence originating at Army or higher headquarters and destined for the various Corps or Divisions will be turned over to the appropriate Corps courier upon arrival at Army for subsequent delivery to the addressee. Correspondence addressed to Divisions will be segregated at Corps and delivered to the appropriate Division by the respective Division couriers."

SECTION III

MACHINE RECORDS UNIT

Arriving in France, the 99th Machine Records Unit found a majority of Third U. S. Army troops on the Continent attached to First U. S. Army. Correspondingly, all status files for units destined to form the Third U. S. Army were being maintained temporarily by Machine Records Units of First U. S. Army.

Prior to 1 August, the Machine Records Unit made detailed plans and coordinated with First U. S. Army the transfer of files and services from First U. S. Army Machine Records Units to Third U. S. Army Machine Records Units, all such plans to be effective at the beginning of operations.

First U. S. Army Machine Records Units had discovered that tactical operations entailed constant shifting of divisions and separate units from corps to corps. This fact required the frequent shifting of files from Machine Records Unit to Machine Records Unit in an effort to keep pace with changing attachments of organizations. Accordingly, it was planned to freeze attachments of organizations to corps Machine Records Units for service until the tactical situation should stabilize sufficiently to insure long-term attachments of divisions to corps.

SECTION IV

POSTAL SECTION

Postal service to Third U. S. Army troops was begun immediately upon arrival on the Continent. Initially, all Army Postal Units and Army Post Offices called at a beach Postal Regulating Section for mail. Within a short time, however, mail delivery to Army Post Offices was begun. Some variation of this plan remained in effect until Third U. S. Army became operational. The urgency of continuous movement of mail across the beaches was so great that no energy was diverted from this task to the less essential chore of record keeping. No records of tonnage handled were kept. None exist.

Instructions were issued to all corps, divisions, and brigades that copies of special orders covering replacement personnel were to be furnished to the Ground Force Replacement System and to whatever Replacement Depot had cleared the personnel in question. By this means, the necessity to pass mail through replacement channels before delivery to addressees was obviated. Concurrently, all Army and Corps troops were instructed to report to the nearest Army Post Office for mail service.

During the pre-operational stage, Army postal installations became familiar with mail service on the Continent and demonstrated their fitness to perform any postal services required of them.

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

SECTION I

GENERAL

The first concern of the Adjutant General at the beginning of operations on 1 August was the division of the Section into Forward and Rear Echelon groups. Prior to 1 August, the entire headquarters had been camped together. When the Forward Echelon displaced from the initial bivouac it was accompanied by two officers and four enlisted men from the Adjutant General's Section on temporary duty with the Secretary General Staff to perform necessary Adjutant General's functions in the Forward Echelon. This arrangement did not prove satisfactory, and during the month of August a separate Adjutant General's sub-section, Forward Echelon (two officers and eight enlisted men), was created. Thereafter, this section remained with the Forward Echelon and [illegible] following functions:

Received, recorded, and routed all mail received by the Forward Echelon.

Authenticated all outgoing documents (mainly operational) dispatched from the Forward Echelon.

Maintained working files only, all documents of permanent record being sent to the Adjutant General's Record Section in the Rear Echelon.

This arrangement proved to possess the necessary flexibility and mobility, and during the month of August operated with gratifying smoothness.

The remainder of the Adjutant General's Section, organized as shown in Chapter 1, was retained in the Rear Echelon under direct control of the Adjutant General. The section functioned as an individual command group, maintaining its own bivouac and (except for messing) controlling its own administration during the operation.

Functions performed in the Adjutant General's Section (rear) during August operations were:

All personnel administration.

Processing of all Battle Casualty Reports received from units of Third U. S. Army.

All machine records work.

Supervision of the postal service within the Army.

Production of orders, maintenance of records, authentication of documents, and all other routine Adjutant General's functions.

The Classification Section worked closely with the G-1 Replacement Section in furnishing units with necessary replacements. This office checked all replacement requisitions for accuracy of figures as regards Table of Organization strength and authorized overstrength, and for correct specification serial numbers. Statistics obtained from replacement requisitions and inventories of specialists formed a basis for balancing overages and shortages between units and for the transfer of misassigned personnel. A file was maintained of replacement requisitions showing the date received and date forwarded, the number of replacements requisitioned, and the military occupational specialty of officers and enlisted men requisitioned. In order to expedite the flow of replacements, the closest possible liaison was maintained between divisional classification officers, replacement battalions, and the Army Classification Office.

Considering the wide flung disposition of the Third U. S. Army during this period, the functioning of administrative activities throughout the Third U. S. Army progressed with remarkable smoothness. This fact is attributed, in the greatest measure, to the attention given to instruction of Adjutants General and other administrative personnel in the series of schools held in the United Kingdom prior to operations (See Chapter 1). The greatest difficulties encountered during the month concerned the lag in transmission of communications which was inescapably concomitant to the unparalleled speed of the operation and diversity of tactical activities which spread at one time from the siege of channel ports to bridging operations on the MOSELLE.

SECTION II

CASUALTY SECTION

Organization of the Casualty Sub-section at the beginning of tactical operations is shown by chart (Annex 2). Initially, this organization was found to be adequate, but it very soon developed that personnel was insufficient. It had been anticipated that a back-log of battle casualty processing work would accompany troop units transferred in the midst of operations from other commands to Third U. S. Army. The volume of such unfinished business acquired in this manner, during the early weeks of August, exceeded all expectations. Sixteen to eighteen hours of labor per man per day were required in the Casualty Section to maintain desired standards of accuracy and speed.

Because of close association of battle casualty and machine records work, it was found to be essential that the Machine Records Unit and the Battle Casualty Section always operate together. It was necessary, therefore, that the Battle Casualty Section be so organized and equipped as to equal the Machine Records Unit in mobility in order that these sections would not be separated while displacing forward. To obtain harmony of operations a ten-ton semi-trailer van was obtained for the Casualty Section, whereby lines were run from Machine Records Unit generator to the Casualty Section tents and van, and the Casualty Section was attached to the Machine Records Unit for mess, supply, and coordination of administrative detail.

During August, Battle Casualty Reports prepared in unit personnel sections were submitted by special courier to the Battle Casualty Section. In appropriate cases, these reports were transmitted through the corps rear echelons, but none were processed by the corps. In addition, the Casualty Section received Admission and Disposition Reports from Army hospitals, Graves Registration Reports from the Army Graves Registration Service, and Straggler Reports from the Army Provost Marshal. All names listed on these reports were carded and cards alphabetically filed. All such reports received in the Section were checked against the alphabetical file, and changes in casualty status, if any, recorded thereon in order that the individual history of each casualty reported in any way might be maintained up to date. After checking against the casualty file, all Battle Casualty Reports were surrendered to the Machine Records Unit for the production of punched cards to be forwarded to higher headquarters, these cards constituting the official Battle Casualty Reports.

The volume of Admission and Disposition Reports received from hospitals in early August was so great that it became necessary during the month to decentralize the processing of this type of report to corps (in the case of hospitals assigned or attached to divisions and corps). The month brought many improvements in the casualty reporting system, among which were:

Closer coordination of casualty reporting in units of Allied Armies attached to Third U. S. Army.

Reduction of large categories of administrative errors encountered in practice.

Institution of close controls to avoid loss of reports.

Elimination of ambiguities in codes.

Late in August the strength of the Casualty Section was increased to two officers and twenty-five enlisted men. Thereafter, the Section functioned smoothly and accurately for the remainder of the month.

A resume of operations for August disclosed that reports of casualties in the following categories were processed:

CATEGORIES	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	TOTALS
Killed in Action	181	2,094	2,275
Died of Wounds Received in Action	21	368	389
Died of Injuries Received in Action	0	4	4
Seriously Wounded in Action	175	2,448	2,623
Seriously Injured in Action	7	115	122
Slightly Wounded in Action	292	4,948	5,240
Slightly Injured in Action	37	667	704
Captured by the Enemy	1	4	5
Missing in Action	98	1,750	1,848
Returned to Duty from a Previously Reported Casualty Status	*(184)	*(1,984)	*(2,088)
Totals	786	12,198	12,984

(* Not included in totals)

Time-lag between dates of casualties and dates on which completed casualty reports were sent to higher headquarters from the Adjutant General's Casualty Section was as follows:

Forwarded Within:	Percentage:
1 - 10 Days	86%
11 - 20 Days	11.9%
21 - 30 Days	2.1%

SECTION III

MACHINE RECORDS UNIT

To provide a functional group for processing Battle Casualty Reports in the Machine Records Unit, a Casualty Section of the Machine Division of that unit was organized. This section contained nine machine and key-punch operators, coders, verifiers, and clerks. Organization of the Machine Records Unit at the beginning of August will be found in Annex 3. Operations during August disclosed no weaknesses of this organization. It was necessary to augment the casualty group by two additional key-punch operators four times during the month when the daily rate of casualties reported exceeded one thousand.

The Machine Records Unit key-punched Battle Casualty Cards from all Battle Casualty Reports received during August. Of these cards, five decks were produced; one to be retained in the Machine Records Unit, three for higher headquarters, and one to be sorted, collecting cards of units assigned or attached to corps. The selected cards were then sent by courier to Corps Machine Records Units. Upon receipt at Corps Machine Records Units, these cards were mechanically compared to status files in order that the corps status files should reflect the casualty status of the individuals. The machine records aspects of the Third U. S. Army casualty reporting system functioned during August with accuracy and speed.

The 39th Machine Records Unit, with the Adjutant General's Casualty Section attached, displaced forward four times during August, displaying the ability to break camp, move, and establish camp with a minimum of interruption in the essential work of administration. This mobility would not have been possible and the unit could not have kept pace with the Army but for the fact that sufficient transportation had been provided to avoid the necessity of shuttling.

Unidentified dead were reported in many cases. In order that the necessary identifications might be made, it was necessary on 8 August to direct that all Machine Records Units of the Third U. S. Army establish and maintain consolidated files of persons assigned to organizations served by such units. Not especially needed prior to operations, such files became indispensable when processing of casualty reports began.

Remainder of Machine Records Unit's activities for August consisted of the routine maintenance of files and production of established reports as listed in Section III, Chapter 1.

SECTION IV

POSTAL SECTION

During August, a Base Post Office was established at Cherbourg and the routing of incoming Third U. S. Army mail through this installation began. From the Base Post Office, mail was transported by Communications Zone to a Postal Regulating Section established and maintained at or near Third U. S. Army Rear Boundary. Eighteen Army Postal Units attached to Third U. S. Army obtained mail from this Postal Regulating Section, hauling such mail in organic transportation directly from the Postal Regulating Section to the Army Postal Units. Outgoing mail followed the same channels in reverse.

Some dislocation of the postal system resulted from the extreme fluidity of the tactical situation. The Postal Regulating Section particularly lacked sufficient transportation and personnel to cope with the rapid movements. Plans called for the publication and distribution of a Mail Distribution Scheme by Communications Zone, but by the time distribution was effected, the scheme, in many cases, was out of date and mail was frequently ochemed to the wrong Army Postal Unit.

To counter the evil of too frequent movement, a "leap-frog" method of displacing Army Postal Units was adopted. Under this system, Army Postal Units near the Army Rear Boundary and no longer needed in their current locations were displaced as far forward as the tactical situation permitted. Once set up, they were not again moved until the tactical situation required. Because Army Postal Units attached to corps were required to move too frequently for effective functioning, early plans to attach two Army Postal Units to each corps were modified to leave only one such unit with each corps.

From the beginning of the operation, Army Postal Units were habitually placed in buildings situated normally in towns. Such location of Army Postal Units greatly facilitated distribution of mail for the following reasons:

When the unit was located in a town, it could be found by mail clerks from troop units with ease.

Army Postal Units could begin to function immediately upon

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arrival at new sites.

Desirable hard standing and turnarounds necessary to clear traffic quickly were available in towns.

Buildings afforded better protection for mail and equipment.

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CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I
GENERAL

In September, the pace of the operation slowed, and the Third U. S. Army entered a relatively static phase. Economy of materiel could be served and effectiveness of operations sharpened by closing the Army into a shallow area. Headquarters and Army Troops moved close behind the corps. In the Adjutant General's Section, the effects of the change in tempo and dispositions were these:

Battle Casualty Reporting -- Couriers from the corps headquarters drove no more than an hour each day to reach the Army Adjutant General's Casualty Section. Reports came, therefore, with less lag, more dependability. By telephone and in person, doubtful situations could be explained, questions answered. Correspondence diminished. Proximity is an aid to understanding. Adjusted to its work, the Casualty Section now ran more quietly and with less effort -- though the total work load for the month was slightly up.

Mail Service -- See Section IV, following.

Machine Records Units -- Slowing the tempo of the operation made easier the control of morning reports. Distance from the beaches increased the difficulty of machine records supply. Otherwise, conditions in September had little or no effect on machine records operation. (See Section III).

Air Courier Service for Battle Casualty Reports -- At the beginning of the operation, a special air courier service was established to expedite transmission of Battle Casualty Reports from Army Headquarters to Theater Headquarters. It was found that Battle Casualty Reports submitted through this channel reached Theater Headquarters belatedly or not at all. In all such cases, investigation revealed either that the reports had not reached the special courier channel or that weather had prevented scheduled flight. Sometimes reports simply disappeared enroute. After the Army Headquarters advanced from NORMANDY, it became necessary to send reports by motor vehicle over long distances to the proper landing strip to be picked up by the courier, or to find some nearby landing strip from which a plane was scheduled to fly to the landing strip at the beach, thus improvising an unscheduled air relay system. As the Army Headquarters increased its distance from the beach, it became necessary to relay reports through several landing strips. All these landing strips were temporary in nature. They possessed no organized means of receiving and processing mail. With each move of the Headquarters, it became necessary to find another landing strip and arrange for an additional stage in the relay. As a consequence of these highly unreliable conditions, it was found that almost no dependence could be placed on the courier system. Even when it worked at its best, much time was lost. Had the system been able to utilize fixed airports and regularly scheduled flights; had the Headquarters been stationary; and had the distances been sufficiently great to justify air transport, the courier system might have functioned satisfactorily. Under existing conditions, however, it failed. On 10 September, it was abandoned.

To comply with the provisions of Public Law 277, attention turned early in September to the subject of soldier voting. A qualified officer from the 10th Replacement Depot joined the Adjutant General's Section on 5 September and was appointed Soldier Voting Officer. This officer began immediately to coordinate the distribution of voting posters and other informational material and to prepare for the distribution of ballots. He made visits to all corps and divisions to coordinate soldier voting activities. It was required that all organizations of the Third U. S. Army appoint Soldier Voting Officers, and rosters of the Third U. S. Army appoint Soldier Voting Officers, and suitable checks were initiated at this Headquarters to assure compliance with this requirement. The Adjutant General obtained the assistance of the Inspector General in soldier voting activities, and the Inspector General and his assistants began in September to include inspection of soldier voting activities in all inspections requiring visits to units of Third U. S. Army.

SECTION II
CASUALTY SECTION

On 18 September, the Headquarters moved to Nivosse within an hour's drive of corps rear echelons. The proximity of the corps rear echelons to the Army Casualty Section facilitated the work of corps casualty couriers and enabled a much closer control of battle casualty reports to be maintained.

On 20 September, a system of processing one day's business in one day was adopted, resulting in more expeditious handling of all work. The new system affected favorably the morale of the men. Until this time, personnel of the Casualty Section had been required to work every night without relief. All work received during the course of a day was processed on the following day.

On 28 September, XV Corps, composed of the 79th Infantry Division and the French 2d Armored Division, was lent to the Third U. S. Army by attachment to the adjacent Seventh U. S. Army. Because of the difference in casualty reporting procedures employed in the two armies, processing of Battle Casualty Reports and allied matters was continued under the Third U. S. Army until such time as the Seventh U. S. Army became familiar with methods and procedures in the European Theater of Operations.

Many inquiries from relatives and friends of casualties revealed that information concerning the casualty status of individuals undoubtedly was leaking into unauthorized channels. To correct this undesirable condition, instructions were issued to all commanders on 30 September as follows:

"1. In order to avoid confusion and establish uniformity in the preparation of replies to letters of inquiry concerning casualties received from relatives or friends, the following procedure will govern in this command.

"a. Receipt of the letter of inquiry may be acknowledged, but information given only to the effect that the letter has been received and turned over to the proper authorities for reply; or, if the request has been received and information desired is being secured and will be sent to the War Department from which agency you may expect a reply in the near future.' Under no circumstances will information concerning the casualty be furnished direct to the writer.

"b. The letter of inquiry will then be turned over to the Personnel Officer or other designated representative of the commanding officer for information through channels giving such detailed information as is available.

"2. The responsible officer will prepare a forwarding indorsement to the letter of inquiry which will contain the following information:

"a. The correct grade, name, and Army Serial Number of the individual on whom the inquiry has been received.

"b. The date and type of casualty as shown on the records of the organization.

"c. All additional information that is available or can be secured regarding the details or circumstances under which the casualty occurred and upon which the War Department can base an answer to the inquiry."

A review of operations for September disclosed that casualties in the following categories were processed:

CATEGORIES	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	TOTALS
Killed in Action	156	1,798	1,954
Died of Wounds Received in Action	30	316	346
Died of Injuries Received in Action	0	10	10
Seriously Injured in Action	185	2,472	2,657
Slightly Wounded in Action	5	77	82
Slightly Injured in Action	345	5,888	6,233
Captured by the Enemy	36	642	678
Missing in Action	7	6	13
Returned to Duty from a previously reported Casualty Status	90	1,858	1,948
Totals	*(156)	*(8,460)	*(8,616)
	854	13,057	13,921

(* Not included in totals)

During this period 298 reports of Non-battle Casualties (Death, Missing, Interned) were processed, 5,456 sets of personnel records for deceased, missing, missing in action, and captured personnel were handled, and seventy-seven Reports of Investigation, W.D., A.G.O. Forms 51, of non-battle deaths and injuries requiring investigation were reviewed.

SECTION III
MACHINE RECORDS UNIT

The organic load of machine records forms in all Machine Records Units in the Third U. S. Army was considerably depleted by September. The commanding officer of the 39th Machine Records Unit consequently made three trips to CHARLES BRACH where machine records stocks had been unloaded, to assist in locating these stocks and in coordinating their distribution to Third U. S. Army Machine Records Units whose supplies were depleted. In all cases, Machine Records Units sent organic transportation back to the beach to pick up such forms as were issued. By the close of September, the stock of essential forms had not been exhausted, but it was dangerously low and the supply situation was precarious.

SECTION IV
POSTAL SECTION

Increased distances from ports and beaches; lack of rail transportation; and the worn, damaged, and congested condition of the roads, all combined to create new delays in the receipt of mail in the Army Area. Incoming first class mail arriving by air from the United States and the United Kingdom at airports in the interior, was received with dispatch. Parcel post and other mail coming over the beaches and through the ports, in many cases, was long delayed. Within troops ceased the work of the Army Postal Units.

The greatest difficulties in handling the mail were found to lie in distance and movement, and not in volume of mail. When units were distant from their Army Postal Units, the problem of transporting the mail from the Army Postal Unit to the troops was measured in proportion to the distance, the availability of transportation, the condition of roads, and the accessibility of Army Postal Units. When troops moved frequently and frequently changed Army Postal Unit assignments, delays occurred. In these cases, very much mail sent from Base Post Offices and Postal Regulating Sections to units, arrived at the station was no longer present. It was necessary then to forward this mail. On many occasions, this process was repeated several times before the mail at length overtook the organization for which it was intended. It was found to be desirable, when the Army occupied a deep area, to hold the maximum number of Army Postal Units under direct Army control in order that they might be moved quickly to locations of high density of troops and also to prevent the movement of Army Postal Units until it was necessary that they be moved. Since the movement of an Army Postal Unit breaks completely the continuity of mail service to all units that it serves, it was most important that unnecessary moves of Army Postal Units be not made. It was found desirable that sufficient Army Postal Units remain attached to corps during field phases to process mail for corps troops concentrated in the corps area. Since many corps troop units remained behind the corps rear boundary, it was found most one Army Postal Unit per corps was adequate during August. As the situation stabilized, however, and more and more units of corps troops were concentrated in the corps area, it became necessary to attach an additional Army Postal Unit to each corps to process mail for corps troops. In September, the shallow Army Area and the relative infrequency of movement of army units of Army Troops relieved the burden on Army Postal Units

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It was found that, in some cases, mail received for casualties had been returned to senders bearing notation of casualty status. Such mail often was returned to senders prior to War Department notification of the casualty. These cases became the subject of War Department inquiry and investigation. To eliminate this practice, on 1 September instructions substantially as follows were issued to all troops:

* * * * *

"All Postal Officers will take immediate, positive, and personal action to insure compliance with the following:

"Undeliverable mail addressed to personnel who become casualties within this theater will be indorsed as indicated below by the unit commander or officer designated to certify the status of the addressees, and returned to the APO serving the unit for disposition.

1. Mail addressed to casualties whose status is "Killed in Action", "accidentally killed", "died in hospital" or "dead" will be indorsed "Deceased".

2. Mail addressed to casualties whose status is "missing", "missing in action", "captured by the enemy" or "prisoner of war" will be indorsed "Missing".

3. Parcel mail will be indorsed with the additional entry "Return to sender without charge by authority of the Third Assistant Postmaster General".

"All classes of mail to addressees who become casualties while outside this theater, will be indorsed with the appropriate notation required by subparagraphs 1, 2, or 3, above, and forwarded, under franked label, direct to the Casualty Branch, Adjutant General's Office, Washington 25, D. C.

"Troops going into action will not be permitted to leave mail behind for future dispatch. Such mail may reach the addressee long after the official casualty notification has been sent, resulting in needless distress, anxiety and confusion to the next of kin, and causing general distrust of the Army casualty reporting system.

"A separate receptacle will be provided at each APO for the deposit of properly certified casualty mail by unit mail clerks. Postal Officers will instruct all unit mail clerks that casualty mail must be separated from other mail prior to deposit at the APO.

"Severe disciplinary action will be taken in cases of future reports of violation of casualty mail instructions."

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POSTAL SECTION DELIVERS PACKAGES



FRONT LINE REINFORCEMENTS MOVING UP

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OCMH Declassification Instructions

SECTION I

GENERAL

Move to Buildings: In HAGUE, headquarters offices and barracks for enlisted men were established in buildings, and billets for officers were obtained in the City. Buildings occupied in the main of the retreating enemy were found in a condition of filth and disorder, infested with vermin, and in need of repair. In addition to the essential police and repair work, some regrouping of activities to fit the building arrangement was necessary, and some structural alterations of buildings were required. All operating schedules had to be rearranged. Fire guards were established. Guard orders were amended.

It required three days to set the Section up in buildings. In the field, three hours had been adequate time to establish the camp and begin operations.

During October, there was an increase in the rate of incidence of upper respiratory diseases which was believed to attributable to living conditions in buildings.

Voting of Federal ballots previously issued took place in October.

SECTION II

CASUALTY SECTION

The 26th and 95th Infantry Divisions, the 10th Armored Division, and Headquarters III Corps were attached to Third U. S. Army during the month. None of these units had been in action, and none had any experience in battle casualty reporting. It was necessary that battle casualty sections be immediately organized in each of these headquarters and that personnel be promptly trained in order that the desired standard of excellence in casualty reporting might be attained as soon as units were committed to action.

Battle casualty sections in the new corps and division headquarters were organized and trained by means of interchange of personnel. Selected individuals were transferred into the casualty sections of the division headquarters in order to make available casualty reporting experience in units having no prior concern with this function. An officer selected from Headquarters III Corps was attached to the AG Casualty Section, this Headquarters, to study methods and procedures.

The Seventh U. S. Army, to which the XV Corps was attached upon its relief from Third U. S. Army, was scheduled for subsequent transfer from the North African Theater of Operations to the European Theater of Operations. It was desirable to maintain continuity of method in battle casualty reporting from the XV Corps during the period between attachment of this corps to the Seventh U. S. Army and transfer of the Seventh U. S. Army to the European Theater of Operations. During this period, casualties from the Seventh U. S. Army, including the XV Corps, were evacuated through the North African Theater of Operations. It was found disadvantageous to process battle casualty reports through one channel when the casualties themselves were evacuated through another. While the battle casualty reports were submitted to this Headquarters, much information required to be checked against these reports at army headquarters level was submitted to Seventh U. S. Army Headquarters, and this information had to be obtained from Seventh U. S. Army Headquarters before battle casualty reports could be processed. Delay was usually encountered in getting the necessary information. Consequently, on 31 October, the processing of battle casualty reports for XV Corps was released to Headquarters Seventh U. S. Army.

A review of operations for October discloses that casualties in the following categories were processed:

CATEGORIES	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	TOTALS
Killed in Action	117	1,742	1,859
Died of Wounds Received in Action	23	368	391
Died of Injuries Received in Action	2	0	2
Seriously Wounded in Action	114	2,155	2,269
Seriously Injured in Action	7	60	67
Slightly Wounded in Action	345	5,148	5,493
Slightly Injured in Action	20	568	588
Captured by the Enemy	1	14	15
Missing in Action	69	2,279	2,348
Returned to Duty from a Previously Reported Casualty Status	*(218)	*(4,018)	*(4,236)
Totals	598	12,334	12,932

(* Not included in totals)

During this period 3,566 sets of personnel records for deceased, missing, missing in action, and captured personnel were processed; 61 Reports of Investigation, WD AGO Form 51, on non-battle deaths and injuries requiring investigation were reviewed. Non-Battle Casualty Reports, ETO-Cas Form 2, on deceased and missing personnel as shown below were cleared by this office:

	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN
Deceased	4	86
Missing	0	40
Total	4	126

SECTION III

MACHINE RECORDS UNIT

Orders were received on 15 October requiring the establishment of a special officer-courier service to deliver machine records strength cards to the Central Machine Records Unit, Headquarters European Theater of Operations. The establishment of this service called for the semi-monthly dispatching of a machine records officer from this Headquarters to PARIS. Since, at this time, difficulties in obtaining machine records supplies still existed, it was planned to take advantage of these trips to obtain necessary supplies of cards and paper stock for operation of Machine Records Units of the Third U. S. Army.

SECTION IV

POSTAL SECTION

Approximately 400 tons of parcel post mail arrived at the Postal Regulating Section during 13 October. This accretion represented about a month's back-log of mail of this category. Since the Postal Regulating Section was not adequately manned to process such an accumulation quickly, thirty men were furnished from Third U. S. Army personnel to assist in unloading and distributing this mail.

To assist in obtaining mail at the Postal Regulating Section, arrangements were made to send three 2½-ton trucks and trailers daily to the Base Post Office near PARIS for first class mail.

The Postal Section was augmented on 26 October by an Assistant Army Postal Officer. This was found desirable in order to free the Army Postal Officer from routine office administration to enable him more readily to visit Army Postal Units of the Army.

There follows an extract of instructions issued to all lower echelon commanders concerning the handling of Christmas mail:

"Corps and division commanders will detail additional personnel to assist in the handling of mail in APOs. Regimental and battalion post offices will be augmented by additional personnel, and where necessary, assistance will be given company mail clerks.

"Each separate battalion and company commander will designate an additional assistant unit mail clerk to assist in the handling of mail.

"Mail will not be permitted to accumulate but will be delivered within 24 hours of receipt, unless precluded therefrom for tactical reasons.

"Insofar as possible, Army transportation will be used in delivering mail to APOs during November and December."

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I

GENERAL

November was a month of routine operations for the Adjutant General's Section. The Third U. S. Army attack, which began on 8 November, occasioned no change in Adjutant General's operations except an increase in battle casualties which will be treated in Section II of this chapter.

Postal problems encountered in prior months persisted (See Section IV following).

SECTION II

CASUALTY SECTION

The offensive launched on 8 November continued throughout the remainder of the month. Battle casualties suffered by Third U. S. Army units during November were heavier than for any prior month of the operation. As a consequence, the large volume of battle casualty reports received developed additional problems in the Battle Casualty Section. One of these problems was the preparation of cards from Admission and Disposition Reports received by the Casualty Section from hospital installations. In order to maintain the central battle casualty files, it had been the practice to type a card covering each entry on all Admission and Disposition Reports. Because of the large volume of such reports received during November, it became impossible with the personnel available to maintain the file in a current condition. Study of this problem by the Casualty Section and the Machine Records Unit revealed that it would be possible for the Machine Records Unit to produce interpreted punch cards from Admission and Disposition Reports as a by-product of normal preparation of cards for the machine records status file. On 21 November, instructions were issued to effect minor modifications in the Admission and Disposition Reports in order to render them susceptible of machine records processing, and the new system was put into effect. A considerable saving of labor within the Casualty Section resulted and increased speed and accuracy in handling battle casualty reports was obtained.

A review of operations for November discloses that casualties in the following categories were processed:

CATEGORIES	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	TOTALS
Killed in Action	167	2,841	2,408
Died of Wounds Received in Action	22	301	323
Died of Injuries Received in Action	0	7	7
Seriously Wounded in Action	182	2,588	2,770
Seriously Injured in Action	9	148	157
Slightly Wounded in Action	429	7,726	8,155
Slightly Injured in Action	81	1,937	2,018
Captured by the Enemy	2	19	21
Missing in Action	81	2,105	2,186
Returned to Duty from a Previously Reported Casualty Status	*(154)	*(2,741)	*(2,895)
Totals	973	17,072	18,045

(* Not included in totals)

During the same period 1,718 sets of personnel records of deceased, missing, missing in action, and captured personnel were processed; seventy-eight Reports of Investigation, W.D., A.G.O. Forms 51, on non-battle incurred deaths and injuries requiring investigation were reviewed. Non-battle Casualty Reports, ETO-Cas Form 2, on deceased and missing personnel, as shown below, were cleared by this office:

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	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN
Deceased	3	54
Missing	0	15
Total	3	69

The lag between dates of casualty and dates on which completed casualty reports were sent to higher headquarters from the Adjutant General's Casualty Section was as follows:

Forwarded Within:	Percentage:
1 - 10 Days	88.69%
11 - 20 Days	10.62%
21 - 30 Days	.19%
Over 30 Days	.5%

SECTION III

MACHINE RECORDS UNIT

By November, the problem of absentees without leave had reached major proportions. To assist in apprehending offenders, the Provost Marshal, this Headquarters, needed an up to date list of names of such absentees for distribution to all his agencies. To provide the desired list, it was directed on 25 November that each Corps Machine Records Unit submit weekly to the 59th Machine Records Unit a file of status cards for all individuals assigned or attached unassigned to organizations served by the Corps Machine Records Units who are in an outstanding absent without leave status as of 2400 hours each Saturday. Files were to include cards for individuals who had been listed in prior weeks as absent without leave and who had not been reported returned to military control at the cut off time. Upon receipt at the Machine Records Unit, these cards were consolidated with similar cards covering Army Troops prepared by the Machine Records Unit, this Headquarters, and an up to date corrected listing was run for the Provost Marshal.

During the latter part of November, the Machine Records Unit completed a statistical study of battle casualties of all Third U. S. Army units during the first three months of operations, 1 August to 31 October. Results of this study follow:

BATTLE CASUALTIES BY NUMBERS

Subdivision of Command	Battle Deaths	Missing In Action	All Other Battle Casualties	Total All Casualties
Third U. S. Army Troops	86	16	279	381
VIII Corps Troops	88	54	393	535
XII Corps Troops	239	117	791	1,147
XV Corps Troops	138	81	601	733
XX Corps Troops	263	64	715	1,042
4th Armored Division	358	125	1,060	1,543
5th Armored Division	121	26	446	593
6th Infantry Division	764	519	3,146	4,429
6th Armored Division	368	65	1,024	1,457
7th Armored Division	227	165	1,138	1,530
8th Infantry Division	263	170	1,336	1,769
26th Infantry Division	116	122	457	695
35th Infantry Division	870	483	3,489	5,142
44th Infantry Division	35		201	236
79th Infantry Division	570	412	3,404	4,386
80th Infantry Division	1,025	696	3,455	5,176
83d Infantry Division	532	81	2,155	2,768
90th Infantry Division	411	109	2,208	2,728
95th Infantry Division	14	2	60	76
Total Casualties - Third U. S. Army	6,488	3,610	26,318	36,416

BATTLE CASUALTIES BY PERCENTAGES

Subdivision of Command	Battle Deaths	Missing In Action	All Other Battle Casualties	Total All Casualties
Third U. S. Army Troops	1.3	.4	1.1	1.0
VIII Corps Troops	1.3	1.5	2.0	1.4
XII Corps Troops	3.7	3.2	3.0	3.2
XV Corps Troops	2.1	.7	2.4	2.2
XX Corps Troops	4.1	1.8	2.5	2.9
4th Armored Division	5.5	3.5	4.0	4.3
5th Armored Division	1.9	.7	1.7	1.5
6th Infantry Division	11.8	14.4	11.9	12.2
6th Armored Division	5.7	1.8	3.8	4.0
7th Armored Division	3.5	4.6	4.3	4.2
8th Infantry Division	4.1	4.7	5.1	4.9
26th Infantry Division	1.8	3.4	1.8	2.0
35th Infantry Division	13.4	23.3	13.0	14.1
44th Infantry Division	.5	.0	.7	.7
79th Infantry Division	8.8	11.4	12.8	12.0
80th Infantry Division	15.8	19.3	13.1	14.2
83d Infantry Division	8.2	2.2	8.2	7.6
90th Infantry Division	6.3	3.0	8.4	7.4
95th Infantry Division	.2	.1	.2	.2
Total Casualties - Third U. S. Army	100%	100%	100%	100%

Individuals previously reported as battle casualties were returned to duty in the following numbers:

Subdivision of Command		Percentage
Third U. S. Army Troops	78	1.4
VIII Corps Troops	93	1.6
XII Corps Troops	121	2.0
XV Corps Troops	112	1.9
XX Corps Troops	171	2.9
4th Armored Division	285	5.8
5th Armored Division	134	2.2
6th Infantry Division	733	12.3
6th Armored Division	307	5.2
7th Armored Division	106	1.8
8th Infantry Division	257	4.3
26th Infantry Division	17	.3
35th Infantry Division	948	16.0
44th Infantry Division	4	.0
79th Infantry Division	655	11.0
80th Infantry Division	754	12.5
83d Infantry Division	658	11.0
90th Infantry Division	589	10.0
95th Infantry Division	1	.0
Total - Third U. S. Army	5,963	100%

SECTION IV

POSTAL SECTION

By November, delays had developed in receipt of mail from the United States by Army postal units of Third U. S. Army. The situation was reported to the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations. On 3 November, the report brought the following reply from the Theater Commander:

"1. The facts are recognized as stated in the basic letter, and result simply from the fact that the air lift allocated the Army Postal Service for movement of air mails from the U. S. to this theater was insufficient to carry the air mail tonnage developed in the port of New York. Excess had to be shipped by water with consequent delay.

"2. It is regrettable but true that a similar situation exists for the current month; and because of higher priority requirements in critical items, such as medical supplies and special ammunition, it was necessary to ship from New York a considerable amount of air mail by water transportation. As a result air mail which normally would have been received here during the week of 22 October will not arrive in the theater until the second week in November. Likewise, it is apparent that the same conditions will exist each month until such time as it is operationally possible to allocate sufficient air tonnage to handle the air mail developed in New York for this theater."

To offset as far as possible the lag in movement of mail from the United States to the European Theater of Operations, steps were taken to accelerate to the maximum, movement within the Army area and from the Base Post Office to the Postal Regulating Section. On 29 November, a daily allotment of 6,000 pounds was authorized to be moved by air from the Base Post Office to the Postal Regulating Section at VERDUN. The practice already begun of assisting in the movement of mail to the Postal Regulating Section by sending army transportation to the Base Post Office, was continued. During November, a total of twelve 2½-ton trucks and one-ton trailers from Third U. S. Army sources were placed at the disposal of the 13th Postal Regulating Section to assist in transporting mail.

On the 27th, 29th, and 30th of November, large quantities of first class mail were received, and throughout the month large volumes of Christmas parcels were received at irregular intervals.

For the first time in this operation, a record of mail received by the 13th Postal Regulating Section during the entire month was kept. Tonnages and number of pouches received are shown below. These figures should not be taken to represent mail destined exclusively for the Third U. S. Army, as certain Seventh U. S. Army units were served by the 13th Postal Regulating Section during the month, and part of the mail received went to these units.

First Class Mail		Daily Average
Approximate tonnage received	370	12
Total number pouches received	19,287	641
Parcel Post		
Approximate tonnage received	1,536	51
Total number sacks received	84,020	2,800



AG CASUALTY CARD FILES

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CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I

GENERAL

During December, routine operations continued in the Adjutant General's Section with little interruption. The German counteroffensive beginning on 16 December resulted in over-loading the Casualty Section. (See Section II, following). The Christmas Season brought dislocations in the postal service. (See Section IV, following).

During the month, six enlisted men were lost from the Adjutant General's Section for retraining as infantrymen, and two officers and four enlisted men from two divisions were attached for short periods to the Casualty Section to study casualty reporting methods and procedures.

SECTION II

CASUALTY SECTION

The seige of BASTOGNE (P-55) and the heavy casualties caused thereby, particularly the large numbers of individuals missing in action as a sequence of events when many units were overrun and scattered, caused difficulties and delays in casualty reporting.

Although the Third U. S. Army was not involved in the initial German assault, the attachment on 20 December of the VIII Corps and the 101st Airborne Division resulted in channeling through the Adjutant General's Section great numbers of reports of casualties occuring prior to the gain of these units by Third U. S. Army. Accumulations of casualty reports in these units prior to their attachment to Third U. S. Army and shortly thereafter, resulted in the receipt of a heavy backlog of casualty reports after 20 December. Since no additional personnel was immediately available to assist in processing these reports, the Casualty Section was required to observe a most severe work schedule from 20 December to the close of the month in order to stay abreast of the work load involved. The sudden increase of Third U. S. Army to include four corps and nineteen divisions had not been anticipated in establishing the Casualty Section, and while no casualty reports were delayed by processing at this Headquarters during this period, nevertheless the Casualty Section reached its absolute capacity and could not have handled a greater load without additional personnel. A review of casualty reporting operations for December disclosed that casualty reports in the following categories were processed:

CATEGORIES	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	TOTALS
Killed in Action	130	2,432	2,562
Died of Wounds Received in Action	27	418	445
Died of Injuries Received in Action	0	5	5
Seriously Wounded in Action	111	1,634	1,745
Seriously Injured in Action	4	57	61
Slightly Wounded in Action	380	6,858	7,238
Slightly Injured in Action	63	1,339	1,402
Captured by the Enemy	0	17	17
Missing in Action	139	3,038	3,177
Returned to Duty from a Previously Reported Casualty Status	*(351)	*(3,068)	*(3,219)
Totals	854	15,818	16,652

(* Not included in totals).

During the same period, 3,667 sets of personnel records of deceased, missing, missing in action, and captured personnel were processed; ninety-two Reports of Investigation, W.D., A.G.O. Form 51, on ceased; ninety-two Reports of Investigation, W.D., A.G.O. Form 51, on non-battle incurred deaths and injuries requiring investigation were reviewed. Non-battle Casualty Reports, MTO-Cas Form 2, on deceased and missing personnel, as shown below, were cleared by this office:

	Officers	Enlisted Men
Deceased	5	0
Missing	61	18
Totals	66	18

The lag between dates of casualty and dates on which completed casualty reports were sent to higher headquarters from the Adjutant General's Casualty Section was as follows:

Forwarded Within:	Percentage
1 - 10 Days	86.67%
11 - 20 Days	11.80%
21 - 30 Days	1.01%
Over 30 Days	.52%

SECTION III

MACHINE RECORDS UNIT

December brought one major change in the general operating procedures in the 39th Machine Records Unit. The new procedure was concerned with the maintenance of patients control cards, key punched in the Machine Records Unit from Admission and Disposition Reports rendered by Third U. S. Army hospitals. The patients control cards were employed for the purpose of keeping organizations of the Third U. S. Army currently informed of the whereabouts of personnel lost to hospitals and the status of such personnel during the period spent in the Third U. S. Army chain of evacuation. The use of this card also enabled the former organizations of evacuated personnel to post to Service Records current changes in the status of individuals during the time that such individuals remained in Third U. S. Army hospitals. Use of these cards also serves as notification to organizations of assignment of the evacuation of personnel from Third U. S. Army hospitals to hospitals of the Communications Zone.

The patients control card, key punched from Admission and Disposition Reports contained the following information:

Full name of individual.
Army serial number.
Name of hospital in which the individual is hospitalized.
Type of casualty.
Name of former parent unit of individual.
Date of change.

In addition to distributing cards so produced to the former organizations of patients concerned, copies of such cards were furnished to the Battle Casualty Section for use in maintaining the central casualty card file in a current condition.

SECTION IV

POSTAL SECTION

The month of December was marked by a decided decline in the receipt of first class mail and a large increase in the receipt of parcel post. Receipt of all classes of mail continued to be very irregular.

Arrangements begun during October and continued throughout November to send three 2½-ton trucks and trailers daily to the Base Post Office for first class mail were discontinued 9 December because these trucks were urgently needed to assist Army Postal Units in hauling mail from the Postal Regulating Section. Because of the tactical situation, all Army vehicles located at the Postal Regulating Section for assisting Army Postal Units were withdrawn on 19 December. For the period 19-26 December, inclusive, no trucks were available for assisting Army Postal Units in hauling mail. However, many Army Postal Units were able to borrow transportation from units served by them. No unusual delays were noted. Army again furnished transportation on 27 December, beginning with four vehicles and augmenting this number until a total of thirty-five were being furnished on 31 December.

The intermittent movement of first class mail by plane from the United Kingdom to an airstrip near the Postal Regulating Section was begun 5 December. Air transportation from the Base Post Office [illegible] also continued, but not on any regular schedule.

Some idea of the increase in the amount of parcel post received by Army may be noted by the figures below:

	Sacks per Month	Sacks Daily Average
October	50,100	1,616
November	84,020	2,800
December	246,057	7,937

A daily record of receipt of mail by the 13th Postal Regulating Section for the month of December follows:

DATE	(1st Cl) POUCHES	(PP) SACKS	TOTAL
December 1	413	2,309	2,722
2	460	860	1,320
3	420	8,706	9,126
4	269	4,751	5,020
5	223	6,677	6,900
6	691	4,227	4,918
7	255	5,744	5,999
8	416	6,931	7,347
9	391	7,435	7,826
10	486	7,866	8,352
11	248	6,345	6,593
12	1,177	7,446	8,623
13	301	8,180	8,481
14	1,378	5,593	6,971
15	399	7,271	7,670
16	1,290	756	2,046
17	395	6,274	6,669
18	690	16,757	17,447
19	461	18,812	19,273
20	380	11,017	11,397
21	29	11,887	11,916
22	629	11,229	12,058
23	524	10,361	10,885
24	165	11,015	11,180
25	316	8,867	9,183
26	10	350	360
27	628	8,031	8,659
28	24	6,650	6,674
29	308	7,968	8,276
30	1,285	10,479	11,764
31	346	15,294	15,640
Totals	14,987	246,057	261,044
December Daily Average	483	7,937	8,420
November Daily Average	841	2,800	3,641
October Daily Average	474	1,616	2,090

Despite the long distances Army Postal Units had to travel for mail and the volume handled, no appreciable delay in mail after reaching Army area was experienced.



AG BATTLE CAS: ALTY SECTION

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CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

SECTION I

REMAIL

The movement from NANCY, FRANCE (F-91), to EUPEN, BELGIUM (P-70), completed on this section on 7 January, required more time than any previous move during the operation. This fact was attributed to congestion in loading trucks from buildings with limited available working space, the additional time and effort required to move evacuated buildings, the difficulties inherent in unloading vehicles at a facility lacking a single entrance, the regrouping of activities to fit the new building, and the rearrangement of operating schedules necessary to adjust to conditions in the new location. These duties, together with the packing of mail, where were accumulated during the time necessary to complete the move, entailed additions, adjustments and reorganization of personnel for three days after arrival in the new location at EUPEN.

During January, the casualty section reported the lowest monthly casualty total since the volume of Army casualty reports received during any prior month of the operation. (See section VI, following.)

The Assistant Secretary General, Third U. S. Army, although remote at Theater Headquarters during the period, was kept fully informed with the very important revision of policies governing processing procedures and information to be followed throughout the Theater. (See section III, following.)

The volume of parcel post mail received during January receded appreciably from the peak load received during the month of December and there was a corresponding increase in receipt of first class mail. (See Section IV, following).

SECTION II

CASUALTY SECTION

January was a tertiary operational month for the casualty section, there being a total of [illegible] days during which casualty reports were received from the [illegible] Division, the [illegible] Division, the [illegible] Armored Division, the [illegible] Infantry Division, and the [illegible] U. S. Army, as follows:

Division	Days
[illegible]	31
[illegible]	31
[illegible]	31
[illegible]	31
[illegible]	31

Immediate and overall prepared casualty files were furnished to [illegible] Army, as well as the necessary disruption of administrative functions [illegible] had been overcome by the casualty [illegible] increased the difficulties of verification. [illegible] status of casualties on whom changes of casualty classification were reported, and increased the [illegible] expressing letters of inquiry, letters of condolence, and other personnel records.

The necessity for rapid instruction of administrative personnel in the policies and procedures employed in Third U. S. Army where these differed from those followed in armies to which the recently joined units had been attached.

Long lines of communication between divisions in METZ [illegible] and LUXEMBOURG and the Third U. S. Army Rear Echelon at NANCY, FRANCE (F-91). This situation, of course, was improved when the Third U. S. Army Rear Echelon moved to [illegible] LUXEMBOURG.

The unexpected additional volume of casualty reports very soon overloaded the Casualty section to the point where it was impossible to clear the daily reports with the required degree of accuracy and speed. The only solution was to augment the personnel of the casualty section by eight additional men on temporary duty from units not in combat. These men joined on 15 January. Thereafter, the casualty section was able to maintain the desired standard of performance.

A review of casualty reporting operations for January disclosed that casualty reports in the following categories were processed:

CATEGORIES	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	TOTALS
Killed in Action	254	5,482	[illegible]
Died of Wounds Received in Action	45	792	[illegible]
Died of Injuries Received in Action	1	7	[illegible]
Missing in Action	249	5,466	[illegible]
Wounded in Action	49	943	[illegible]
Slightly Wounded in Action	259	11,251	[illegible]
Severely Injured in Action	120	[illegible]	[illegible]
Returned by the Enemy	1	[illegible]	[illegible]
Prisoner in Action	107	19,566	[illegible]
Returned to Duty from a Previously Reported Status	252	10,177	[illegible]
Erroneous Reports, Such as Cattle Casualties	4	164	[illegible]
Totals	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

During the same period, [illegible] sets of personal records of deceased officers, missing in action, and personnel were processed. [illegible] reports of investigation into Missing in Action, Unfavorable Discharge and Line of Duty determination were received. Casualty reports, [illegible] were received from deceased and missing personnel, as shown below, were cleared by this office:

	Officers	Enlisted Men
Deceased	[illegible]	[illegible]
Missing	[illegible]	[illegible]
Totals	8	128

The lag between dates of casualty and dates on which casualty reports were sent to higher headquarters from the Adjutant General's casualty section was as follows:

Percentage Within	Percentage
1 - 10 days	[illegible]
11 - 20 days	[illegible]
21 - 30 days	[illegible]
over 30 days	[illegible]

SECTION III

MAIL DIRECTORY SERVICE

Prior to the mail directory service, a serious problem existed in the [illegible] Army, as well as the remainder of the European Theater of Operations, as [illegible] Army headquarters moved, [illegible] of letters addressed to persons in the [illegible] headquarters. [illegible] Army Postal Service [illegible] the mail directory service, which was established to [illegible] the mail [illegible] necessary records in a central [illegible] Army area. A [illegible] number of the procedures described in Section III, [illegible] Army, of this report, went far towards solving the problem although [illegible] U. S. Army, results obtained during December were such that the Theater Adjutant General investigated the desirability of adopting similar procedures on a theater wide basis, and during the period 2 - 5 January conducted conferences at Theater Headquarters to study the problem and apply the solution.

With slight modification, Third U. S. Army's procedures were approved under the descriptive term "Casualty Locator Procedure" for adoption throughout the Theater. The revised procedures were published from Theater Headquarters on 25 January, to become effective 1 February.

SECTION IV

POSTAL SECTION

Arrangements placing trucks at the disposal of the 15th Postal Regulating section to assist postal installations in transporting mail to their army, postal units were continued with little interruption throughout the month. Because of the tactical situation, trucks were withdrawn during the period 5 January to 8 January, but were made available on 9 January. On this date, six trucks were furnished to the 15th Postal Regulating Section. This number was steadily augmented until 13 January, at which time thirty-one trucks were furnished. After 13 January, the number was reduced to sixteen, which were furnished daily throughout the remainder of the month.

Mail received by the 15th Postal Regulating Section during the month of January was as follows:

First Class Mail

Total number of pouches received - - 21,780
Daily average number of pouches - - 702

Parcel Post

Total number of sacks received - - 177,993
Daily average number of sacks - - 5,700



A. G. POSTAL DIRECTORY SERVICE



SORTING INCOMING MAIL

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FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

SECTION I

GENERAL

On 6 and 7 February, the Adjutant General's Section moved, with the remainder of the Rear Echelon, a distance of twelve miles from SECH (F-75) to the City of LUXEMBOURG (P-61) in order to realise the advantages of operating with the Rear and Forward Echelons at the same location. At the time of the move, the 36th Machine Records Unit and the Battle Casualty Subsection were involved in a critical period of processing battle casualty reports still being received in great numbers as a result of the German breakthrough in BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG in December. Because of the short distance involved in the move of the Adjutant General's Section, and because of the undesirability of interrupting battle casualty reporting, the 36th Machine Records Unit and the Battle Casualty Subsection were permitted to remain in the Town of SECH thereby splitting the AG Section. This arrangement continued throughout the remainder of the month of February and proved to work quite satisfactorily. Obviously, it was possible to operate without disadvantage in two locations only because of the lack of close relationship between functions of Battle Casualty reporting and the remainder of the administrative functions performed by the AG Section in particular and the Rear Echelon of the Army Headquarters in general.

For some time it had been noted that the Top Secret Control Subsection was operating with the Adjutant General's Section in the Rear Echelon at a disadvantage by reason of the fact that a large majority of Top Secret papers received at the Army Headquarters pertained to the Forward Echelon alone. Receiving, routing, and accounting for these papers in the Rear Echelon and their physical distribution to elements of the Forward Echelon presented difficulties of transportation and coordination, necessitated unnecessary time lags in the distribution of documents, and increased inherently the danger of loss and compromise of Top Secret papers. To eliminate these difficulties, on 3 February the Top Secret Control Subsection was removed from the Adjutant General's Section near Echelon and incorporated in the Forward Echelon Group of the Adjutant General's Section. Thereafter, more secure and expeditious processing of the majority of Top Secret documents was possible.

As had been previously noted, personnel of the AG Section had never been adequate to accomplish the necessary AG functions under operational conditions, and through the months had been augmented, it was still inadequate in size to perform these functions and at the same time provide reserve capacity to meet emergencies. Such an emergency had occurred when, as a result of the German breakthrough in December, an extraordinarily heavy load of battle casualty reports began to reach the Battle Casualty Subsection in January. The emergency relief in January, when additional enlisted men from depot and divisions were placed on duty in the Battle Casualty Subsection, met part of the temporary measure. These men were returned to their organizations gradually during the period 1 to 10 February and were replaced by nine additional clerks and typists obtained on requisition.



Records Section

SECTION II

CASUALTY SECTION

During February, casualty reports in the following categories were processed:

CATEGORIES	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	TOTALS
Killed in Action	134	2,309	2,543
Died of Wounds Received in Action	18	281	299
Died of Injuries Received in Action	0	11	11
Seriously Wounded in Action	111	1,700	1,811
Seriously Injured in Action	1	110	111
Slightly Wounded in Action	344	5,183	5,527
Slightly Injured in Action	75	2,345	2,420
Captured by the Enemy	4	0	4
Missing in Action	44	1,797	1,841
Returned to Duty from a Previously Reported Casualty status	190	4,496	4,686
Erroneously reported as Battle Casualties	4	44	48
Totals	925	18,475	19,400

During the same period, fifty sets of personnel records of deceased, missing, missing in action, and captured personnel were processed; fifty-six reports of Investigation, DD Adj Form 71, on non-battle incurred deaths and injuries requiring investigation were reviewed. Non-battle Casualty Reports, DD Adj Form 7, on deceased and missing personnel, as shown below, were cleared by this office:

	Officers	Enlisted Men
Deceased	4	76
Missing	2	11
Totals	6	90

The lag between dates of casualty and dates on which completed casualty reports were sent to higher headquarters from the Adjutant General's Casualty Section were as follows:

Forwarded within:	Percentage
1 - 10 days	35.6%
11 - 20 days	44.2%
21 - 30 days	17.2%
Over 30 days	3.0%

Although in numbers February battle casualty reports were less than half those processed in January, the entire month of February was characterized by long hours of arduous labor in the Battle Casualty Section brought about by the necessity of revising and posting the central battle casualty card file which had fallen, to some extent, in arrears during the hectic days of January and early February.

SECTION III

MACHINE RECORDS UNIT

The European Theater of Operations locator procedure described in Section III, Chapter Eight, of this volume became effective 1 February. Otherwise, for the month, operations were perfectly routine and there was nothing to report.



SECTION IV

POSTAL SECTION

The month of February was marked by a decline in the receipt of parcel post and a slight increase in the receipt of first class mail. Receipt of all classes of mail continued to be irregular.

Arrangements placing trucks at the disposal of the 13th Postal Regulating Section to assist postal installations in transporting mail to their army postal units were discontinued on 28 February.

On 25 February the 13th Postal Regulating Section began operating at KLEINBETTINGEN, LUXEMBOURG (P-60), and the 21st Postal Regulating Section, which had formerly been assisting the 15th Postal Regulating Section, began operating at THIONVILLE, FRANCE (U-68). There was no interruption in postal service during the movement of these units from VERDUN, FRANCE (U-20).

The movement of first class mail by plane from the United Kingdom and from the Base Post Office near PARIS (S-34) to an airstrip near VERDUN was discontinued upon movement of the 13th Postal Regulating Section. Air service was not resumed.

Mail received by the 13th Postal Regulating Section during the month of February was as follows:

First Class Mail

Total number of pouches received - - - 22,342
Daily average number of pouches - - - 933

Parcel Post

Total number of sacks received - - - 141,347
Daily average number of sacks - - - - 5,057

Mail receipts for December and January, as compared with those for February, are as indicated:

First Class Mail

	Pouches Daily Average
December	464
January	702
February	933

Parcel Post

	Sacks Daily Average
December	7,437
January	1,762
February	5,057



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CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

SECTION I

GENERAL

Two officers, requested by name for other assignments, were transferred from the Section. Because of the anticipated reorganization under new Tables of Organization, replacements were not requested pending determination of future authorized commissioned strength.

On 11 March, one enlisted man was killed by enemy artillery fire. This was the first death in the Adjutant General's Section during the operation attributable to enemy action.

On the 29th and 30th of March, the Section moved with the remainder of the Rear Echelon from the City of LUXEMBOURG (P-81) to TRIER, GERMANY (L-22). During the months of winter operations, the Section had become, to some extent, habituated to a stabilized situation and excess material had been accumulated. It was felt that the move to TRIER would initiate a phase of rapid movement forward into GERMANY, and therefore every effort was made to jettison all extraneous equipment. There were sixteen 2½-ton truck loads of personnel and equipment remaining at the time of the move from LUXEMBOURG to TRIER.

Despite the change in the nature and tempo of tactical operations in the month of March, there was almost no change in the nature and volume of administrative work during this period.

Because of the imminent entry into GERMANY and the anticipated curtailment of pass privileges, it was desired during March to permit as many officers and enlisted men as possible to avail themselves of pass and detached service privileges. During the month a total of nine officers and nineteen enlisted men went on pass or detached service to the UNITED KINGDOM, to BRUSSELS (J-65), BELGIUM, PARIS, FRANCE (S-Ol), and the United States Recreation Area at CANNES, FRANCE (S-56). In addition, by way of relaxation, three enlisted men were permitted detached service of one week duration with the Army Air Forces.

SECTION II

CASUALTY SECTION

The utility and desirability of hospital Admission and Disposition Reports had been discussed throughout the Theater since the operation started. In some armies good use was made of these reports in verifying battle casualty and non-battle casualty reports (particularly in locating casualties reported as missing in action), while in other armies, little or no use was being made of this report. The form of the Admission and Disposition Report, likewise, varied among the armies. The hospital Admission and Disposition Report was standardized and made an integral part of the battle casualty reporting system by instructions of the Theater Commander on 2 March 1945, issued pursuant to Circular No. 14, War Department, 11 January 1945, which prescribed submission of a standard Admission and Disposition Report from all hospitals and clearing stations throughout the army.

During March, casualty reports in the following categories were processed:

CATEGORIES	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	TOTALS
Killed in Action	164	2,863	3,027
Died of Wounds Received in Action	27	440	467
Died of Injuries Received in Action	0	8	8
Seriously Wounded in Action	153	1,970	2,123
Seriously Injured in Action	2	62	64
Slightly Wounded in Action	473	8,016	8,489
Slightly Injured in Action	65	1,455	1,520
Captured by the Enemy	0	2	2
Missing in Action	66	2,104	2,170
Returned to Duty from a Previously Reported Casualty Status	212	4,562	4,774
Erroneously Reported as Battle Casualties	0	195	195
Totals	1,162	21,677	22,899

During the same period, 4,582 sets of personnel records of deceased, missing, missing in action, and captured personnel were processed. Non-Battle Casualty Reports, ETO-Cas Form 2, on deceased and missing personnel, as shown below, were cleared by this office:

	Officers	Enlisted Men
Deceased	5	80
Missing	0	9
Totals	5	89

The lag between dates of casualty and dates on which completed casualty reports were sent to higher headquarters from the Adjutant General's Casualty Section was as follows:

Forwarded Within:	Percentage
1 - 10 Days	96.68%
11 - 20 Days	2.85%
21 - 30 Days	.25%
Over 30 Days	.34%

SECTION III

MACHINE RECORDS UNIT

In the past, duplications of strength had occurred when individuals evacuated from front line elements to division clearing stations were reported in the strengths of the division clearing stations or comparable medical installations and also carried on the morning reports of their units. To eliminate this difficulty, instructions were issued on 27 March in Circular No. 53, this Headquarters, requiring that patients be dropped from their former organizations if they had not rejoined by the close of the morning report day.

On 27 March, all machine records units attached to Third U. S. Army were relieved from their former assignment to Communications Zone and were reassigned to Third U. S. Army.

SECTION IV

POSTAL SECTION

Receipts of first class mail in March were consistent with receipts in February, but there was a sharp drop in parcel post mail received.

With the mounting tempo of tactical operations, army postal units rapidly moved forward. The 13th Postal Regulating Section closed out at KLEINBETTINGEN, LUXEMBOURG (P-01), and opened up for operations at KIRCHBERG, GERMANY (L-74), the latter part of the month; while the 21st Postal Regulating Section began operations at TRIER, GERMANY (L-22), on 25 March.

In early March all mail, with the exception of certain cars from the ports, was transported to VERDUN (U-26) via the "Foot Sweet" express train from which point it was transferred to Advance Section, Communications Zone trucks and hauled to the two postal regulating sections. However, when the two postal regulating sections moved to GERMANY, transportation was available to transport the mail only as far East as TRIER (L-22). Recommendation was made that all mail be shipped by rail as far forward as possible and that the "Foot Sweet" be extended to the vicinity of BAD KREUZNACH (M-05) or MAINZ (M-35) where it was proposed to locate the postal regulating section. Rail service had not been extended to points recommended by the end of March. In the meantime, mail continued to reach the postal regulating section at TRIER where army postal units called for it. Several army postal units were assisted in transporting their mail over unusual distances by transportation borrowed through efforts of the 21st Regulating Station.

Mail was received by the 13th Postal Regulating Section during the month of March as follows:

First Class Mail

Total number of pouches received - - 26,022
Daily average number of pouches - - 839

Parcel Post

Total number of sacks received - - -117,779
Daily average number of sacks - - - 3,79[illegible]

Mail receipts for January and February, as compared with those for March, are as indicated:

First Class Mail

	Pouches Daily Average
January	702
February	833
March	839

Parcel Post

	Sacks Daily Average
January	5,760
February	5,037
March	3,799

CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

SECTION I

GENERAL

During April the Adjutant General's Section completed two moves, from TRIER (L-22) to FRANKFURT (M-66), and from FRANKFURT (M-66) to ERLANGEN (O-35) -- all in GERMANY. During this time, the Machine Records Unit with the Battle Casualty Section attached made three moves -- from ESCH, LUXEMBOURG (P-70), to BAD KREUZNACH, GERMANY (M-05), from BAD KREUZNACH (M-05) to FRANKFURT (M-66), and from FRANKFURT (M-66) to ERLANGEN (O-35). At FRANKFURT (M-66), the Machine Records Unit and the Battle Casualty Section, which had been separated from the remainder of the Adjutant General's Section since early in February, rejoined the Section and thereafter the entire Adjutant General's Section moved and functioned intact. Throughout the month the Section was established in buildings formerly in use by the Germans as barracks, and personnel was quartered in buildings. An anticipated return to tentage failed to materialize. In all cases more time was required to load and unload the Section and to establish it at each location ready for operations than was required during operations in FRANCE in 1944 when the Section operated entirely in tents.

On 21 April the Adjutant General's Section, in common with the remainder of the Headquarters, was reorganized under revised Tables of Organization and Equipment 200-1 dated 26 October 1944, with Changes 1 and 2 thereto. The new Tables of Organization operated to increase the Adjutant General's Section by four officers, one warrant officer, and thirty-four enlisted men, and made it possible to absorb the Adjutant General's Casualty Section, which had been carried as overstrength, within the authorized strength of the Section. After the reorganization, it became possible for the first time to operate the Adjutant General's Section within its authorized strength.

Battle casualty reports during April dropped to approximately half the number during the preceding month. As a result, work in the Battle Casualty Section was considerably reduced, but this reduction was offset in part by a gradually increasing volume of work in the Personnel and Classification Sections.

SECTION II

CASUALTY SECTION

On 16 April a letter was published to the command, the text of which follows:

"During the advances of the Third U. S. Army across Germany, German prisoner of war Camps and hospitals will be overrun by our forces and inmates liberated. Others, because of confusion and disorder in the zone of our advance, will escape from camps in which held and others will evade capture and return to allied military control.

"It is essential that this personnel be reported to the next of kin or emergency addressee as promptly as possible, and to this end,

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it is necessary that the required information on which to base such notification be furnished this headquarters with the least practicable delay.

"When units or organizations [illegible] installations, or when individuals [illegible] evaded capture, report to an [illegible] form, which will be reproduced [illegible] vidual or individuals concerned and forwarded to this headquarters through the Battle Casualty Report courier system by the organization concerned. In the cases of Prisoner of War Camps being overrun, the responsibility for completion and forwarding of these forms rests with the commander of the U. S. Forces liberating the camp and not the medical installation furnishing dispensary service.

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"In addition to the immediate rendition of the above reports, the Provost Marshal, this headquarters, will be notified of the location of the camp or hospital overrun and the number of personnel interned therein. A "Stand Fast" order will be enforced pending arrival of the Provost Marshal's representatives and no personnel will be released to their own custody to rejoin their organizations or to make their way to rear areas. Those individuals requiring early medical attention may be evacuated through medical channels after completion of the attached report. In those cases where medical evacuation is accomplished, a statement will be rendered on the Emergency Medical Tag or Field Medical Record that the individual concerned is an Ex-Prisoner of War, Evader, Escaper, or Liberated Internee. In connection with entries to be made on Admission and Disposition Reports, see Section IV, Circular 57, this Headquarters, as.

"These instructions will apply equally to all individuals subject to U. S. Military Law under Article of War 2 and will be thoroughly disseminated to all elements of your command."

The "attached form" mentioned in the above quoted text follows:

"Name _____
Last Name First Name Middle Initial
Army Serial Number Grade Nationality
Former Organization _____
Air or Ground Force _____
Theater of Operations under which your organization was operating at time you were separated therefrom: _____
(ETOUSA, MTOUSA, NATOUSA, etc.)
Date you were returned to Allied Military Control _____
What was your Status: Check one:
Liberated Prisoner of War _____
Escaper from the Enemy _____
Evader from Capture _____
Liberated Military Internee _____
Have you previously filled out a form such as this or similar:
Yes _____ No _____
PW date to be filled out by PW officer, Medical Officer, or their representative.
Is hospitalization necessary? Yes _____ No _____
If hospitalization is necessary, what is the cause therefor:
Battle Wound or Injury _____
Non-Battle Wound or Injury _____
Sickness _____

NOTE: After completion, this form will be forwarded by the most expeditious means to Adjutant General Casualty Division, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, APO 403, U. S. Army."

During April, casualty reports in the following categories were processed:

CATEGORIES	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	TOTALS
Killed in Action	129	1,779	1,908
Died of Wounds Received in Action	31	220	251
Died of Injuries Received in Action	2	4	6
Seriously Wounded in Action	99	1,124	1,223
Seriously Injured in Action	7	68	75
Slightly Wounded in Action	243	4,034	4,277
Slightly Injured in Action	49	731	780
Captured by the Enemy	1	27	28
Missing in Action	67	1,370	1,437
Returned to Duty from a Previously Reported Casualty Status	109	1,331	1,440
Erroneously Reported as Battle Casualties	5	202	207
Totals	742	[illegible]	[illegible]

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During the same period 11,500 sets of personnel records of deceased, missing, missing in action, and captured personnel were processed. Non-battle Casualty Reports, ETO-Cas Form 2, on deceased and missing personnel, as shown below, were cleared by this office.

	Officers	Enlisted Men
Deceased	2	129
Missing	0	19
Totals	2	148

The lag between dates of casualty and dates on which completed casualty reports were sent to higher headquarters from the Adjutant General's Casualty Section was as follows:

Forwarded Within:	Percentage
1 - 10 Days	90.5%
11 - 20 Days	8.7%
21 - 30 Days	.1%
Over 30 Days	.7%

SECTION III

MACHINE RECORDS UNIT

For the month of April, Machine Records operations were routine and there was nothing to report.

SECTION IV

POSTAL SECTION

During April there was a decrease in the receipt of all types of mail. Outgoing mail, particularly parcel post, continued very heavy.

Because of the rapid advance of Third U. S. Army, the 13th Postal Regulating Section was moved from KIRCHBERG, GERMANY (L-74), to MAINZ (M-35) on 1 April. The 21st Postal Regulating Section, then located at THIES (O-22), ceased operations with the Third U. S. Army on 5 April to join another Army.

On 28 April the 13th Postal Regulating Section was moved to PORCHHEIM, GERMANY (O-33), and two days later the "Fast Sweet" express train was extended to WURZBURG (N-65) pending opening of rail to PORCHHEIM (O-33). In the meantime, the mail was unloaded and transported from WURZBURG (N-65) to PORCHHEIM (O-33) by motor transport.

Mail was received by the 13th Postal Regulating Section during the month of April as follows:

First Class Mail

Total number of pouches received - - - 10,969
Daily average number of pouches - - - 653

Parcel Post

Total number of sacks received - - - - 95,728
Daily average number of sacks - - - - 3,191

Mail receipts for February and March, as compared with those for April, are as indicated:

First Class Mail

	Pouches Daily Average
February	833
March	890
April	653

Parcel Post

	Sacks Daily Average
February	5,037
March	3,779
April	3,191

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

SECTION I

GENERAL

From 1 May to 9 May, when active operations terminated, there were no unusual developments in the Adjutant General's Section.

With the end of operations discernible and imminent, there already existed a noticeable trend toward a phase of more voluminous administration. The demand for statistical surveys and other planning reports was increasing, and the center of gravity in all planning was shifting from the support of tactical operations to territorial administration and necessary post-operational readjustments in personnel, equipment, and organization.

SECTION II

CASUALTY SECTION

The most important function of the Casualty Section during this period was the preparation of nominal rolls of liberated prisoners of war. From 1 May to 8 May, the names of 3,606 individuals from German prison camps overrun by Third U. S. Army were reported to the Theater Commander. Procedures established (see Section II, Chapter 11, preceding) for the purpose of obtaining information on which to base nominal rolls functioned smoothly.

During this period, the V Corps was assigned to the Third U. S. Army. As a result of this assignment, 80,000 cards representing casualties suffered by units of the V Corps during Continental operations were received and the immense job of manually interfiling these cards into the already large files of the Casualty Section was begun. This filing of cards was a necessity as there was a considerable and continuous flow of casualty reports, changes in status, letters of condolence, replies to letters of inquiry, and personnel records which had to be processed and verified, and accuracy in processing these documents required accurate and current files. It was anticipated that inquiries concerning casualties would continue to be received for a long time.

During the same period 664 sets of personnel records of deceased, missing, missing in action, and captured personnel were processed. Non-battle Casualty Reports on deceased and missing personnel, as shown below, were cleared by this office.

	Officers	Enlisted Men
Deceased	4	63
Missing	1	3
Totals	5	66

During the first week of May, casualty reports in the following categories were processed:

CATEGORIES	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	TOTALS
Killed in Action	22	232	254
Died of Wounds Received in Action	5	35	40
Died of Injuries Received in Action	0	2	2
Seriously Wounded in Action	20	192	212
Seriously Injured in Action	0	10	10
Slightly Wounded in Action	59	574	633
Slightly Injured in Action	6	123	129
Captured by the Enemy	1	19	20
Missing in Action	6	163	169
Returned to Duty from a Previously Reported Casualty Status	21	485	506
Erroneously Reported as Battle Casualties	1	75	76
Totals	121	1,910	[illegible]

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The lag between dates of casualty and dates on which completed casualty reports were sent to higher headquarters from the Adjutant General's Casualty Section was as follows:

Forwarded Within:	Percentage
1 - 10 Days	94.00%
11 - 20 Days	4.00%
21 - 30 Days	.50%
Over 30 Days	.50%

SECTION III

MACHINE RECORDS UNIT

On 6 May the 14th Machine Records Unit began formulating plans to enable it to fill its assigned role in the War Department Basic Plan for Readjustment and Redeployment. In addition to records to be prepared for use at the port of embarkation by headquarters European Theater of operations, it was planned that the Machine Records Unit would furnish the following records for use by the Staff of this Headquarters in making readjustments:

Adjusted Service Rating Credit Report by parent unit showing the number of enlisted men within each adjusted service rating score level.

Adjusted Service Rating Credit Report by parent unit showing the number of enlisted men within each military occupational specialty sub-divided within each adjusted service rating score level.

It seemed evident that in addition to prescribed routine operations, the Machine Records Unit would be called upon to play an important part in readjustment and redeployment.

SECTION IV

POSTAL SECTION

Mail was transported via rail "Red Ball Express" to [illegible] and then trucked to the Postal Unloading Section at [illegible] from 1 May to 4 May. On 5 May, rail service direct to the Postal Regulating Section was begun.

An air tonnage allotment of 1½ pounds of mail between Paris (Base Post Office) and Air Strength (Main) at [illegible] (ZZZ), GERMANY (WAF), near the 1st Postal Regulating Section at [illegible] was authorized and transported on 5 May. Thus the Third U. S. Army pioneered the establishment of air mail service to forward areas, thereby expediting the delivery of mail by four to ten days.

Mail was received by the 1st Postal Regulating Section during the first eight days of May as follows:

First Class Mail

Total number of pouches received - - - 9,761 *
Daily average number of pouches - - - 1,220

Parcel Post

Total number of sacks received - - - 45,247
Daily average number of sacks - - - 5,656

(* This total includes pouches received by air.)

Mail receipts for March and April, as compared with those for the first eight days of May, are as indicated:

First Class Mail

	Pouches Daily Average
March	859
April	955
May	1,220

Parcel Post

	Sacks Daily Average
March	3,799
April	5,191
May	5,656

CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

ORGANIZATION

There was much activity in the Top Secret Section during planning phases; little during periods of operation.

The organization of the Forward Echelon Section depends upon the tactical situation and the policies of the Commanding General as to designated functions to be performed in the Forward and Rear Echelons.

The Battle Casualty Section is closely associated in function with the Machine Records Unit. The policy adopted during the "OVERLORD" operation of attaching the Casualty Section and the Army Graves Registration Office to the Machine Records Unit and requiring these three groups to mess, travel, and work together materially facilitated the operational effectiveness of each.

It was desirable to organize a mess in the Machine Records Unit.

The Army Battle Casualty Section should be provided with not less than three officers and twenty-five enlisted men.

The functions of supply, communications, and casualty reporting are sensitive to the tactical attitude, the tempo of operations, and the fluidity of the battle situation. It is desirable to have a reserve of trained personnel within the Adjutant General's Section who can be made available to the several sub-divisions of the Section when emergency situations demand additional manpower.

Tables of Organization 2X-1, dated 26 October 1944, providing a strength of ninety-three enlisted men, five warrant officers, and sixteen officers was found to be adequate for the operation of the Adjutant General's Section of Third U. S. Army.

Whether in bivouac or established in quarters and billets, the size of the Adjutant General's Section with the Machine Records Unit attached is such that it is desirable more often than now to separate physically the Machine Records--Casualty Section groupment from the remainder of the Adjutant General's Section. Moreover, the weight and bulk of the machine records vans is such that it is frequently impossible to place the Machine Records Unit in the immediate vicinity of the Adjutant General's Section proper.

ORGANIZATION IN SUBORDINATE UNITS

The original basis of allotment of one army postal unit per 10,000 of non-divisional troops was found to be inadequate -- the reason being that in addition to troops assigned and attached to the Army proper, large numbers of Communications Zone and Air Force troops in vicinity of army postal units were required to be serviced, thereby adding a considerable overload to the strength of 10,000 theoretically served by the army postal unit.

The Personnel Administration Plan established for the Third U. S. Army at the beginning of the "OVERLORD" operation (see Volume II, Part Seven, Chapter 1, above) proved to be sound. Administration Centers in divisions functioned in a highly satisfactory manner.

EQUIPMENT

It was found that the 1½-ton personnel carrier is inadequate for the transportation needs of any army postal unit.

The sub-allotment of equipment authorized for the Adjutant General's Section at the beginning of the operation was inadequate. It was necessary to obtain additional tentage, typewriters, chairs, and tables to equip the Cables Section and the Battle Casualty Section.

With the functional attachment of the Battle Casualty Section to the Machine Records Unit, it was desirable to obtain a 10-ton semi-trailer van for the Battle Casualty Section in order to give the entire group mobility equal to that of the Machine Records Unit.

During operations, it was necessary that sufficient tentage be made available to house and protect properly the vital card files of the Casualty Section.

At least one high speed, power operated mimeograph machine is an absolute necessity. Two would be preferable. Hand operated mimeograph machines are entirely inadequate to meet the absolute minimum requirements of a field army under any condition encountered during this operation.

TRAINING

Administrative officers and clerks adequately trained for garrison operations of an Adjutant General's Section, if possessing reasonable resourcefulness, should be able to perform similar functions in operations. Additional training is highly desirable, however, for those officers and clerks detailed in the Battle Casualty Section. This training should be conducted by personnel having experience of battle casualty reporting in operations. Wherever possible, officers and clerks from the Battle Casualty Section should be detailed in the Casualty Sections of operating units prior to the commitment of the organizations of assignment. This method was followed by the Adjutant General's Battle Casualty Section at the beginning of the "OVERLORD" operation. It paid dividends.

Schools conducted prior to the beginning of the "OVERLORD" operation, in which personnel officers, clerks, and sergeants major from attached corps and divisions received instructions in battle casualty reporting, procurement of replacements, and other phases of administration (see Volume II, Part Seven, Chapter 1, above), materially standardized and facilitated personnel administration within the Third U. S. Army during the operation.

OPERATIONS

When units are reattached from army to adjacent army, a system for the speedy transfer of machine records files from the old machine records unit to the new machine records unit is essential. The system adopted in the "OVERLORD" operation under which the machine records unit terminating service to an organization assumed the responsibility of transferring by courier, without delay, files to the new machine records unit of service proved to be effective.

Battle casualty reporting channels and channels of evacuation of casualties should coincide from the lowest echelons to the headquarters of the theater of operation. If a casualty report in a given case is rendered by a unit of one army while the casualty himself is evacuated through an adjoining army, much confusion and unnecessary correspondence is caused in each army before the status of the case can be accurately determined in either army.

It is especially important that battle casualty reports be transmitted directly from divisions to the Army Battle Casualty Section without suffering the loss of time necessary for administrative processing at corps headquarters level.

When mail accumulates at any point behind the postal regulating section, the accumulation is likely to arrive at the postal regulating section in very large increments causing heavy peak loads at the postal regulating section. Plans should include the augmentation of the postal regulating section at such times in order to assure the expeditious handling of mail.

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Constant check is required to ensure that non-divisional troops do not travel too far for mail [illegible] nearer. Troops will endeavor to regi[illegible] and corps command army postal units [illegible]

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General assignment army postal units should [illegible] principal towns having good road nets. Organizations will not register with army postal units located in out-of-the-way places. It is desirable that an army postal unit be located at one place as long as possible and that there should be the minimum disruption of mail service during movement. The leap-frog system of moving army postal units -- i.e., placing a unit as far forward as practicable and leaving it there until it becomes the rear army postal unit -- has proved advantageous.

During fluid phases of field operations when units of army and corps troops are scattered through a deep army area, more effective postal service can be rendered if a majority of the army postal units remain attached directly to Army. When the tempo of operations slows to a relative static phase and corps troops are largely concentrated within corps areas, the postal service can be improved by attaching directly to corps sufficient army postal units to furnish service to the corps.

The practice of having an army postal unit move with the Forward and another with the Rear Echelon of Army Headquarters is desirable, since there are a number of troop units habitually moving with either. Under such circumstances, such troops will always be served by the same army postal unit.

SUPPLY

During highly mobile phases with consequent frequent shifts of depots and supply points and long and frequent movements of units, demands upon supply agencies and channels for high priority items of supply are so great that danger exists of breakdowns in the supply of lower priority items (such as blank forms, envelopes, and mimeograph paper). Adequate stocks of low priority items should be established prior to entering a highly fluid phase in order to assure that supplies in adequate quantity are available for the support of the operation. At least a thirty day level in local reserve is highly desirable.

COMMUNICATIONS

Special courier services utilizing air transportation should be established with caution. During fluid phases of operation, confusion and loss of time incident to establishing contact with the appropriate air strip from each successive bivouac area may be such as to nullify the advantage of speed of transmission in many cases. Greater certainty and equal or greater dispatch may be obtainable through normal ground transmission agencies when short distances are involved.

The special courier system for transmittal of battle casualty reports established immediately prior to the beginning of the operation (see Volume II, Part Seven, Chapter 2) was essential to the procurement of casualty reports and morning reports with a minimum of delay. This, or a similar procedure, is necessary.

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ANNEXES

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ANNEXES

ANNEX NO. 1

ETOUSA MD Form No. 2544
30 April 1944

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Page 1 of 1 pages

ADMISSION AND DISPOSITION REPORT

NAME OF UNIT 956th CONVALESCENT HOSPITAL

LOCATION 4.5 mi. NE St. Mihiel Date 15 Nov 44 Hours 0001 A to 2400 A

INSTRUCTIONS.—An entry will be made for each case admitted and/or disposed of. If admission and disposition occur same day complete entry on one line will cover both. In Col. 4 for wounded, enter number of Purple Heart or Oak Leaf Cluster, if awarded. In Col. 8 "Trf." means transferred within Army area. "Evac." means evacuated to C. Z. Indicate unit to which "Trf." or "Evac." is made, if known. In Col. 9 "NC" should precede battle casualty diagnosis.

NAME AND SERIAL NUMBER	GRADE AND ORGANIZATION	STATE NATURE OF ARMY-NAVY ALLIED (Specify) ENEMY (Specify)	CAUSE FOR ADMISSION (Specify) Wounded-Battle injury Wounded-Non-battle injury Disease Non-battle injury	Condition Serious, Slight, or D. W. I. A.	DATE OF ADMISSION	Record Received with Patient Yes—Trf. No—Evac.	Disposition Duty, Trf., Evac., Death, Other as Directed, Sig	BRIEF DIAGNOSIS
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
35922451	Pfc. (W)							
GONSOPICK, CYRIL H. 37240929	534 Armd Inf Bn Pfc (W)	SLD			14 Nov		EVA	Psycho-neurosis. Anx. States
STREET, EMERY (NMI) 0105347	9th Armd Inf Bn 1st Lt (W)	LWA					EVA	Perf. W rt arm & leg
SZEWEYK, JOSEPH A. (INF) 42112715	9th Armd Inf Bn Pvt (W)	NBW					TRF 9 CONV HOSP	GSW lt arm, Shr. W lumbar region
SIMONETTI, FRANCIS (NMI) 0918763	10th Armd Inf Bn 1st Lt. (W)	LIA					RTU	Sprain, mild, left ankle
SHAVER, JOHN W. (MG) 20101412	315 Inf. Regt. Med. Det. S/Sgt (C)	SWA					EVA	Mult. Shr. W lt thoracic region
SMITH, ALBERT W. 38334678	900th QM Co. (Ldry) Cpl. (W)	NBI			11 Nov		5 RTD BR	Sprain, lt Wrist & abr lt hand
PIPER, JOHN W. 36543211	68th Tk Bn Tec 5 (C)	SIA			13 Nov		DOI	Generalised 1st & 2d ° Burns
MILLER, WILBERT R. 20729857	4203 QM Trk Co Sgt. (W)	SLD			14 Nov		DIE	Appendicitis, acute, peritonitis
WILSON, LOUIS V. 31084567	56th TD Bn Pvt. (W)	SND						Syphilis, primary
FULTON, CARL A. 31084789	135th Engr (C) Bn. T/Sgt. (W)	DOA					DOW	Multiple Shr. W. chest and neck
STARREN, MILLER (NMI)	321st Inf. Regt.	SWA			11 Nov		EVA	Traumatic amp. lt leg, mine
U. S. NAVY								
423768								
SMITH, JOHN A.	MM 1c1 "STANDISH" U. S. LST	LWA						GSW lt should, lt arm, 20mm shell
ALLIED BRITISH								
1410064	Cpl. RAF							
THOMAS, DYFRIG R.	724 Wing 5 Squad.	LIA						Burns of face and hands

s/ Albert C. Davis
t/ ALBERT C. DAVIS
Capt., M.A.C.
Registrar

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE.—This report must be signed by a responsible officer directly under Final Entry on last page.

ANNEX NO. 2



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

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PART 8

ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY



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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SUBJECT: Submission of After Action Report.

TO : Commanding General, Third US Army, APO 403, US Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Antiaircraft Artillery Section, Headquarters Third US Army, beginning with the time of arrival of this section at Camp Toft, Cheshire, England on 24 March 1944, and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapters until the cessation of hostilities with Germany.

2. The report covers mainly the activities of Antiaircraft Artillery units directly under Army control which were employed to defend lines of communications, supply points and vital areas in both the Army area and in the Corps areas. However all outstanding or unusual instances concerning Antiaircraft Artillery units attached to Corps and Divisions are included. In addition, the attached annexes summarize the activities of all Antiaircraft Artillery in the Third US Army.

F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



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CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

During the planning phase in the United Kingdom, Antiaircraft Artillery units were assigned to Third US Army in accordance with the following estimate of requirements which had been made by Headquarters European Theater of Operations:

Per Division	-	1 AAA AW Bn
Per Corps	-	1 AAA Group Hq & Hq Btry 1 AA Gun Bn 2 AAA AW Bns
Per Army	-	1 AAA Brigade Hq & Hq Btry 3 AAA Group Hq & Hq Btrys 2 AAA Gun Bns 6 AAA AW Bns

On the above basis and with a designated strength of four corps, the total amount of Antiaircraft Artillery assigned or "earmarked" for assignment to Third US Army consisted of one Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, seven Group Headquarters and Headquarters Batteries, six Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalions and twenty five Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalions.

Few of the above units were released to control of Third US Army during the planning stage. Many were attached to First US Army and participated in the assault on the Continent and ensuing operations during the months of June and July. Others were attached to European Theater of Operations and the Ninth US Air Force for defense of installations in England. Information concerning the probable use of flying bombs by the Germans resulted in the retention of Antiaircraft Artillery units on operational assignments until they left for the Continent, instead of earlier release to Third US Army in the United Kingdom as had been planned. Two units were attached to the Advance Section Communications Zone.

As a result of the above detachments, two Group Headquarters and Headquarters Batteries, five Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalions and twelve Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalions did not revert to Third US Army control until after arrival on the Continent.

Those units which were released to Third US Army in the United Kingdom were "Phased" on the troop priority list. Arrangements were made to pick up units attached to First US Army and Advance Section Communications Zone on the Continent in time for operations with the divisions, corps, or army unit for which earmarked.

With the exception of units attached to First US Army, all Antiaircraft Artillery units assigned Third US Army in the United Kingdom, were inspected by officers from the Army Antiaircraft Section and 34th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade to determine their status of training and equipment. Antiaircraft artillery units which had been released to Third US Army were sent to Antiaircraft practice ranges in England for refresher and familiarization firing. The one gun battalion released to Third US Army was attached to VIII Corps and sent to a Field Artillery range for instruction and firing in a Field Artillery role under the supervision of Field Artillery officers.

Operations memoranda were published which outlined the responsibilities of the Field Artillery and Antiaircraft units and procedure to be employed when Antiaircraft units were used to reinforce Field Artillery fire. Existing graphic firing tables for terrestrial firing by 90mm guns were found to be based on obsolete firing tables and to contain no information on the M-67 Field Artillery fuse when used with the 90mm shell. Since it was essential to know the difference between fuse range and time of flight when using this fuse on the 90mm shell, a study was made of the characteristics of the M-67 fuse on the 4.5 inch and 155mm Field Artillery projectiles and an approximate scale developed for its use with the 90mm projectile. A Graphic Firing Table based on revised firing data and including information for use of both the M-43 and M-67 fuses for time fire was developed, produced, and distributed to all Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalions assigned to Third US Army.

Quotas for special schools for Antiaircraft Troops in the United Kingdom were allotted to units in accordance with their priority for movement to the Continent. These schools included Care and Maintenance of Materiel, Antiaircraft Dive Bombing Tactics, Waterproofing of Vehicles and Equipment, Deployment and Movement of Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalions, Camouflage and Mines and Booby Traps.

An operations memorandum covering the Air Defense System, Employment of Antiaircraft Artillery, Rules for Antiaircraft Engagement and Limitations to Flying was published. Other operations memoranda were published which included the procedure to be used in obtaining meteorological messages by using the Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion radars to obtain ballistic winds (Rawin Process). This data was combined with ballistic densities obtained by radiosonde at the Army weather detachment. Types 1, 2 and 3 meteorological messages were known to be transmitted to all units in the Army desiring this information. An Antiaircraft Bulletin was published outlining the use of demolitions for blasting gun emplacements.

Plans were made for an air warning system for the Army area. The 11/7th Operations Detachment was activated and attached to the 34th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade to operate an Antiaircraft Artillery Operations Room for the Third US Army area.

Since the employment of Third US Army in the coming operations depended on the situation at the time it became operational, no definite plans for employment of Antiaircraft Artillery could be published. The Antiaircraft Artillery Annex to the Third US Army Outline Plans outlined the basic air defense plan and air defense measures which would be employed. It also included an estimate of the initial vulnerable points in case of an amphibious landing, and other points which would become vital Army objectives. A general plan was outlined for control and employment of all Antiaircraft Artillery troops, Barrage Balloons, and Smoke Screens in the Army Zone and instructions were included covering such matters as aircraft identification and recognition, ammunition loads, handling of captured material and local security.

A close check was maintained on the status of equipment of units, and, where necessary, special efforts were made to facilitate the drawing of critical items of equipment.

A study was made of Third US Army administrative instructions preliminary to mounting and their application to Antiaircraft Artillery units. Computations were made to determine that units would be loaded as specified in these instructions and to ascertain that Antiaircraft Artillery battalions were sufficiently mobile to meet the requirements of the coming operations. A study was also made of ammunition maintenance requirements for the period up to "D" plus 10A and recommendations made to Army Ordnance Officer.

Training was also conducted for Third US Army units other than Antiaircraft Artillery. A training memorandum prescribing practice Antiaircraft firing for .50 caliber guns was published, and facilities at practice camps in England were obtained for training of .50 caliber machine gunners of ground units other than Antiaircraft Artillery. A quota of two gunners per caliber .50 machine gun was allotted to all Third US Army units. Officers of units which were to participate in this training program were sent to the practice camps one week in advance of the enlisted gunners for intensive training under the supervision of British Antiaircraft personnel to qualify them as instructors for their own troops. Approximately 1400 officers and 10,000 enlisted men from Third US Army received this training. In addition, a letter directive was published outlining the rules for firing of small arms at enemy aircraft and another for fire at hostile aircraft with Antiaircraft weapons by other than Antiaircraft Troops.

Upon departure of Third US Army Headquarters from England, an echelon from the Antiaircraft section remained with the "T" echelon to complete this program of machine gun firing and also to assist in equipping the Antiaircraft units assigned to Third US Army which were still in the United Kingdom.

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

Upon arrival on the Continent, contact was established with the Antiaircraft Section, First US Army and the plans and procedures set up for operations of Third US Army Antiaircraft units were checked for adequacy in the light of battle experience. This contact was maintained throughout the pre-operational phase.

Additional operational memoranda were published, one of which covered the employment of aircraft by ground forces other than Antiaircraft Artillery and another the designation of Antiaircraft Artillery Intelligence Service reporting stations.

The plans for employment of Third US Army were still indefinite at this time but port installations along the BRITTANY coast and the west coast of FRANCE were studied and plans prepared for antiaircraft defense of those installations.

Inasmuch as the majority of the Antiaircraft units assigned Third US Army were still operational with First US Army and Communications Zone, a constant check was maintained on the location, availability and status of equipment of these units, and arrangements were completed for these units to be released to Third US Army when it became operational.

Until the latter part of this period, when the needs of First US Army for Antiaircraft Artillery had been satisfied, Third US Army Antiaircraft units arriving on the Continent continued to be attached to First US Army for operations. Thereafter, arriving Third US Army units became available for its own protection. These were utilized to establish Antiaircraft defense of the Army Command Post and supply installations in the vicinity of ST JACQUES DE RAMOU (T2800). As units continued to arrive, sufficient Antiaircraft Artillery was attached to the XV Corps to protect its concentration.

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

On 1 August the Army had one Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, seven Antiaircraft Artillery Groups, six Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalions, eight Antiaircraft (Self-propelled) Battalions and seventeen Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalions assigned or earmarked for assignment. The majority of these units had been attached to First US Army for operations and arrangements were made to secure their immediate release.

In accordance with previous plans, an Automatic Weapons Battalion was to be attached to each division, and an Antiaircraft Artillery Group Headquarters, one Antiaircraft Gun Battalion and two Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalions to each corps. The remainder of the Antiaircraft Artillery in the Army was to be attached to the 34th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade. The Brigade with its attached units was to perform the mission of protecting installations in the rear of corps zones. When necessary, additional Antiaircraft units required to augment corps defenses would be furnished from Antiaircraft Artillery units attached to the Brigade.

Until Third US Army became operational, the mission of the 34th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade was defense of Third US Army Headquarters and supply installations in the vicinity of ST JACQUES DE RAMOU (T1800).

After United States forces had broken through the German shell between LESSAY (T1677) and ST LO (T5043), driven on down the Contentin Peninsula and fanned out into BRITTANY, a line of communications "funnel" was formed in the region of AVRANCHES (T2718) - PONTAUBAULT (T2810) - ST HILAIRE DU HARCOUET (T4503). Referring to Figure 1, it can be seen that the only north-south supply road through this area, N-176, crosses the SELUNE River and passes through numerous defiles including the towns of AVRANCHES (T2718) and PONTAUBAULT (T2810). The area also included several bridges on the east - west supply roads, and a dam on the SELUNE River, the breaching of which would flood the area and jeopardize the successful exploitation of the break through. Several supply points were within the area and two airstrips were in operation. In short, the area contained numerous enticing targets to lure maximum effort from the German bomber force.

As the VIII Corps moved south, Army Antiaircraft Artillery units under the 34th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade were moved in rear of the corps with the mission of protecting bridges southeast of COUTANCES (T2457) and in the vicinity of HYENVILLE (T2251) and other salient points along the route of advance with particular attention to LA HAYE PESNEL (T2928) and SARTILLY (T2424). Efforts were continued to secure release of Third US Army Antiaircraft Artillery units still attached to other headquarters in order that they might be brought south to build up the defense of critical points along the supply route, and plans were made to extend Army Antiaircraft Artillery defenses south through the gap at AVRANCHES (T2718) and east along the SELUNE River.

By 3 August, Antiaircraft Artillery units released by the First US Army had moved south to develop defenses extended through the gap at AVRANCHES (T2718) and west toward the BRITTANY Peninsula to include PONTORSON (T1703) and PONTAUBAULT (T2810). Defense of the SELUNE River with 90mm guns was extended east from the mouth of the river to ST

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

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HILAIRE DU HARCOUET (TL503). Due to the extreme importance placed upon keeping the AVRANCHES (TQ7718) gap open to allow an uninterrupted flow of supplies for the rapid advance, arrangements were made to establish the area bounded by a line 12,000 yards north and south of the river and 12,000 yards west of its mouth and east of ST HILAIRE DU HARCOUET (TL503) as a restricted area called an Inner Artillery Zone (IAZ). In this area at night only, antiaircraft Artillery was authorized to immediately engage any plane not identified as friendly, as compared with the normal restricted area in which only those planes which committed a hostile act were positively recognized or identified as enemy, could be engaged.

Automatic Weapons protection was also provided for the airstrips at ST JEAN DE DAYE (TL776) and MEAUTIS (TS62) with a minimum scale of one (1) Automatic Weapons Battery at each strip.

By 4 August all Antiaircraft Artillery had been received by Third US Army with the exception of the 486th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) which was scheduled to arrive on the Continent shortly, and the 484th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, attached Section 3-th Infantry Division which was still operational with the First US Army. The 484th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion was released to Third US Army when the 8th Infantry Division reverted to Third US Army

Attachments and assignments of Antiaircraft Artillery units as of 4 August are indicated below:

38th AAA Brigade

(347th Opns Det)

97th AAA Group

128th AAA Gun Bn
482d AAA AW Bn
777th AAA AW Bn
459th AAA AW Bn (SP)

207th AAA Group

120th AAA Gun Bn
590th AAA AW Bn (SP)
113th AAA Gun Bn
346th AAA AW Bn

VIII Corps

113th AAA Group

•119th AAA Gun Bn
445th AAA AW Bn
(Attchd 6th Inf)
453d AAA AW Bn
(Attchd 83d Inf)
459th AAA AW Bn
463d AAA AW Bn
(Attchd 79th Inf)
473d AAA AW Bn (SP)
489th AAA AW Bn (SP)
(Attchd 4th Armd)
634th AAA AW Bn
777th AAA AW Bn (SP)
(Attchd 6th Armd)

XII Corps

7th AAA Group

XV Corps

234 AAA Group

398th AAA AW Bn (SP)
456th AAA AW Bn
537th AAA AW Bn
(Attchd 90th Inf)

•• XX Corps

112th AAA Group

387th AAA AW Bn (SP)
(Attchd 5th Armd)
449th AAA AW Bn
(Attchd 5th Inf)
551st AAA AW Bn

• Temp attached
•• Not operational

The above attachments marked a change from the original plan for permanent attachment of one gun battalion to each corps, with the retaining two gun battalions attached to Army. It had been decided that this system would not allow sufficient flexibility for building up gun defenses and also maintaining such defenses as the corps moved forward.

The new plan was to keep all gun battalions under Army control and attach them to corps as necessary. As the corps moved forward, the gun battalions would remain in position and revert to Army control. Protection of defiles or installations further along the corps zone of advance would be provided by moving up other gun battalions from the rear of the army area and attaching them to corps.

This method of "leap frogging" proved very successful in that gun defenses could be established as necessary throughout the Army area without respect to Corps zones and continuous protection could be provided to bridges and other critical points along the main supply roads.

By 4 August enemy action was becoming increasingly heavy. Fierce air attacks were being made in an effort to interrupt the movement of troops and supplies through the AVRANCHES (TQ7718) gap. During the period 031200B - 041200B August the enemy sent over 467 aircraft in ninety seven raids. Antiaircraft claimed twenty nine planes as destroyed and twenty as probably destroyed.

When it became evident that RENNES (XS4148) would fall to the rapidly moving Third US Army columns, arrangements were made for the city to be declared an Inner Artillery Zone by night as soon as possible or upon capture. The restrictions to flying were to apply to the area enclosed within a circle having a radius of 15,000 yards, the center of which would be RENNES (XS4148).

During the period 041200B to 051200B the enemy made 107 raids employing 203 aircraft. Antiaircraft units made claims for fifteen Category IIs (destroyed) and eight Category IIIs (probably destroyed) with no defence to defenses. All available Antiaircraft Artillery was required to cope with these efforts and

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By 6 August the AVRANCHES (T2718) defenses were built up to a maximum of seven and one half battalions, disposed as shown in Figure 2 and organized as follows:

<u>29th AAA Brigade</u>

207th AAA Group
(1) 217th AAA Gun Bn (M)
(Btry "A", 111th Gun Bn attchd)
(2) 115th AAA Gun Bn (M)
(Btry "C", 111th Gun Bn attchd)
(3) 502nd AAA AW Bn (SP)
(4) 465th AAA AW Bn (SP)

<u>214th AAA Group</u>

(1) 120th AAA Gun Bn (M)
(2) 550th AAA AW Bn (M)
635th AAA AW Bn (M) - (Attchd VIII Corps)

The effort expended by the German Air Force against this vital area was indicative of the seriousness with which the enemy viewed the effect of the breakthrough. Enemy fliers made repeated determined attempts to breach the dam, destroy the bridges, and otherwise interfere with the movement of men and supplies through the "funnel". Heaviest attacks occurred on the night of 6 August, when 263 aircraft were reported over the AVRANCHES (T2718) area. Antiaircraft artillery claimed 10 enemy planes destroyed and fourteen probably destroyed. Of the 5 assigned VIII Corps Antiaircraft Artillery and Divisional Antiaircraft Artillery units claimed an additional 2 for planes destroyed and 2 probably destroyed. The XV Corps and Divisional Antiaircraft Artillery claimed five Category I's and three Category II's. The enemy planes operated almost exclusively at night. A bright moon during the period was of considerable assistance to Automatic Weapons units, which were able to engage during the hours of darkness. Planes attacked singly, or by small groups. Extensive use was made of flares. Types of attack included medium level and glide bombing, using heavy demolition and anti-personnel bombs, as well as strafing attacks. At times, attacking planes came low enough to be silhouetted against the flares of burning buildings and trucks, thereby presenting good targets for the automatic weapons.

Arrangements were completed on 6 August for the attachment of two additional Antiaircraft Artillery Brigades to Third US Army. Plans were made for the 52d Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade to be used in the defense of St. MALO (S7915) and RENNES (X9448), and the 54th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade in the defense of BREST (V9090) immediately upon capture of these cities.

Arrangements were made for the establishment of MAYENNE (Z8171) and LAVAL (Y6060) as Inner Artillery Zones for protection of bridges at these places, since efforts of the German Air Force were being directed largely against lines of communication in the attempt to stop the rapid movement of Third US Army. This made imperative immediate Antiaircraft Artillery defense of bridges and other critical points as soon as they were secured by our troops. To protect the crossing of the ERVENNE River at LAVAL (Y6060), the 120th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion was detached from the MAYENNE River defenses and moved in the late afternoon to the vicinity of LAVAL (Y6060) for employment by XV Corps. A Chemical Smoke Company was also attached to XV Corps and moved to LAVAL (Y6060) to augment the Antiaircraft defenses there.

In order that the defenses along the SELUNE River south of AVRANCHES (T4716) and east of PONTAUBAULT (T2610), which were still receiving heavy raids nightly might not be weakened, the two batteries of the 111th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion which had been protecting bridges in the vicinity of COUTANCES (T2157) were moved south to maintain the defenses in the critical area.

The XV Corps became operational on 7 August. Initially the 13th Antiaircraft Artillery Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and the 551st Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion were attached as corps units. Several days later the 105th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion was also attached. The 387th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) had been attached to XX Corps for the 5th Armored Division and the 449th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion for the 5th Infantry Division.

On 7 August, responsibility for the Antiaircraft Artillery defense of RENNES (X9448) was taken over from VIII Corps by Army, and the Gun Battalions which were defending RENNES (X9448) were attached to the 38th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.

A change in the boundary between armies placed MAYENNE (Z8171) in the First US Army zone of action and XV Corps was relieved of responsibility for defense of that city. This enabled the 120th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion which had been defending both LAVAL (Y6060) and MAYENNE (Z8171) to augment the defense of LAVAL (Y6060).



The 52d Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade consisting of the 19th Antiaircraft Artillery Group, 449th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion (semi-mobile), and the 467th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (semi-mobile), which had been attached to Third US Army, moved west on the 6 August Peninsula with orders to be prepared for movement into BREST (V9090) to organize Antiaircraft defense of that city immediately upon capture. In the meantime the brigade was directed to set up a defense of airfields on the main supply route between LAUDEAC (Z2166) and ROSTRENEN (W8176).

The heaviest air activities since Third US Army began its move to the south occurred during the period 6 - 7 August. Most of the raids were on bridges and critical points in the vicinity of AVRANCHES (T2718) and ST HILAIRE DU HARCOUET (TL703). The rapid build-up of Antiaircraft defenses provided protection for all critical areas, however and even though the German Air Force made repeated attempts to slow up the operations by attacking these objectives in force, not a single defended installation was reported destroyed or damaged. Of the 534 enemy planes reported over the Army area during the 48 hour period, more than ten percent were destroyed or probably destroyed by Antiaircraft Artillery.

Due to the rapid movement of Third US Army both to the east and west it became apparent that the city of RENNES (X9448) would be of less importance than had been anticipated. Defense of the city was reduced by one Gun battalion, and the 467th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion was moved east to LE MANS (WL979) and attached to XV Corps to protect its crossings over the SARTHE River. Here an Inner Artillery Zone was established on 9 August.

By this time, the extremely heavy enemy activity in the AVRANCHES (T2718) and SELUNE River area had begun to decline, but scattered enemy raids were still being reported throughout the Army area.

Antiaircraft defense of the main supply route through LAVAL (Y6060) and LE MANS (WL979) now began to assume great importance as the advance continued to the north and east and additional Automatic Weapons units were attached to XV Corps for this purpose. As the corps moved rapidly to the north, Antiaircraft defenses at LAVAL (Y6060) were taken over by Army. In accordance with the policy which had been established, Antiaircraft Artillery units defending the city reverted to Army control and were attached to the 38th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.

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On 10 August enemy air action reached the lowest ebb since Third US Army became operational. Only thirty one enemy planes were reported over the entire Third US Army area during the twenty four hour period.

Army supply lines continued to stretch and transportation became a critical problem. To assist in meeting the increasing demands, arrangements were made for Antiaircraft Artillery units under the control of Army Groups to furnish vehicles for hauling supplies provided such action would not hinder the units in the performance of their primary mission. Vehicles taken from these units which were not expected to be used for 24 hours and the vehicles were placed at the disposal of the Army Transportation Section for this period to bring up the needed supplies. 36th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade organized such transportation into the equivalent of truck companies under the control of one of the Antiaircraft Artillery Groups. With the exception of a few instances, movement of Antiaircraft units was not affected adversely by the temporary loss of these vehicles, since definite control was retained so that the vehicles could be recalled if an Antiaircraft Artillery unit received orders for movement sooner than had been anticipated.

The Army area was now so large that it became impossible to continue the protection of rear installations and also to cover the forward areas of the swift advances. A request was therefore made to Twelfth US Army Group for the attachment of additional Antiaircraft Artillery to Third US Army. Units were not available for this purpose, but to relieve the situation, arrangements were made through Twelfth US Army Group for First US Army to take over Antiaircraft defense of the crossings of the ORNE and SEULNE Rivers from the coast to ST HILAIRE DU HARCOUET (TJ503), the dam on the SEULNE River near DULCY (T3603) and critical points on supply routes north of the SEULNE River. Third US Army was to supplement those defenses south of the SEULNE River. Third US Army units relieved from the SEULNE River defenses were to protect airfields which had become operational in the Army area, and to cover supply installations and critical points in the forward part of the Army area.

The 111th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion was released from the SEULNE River defenses on 13 August and was attached to the XV Corps for the protection of the city of ALENCON (Z33Ø4). The vital crossroads in this city formed a bottleneck in the advance of the XV Corps and ALENCON (Z33Ø4) was declared an Inner Artillery Zone by night. Other units relieved from the SEULNE River defense moved forward to protect Class III and V supply points in the vicinity of LAVAL (YØ6Ø) and LE MANS (VL979) as well as the river crossing at LAVAL (YØ6Ø) and Army took over from XV Corps, responsibility for protection of LE MANS (VL979).

On 13 August the XII Corps became operational and the 7th Antiaircraft Artillery Group and 452d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion were attached as Corps Antiaircraft. The 489th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons (Self-propelled) Battalion was also attached to XII Corps for further attachment to the 4th Armored Division.

Violent enemy activity such as experienced along the SEULNE River had now been reduced to sporadic attacks throughout the Army area.

Information was received that the railroads leading into LE MANS (VL979) from the CHERBOURG Peninsula were being opened for the purpose of bringing in supplies. Class III supplies had become especially critical at this time. Due to the limited capacity of railroad yards in the city of LE MANS (VL979) and the problem of unloading and routing, it was anticipated that the trains would be held on sidings northwest of LE MANS (VL979) and as far back as SILLE (Z1757) and CONLIE (Z2149). Plans were therefore made for a flexible Antiaircraft defense which could be adjusted as necessary.

By this time RENNES (XØ448) was so far to the rear of the front lines that it was no longer of importance to Third US Army. Its defense was discontinued and the 119th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion was moved west to be available for protection of ORLEANS (W6540) upon capture. Arrangements were made for the establishment of Inner Artillery Zones at ORLEANS (W6540), CHATEAUDUN (W2461), BLOIS (Y2188) and NOGENT LE ROTROU (V8893), all of which contained either important river crossings or road junctions in the broad path of the Third US Army drive. Of these, BLOIS (Y2188) later proved to be of no importance and plans for its defense were discarded.

By 16 August the importance of the installations requiring antiaircraft protection in the vicinity of LE MANS (VL979) had increased greatly, due to the extension of the railroad system to the east. The last gun battalion remaining in the SEULNE River defenses was therefore moved to LE MANS (VL979) to augment the Antiaircraft Artillery defenses there. Both 90mm gun and Automatic Weapons defenses were extended from LE MANS (VL979) to the West and provided protection not only for the unloading points in LE MANS (VL979) and the supply dumps in the area, but also for the trains waiting west of the city until they could be moved into LE MANS (VL979) and unloaded. Two Automatic Weapons battalions were given a "roving" mission of protecting such concentration of trains as they arrived at waiting points on the tracks Northwest to CONLIE (Z2149) and SILLE (Z1757).



FIG. No. 3

Defense of ALENCON (Z33Ø4) was taken over by Army from XV Corps on 17 August and the 111th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion protecting this city reverted to Army control and was attached to the 38th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.

The tempo of enemy air attacks now began to increase. Between 1000S and 1930S on 16 August, the 270th and 99th Field Artillery Battalions, protected by two batteries of the 456th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, were attacked by thirteen enemy aircraft. Of these planes, nine were chalked up as destroyed. This action marked the beginning of a determined attempt by the enemy to strike at our forces which now had overheads only nine miles from the outskirts of PARIS (8Ø545). Enemy air activity became more intense than at any time since the heavy attacks along the SEULNE River during 6 - 7 August.

The fall of ORLEANS (W6540) to XII Corps appeared imminent and the 119th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion which had been held in readiness for defense of the city upon capture was attached to the corps.

Information was received from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, that cargo planes would begin to use two airstrips in the vicinity of LE MANS (VL979) for the unloading of gasoline on 18 August. Antiaircraft Artillery defenses were immediately adjusted in order to protect airstrips, and two batteries of the 467th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion were brought forward from LAVAL (YØ6Ø) to augment the defenses in the vicinity of LE MANS (VL979).

First US Army took over defense of ALENCON (Z33Ø4) from Third US Army on 19 August. Defense of LAVAL (YØ6Ø), which was now in the Communications Zone, was discontinued the same date and the Third US Army Antiaircraft Artillery so relieved, moved forward to protect critical points and supply installations in the vicinity of CHATEAUDUN (W2461) and VENDOME (PØ511). Arrangements were made to establish VENDOME (PØ511) as an Inner Artillery Zone.

Third US Army units were now driving ahead to secure the line of the SEINE both above and below PARIS (8Ø545). In order to protect anticipated crossings of the SEINE River, arrangements were made to establish Inner Artillery Zones at MELUN (S2705), MONTEREAU (X3195) and SENS (Z6Ø6Ø). On 20 August, Inner Artillery Zones were placed into effect at MANTES-GASSICOURT (R6161), CHARTRES (H38Ø4) and ETAMPES (W8897).

The 120th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion was detached from Army and attached to the XX Corps to furnish protection for the crossings planned in the Corps Zone. The XV Corps already had the 111th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion under its control.

On 21 August, enemy air activity which heretofore had been confined almost exclusively to night attacks suddenly changed, with the Luftwaffe making its appearance in daylight sorties, especially in the vicinity of the XV Corps crossing north of MANTES-GASSICOURT (R6161). Here planes attacked repeatedly, strafing, bombing and firing rockets in an attempt

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to destroy the bridge constructed by the engineers. When the scare was revealed, one Antiaircraft Artillery gun battalion and two Automatic Weapons battalions claimed to have destroyed twenty five planes and probably destroyed six more, but in spite of the vicious and repeated attacks, Antiaircraft Artillery had succeeded in its mission of defending the vital bridge.

Although the Germans had demonstrated, by their efforts against the bridgehead north of MANTES-GASSICOURT (R6161), that they were still capable of large scale raids, little attention was paid by the Luftwaffe to the targets at LE MANS (VL979). By 21 August the importance of LE MANS (VL979), as a supply point, had increased with the further progress of the Army, north, northeast and east. In addition to the accumulation of materiel which had been brought by truck, freight trains were dispatched from the beaches to LE MANS (VL979) for unloading. Marshalling yards there were unable to accommodate such incoming trains with the result that the track from SILLE (Z1757) to COSLIE (Z2649) was lined with cars. The yards at LE MANS (VL979) hummed with activity as the unloading of much needed supplies went on. Besides this unusual rail activity, supplies were being continuously flown in by cargo planes. Two airfields, a large Army Supply Point, one Class III dump, the railroad terminals, roads and bridges in LE MANS (VL979) comprised the defended installations. Dispositions of Antiaircraft Artillery were as shown in Figure 3. While frequent reconnaissance flights over the area and some strafing was reported, no major attack against the objectives ever materialized.

In the XV Corps zone, however, the numerous and determined daylight assaults against the bridges over the SEINE continued. The high point of the enemy attack was reached by 22 August. Established by the 79th Infantry Division, the bridgehead over the SEINE represented so critical a threat that the Luftwaffe attack rivalled the action near AVRANCHES (T8718). Potent evasive tactics were employed. Planes made run s against the targets from several different directions, darting in and out of cloud cover, and engaging in mock dog fights before diving on the target. In one instance, which occurred at night, an enemy plane came over low, twice open to attract attention, followed by two or three others which, with motors cut, glided quietly in to bomb a tracer source. In the face of extremely heavy losses, sixty enemy planes destroyed or probably destroyed were claimed for the two day period, the assaults against the bridges and nearby targets continued. The effectiveness of Antiaircraft fire was further demonstrated when twenty five FW 190's attempted to strafe and bomb from 1000 feet. Of this number, Antiaircraft Artillery claimed to have shot down fifteen. Despite the aggressive enemy tactics, no damage resulted to the bridge or other important objectives in the area. For the second time in the campaign, a critical threat toward the heart of enemy communications and supplies was met by an all out effort on the part of the Luftwaffe, and for the second time the effort met with failure. Dispositions of XV Corps Antiaircraft Artillery which so successfully defended the crossings are shown in Figure 4.



FIG NO 4

By this time important supply points had been established forward of LE MANS (VL979) and information was received that large quantities of supplies would be landed at an airfield in the vicinity of EVREUX (U5752). Defense of airfields south of AVRANCHES (T8718), now in the rear of the Army area was taken over by IX Air Defense Command Antiaircraft Artillery and Third US Army units so relieved moved forward to protect the new cargo field and supply installations in the vicinity of CHATEAUDUN (N8161) and MEHUN (N1944).

Responsibility for Antiaircraft Artillery defenses at ORLEANS (W6740) was taken over from XII Corps by Army on 22 August. The 119th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion was moved to vicinity of MONTARGIS (X2645) and released there for employment by the XII Corps.

Considerable importance was attached to the river crossings at MONTARGIS (X2645), MEHUN (X2705), MONTEREAU (X3193) and SENS (X6660) and the Antiaircraft defenses at these points were augmented and adjusted as necessary to provide adequate protection. All of these areas had been or were being established as Inner Artillery Zones. A Gun Battalion and two Automatic Weapons Battalions were attached to XII Corps for defense of the crossing at SENS (X6660). On 23 August the enemy struck at the crossing. Twelve to fifteen enemy planes flying low, in a determined effort to carry out their mission, were met by accurate flak which brought down three planes and drove the remainder off.

The attacks against bridge north of MANTES-GASSICOURT (R6161) were not resumed, apparently because of the prohibitive cost in aircraft destroyed. Here, in addition to warding off enemy air attacks, automatic weapons and gun battalions were given credit for repelling successive attacks on the bridgehead by ground troops.

On August 21, Antiaircraft Artillery defense of LE MANS (VL979) became the responsibility of Advance Section Communications Zone due to the movement forward of the rear army boundary. Antiaircraft Artillery so relieved was redisposed to protect critical points in the vicinity of ETAMPES (N8897), and ammunition and other supply points in the forward area. The Automatic Weapons defenses in the vicinity of CHATEAUDUN (N2161) were extended in order to furnish protection for a XIX Tactical Air Command Airfield southeast of the city.

Although enemy air activity now began to lessen, seven Category I's (destroyed) and eight Category II's (probably destroyed) were claimed for the twenty four hour period 21 August.

The XV Corps, 23d Antiaircraft Artillery Group, and attached units were relieved from assignment to Third US Army and assigned to First US Army on 21 August. The 413th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion attached to XV Corps was to be returned to Third US Army when relieved by a First US Army unit since all gun battalions in the Third US Army were normally under Army control and attached to corps only for specific missions. This movement of troops to First US Army also changed the Army boundary to exclude the river crossing at LA TUILERIE-GASSICOURT (R6161).

As the XII and XX Corps, southeast of occupied PARIS (3054.5), continued their swift thrust to the east, the defense of MONTARGIS (X2645) was taken over from XII Corps by the Army in accordance with the policy of pushing forward as soon as possible and relieving Corps Antiaircraft Artillery for forward areas. Army units, both 90mm and Automatic Weapons were moved forward from ETAMPES (N8897) to the vicinity of MONTEREAU (X3193) and the defense of that crossing was taken over by Army from XX Corps. The 217th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion which had been protecting ORLEANS (W6740) was moved forward and released to XII Corps for the use in the defense of TROYES (U2773) upon capture of that city.

Automatic Weapons defenses in the rear of the Army area were readjusted in order that units might be pushed forward to protect river crossings in the vicinity of MONTARGIS (X2645), SOUPPES (X2966) and NANGIS (X3057).

By 26 August the enemy activity had decreased considerably. Only four aircraft were reported over the entire Third US Army area.

Automatic Weapons protecting Class I, III and V supply points in the rear of the Army area were moved forward to defend similar installations operating in the vicinity of SENS (X6660).

Plans were made for the establishment of Inner Artillery Zones at EPERNAY (T3356), REIMS (T3377) and CHATEAU-THIERRY (S8957) and the Antiaircraft defense of these places. Plans included the protection of bridges, the airport at REIMS, (T3377) and air landing strips in the vicinity of EPERNAY (T3356) which might be used for the landing of cargo planes with gasoline and other critical supplies.

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Antiaircraft Artillery units which had been attached to the First US Army for the assault had been allowed to store Directors and Power Plants. Although units had reported considerable success with the Stiff-bog-stick, instructions were now issued that all Third US Army units which had turned in this equipment were to take immediate steps to recover it in order that the effectiveness of their fire might be increased in situations when director controlled fire was possible.

Preliminary planning was started for the establishment of Antiaircraft Artillery defenses at the river crossings along the MARNE River at CHALONS - SUR - MARNE (T5446) and VITRY - LE - FRANCOIS (T6918). The rapid advance of Third US Army made it very difficult to push units forward fast enough to provide protection for vital river crossings, but in nearly every instance, Antiaircraft Artillery was ready to move in to defend the critical area immediately after the bridge or crossing was secured.

On 29 August the XV Corps reverted to the control of the Third US Army. All Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions attached to the corps, except for units attached to Divisions reverted to Third US Army along with the corps.

Enemy air activity had declined steadily since the heavy attacks at MANTES-GASSICOURT (R6161) but it was realized that the German Air Force was still capable of a strong effort and Antiaircraft Artillery continued to push forward to protect the newly gained critical points on the main routes of advance.

On 29 August, Inner Artillery Zones were established at FONTAINEBLEAU (X2992), MONTEREAU (Y8893) and TROYES (Y2773) and on the following day Inner Artillery Zones also came into effect at CHATEAU-THIERRY (S8957), VERNEUIL (T0465), EPERNAY (T3156), REIMS (T3377), CHALONS (T5446) and VITRY (T6918). As defense of these points and restricted areas were established, Inner Artillery Zones in the rear of the Army zone were cancelled.

On 31 August, the Army discontinued the defense of MONTARGIS (X2459) and moved units forward to relieve XII Corps of the responsibility for defense of SENS (X6866) and TROYES (Y2773).

During the month of August, there had been 1,088 enemy raids consisting of 2,352 aircraft over the Third US Army area. Of these planes, Antiaircraft claimed to have destroyed 216 and probably destroyed ninety three more, while suffering this loss of planes and personnel, the German Air Force failed in its efforts. No bridge or installation defended by Third US Army Antiaircraft Artillery had been damaged during the entire month and the lines of communication had never been cut. In addition to its success against the Luftwaffe, Antiaircraft Artillery had played an important role in the ground fighting. This was particularly true in the case of the self-propelled units with the armored divisions which, when not required for their primary mission, had employed their automatic weapons with great success against enemy ground units.

Weekly intelligence reports published by the Antiaircraft Section, Headquarters Third US Army during the month of August are attached as Annex I. Also attached as Annex II are selected extracts from the daily unit reports.

CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

OPERATIONS OF THE ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY SECTION - SEPTEMBER 1944

As of 1 September, Third US Army Antiaircraft units had established defenses at crossings of the SEINE, MARNE and MEUSE rivers, important road junctions and numerous supply installations throughout the Army area. The disposition of units is shown in Figure 5. Those Antiaircraft units attached to VIII Corps and operating on the BRITTANY Peninsula are not shown.

In order to furnish protection for important installations forward in the Army area, it became necessary to set up priorities for defense. Appropriate staff sections of the Headquarters were contacted and it was decided to give up gun defense of the SEINE river crossings at FONTAINEBLEAU (X2891) and MONTEREAU (X3195). The 128th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion was to move forward to SENS (Y6666) and TROYES (Y2973) to cover the river crossings at these two points.

The 119th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion which had been covering the river crossing at SENS (Y6666) was to be moved to the cities of REIMS (T3181) and EPERNAY (T2457), putting two batteries at each point.

The [illegible] Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion which had been defending the river crossing at TROYES (Y2973) was to be released to the XII Corps [illegible] relieved by the 467th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion. This battalion was being [illegible] in accordance with the Army policy of making gun battalions [illegible] Corps in order to establish gun defenses at critical points as [illegible] such points were cleared of the enemy by the ground troops.

Automatic Weapons defenses in the Army area were also readjusted. With the movement forward of the Army rear boundary, defense of the airfield at CHATEAUDUN (R2461) became the responsibility of the Communications Zone, and two batteries of the 550th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion relieved from this mission became available to augment the defenses already established at VITRY-LE-FRANCOIS (T6919). Class I and III Supply Point Number 28 and Class V Supply Point Number 19 were no longer of great importance and the 467th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) was moved forward to augment the defenses at EPERNAY (T2457), REIMS (T3181) and the river crossing at CHALONS (T5446).



FIG. NO. 5

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[illegible] were assigned as Corps Artillery [illegible] September and [illegible] Third US Army [illegible] Corps [illegible] Third [illegible] Army [illegible] Corps [illegible] Army [illegible] Corps [illegible] Army [illegible] Corps

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

On the 29th of September the XV Corps was relieved from assignment to Third US Army. The following attached Antiaircraft Artillery units were temporarily attached to Sixth US Army Group along with XV Corps:

25d AAA Group

1456th AAA AW Bn	1634 AAA AW Bn (79th Inf Div)
398th AAA AW Bn	224 Fr (24 Pr Armd)
115th AAA Gun Bn	559th AAA AW Bn

Of these units, some were expected to revert to Third US Army control in the near future.

The repair and maintenance of equipment and the procurement of spare parts for radar had become critical by the latter part of September. All Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalions came to Third US Army from First US Army with spare parts kits ME-101 as their only source of Radar parts. No spare parts were available in Army Signal Depots. The effects of this situation were not felt during the first days of the Army's advance, but with radars on the air twenty four hours daily, the ME-101 spare parts kits became dangerously depleted and maintenance of radars presented a serious problem. The arrival of a few spare parts, plus two additional SCR-584's requisitioned in August, were sufficient to keep radars actually used for gun laying, in operation. The extra radars were heavily cannibalized for parts although no parts were removed except as a last resort. A log was kept of everything removed to facilitate any eventual refitting of the sets. Cannibalization of course, was not a solution to the spare parts problem since once a part had been removed there was no further replacement possible for that particular part. Radar officers were dispatched to PARIS (SO439) where a new radar spare parts depot had been set up. Although only a small quantity of spare parts were obtained, there issue was closely controlled in accordance with the most critical needs. By these means all Third US Army Radars were maintained in operation during the month of September.

Since the activity during the first week in September, no attacks of consequence were reported. Sporadic, half-hearted attempts to strafe were made by one or two enemy aircraft from time to time, but for the most part raids were confined to reconnaissance flights. Low clouds kept these at low altitudes and, accordingly, daylight reconnaissance proved costly as this reduction in range enabled automatic weapons units to engage at good range and promptly bring them down.

Most enemy aircraft appeared at low or medium altitudes, with some at night and some during daylight. Evasive action followed immediately after any engagement by Antiaircraft. Occasionally a plane turned to give battle, but this was rare.

In actions of note, the 120th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion, during the first week, engaged eight enemy aircraft attacking a bridge at CHALONS (89376) during the hours of darkness, and downed five of the eight. For the same period, the 489th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled), protecting Combat Command "A" of the 4th Armored Division, claimed six Category I's (destroyed) of fifteen enemy aircraft which came in low to strafe and fire rockets. Other actions of interest by Antiaircraft Artillery are included in Annex 4.

An analysis shows how sharply enemy air activity was curtailed in Third US Army zone during the month of September. As compared with August's totals of 1117 raids by 3213 aircraft, September's figures showed only 128 raids by 287 aircraft during the entire month. This was an average of approximately nine planes per day as compared with approximately 103 planes per day during August. Twenty eight Category I's (destroyed) and fifteen Category II's (probably destroyed) were the total claims submitted by Antiaircraft Artillery units during the month of September. Enemy air activity for the month of September is further summarized in Weekly Intelligence Reports, Annex Number 3.

Losses sustained by the German Air Force, both to Antiaircraft Artillery and the Air Forces may have partially caused this down-scaling of effort. Bad flying weather was also a factor. Probably the main reason was the desire of the German Air Force to husband and recoup its strength, risking no large losses until an all-out effort was strategically necessary and tactically sound.

Dispositions of antiaircraft artillery as of the end of September are shown in Figure 7.

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

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CHAPTER 5

OCTOBER OPERATIONS

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On the night of 2 - 3 October, HUMBERT (U7748) was established as an Inner Artillery Zones in order to cover the XX Corps crossings over the MOSELLE River.

Antiaircraft defense of the 290,000 watt radio station LUXEMBOURG was taken over by Ninth US Army from Third US Army. This installation had been captured intact and because of its importance for propaganda purposes, its defense had a high priority. The battery of the 390th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) so relieved, was moved on 2 October to TOUL (U6410) to augment the defense of Class III Supply installations there.

The 448d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion which had been attached temporarily to Third US Army reverted to Ninth US Army control on 2 October. Defenses in the Army area were readjusted but the available Antiaircraft Artillery still proved inadequate to protect vital areas. In order to provide defense for VERDUN (U2965) it became necessary to detach from XIII Corps the two automatic weapons batteries which had been temporarily attached, from Army, for defense of the PONT-A-MOUSSON (U7735) crossing. XIII Corps continued defense of the crossing with other Corps Antiaircraft troops.

In preparation for the movement of Third US Army Headquarters from ETAIN (U4770) to NANCY (U8511), two batteries of the 526th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion were relieved from the defense of the headquarters at ETAIN (U4770) and moved to NANCY (U8511), on 3 October. Two batteries of the 550th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, so relieved at NANCY (U8511), were moved to VERDUN (U2965) to augment the Antiaircraft Artillery defense of bridges, railheads, supply points and Twelfth US Army Group Headquarters which was located in that city. Responsibility for the defense of NANCY (U8511) passed from XII Corps to 30th Antiairaraft Artillery Brigade on 3 October.

Inner Artillery Zones had been established at MERZIG (Q8995), SAARLAUTERN (Q8980), SAARBRUCKEN (Q4571) and SARREGUEMINES (Q5157) in anticipation of crossings at these points. Since it did not appear probable that these restricted areas would be utilized in the immediate future, and in order not to hamper the activities of friendly aircraft over these areas, Inner Artillery Zones at these places were cancelled on 5 October.

To improve the combat effectiveness of Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalions, Twelfth US Army Group attached a Gunnery Instruction Team to Third US Army on 4 October. The team was comprised of four officers who had had special training in 90mm gun and fire control materiel. Many of the gun batteries had received new materiel since their arrival overseas, and in some instances, additional instruction and training for operating personnel were necessary. It was planned to have these officers visit each Third US Army Gun Battalion for a period of several days, checking adjustments, assisting with maintenance, and indoctrinating personnel in new methods.

At PONT-A-MOUSSON (U7735), the 411th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion although primarily providing Antiaircraft defense for the bridges, had a secondary mission of supporting 80th Infantry Division Artillery. On 7 October, Division air observers had spotted a battery of 88mm Antiaircraft Guns firing against American aircraft. Counter-battery fire was opened by a battery of the 411th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion. After two direct hits were secured, the air observer radioed that the mission had been accomplished. Fire was conducted at a range of 12,950 yards.

Antiaircraft units with divisions also utilized their weapons in a ground role. During the advance of the 6th Armored Division from LEYR (U9883) to JARNISLICOURT (U9128) on 8 October, the 777th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled), provided close support to the Armored Infantry. Quadruple mount Caliber .50's were utilized to good advantage in cleaning out pockets of enemy resistance during the advance. In addition to causing many enemy casualties the battalion assisted in rounding up approximately 300 prisoners.

Two batteries of the 633d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion were used by the 80th Infantry Division, supporting the attack of the 6th Armored Division, in the assault on high ground at MT TOULON (U8628) and MT ST JEAN (U8628). Sixteen Quadruple Mounts, Caliber .50's were employed to spray the woods where enemy troops were dug in. This is the first reported instance in which barrage fire by Antiaircraft machine guns had been employed in Third US Army preceding an infantry attack. 79,700 rounds of caliber .50 ammunition were expended. Results were reported by the division G-2 and G-3 to have been excellent in that this heavy machine gun fire contributed materially to the capture of 575 prisoners including ten officers.

When the XV Corps had been assigned on 29 September to Sixth US Army Group and Seventh US Army, all attached antiaircraft units remained temporarily with the Corps. The first of these to be returned to Third US Army was the 559th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion on 9 October. One battery each of the battalion was deployed around airfields A-95, A-96, A-98 (all in the NANCY (U8511) - TOUL (U6410) area) and the bridge at PONT-A-MOUSSON (U7735).

Since there was no prospect that Inner Artillery Zones which had been established at METZ (U8659) and THIONVILLE (U8685) would be utilized in the immediate future, these were cancelled as of 11 October.

On 11 October the 453d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion was relieved from assignment to Third US Army, and assigned Ninth US Army with the 83d Infantry Division.

Of twenty nine enemy aircraft reported over the Third US Army area in sixteen raids during the night 10 - 11 October, two were claimed as destroyed and three probably destroyed by Third US Army Antiaircraft.

Another Battalion, the 456th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons, which had been temporarily attached with XV Corps to Sixth US Army Group and Seventh US Army, reverted to Third US Army on 10 October. This unit took over defenses covered by the 390th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled), which was then attached to the 26th Infantry Division.

In a continuation of the effort of the previous night, thirty-three enemy aircraft were reported over the Army area, during the night 11-12 October. Two planes were claimed destroyed and four were claimed probably destroyed by Third US Army Antiaircraft.

Since Class III Supply Point at FRESNES (U4760) had diminished in importance, B Battery of the 465th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) was moved from that installation on 13 October, to the defense of the Air Force Class III Railhead at LERONVILLE (U4083). Similarly Army Class V Supply Point No 25 east of VERDUN (U2965) was depleted, and Battery A of the 550th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion was moved from that installation to the Railhead at ST MIHIEL (U3935) where Air Force ammunition and gasoline were being unloaded. Other defenses were also readjusted in order to provide protection for an Air Force Class III Railhead at BANNONCOURT (U3642) and a Class III Supply Point west of ST MIHIEL (U3935) which contained more than 600,000 gallons of high octane gasoline. On 14 October, one battery of the 456th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion moved from the TOUL (U6410) defense to LERONVILLE (U4083). The Battery of the 465th so relieved, covered the Air Force Class III Supply Point, east of ST MIHIEL (U3935), and the Air Force Class III and V Railhead at BANNONCOURT (U3642).

Maintenance difficulties on Antiaircraft Gun Battalion equipment were now increasing. Long hours of search had caused considerable wear to M-7 Generators supplying power for the SCR-584. Replacement of rings and spark plugs had become necessary in almost all units. It had also been found that voltage regulators were needed for these generators. Because of excessive wear, power surges became more frequent, causing radars to lose targets or go completely off the air. Working in connection with the Ordnance Section Third US Army, every effort was made to secure the necessary spare parts, as well as new generators.

In the XII Corps Zone, during the afternoon of 15 October, two Me 109's were observed to peal off from a dog fight involving some twenty aircraft. The enemy aircraft, hedgehopping at 300 mph, strafed Antiaircraft and Field Artillery positions along the front of the 26th Infantry Division. A number of antiaircraft batteries engaged these planes and both were shot down.

The 115th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion which had also been temporarily attached with XV Corps to Sixth US Army Group and Seventh US Army, was released to Third US Army on 15 October. Two batteries of the battalion were moved to NANCY (U8511) to reinforce the Antiaircraft defenses there, and the other two batteries were directed to COMMERCY (U6828) to relieve the 217th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion. The two batteries so relieved were moved to augment the two batteries of the 217th already at TOUL (U6410), which was becoming a supply point of first importance. Defenses of TOUL (U6410) and installations in its vicinity, now consisted of one gun battalion and five Automatic Weapons Batteries.

Upon request of the Passive Air Defense Officer, Third US Army, an arrangement was made whereby the 7th Antiaircraft Artillery Group, located in NANCY (U8511), would transmit air raid warnings to the civilian authorities.

In the XX Corps zone, two batteries of the 119th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion had been relieved of their primary mission by Corps in order to support Corps Artillery. The following account of terrain "Busting" near METZ (U8659) on 18 October, was one of many successful missions fired by these batteries. Where an initial volley was fired, two direct hits were scored on the locomotive of a supply train operating behind the enemy lines. Air bursts were laid on the area as the crew fled to cover. Two direct hits were also scored on the roadbed. Similar reports received during the month indicated the high degree of accuracy which characterized the fire of 90mm guns against ground targets.

Notification was received that the 559th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion which had been temporarily attached Third US Army was to revert to Ninth US Army on 21 October. One Battery of the battalion was defending the bridge at PONT-A-MOUSSON (U7735) while the remainder was employed on airfields in the Army area. Insufficient antiaircraft artillery was available to Third US Army to provide defense for vital installations in the Army area and continue defense of these fields. This situation was discussed with Twelfth US Army Group, and arrangements were made for IX Air Defense Command to attach six (6) Automatic Weapons Batteries to Third US Army (for operational control only) for the defense of airfields in the Third US Army area. Each airfield was to be defended by one Automatic Weapons Battery.

The night of 19 October furnished considerable activity for Antiaircraft defenses throughout the Army area. With no previous warning, about 450 RAF planes flew over the Army zone and through Inner Artillery Zones from about 2230 until 0230. In some cases IFF was shown but many planes flew through Inner Artillery Zones without showing IFF. To add to the problem, unidentified planes were entering the Inner Artillery Zones from the east. A large quantity of window was dropped in the NANCY (U8511) area and one Gun Battery was strafed by enemy aircraft. Two enemy aircraft were claimed destroyed and two probably destroyed by Third US Army Antiaircraft. No evidence of damage to friendly planes as a result of these engagements by Antiaircraft Artillery was received.

Flying bombs began to appear over the Army zone with some regularity. Two main routes seemed to be evident. One approached METZ (U8659) from the Northeast and turned South after crossing the MOSELLE River. The second was from the direction of the LUXEMBOURG (U8414) area flying South by Southwest. If these missiles were directed at any particular target, this was not apparent from a study of areas of impact. Reports indicated that the missiles were launched both from aircraft and from ground ramps. No damage was reported in the Army area.

On 23 October the 796th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) was attached to XX Corps for the 80th Armored Division. The 778th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) and the 324 Antiaircraft Artillery Group were assigned Third US Army and were earmarked for attachment to III Corps.

Two batteries from the IX Air Defense Command arrived in the Army area and took over protection of Airfield A-82. The battery of the 465th so relieved was moved to Airfield A-54 increasing that defense to two batteries.

Another battery from the IX Air Defense Command arrived on 25 October and was moved into position on Airfield A-50. The battery of the 465th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion so relieved moved to augment the defense of the Class III Supply Point near ST MIHIEL (U3935). The platoon of the 465th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion which had been on this Class III installation was moved to the Air Force Supply Point at BANNONCOURT (U3642) increasing that defense from a platoon to a battery.

Two more Automatic Weapons Batteries from the IX Air Defense Command arrived on 26 October and established defenses for airfields A-95 and A-98 with one battery each.

During the night 26 - 27 October, three aircraft were reported over the Army area and two were claimed destroyed.

The 139th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion fired another series of successful field artillery missions on 28 October in support of XX Corps Artillery. First an enemy troop concentration near the VERDUN Forts was engaged and dispersed with heavy casualties. Fire was then conducted on an enemy motor convoy, and debris was scattered in all directions. Following this an enemy supply train was engaged, the locomotive was destroyed and several buildings in the vicinity were set on fire.

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

On 29 October, the sixth IX Air Defense Command Automatic Weapons Battery arrived and moved into position at airfield A-95. This phenomenal arrival was occasioned by shortage of transportation, since these were all semi-mobile units.

Arrangements were made to have daily scheduled tracking missions flown by the 10th Liaison Squadron for all Army Gun Battalions. These missions were necessary as a means of checking the calibration of the radar orienting scope as well as an overall check of the orientation and synchronization of the equipment. In addition, tracking missions were being provided for Army automatic weapons battalions as frequently as possible.

Enemy air activity had been limited during October in keeping with the lack of activity by ground troops on Third US Army front. Only when a serious threat to vital areas developed, had any large scale effort been undertaken by the German Air Force. Enemy planes made regular reconnaissance flights over the Army area, however. Claims for the month totaled 27 planes destroyed or probably destroyed by Third US Army Antiaircraft Artillery to bring the total since August 1st to 1464.

There is enclosed as Annex 5, Weekly Intelligence Reports for the month of October, except the first five days, which are covered in Report No 10 of Annex 1.

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

To assist the XX Corps in protecting projected crossings over the MOSELLE River, two batteries of the 469th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Self-propelled) were detached from the 38th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade and attached to the Corps on 1 November.

In preparation for the attack across the MOSELLE river by the XX Corps, an Inner Artillery Zone was established on 3 November at HOHENGRAEFEN (V9490) where the main effort was to be made. Arrangements were also made for this Inner Artillery Zone to be cancelled and a new one set up at THIONVILLE (U8685) as soon as a bridgehead had been established and the main route through that city could be used for movement of troops and supplies.

Supply installations throughout the army area had been greatly increased in size in preparation for the scheduled offensive. Antiaircraft defense of these installations assumed a high priority even though air activity had continued to be light. During the 5th and 6th of November, only six enemy planes were over the Third US Army area, three of which were shot down.

The disposition of Antiaircraft units prior to the attack is shown in figure 8.

The attack was to be preceded by large scale bombing of enemy positions, as a supplement to artillery preparation prior to the ground offensive. Since this bombing was to be carried out by heavies at high altitudes, it was considered necessary by the Air Force that pilots be provided with a positive visual means of orientation to prevent the dropping of bombs on friendly troops. At the request of 8th Air Force, the Antiaircraft Section, Third US Army made plans to provide this orientation by means of flak lines in the sky.

The attack took place on 9 November, and between 0900 and 1000 the heavy bombers arrived over the Third US Army area.

Two separate flak lines were fired. In the vicinity of THIONVILLE (U8685) two batteries of the 119th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion established one line. In the vicinity of METZ (U8669), one battery of the 441th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion and one battery of the 120th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion established another line. Each line consisted of eight bursts spaced at 500 yard intervals, forming a line extending approximately one mile north and one mile south of a fixed point, the location and altitude of which had been predesignated by the Air Force. The bursts were fired in close succession, starting on the north and progressing south. The METZ (U8669) flak line was repeated three times per minute and the THIONVILLE (U8685) line two times per minute throughout the bombing period which lasted approximately one hour. Ordinary 90mm ammunition without added color was utilized.

Both flak lines were fired at 17000 feet altitude which was approximately 3000 feet below the altitude of the bomber formations. The line at THIONVILLE (U8685) proved ineffective due to interfering cloud forma-

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tions, but the bursts in the METZ (U8659) area were clearly visible both in the air and from the ground.

Reports from the Air Force were that the marker line at METZ (U8659) had proved to be a valuable aid to the pilots and bombardiers. In addition it was reported that the action had a favorable morale effect on the doughboys who could see that their positions in relation to the enemy targets were clearly designated by the line of bursts. No bombs were dropped on friendly troops.

The ground attack, pushing off after the preparation, produced a short lived reaction from the German Air Force. Thirty-three enemy planes appeared over the Third US Army area during the day, evidently to see what was going on for no persistent attacks were made. One of the raiding planes was destroyed and three probably destroyed.

On the 11th of November a check was made of all supply installations and bridges in the army area. Due to heavy rains the MOSELLE river and its tributaries had risen to a flood state, inundating much of the country side and washing away many of the bridges. This caused many previously unimportant streams in the Corps zone to become sizable rivers, the crossing of which required Antiaircraft Artillery protection. In addition to this, large quantities of supplies were building up in the army area for the new advance. Many of these supply installations were being moved forward across the river in the event the remaining bridges were destroyed by the floods. These points coupled with the large number of installations becoming operational required much of the Army Antiaircraft Artillery to be moved well forward in the Corps zones.

In accordance with instructions from Twelfth US Army Group, arrangements were made whereby Antiaircraft Artillery in Inner Artillery Zones could be directed to hold fire to allow the safe passage of friendly bomber flights through the restricted areas. The arrangements were based on the assumption that adequate notice of such flights would be provided the Army Antiaircraft Operations Room.

Since Antiaircraft Artillery communications were inadequate to insure transmission and acknowledgment of "Hold Fire" missions, radio equipment over and above that authorized by TO's was borrowed from the XIX Tactical Air Command and Third US Army Signal Supply. Each Antiaircraft Gun Battalion was furnished a FM radio set which would place it in direct communications with the Army Antiaircraft Operations Room. In addition, each battalion was provided with an SCR-193 which insured communication with the Army Antiaircraft Operations Room by CW in case of failure of the FM set. Both sets were to monitor the Army Antiaircraft Operations Room frequency over which hold fire orders would be transmitted and each order was to be acknowledged.

By 15 November, the crossing at THIONVILLE (U8685) had become important for movement of both troops and supplies and an Inner Artillery Zone was established there. Although previously it had been planned to cancel the Inner Artillery Zone at KOENIGSMACKER (U9490) at the time the THIONVILLE (U8685) Inner Artillery Zone was established, the KOENIGSMACKER (U9490) restricted area was retained temporarily at the request of XX Corps.

As the attack progressed it appeared that the city of MERZIG (U8095) would be the site of a river crossing by troops of the XX Corps. An Inner Artillery Zone was established there effective 18 November. On this same date enemy air activity flared up considerably. Nineteen attacks were made on targets in the Third US Army area by thirty one enemy aircraft. Antiaircraft shot down seven and made further claims for having probably destroyed eight additional aircraft.

Looking ahead towards the necessity for protecting bridges across the RHINE river, Twelfth US Army Group was requested to obtain two Searchlight Control detachments and one Searchlight Battery for Third US Army. It was planned to use these units for detection of explosive laden barges or anything else which the enemy might attempt to float against the bridges which would be established over the RHINE river.

On 20 November, two batteries of the 120th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion were moved from VERDUN (U2966) to THIONVILLE (U8685). Temporarily, they were placed under the operational control of XX Corps which was still responsible for Antiaircraft Artillery defense of the MOSELLE river crossing. Arrangements made, were, that when it became necessary, XX Corps would move its own gun battalion, the 119th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion, from THIONVILLE (U8685) to cover any new crossings over the SAAR river to the east. At that time, responsibility for the MOSELLE river crossing at THIONVILLE (U8685) would be assumed by the 36th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade which would have available the two batteries of the 120th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion, plus two Automatic Weapons Batteries which had been temporarily attached to Corps to cover the crossings in THIONVILLE (U8685) and vicinity.

On 22 November the XX Corps requested an Inner Artillery Zone for SAARBURG (L1513) to become effective the night of 24 November, as the corps plan now indicated that the main crossing was to be affected at this point rather than at MERZIG (U8095). The XX Corps further agreed to cancel the Inner Artillery Zone at KOENIGSMACKER (U9490) at the same time that SAARBURG (L1513) came into effect.

On 15 November, a report from the 465th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion emphasized the importance of complete information in the reports submitted daily by units. At a Class III Supply Point defended by one battery, security measures were difficult, the location of the installation being such that opportunities for sabotage were plentiful. This information was given to the Army Quartermaster and resulted in the immediate movement of the installation to a location where security measures could be improved.

To provide a mobile reserve for the attack, trains of ammunition were being brought into the army area and left on sidings so that they could be moved forward as necessary. In order to protect such vulnerable targets, antiaircraft defenses in these areas were readjusted so that the protection of these sidings could be augmented on short notice in accordance with the build-up of trains.

The shortage of Antiaircraft units under Third US Army control had now become critical. Many vital installations in the Army area were without Antiaircraft Artillery protection. Arrangements were therefore made with IX Air Defense Command, through Twelfth US Army Group, for IX Air Defense Command to take over Antiaircraft defense of several installations along the rear of the Army boundary. These installations, VERDUN (U2966), and Class III Supply Points near ST MIHIEL (U5985), LEROUVILLE (U4283), and COMMERCY (U4220) would be actually in the Communications Zone at the next change in the Army rear boundary which was scheduled for 30 November. Automatic Weapons defenses were to be taken over by IX Air Defense Command at once. Third US Army was also to be relieved of gun defense at VERDUN (U2966) and COMMERCY (U4220) as soon as a gun battalion could be made available and moved forward by IX Air Defense Command.



FIGURE 9

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XII Corps was defending an important Class 70 bridge at SAILONNES (Q0821), railhead at CHAMBREY (Q0521) and railhead in the vicinity of MONCEL SUR SEILLE (Q0800). Movement forward of the corps rear boundary on 21 November placed these installations in the Army area. Arrangements were made for corps to continue to cover these points until 23 November by which time Army was to take over the defenses of the bridge at SAILONNES (Q0821) and the railhead in the vicinity of MONCEL SUR SEILLE (Q0800). CHAMBREY (Q0521) was no longer considered important, as the railhead at this point had moved to CHATEAU SALINS (Q1085). The Army Antiaircraft to cover these installations was to come from the bridges at FROUARD (U0219), CUSTINES (U0522) and DIEULOUARD (U7829) and the Class III installations at ATTON (U7954), all of which were now relatively unimportant due to the receding of the flood waters of the MOSELLE river and the large number of bridges which could now be used to cross the river.

Six single enemy planes made raids over Third US Army area on 25 November, two of which were shot down by Antiaircraft fire. On the 27th, the same number of enemy aircraft made raids over the army area, with one going down as a result of Antiaircraft fire.

With capture of SAARLAUTERN (✠880), imminent, the Antiaircraft Officer, XX Corps, requested that an Inner Artillery Zone be approved immediately for this city. This restricted area was established on 30 November. The Inner Artillery Zone at SAARBURG (L1513) was cancelled.

The month of November saw a further decrease in hostile air activity over the Third US Army zone. Totals for the month reported by Antiaircraft units were seventy eight raids by 136 aircraft.

Of these 136 aircraft, sixteen made attacks upon ground targets, in formations of one to three aircraft. A total of ten attacks were made, of which all but one were strafing attacks, made from altitudes of 100 - 3,000 feet. The exception was an effort by two Me 109's which dropped anti-personnel bombs or mines over the area occupied by an armored divisions artillery from an altitude of 3,000 feet. All attacks but one were made by daylight, the night attack being a strafing run by an He 111 over Antiaircraft positions in NANCY (U8611). Except for this He 111 and one Me 410, all attacking planes were Me 109's.

Field Artillery was the target most frequently attacked, with other targets being armored columns and installations, troops, standing vehicles, Antiaircraft positions and one Cub observation plane. Effects were negligible, particularly in view of enemy aircraft lost to Antiaircraft fire. On a strafing attack, one man of a Field Artillery unit was killed and three were wounded. On the bombing attack, troops of an armored combat Command are known to have been injured but the number of casualties was unknown, though believed to have been slight. No other casualties were reported and, likewise, no material damage was reported.

Of the sixteen enemy aircraft attacking ground targets, Antiaircraft units claimed five destroyed, two probably destroyed and one damaged. Overall totals for the month were sixteen Category I's (destroyed) and eleven Category II's (probably destroyed) of the 136 enemy aircraft reported in the area.

At the close of November the Antiaircraft situation in the Third US Army was as indicated in Figure 9. Copies of the Weekly Intelligence Reports covering the month of November, except for the first three days, which are covered in Annex 5 of the previous month, are inclosed as Annex 4.

CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

The 52d Antiaircraft Artillery Group which was assigned to Third US Army on 22 November, arrived in the vicinity of JUTREVILLE (U5676) on 2 December and was attached to the III Corps. Plans were made to attach additional Antiaircraft units to the corps on the normal scale, pending availability of units.

By 3 December, the advance of the Third US Army on SAARLAUTERN (✠981) indicated that this city would fall within a few days. Two batteries of the 119th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion were moved therefore from THIONVILLE (U8685) to the vicinity of SAARLAUTERN (✠981) to protect the vital bridge across the SAAR River which had been seized intact. The other two batteries remained at THIONVILLE (U8685).

The advance on SAARGEMUEND (✠597) was likewise progressing satisfactorily and the 115th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion was moved forward to the vicinity of HUTTENLANGE (✠151) pending the clearance of SAARGEMUEND (✠597) which would be the focal point of communications on the south flank of the Army. Arrangements were made to establish this city as an Inner Artillery Zone effective 7 December.

On 6 December, IX Air Defense Command took over complete responsibility for Antiaircraft defense of VERDUN (U5978) and consequently the two batteries of the 120th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion were moved forward to PONT-A-MOUSSON (U7735). Two batteries of the 111th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion were relieved at that crossing and moved North to reinforce the Antiaircraft gun defenses at METZ (U8858).

To the North, the two batteries of the 119th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion, still at THIONVILLE (U8685), were moved forward for the defense of SAARLAUTERN (✠981) and the 38th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade took over from XX Corps responsibility for defense of the crossing at THIONVILLE (U8685) and vicinity.

By this time it had become apparent that all SAAR River crossings in the XX Corps zone would be south of MERZIG (Q8195). The Inner Artillery Zone which had previously been requested, for that city was therefore cancelled on 10 December.

On 9 December, the 87th Infantry Division recently assigned Third US Army, began to move from METZ (U8758) to the XII Corps zone to relieve the 26th Infantry Division. Protection for movement and assembly of this initial division element was provided by Army Antiaircraft units until the 549th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion arrived and was attached to the Division.

The new 90mm fuse PD T74E6, known as the Posit fuse, was released for use on the continent as of 15 December. Initially, notification to higher headquarters was required prior to use of this fuse in each Inner Artillery Zone. On 16 December its use was authorized in the SAARLAUTERN (✠981) Inner Artillery Zone and shortly thereafter it was authorized for use in all other existing Inner Artillery Zones.

For the first fifteen days in December, enemy air activity had been very light. Only sixteen enemy aircraft appeared over the Third US Army area, two of which were shot down.



FIGURE 10

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ANTIAIRCRAFT SITUATION
25 DEC 1944

AREA ENCLOSED IN BLUE - AUTOMATIC WEAPONS
" " " RED - 90 MM GUNS
" " " DASHED RED - IAZ



FIGURE 11

Before it had been noted that many unidentified planes were flying at night just above the Inner Artillery Zone ceiling of 10,000 feet, Twelfth US Army Group was requested to approve an Inner Artillery Zone for LUXEMBOURG (P5558) with a ceiling of 15,000 feet. The Twelfth US Army Group modified this request and gave approval for a ceiling of 12,000 feet. This restricted area became effective on the night of 31 December.

On the 29th of December, the German Air Force appeared in strength with eighty eight planes which participated in sixty one raids over the Third US Army area. Antiaircraft shot down ten of these planes and claimed seven probables. The following day, enemy planes restricted their activities mostly to reconnaissance. Two were brought down and three additional planes probably destroyed.

The 567th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion was assigned Third US Army on 30 December and was earmarked for attachment to the 30th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade as soon as it closed in the Army area. On 31 December the 91th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled), assigned to the Seventh US Army, arrived in Third US Army area to take over defenses at airfields A-90, 95 and 96 in the TOUL (U6411) - NANCY (U8511) area since these fields were being used by the Tactical Air Command of Seventh US Army. In accordance with Twelfth US Army Group policy, the unit was attached to Third US Army for operations and was placed under operational control of the 30th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.

The last day of the month was another day of heavy enemy air action. Sixty four raids, consisting of eighty nine planes, struck at installations throughout the area. Three of the raiding planes were destroyed and four additional planes probably destroyed.

The disposition of Third US Army Antiaircraft Artillery on 31 December, supporting the fighting attack on the Southern flank of the German bulge, is shown in Figure 12.

SUMMARY OF ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY FOR THE MONTH OF DECEMBER.

The month of December saw enemy air activity increased almost tenfold over activity of any previous month, excluding August when 3215 enemy planes were overhead. Although the first three weeks of December brought almost no activity, the enemy air effort from 22 December on was such that by the month's end 729 raids by 1090 enemy aircraft had been tallied, as compared with November's seventy eight raids by 138 enemy aircraft.

As Third US Army regrouped and moved North to strike at the flank of the German counter-offensive piercing its way through Belgium and northern LUXEMBOURG, the skies cleared and the pent up fury of the German Air Force, hitherto so closely husbanded, was unleashed in its full strength. Attacks by as many as 250 enemy aircraft in one day were made.

At the outset, supply installations and traffic moving northward along highways were the main targets. Most attacks were by night. But later, attacks came by day as the German pilots took advantage of the first bright sun in weeks to dive down out of it, bombing and strafing. Most attacks were from low altitudes, some so low that gun battalion radars failed to detect the approaching aircraft, so that automatic weapons played the major defensive role for Antiaircraft.

As the lines became more tangible, target priorities changed and heavy attacks were made upon artillery, troops, vehicles and numb other targets as opportunity presented. Tactics were keyed to harass and hinder, rather than to forestall or destroy entirely. Airfields were frequently attacked by one or two aircraft, flying in low at night to bomb and strafe. Command Posts were lightly attacked, and vehicles parked in fields were frequent targets.

Despite the weight of the effort, however, little damage was done. A few vehicles were destroyed, some men were killed and wounded. But compared with the size of the effort, results obtained were insignificant. The exception to this was the strafing of a Class III dump near MARIENBURG (U6677) where 100,000 gallons of gasoline, some jerricans and bazookas were lost. This was the sole instance where objectives protected by Antiaircraft Artillery were destroyed or even seriously damaged. In most cases, the protection afforded was most successful. And in the course of their engagements, Antiaircraft Artillery claimed 115 enemy planes destroyed and twenty five probably destroyed, with immeasurable other undoubtedly damaged.

For further information the Weekly Intelligence Reports covering the month of December are inclosed as Annex 7.

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

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CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

The savage attacks by the Luftwaffe, in the attempt to slow down Third US Army's drive, reached their peak on 1 January when more than 308 hostile aircraft were over the area in 139 raids during the twenty four hour period. Attacks were heavy in the XX Corps zone but the heaviest single attack of the day was on an airfield southwest of METZ (U8858). Here twenty five aircraft came in from all directions at low level and strafed the parked P-47's, twenty of which were destroyed and seventeen damaged. Of the twenty five enemy aircraft attacking however, sixteen were shot down by Antiaircraft Artillery and one more was claimed as probably destroyed.

Other targets most frequently attacked in the Third US Army area were supply installations, traffic, and field artillery and although no material success was achieved by these attacks, the enemy paid heavily. During the twenty four hour period, sixty-three planes were shot down and seventeen more were claimed as probably destroyed by Antiaircraft Artillery. The 146th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, which was defending artillery in the XX Corps zone, turned in the highest tally for the day. Five units of the battalion claimed sixteen Category I's and six Category II's, which included ten out of a flight of twenty five FW 190's.

The arrival of the 567th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion in the Army area on 1 January increased Army Antiaircraft Artillery sufficiently to permit coverage of all installations considered vital at this time. In addition the Army was able to take over from the Corps the Antiaircraft defense of two bridges in the vicinity of THIONVILLE (U8695) and the supply point at ARLON (V6823).

Plans of the XII Corps for an attack across the OUR River included preliminary close support bombing by medium bombers. Two batteries of the 119th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion were therefore attached to Corps to draw ammunition and complete necessary data for the firing of a flak line. Arrangements were made to attach an additional gun battalion since the flak line requested would require six gun batteries.

The heavy attacks at 1-2½ brought about the strengthening of Antiaircraft Artillery defenses on the following day to the scale of three Automatic Weapons batteries. One battery of Automatic Weapons from Army was used to augment the two batteries of attached IX Air Defense Command Antiaircraft already at this field.

Enemy air activity continued to be heavy on 2 January but did not equal the violence of the previous days' attacks. Fifty-five raids were made by eighty-six planes. Attacks on supply installations had dropped off, and traffic and Field Artillery appeared to be the principal targets. For the day, Third US Army Antiaircraft claimed seven kills and an equal number of probables.

The 80th Infantry Division had been hit hard in the breakthrough and it became necessary to pull the division out of the line. The combat efficiency of its attached Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, the 447th, was considered satisfactory, however, and in view of the Antiaircraft Artillery shortage the unit was relieved from attachment to the division on 3 January and attached to VIII Corps for defense of installations in the Corps area. One battery was used to augment the 159th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Anti-tank Battalion of the 17th Airborne Division.

The attack by XII Corps had been postponed and the two gun batteries which had been attached for the flak line mission became available for use in their primary role. To the west, ARLON (V6823) had been the target for repeated attacks and on 4 January the two batteries were moved to III Corps for the defense of this city. In order to give the Air Force as much freedom as possible to operate on the ARDENNES bulge, an Inner Artillery Zone was not requested for ARLON (V6823). Instead, arrangements were made with the XII Tactical Air Command to allow the 50mm guns to fire at unseen planes at night upon authorization from the controller at the Fighter Control Center. This arrangement, called a "Blank Check" area, had previously been used in defenses along the MOSELLE River at PONT-A-MOUSSON (U7735).

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On 4 January one battery of the 792d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Semi-mobile), which had been included in the Antiaircraft Artillery defense of the steel mill at DIFFERDANGE (P6604) reverted to IX Air Defense Command and one battery of Automatic Weapons from Army was moved to relieve the outgoing unit. This loss of Antiaircraft artillery from units available to cover supply points and other installations in the army area was increased on 6 January, when the 94th Infantry Division arrived in Third US Army without an automatic weapons battalion. To furnish this division with a unit, it was necessary to relieve the 465th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) from its mission under 38th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.

Since 2 January, enemy air activity had been negligible but the force with which it could strike was not underestimated, and every effort was made to provide adequate Antiaircraft Artillery for all vital points. The retention of the 482d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) by the VIII Corps, when the 9th Armored Division was pulled out of the line for refitting on 8 January, assisted materially in this respect since the deep zone of the VIII Corps included many far flung bridges and installations.

Movement of the 94th Infantry Division into the XX Corps zone on 6 January strengthened the front considerably, but no major elements were on the line east of LUXEMBOURG (P8414). The pressure in the ARDENNES bulge, especially southeast of BASTOGNE (P5558) occupied most of our forces. This together with the fact that a number of German divisions were still unlocated, drew considerable attention to the possibility of a German thrust toward LUXEMBOURG (P8414) or as far south as METZ (U8858). Plans were made therefore to employ Antiaircraft in anti-tank and field artillery roles, if such a threat should materialize. The 16th Antiaircraft Artillery Group, which controlled the defense of LUXEMBOURG (P8414), coordinated its anti-tank and field artillery plan with the XII Corps. In the METZ (U8858) area, the 38th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade planned the use of Antiaircraft Artillery for similar missions, coordinating with the XX Corps.

On 9 January, the 894th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Semi-mobile) minus one battery, was attached to Third US Army for operational command. This was a Seventh US Army unit which was being employed in defenses at airfields A-90, 95 and 96 in the NANCY (U5511) and TOUL (U6410) areas, all of which were used by the Tactical Air Command supporting Seventh US Army.

The failure of the German Air Force to sustain the scale of attacks set earlier in the month indicated that their violent effort to stop Third US Army's drive had been at least temporarily abandoned. Consequently, the defenses at airfield Y-34 near METZ (U8858) were reduced to the normal scale of two automatic weapons batteries in order that one battery of Army Antiaircraft Artillery could be made available to cover a Class III reserve at LANDRES (U6082).

Return of the 9th Armored Division to the Third US Army area on 11 January without Antiaircraft Artillery made it necessary to relieve the 482d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) from VIII Corps for reattachment to the division. Antiaircraft Artillery available to Third US Army for protection of vital points was further reduced by the arrival of the 8th Armored Division minus an Antiaircraft Artillery unit. The 467th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) was relieved from the III Corps and attached to XX Corps for this division. This change reduced the Automatic Weapons of the III Corps to a single battalion and a readjustment was made in the Automatic Weapons units attached to III and VIII Corps so that the III Corps would have at least one and one half battalions to cover installations in the Corps zone.

With good weather, the German Air Force ventured out on 14 January to attack targets in the XII and XX Corps. Of the eleven planes taking part in these raids, one was destroyed and two additional planes probably destroyed.

Two Antiaircraft Artillery units were lost by the Third US Army on 16 January when divisions were moved into Sixth US Army Group area where the Germans were applying considerable pressure at this time. The 796th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) was moved with the 10th Armored Division and the 447th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion went with the 28th Infantry Division, the unit moving on 18 January. Loss of the latter unit which had been attached to VIII Corps required an additional adjustment of Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons between the III and VIII Corps in order that each Corps could protect high priority installations in its area.

Still another unit was lost by Third US Army on 28 January when one more Automatic Weapons Battalion, the 567th, was ordered attached to Sixth US Army Group. Even though Antiaircraft defenses were readjusted, only those installations most vital to the army were protected since sufficient Antiaircraft Artillery was not now available to cover all the important installations.

The swing of the Third US Army to the north had drawn to that area the bulk of supply installations and the supplies which had been formerly stored in the NANCY (U8511) and TOUL (U6410) area had been depleted. Antiaircraft defenses at these two cities were therefore discontinued on 20 January and the units furnishing defense for these two points were moved to the city of METZ (U8858) which had become an important supply center.

The German "Bulge" had been reduced by 21 January and availability of roads in that area reduced the importance of BASTOGNE (P5558) which previously had been at the center of the only available road net. The Inner Artillery Zone at the city was therefore cancelled in order to allow maximum freedom for night operation in that area by the air forces.

On 21 January the 76th Infantry Division arrived in the Third US Army area without an Antiaircraft Artillery unit and it became necessary to further reduce the Antiaircraft Artillery which was available to cover supply installations and other vital points in the Army area in order to provide the 778th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) for the division.

As a result of a change in the Army boundary on 23 January, air fields covered by the units of the 795th and 894th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalions (Semi-mobile) were outside of the Third US Army area therefore operational command of these units was relinquished.

In accordance with instructions from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, arrangements were made on 29 January to establish a new boundary in the Army area which was to be known as the Army Group Rear Air Boundary. Antiaircraft defense of installations forward of this line was to be the responsibility of the Army. Antiaircraft defense of installations to the rear of this line was to be the responsibility of the IX Air Defense Command. The location of this boundary was to be determined by mutual agreement between the Army Group Commander and the Air Force Commander. The initial boundary agreed upon excluded from the areas of Army responsibility the Ordnance installation and the airfield at ETAIN (U4770) as well as the airfield east of CONFLANS (U6765) and airfield Y-34 southwest of METZ (U8858). Antiaircraft units of the IX Air Defense Command which had been defending these fields and had been attached to Third US Army for operational command, were relieved when IX Air Defense Command took over responsibility for defense of the airfields. Third US Army was to continue to exercise operational control over all Antiaircraft units inside the Army area.

During the month, LUXEMBOURG (P8414) had been subjected to artillery fire of a strange type on several occasions. Information gathered indicated that the projectile was finned and traveled at a very high velocity. At the request of the Artillery Section, an attempt was made to use radar to locate the source of the firing. One radar set (SCR-584) was set at an estimated azimuth furnished by the Artillery Section, and at an angular height of 17½ mils in order to avoid ground echos and reflections. The plan was to determine an approximate range and then run the narrow gate out to this range, if possible, to try and look the radar on the projectile in automatic. If this were successful, readings were to be taken at the computor and at the tracking hand to give range, azimuth and angular height of the projectile at specified times.

The above experiments were carried on during several shelling attacks. At the initial angular height, several "flicks" were seen which appeared to correspond with the landing of shells in the city but the radar was unable to "lock-on". The angular height was then lowered to fifty two mils in an attempt to pick up the projectiles nearer their source, but flicks then began to appear which were believed due to friendly artillery fire. These flicks appeared for a period of less than one second and did not show any noticeable travel in range which would give an indication of incoming or outgoing direction. No information was secured as a result of these experiments which was of any value in locating the source of enemy fire.

Copies of Weekly Intelligence Reports for the month of January are attached as Annex 4. It will be noted that after 2 January the German Air Force made no appearance in strength and only came over on infrequent reconnaissance flights.

The disposition of Third US Army Antiaircraft units is shown in Figure 13. The ARDENNES breakthrough had been erased and Third US Army installations had been moved to support the drive through the Siegfried line.

CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

Normal lines of communications and supply had been reopened and arrangements were made to relieve some Antiaircraft units which had been temporarily attached to the Third US Army at the time of the breakthrough. The 16th Antiaircraft Artillery Group and the 109th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion which had been employed in the defense of LUXEMBOURG (P8414) reverted to First US Army control on the 4th and 5th of February respectively.

The 38th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade took over the responsibility of the defense of LUXEMBOURG (P8414) as soon as the elements under its control could relieve the 16th Antiaircraft Artillery Group and the 109th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion. In order to maintain the two gun battalion scale of defense at LUXEMBOURG (P8414), the 411th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion was released from its mission in the defense of METZ (U8659) and moved to LUXEMBOURG (P8414) on 5 February.

Although impeded by melting of deep snows, and the weather which prevented air support, Third US Army troops were pushing deeper into Germany in the area of the German-Belgium-Luxembourg borders, and further to the south Third US Army troops were advancing favorably. Although Third US Army advances continued, the main effort was assigned to the First and Ninth US Armies, and troops were shifted north in preparation for an offensive. On the 1st of the month the 35th Infantry Division was moved to the Ninth US Army area, taking with it its attached 448th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion. On 2 February the 467th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion attached to the 8th Armored Division was relieved from attachment to Third US Army when this division also moved to the First US Army. Continuing the build-up of troops on 5 February, the 95th Infantry Division and its attached 547th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion moved into the Ninth US Army area.

In October plans had been made for the use of searchlights in the crossing of the river RHINE. As a result, one battery of the 226th Antiaircraft Searchlight Battalion arrived in the Third US Army on 31 January. These searchlights were incorporated in the Antiaircraft defense of LUXEMBOURG (P8414) until requested by Corps for battlefield illumination for infantry troops.

Searchlights were first used in a ground role in the Third US Army area on the night of 4 February, in a familiarization mission in the XII Corps area. Since the ground troops were not accustomed to night combat under artificial moonlight, a sector was chosen in which no major operation was underway.

A position overlooking the enemy lines along the MOSELLE river was chosen for first employment of searchlights for battlefield illumination. Two lights were emplaced in defiladed sites near the village of CANACH (P9813) to throw a beam over the MOSELLE river in the direction of the German lines. At that time, outposts were established in the town of REMICH (L0312). The hostile shores were illuminated sufficiently to discern objects on the far shore. The 284th Combat Engineer Battalion, which was supported by the searchlights, furnished communication for control. No artillery fire was drawn during the three day period these lights were in operation.

On the second night of the XII Corps attack over the SAUER and OUR rivers in LUXEMBOURG (P8414), the 5th Infantry Division requested Antiaircraft Artillery Searchlights for battlefield illumination. Two lights were sited in the 11th Infantry sector of the 5th Division for this purpose. The first night the lights were used only ten minutes as too much light was provided, revealing infantry assault boats making the crossing. Necessary adjustments in siting were made the following day and on the second night the lights were used for eight hours. The first reports stated the infantry did not like the illumination. However, after becoming accustomed to the effect of the lights, they requested additional lights. A total of six lights were employed with the 5th Infantry Division by 15 February.

During the hours of darkness progress on bridge construction was slow. Since the bridges were normally under direct observation it was impractical to employ local direct illumination. Indirect lighting provided by Antiaircraft searchlights was more diffused, comparing to the light of a three quarter moon. Our troops were able to see well enough to work, without being observed by the enemy who faced the light reflecting directly upon them from the low hanging overcast. Illumination for bridge construction in the 5th Infantry Division sector was furnished on the night of 13 February at the request of the engineers who reported a material increase in the amount of work accomplished.

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

FIGURE 13

During 10, 11 and 12 February, troops of the 26th Infantry Division, in the XX Corps sector to the south, first experienced working with searchlights under battle conditions. The division held a bridgehead over the SAAR river and occupied several blocks of buildings in the town of SAARLAUTERN (Q2980), RODEN (Q2882) and FRAULAUTERN (Q3001). Enemy troops occupied buildings directly across the street. Any movements during the hours of darkness drew small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire. The S-3 of the 104th Infantry Regiment requested the assistance of searchlights on the night of 10 February to assist our patrols in occupying the outer fringe of enemy held houses which the enemy habitually vacated at night and reoccupied the following morning.

On the night of 11 February the lights were again employed all night at the request of Task Force "A" of the 101st Infantry, which was on the left flank of the 104th Infantry. Having objected to the use of lights on the previous night, they were now accustomed to them and believed they could better conduct mortar fire and motorized patrols.

The 104th Infantry was completely relieved by the 328th Infantry on 12 February during the hours of darkness with searchlights facilitating the relief of troops.

Searchlights were continued in operation on the night of 13 February. However, they were not used on the next two nights as clear skies failed to adequately reflect the light beams.

In the SAARLAUTERN (Q2980) area, a number of night counter-attacks had taken place and on 17 February such an attack was launched against one of the battalions of the 320th Infantry. Searchlights were used and sufficiently penetrated the heavy mist to contribute to the halting of this counter-attack. It was observed that finer adjustment of mortar fire was possible under illumination.

Battlefield illumination by Antiaircraft searchlights was well received by units with which they were employed in the Third US Army area. A typical comment, by the 104th Infantry, is quoted below:

"The experimentation of this regiment with artificial moonlight was highly successful. The results obtained have exceeded expectations. All individuals interrogated from squad leaders to battalion commanders were very favorably impressed with the employment of artificial moonlight. The American soldier will fight anything he can see. This type of illumination lifts the doughboy from a blind groping ineffective, to an efficient, confident and aggressive soldier."

Although generally agreed on the assistance of Antiaircraft lights, Combat Commanders also observed certain limitations. The most serious objection offered was that, when located in buildings or in trenches, enemy troops could observe the movement of friendly troops in the open.

To ascertain the reaction of the enemy, PWs were interrogated regarding the use of searchlights. Generally speaking, PWs had been enjoying a number of the advantages from the lights that our own troops received, but patrol activity by the enemy had been greatly reduced.

As Third US Army Infantry and Armor continued to drive into the Siegfried line east and southeast of ST VITH (P9586), the net work of roads leading from the city bore heavy movement of supplies and troops. The mud and slush from melting snow impeded traffic. ST VITH (P9586) became a logical target for the German Air Force. The BASTOGNE (P5558) road junctions having assumed a more normal status, its Antiaircraft defense was reduced to two gun batteries; an Antiaircraft defense of two gun batteries was accordingly set up at ST VITH (P9586) on 9 February. On 12 February the 50th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade took over from VIII Corps the responsibility for Antiaircraft defense of BASTOGNE (P5558) and added an Automatic Weapons Battery to the two gun battery defense.

The bridgehead over the OUR river at ECHTERNACH (L0536) was being expanded and, when progress permitted it was planned to establish gun defenses of OUR river bridges in that vicinity. Two batteries of the 115th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion, relieved by two batteries of the 119th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion from ARLON (P6222) in the Antiaircraft defenses of LUXEMBOURG (P0,1,4), were moved forward to the vicinity of ECHTERNACH (L0536) on 8 February. The 129th Antiaircraft Gun Battalion was divided between the steel mill at DIFFERDANGE (P66d,) and ARLON (P6222), with two batteries at each point.

On the night of 10 February, memories of a past campaign were revived when Third US Army Antiaircraft shot down an enemy mail plane bearing mail for German troops in the beleaguered ports of ST NAZAIRE (R5665) and LORIENT (Q7921). These two cities formed the remaining pockets of German troops which the Third US Army had

On 10 February Third US Army regained control of the 10th Armored Division and the attached 796th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled). These units were moved to the vicinity of METZ (U8699) and attached to the XX Corps.

A request was received from the Ninth Air Force for protection of a large maintenance depot to be set up at Airfield Y-32C in the vicinity of THIONVILLE (U8605). Defense of the above installation was established with one Automatic Weapons Battery, withdrawn from a supply point of relatively low priority, on 22 February.

Antiaircraft Artillery gun defense of ECHTERNACH (L0536) was established on 14 February with the two gun batteries which had been attached to the XII Corps on 8 February. Although it had been the policy of the Third US Army to establish Inner Artillery Zones at vital river crossings, it was felt that air superiority at this particular time was such that complete restriction of flying in this area was not justified. With concurrence of the Commanding General XIX Tactical Air Command, a Black Check area was established to permit Antiaircraft guns to fire at unseen aircraft when the Fighter Control Center could inform them that no friendly planes were in the area.

The offensive in the XX Corps was progressing and the SAAR MOSELLE triangle was being cleared. This resulted in the movement of two batteries of the 119th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion from the defense of LUXEMBOURG (P6414) into the XX Corps sector for Antiaircraft defense in the vicinity of SAARLAUTERN (L1112) on 23 February. The desired scale of gun defenses at LUXEMBURG (P6414) was maintained by taking the two batteries from ARLON (P6222), no longer a vital communications center.

With good weather continuing, the drive in the XII Corps was expanding its bridgehead and build-up of troops across the river. To insure adequate gun defenses for the river crossing in ECHTERNACH (L0536), the two remaining batteries of the 115th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion were moved forward to this crossing on the 22d and 24th of February respectively, reducing the scale of gun defense of LUXEMBOURG (P6414) to six batteries.

The 367th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion which had been temporarily attached to the Sixth US Army Group was returned to the Third US Army on 27 February. Automatic Weapons defenses of installations in the Army area were adjusted to furnish maximum protection. The addition of this Antiaircraft unit permitted a general regrouping of Automatic Weapons units.

The German Air Force flew no sizable sorties in the area and was content with sporadic reconnaissance flights.

No new tactics were reported. No jet-propelled planes were sighted over the Army area.

Antiaircraft Artillery units claimed three category I's and six category II's. Since the number of enemy planes engaged was a few less than the thirty two reported, these nine claims equal about thirty three percent destroyed or probably destroyed of all enemy aircraft reported.

With the decline in activity of the Luftwaffe an increasing number of ground support missions were fired by Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalions attached to Divisions.

Figure 14 indicates Antiaircraft dispositions as of 28 February.

Copies of Weekly Intelligence Reports for the month of February are attached as Annex 9.

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

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CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

The assignment of the 66th Infantry Division to the Third US Army without an Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion made it necessary to furnish a unit from the 30th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade. On 2 March, the 546th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion was attached to the division. A second unit was withdrawn from Army Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion was attached to the 95th Infantry Division when it had also been assigned to Third US Army without Antiaircraft Artillery.

Due to limited activity of the German Air Force and the lessening of the threat to rimal areas, it was felt that restrictions on flying of friendly aircraft over these areas were now unwarranted. Therefore the within the Third US Army area cancelled effective 1 March. Inner Artillery Zones were to be main re jected upon request of Army to German Air Force. Flak-wagon areas were subsist ted at all units defended by 40mm guns.

Having penetrated the Siegfried Line, the Third US Army advanced rapidly along the north portion of the front and by 2 March had expanded its SAAR River bridgehead south of Trier (U8695). By 5 March the 10th Armored Division had pushed into Prüm (U8194), and the 11th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion w for had been employed at (U8 and B (U8192) was moved forward in the XII Corps area for the defense of this city. On 6 March when the str had been sufficiently cleared, gun defense was established.

The evacuation of Antiaircraft Artillery which had been created by the arrival of the above Infantry Divisions was alleviated by the assignment of the 99th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion and the 16th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion to Army control of the divisions to which they were attached released to the Third US Army Group. On 12 March the 99th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) was attached to the 95th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade to cover missions in the Corps and Army areas.

Advantage was taken of the lull in enemy air activity to make available special tactical missions in the Army area and in the rear of the Corps areas. Through the cooperation of the XIX Tactical Air Command, [illegible] were flown by fighter-bomber pilots simulated low level dive bombing and strafing attacks on Antiaircraft weapons units. Missions were scheduled and flown with marked success however weather conditions permitted.

On 11 March the 32d Antiaircraft Artillery Group was given the task of reconnoitering for a suitable Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons firing range site and early movement preparatory to operate the range. The loss of the 32d Antiaircraft Artillery Group up to the fifteenth of any aircraft necessitated postponement of these plans.

A change in lateral boundaries enabled the city of [illegible] from the Third US Army area. The 143d Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion which had been defending the city was relieved of its mission on 14 March and prepared to move forward to the vicinity of [illegible] where it was to defend the Rhine River crossing. Plans for this move Arrangements were completed to establish gun work area to permit unseen firing at night when the defense was established.

On 15 March the 127th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion was attached to Combat Command Army with the 11th Armored Division. On 16 March the 126th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) was released from the Third US Army and was available as an Antiaircraft unit for the 17th Armored Division which had been assigned to the [illegible] Army Group.

During the initial phase of the drive toward the Rhine River, the German Air Force had failed to attempt to strafe the Antiaircraft units had therefore been employed extensively in a ground role. On 1 March [illegible] of the 143d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled), supporting a task force of the 90th Infantry Division, [illegible] the town of [illegible] (U8594) silencing enemy troops while under heavy fire and rifle-pit sniper and machine gun fire to capture a bridge intact. The defense of the bridge was quickly organized and it was held intact until the 90th Tank Destroyers and Infantry arrived to take over. Other Antiaircraft units contributed to the Third US Army push by their execution of ground role missions.

The 11th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion was relieved of its mission at [illegible] (U8793) on 1 March and moved forward to the XII Corps zone. The 120th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion was relieved from its mission at the steel mill at [illegible] (U8792) on 10 March and the defense of [illegible] (U8415) and moved forward to be [illegible] were to be available immediately for defense of planned [illegible] River crossings, especially they were given the mission of defending the river crossings near the 11th River in the vicinity of [illegible] (U8695).

On 10 March the 71st Infantry Army drove across the Kyll River capturing a bridge intact at [illegible] (U8695) and [illegible] and at this point, the 120th Gun Battalion under control of XII Corps set up its Antiaircraft defenses. Artillery were [illegible] the river further south [illegible] (U8693) and [illegible] (U8695) and were [illegible] covered by automatic weapons battalion attached to Corps and Divisions.

The German Air Force, active over First US Army's [illegible] bridgeheads, displayed relatively little activity over Third Army during the first eleven days of March. On 11 March it continued its attempts, however, only sixteen attempted fighter-bomber columns of the 4th Armored Division, a mere [illegible] of the corps' strength, were subject to fourteen attacks. On 14 March, Antiaircraft artillery shot down seventeen planes and probably destroyed three others. During the following two days, the remains of the German air attack lessened, although eight planes were shot down and ten more claimed as probables.



On the south, XX Corps' columns, rolling up the Siegfried Line and destroying German static positions, drew equal attention from the Luftwaffe. When it appeared that RHINE bridges might be captured, the Antiaircraft Officer of the XX Corps requested a gun battalion be made available at the earliest possible date. The 120th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion, which was divided between DIFFERDANGE (P6604) and THIONVILLE (U8585) had been alerted for movement on short notice. Upon being relieved by units of the 51st Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade at DIFFERDANGE (P6604), the 120th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion was moved forward on 22 March to the vicinity of ALZEY (M2726), where large quantities of ordnance and engineer equipment were expected to accumulate. Under the control of the 30th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, the 120th Antiaircraft Gun Battalion and other Antiaircraft units which were moving forward in preparation for the river crossing were given the temporary mission of protecting the equipment.

On 23 March, armored spearheads of the Third US Army had driven deep into the Seventh US Army zone. As a result, the 10th and 12th Armored Divisions and their attached 376th and 57th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalions (Self-propelled) were attached to the 63rd Infantry Division. On the same date the 77th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) reverted to Third US Army control from [illegible] Army Group. The Antiaircraft situation as of 23 March is shown in figure 15.

When CI [illegible] (M4644) was chosen for the site of the river crossings for the XII Corps, a [illegible] area was initially established to allow unseen fire at [illegible]. Because of the importance of this crossing, a request was [illegible] made for an Inner Artillery Zone with a ceiling [illegible] a radius of 10,000 yards through which the flight of friendly aircraft would be prohibited at night.

On the 24th, the enemy made the heaviest air attacks experienced by Third US Army troops during the entire campaign. Attacks were made [illegible] the entire front, principally on the [illegible] (M4644), [illegible] (M4644) and [illegible] areas to the north with [illegible] and 4th Infantry Divisions [illegible] aircraft, including jet-propelled [illegible] were [illegible] and [illegible] attacks. A total of 331 aircraft [illegible] the XII Corps zone. Antiaircraft, especially [illegible] and [illegible] installations, shot down twenty-five attacking planes and claimed several more as probably destroyed.

On the 25th of March troops of the 5th Infantry Division began [illegible] over the [illegible] River at [illegible] (M4644). An additional Antiaircraft artillery, the [illegible], had been attached to XII Corps for the [illegible]. [illegible] and 120th Antiaircraft, which had been held [illegible] for this crossing, initially was a [illegible] antiaircraft defense. The [illegible] effectively achieved tactical surprise. The Luftwaffe made no [illegible] the [illegible] first [illegible] of the morning; then it struck in force at [illegible]. Of 175 attacking enemy aircraft, eighteen were shot down [illegible] were probably destroyed, and [illegible] remained intact. Two [illegible] were shot down by XII Corps Antiaircraft gunners [illegible] were made against the 14th Armored Division and field [illegible] installations.

On 26 March the German Air Force continued to concentrate its efforts [illegible] the crossings in the XII Corps zone. Again Antiaircraft scored [illegible] shot down twenty-six of the 150 attacking planes and [illegible] probably destroyed six additional planes. On the following day, the [illegible] was made on the bridgehead tank plane when [illegible] aircraft [illegible] and installations. Antiaircraft artillery destroyed [illegible] outside of the restricted zones and claimed twenty-three probables. [illegible] were shot down by air-and-ground fire from [illegible] made five [illegible] of twenty feet to 1,500 feet. Strafing followed [illegible] attacks. Only three planes [illegible] over the remainder of the XII Corps zone, one of which was destroyed and another probably destroyed. [illegible] losses to the German Air Force, averaged with the loss of [illegible] and [illegible] destroyed by Third US Army's advancing [illegible] and [illegible] the threat to the bridgehead which had now [illegible] with [illegible]. The Inner Artillery Zone with a radius of 10,000 [illegible] of the Corps was established for the OPPLN and [illegible] was cancelled considerably in the defense.

Following close behind the establishment of the bridgehead at [illegible] (M4644), the XII Corps sent troops of the 5th Infantry Division [illegible] the [illegible] River at [illegible] (M4644) on 24 and [illegible] the 90th Infantry Division made [illegible] on 27 March [illegible] (M4644) on 28 [illegible] Troops [illegible] at three points [illegible] and 120th Antiaircraft [illegible] Battalions and the [illegible] and 120th Antiaircraft Artillery [illegible] were [illegible] to the [illegible] Division and [illegible] Battalion [illegible] Antiaircraft Artillery [illegible] were attached to [illegible] Division [illegible] Antiaircraft Artillery [illegible] Division [illegible] Antiaircraft Artillery [illegible] Division [illegible] Antiaircraft Artillery

Enemy Air Force efforts at BOPPARD (L9081) and ST GOAR (L9072) was confined to less than thirty planes of which four were shot down and three probably destroyed during the first five days of the operation.

The Third US Army forward Command Post was moved from LUXEMBOURG (P6413) to OBERSTEIN (L7123) Germany on 27 March and an Automatic Weapons defense established there with two batteries of the 456th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion.

A fourth crossing of the River RHINE at MAINZ (M3950) was made by the XX Corps on 27 - 28 March by troops of the 80th Infantry Division. Army units, the 119th and 141th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalions and the 567th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, had been attached to the XX Corps for this crossing. A Rhinebeck area was established there effective the night of 28 March until an Inner Artillery Zone became effective. Enemy air activity over this bridgehead was very light.

Third US Army's sweep across the RHINE toward the heart of Germany had produced supply problems similar to those which existed after the AVRANCHES (T2718) breakthrough in August. Lines of communication were extremely long and every available truck was needed to move supplies forward and prisoners of war to the rear. A large number of trucks were made available for twenty-four or forty-eight hour trips and thousands of tons of badly needed supplies were moved by Antiaircraft Artillery units.

On 30 March the 146th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) was relieved of its mission under VIII Corps and assembled in preparation for its transfer to Fifteenth US Army on 1 April. The Antiaircraft Artillery situation as of 30 March is shown in Figure 15.

The attachment of the bulk of Army Antiaircraft Artillery to the Corps for the RHINE River crossings left undefended many important installations in the Army area. Some of these in the rear of the Army area were taken over by Antiaircraft units of the IX Air Defense Command. Others remained undefended. The vulnerability of the bridges and bridgeheads and also the belief that the Luftwaffe would mass its strength there, justified the risk which was taken.

By 31 March the 38th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade had taken over from the Corps the mission of protecting all crossings of the RHINE River as well as important installations west of the RHINE. Corps Antiaircraft Artillery Groups, moving forward, set up defenses along the MAIN River for airfields on which gasoline was being landed by the Air Transport Command and for other important installations.

The arrival of the 70th Infantry Division provided an additional Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion which was placed under operational command of the 38th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade on 31 March. Under an existing directive this battalion could only be employed on the west bank of the RHINE River. The 70th Infantry Division was charged with ground security to the west of the RHINE River, including the crossings, and all Antiaircraft Artillery on the river, including radar and searchlights employed in river surveillance, was coordinated with the Division Plan.

The month of March marked the first appearance of jet-propelled aircraft over Third US Army area in any numbers as Me-262s and Ar-234s became commonplace. Flights as large as six and larger flights of mixed jet and standard type aircraft were encountered.

Copies of Weekly Intelligence Reports for the month of March are attached as Annex 10.



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

Figure 16

CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

At the beginning of the month the enemy decreased his efforts to interrupt traffic over the RHINE and MAIN Rivers. Instead, frantic efforts were made to brake the advance of the 4th, 6th, and 11th Armored Divisions, all of which were thrusting prongs deep into the center of Germany. The change in enemy tactics proved costly as evidenced by the 2 April reports of the 489th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) which claimed thirty-five enemy planes destroyed and five probably destroyed during the twenty four hour period. In the entire Army area, sixty-seven enemy planes destroyed and twenty-three probably destroyed were claimed for the same period.

The abandonment of the BOPPARD (L8983) crossing, and the expected opening of the bridges at LORCH (M0560) and BINGEN (M1353) necessitated the reorganization of defenses on the RHINE River. On 3 and 5 April the entire defense of the BOPPARD (L8983) crossing was discontinued and the units moved to establish the defense of the LORCH (M0560) crossing at a scale of one gun battalion and one automatic weapons battalion. On 4 and 5 April, two gun batteries from the OPPENHEIM (M4441) crossing were moved to the BINGEN (M1353) crossing and on 4 April this gun defense was augmented by two automatic weapons batteries. Inner Artillery Zones were established at the BINGEN (M1353) crossing on 6 April, and at the LORCH (M0560) crossing on 4 April. The zone at BOPPARD (L8983) was cancelled on 3 April. Two automatic weapons batteries were moved from OPPENHEIM (M4441) to the MAINZ (M3956) crossing on 5 April to balance defenses between these two major crossings.

On 5 April, the 574th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) which had been defending supply points and installations in the Army area was released to the 13th Armored Division and the 551st Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, which had just been relieved of defense of bridges at BAD KREUZNACH (M1640) by the IX Air Defense Command, was placed under control of the Provost Marshal, Third US Army. Although there were many installations at which use could be made of the 551st Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, the need for additional troops to provide security was urgent enough to make the change necessary.

As the 4th Armored Division drove through the THURINGIA Forest and the other armored divisions continued their rapid progress, uninterrupted delivery and supply of gasoline became a matter of great concern. The defense of the airfield terminals constituted an important part of the Antiaircraft activities throughout April. The 5th Infantry Division, being temporarily on a security mission, its Antiaircraft unit, the 469th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, was placed under operational command of the 38th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade on 6 April and assigned the mission of protecting airfields. On 8 April the 5th Infantry Division moved north out of the Third US Army area and the antiaircraft artillery battalion was released from its mission. Defenses on the RHINE at MAINZ (M3956) and OPPENHEIM (M4441) were decreased by two automatic weapons batteries each in order to replace the battalion on the airfields.

The importance of giving protection to airfields used by C-47 transports carrying gasoline was illustrated on 10 April when enemy planes attacked C-47s coming in to the LANDSBERG (JO48) airfield. Two C-47s were attacked and destroyed while they were out of range of the antiaircraft protecting the airfield. As the flight of transports came closer, the attacking fighters were engaged by the antiaircraft unit protecting this field and were driven off, thereby preventing further damage.

Further reduction of the defenses on the RHINE River was necessary on 8 April to provide antiaircraft units for several new missions. Two gun batteries and one automatic weapons battery were required for the Forward Third US Army Command Post which was scheduled to move from FRANKFURT (M6768) to HERSFELD (N4053) in a few days. Two gun batteries and one automatic weapons battery were required for river crossings at EISENACH (N8068). Third US Army troops had discovered a mine in the vicinity of MERKERS (M6850) where gold and art treasures were stored; two gun batteries and one automatic weapons battery were necessary for this defense. Antiaircraft units furnished a task force on 15 and 17 April which provided protection for movement of the gold and art treasures out of the mine to the rear area. To provide these organizations, the gun defenses at OPPENHEIM (M4441) and MAINZ (M3956) were each decreased by two gun batteries; this change left a full gun battalion at OPPENHEIM (M4441) and six gun batteries at MAINZ (M3956). The gun defenses at LORCH (M0560), consisting of four gun batteries and four automatic weapons batteries, were decreased fifty percent as it became apparent that the approaches to the bridge were inadequate, and the crossing would be abandoned.

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(On 12 April, the defense at La [illegible] and at Bad [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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

ANTIAIRCRAFT SITUATION
26 APR 1945

AREA ENCLOSED IN BLUE - AUTOMATIC WPNS
" " " RED - 90 MM GUNS
" " " DASHED RED - IAZ
" " " DOTTED RED - BLANK CHECK AREA

Figure 17

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

To the west in the zone of the III Corps, responsibility for Antiaircraft Artillery defense of the ISAR River crossings was taken over by Army on 5 May; the 119th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion reverted to Army Control. The 115th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion had been attached to III Corps to cover the INN River crossing and was moving south to an assembly area.

V Corps was placed under control of Third US Army on 5 May. Attached to the 115th Antiaircraft Artillery Group, operating under V Corps, were the 140th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-propelled) and the 460th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion. Attaching the Corps brought also the 103d, 111th and 462d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalions attached to the 1st, 97th and 2d Infantry Divisions and the 571st and 482d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalions (Self-propelled) attached to the 16th and 9th Armored Divisions.

Until V-E Day, 8 May, Third US Army continued to surge forward to the southeast into Czechoslovakia and Austria. During the period, an estimated 110 enemy aircraft were over the area in a series of approximately ninety raids with the Luftwaffe reluctant to remain on the ground until the final day. Of these, nearly all planes were engaged in reconnaissance missions. Only four attacks were reported. A Ba-181 reconnaissance craft dropped two small anti-personnel bombs (perhaps hand grenades) in the 80th Infantry Division area; two Me-109s strafed in the 26th Infantry Division area; and on the final day -- 8 May --- fifteen enemy aircraft strafed in the vicinity of PASSAU (Q22 12) and DEGGENDORF (U8338). In the strafing attack on PASSAU (Q22 12), two reconnaissance type ships used machine pistols fired out of the cockpit. Many were shot down and a number of pilots and passengers killed. In all, Antiaircraft claimed forty-seven aircraft destroyed and twelve probably destroyed.

Some of the reconnaissance ships shot down were loaded with explosives and detonating caps intended for use of pilot saboteurs who were to land behind our lines. This fairly large scale plot aborted.

As the last day of the campaign entered the pages of history, Third US Army Antiaircraft Artillery reported 6192 enemy planes over the area in 2163 raids since 1 August 1944. Of these 1081 were claimed as destroyed and 564 more as probably destroyed.

AAA Weekly Intelligence Report Number 41 covering the period from 0600B May to 0900B May is included as Annex E.

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CHAPTER
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

TACTICS

1. EMPLOYMENT. With relatively few exceptions, enemy tactics were to make small-scale hit and run attacks on targets of opportunity throughout the area. In most instances a relatively light concentration of Antiaircraft Artillery fire was sufficient either to destroy or drive off the attacking aircraft. Where targets of vital importance presented themselves, however, attacks by enemy planes were made in large numbers and were pressed regardless of casualties. Where the enemy is not aggressive and has shown a disinclination to launch large scale attacks, defenses may be lightened to cover many objectives. A few batteries under such circumstances will be adequate to drive off light attacks. On the other hand, where objectives are of vital importance, sufficient concentration must be provided to meet irresistified attacks.

2. AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE ON UNSEEN TARGETS. Firing of automatic weapons at unseen targets was wasteful of ammunition and had no apparent deterrent effect on attacking planes. In addition, the tracer streams disclosed the gun position and outlined the target area. No barrage fire was employed by Third US Army Antiaircraft Artillery units. With the present equipment, automatic weapons are of little value unless the target can be seen.

3. GROUND COMBAT. During the campaign many Antiaircraft Artillery units engaged in close combat with enemy ground or mechanized troops either in its own defense or while in an offensive supporting mission. Such engagements occasionally resulted in excessive casualties and loss of equipment due to lack of training for this type of combat. Greater emphasis should be placed upon training of Antiaircraft Artillery personnel for ground support missions and in the role of an infantry soldier. The training required is not so much in shooting as in moving into and occupying positions.

ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Two methods of identification were provided, i.e., IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) and identification through flight plans or liaison officer. Neither proved successful, many targets being carried as unidentified. Frequently the IFF equipment was not used by friendly aircraft. Communications provided for the dissemination of Air Warning by Antiaircraft Artillery units was inadequate. Transmission of warning was accomplished with equipment supplied in excess of Tables of Organization and Equipment by the Air Force and Army Signal Officer. Early warning would not be necessary for antiaircraft units except to alert gun crews, if a satisfactory means of identification for guns and automatic weapons units were provided. Units lacked training in establishment of local Antiaircraft Artillery Intelligence Service nets, and procedures evolved in the field differed considerably, often making difficult the coordination of Antiaircraft Artillery Intelligence Service between adjacent units. Mutual identification between aircraft and ground units is vital to efficient operation of the Air Force and Antiaircraft Artillery. Communication equipment for the dissemination of air warning should provide two-way radio communication for the exercise of operational control. Antiaircraft Artillery Intelligence Service training should be standardized. Nets for transmitting this information should be specified and personnel indoctrinated and trained accordingly.

AUTOMATIC WEAPONS

1. MINE DETECTORS. Antiaircraft units normally occupied positions not previously swept for mines by Engineer units and each gun section had to clear its own area of mines. Mine detectors should be provided for each automatic weapons fire unit.

2. SECURITY AND OBSERVATION. The normal disposition of automatic weapons in the field was such that each halftrack, 40mm gun and type M51 mount had to provide its own security and perform its own observation. Bazookas and field glasses should be provided for each 40mm gun, type M51 mount and halftrack.

3. FIRE UNITS. In the majority of situations the towed automatic weapons mounts were greatly handicaped in furnishing convoy protection and in occupying positions. The separate fire control equipment which required orientation and frequent adjustment proved to have distinct disadvantages. Fire control equipment proved unsatisfactory for coping with normal zeros targets. No provision was made for unseen fire or to illuminate targets.

Throughout the campaign, automatic weapons were employed for both offensive and defensive missions in a ground role. Difficulty in this role was encountered due to the unsuitability of fire control equipment for direct and indirect fire plus the inability of antiaircraft weapons to depress below zero degrees in elevation, and fire in travelling position to the front. All automatic weapons should be Self-propelled. A more effective built-into-the-carriage system of fire control is required. Provision should be made for fire during darkness. Automatic weapons should be designed to perform useful and necessary secondary ground missions. Sufficient armor and mobility to perform such a role as well as scales and sighting equipment for indirect fire should be provided. Weapons should be designed to fire below zero degrees through 360 degrees.

ORDNANCE

Mixed lots of 90mm ammunition were common and required continual planning on the part of Battery Commanders to insure availability of a sufficient number of rounds of the same lot for check fire and engagement of aircraft. Provisions should be made for ammunition to reach ammunition supply points with a minimum of lot numbers. Supervision must be exercised by antiaircraft officers to insure the fewest possible lot numbers at each battery position.

EQUIPMENT

1. RADAR. The type SCR 584 radar was not fully dependable for detection of enemy aircraft, particularly low flying targets. It was necessary to take the set off search to make circuit checks. Supply of spare parts for the SCR 584, especially spinner motors and T-R tubes, proved entirely inadequate. Search feature of SCR 584 requires modification or redesign to provide better search coverage against low flying targets. Built-in test equipment to enable checks during search operation would be advantageous. More adequate supplies of spare parts should be provided.

2. HEIGHT FINDERS. Height finders of 90mm batteries were not used by Third US Army units during operations on the continent. They should be eliminated from Tables of Organization and Equipment.

3. TYPE M-7 GENERATOR. Supply of spare parts for type M-7 Generators proved entirely inadequate to permit the required hours of operation. The additional load resulting from the energizing of the remote control systems of one or more guns, frequently caused the output voltage to fluctuate to such an extent that the radar beam went off the air and the target was lost. Supply of spare parts for type M-7 Generators, especially piston rings, valves and over size pistons should be increased. Facilities should be provided for reboring cylinders. Voltage regulators should be modified or redesigned.

4. TYPE M-4 TRACTORS. Type M-4 Tractors proved unable to maintain traction under conditions of icy roads and packed snow. Attachments should be provided for tracks of type M-4 tractors to enable them to maintain traction under icy conditions.

5. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. Due to rapidly changing situations, radio proved to be the primary means of communication, with wire used infrequently. Radio equipment provided by Tables of Organization and Equipment however, proved inadequate in quantity and performance. The type SCR 593 radio was totally unsatisfactory; it was difficult to tune and lacked satisfactory provision for maintaining power. The range of the type SCR 543 radio proved insufficient to meet normal needs. The type SCR 177 radio was found difficult to keep on frequency and its range was frequently inadequate. Wire communication was used where possible. The fact that Tables of Organization and Equipment of Self-propelled units made no provisions for wire or telephone proved a distinct handicap in communication with supported elements. Radio is the primary means of communication for antiaircraft units in the field and more dependable radio equipment [illegible] longer range should be provided in sufficient [illegible] command and intelligence nets. Adequate communication [illegible] provided each Self-propelled unit for wire [illegible] of supported elements.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX NO. 1

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
•AUTH: CG, Third US Army
•INIT: FRC
•DATE: 9 Aug 44

9 August 1944.

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 1

Period:
0112000B to 0106000B

1. This report covers the period 1200B 1 August (when Third US Army became Operational) to 0600B 4 August 1944.

2. Battalion reports, giving details of engagements, have not all been received. Hence this report is incomplete and based only on such Battalion reports as have been received, plus consolidated raid reports submitted by Groups and Brigade, for the period 0600, 3 August to 0600, 4 August.

3. Most hostile air activity has been at night, centering over bridges and roadways south of AVRANCHES. Most attacks have been from low altitudes, with some bombing from medium altitudes. "Window" has been dropped extensively but has not effected radar tracking. Several low-level bombing and strafing attacks have been made but reports indicate no material damage to vital dam, bridges and roads protected by Antiaircraft Artillery.

4. Consolidated raid report 0600 3 August to 0600 4 August is as follows:

	RAIDS	NO E/A	CAT I	CAT II
(0600 3 August to 0600 4 August)	21	159	14	8

5. Battalion reports received late will be summarized in the following week's report.

For the Commanding General:

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
•AUTH: CG, THIRD US Army
•INIT: FRC
•DATE: 16 August 1944

16 August 1944

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 2

Period:
0106000B to 1106000B

1. Summary of Activity

a. Heaviest GAF activity during the week was aimed at lines of communication, repeated heavy attacks were made upon bridges over the SEULNE RIVER near PONTAUBAULT and DUCEY, with particularly heavy raids upon the bridges bottlenecking traffic near AVRANCHES. The area between DUCEY and ST HILAIRE DU HARCOUET have been attacked several times, as has RENNES. Heaviest activity was reported the night of 7 August, with 186 raids by 250 enemy aircraft. AAA defense of bridges and dams has been uniformly successful, and no damage to these targets has been reported.

b. Antiaircraft Artillery claims 63 Cat I's and 34 Cat II's for the week, or approximately 9% of all E/A reported. Corrected totals from 1200B, 1 August, to 0600B, 11 August, (still incomplete) bring reported totals to:

	RAIDS	NO E/A	CAT I	CAT II
1200B, 1 August to 0600B, 11 Aug	176	1280	89	39

Total Cat I's and II's equal just 10% of all E/A reported.

2. GAF Tactics Notes

a. Attacks have been made almost exclusively at night, between the hours of 2200 and 0430, with a few earlier and later. Bridges have been most frequently attacked, about 58% of attacks being against bridges. Known targets of next importance have been Field Artillery at approximately 7%, and AAA positions at approximately 6%. A few strafing attacks against highway convoys have been reported. The attacks against AAA sites ordinarily employed anti-personnel fragmentation bombs, followed by strafing, which caused some casualties.

Altitudes of attack naturally vary, but most night attacks are made from medium and low altitudes, with some strafing efforts reported. High-altitude bombing is infrequent and dive-bombing, also, has been infrequently employed.

Reports indicate some glide-bombing, with motors cut on the approach to the area attacked.

Planes usually attack singly or in small groups of 2 to 15. In instances, as many as 75 E/A have made single attacks on the same objective, approaching from all directions. Reported speed estimates run roughly from 300 to 400 mph, with a few slower.

One battalion reported that, on an enemy night raid, one E/A apparently marked the target area with a light smoke ring through which other planes dropped their flares. Flares are reported as used on most night raids, both to illuminate and to signal other E/A. Some night strafing has been done with non-tracer ammunition, making location of E/A difficult for automatic weapons units.

Two FW 190's were reported over RENNES painted with allied invasion stripes.

"Window" is frequently reported, with considerable flashing on the range tubes resulting. But targets have been readily tracked through it.

b. Extracts of a letter from the 21st AAA Group commander to the CO, 38th AAA Brigade, give an interesting outline of a GAF tactic:

"1. The following tactics employed by the German Air Forces over the AVRANCHES-LA HAYE PESNEL area during the nights of 6, 7, and 8 August have been observed:

a. Employment of one (1) or two (2) fighter planes at altitudes between 1000 - 3000 feet. Formation of bombers follow at 10,000 to 15,000 feet.

b. The fighters fly very low to encourage engagement by our light AA. Some fighters have been observed to flash on searchlights. If light AA fire, the DA is exposed by tracer streams. Immediately the defense zone is indicated, then bombers drop pathfinder, chandelier and parachute flares. High-level bombing follows within our defense zone.

c. The nights of 7 and 8 August 1944 observations were made of engagement of enemy planes by heavy AA. Firing treserless projectiles, the heavy AA do not reveal their defense zone. The low cruising enemy fighter strafed at random in the immediate area and was successful in attracting light AA fire. The procedure outlined in paragraph 1a followed.

d. During the nights of 7 and 8 August 1944, a low cruising fighter attracted machine gun fire from the center of a DA. Very shortly, flares dropped were engaged by light AA. High-level bombing, out of light AA range, followed immediately."

F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR,
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
•AUTH: CG, Third US Army
•INIT: FRC
•DATE: 23 August 1944

23 August 1944

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 3

Period:
1106000B to 1806000B

1. Summary of Activity

a. During the week, the enemy continued air attacks against lines of communication, though on a scale reduced from last week's efforts. Bridges and road nets at ALENCON, REMNES and LE MANS received scattered raids, as did other such targets. No damage to protected targets has been reported. The latter part of the week, the GAF switched objectives and struck at forward areas. Field Artillery and armored columns were repeatedly subjected to sudden daylight attacks, most being reported in the XV Corps area.

b. Antiaircraft Artillery claims 28 Cat I's and 11 Cat II's (corrected totals) for the week, out of 113 raids by 252 enemy aircraft or approximately 15% of E/A reported in the Third US Army zone of action. Corrected totals from 1200B 1 August, to 0600B, 18 August (still incomplete) bring reported totals to:

	RAIDS	NO E/A	CAT I	CAT II
1200B 1 Aug. to 0600B 18 Aug	923	1,685	130	55

Total claims for Cat I's and Cat II's equal more than 13% of all E/A reported over Third US Army.

2. GAF Tactics Notes

a. While the GAF has continued with night attacks against such stationary targets as roads and bridges, daylight attacks as noted are a new development and afford interesting speculation. From start of Third US Army operations to date, approximately 35% of apparent objectives have been bridges.

b. High altitude bombing remains a rarity, and dive-bombing is infrequently reported. Night attacks are made from both low and medium altitudes, while daylight efforts usually are from strafing or low-level heights. From start of operations to date, approximately 35% of attacks have been at low altitudes (0-6000 ft), 30% at medium altitudes (6000 - 15000 ft), and 10% have been strafing attacks.

c. No mass raids have appeared though as many as 28 E/A have been reported, apparently making individual attacks, while 15 Me 109's appeared as a group, but passed without making an attack.

3. Miscellaneous Notes

The 270th and the 999th FA Bns, protected by two batteries of the 146th AAA AW Bn, were attacked by 13 enemy aircraft between 1000 and 1630 on 16 August. It is interesting to note that of these 13 planes, 9 were shot down as certain or probables by Antiaircraft fire. 577 rds of 40mm and 4311 rds of .50 cal ammo were expended. No damage to FA materiel or personnel has been reported.

F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR,
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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FROM: [illegible]
TO: [illegible] ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
AUTH: CO, Third US Army
dtd 31 Aug, FAC
DATE: 30 August 1944

30 August 1944

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 4

Period:
1200B to 2400B

1. Summary of Activity

a. In formation averaging about six planes per raid, the GAF struck heavily at forward targets this week. Though many single-plane attacks were made, multiple-plane attacks were more numerous as the enemy continued increasingly to employ tactics. Further, though unsuccessful, attempts by rocket-firing aircraft were made to destroy bridges over the [illegible], especially near [illegible], and numerous attacks were directed at Ordnance, supply and ammunition columns. In one day (August 22d) 117 E/A attacked targets in the XV Corps area, alone.

b. For the week, Antiaircraft Artillery claims 68 planes destroyed (Category I) and 55 probably destroyed (Category II), totaling 209 out of 2176 E/A reported, or approximately 10%. Recapitulation of claims is as follows:

WEEK	RAIDS	NO E/A	CAT I's	CAT II's
(1806008 to 2406008)	72	420	68	55
TO DATE				
(0112008 to 2406008)	1000	2176	209	94

Recapitulation to 2406008 corrected totals, still incomplete) brings Antiaircraft claims to a total of [illegible] E/A destroyed or probably destroyed out of 2176 E/A, or approximately 14%.

2. GAF Tactics Notes

a. Though small scale, sporadic attacks were made against supply dumps, by far the heaviest raids were made upon field artillery, bridges, and AA light and heavy weapons positions.

b. While some attacks occurred during early morning and late evening hours, no determinable effort was made to attack consistently from out of the sun. Attacks came at all hours and from all directions. Low clouds were used as cover both for the attack and in aid of subsequent evasive action.

c. Reports again tell of enemy planes engaged in mock dogfights to mislead ground troops into believing the enemy was pursued by allied fighters, only to peel off and strafe roads and other targets.

d. By far the greatest number of attacks were from low altitudes, being either rocket or strafing attempts by fast-flying FW 190's, with some bombing reported. Ju 88's and Me 110s were but infrequently encountered.

e. One battalion reported 60-70 E/A overhead within a period of six hours during the daytime and reports of attacks in the neighborhood of 25-30 aircraft were not infrequent.

f. Reconnaissance flights at very high and at low altitudes have been reported.

g. A late report mentions a night tactic wherein one plane came over low, wide open to attract attention, followed by 2 or 3 others who, with cut motors, glided quietly in to comb a tracer source.

h. With objectives undeterminable on 31% of raids overhead, to date targets in the Third US Army zone have been attacked as follows:

Bridges	31%
Dams	1%
Artillery	7%
AA positions	6%
Others	12%
Low altitude	35%
Medium altitude	11%
Strafing	10%
High altitude	4%
Dive-bombing	4%
Others (Fen, unstated, etc)	15%

3. Miscellaneous Notes

a. Employed by XV Corps mainly to protect bridges used by the forces initially crossing the [illegible] northwest of Paris, 23d AAA Group reported this action. To record claims, group posted 4.5 Cat I's and 17 Cat II's--a total of 660 aircraft destroyed or probably destroyed out of 2000 E/A reported by them for the two-day period 25 Aug 0001 - 26 Aug 2400. Largest day of these two was the second when 20 Cat I and 15 Cat II claims were scored. No damage to targets under protection is reported.

b. Two battalions contributed heavily to the score. The 450th AAA AW Bn exceeded its record of the previous week. On 25 August this battalion claimed 14 Cat I's and 6 Cat II's. In one action of note, 25 FW 190's and Mr 109's attempted to strafe and dive-bomb from 1200 ft. Driven off, they lost 12 Cat I's and 5 Cat II's all were unsuccessful in their mission. The battalion suffered 5 casualties for the day.

c. The 111th AAA Gun Bn participated in equal measure, claiming 11 Cat I's and 4 Cat II's for the two-day period. Using both 90mm and .50 cal MF fire against formations of 2 to 30 A/C flying at altitudes of 5000 ft down to tree-top height, all attacks were successfully beaten off. Though gun positions were strafed and bombed, but one casualty was suffered.

F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR,
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
AUTH: CO, Third US Army
dtd FAC
DATE: 6 Sep 44

6 September 1944

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 5

Period:
2400B to 0106008

1. Summary of Action

a. The Luftwaffe sharply curtailed its air activity for the week, returning to sporadic, single-plane night attacks after last week's heavy daytime activity. Raids were spread over targets at [illegible], ST-MIHIEL, MONTMEDY, ORLEANS, METZ, NANCY, ST DIZIER, PITHIVIERS, TROYES and other localities. Bridges and Field Artillery were most frequent targets, with the city of [illegible] suffering one drawn-out raid by 35 enemy aircraft, during which two large fires were started by incendiaries.

b. For the week, 6 E/A were destroyed and 3 probably destroyed of a total of [illegible] E/A reported in 46 raids. Recapitulation of claims is as follows:

WEEK	RAIDS	NO E/A	CAT I	CAT II
(0600, 25 Aug to 0600, 1 Sep)	46	324	6	3
TO DATE				
(1200, 1 Aug to 0600, 1 Sep)	1089	2352	216	93

The above recapitulation of totals for the 31-day period 1200B, 1 August, to 0600B, 1 September, (corrected totals above still incomplete) shows Antiaircraft Artillery to claim a total of 310 enemy aircraft destroyed or probably destroyed, for an average rate of 10 planes per day.

c. Total ammunition expenditures for the 31 days are as follows:

90mm	40mm	37mm	.50 Cal
18,300	17,401	20,324	1,088,649

This ammunition was expended only while antiaircraft was engaged in its primary mission, and includes no expenditures for checks-fire. Antiaircraft also has been employed, though to a lesser degree, for a ground role, notably in the present series of battles. 90mm and self-propelled units have been employed in this manner, and various bridgeheads of the [illegible] river [illegible] on other occasions. Expenditures of ammunition fired in other than an AA role are as follows:

90mm	40mm	37mm	.50 Cal
358	1,106	2,802	88,537

2. GAF Tactics Notes

a. While some raids this week occurred at dawn and dusk, by far the greater number occurred [illegible] hours of darkness with but a few raids scattered throughout the daytime.

b. Direction of approach was from the East in a majority of cases reported.

c. Low-altitude (0-5,000 ft) attacks were most commonly reported, with a few medium-altitude and low-strafing efforts.

d. A small number of reconnaissance flights were observed, with purpose of flight unknown in many other instances where aircraft merely flew past a position without making any sort of attack.

3. Miscellaneous Notes

a. An item of interest to those participating in the heavy attacks near AVRANCHES the first two weeks of August is reported in a USSTAF publication, "Air Intelligence Summary No 40".

"Among the long range bombers, two items are worthy of note .... The second is the use of Ha-[illegible] glider-bombs... against land targets for the first time. Prisoners from III/KG 100, taken on 4 and 7 August, confirmed that several attempts were made on successive nights with these bombs to destroy an important road bridge south of AVRANCHES. It is indicative of the present state of the GAF bombers force that one of the prisoners reported that no special tactics were ordered for this operation, which was entirely foreign to anything they had ever attempted before. Each crew was left to simply improvise what it thought best as it approached the target."

b. Several appearances of the Ju 52 have been reported, being used apparently to resupply troops trapped in southern France. Both the [illegible]th AAA AW Bn (SP) and the [illegible]th AAA AW Bn (SP) report bringing down a Ju 52 (probably the same plane) on 20 August containing 20 German nurses and 9 airmen, all of whom were made prisoners.

c. The [illegible]d AW Bn (SP) for the period 260600-270600 reports an interesting ground employment. At 2230 hours 5 M-51's and 3 M-16's of D Btry were used to fire into OPs, boats, pill boxes and houses across the river at [illegible]. 8 small boats were sunk in the river with enemy troops aboard, and several houses set afire on the far bank of the river, at a cost of 1 man killed and 2 wounded by enemy snipers.

F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR,
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

ANNEX NO. 2

EXTRACTS FROM DAILY REPORTS
PERIOD AUGUST 1 TO AUGUST 30, 1944

030030 - 030330 - 217th Gun Battalion defending bridges at T2810 (PONTAUBAULT), main roads in vic, and troop concentrations. Enemy aircraft made three bomb runs over target (bridge) without damaging targets or roads. "Window" dropped, but didn't interfere.

Damage to target - none.
4 Cat I's claimed.

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0513/40 - 320th AW Bn (SP) - "C" & "D" Btrys - Number of E/A over "C" and 0540/47 "D" Btrys near T365038. "C" Btry engaged Me 109, one of flight of 15 Me 109's and FW 190's which attempted armored column E or Dussey. Range - 1,000 yards. Plane smoked and pilot parachuted to ground where captured by infantry. Plane seen to crash. M5 and M49 sights used from M15 and M16 half-tracks.

1 Cat I claimed by "C" Btry.

0513/0 - 119th Gun Bn - 12 raids overhead, altitudes ranging from 200 ft 0540/2 to 7,000 ft. Most flights: around 3,000 ft. "D" Btry reported strafing attack on field H of their position at 2000 hrs. Me 109's, Ju 88's and FW 190's recognized. Largest raid composed of 15 Me 109's. Other attacks composed of 1 or 2 A/C. Most attacks came from W, with others around the compass. In 4 instances, evasive action taken. "Flinder" scattered extensively at approx 0030 hrs. AAAIS inoperative.

2 Cat I's, 4 Cat II's and 1 Cat III claimed.

0523/0 - 467th AW Bn (SP) - "C" & "D" Btrys - defending bridges and sup-0540/0 ply routes near PONTORSON and PONTAUBAULT. On first attack, approx 5 E/A came from S, circled to North at 4,000 ft, and attacked from NE to SW, going down to 200 ft to strafe. Later attacks - strafing, with one DB attack disrupted by "D" Btry. DB attack started at 4,000 ft, 40 deg angle of dive, continued down to 200 ft to strafe. Bomb release alt unknown. "C" Btry claims one Cat I, results of .50 cal and 37mm fire. E/A seen to hit at approx T168017.

1 Cat I claimed.

0411/0 - 320th AW Bn (SP) - 24 plat, Btry A, protecting main route thru 0501/0 SARTILLY. Seven or eight Ju 88's and He 111's strafed and dropped anti-personnel bombs, LL atk, speed 300 to 400 mph.

Btry C, protecting dam at T365038. Single planes came in from all directions, alt from 700 to 1800 ft. Only enemy activity was dropping of flares.

Btry D, protecting dam at T365038. 1 FW 190 strafed and 1 Do 217 strafed and bombed, alt approx 1000 ft. Several other low flying A/C over area.

355rds 37mm and 17,644 rds .50 Cal ammo expended.
Damage to target: None.
Category of Claims: 1 Cat I claimed - 1 Cat II claimed.

0422/0 - 119th Gun Bn - Considerable enemy air activity, consisting of 0502/0 both single plane raids and multi-plane raids. Bombing appeared to be primary mission of enemy. Presumably primary targets for enemy bombs were dam at Coord T367040 and bridge in ST HILAIRE.

Damage to target: None.
Category of Claims: 3 Cat I's claimed - 2 Cat II's claimed.

050950 - 473d AW Bn (SP) - protecting bridges and routes via REGNIES, 050109 Unidentified E/A attacked using DB tactics; planes painted with invasion stripes. 389 rds 37mm and 12,650 rds .50 cal ammo expended.

Damage to target: Reported no serious damage.
Category of Claims: 1 Cat I claimed - 1 Cat II claimed.

051730 - 119th Gun Bn - protecting 2 dams on LA SELUNE River. 23 raids 060226 by E/A between hours stated - fighters strafed nearby positions and roads in a flight of about 10 planes; 10 to 15 bombers flying at alt of about 6000 ft; single raiders. Bombers apparently had as their objective the town of ST HILAIRE and road junctions. 125 rds 90mm and 783 rds .50 cal ammo expended.

Category of Claims: 1 Cat I claimed - 3 Cat II claimed.

051725 - 320th AW Bn (SP) - Btrys A & B protecting river crossings at ST 060030 HILAIRE DU HARCOUET, main routes thru SARTILLY, and river crossings at ST JAMES, seven Me 109's and 1 FW 190 strafed convoy on hwy, alt 100 ft, speed 350 mph, level flight. 1 E/A engaged, alt 2000 ft, speed 200 mph. 1 FW 190 strafed gun section, alt 1000 ft, atk from S, speed 300 mph. 119 rds 37mm and 728 rds .50 cal ammo expended.

Damage to target: None
Category of Claims: None.

051730 - 465th AW Bn (SP) - protecting bridges and supply routes at 051800 PONTORSON and PONTAUBAULT and dam at DUCEY. Btry D was dive bombed and strafed by 3 FW 190's. On return from 1 dive bombing run made at approx alt of 200 ft E/A were pursued by 1 P47 at approx 500 ft alt. Btry continued to fire. Between 0023 and 0215 single bomber attempted to get to defended area but claimed driven off by heavy AA fire.

Category of Claims: 1 Cat II claimed.

061200 - Enemy activity consisted of 75 raids between hrs 060395-070217 071800 reported by all gun Btrys of 119th AAA Gun Bn consisting mostly of single planes each. Only 3 raids consisted of more than one plane. Target apparently town of ST HILAIRE, which was badly damaged. While more raids were reported during this period than any other, multi-plane raids were fewer, and all raids were characterized by a lack of bombing runs and violent evasive action (119th AAA Gun Bn).

062230 - 217th Gun Bn (M) - protecting bridges, roadways and troop con-070548 centration areas. Numerous bombing raids made via this battalion. Enemy normal approach from E, alt ranging from 800 to 6800 yds. It is believed that the targets were bridges at coordinates T281102 and T150040. Main roads in vic and troop concentration areas also included.

Damage to target: None.
Category of Claims: 4 Cat I's claimed - 2 Cat II's claimed.

072200 - 550th AW Bn - protecting defiles and roads vic AVRANCHES. Enemy 080300 sent medium bombers over area with very evident intention of destroying all bridges in the AVRANCHES area - raided area at least 40 times, coming from all directions but predominately N to S and S to E, at alts ranging from 500 to 2000 ft, composed usually of groups of 10 planes. Strafing atks carried out. 524 rds 40mm and 9565 rds .50 cal ammo expended.

Damage to target: Damage, though not vital, was caused. 2 bombs, probable 500 KG's each landed near Btry position resulting in the neutralization of 40mm gun and 10 men of crew (all evacuated, at least 6 being stretcher cases). Two - 1½ ton trucks loaded with reserve ammo destroyed. Bridge was not hit but craters were created just N of bridge on road.

Category of Claims: 1 Cat I claimed - 5 Cat II's claimed.

072315 - 465th AW Bn (SP) - raids started at 072315 and ended at 080830. 080830 Most bombing done from Med and HA except vic of DUCEY which was atkd by dive-bombers as well as Med and HA bombing, 1 low-level bombing atk at PONTORSON - both anti-personnel and HE used.

Damage to target: Several near bomb misses at both DUCEY and PONTORSON.

Category of Claims: 5 Cat I's claimed.

081200 - Encountered radar interference between 100 mils and 400 mils, 091200 elevation at an azimuth of 6400 mils and between 0 and 20000 yds range. Echoes from this interference were not as pronounced as those from window. Echoes appeared at 0045B and disappeared slowly until 0115B. A target picked up beyond 20000 yds could be tracked through this interference but target echo could not be distinguished when encountered first at less than 20000 yds, (119th Gun Bn). Enemy activity consisted mainly of bombing with anti-personnel bombs and strafing of roads and positions - heavies. It was noted that E/A are not using tracer ammunition when strafing, (465th AW Bn (SP)).

082248 - 217th Gun Bn (M) - protecting bridges, roadways and troop con-090336 centration areas. Approx 50 E/A involved in numerous bombing and strafing raids in area, approach normally from E, speed, alt and direction changed constantly before and after dropping bombs. 567 rds 90mm ammo expended.

Damage to target: Btry A received direct hit from an anti-personnel bomb at 2340 causing minor damage - 5 EM wounded (4 minor, 1 probably to be evacuated).

Category of Claims: 2 Cat I's claimed - 1 Cat II claimed.

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[illegible] - 473d AW Bn (SP) - protecting bridges at REGNIE. A single E/A [illegible] to bomb targets at REGNIE from E, but was shot down [illegible] of city. M16's fired at target using a [illegible] sight.

Category of Claims: 1 Cat I.

091200 - One apparent tactical move of enemy aircraft at night is to 101200 have one plane circle the objective projecting a light smoke. The trailing planes then dropped flares in area designated by smoke. (320th AW Bn (SP)).

100600 - Enemy patrols active in vic of our installations. 537th Bn 110600 captured 61 prisoners and killed one enemy. 387th Bn took 13 PW's; 320th Bn took 18 PW's; 456th Bn captured 3 PW's; 128th Bn captured 20 PW's. (234 Group).

121800 - 537th AW Bn - Btry C, protecting bridges in ALENCON: Btry D, 130005 supporting 344th FA Bn. Btry D engaged 35 Me 109's vic (3598L7) at approx 1800 hrs, approached from high alt from W - turned N and circled to E and left. Btry C engaged 9 FW 190's circling positions vic (3535BL) at 1840 hrs, At 0001 hrs enemy bombed ALENCON after dropping flares. Planes were engaged.

Damage to target: None.

Category of Claims: 1 Cat II (at 0005).

132052 - 320th AW Bn (SP) - Btry B, assigned AA defense of bridges at 132053 LE MALE (B4060). Gun He 211 engaged 1 Me 109 during strafing atk toward town, flying E to W using hedge-hopping tactics, alt 200 ft, speed 250 mph. Hits secured on tail of plane, causing it to reverse direction and leave area. No special target atkd, apparently trying to disrupt communications on main hwy leading into town.

Damage to target: None.

Category of Claims: None.

140830 - 551st AW Bn (M) - Btry A, furnishing protection for 2d4th FA 000000 Bn. Three FW 190's strafed and bombed Btry vic SCHAUPAL shot down by Btry A with M51's. Observed going down in smoke by FA.

Damage to target: None.

Category of Claims: 1 Cat I claimed.

160600 - 463d AW Bn - furnishing protection for 79th Div Arty. Seven 170600 Me 109's strafed column on road in ORMOY and installations of Hq 79th Inf Div. A/C approached from E flying at about 25 ft alt. After strafing vehicles in ORMOY, three planes flew off and were not seen again. The four remaining split into two pairs and flew one pair on either side of the woods, strafing trucks dispersed in open fields. Planes were engaged with 40 mm and .50 cal fire, and one plane was hit by 40mm. Pilot landed plane in nearby field, and was captured by personnel of the 456th AAA AW Bn. 106 rds 40mm and 1230 rds .50 cal ammo expended.

Category of Claims: 1 Cat I claimed.

161000 - 466th AW Bn (M) - Btrys B & D, protecting 270th and 999th FA Bns 161630 respectively. At approx 161000 5 Me 109's approached from N at alt of 300-1000 ft and strafed ground troops, taking constant evasive action, and disappearing towards the E. Planes were engaged by 40mm fire with Stiffkey Stick and .50 cal M51's with 40m-9.

Category of Claims: 2 Cat I's claimed - 1 Cat II claimed.

Btry D, protecting 999th FA Bn. At 1630 2 Me 109's flew at 100 - 150 ft - N to S - directly over Btry area at speed of 350 mph, strafing indiscriminately, no evasive action employed. Engaged by 40mm fire. Lead plane engaged by M51's and hits (for Cat II) claimed.

No damage reported to personnel.

Category of Claims: 1 Cat I claimed - 1 Cat II claimed.

170600 - 398th AW Bn (SP) - furnishing protection to elements of XV [illegible] - Seven flights of E/A, Me 109's and FW 190's [illegible] sections. All available AA weapons opened fire. [illegible] 00 rds .50 cal ammo expended.

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Bty B reports slight damage to equipment.

Category of Claims: 3 Cat I's claimed - 1 Cat II claimed.

171600 - 171801 — 44.8th AW Bn - protecting XII Corps Arty. One Ju 52 came in at 900-1000 ft from S and W of [illegible]. (It is believed it intended to land at airfield 8634.35, not knowing Americans were in the vic). As K/A got in range guns unable to fire freely due to the danger angle of 10 degrees, or plane was out of sight below hill -- one or the other. 11 rds 40mm and 55 rds .50 cal fired, following which K/A took evasive action and departed to the E.

Damage to target: None.

Category of Claims: None.

190840 - 191830 — 111th Gun Bn - protecting SEINE R crossing (bridge). Two flights of K/A FW 190's and Me 109's (11 at 0840 - 0845 and approx 20 at 1825 - 1830) flew over area approaching from NE at alt of 1100 - 2000 yds. Planes took violent evasive action when engaged - seem fire methods for 90mm. 91 rds 90mm and 7780 rds .50 cal ammo expended.

Category of Claims: 2 Cat I's claimed.

191835 - 000000 — 467th AW Bn - protecting XX Corps Arty. Flight of 15 K/A, Me 109's and FW 190's, swept over bivouac area at 6000 - 8000 ft, 5 of which dived to atk liaison plane but were driven off by AA fire. Heavy firing was done at extreme range.

Category of Claims: 3 Cat I's claimed.

211100 - 211950 — 44th AW Bn - employed with 79th Div Arty. Air activity was very heavy over the area near the bridge over the SEINE R (8546690). All K/A which approached (general approach from N and E) were fighters, Me 109's and FW 190's, Me 109's being in majority - and were in groups of 2 to 6 planes each. Alt before clouds lifted at 1400 was from 2½ to 700 ft - later 2000-5000 ft. Ac atks were pressed home in a determined fashion - K/A taking full advantage of cloud cover at first signs of AA fire. 1538 rds 40mm and 23171 rds .50 cal ammo expended.

Damage to target: None.

Category of Claims: 11 Cat I's claimed - 3 Cat II's claimed.

210800 - 221955 — 44th AW Bn - protecting 79th Div Arty. Air activity was again very heavy vic bridge over the SEINE R (8546690) and bridgehead across the R. K/A approached area in large flights, Me 109's and FW 190's with Me 109's in the majority, but broke up into units of from 3 to 8 and atkd from many directions. Atks in general were carried out from alts of about 1000 ft although some A/C came down to minimum alt, forcing some guns to hold fire rather than fire on friendly troops. There were seven raids, as such, and many individual engagements - engaged with 40mm (8B) and .50 cal M51 (IFC) fire. Direction of approach in each case was from the N or NE.

Attacks were frequent, with planes strafing AA gun positions at times and Bazooka were fired at bridge across the SEINE and in at least one case at 40mm gun position.

In one case several K/A flew figure 8's at medium alt, while three others made a very low alt strafing run at bridge - apparently designed to distract AA guns from atking planes.

Damage to target: 1 BM killed, 5 wounded by strafing planes - no material damage.

Category of Claims: 7 Cat I's claimed - 1 Cat II claimed - 1 Cat III claimed.

220803 - 230830 — 441th Gun Bn - protecting SEINE R crossing (bridge). Enemy raids consisted of were planes per raid than heretofore encountered. Formation at approach to area generally 4 to 6 planes staggered line abreast. Formations of from 2 to 30 planes, general approach from the E, scattered to atk from all directions - strafing and rocket-firing - from tree-top to 7000 ft alts, at high speeds of from 300 to 400 mph. To avoid AA fire, K/A dived out of sun, took weaving action, and went into shallow dives. Window was dropped extensively but no difficulty was experienced in tracking.

Damage to target: Bty B strafed - 1 casualty. AP bomb fell in Bty B position - damaged M-4 tractor.

Category of Claims: 11 Cat I's claimed - 2 Cat II's claimed.

Ammo expended: 279 rds 90mm and 18954 rds .50 cal (NOTE): (all above claims for .50 cal MG).

221148 - 221515 — 387th AW Bn (SP) - protecting CT's, 5th Armd Div. At 1148 Bty C observed and engaged 4 Me 109's flying low at 400 ft. At 1316 Bty C fired 10 rds 37mm ammo on 2 P-51's at 600 yds. (No damage) - At 1515 Bty B vic ST VINCENT les BOIS at (R3977130) observed and engaged 7 FW 190's flying at 800 - 2000 ft E strafing the 400th FA and 71st.

Damage: 1 of Bty B's trucks damaged. 10 personnel casualties.

Category of Claims: 1 Cat I claimed. 3 Cat II's claimed.

230730 - 232001 — 44th AW Bn - protecting 79th Div Arty. Air activity was less intense during period as friendly fighters were in vic most of the day. Enemy A/C which did operate over the area were still attempting to knock out the bridge over the SEINE (5166630) and 2 K/A strafed AA gun positions. Flights composed of 2 FW 190's, 12 Me 109's and 20 FW 190's, approaching from all directions at alts ranging from 150 ft to 7000 ft. Two P-47's over area at 2000 - 2001 -- 1 reported to have fired rockets at bridge over the SEINE and to have strafed AA positions -- fire was broken off upon identification of the plane type.

Category of Claims: 3 Cat I's claimed.

231410 - 000000 — 489th AW Bn (SP) - protecting CT's and Trains, 4th Armd Div. Flight of approx 20 K/A at alt of 200 ft engaged by Bty B, 1 mi E of SALIGNY. A/C were identified as FW 190's and at least 1 Ju 87 (Stuka). 92 rds 37mm and 3535 rds .50 cal ammo expended.

Damage to target: None reported.

Category of Claims: 7 Cat I's claimed.

231430 - 231445 — 452d AW Bn (M) - 1st Plat, Bty C, providing protection for 191st FA Bn. 15 K/A, believed to be Me 109's with 2 FW 190's, approached from various directions and approx 500-1000 ft alt. Speed of atk approx 390 mph. Evasive action was taken. All gun sets of 1st Plat Bty C opened fire with both 40mm using SS and .50 cal multiple gun using M-9 sight. Target of K/A was evidently the 191st FA Bn. 55 rds 40mm and 2130 rds .50 cal ammo expended.

Damage to target: None.

Category of Claims: 2 Cat I's, 2 Cat II's and 2 Cat III's.

252310 - 260256 — 119th Gun Bn (M) - employed for defense of SEINE, many planes (approx 35) were fired upon in 29 engagements. K/A in single formation - at alts from 600 to 10,000 ft (avg 6000 ft), avg speed 250 mph, general approach from E and NE. Raiders flew on straight course until flak was encountered at which time in most instances evasive action was violent -planes circling out of range and zig - zagging. 90mm firing with M-9 Director and SCR-584 and .50 cal with ITC. 282 rds 90mm and 300 rds .50 cal ammo expended.

Damage to target: Two large fires started in town of SEINE by incendiary sticks - extent of damage unknown.

Category of Claims: 2 Cat I's claimed.

260655 - 000000 — 452d AW Bn (M) - Bty A, (less 2d Plat), protecting 179th FA Bn. At time stated 1 Ju 52 flying S to N at about 300 ft alt was engaged by M51 of Bty A. The plane opened fire on the M51 immediately after it went into action. 360 rds .50 cal ammo expended.

Damage to target: None.

Category of Claims: 1 Cat I claimed.

(NOTE: Plane crashed at Y180550). Prisoners captured, 9 German airmen, 19 German marines. Gunner Killed).

261730 - 000000 — 203d AW Bn (SP) - protecting 79th Armd Div. Two Me 210's approaching at a terrific rate of speed from the N dived from alt of 10,000 ft to 4,000 ft and dropped anti-personnel bombs which exploded before hitting ground.

Damage to target: None.

Category of Claims: None.

262311 - 262330 — 126th Gun Bn (M) with Bty D, 390th AW (SP) Bn attchd - protecting bridges across SEINE R, vic FONTAINEBLEAU. Approx 30 K/A approached area from Easterly direction heading N. Planes began circling and dropping photographic flares - flares falling in at least 7 different groups. Alt of A/C ranged from 800 to 7500 ft. Heavy flak employed prevented any bombing run over bridges. Two small fires seen burning approx 6 miles N of protected bridges - bombs believed to have been dropped in that area. 65 rds 90mm, 13 rds 37mm and 1600 rds .50 cal ammo expended.

Damage to target: None.

Category of Claims: 1 Cat II claimed.

291630 - 000000 — 452d AW Bn (M) - protecting FA, five Me 109's approached from N and circled Arty concentration vic CHALONS (T6284165). After circling K/A split, 4 to the left and 1 to the right, and made strafing atk. 26 rds 40mm and 200 rds .50 cal ammo expended.

Damage to target: None.

Category of Claims: None.

ANNEX NO. 3

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
AUTH: CO, Third US Army
INIT: FEC
DATE: 11 Sep 44

11 September 1944.

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 6

Period:
0106GB to 0806GB

1. Summary of Action

a. Air activity this week continued at a lower rate than that of which the enemy is believed capable. Greatest number of planes reported in one day was 66 K/A for the period 1 - 2 September. A few daylight raids were reported during mid-afternoon hours against such targets as armored columns and field artillery. By far the greatest number of raids occurred at night, however, with bridges and road nets the apparent objectives. Targets in VERDUN, CHARNY, COMMERCY, and VITRY - LE-FRANCOIS received most attention, with REIMS, EPERNAY and other cities receiving scattered raids. Three squadrons of K/A strafed and fired rockets at field artillery during one daylight raid, and 35 dive-bombing, strafing and rocket-firing K/A attacked elements of CCA of the 4th Armored Division in another. Some personnel casualties resulted, at a cost to the GAF of a considerable number of planes and pilots. Bridges and other targets protected by antiaircraft units were undamaged.

b. For the week 25 K/A were destroyed and 7 probably destroyed of a total of 150 reported. Better than 83% of all K/A reported were claimed as casualties to antiaircraft fire. Recapitulation of claims (corrected, still incomplete) is as follows:

	Raids	No K/A	Cat I	Cat II
Week (0600, 1 Sep, to 0600, 8 Sep)	36	150	85	7
To Date (1200, 1 Aug, to 0600, 8 Sep)	1185	2303	218	100

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2. GAF Tactics Notes

a. Most attacks were at night between the [illegible] Small numbers of A/A were used in these raids and ... by followed quickly upon engagement by AA.

b. Daylight raids involved larger formations and more violent attacks, featuring strafing, dive-bombing and rocket-firing, with several attacks made directly against AA positions.

c. Most bombing attacks were from low altitudes, with medium altitude and low-level strafing attacks next in order.

d. Since many attacks were driven off before delivered, it cannot be determined what specific targets in cities had been selected. Bridges and other traffic bottlenecks may be assumed as probable targets, with warehouses a suggested possibility.

3. Miscellaneous Notes

a. A late report from the 148th AAA AW Bn gives interesting detail on GAF rocket-firing technique. Two rockets are always projected at the same time, leaving the A/C in a tremendous volume of flame that extends 3/4ths the length of the fuselage. They usually are projected from an altitude of 500 - 1,000 ft, at an angle of dive of 45 deg's, with little or no smoke or flame following the rocket from the A/C to the target.

b. The 492nd AAA Gun Bn, defending bridges at VERNON and CHARNY, engaged 8 R/A on 3 September, between 2240 and 2300 hours. The aircraft approached from different directions at an average altitude of 5,000 ft, with one low-flying attack at 1,000 ft. Firing was entirely unaccom with 90mm guns, using the radar SCR-584 and the M-9 Director, except for the low-altitude attack which was engaged by .50 cal machine gun fire. 270 rds of 90mm and 521 rds of .50 cal ammo were expended, with a claimed result of 4 Cat I's and 1 Cat II, or 5 planes downed out of 8.

c. Protecting CCA of the 14th Arm'd Div, the 489th AAA AW Bn (SP)("Murphy's Marauders") engaged 15 R/A which came low to fire rockets, strafe and dive-bomb elements of the command. Of these 15, 6 are claimed as Cat I's. Expenditure of 382 rds of 37mm, 8295 rds of .50 cal and 250 rds of .30 cal ammo is reported.

d. Reports indicate frequent instances this week of personnel casualties and material damage resulting to AA units employed close to the non-firing front lines. Hostile artillery and mortar fire against AA positions must be expected to continue so long as the present situation continues, particularly when employment as field artillery risks attraction of counter-battery fire.

e. The 38th AAA Brigade and units attached for the period 1 August to 10 August and engaged in the defence of the vital supply route from COUTANCES south to AVRANCHES have been officially commended in General Orders No 53, this Headquarters, for their outstanding performance of duty.

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain, Jr, mab
F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR,
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
•AUTH: CG, THIRD US Army
•INIT: FRC
•DATE: 18 Sep 1944

18 September 1944

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 7

Period:
0806000 to 1506000

1. Summary of Action

a. But little enemy air activity was reported over Third US Army zone this week. 19 R/A was the greatest number reported in any one day as bad weather, plus heavy losses, hampered the GAF. Most flights were at low altitudes, and apparently were reconnaissance flights as few attacks on ground targets were made. Immediate evasive action usually followed any engagement by antiaircraft. Most R/A were reported by AA units located in forward zones, with activity also reported over COMBERET, VIENT-LE-FRANCOIS, TOUL, PONT-A-MOUSSON and CHALONS.

b. 1 Cat I and 6 Cat II's out of 45 R/A constitute this week's claims. Recapitulation of claims (corrected, still incomplete) is as follows:

	Raids	No. R/A	Cat I	Cat II
Week (0600, 8 Sep, to 0600, 15 Sep)	16	45	1	6
To Date (1800, 1 Aug, to 0600, 15 Sep)	103	348	295	135

2. GAF Tactics Notes

a. Most R/A appeared during darkness, 26 raids being reported between 2130 - 0315 hours, as against 16 during daylight.

b. Low-level appearances accounted for 30 of the 42 raids reported, 7 of these being strafing attacks. Low cloud formations may have dictated the tactics reported.

c. Clouds frequently were used to mask approaches and evasion of AA fire.

d. This week, the only targets definitely known to be attacked (and these but two or three times) were antiaircraft and field artillery gun positions, with other targets being hidden from view of the reporting units by trees and hills. To date, of these targets still being attacked, percentages are as follows:

bridges	39%
field artillery positions	6%
antiaircraft positions	6%
cities	14%

Other targets have been attacked, sometimes in considerable strength as in last week's attacks on armored columns, but such are infrequently chosen.

e. To date, figures for altitudes and types of attacks are as follows:

low-altitude bombing (and rocket-firing)	37%
medium-altitude bombing	8%
strafing	15%
high-altitude bombing	9%
dive-bombing	9%
reconnaissance & unrated	14%

3. Miscellaneous Notes

a. Personnel casualties and material damage continue to be reported by antiaircraft units in forward areas, with both guns and automatic weapons occasionally being used in ground-fire roles.

b. With the historic, space-eating sweep of the Third US Army slowed by heavy enemy resistance and with the front narrowed, AAA/D systems are beginning to function on an Army and Corps, rather than a unit, basis. The 38th AAA Group, under 38th AAA Brigade, has established an AAA/D using plots from the 1st Air Defense Wing, radars and visual OPs and the 23d AAA Group (XV Corps) has set up near CHARTRES an AAA/D of a similar type, first established so successfully by them at the MANTES-GASSICOURT bridgehead over the SEINE River.

c. Attached is a tabulation of claims, showing total number of formal claims submitted, and total approved claims. Apparent discrepancies in claims and claims-granted figures arise when a claim is denied, but allowed as a lesser or as a higher category than claimed.

d. Holders of greatest numbers of approved claims are listed below:

		Cat I	Cat II
(1)	Guns - 413th AAA Gun Bn (M)	2½	½
(2)	AW - 456th AAA AW Bn (M)	2½	11
(3)	SP - 489th AAA AW Bn (SP)	1½	0

e. Most accurate shooting score hung up (counting both Cat I and II claims) is by the 489th AAA AW Bn (SP) which was granted 19½ Cat I's out of a total of 52 airplanes engaged, for approximately 36% accuracy.

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain, mab
F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR,
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

TABULATION OF CLAIMS
as of
15 September 1944

UNIT	CLAIMS SUBMITTED Cat I	Cat II	Cat III	CLAIMS APPROVED Cat I	Cat II	Cat III
119th AAA Gun Bn	35	6	0	35	6	0
119th AAA Gun Bn	0	0	0	0	0	0
120th AAA Gun Bn	14	3	1	14	3	1
120th AAA Gun Bn	0	0	1	0	0	1
209th AAA AW Bn (SP)	0	1	0	0	1	0
217th AAA Gun Bn	16	7	0	16	7	0
387th AAA AW Bn (SP)	3	4	0	3	4	0
390th AAA AW Bn (SP)	1	0	0	2	0	0
398th AAA AW Bn (SP)	1	1	0	1	1	0
413th AAA Gun Bn	23	5	1	22	5	1
449th AAA AW Bn	14	1	0	8½	1	0
460th AAA AW Bn	3	0	0	3	0	0
469th AAA AW Bn	0	0	0	0	0	0
498th AAA AW Bn	0	0	0	0	0	0
534th AAA AW Bn	7	2	1	5	2	1
556th AAA AW Bn	22	11	0	9½	11	0
577th AAA AW Bn	0	0	0	0	0	0
603d AAA AW Bn	15	3	0	15	3	0
669th AAA AW Bn (SP)	0	0	0	0	0	0
688th AAA AW Bn (SP)	8	3	1	8	3	1
734th AAA AW Bn (SP)	0	0	0	0	0	0
489th AAA AW Bn (SP)	20	8	0	7	8	0
597th AAA AW Bn	0	1	0	0	1	0
546th AAA AW Bn	0	0	0	0	0	0
950th AAA AW Bn	0	0	0	0	0	0
951st AAA AW Bn	0	0	0	0	0	0
693d AAA AW Bn	3	0	0	3	0	0
695th AAA AW Bn	1	1	0	1	1	0
777th AAA AW Bn (SP)	17	1	0	17	1	0
324 FIA (French)	1	0	0	1	0	0
TOTALS	207	48	13	197	44	13

Inclosure #1

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
•AUTH: CG, THIRD US Army
•INIT: FRC
•DATE: 27 September 1944

27 September 1944

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 8

Period:
1506000 to 2206000

1. Summary of Action

a. With ground activity on other fronts now demanding its attention, and bad flying weather hampering its activities locally, the GAF sent but 20 reported aircraft over Third US Army zone this week for the lightest air effort reported since operations began. Only two attacks were made, one against the MOSELLE River bridge at CHARNES, and one against a Cub observation plane in the same vicinity. Flying for the most part at medium and low altitudes, other flights apparently were information-gathering in character, and were reported over VIENT-LE-FRANCOIS, CHALONS, COMMERCY and TOUL, as well as over divisional artillery units.

b. Two Category I's are claimed this week, with no Category II's reported. Recapitulation of claims (corrected, still incomplete) is as follows:

	Raids	No R/A	Cat I	Cat II
Week (0600, 15 Sep to 0600, 22 Sep)	13	20	2	0
To Date (1800, 1 Aug to 0600, 22 Sep)	116	368	297	137

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2. GAF Tactics Notes

a. No noteworthy tactics or trends appeared in this week's meagre air activity. E/A came in at moderate altitudes, often being seen only momentarily thru rifts in the clouds. Those fired upon took ordinary evasive measures and usually continued on their course.

b. This week marked the first instance (reported by AA units) of enemy fighters attacking Cub-type A/C. The plane shot down apparently had been observing for a division artillery unit.

3. Miscellaneous Notes

a. Attacks this week by P-47s, which continued despite display of correct panels, smoke and flares by ground units, strengthen the possibility that the enemy is using captured aircraft of American manufacture.

b. The GAF is still capable of a considerable air effort. For the week, 7R raids by 151 E/A were reported by First US Army, with 47 plus being the greatest number in any one period. Latest figures obtained from the XIX TAC show the following A/C available to the German Air Force:

NW Germany	220 SEP	110 TRP
SW Germany	470 SEP	280 TRP
TOTALS -	690	390

Of these single and twin-engined fighter aircraft, approximately 550 are available for use against the Third US Army zone, with maintenance requirements making 66% of these flyable at any given time. Each airplane could fly 2 sorties per day. Current tactics suggest their appearance in flights of 30-40 A/C when used defensively, with ground attacks following recent trends.

c. Two jet-propelled E/A were observed via STE GENEVIEVE on 16 September, travelling at an estimated speed of 450-500 mph. Another report from outside sources notes an E/A travelling too fast to be engaged by radar.

d. Attempted radar jamming of a new type has been reported by the 128th AAA Gun Bn. In a report dated 22 September, it is said:

"1. On 19 September 1944, at approximately 1845, there was observed an apparent attempt at radar jamming, at two different sets of this battalion. On the 32000 yard scope there appeared a five starred figure, constantly rotating about the scope. These traces were also evident on the FPI scope. Changes in azimuth did not have any effect on the picture. The traces continued for approximately 30 minutes and then disappeared on both sets. The same phenomenon was again observed the following day.

"2. On 20 September 1944, at approximately 1545, there was observed radar interference at "A" Battery radar of this battalion. There was a moving trace, similar to what a formation of from six to ten planes, would make, that continued to move along the sweep of both the 32000 yard and FPI scopes. The echoes would come from more than 100,000 yards and continue inward to 0 range. The repetition frequency was different for the two crystals. On crystal #1, the trace moved clockwise, at a repetition rate of approximately 12 seconds. On crystal #2, the trace moved counter-clockwise at a repetition rate of approximately 22 seconds. The trace did cause the set to lose a target. As the trace passed through a target being tracked in automatic, the set lost the target. The intensity of the trace was dependent on azimuth, that is the trace would slowly disappear as the azimuth was changed, but the trace would come in strong on several different azimuths, in all polar directions. All signs of the trace disappeared at 1615."

/s/ T. B. Chamberlain, Jr.
/s/ T. B. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

Distribution "F"

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
AUTH: CO, Third US Army
INIT: FRC
DATE: 3 Oct 44

3 October 1944

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 9

Period:
220600A to 290600A

1. Summary of Action

a. Hostile air activity over the Third US Army zone continued at a low scale this week. Only four actual attacks were made against ground targets, with an additional attack on two artillery observation planes in the air. Total E/A attacking were 10, of which 4 were claimed as destroyed or probably destroyed. Other E/A reported apparently were engaged on low-level reconnaissance missions, as no attacks were made. The majority of E/A were reported over bridges, artillery and armored elements in forward zones, with others over COMMERCY, NANCY and CHARMES. Automatic weapons units claimed all Categories, as E/A made most appearances by daylight, usually around 0930 and 1330 hours.

b. A total of four Categories are claimed. Corrected recapitulation of claims is as follows:

	Raids	No E/A	Cat I	Cat II
Week (0600, 22 Sep to 0600, 29 Sep)	20	49	2	2
To Date (2200, 1 Aug to 0600, 29 Sep)	1236	3475	299	137

Total of Categories claimed is 436, or approximately 13% of all enemy aircraft reported over Third US Army zone. This figure does not include those known to be merely damaged, of which there are many.

2. GAF Tactics Notes

a. Most E/A were observed at low altitude (0 - 6,000 ft), as clouds apparently made higher reconnaissance flights impossible.

b. When engaged by AAA fire, enemy pilots repeated last week's tactical reaction and took evasive measures, continuing on course rather than turning to attack AAA sites or defended areas. Rapid climbs and dives until out of gun range appeared to be the tactic generally employed.

3. Miscellaneous Notes

a. Gun section No. 8 of Battery A, 1824 AAA AW Bn, used but 4 rds of 40mm fire to get a direct hit on the cockpit of a Me 109 and bring it down, in a very economical piece of shooting.

b. Observation planes of the 80th Inf Div took full advantage of the safety-zone established by the 693d AAA AW Bn over the division artillery and, when pursued by two Me 109s, lured them into it with the result that one was knocked down and the other driven off. The observation planes were unmanaged by the attack.

c. Late reports received from the 777th AAA AW Bn (SP) place them at the top of the list for accuracy, displacing the 489th AAA AW Bn (SP), prior record holder. The 777th was awarded 16 Oct I's and 1 Oct II, or 17 planes damaged or destroyed out of 41 engaged for a percentage of 38.6%, bettering the mark of 37.5% established by the 489th.

d. AAA IR systems are now generally working smoothly throughout the entire Third US Army area, with six minute prior warnings being not uncommon. Considerable interference with radio reception is still encountered though wire circuits have, in many cases, overcome this difficulty.

e. With enemy air activity lately at a minimum, AAA gun battalions are occasionally called upon to fire field artillery missions, with some excellent results observed. Taking advantage of the high muzzle velocity of the 90mm gun, harassing and interdiction fires form the usual missions.

f. Yet another type of radar interference has been reported by the 128th AAA Gun Bn, which last week reported a five-starred figure which rotated about the scopes. In a special report dated 24 September, it is said:

"2. The interference is in the form of a moving pulse, appearing to be similar to what a flight of eight to ten planes would resemble. The pulse moves inward and outward from maximum range to minimum range, at a repetition frequency and direction that depends upon the crystal used. The repetition frequency varies from 12 to 22 seconds.

"3. The main source of interference appears at an azimuth of 1200 mils. Interference is also received, in lesser degrees, from other azimuths. However, the interference is dependent upon the azimuth positions of the parabola, and disappears entirely throughout most of the circle. The interference is also dependent upon elevation and disappears completely at 200 mils."

/s/ T. B. Chamberlain, Jr.
/s/ T. B. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
AUTH: CO, Third US Army
INIT: FRC
DATE: 11 Oct 44

11 October 1944

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 10

Period:
290600A to 060600A

1. Summary of Action

a. Efforts of the German Air Force persisted at a modest scale this week as but 22 raids were reported, 8 of which developed into actual attacks on ground targets. The remainder were presumably reconnaissance missions, made under cover of darkness as in the past. Two attacks comprised an effort to bomb an ammunition train and antiaircraft units protecting it south of COMMERCY. Other flights, mainly low-level, were reported over TOUL and DOMREMAIN as well as over MOSELLE River bridges and front line targets. No damage to any protected areas was reported.

b. Tally of claims to date is as follows:

	Raids	No E/A	Cat I	Cat II
Week (0600, 29 Sep to 0600, 6 Oct)	22	31	0	4
To date (2200, 1 Aug to 0600, 6 Oct)	1258	3506	299	141

2. GAF Tactics Notes

No new tactics were noted during the week.

3. Miscellaneous Notes

a. The 489th AAA AW Bn states that, in its area, daylight appearances by enemy aircraft usually presage an attack at night.

b. Attached is a daily tabulation of claims for the month of September. Also attached is a corrected tabulation for August, made necessary by receipt of corrected figures from some units and of numerous late claims from widely dispersed units of VIII Corps.

c. Extract of G-2 Periodic Report No. 134, Headquarters Third US Army, 050600 Oct, reads as follows:

"(1) AIR -

(a) Estimate of GAF Fighter Planes and activity in the West (prepared by A-2, XIX Tactical Air Command): During the whole month of Aug and the first part of Sep, GAF fighter activity in the Third US Army zone continued to decline. This reduction in operations was undoubtedly due to a combination of the following factors:

1. Losses incurred as a result of counter air force operations.
2. Withdrawal from bases in FRANCE to airfields within GERMANY.
3. The subsequent organization difficulties involved in establishing new A/F and adequate supply and maintenance facilities.
4. The reported fuel shortage.

Through the same period, GAF 1/R number activity was also at low ebb. It is believed this lack of number activity was mainly due to:

1. Fuel shortage, priority undoubtedly being given to fighter E/A.

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2. The diversion of personnel, equipment and supplies to fighter effort.

It is believed that early in [illegible] battle wastage [illegible] tacks on enemy airdromes by friendly aircraft had reduced the number of single-engine fighters capable of operating against the Allies in the WEST to approximately 450-500. Since the middle of the month it is apparent that the enemy fighter strength has been increasing. It is estimated that the enemy now has close to 800 single-engine fighters based on airdromes along the Western front available for operations.

This increase in single-engine fighter aircraft is probably due to a variety of reasons:

1. Withdrawal to bases behind the RHINE, which simplifies his repair and maintenance problems.

2. Non-flyable weather, which reduces battle wastage and prevents attacks on his airdromes.

Such periods of inactivity also give the enemy an opportunity to increase the serviceability of his aircraft. How much of this build-up is due to the transfer of other units into this area is not known at present.

In spite of reported fuel shortages, it must be assumed that every effort is being made to bring existing stocks to operational levels.

The enemy's airfield development program has had sufficient time to provide the necessary servicing and repair facilities to effectively support operations.

Although the GAF may not be capable of sustaining intensified operations over the entire front simultaneously, it is capable of employing a considerable force over any sector of the front when the situation calls for such an effort.

Around CAEN, it was possible to maintain constant Allied air patrols which usually succeeded in intercepting enemy a/c before they could reach the battle area. The length of the present front precludes the effective use of air patrols to interdict enemy aircraft.

During the Allied Airborne landings in HOLLAND, the GAF displayed increasing aggressiveness in its efforts to combat these operations.

Fighter-bombers were employed for the first time in several weeks against the airborne landings in the North. Fighter-bombers equipped with rockets have operated only spasmodically during the past several weeks.

Most of the recent GAF fighter activity has been in defense of German ground forces against our fighter bombers.

Photo Intelligence reports and observations by our own pilots disclose the presence of both the ME-262 and ME-163 jet-propelled a/c in the XIX TAC and Third US Army zones.

The conclusion indicated is that the enemy fighter force has now largely recovered from the losses incurred in August and early September and is capable of a strong air effort at any selected point on the front for a brief period. An all-out effort, however, will probably be reserved for an attempt to counter a particularly dangerous penetration of Reich territory.

(b) Two P-51's reported to have dark olive drab camouflage on upper surfaces and sky-blue on lower surfaces, but with no Allied or other markings discernible, attacked P-47's of 36th Group (XIX US TAC) at 6,000 feet 021530A Vic SAARLAUTERN (Q 72) area, damaging one. Hits were scored on one of the P-51's, believed to have been enemy operated."

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain, Jr,
/t/ F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR,
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

Incl #1 - Tabulation of Daily AAA Claims
1 Aug to 1 Sep

Incl #2 - Tabulation of Daily AAA Claims
1 Sep to 1 Oct

DISTRIBUTION:
"H"

Tabulation of Daily Antiaircraft Claims, for period 1200B, 1 August to 0600B, 1 September 1944

Date	24th AAA Gp				38th AAA Brig 27th AAA Gp				207th AAA Gp				XII Corps 7th AAA Gp				XV Corps 23d AAA Gp				XX Corps 112th AAA Gp				VIII Corps 113th AAA Gp			
August 1944	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II
1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NO TROOPS				0	0	0	0	NOT OPERATIONAL				45	247	24	9
2	13	13	4	0	0	0	0	0	3	8	4	0					1	4	0	1					38	90	21	5
3	22	24	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	30	5	4					9	117	7	7					47	296	17	9
4	22	24	1	0	0	0	0	0	60	224	5	3					0	0	0	0					25	45	9	5
5	22	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	45	84	2	5					2	5	1	1					20	52	2	1
6	33	65	2	5	0	0	0	0	139	168	12	9					3	40	5	3					11	27	4	1
7	17	33	0	0	0	0	0	0	135	195	14	4					16	41	1	0	0	0	0	0	9	33	5	2
8	8	8	1	0	0	0	0	0	77	173	6	1					3	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	1	1
9	4	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	158	2	0					7	10	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	8	0	0
10	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	15	1	0					9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	1	0
11	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	15	0	0					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
12	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0					5	27	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	3	3	0	0	3	3	2	1	1	2	0	0					17	72	4	2	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	0
14	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0					8	10	0	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0
15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					0	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	0	0	0	0
16	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					13	32	8	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	3	4	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					14	41	11	4	2	4	1	0	0	0	0	0
18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	27th AAA Gp				8	12	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	atchd XII Corps				10	70	6	3	2	30	5	0	0	0	0	0
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	210600B Aug				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	83	21	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22	0	0	0	0	27th AAA Gp				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	117	22	13	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	0
23	0	0	0	0	detchd Brig				0	0	0	0	4	63	13	2	4	53	4	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
24	2	2	0	0	210600 Aug				5	5	0	0	14	17	0	0	Atchd FUSA with				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25	0	0	0	0	replaced by				1	2	0	0	5	18	0	0	XV Corps 24 Aug				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
26	2	2	0	0	7th AAA Gp				0	0	0	0	3	3	2	0					2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
27	2	31	0	1					0	0	0	0	8	8	0	0	Re-atchd				1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
28	0	0	0	0	NO TROOPS				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	TUSA				5	11	0	0	0	0	0	0
29	0	0	0	0					0	0	0	0	3	10	0	0	30 Aug				5	6	1	1	0	0	0	0
30	0	0	0	0					0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	16	0	1	0	0	0	0
31	0	0	0	0					5	5	0	0	1	54	3	0	0	0	0	0	4	9	0	1	0	0	0	0
TOTALS	157	281	9	7	5	5	3	1	522	1084	51	26	39	175	15	5	161	776	95	46	28	84	8	5	207	810	87	33

Incl #1

Tabulation of Daily Antiaircraft Claims, for period 0600B, 1 September to 0600A, 1 October 1944

Date	24th AAA Gp				38th AAA Brigade 7th AAA Gp				207th AAA Gp				XII Corps 27th AAA Gp				XV Corps 23d AAA Gp				XX Corps 112th AAA Gp				VIII Corps 113th AAA Gp			
Sep 1944	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II
1	3	3	0	0	NO TROOPS				0	0	0	0	1	15	6	0	0	0	0	0	7	27	6	2	0	0	0	0
2	0	0	0	0					0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	43	4	1	0	0	0	0
3	1	2	0	1					2	2	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	13	4	1	0	0	0	0
4	0	0	0	0					3	3	0	0	3	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	0	0	0	0					1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	1	2	0	0					1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Asgd NUSA			
7	0	0	0	0					0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	16	3	1	5 Sep			
8	1	1	0	0					2	2	0	0	3	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	8	0	4				
9	2	2	0	0					1	1	0	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	13	0	1				
10	0	0	0	0					2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	6	0	0				
11	1	2	0	0					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
12	5	5	0	0					1	1	0	0	4	8	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0				
13	0	0	0	0					1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0				
14	0	0	0	0					0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
15	0	0	0	0					1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	1	0	0	0	0	0				
16	0	0	0	0					4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	10	1	0	0	0	0	0				
17	1	1	0	0					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
18	0	0	0	0					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
19	0	0	0	0					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	12	0	0	0	0	0	0				
25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	00	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
26	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0				
27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	22	2	2	0	0	0	0	2	4	0	0				
28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
29	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	0	6	6	0	0	Atchd Sixth				0	0	0	0				
30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	6	0	2	0	0	0	0	Army Gp 29 Sep				0	0	0	0				
TOTALS	16	19	0	1	0	0	0	0	28	32	0	2	38	75	8	3	12	33	3	0	40	130	17	10	0	0	0	0

Incl #2

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ANNEX NO. 4

EXTRACTS OF BATTALION
DAILY UNIT REPORTS

SEPTEMBER 1944

310600 - 010600 (Aug-Sep) - 480th AW Bn - Bury B (atchd to 175th Inf Regt to knock out installations on hill 103) fired on emplacements on crest of hill destroying one gun positions and employed harassing fire in general area. 40mm of Sec 16 also fired on, and destroyed, an enemy gun position.

Bury C (atchd to Task Force "S" to knock out strong points along route GC 67) fired on and destroyed enemy pillbox and employed harassing fire on dug-in positions along crest of hill.

Bury D (atchd to Task Force "X" to knock out positions via bridge across canal on route GC 53) fired on enemy troops, AA installations, pillboxes, MG nests, and mortar positions. Damage to enemy: 2 AA positions known to be destroyed and possibly a third. Enemy troops forced to evacuate pillboxes under fire, resulting in heavy losses in personnel. 1 Mortar position probably destroyed.

Damage suffered: Bury B: None. Bury C: 4 casualties (evacuated), no damage to equipment. Bury D: Barrage of mortar and 88mm fire on 2d Plat emplacements resulted in destruction of 3 Hiffley Stick on 40mm, Sec #9; and flash hider of 40mm, Sec 30. No casualties.

010600 - 080600 - 480th AW Bn - Bury B (atchd to 175th Inf Regt to knock out installations on hill 103) fired 9 rds 40mm at haystack and shed, where activity was observed. Both haystack and shed were destroyed. 20 rds 40mm were fired at house being occupied by enemy troops - house was destroyed. 213 rds .50 Cal and 35 rds 40mm ammo were fired at hedge over which the enemy were attacking, inflicting casualties.

Bury C (atchd to Task Force "S" to knock out strong points along route GC 53) fired at 2 pillboxes and 4 houses occupied by the enemy. A prisoner stated several were killed in these houses. Bury also fired harassing fire at an 88mm gun position to keep it from being used. 1 prisoner taken.

Bury D (atchd to Task Force "X" to knock out positions via bridge across canal on route GC 53) fired 19 rds 40mm at a pillbox - no further activity observed around this pillbox. 18 rds 40mm fired at 2 vehicles - sending one off the road.

011305 - 011515 - 482d AW Bn (M) - Protecting PA. 3 Sqdns of Me 109s and FW 190s, approx 18 planes per Sqdn, strafed and fired rockets at PA construction via (U-4558), approached from Easterly direction at alt of 300-500 ft. Planes dispersed upon being engaged. 321 rds 40mm and 1309 rds .50 cal ammo expended.

Damage to target: No damage inflicted on protected PA Bn, however, another PA Bn in near vic suffered 25 casualties.

Category of Claims: 3 Cat Is claimed (no 109s).

012000 - 020000 - 467th AW Bn (SP) - Protecting CCs A & B, 4th Armd Div. Approx 25 E/A (FW 190s and Me 109s) strafed, dive bombed, and fired rockets at elements of CCA, 4th Armd Div near COMMERCY (U-4652-8000). 382 rds 37mm, 2895 rds .50 cal, and 890 rds .30 cal ammo expended.

Damage to target: Elms of CCA suffered casualties of 3 killed and 25 wounded. 3 guns of Bury B, 467th AW Bn (SP) slightly damaged.

Category of Claims: 6 Cat Is claimed.

012251 - 012328 - 120th Gun Bn (M) - Btrys C & D, protecting bridges at VERDUN. Btrys C & D report a total of 13 unidentified E/A engaged on 17 courses (Btry C-8 E/A and Btry D-5 E/A) at avg alt of 2600 yds. E/A on bombing and Ron mission - no strafing reported. Flares and window were dropped. All firing unseen with SCR-584 and M-9 Director. 361 rds 90mm ammo expended.

No damage to bridges.

Category of Claims: 4 Cat Is claimed.
1 Cat II claimed.

012300 - 020030 - 551st AW Bn (M) - Protecting XX Corps Arty and MEUSE R bridges at VERDUN and CHAREY. 6 flights, of 3 E/A each, over Arty CA; and approx 12 E/A bombed bridges at VERDUN and CHAREY. 239 rds 40mm and 3670 rds .50 cal ammo expended.

Damage to target: Near bomb miss at VERDUN - bridges undamaged - fires started in city. 1 casualty suffered in unit protecting Arty - shrapnel in hip and leg. Any further damage unknown.

Category of Claims: 2 Cat Is claimed.
1 Cat II claimed.

022221 - 022258 - 120th Gun Bn - Btrys C & D, defending bridges at VERDUN, 10 E/A, type unknown, on bombing and run flights at avg alt of approx 2100 yds. General area atkd VERDUN, with flares being dropped. Firing unseen with SCR-584 and M-9 Director.

336 rds 90mm and 3345 rds .50 Cal ammo expended.

Category of Claims: 4 Cat Is claimed.

130900 - 000000 - 466th AW Bn (M) - Btry D, protecting 909th and 999th FA Bns. 2 Me 109s flying at low level from E to W engaged by 40mm (SE control) and M-51 MD (MD-9 sight control) while on strafing run. 13 rds 40mm and 546 rds .50 Cal ammo expended.

Category of Claims: 1 Cat I claimed.

162355 - 170106 - 119th Gun Bn (M) - Protecting bridge crossings of the MOSELLE River. All Btrys report a total of 11 engagements against single E/A during time stated. E/A entered defended area both from the N and S, although in the majority of cases from the SE. Alts of approach varied from 1500 to 9000 ft with most flights above 3600 ft. Speeds of E/A were from 300 to 380 mph. Evasive action was moderate and it was habitual for the planes to recede upon being fired on. All firing was unseen using SCR-584 and M-9 Director. 186 rds 90mm ammo expended.

Damage to target: None, no atks reported.

Category of Claims: 3 Cat Is claimed.

180600 - 190600 - 56th AAA Gp - This Group furnished AAA SW warning to the Engr 2207 CB working on the construction of the RR bridge at VERDUN, using SCR-535 for reception. Lights were being used during the hrs of darkness and information as to enemy activity in the VERDUN area was to be relayed to the Engrs so that they could extinguish the lights in the event of enemy atk. This AAASW warning will be continued until the construction is finished.

180601 - 190600 - 467th AW Bn - As No3 gun of Bury B pulled into position 18 Sep, it was ATKD by approx 50 to 100 Germans with SMGs, machine pistols, rifles and other small arms. During the action one man was shot through the calf of the leg and had to be evacuated. Four tires on the vehicle were shot up but no other damage sustained. The atk was halted when an M-51 opened up on the enemy.

190600 - 200600 - 119th Gun Bn - Need for smoke shells if unit is to continue efficiently in a PA role is imperative. It is extremely difficult to conduct a precision registration with present type shells (HE1 with 48, 4AAB, and 87 fuzes). The burst, on ground, is just not apparent to either air or ground observers. In the past two days precision adjustments have been attempted on three occasions with air observation. Out of 81 rds fired, 15 were sensed as lost and no results could be obtained from the few rds visible to the observers. It has been our experience that from 30% to 40% of all mechanical fuzes are duds on impact. Probably more in soft earth. Neither the mechanical fuzes (if they do explode) nor the 48 (out to quick or delay) cause enough effect on impact to be sufficiently apparent to produce any sufficient results. It is felt that smoke shells would remedy this situation.

220600 - 230600 - 467th AW Bn (M) - Gun Sec #4, Bury D, engaged parachute flares at 2230 believed to have been fired by enemy ground troop N of their gun position. Range approx 1200 ft. A total of 9 flares, all white, were fired.

270600 - 280600 - 467th AW Bn - Two (2) half-tracks, M-16, with Provisional Bury E located near PETTONCOURT protecting elements of 79#4 FA Bn were fired on by enemy infantry at 0800A 27 Sep 44. Friendly and enemy troops were so intermingled that it was impossible to return the fire. Both half-tracks were hit and one set afire and destroyed. The Bury Commander, enroute to inspect these tracks was fired on and both he and his driver wounded. He was rescued by a half-track and left at an infantry clearing station at PETTONCOURT.

270600 - 280600 - 44[illegible]th AW Bn - At 2708[illegible], Section four of Bury D was cut off by German troops. Friendly armor had withdrawn from area when a column of Germans appeared on a hill 700 - 900 yards in front of gun position. The crew immediately opened fire with 11 rounds, dispersing the column, killing 8 Germans and wounding 7 others who were later captured.

At about the same time the Germans attempted to set up a machine gun position on forward slope of the hill but retreated when fired upon by M51. Shortly friendly armor came up and pushed the Germans off the hill. The results of this firing on ground troops was excellent, as it prevented the Germans from setting up on high ground with good observation of bridge, road junctions and troop locations. Ammo expended by Bury D during period: 148 rds 40mm, 5600 rds of .50 Cal.

271305 - 000000 - 6524 AW Bn - Protection for river crossings, PA, CP and Troop concentrations of the 80th Inf Div. Two (2) Me 109s appeared from the north, altitude 2,000 ft and opened fire on two (2) observation planes of the 80th Inf Div Arty. 40mm fired upon by AW Guns of this unit E/A departed and headed back over enemy territory. One (1) E/A seen to be smoking heavily and losing altitude. E/A engaged by Gun Secs #2, #3 and #4. 11 rounds of 40mm and 570 rounds of .50 Cal ammo expended.

Damage to target: None, no atk made.

Category of Claims: 1 Cat I.

271305 - 000000 - 482d AW Bn (M) - Bury A protecting 738th FA Bn. Two (2) Me 109s approached from the N and strafed the area of the 738th FA Bn protected by Gun Sec No 3 of Bury A. The 40mm gun of this section fired four (4) rounds at one (1) of the planes and obtained a direct hit in the cockpit of the plane. The plane was seen to burst into flames and was out of control. It then crashed to the ground beyond the hill into enemy territory. During this encounter two (2) other Me 109s approached from the North.

Damage to target: None. One (1) man wounded in leg.

Category of Claims: One Cat I.

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ANNEX NO 5

DECLASSIFIED

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

S E C R E T
AUTH: CG, Third US Army
INIT: FRC
DATE: 17 Oct 44

17 October 1944

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 11

Period:
060600A to 130600A

1. Summary of Action.

a. Though remaining at a scale far below that of which it is believed capable, GAF air activity this week doubled that of last week, with 42 raids by 75 E/A reported. This is the most activity recorded over Third US Army zone in more than a month. Of the 42 raids, 7 developed into attacks on ground targets, with no damage reported. Approximately 15% of the E/A were claimed as Categories, all by automatic weapons units. With the exception of 5 raids, all raids were by daylight, the majority being low-level reconnaissance flights with front line troop dispositions and activities occupying most attention. MOSELLE River bridges and traffic also received considerable scrutiny, with other appearances reported over CHARNY, VERDUN and NANCY.

b. Recapitulation of claims (corrected) is as follows:

	Raids	No E/A	Cat I	Cat II
Week (0600, 6 Oct to 0600, 13 Oct)	42	75	4	7
To Date (1200, 1 Aug to 0600, 13 Oct)	1301	3596	303	148

2. GAF Tactics Notes.

a. With a few exceptions, most E/A appeared during daylight hours, usually in late afternoon.

b. Most flights were at low altitudes with some strafing and a few bombs dropped. The greater portion of flights apparently were reconnaissance missions, which proved costly to the GAF as daylight enabled AW units to fire, claiming 11 E/A, as above.

c. Two attacks, both unsuccessful, were made upon artillery observation planes which scuttled to the safety of AA-protected zones when attacked, the E/A being chased off by AW fire. Other targets attacked were field artillery and armored division trains.

d. Evasive action frequently was violent, with E/A taking full advantage of low cloud cover to aid in escape.

3. Miscellaneous Notes.

a. The 411th AAA Gun Bn fired an interesting counter-battery mission. German AA, firing at a division artillery plane, was fired upon at 12,950 yds by our 90mm guns with the airplane doing the adjusting. Two direct hits were observed and the German 88mm battery was silenced.

b. Two batteries of the 633d AAA AW Bn recently were used by the 80th Inf Div in the attacks on high ground at MT TOULON and MT ST JEAN. Dug-in M-51's were employed, with results reported to be excellent, and contributing materially to the capture of 575 prisoners, including 10 officers. Such employment, however, is recommended by the battalion commander only in exceptional cases, due to the great wear on materiel. 79,700 rds of .50 cal were fired. 11 gun barrels were lost due to overheating.

The 777th AAA AW Bn (SP) also was used in support of the task forces made up by the 6th Armd Div and fired a considerable number of rounds against ground targets during the advance.

c. Casualties among AA personnel, incurred by driving across road mines, have again been reported, for the first time in a considerable period.

d. For "outstanding performance of duty" for the period 2 Aug to 15 Sep, during which time they were under Third US Army, the commanding General, XV Corps, has officially commended the 23d AAA Group and attached AAA units as follows: 411th AAA Gun Bn, 22d AAA Bofors Bn (Fr), 387th AAA AW Bn (SP), 390th AAA AW Bn (SP), 456th AAA AW Bn, 463d AAA AW Bn and the 537th AAA AW Bn (Most of these units are now under Seventh US Army). During this period they contributed materially to the success of the advance from AVRANCHES to ARGENTAN and the subsequent drive to the SEINE and MOSELLE rivers. A total of 100 Cat I's and 45 Cat II's were claimed and many prisoners were taken, as well. Not one bridge or other protected critical area was damaged, and injury to troops and equipment was "exceptionally small." In a noteworthy period from 21-22 Aug, 60 German aircraft, attacking the MANTES-GASSICOURT bridgehead, were destroyed or probably destroyed by these units.

e. In a recent ceremony at one of the divisions, General George C. Marshall presented awards for heroism to men of the division and attached troops. It is to be noted with considerable pride that of ten awards made, five were given to enlisted men of the 537th AAA AW Bn. A Bronze Star, three Silver Stars and a Distinguished Service Cross were the awards presented.

f. To clarify any confusion arising from terminology employed in discussing new types of aircraft, the following is quoted from USSTAF "Air Intelligence Summary" No. 45, for 17 September 1944:

"'Jet-propulsion' is a general term for power supplied by the thrust of heated gases from a jet orifice, and covers all types of units which produce this reaction.

'Several types of such units are now in use. They can be subdivided into solid or liquid 'rocket' and 'turbo-jets'.

'A 'rocket', either solid or liquid, contains its own oxygen; a turbo-jet pressurises oxygen from the atmosphere for combustion. All three, however, produce a jet whose thrust propels the aircraft to which they are fitted.

'Thus, both the Me 163 and the Me 262 may be described as jet-propelled in contrast to airplanes powered by internal-combustion reciprocating engines driving propellers.

'The type of jet-propulsion in the Me 163 is a liquid rocket, and that of the Me 262 a turbo-jet. The distinction between the two power units is no more complicated than that between a Wright and an Allison engine — both provide power to a propeller by the same internal-combustion principle, but one has its cylinders in-line and the other has them radially."

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain, Jr,
/t/ F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR,
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

S E C R E T
AUTH: CG, Third US Army
INIT: FRC
DATE: 22 Oct 44

22 October 1944

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 12

Period:
130600A to 200600A

1. Summary of Action

a. As though to justify allied estimates of its capabilities, the GAF this week made a large-scale appearance over the Third US Army area. During the night of 19 October, between 2100 - 2300 hours, 118 enemy aircraft made their appearance in a series of 43 raids. 70 enemy sorties were flown over NANCY, alone. No bombs were dropped at NANCY, though a strafing attack was reported upon an AA gun position. One bomb dropped near LEMOUVILLE and infantry units reported some bombing via PONT-A-MOUSSON. No damage was anywhere reported. The purpose of the raids is unknown, though railroad yards may have been the intended target. Poor visibility, absence of activity in the yards or heavy antiaircraft fire may have caused the abandonment of such a mission. Other activity during the week consisted of the usual reconnaissance sorties, with some daylight strafing of forward elements via ARRACOURT and ATHIENVILLE. All strafing planes were shot down and no damage was reported.

b. Recapitulation of claims (corrected) is as follows:

	Raids	No E/A	Cat I	Cat II
Week (0600, 13 Oct to 0600, 20 Oct)	58	140	9	3
To Date (1200, 1 Aug to 0600, 20 Oct)	1361	3737	312	150

Ammunition expenditures on AA firing for the week were as follows (number of rounds)

.50 Cal	37mm	40mm	90mm
29,110	145	758	849

2. GAF Tactics Notes

a. In the NANCY raid E/A approached from all directions and at medium, low and very low altitudes using small formations, in a tactic apparently designed to confuse and saturate the defense. Few straight runs were made, as the aircraft continually circled and maneuvered, gaining and losing altitude. When engaged by antiaircraft, evasive tactics became more positive. Some A/C showing no IFF were overhead at altitudes exceeding 10,000 ft but as these exceeded the IAZ limit, none were engaged. "Window" was dropped on a large scale throughout the area.

b. Most other raids were at low-level, with some high-speed strafing of field artillery, antiaircraft and troop concentrations from as low as 50 ft.

c. Jet-propelled A/C are being more frequently reported in the Army area. These planes apparently are used for low-level reconnaissance missions at the present time.

3. Miscellaneous Notes.

a. Attempts at radar interference are increasing. The 120th AAA Gun Bn reported IFF interference, believed to be general radio jamming, taking the form of "grass" high enough to fill the scope.

The 411th AAA Gun Bn engaged a target which released an object not having the characteristics of "window", but on which the SCR-584 looked. Again, a target was picked up which made 5 or 6 additional pips appear on the 32,000 yd scope and 2 or 3 on the 3,000 yd scope, with the narrow gate widened to about 500 yds. These targets traveled at a very slow rate and were tracked in to 2,000 yds. No planes could be heard. At the same time on the PPI scope a number of targets appeared from 5,700 mil azimuth to 1,200 mil at ranges of 10,000 to 15,000 yds. Each target investigated produced a clear pip and was not like window. At the same time a solid blur occurred on the PPI scope from 400 to 1,200 mil azimuth. No pips appeared on the range scope.

The 119th AAA Gun Bn reported considerable window experienced, with radar interference of three types:

(1) A straight line horizontal just above the base line.

(2) "Hash" all the way across the scope.

(3) Waving line, similar in shape to a sine curve.

b. Ninth US Army reports two FW 189s have been identified in the Ninth US Army zone, engaged presumably upon reconnaissance. Family resemblance of this plane and our own P-38 and P-61 should be noted.

c. For support given to the 4th Armored Division in performance of its missions, the 489th AAA AW Bn (SP) has been officially commended by the division commander. In one instance a battery of the battalion engaged a large body of the enemy, resulting in its destruction and the capture of over 500 prisoners.

d. The 119th AAA Gun Bn continues to fire many FA missions. Increased facilities for observation have improved results and the firing has proved highly effective. Bridges, trains, vehicles, forts, personnel and other targets have been engaged, counter-battery missions have been fired, and much damage has been done. Recently a bridge was fired upon at 20,000 yds with good results observed.

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e. Following is a tabulation of enemy aircraft claimed, by type. Duplications in battalion claims have not been eliminated, nor excessive claims reduced to category, hence claims are greater than reported in paragraph 1 b hereof. However, the tabulation has sufficient accuracy to indicate E/A types in use and destroyed or damaged by AAA units of the Third US Army.

Type	No E/A Engaged	Claimed Cat I	Cat II	Cat III
Me-109	1031	101	53	8
FW-190	765	100	29	1
Ju-88	124	3	10	0
Me-410	23	1	2	0
He-111	16	1	1	0
Me-110	6	0	1	0
Ju-52	5	3	1	0
Ju-87	5	0	0	0
Do-217	3	1	0	0
FW-200	1	0	1	0
Unknown	1458	116	49	10
TOTALS	3857	355	147	19

f. Attached is record of formal claims submitted resulting from engagements occurring while units were attached to Third US Army, and formal awards made.

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain, Jr.
/s/ F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer

1 Incl-Tabulation of Formal Claims submitted and awarded.

TABULATION OF FORMAL CLAIMS SUBMITTED AND AWARDED
(As of 21 October 1944)

	UNIT	Formal Claims Submitted Cat I	Cat II	Cat III	Claims Approved Cat I	Cat II	Cat III	TOTAL I	II
1.	444th AAA AW Bn	33	11	0	30 1/2	13	0	43	1/2
2.	113th AAA Gun Bn	33	8	0	30 1/2	8	1	38	1/2
3.	465d AAA AW Bn ●	28	4	0	26	5	1	31	
4.	115th AAA Gun Bn	18	8	0	20	6	0	26	
5.	213th AAA Gun Bn	24	2	0	17	7	1	24	
6.	449th AAA AW Bn (SP)	23	3	0	22	1/2	0	2	22 1/2
7.	442nd AAA AW Bn ●	24	0	0	20	1	0	21	
8.	777th AAA AW Bn (SP)	17	1	0	17	1	0	18	
9.	120th AAA Gun Bn	20	0	0	15	3	1	18	
10.	473d AAA AW Bn (SP) ●	14	4	0	13	4	0	17	
11.	398th AAA AW Bn (SP)●	14	1	0	14	0	0	14	
12.	45d AAA AW Bn	9	3	0	7	1/3	2	1	9 1/3
13.	128th AAA Gun Bn	9	1	0	8	1	1	9	
14.	454th AAA AW Bn	10	1	0	5	3	1	8	
15.	467th AAA AW Bn (SP)	7	0	0	6	1	0	7	
16.	398th AAA AW Bn (SP)	4	3	0	2	5/6	3	0	5 5/6
17.	449th AAA AW Bn	3	4	0	4	1	1	5	
18.	537th AAA AW Bn	4	3	0	4	1	0	5	
19.	387th AAA AW Bn (SP)#	5	2	0	2	3	0	5	
20.	467th AAA AW Bn	4	1	1	3	1/3	1	1	4 1/3
21.	61th AAA AW Bn ●	1	3	1	3	1	1	4	
22.	551st AAA AW Bn	5	0	0	3	0	1	3	
23.	6334 AAA AW Bn	3	0	0	0	3	0	3	
24.	224 FTA (Fr) ●	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	
25.	550th AAA AW Bn	1	5	0	1	0	5	1	
26.	203d AAA AW Bn (SP)#	2	2	0	0	1	0	1	
27.	449th AAA AW Bn	1	2	0	0	1	2	1	
28.	463d AAA AW Bn ●	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
29.	117th AAA Gun Bn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
30.	482d AAA AW Bn ●	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
31.	467th AAA AW Bn (SP)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
32.	546th AAA AW Bn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
33.	547th AAA AW Bn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
34.	559th AAA AW Bn ●	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	TOTALS - - - -	318	72	2	276	70	20	346	

- Now under First US Army
● - Now under Ninth US Army
● - Now under Seventh US Army

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
•AUTH: CG, Third US Army•
•INIT: FRC
•DATE: 30 Oct 44

30 October 1944

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 13

Period:
2000 23AA to 2706 00A

1. Summary of Action

a. Enemy air activity slackened off and a week of comparative inactivity was reported, as the GAF failed to make any show of strength, flying only the normal number of reconnaissance missions with one reported strafing attack to vary the pattern. Appearances were by single planes for the most part. Again most flights were by daylight and at low level, as ground dispositions and activities were reconnoitered. Aircraft literally flew from cloud to cloud, keeping well out of AAA range where possible and taking evasive action when engaged. Most flights were reported over forward areas, with others over VERDUN, NANCY and TOUL, as well as the usual flights up and down the MOSELLE River. AAA Gun battalions claimed 2 Cat I's from nighttime engagements and AAA AW battalions 3 Cat I's during daylight.

b. Total claims for the week and to date (corrected) are as follows:

Week	Raids	No E/A	Cat I	Cat II
(0600, 20 Oct to 0600, 27 Oct)	29	31	5	0
To Date				
(1200, 1 Aug to 0600, 27 Oct)	1390	3768	315	148

2. GAF Tactics Notes

a. Most of the 29 raids were flown at low altitude (0 - 6,000 ft) with the few medium level (6,000 - 15,000 ft) flights reported flown during darkness.

b. All night raids were reported between 2300 - 0130 hours and daylight raids between 1215 - 1330 hours (with the exception of 1 at 1545) or, roughly, noon and midnight.

c. No new tactics were reported.

3. Miscellaneous Notes

a. The first actual engagement of a jet-propelled A/C by Third US Army antiaircraft was this week reported when the 551st AAA AW Bn fired at one. It was described as being a little larger than a P-47, with square wing tips, wings set about the center of the fuselage, and no dihedral. Several jets in the rear emitted many sparks. It made a distinctive sound, much louder than an ordinary plane, and was in hearing for about 2 minutes, though in sight for only 30 seconds. (Later description fits an Me-262) As it flew S at approximately 500mph and 1,000 ft altitude it was engaged by .50 cal fire and believed to have been damaged. The race battalion also engaged and shot down a rarely-reported Do-217 which was attempting to strafe.

b. Latest figures obtained from the XIX TAC show the following number of A/C estimated as available to the GAF:

	SAF	FTF	Total	Lab
NW Germany	550	200	30	105
SW Germany	250	140	20	0
TOTALS (Western Germany)	810	640	50	105

Of these, 400 single-engine fighters and 200 twin-engine fighters are within operational range of the Third US Army front. All of the long-range bombers and twin-engine jet-propelled A/C are also within this range. Of these A/C approximately 60 - 65% are flyable at any given time, maintenance requirements keeping the remainder on the ground. The Luftwaffe is believed capable of mounting an offensive against Third US Army by up to 200 A/C at any time.

c. Given below are the "batting averages" of the AAA battalions operationally attached or assigned to this Headquarters. Percentages given are based upon total enemy planes reported to have been fired at and total Category I's and II's approved by Third US Army.

		Total I & II	No E/A Engaged	Average
1.	777th AAA AW Bn (SP)	18	48	.375
2.	452d AAA AW Bn	9 1/3	40	.2333
3.	489th AAA AW Bn (SP)	22 1/2	101	.22277
4.	120th AAA Gun Bn	18	103	.1747
5.	453d AAA AW Bn	3	18	.1666
6.	469d AAA AW Bn ●	31	198	.1616
7.	387th AAA AW Bn (SP) #	5	34	.1470
8.	442nd AAA AW Bn	5	34	.1470
9.	213th AAA Gun Bn	24	196	.1224
10.	456th AAA AW Bn	43 1/2	358	.1215
11.	443th AAA AW Bn ●	21	179	.1173
12.	111th AAA Gun Bn	38 1/2	351	.1096
13.	329th AAA Gun Bn	9	88	.1022
14.	457th AAA AW Bn	4 1/3	45	.0962
15.	449th AAA AW Bn	8	93	.0860
16.	380th AAA AW Bn (SP)	5 5/6	99	.0843
17.	551st AAA AW Bn	3	50	.0600
18.	398th AAA AW Bn (SP) ●	14	240	.0583
19.	537th AAA AW Bn	5	116	.0431
20.	117th AAA Gun Bn	26	612	.0421
21.	467th AAA AW Bn (SP)	7	178	.0393
22.	203d AAA AW Bn (SP) #	1	27	.0370
23.	695th AAA AW Bn ●	4	117	.0342
24.	224 FTA (Fr) ●	1	33	.0303
25.	447th AAA AW Bn	1	50	.0200
26.	550th AAA AW Bn	1	128	.0078
27.	547th AAA AW Bn	0	1	.0000
28.	559th AAA AW Bn ●	0	5	.0000
29.	463d AAA AW Bn ●	0	6	.0000
30.	467th AAA AW Bn (SP)	0	8	.0000
31.	546th AAA AW Bn	0	31	.0000
32.	113th AAA Gun Bn	0	90	.0000
33.	462d AAA AW Bn	0	0	.0000
34.	473d AAA AW Bn (SP)●	17	Unknown	Unknown
	TOTALS - - - -	346	3841	

- Now under First US Army
● - Now under Ninth US Army
● - Now under Seventh US Army

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain, Jr
/s/ F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR,
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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•AUTH: CG, Third US Army•
•INIT: FRC
•DATE: 6 Nov 44

6 November 1944

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 14

Period:
270 19AA to 0306 00A

1. Summary of Action

a. There were 20 raids by 23 enemy aircraft — and that about sums up this week's hostile air activity. No attacks were made against ground targets, no new tactics noted. Sorties flown were equally split between low and medium altitudes and between hours of darkness and hours of daylight. Daylight appearances occurred during early morning and noon hours, while most night flights were reported between 2000 - 2300 hours. All missions apparently were for reconnaissance, flown over forward elements in the main, but also reported over PONT-A-MOUSSON, NANCY, ÉPINAL and VERDUN.

b. Total claims for the week and to date are as follows:

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	Raids	No A/A	Cat I	Cat II
Week (0600, 27 Oct to 0600, 3 Nov)	17	43	4	3
To Date (2200, 1 Aug to 0600, 3 Nov)	379	1,125	319	152

2. GAF Tactics Notes

No new tactics were reported.

3. Miscellaneous Notes

a. The 441th AAA Gun Bn reported another type of radar interference. Battery C reported that at 2030 hours a streak was found on the FFI scope from an azimuth of 240°, range 20,000 yds, to an azimuth of 360°, range 16,000 yds and elevation of 250. At 2053 hours a plane was picked up which dropped something giving an extremely good echo at about the same strength as the plane's echo. On the 30,000 scope the series of pips left behind appeared as a number of good echoes. Approximately 5 minutes later, a clear streak was still evident on the FFI scope where the course of the plane had been. A similar phenomenon appeared at 2110 hours. Planes gave no IFF. The material dropped seemed to be window or a similar substance which gave a very good echo and seemed to have small dispersion.

b. Anti-mechanized training, with German half-track personnel carriers as targets, has been conducted by the 449th AAA AW Bn. HE shell was reported to be effective, smoking the armor plate and blowing it apart, though solden penetrating it on the first round. Firing was done at approximately 600 yds. Remarks of the Battery Commanders were reported as follows:

(1) The major adjustment necessary is elevation.

(2) Once the target is registered-in with Stiffkey Stick, succeeding rounds all are in, too.

(3) The No. 7 man, using hand or knee, fires more successfully than the No. 9, as the latter tends to depress the gun muzzle when stepping on the firing pedal.

c. Three enlisted men of the 693d AAA AW Bn have been conducting classes in aircraft recognition for the officers and men of the 80th Inf Div. So far, 1200 men of the FA and Inf have received instruction.

d. An engineer battalion, pressed for time, has been working at night under floodlights on the construction of a bridge. Concerned about enemy air attack, it asked for air warning service, and now receives it from the 457th AAA AW Bn. Battery B operations room transmits warnings of unidentified or hostile planes to the Engr Pond CP at the bridge site, where lights are extinguished until the "all-clear" is given.

e. Two batteries of the 119th AAA Gun Bn, Batteries C and D, have been the subject of official commendation. Since these are semi-aircraft units, it is unusual that the commendation was given by the Commanding General, XX Corps Artillery, for their performance in a field artillery role. From the period 14 September to 3 November, they expended over 10,000 rounds of 90mm ammunition upon artillery missions. Especial note was taken, among other missions, of a mission on 5 Oct, when a projected counter-attack by elements of the HEFT OCS Rgt, via FF DELAMY and FF MARIVAL, was so disorganized by fire that the attack was never launched. Again, on 29 Oct, the fire from C Btry contributed materially to the unrelentingly successful attack by elements, 90th Inf Div, upon MAIZIERES-LES-METZ.

f. Using paper captured from the retreating Germans, the 440th AAA AW Bn publishes a daily "News and Intelligence Summary". Besides giving the news, day by day, it keeps the men abreast of the local military situation. Best feature, however, from a practical standpoint, is the airplane silhouettes reproduced in various attitudes of flight to keep all men constantly refreshed in aircraft recognition.

This organization also claims to be the first Antiaircraft unit to have given battlefield appointments. Two platoon sergeants recently received their commissions as second lieutenants on the battlefield.

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain, Jr,
F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, Jr,
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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ANNEX NO. 6

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13 November 1944

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 15

Period:
0300GA to 1006GA

1. Summary of Action

a. The German Air Force reacted slowly to the Third US Army's attack the morning of 8 November, and it was not until mid-afternoon that it put in an appearance. 10 raids by 33 A/A were reported at that time, with Fritz being most interested in reconnaissance, as only one attack by one Me 109 was made. This day's small effort accounted for most of the week's 43 sorties. Over the week, most appearances were at low altitudes as poor visibility and low clouds forced enemy reconnaissance planes to hug the ground. Two strafing attacks were reported for the week, one by an Me 111 against AAA positions in NANCY during darkness, and the other by day against field artillery as mentioned above. One was claimed shot down, the other a probable. Other engagements with recce planes brought the week's total claims to 4 Cat I's and 3 Cat II's. Most A/A were reported by AAA units protecting artillery in the forward zones of divisions, but others were reported by AAA deployed at crossings over the MOSELLE and SEILLE Rivers. None were noted West of the MOSELLE. Two buzz-bombs (pilotless aircraft, V-1) were reported and fell harmlessly, causing very minor damage. They were not engaged by antiaircraft fire.

b. Total claims for the week and to date from 1200 hours, 1 August 1944, are as follows (corrected):

	RAIDS	NO A/A	CAT I	CAT II
Week	17	43	4	3
To Date	1409	3835	319	152

	PAC OVER AREA	PAC ENGAGED	CAT Ae	CAT Be
Week	2	0	0	0
To Date	31	14	0	2

Ammunition expenditures for the week (trial fire excluded) are as follows:

90mm	40mm	37mm	.50 Cal.
173	357	10	8,906

• Cat Ae - exploded in air by AA fire
Cat Be - caused to crash by AA fire

2. GAF Tactics Notes

a. Me 109s were the A/A most commonly encountered. Other types reported — FW 190s, Ju 88s, He 111s. These appeared singly or in twos for the most part, with formations of 4, 5 and 6 reported on 8 November.

b. A/A were about evenly divided between night and daytime sorties, though 8 November's daylight sortie tilt overall totals for the week toward daylight predominance.

c. The two PAC appeared at approximately 2300 and 1300 hours, flying roughly North to South at low altitudes.

[illegible] altitudes of 2,000 - 3,000 ft and took [illegible] by AAA. Usually this consisted of [illegible] acrobatics.

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c. Third US Army's first three months' operations furnish a fair basis for study of targets attacked by the GAF. During August, with ground activity violent and flying weather good, the enemy mounted 1,117 raids by 3,213 A/C, an average of 2.87 A/C per raid and 103.6 A/C per day. Most such raids terminated in actual attacks against ground targets. September and October, on the other hand, saw increasingly poorer flying weather, a much slower and less threatening rate of advance on the ground, and correspondingly less hostile air activity. September's totals were 128 raids by 287 A/A and October's were 144 raids by 269 A/A, giving averages of daily activity far below those for August. Furthermore, most aerial activity was for reconnaissance, as reflected in the percentages shown under "Targets Unknown or No Attack Made" in the tabulation below. (In this category are included instances where attacks were made but the target was hidden by terrain features from reporting units, as well as raids which merely passed overhead, possibly to attack some more distant target, or possibly for reconnaissance only). Since we are again advancing and may expect heavy aerial thrusts at any time, the table below may prove of value when read in the light of ground activities during the particular month involved.

	AUGUST		SEPTEMBER		OCTOBER	
	Raids - 1,117 No A/A- 3,213		Raids - 128 No A/A- 287		Raids - 144 No A/A-269	
Targets	Raids	No A/A	Raids	No A/A	Raids	No A/A
AA Positions	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Ammo Dps	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Arty Observation Planes	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Rivermne and Tr Concentrations	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Bridges	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Cities	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Convoys	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Dams	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Field Arty	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Gen Dps	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Target Unknown or No Atk Made	29	2	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

3. Miscellaneous Notes

a. As the Third US Army advance proceeds, reports of casualties from AA units are multiplying. Offsetting these losses, however, are the many prisoners captured and casualties inflicted on enemy ground troops by antiaircraft elements. The 693d AAA AW Bn recently was called upon by division G-3 to emplace M51 mounts in support of the division's attack. After a map reconnaissance and a ground reconnaissance conducted under enemy observation, positions were selected for the emplacement of those M51 quadruple .50 cal mounts. Positions were prepared by hand during daylight, tree-covered, defiladed positions being selected where possible. Positions were occupied during darkness with great difficulty, due to excessive mud and wet ground. Prime movers and bull-dozers stuck in the mud, and only one platoon finally was able to occupy its positions.

Targets selected included two 88mm gun positions, one 75mm gun position and several mortar positions. All trucks were left in the ammunition upon request of an Inf Bn Commander, who desired the morale effect which his troops derived from observation of the tremendous fire poured out by the machine guns. After fire was opened, not one of the enemy artillery positions fired a shot, and the supported infantry battalion was successful in its mission. 10,500 rounds of .50 cal ammunition were fired.

b. Since beginning of operations, at 1200 hours, 1 August 1944, Third US Army Antiaircraft Artillery has expended considerable ammunition in a ground role, both as field artillery and in close support of infantry and armor. Expenditures to date in this capacity are tabulated below:

90mm	40mm	37mm	.50 cal
22,032	3,378	4,560	282,298

This compares with ammunition fired solely at enemy aircraft as follows (trial shot fire included):

90mm	40mm	37mm	.50 cal
24,791	22,816	22,661	1,331,587

c. To enable the 8th Air Force to bomb accurately in the recent large-scale bombardment in the METZ area, four batteries from three AAA Gun Battalions on a pre-set, coordinated mission fired continuously for almost an hour, establishing two visible lines of flak bursts at high altitude from which Air Force navigators found their true position with reference to the ground. The batteries were moved a considerable distance to perform this mission and experienced great difficulty getting into position due to ground and weather conditions. A total of 1,800 rounds of 90mm were fired.

AAA

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c. With many AAA units deployed in protection of bridges, the record rise of the MEUSE and other rivers caused considerable difficulty to dug-in antiaircraft guns. Gun crews were marooned for some time by the floods and had to be evacuated by engineer assault boats; some equipment was under water before it could be moved to higher ground. Heavy mud conditions complicated matters tremendously.

c. The 27th AAA Group some time ago completed arrangements with a Quartermaster Repair Company to manufacture heavy canvas covers for the Skiffbay Sticks of all Automatic Weapons units so equipped. Recently, these covers were completed, and XII Corps and its Division AAA AW Battalions now have been furnished with the covers so badly needed under current conditions.

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain, Jr.
/s/ F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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•DATE: 20 Nov 44

20 November 1944

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 16

Period:
121600A to 170600A

1. Summary of Action

a. From the fact that 22 rounds of 90mm ammunition represents this week's total antiaircraft expenditures, it may be seen that a week noteworthy for lack of hostile air activity was enjoyed. Bad weather kept enemy air efforts in Third US Army area at minute proportions. A total of 4 raids by 5 E/A were all that AAA units reported. No attacks upon ground targets were made. Antiaircraft engaged one E/A and made no claims. 22 buzz-bombs (V-1) and 1 rocket-bomb (V-2) were reported over the area, with no damage anywhere reported. None were engaged.

b. Total claims for the week, and to date from 2400 hours, 1 August 1944, are as follows:

	Raids	No E/A	Cat I	Cat II
Week	4	5	0	0
To Date	1413	3820	339	252

	RAC OVER AREA	RAC ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	13	0	0	0
To Date	44	24	0	2

2. CAP Tactics Notes

No new tactics were reported.

3. Miscellaneous Notes

A tabulation of daily claims for the month of October is given below.

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain, Jr.
/s/ F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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Tabulation of Daily Antiaircraft Claims, for period 0600, 1 October to 0600, 1 November 1944.

Date	20th AAA Bde (Gp)								1 XIX Corps								XX Corps			
	214th AAA Gp				7th AAA Gp				207th AAA Gp				27th AAA Gp				132nd AAA Gp			
Oct 1944	No Acft	E/A	I	II	No Acft	E/A	I	II	No Acft	E/A	I	II	No Acft	E/A	I	II	No Acft	E/A	I	II
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	0
2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	4	0	0
3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	2	0	0
6	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	4	4	0	0	1	2	0	0
7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	12	1	1	4	13	1	2
12	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	11	18	0	2	6	13	0	2
13	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	8	0	0	3	4	0	0
14	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	1	1	0	0
15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	5	5	0	0	0	0	0
16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	0	26	91	1	1	13	13	1	0	3	12	0	0	1	2	0	0
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	1	1	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	1	0	1	1	0	0
22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	2	0	0
24	0	0	0	0	5	5	1	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
26	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
27	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	3	0	1	1	3	0	0	2	3	0	0
28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
29	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
31	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	2	2	0	0	43	109	5	1	25	27	1	2	43	77	7	4	31	54	3	4

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28 November 1944

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 17

Period:
170600A to 240600A

1. Summary of Action

a. Taking advantage of good flying weather the first three days of the week, the German Air Force made several sharp, small-scale attacks against ground troops in forward areas. Two Me-109's dropped anti-personnel bombs or mines and seven strafing attacks were made by formations of one, two or three aircraft. Other flights presumably were for reconnaissance and though several of these E/A were observed to carry bombs, no bombing was reported other than that mentioned above. Targets attacked were field artillery, armored columns, troops, vehicles and antiaircraft, with one attack on a Cub observation plane. Most reconnaissance flights reported were in forward areas, with a few others over THIONVILLE, PONT-A-MOUSSON, FROUARD, NANCY and TOUL. 35 of the raids were at low altitudes (300 - 6,000 ft) and most were during daylight hours. 22 E/A were observed the 1st day of the week and 31 the second day. Thereafter, activity dropped and the week's total was 70 E/A reported. Some other A/C were detected by radar but identification in most cases was inconclusive so those were not counted in the totals.

b. Low cloud ceilings and resulting enemy tactics combined to give automatic weapons units many good targets, resulting in their claiming 9 Cat I and 9 Cat IIs, or approximately 22% of all E/A destroyed or probably destroyed. No damage to materiel was reported as a result of the air attacks and but a few personnel casualties. Totals for the week, and to date from 2400, 1 August 1944, are as follows:

	Raids	No E/A	Cat I	Cat II
Week	46	70	9	9
To Date	1459	3890	348	261

	RAC OVER AREA	RAC ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	2	0	0	0
To Date	46	24	0	2

Ammunition expenditures on AA firing for the week were as follows (number of rounds):

.50 Cal	37mm	40mm	90mm
73,571	284	2,636	34

2. CAP Tactics Notes

a. No particularly new tactics were noted. The Germans practically hugged the ground on many of their attacks and are reported to have strafed without using evasion. On one occasion, E/A flew so low that AAA could not fire for fear of endangering friendly troops on nearby hills. On another, an E/A flying at 300 Ft tried to avoid AAA fire by diving still lower, and being unable to pull up, crashed.

b. AAA fire drove off all attacking A/C, as none chose to press home an attack, once fired upon. However, evasive tactics frequently consisted only of a fast climbing turn, with the plane thereafter circling out of range.

c. The Teutonic tendency toward routine has in the past led to several enemy aircraft losses. This week Pilot made a reconnaissance plane to fly the same course, the same time, each day. Alert AAA crews anticipated its arrival and on the third day the plane did not go home.

d. During darkness, E/A often fly into protected areas at slow speeds, cutting their motors and gliding to minimize chances of detection from the ground. When discovered and fired upon, motors are gunned and quick changes of direction are made in evidence.

3. Miscellaneous Notes

a. In order to insure that "hold fire" and other such operational orders are received by AAA Gun Battalions, separate elements thereof, or restricted area commanders, the 30th AAA Brigade recently secured the loan of "Link" FM transmitters and receivers from XIX TAC. Using these Link radios, an instantaneous, two-way FM radio communication has been established between the Army AACP and units whose fire is controlled from there. In addition, wire has been laid from AAA Gun Battalions to all Army Automatic Weapons units located within the IAZs. Use of this system has proved most effective in preventing fire upon friendly A/C which, without prior warning, occasionally wander into an IAZ contrary to present flying rules.

b. The alertness of C Battery commander, 465th AAA AW Bn (SP), in discovering and reporting conditions at a large supply point protected by his battery, may have saved the army large quantities of vital supplies. As a result of his report, the supply point was moved to a safer location less open to sabotage and away from suspected civilians. In addition, this intelligence-conscious officer has submitted reports of new types of mines and booby traps which have been of considerable value to the Enemy Equipment Intelligence Services (EEIS) of this Headquarters.

c. Further reports have been received on the results of recent ground support missions by AAA units. Engineers constructing a bridge at CLERMONT, over the SEILLE River, were fired upon, November 28th, by hostile machine guns and small arms from prepared positions across the river. D Battery, 467th AAA AW Bn (M), giving air and ground protection to the construction crews, fired 18 rounds 40mm and 1320 rounds .50 cal silencing the enemy. Later investigation revealed that the positions silenced were heavy earth breastworks, partially covered with light metal. The metal covering had been thrown aside and considerably chopped up by 40mm fragments. Tree bursts from the 40mm HE had sprayed the positions, killing machine gunners and riflemen.

Batteries B and D of the 796th AAA AW Bn (SP), attached to elements of the 10th Armd Div, fired 12,300 rounds .50 cal and 60 rounds 37mm supporting the advance into Germany. Some sections were sub-attached to combat patrols spearheading the drive. Missions included spraying woods, buildings and prepared enemy positions, as well as covering an infantry squad sent to rescue crews of burning tanks. 40 PWs were taken and 50 enemy were known to be killed, with many more probably killed and others wounded and burned as incendiaries set fire to buildings.

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d. The 119th AAA Gun Bn experienced a new type of radar interference, which they have termed "step jamming", the [illegible] number. The phenomena was picked up by two separate radars [illegible] three occasions. An operator in B Battery, corrobo[illegible] one from A Battery, reported as follows:

"We picked up a plane and I challenged him with IFF. His return signal appeared on the scope, plus a number of identical signals. The other signals were all over the scope and seemed to be returned from other planes, but there were no other planes than the one being tracked. My IFF signal was perfectly on the step as I reported IFF on this plane. Both the plane's return signal and the interference continued as I kept challenging him. I dropped the plane but the interference remained.

The signal from both plane and interference were unusually narrow in width. Also, the caps were very bright while the side lines remained very dim. This interference continued for some time and then died out. It returned several minutes later, however. I changed my azimuth and found I could pick it up almost any place." Since numerous contacts were made by both radars, both before and after this phenomenon with no unusual effects, battalion considers a new type of jamming was experienced.

e. A point of interest arose from a meteorological message taken at 1645, 20 November, by the 413th AAA Gun Bn. Ballistic winds in zones #5 thru #11 varied from 69 - 73 mph, all being in excess of the 60 mile maximum wind compensation provided for by the M9 director.

f. Casualties from artillery fire, mines and booby traps continue to be reported by AAA units as assuming enemy resistance is encountered. More than offsetting these, however, are the many PWs taken by AAA battalions. A check of figures shows that more than 8,500 PWs have been taken since the beginning of operations, with many battalions making no report of PWs turned over to division enclosures for interrogation and processing. The 777th AAA AW Bn (SP), attached to 6th Armd Div, has reported taking 700 PWs, the greatest number reported by any battalion.

g. Thirty-six officers and enlisted men of the 390th AAA AW Bn (SP) recently were awarded Bronze Stars in connection with operations from 27 July to 9 November by the Commanding General of the 26th Inf Div. Of these, one was a posthumous award.

h. The 469th AAA AW Bn (SP) which as late has suffered a number of casualties during the advance of the 4th Armd Div, to which it is attached, recently announced the battlefield appointment of one of its Staff Sergeants to the rank of 2nd Lieutenant.

/s/ P. R. Chamberlain, Jr.
P. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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•NOTE: CG, Third US Army•
•INFO: FEC•
•DATE: 6 December 1944•

6 December 1944.

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 20

Period:
2400A to 0100A

1. Summary of Action

a. Little hostile air activity was reported this week. Once again, the GAF was content to fly a minimum number of reconnaissance missions covering Third US Army area. Some flights were reported by front line units, but the majority were reported by units via THIONVILLE, PONT-A-MOUSSON, NANCY and VERDUN. A total of 35 E/A were over the area, flying at low and medium altitudes. Only 2 of these appeared by daylight. Of the 35 E/A, 11 were engaged by AAA units which claimed a total of 3 Ost I's as a result. No attacks on ground troops or installations were reported.

b. Activity by pilotless aircraft kept far behind that reported [illegible] by First and Ninth US Armies, but this week's total of 45 represents a substantial increase over the number of PAC previously observed in Third US Army area. Both V-1's and V-2's were reported, the latter climbing [illegible] altitudes and disappearing. V-1's were observed at altitudes ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 ft, and traveling at speeds of 200 - 400 mph. The usual time of appearance was late dusk or early dawn, and direction of travel was E-W or NE-SW.

c. Totals for the week, and to date from 2400, 1 August 1944, (corrected) are as follows:

	Raids	No E/A	Ost I	Ost II
Week	32	35	3	0
To Date	1,467	3,905	331	160

	PAC OVER AREA	PAC ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	45	6	0	0
To Date	89	80	0	2

2. GAF Tactics Notes

No new tactics were reported.

3. Miscellaneous Notes

a. XIX TAC advises that the German Air Force is steadily building up strength in western GERMANY. Poor flying weather and consequent lessening of attrition, as well as tactical necessity, has fostered the improvement of its position. Estimates of current strengths are as follows:

	SEF	TEF	TRInst	IRD
NW Germany	790	500	90	120
SW Germany	240	130	30	0
Totals, western Germany	1,030	630	80	120

Comparison with figures last published in AAA Weekly Intelligence Report No 13 reveals a marked increase in single-engine fighter strength. Of the above totals, approximately 1,450 SEFs and 200 TEFs are within operational range of Third US Army and could be used at any time. Of these, 65% are believed to be flyable at any given time, with the remaining 35% grounded for maintenance.

b. A platoon of C Battery, 547th AAA AW Bn, recently supported division elements in an attack upon FT JEANNE D'ARC in the METZ group. Its mission was to fire in front of the advancing infantry, shifting later to the main fort to force it to "button up". Reconnaissance was made at night under considerable difficulty, but defiladed positions finally were selected, 200 yds to the rear of the infantry line of departure. Four 40mm guns were placed on line approximately 40 yds apart. Only one M51 could be winched into position due to heavy mud. Firing data was secured from a map and guns were laid using a GERNERS' quadrant and lensatic compass from firing table data. In addition, an OP was established to direct fire. Positions were occupied for two days and targets included two observation towers in the fort (which were destroyed), as well as call missions on pin-point targets requested by the infantry. Original targets were abandoned due to limited visibility. The platoon was credited with killing a considerable number of the enemy and encouraging the surrender of others, as the infantry pressed on to reach its objective. In addition, 20 prisoners were taken directly by AAA personnel. Enemy artillery dropped 40 shells in the platoon area, and fire was drawn from an enemy machine gun 300 yds south of the position. However, neither casualties nor damage resulted.

c. For their courage in establishing the observation post mentioned above, and maintaining it in the face of heavy and accurate fire from all caliber and type of weapons, two privates who volunteered as observers were awarded Silver Stars. On one occasion, an enemy shell burst in the very room of the house from which they directed fire.

d. Four enlisted men of the 390th AAA AW Bn (SP) were recently awarded the Soldier's Medal by the Commanding General, 26th Inf Div, for heroism displayed in rescuing crew members of a friendly A-20, which had crash-landed in deep water.

e. An unusual chain of circumstances recently resulted in dam[illegible] round of 105mm, fired by a [illegible] and power line. Shell frag[illegible] [illegible] gun section, which exploded [illegible] ruptor on a Bofors gun.

f. Below is a tabulation of claims made by AAA units for the month of November.

g. Corrections: AAA Weekly Intelligence Report No 17 stated that the 777th AAA AW Bn (SP) had taken 700 PWs. The Battalion Commander has written to advise that the battalion lays no claim to exclusive credit for all captures. In several instances, it was stated, the battalion assisted in the round-up of large numbers of prisoners, and did not [illegible] the captures alone.

/s/ P. R. Chamberlain, Jr.
P. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

1 Incl - Tabulation of claims made by AAA units for the month of November.

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Tabulation of Daily Antiaircraft Claims, for Period 0600A, 1 November to 0600A, 1 December 1944

Date	38th AAA Brigade												XII Corps				XX Corps			
	7th AAA Gp				24th AAA Gp				207th AAA Gp				87th AAA Gp				132nd AAA Gp			
Nov 1944	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II
1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	0	0	0	0	0
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	2	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	8	1	0	0	0	0
11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	28	5	1	0	0	0	0
19	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	26	5	1	0	0	0	0
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	10	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	6	0	0	0	0	0	0
22	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
23	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
28	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
29	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTALS - - -	12	15	4	0	5	5	0	0	4	7	0	0	43	88	8	2	0	0	0	0

	38th AAA Brigade												XII Corps				XX Corps			
	7th AAA Gp				24th AAA Gp				207th AAA Gp				87th AAA Gp				132nd AAA Gp			
Dec 1944	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II	Raids	E/A	I	II
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTALS - - -	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Incl #1 to HQ Third US Army AAA Weekly Int Report No 18, 6 Dec 44.

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ANNEX NO. 7

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

* SECRET *
*AUTH: CO, THIRD US Army
*INIT: FRC
*DATE: 12 Dec 44

12 December 1944

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 19

Period:
0100GMT to 0806GMT

1. Summary of Action

a. A quiet week was experienced by Third US Army Antiaircraft Artillery, as enemy air activity remained at low level. Only 13 E/A were reported over the area in a series of 9 raids. Of these, 5 were engaged by AAA, but no claims for their damage or destruction were made. A strafing attack was made against elements of the 14th Armd Div by Fw-51s reported to carry German markings and 8 bombs landed via DEIRACH. No damage to military installations was reported as a result of these occurrences and, other than these, no attacks were made. The E/A over the area were observed to fly at low and medium altitudes engaged, apparently, upon reconnaissance. Raids were almost evenly split between night and daytime. Afternoon and early evening were the most favored times of appearance, as only one morning flight was reported and none from midnight to dawn.

b. 9 pilotless aircraft were reported, of which 3 were engaged by AAA without result. These generally flew a N-S course, though one was seen to fly West.

c. Totals for the week, and to date from 1 August, 1944, are as follows:

	Raids	No E/A	Cat I	Cat II
Week	9	13	0	0
To Date	1,476	3,918	331	160

	TAC OVER AAA	TAC ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	9	3	0	0
To Date	98	25	0	2

2. GAF Tactics Notes

a. No new tactics were reported in this area.

b. Demonstrating that the GAF is far from dead, First US Army this week reported a daylight attack by approximately 60 enemy fighter aircraft against motor transport, troops and installations of V and VII Corps. The attacks were made from very low altitudes, in the main, and involved both bombing and strafing. An interesting feature of the attack was that, at the time, IX TAC planes were grounded by bad weather surrounding their airfields and could not rise to counter the blow. In all, First US Army reported 74 E/A overhead during the 24 hour period encompassing the above raid. Of these, AAA units claimed the considerable number of 30 Cat I's and 23 Cat II's, which must have made Fritz most unhappy. (Source: AAA Sitrep No 123, First US Army)

This repeats a strategy employed by the GAF in its attacks against XV Corps (then under Third US Army) at the MANTES-GASSICOURT crossings of the SEINE River on 21-22 August. There, attacks by as many as 117 E/A were made at a time when bad weather in the rear of the army kept all XIX TAC A/C on the ground.

c. Bad weather apparently affects hostile air activity in other ways as, during periods of poor visibility, a considerable increase in numbers of pilotless aircraft has been noted in Ninth US Army zone. (Source: Weekly AAA Notes No 10, 95th AAA Brigade)

d. As to the use of V-weapons, it is evident they are not being used as haphazardly as in recent times. Specific targets have been selected and the occasional V-1s and V-2s seen flying in this area are believed to be malfunctioning eccentrics for the most part, though a few may be launched with harassment in mind. SHAEF has stated that: "... It is becoming increasingly obvious that he (the enemy) realizes port facilities are the most profitable targets..." (Source: SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary No 35)

e. First US Army also reported an attempt by 6 E/A to dive-bomb and strafe an engineer bridge during hours of darkness. As dive-bombing is a rarely employed tactic, the event is worthy of notice. (Source: First US Army Sitrep No 124)

f. In view of the above, the appearance in recent weeks of the antiquated Ju-87 — the dread "Stuka" dive-bomber of other days — is worthy of note and indicative of the German determination to reinforce his air strength in the West in an effort to counter the mounting threat to his lines of defense. Use of these has been reported in the northern sectors of the allied front, so that tactics employed and targets selected merit some attention. Use of this type aircraft has been restricted almost entirely to night operations. The following information is based on reports of crews of Ju-87s captured when their planes were shot down by AAA:

"The usual types of target include, in their order of priority, troops preparing to attack, artillery positions, tanks and M/T concentrations and M/T supply routes. Crews are invariably given a definite objective, and no free-lance operations are flown. Ground strafing attacks are not carried out."

"Occasionally an alternative target is given at the briefing and crews are sometimes told that if they are unable to locate or attack the given target, they should release their bombs over any suitable concentration of ground forces observed."

"Bombs used include H.E., fragmentation and incendiary types according to the nature of target assigned. On occasion loads as heavy as 1,500 kg. and even 1,800 kg. are taken."

"The standard laid down in regard to weather conditions is a minimum of 4/10ths cloud for cover purposes, and visibility of at least 5 kms. Operations are not flown during the period extending from about three days before to three days after full moons."

"Aircraft take off individually at fixed intervals of from one to five minutes, and fly independently to their objective. After flying at about 1,000 feet, they begin to climb when approaching the Allied lines so as to attain a height of from 3,500 to 7,000 feet when crossing the front line; altitudes between these two limits are considered best for bombing, so that an effective spread of anti-personnel bombs is insured. After the release of the bombs height is lost to between 600 and 1,000 feet, and the homeward course is flown at about this altitude."

"The speeds flown on operations by JU 87 D-5's are stated by P/W to be as follows:

Outward flight at height of about 1,000 feet	250 - 260 k.p.h. A.S.I.
Outward flight after climbing to the usual operational altitude of about 3,500 to 7,000 ft	260 - 270 k.p.h. A.S.I.
Homeward flight at low altitude	About 270 k.p.h. A.S.I.

"...flares are often used to mark the target...The normal parachute flare is used, released from 2,500 to 3,000 feet, the colours employed being white or orange.."

"Duppel ("window") is used on a fairly extensive scale, and evasive action is taken against night fighters and AA."

"No special instruction on the type of evasive action had been given to P/W, but crews of N.S.G.1 had discussed this aspect soon after arrival at Bonningharde/South, and at the base of N.S.G.2 at Wahn a meeting presided over by the Staffelkapitan, was called during the last week in October for the purpose of free discussion on the best type of evasive action to be taken."

"It was generally agreed that continuous and somewhat violent weaving with continuous changes in height offered the best solution, and it was thought advisable to adopt this tactic on both the outward and homeward course."

"On operational flights made by present P/W, considerable weaving involving 45 degree turns was resorted to; on one flight, evasive action was carried as far as a turn at 360 degrees." (Source: Ninth Air Force Intelligence Summary No 108)

3. Miscellaneous Information

a. On December 2d, the 390th AAA AW Bn (SP) committed half-track elements to a ground role, supporting elements of the 26th Inf Div in an attack upon a wooded area. A previous infantry attack on the area had been repulsed by automatic weapons and observed mortar fire. The commander of the Regimental CT asked for a recommendation for AAA fire upon the area. A reconnaissance was made and recommendation submitted that fire be delivered from a town approximately 1,200 yds from the edge of the woods. This was accepted, and a platoon of 4 M-15 and 4 M-16 half-tracks was moved to the town. This move was made during darkness as the approaches were under enemy observation.

Weapons were fired upon order from the commander of the Inf Bn making the attack. 37mm HE fire was used to produce brush bursts over foxholes and trenches known to be in the woods, and 37mm AP was fired against fortified emplacements which possibly included concrete pillboxes. A total of 29,600 rds .50 cal, 760 rds 37mm HE and 25 rds 37mm AP were fired. The fire is believed to have kept enemy troops effectively pinned down — more closely pinned than the previous days' artillery preparation did.

A similar mission was fired on 3 December, targets including a small town, as well as two wooded areas. Weapons were moved up under cover of darkness and backed into position between buildings just prior to firing. Some buildings in the village attacked were set afire and a church steeple, possibly used as an enemy OP, was shattered. When firing ceased, our infantry entered town and woods without opposition. For this mission, 16,133 rds .50 cal, 563 rds 37mm HE and 80 rds 37mm AP were fired.

The battalion commander concluded that:

(1) Small towns offer very good cover and approaches for half-track AAA ground fire functions.

(2) Weapons should be taken in under cover of darkness, if possible.

(3) Enough weapons should be brought to bear on the area to maintain continuous intermittent fire for a sustained period.

(4) The entire area should be covered by fire, especially those places which would most likely be used as an OP for mortar fire. The initial burst of fire should be strong enough to cause the enemy to button up completely.

b. Casualties among AAA units continued to climb as artillery, mines and booby traps took their toll. Total casualties were 27 killed and 53 wounded, for the week. Most of these were from artillery fire, though the explosion of a time bomb in the building occupied by Hq & Hq Btry of one AAA AW unit caused the death of 19 officers and men, and wounded 17 others.

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain, Jr.
F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

•AUTH: CO, THIRD US Army
•DIRECT: FEC
•DATE: 19 December 1944

19 December 1944

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 20

Period:
0806OOA to 150600A

1. Summary of Action

a. German air activity this week was negligible, but 6 E/A being overhead, one on high altitude reconnaissance and the remainder flying at low and medium altitudes. No attempt was made upon ground targets. Four of these A/C were observed over SAARLAUTERN, one at PONT-A-MOUSSON and one over 35th Div Army. AAA engaged 5, resulting in claim for 2 Category Is by an AAA Gun battalion. Two FW190 were observed, but neither crashed in the area.

b. Totals for the week, and to date from 1 August 1944, are as follows:

	Raids	No E/A	Cat I	Cat II
Week	6	6	2	0
To Date	1,482	2,984	353	160
	PAC OVER AREA	PAC ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	2	0	0	0
To Date	100	83	0	0

2. GAF Tactics Notes

No new tactics were reported.

3. Miscellaneous Notes

a. At the request of a Cavalry Rcn Sq Commander, 4 half-tracks of the 796th AAA AW Bn (SP) - attached 10th Armd Div - this week performed a special road-clearing mission, firing into woods, at houses, emplacements and pavements. 117 rds 37mm and 2,300 rds .50 cal ammunition were expended, resulting in destruction of 3 houses, a machine gun emplacement, 2 small ammunition dumps, some mines, and causing an undetermined number of enemy casualties.

b. The same battalion was singled out for commendation by the Commanding General, 10th Armd Div, for the low rate of trench foot cases reported during the past month.

c. Reference radar interference reported in paragraph 3 d, AAA Weekly Intelligence Report No. 17, the Signal Section of Twelfth Army Group has advised that it probably was a case of "Squittering IFF", caused by maladjustment of the transponder in the aircraft. Procedure has been established so that the pilot may be quickly notified and his IFF equipment adjusted to prevent further occurrences.

P. R. Chamberlain, Jr.
P. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, GSC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

•AUTH: CO, THIRD US Army
•DIRECT: FEC
•DATE: 26 Dec 44

26 December 1944

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 21

Period:
150600A to 220600A

1. Summary of Action

a. It was not until mid-afternoon of December 17th — 36 hours after the German counter-offensive began — that the Luftwaffe visited the Third US Army zone. One strafing attack was reported that afternoon and a flurry of reconnaissance flights was reported over XII and XX Corps zones, as great interest in troop movements in those areas was evinced. Thereafter, hostile air activity declined until December 21st, when the first indication was given of the large-scale activity to follow. 39 E/A were over the area on that day. 10 strafing attacks were made during the week but no bombings were reported by AAA units, though other sources reported bombing of troop concentrations and the dropping of butterfly bombs in XX Corps area. One unconfirmed report of rocket-firing was received. Most attacks were during hours of darkness with only two made by daylight. All attacks were by single A/C, whose missions apparently were to harass convoys and other road traffic. Field artillery was also strafed and, for the first time since Third US Army became operational, airfields in its area were attacked. No damage from the attacks was suffered by any AAA-protected installation or unit. Most reconnaissance, likewise, was flown at night as improved visibility and use of lights by vehicles aided this mission. Areas mainly covered were highways along the river leading north from METZ to THIONVILLE, where photographic flares were dropped, the SAARLAUTERN and SARREGUEMINES areas, and a few flights reported over NANCY and LUXEMBOURG. 2 PAC (a V-1 and a V-2) were reported observed from the SAARLAUTERN IAF. Neither is known to have crashed.

b. Totals for the week, and to date from 1 August 1944, (Corrected) are as follows:

	Raids	No E/A	Cat I	Cat II
Week	74	75	35	7
To Date	1,556	3,059	388	167
	PAC OVER AREA	PAC ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	2	0	0	0
To Date	100	83	0	2

For the same period, Ninth US Army reported 259 raids and 435 E/A, and First US Army showed 167 raids by 444 E/A.

2. GAF Tactics Notes

a. A tendency of E/A to hug the ground, even during night action, has been noted in recent days. This probably is in furtherance of attempts to escape giving early warning thru radar sources and to hinder engagement by 90mm guns and has, to some extent, been successful in terrain favorable to such tactics, such as country of long, winding valleys affording masked lanes of approach.

b. "Window" has, with increasing frequency, been reported in the area, as would be expected. No difficulties in radar tracking have occurred.

c. Flares were frequently reported, but only infrequently preceding an attack, as most concern evidently was for photo reconnaissance, rather than harassment.

3. Miscellaneous Notes

a. During the recent period of heavy rains, a large number of targets frequently detected by gun radars were picked up [illegible] Gun Bn. Once identified, they are easily distinguished [illegible] to the data already known concerning these phenomena, [illegible] Bn submitted the following findings made in the SAAR-

(1) Signal was weak and at times would disappear in the range scope. This occurred at about ranges as close as 4,000 yds.

(2) The speed was determined, in most cases, to approximate 40 miles per hour.

(3) The targets proceeded in all directions, though the majority moved south or west.

(4) Altitudes varied from 300 yds to 4,000 yds. The large majority, however, were from 300 - 600 yds.

(5) The following meteorological conditions prevailed on two occasions:

30536	4391706	30536	4570924
0390406	5401706	0830406	5690924
1300406	6411905	1810806	6690924
2350906	7441905	2871306	7691306
3381906	8200	3301106	7691306
			1820

(6) Gun batteries could locate these targets by relocation as they were broadcast over the unit AAARS.

(7) It was noted that on all nights the phenomenon occurred, air density was extremely high, being as much as 5% - 6% above normal.

(8) Normal targets may be tracked without confusion.

b. In shooting, unusual not only for exceptional results but also because all engagements were with unseen targets (all firing data being furnished by radars and M9 directors), the 120th AAA Gun Bn claimed 4 Cat I's and 1 Cat II out of 9 E/A engaged during a 45 minute period in the THIONVILLE IAF, one night this week.

c. Hitting power of the 90mm gun used in a ground role is amply shown by examination of fortifications and positions against which it was used. A FW recently taken from one of these stated that the 350mm steel doors on a medium sized bunker (20 man bunker complement) was completely pierced by 90mm shells. He had been informed of the caliber weapon used against them by a US officer present at the time of his capture, who was aware of the employment. Concrete walls of 1.50m to 2.00m thickness were damaged, but not pierced, by the 90mm fire. (Source: Third US Army, G-2 Periodic Report No. 188).

P. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
P. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, GSC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
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•AUTH: CO, THIRD US ARMY
•DIRECT: FEC
•DATE: 3 Jan 45

3 January 1945

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 22

Period:
0806OOA to 250600A

1. Summary of Action

a. As the regrouped Third US Army started its attack on the southern flank of the enemy salient the Germans unleashed the striking power of their air forces, hitherto so closely husbanded. 751 enemy airplanes were counted during the week in a series of 493 raids over the Army zone. Largest number of E/A reported for any single day was 214, for the period 26-27 December. Most attacks were made against lines of communication, supply routes and installations. Traffic passing along main roads, and particularly at points of congestion - such as in the vicinity of the bridge at DIEKIRCH and the road nets surrounding and in-

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side of BRENY, PONT-A-MOUSSON, COMPLAIN, METZ, THIONVILLE and ARLON - one attacked time and time again. Ammunition dumps at SIVRY and MERSH-IN-BOSNY were bombed and strafed, supply dumps (particularly Class III) were attacked with a loss at one, vic HALDENVILLE, of 100,000 gallons of gasoline, 3,000 jerricans and 8 bunkers. Likewise attacked were railroads and railheads at COMPLAIN, SEDAN and FLORANGE. Attacks upon Field Artillery were numerous and AAA units also were subjected to several attacks. In addition, bombing and strafing attacks upon airfields continued, some 20 being made in all. Other than the loss of gasoline, not much damage was caused by these efforts, and personnel casualties were inconsiderable. Jet-propelled A/C attempted to bomb a division CP from low altitudes, with no success. Reconnaissance flights were numerous and covered the entire Army area, night and day.

b. 3 Me262 were sighted and one was hit and caused to crash. All others passed over the area.

c. Totals for the week, and to date from 1 August 1944, are as follows:

	Me109	Fw 190	Ju 87	Ju 88
Week	4,93	751	83	56
To Date	2,049	4,790	491	823

	Me 410 & Ju 188	Me 262	HS 129	Do 217
Week	85	3	0	1
To Date	193	26	0	5

2. GAF Tactics Notes

a. With the weather clear and bright sun prevailing this week, much use was made of the sun's blinding effect and many attacks, both bombing and strafing, were made with the sun behind the attacking aircraft.

b. Noticed again was the continuing tendency of E/A to attack from very low altitudes. However, this was far from being an exclusive tactic and in many instances bombs were released from medium and even from high altitudes. Whenever engaged from the ground by AAA, few bombing runs were completed and, in most cases, bombs were apparently released haphazardly with the pilot more intent upon escape than upon accurate bombing, as the results achieved show.

c. Some AAA Gun Battalions have cited increasing instances of German A/C, (which ordinarily take continuous evasionce tactics in flying across LOCs), flying a straight-line course at altitudes only a thousand feet over IAS top limits. This has led to their conclusion that German pilots, well aware of the restrictions imposed on AAA gun fire, feel secure in flying at slightly above the IAS ceilings.

d. In an attack upon artillery and other targets, a flight of 75 E/A of mixed types approached at noontime at an altitude of 18,000-20,000 ft. When over the target area, they broke formation and approximately 30 of them, in groups of two, began a circling descent to 3,000-4,000 ft, from which altitude they began a dive-bomb and strafing attack lasting some time.

e. E/A were overhead at all hours, both day and night, so that no time seemed to be preferred for attack or reconnaissance.

f. In an attack upon targets in HERSTHALTRAU, 7 Jet-propelled Me-262's attacked at elevation from altitudes of 300 - 5,000 ft. These A/C first bombed at the end of a long, shallow dive and then came low to strafe targets of opportunity.

3. Miscellaneous Notes

For a period of 14 days, from 4 December to 18 December, the 574th AAA AW Bn (M) furnished antiaircraft protection to the bridge crossing the SAAR River into SAARLAUTERN. The bridge had been captured intact on 5 December by elements of the 95th Inf Div, the vital AAA protection given to this vital crossing. Battery "A" was assigned the mission and at 0930, 14 December, the 1st platoon was given March Order, to proceed to an assembly point, vic GERSWEILER, GERMANY, preparatory to occupying positions in defense of the bridge.

A Recn party went forward to select gun sites and upon arrival at SAARLAUTERN found the town to be under intense enemy small arms, sniper and artillery fire. The S-3 of the 379th Inf Regt suggested not bringing in AAA at this time because of the uncertainty of a counter-attack. However, it was decided to continue as planned and the Recn party completed the selection of positions on foot.

The guns were brought up and while Sec #4 was building revetments, a heavy concentration of enemy artillery fire forced members of the crew to take cover. Shortly thereafter, enemy MG fire harassed the position and an NCO, who had elected to remain at his M-51, fired 200 rds .50 Cal ammo from his exposed position, silencing the enemy MG nest. In order to emplace the M-51 at Sec #2, it was necessary to build a revetment and then back the M-51 into position. An NCO, with assistance, built three sides of the revetment while lying on his side, then backed the mount into position, disconnected the trunk, and completed the revetment. Sniper fire originating from a church steeple located about 150 yds from the gun section, forced members of Sec #3 to take cover on several occasions. Bazooka fire was ordered on the steeple and an NCO fired 9 rds of bazooka ammo from an exposed position in the middle of the street. Later on, at the request of an Inf lieutenant, 21 rds 1/2cm AP ammo were fired into the tower and sniper fire from this source ceased.

About 1800 hrs, 6 Dec, "A" Btry Commander was directed to move two gun sections across the river. Accompanied by the Bd Platoon Commander, he made a reconnaissance on foot and selected the two gun sites. Gun sections #3 and #4 moved across the bridge and occupied positions under heavy artillery fire. Wire communications were established between the battery and all gun sections.

During the first 36 hrs that the platoon occupied positions, all gun sections were under extremely heavy enemy artillery fire, averaging 200 rds per hour. After that time and until 0400, 18 Dec, at which time the Bn was relieved of this mission, approximately 31,050 rds of enemy artillery landed in the bridge area.

During the period of the defense of the SAARLAUTERN bridge a director, a power plant, a truck and an M-51 quadruple machine gun mount were destroyed by enemy artillery fire. In addition to the loss of 10,835 rds .50 Cal ammo and some 1/2cm ammo. The M-51 was destroyed by two direct hits at 0050, 4 Dec 44. No casualties were suffered and the gun was replaced on the morning of 5 Dec 44. The position was changed and the M-51 was emplaced in an open casemate which was blown by the engineers. Other equipment, including 4 trucks and one M-51, was also damaged by artillery. Personnel casualties were 1 KIA killed, and many wounded.

The period was highlighted by individual achievements and acts of heroism, for which 2 officers and 6 enlisted men received Silver Stars, 4 officers and 14 enlisted men received Bronze Stars, and 14 men were awarded Purple Hearts for wounds received.

/s/ P. R. Chamberlain, Jr,
P. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR,
Colonel, GSC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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7 January 1945

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 83

Period:
0600A, 29 Dec 44 to 0600A, 05 Jan 45

1. Summary of Action

a. Continuing the pace of the previous week for the first five days of the present one, the inclement was ever in force until had weather grounded its chips. Flying more day than night sorties, it struck savagely at ground targets and - except in one instance - failed in material success. The scale of attacks reached its peak New Year's Day and night, when 343 hostile aircraft were reported in raids approaching but never quite equalling the air attacks on this Army in NORMANDY. Targets most frequently attacked were highway targets vehicles and field Artillery, with a lessening in number of attacks upon supply installations. Highways from METZ to LUXEMBOURG were strafed by jagglas of up to 20 A/C, and vehicles and bridges were strafed or bombed in and near PONT-A-MOUSSON, METZ, THIONVILLE, MONTMEDY, SEDAN, ARLON, BASTOGNE, MARTELANGE, TRENTANGE, ASSDORF, LOMENY, METZERE, FLORENVILLE and other cities and villages. An Ordnance dump vic BOULAY was strafed and bombed; railheads and railroad installations at SEDAN MANCHERULLES, TOUL, ESCH and LATOUR, Class I or III dumps at SIVRY and ARLON, and parked vehicles and tanks at various places, including RAMSBROUCH, all were attacked. Artillery was frequently attacked and in XX Corps zone, flights as large as 50 E/A fired machine guns, rockets and cannon at gun sites. 57 E/A attacked BASTOGNE on New Year's night. The damage from all these attacks was slight in comparison with the scale of the effort. A few vehicles were damaged and some personnel casualties were caused. An attack on the airfield near METZ, however, had more success though at great cost to the enemy. There, E/A bounced the field to strafe and destroy 20 closely-parked P-47's and damage 17 others. Of the 175 E/A attacking, 16 were shot down by AAA in the METZ area defense, and another was probably destroyed. Many other E/A covered the army zone on reconnaissance and there were few AAA units that did not sight and engage some hostile A/C.

b. 146 Me 262 were sighted over the area, of which 4 were engaged without result. One crashed in an open field, causing no damage.

c. Totals for the week, and to date from 1 August 1944 (corrected) are as follows:

	Me109	Fw 190	Ju 87	Ju 88
Week	334	647	86	38
To Date	2,382	5,487	436	859

	Me 410 & Ju 188	Me 262	HS 129	Do 217
Week	46	4	0	0
To Date	178	30	0	5

Ammunition expenditures on AAA firing for the week (shoot and test fire expenditures included) are as follows:

20mm	40mm	37mm	.50 Cal
3,014	7,441	3,855	841,533

2. GAF Tactics Notes

a. In attacking METZ airfield at 0520 New Year's morning, the German aircraft approached from the North at altitudes ranging from 1,500 ft down aboard to ground level, and speeds of 250 - 300 mph. Over the field, they split into elements of three which circled the field to attack from the four points of the compass and, as the attack progressed, these split up and the planes attacked individually. These still flying then departed to the North, hedge-hopping and strafing MOSELLE River bridges on the way out.

b. Dive-bombing was a tactic more frequently employed than heretofore, though other approaches were used, as well. The A/C frequent ly attacked from out of the sun. Accuracy was rather poor, however. Near RAMSBROUCH a plane attempted to bomb vehicles dispersed in an open field but, instead, hit a church, demolishing it.

c. Strafing often was done from extremely low altitudes and in attacking Field Artillery, strafing with machine gun and cannon and rocket-firing were almost exclusively the methods used.

d. A jet-propelled Me-163 was engaged vic XII Corps Artillery while cruising at 250 mph. In avoidance of AAA fire, it was reported to have accelerated to approximately 500 mph in a short space of time.

e. The AAA Gun Battalion in SAARLAUTERN IAS reported that E/A passing through, upon one occasion dropped "Window" in such large quantities that radars could not stay on target, nor could the targets be carried thru on remote.

f. Increasing efforts to create momentary confusion among AAA gun crews by the dropping of flares has been noted. Various colors and combinations of flares have been dropped, but there is no reason to believe recognition codes have been compromised.

g. In one strafing attack upon Field Artillery by approximately 15 E/A, the bulk of the planes created a diversion on one side of the area to allow a single Me-109 sneak in from the other side and strafe.

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a. Many of the battalion engagements these past two weeks have been outstanding. On 26 December, a total of 36 E/A attacked the artillery with the 26th Inf Div and a division bridge crossing of La SURE River. The 590th AAA AW Bn, a self-propelled unit, engaged 25 of these, claiming 15 Cat Is and 3 Cat IIs. The attacking A/C came in at speeds of 250 to 300 mph, and at altitudes of [illegible] feet. Although almost all Cat Is claimed crashed within [illegible] of the firing units, they vary the pattern, 2 gun sections protecting the bridge from A/C, bearing shooting down several A/C, lowered their [illegible] that took effect vation, machine gun and sniper positions across the river, according for 15 enemy casualties and materially assisting the advance of the infantry.

b. Located well within artillery range and taking an occasional pounding, the 217th AAA Gun Bn is in BASTOGNE, where it has been almost constantly firing throughout several nights, using both 90mm and .50 cal weapons. On the night of 1 January, it had 57 engagements between 1825 and 0600 hours, with most activity concentrated between 2200 - 0100 hrs. The E/A came in singly and in pairs at altitudes averaging 4,500 ft, but on occasion as low as 900 ft. Radars performed well despite liberal dropping of "window". Target pick-ups were made at 900 ft altitudes twice. It was shot down on the second run-up and crashed 200 yds from the gun position which engaged it. After crashing, the pilot seemed still full of fight and was shot by nearby FA personnel after he exhibited considerable hostility. Another plane crashed when .50 cal hits caused the motor to conk out. The pilot, illiterate, was apparently unhurt. Quitting his ship he started a dash for the woods, but was delayed when 2 rounds of 40mm tracer were fired across his bow, and he thought it better to sit down and wait for his captors to catch up with him. Following this, 2 more Me-109s, curious about their fellow A/C, flew low to inspect the crash and were both shot down and crashed nearby. The 465th AAA AW Bn feels it was a lovely day. In all the 112th AAA Gp reported 33 Cat Is and 12 Cat IIs for activities during the day by the AAA units within XX Corps zone.

d. Preliminary to the action at METZ airfield, units under control of the 24th AAA Gp (30th AAA Brig) had established a defense for all METZ, including the airfield. The CO, 411th AAA Gun Bn, was designated area defense commander and for his defenses had 4 batteries of guns, 1 battery of the 466th AAA AW Bn (SP) and 2 batteries of the 386th AAA AW Bn (SP), attached to Third US Army for operational control from the 51st AAA Brigade (the ADC Brigade supporting XIX TAC). Only the 386th AAA Bn was in direct defense of the airfield, alone, and its first engagements with enemy aircraft gave it 8 Cat Is from the 15 targets it engaged. Batteries of the 411th Gun Bn used .50 cal fire exclusively, with the exception of one course fired by its 90mms, by gunner 7 Cat Is, and the 466th Self-propelled Bn, firing at the flight only as it approached and departed to the North, got a Cat I and Cat II. Several of the hit E/A crashed on the field, or blew up over it, spraying parts for many yards around. Most of the other carcasses already have been found.

e. Battalions bothered by frozen solenoids in the present cold weather conditions have shown ingenuity in solving the problem. The 796th AAA AW Bn, a self-propelled unit, attaches a small hose to the exhaust of the turret generator motor and heats the solenoids with the hot exhaust gasses. The 547th AAA AW Bn (M) has found that turning on the firing switch let enough current pass thru the solenoids on M-51 mounts to warm them in 3 - 4 minutes. Machine gunners are instructed to open the top cover, point the guns to a safe field of fire, and turn on the firing switch, taking care that the trigger is not released.

f. The 635th AAA AW Bn (M) is experimenting with a method of conducting unseen ground fire by 40mm guns. Range and azimuth drums have been made by calibrating 90mm shell cases and fitting them to elevating and traversing mechanisms of a 40mm towed mount. Test firing to determine accuracy and practicability of the method is being conducted.

g. Under certain conditions, tracer ammunition has been used by M-51 and half-track mounts when employed in ground support roles. Ordinarily, this involves the hazard of drawing mortar and artillery fire as the source of fire, even when deflected, is soon discovered. When used, however, tracers have proved of considerable value in bolstering morale of our own troops, who delight in the readily apparent spray of fire, and are sure of its direction. Now, from PW sources, comes a statement from the enemy.

"The defenders of BASTOGNE, in repulsing the attack of 3 PG Div in the early morning hours of 30 Dec, did so partly by a lavish expenditure of tracer bullets. All PW ascribe to them a considerable part in lowering morale. The lighting effect of the tracers made every soldier feel that he could not possibly go any farther without being spotted immediately. Secondly, the certain feeling that every tracer bullet comes straight onto the man, immobilized many of the enemy, especially inexperienced young Replacements, through sheer fear. Even such enemy personnel as had already some five years of warfare to its credit, men that have gone through the STALINGRAD battle, commented on the frightening display of fireworks ("Feuerzauber"), more intense than anything they had previously experienced." (Source: Third US Army Daily Periodic Report No. 208)

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain, Jr.
/s/ F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS
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*AUTH: CO, Third US Army
*INIT: FRC
*DATE: 16 Jan 45

16 January 1945

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 24

Period:
050600A to 120600A

1. SUMMARY OF ACTION

a. Clouds, snow and haze halted most air activity during the week. In Third US Army area, a total of 4 raids by 5 enemy aircraft were observed in efforts which, following upon the heavy raids of the previous two weeks, were anticlimatic. 2 single E/A which made no attacks were observed near BASTOGNE, and a flight of 2 other E/A attempted to strafe and bomb a weak force in the same general area. One E/A flew over LUXEMBOURG, apparently on reconnaissance. All 5 A/C were detected during hours of darkness. Other A/C, believed to be hostile, were detected by radars. AAA engaged 3 of the 5 reported E/A, making no claims.

b. 6 pilotless aircraft were observed over the area, 3 of them crashing without causing any reported damage. All but one of these were observed during hours of darkness.

c. Totals for the week, and to date from 1 August 1944, are as follows:

	RAIDS	NO. E/A	CAT I	CAT II
Week	4	5	0	0
To Date	2,396	5,432	516	259
	PAC OVER AREA	PAC ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	6	0	0	0
To Date	176	30	0	3

2. GAF TACTICS NOTED

No new tactics were reported.

3. MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

a. The Air PW interrogation unit with Ninth Air Force has furnished information of considerable value and interest, recently obtained from German Air crewmen shot down by our AAA. In particular, a Ju-88 pilot criticized our light AAA by saying it often opens fire with tracer at such long ranges that it was frequently possible for a pilot to locate the firing section and swing out around it in a circle, then never coming into really effective AAA range.

b. Of encouraging nature is information from the gunner of an Me-110, shot down by AAA near SAARBURG just after midnight, 27 December. He stated that the turn-over in his unit, in both flying personnel and aircraft, was very heavy due to the toll of our AAA. One Me-110 had returned to base, a week before his capture, with 84 medium caliber perforations in wings and fuselage.

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain Jr
/s/ F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR,
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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21 January 1945

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 25

Period:
120600A to 190600A

1. SUMMARY OF ACTION

a. Clearing skies allowed a slightly increased air effort this week, and raids by a total of 27 A/C were reported. While some flights were flown for reconnaissance, the majority of aircraft made attacks upon ground targets. Field Artillery received most of these, some 16 strafing and bombing attacks by a total of 34 A/C being made. Vehicles, and troops along highways were frequently strafed and bombed, notably via LAUBSFELD, ST MARGUERITE, EVERNDORF, NOTHUM, HAISTROFF, FELS and BOURSCHEID, and AAA positions were twice included as targets. Few attacks were apparently preplanned. Targets of opportunity were the main objectives as no supply installations, large communications centers, bridges or like targets were attacked. Some casualties were reported although the total number wounded or killed was small, and several vehicles were damaged. On the whole, missions seemed intended to harass, rather than to disrupt or seriously impede our ground efforts. Instances of reconnaissance were scarce, although flares were dropped 11 miles East of THIONVILLE, apparently for photographic purposes.

b. 8 PAC, both V-1 and V-2, were observed over Third US Army area, 2 of which crashed without doing any reported damage. One of these was reported as a V-2, but the report is unconfirmed at this date.

c. Totals for the week, and to date from 1 August 1944, are as follows:

	RAIDS	NO. E/A	CAT I	CAT II
Week	27	87	3	9
To Date	2,423	5,519	519	268
	PAC OVER AREA	PAC ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	8	0	0	0
To Date	186	30	0	3

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2. GAF TACTICS NOTES

No new tactics were noted. A/C attacked out of the sun when possible. Upon occasion, attacks came from several directions simultaneously, the attackers then climbing into the sun in avoidance of AA fire. A/C frequently dove to the attack at angles of 45°-60°, from altitudes of 1,000-2,000 ft, pulling out at very low altitudes.

3. MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

a. Summarizing the over-all story of recent German air activity on the western front, XIX TAC's A-2 has gathered interesting information in a small tract entitled "Thirty-one Days with the GAF in the West". Figures given include claims of both air and ground forces, made in beating the GAF to its knees.

"10. In summarizing the GAF activity on the Western Front during the period covered by this report (17 December 1944 to 16 January 1945), it may be said that:

a. The enemy flew an average of 275/300 sorties daily in the Western battle area.

b. Total claims of Allied units, as reported, are 1740 enemy aircraft destroyed, 208 probably destroyed, and 380 damaged.

c. The 1740 enemy aircraft reported as destroyed represents about 20% of the sorties flown.

"11. To appreciate the recuperative powers of the GAF, the following estimates on production of their single-engine fighters may be of interest:

a. The enemy single-engine fighter aircraft production for October 1944 is estimated to have been 850 Me-109s and 650 FW-190s.

b. It is believed that the total number of new Me 109s and FW-190s produced in November was about 50 less than in the previous month.

c. Estimates for December are not yet available, but indications lead to the belief that production during this month should at least equal that of November.

"12. The single-engine fighter strength of the German Air Force, based in Germany (not including fighter aircraft employed on the Russian front) 16 December 1944 to the 16th of January 1945 is estimated as follows:

Date	W GERMANY (8 of 11th)	E GERMANY (8 of 11th)	TOTAL
16 December	1350	650	2000
25 December	1250	550	1800
2 January	1000	575	1575
9 January	1095	425	1520
16 January	1000	450	1450

"13. Of the 1,000 enemy single-engine fighter aircraft on the Western Front, there are approximately 600 considered as operationally serviceable. Of the 600 serviceable aircraft, there are 250/275 within range of XIX TAC (and Third US Army) installations.

"15. d. With reinforcements from NE and SW GERMANY, the GAF is capable of doubling his single-engine fighter forces in range of the Third US Army.

e. Up to 150 night fighters may be employed on harassing attacks....

f. The enemy can make dive-bombing attacks, at night ....using formations of up to 50 aircraft (Ju-87s)."

b. The CO, XII Corps Artillery, has advised that fire by Battery C of the 119th AAA Gun Bn, used in a ground role for the period 16 - 21 December, was of considerable help, thickening the fires of artillery with the Corps and in at least one instance being instrumental in averting a threatened enemy tank attack. The battery fired 1,800 rds of 90mm ammo during the period.

c. The 2d platoon of the 390th AAA AW Bn's "B" Battery recently was called upon to fire a ground mission in support of infantry. The enemy was located in a wooded area bounded by two roads, between WILTZ and BOTHUM. A foot reconnaissance was made by the Platoon Commander as a result of which he decided to back his four half-tracks along the road up to the area, using fire from the tracks alternately so that continuous fire could be delivered. As a weapon moved forward, or completed fire and was pulled out, its movement was covered by fire from the other tracks. On a succeeding day the same mission was repeated, fire being delivered this time from the other road. Small arms fire from very close range was encountered, but armor on the tracks afforded good protection against it. Heavy mortar and artillery fire fell upon the road and nearby road junction soon after this second firing mission was completed, so the half-tracks were quickly moved out. Only one casualty, resulting from small arms fire, was suffered. Infantry which swept the area reported 30 enemy were killed and 16 wounded, mostly as result of the fire, and 20 PWs were taken from the area.

Firing could not be done from a distance as the surrounding area was wooded. The Battalion Commander recommended that half-tracks should not normally be used in a ground role which involved taking them into enemy-held territory not providing adequate cover. However, since in this instance a foot reconnaissance was made and there were no indications either of enemy tanks or TDs in the vicinity, it was concluded the employment was feasible and the results satisfactory.

d. From the 633d AAA AW Bn comes another report of ground firing by M-51 (quad .50 cal) mounts. Weather limited visibility to 50 yds, but this had been foreseen and aiming stakes had been emplaced for each mount, indicating the azimuth to the selected target. Range had been computed and elevation was set by gunners' quadrant using firing table data.

e. From the same battalion comes report of an unusual casualty. An 88mm shell struck a house and, without detonating, passed thru its foot thick wall, went across a room and thru another wall 4 inches thick, where it struck the ankle of soldier who was walking up some stairs. The shell continued thru the stairway and into another room where it struck another wall and finally exploded.

f. In the interests of improving air-ground recognition, a discussion had with Army's G-3 (Air) and a representative from Ninth Air Force brought out the fact that in relatively few cases are amber flares fired from the ground seen by pilots in the air. While realizing the difficulties and even hazards involved, it was suggested that every effort be made to fire the flares so that they burst somewhere ahead, along the line of the plane's line of flight. Other units in the area which observe such attacks should also fire flares, keeping in mind that a flare must be fired intelligently if it is to be seen by the pilot.

g. Also attached are airplane silhouettes which it is planned to make a regular addition to this publication.

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain, Jr.
/t/ F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

1 Incl
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

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





TEMPEST II is a RAF innovation with the Bristol "Centaurus" radial engine in place of the Napier-Sabre in-line engine. The same airframe is used, but despite the greater power developed by the Centaurus IV motor, Tempest II is inferior in performance because of increased drag. The Centaurus IV engine develops 2,400 hp at 5,000 ft alt, and gives Tempest II a maximum speed of over 465 mph at 19,000 ft alt. It has a wing span of 41 ft and is 34 ft long. Most notable difference between these two models is the absence of the bulging airscoop on the Tempest II.

The DOUGLAS C-74 is a new four-engined transport which is under development. It is an enlarged version of the C-54 and is fitted with four Pratt & Whitney "Double-Wasp" R-2550 engines.

Incl No 1 to Hq Third US Army AAA Weekly Int Report No 25, 21 Jan 45.

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET

UNIT: PAC
DATE: 28 Jan 45

28 January 1945

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 26

Period:
190600A to 260600A

1. SUMMARY OF ACTION

a. The GAF, licking its wounds as a result of recent drubbings, bothered by bad weather, and undoubtedly called for duty more pressing on the Eastern front, this week set a record for inactivity over Third US Army zone. One raid by one, lone aircraft in the BASTOGNE area was all that was reported. It was a quiet week.

b. 11 PAC were reported over the area. One of these is reported to have crashed in a heavily wooded spot via LUXEMBOURG. No damage is believed to have been caused. All others passed without falling.

c. Totals for the week, and to date from 1 August 1944, are as follows:

	RAIDS	NO. E/A	CAT I	CAT II
Week	1	1	0	0
To Date	2,402	5,520	519	868

	PAC OVER AREA	PAC ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	11	0	0	0
To Date	197	30	0	3

2. GAF TACTICS NOTES

No new German tactics were reported.

3. MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

a. Crews of 90mm guns will be happy to know that they no longer carry a simple thing like a 90mm gun but, instead, are T/O heirlers of a "Ratschbum". This is a nickname devised by the Germans for American 90's and expresses, according to PW recently interrogated, the sound made by the gun when fired at them as ground artillery. Rrrrratsch - bumi

b. German antiaircraft gun densities are usually much heavier than those of the Allies and the Allied Air Forces fly deep into Germany in large, massed formations. Nevertheless, figures of the Ninth Air Force for loss and damage caused by German flak are of considerable interest to Antiaircraft Artillerymen. (Source: 9th AF Int Sum No 114):

"FLAK, the most formidable foe of the Ninth's fighters and bombers....is the primary cause of loss and damage to (aircraft) of this command.

"During the period covered by this report (1 June - 30 Nov):

Bombers

(1) Flak caused 58% of all bomber losses.
(2) Enemy aircraft caused about 5% of all bomber losses.
(3) Flak caused about 97% of all bomber damage.
(4) Enemy aircraft caused about 3% of all bomber damage.

Fighter-Bombers

(1) Flak caused 53% of all fighter losses.
(2) Enemy aircraft caused 27% of all fighter losses.
(3) Flak caused 86% of all fighter damage.
(4) Enemy aircraft caused about 3% of all fighter damage.

"An analysis of bomber loss by type of mission shows that medium altitude visual bombing sustains the highest rate of loss, followed in order by blind bombing, and by miscellaneous, which includes window and leaflet dropping. When atmospheric conditions make blind bombing necessary, the Flak gunners must rely on non-visual methods of fire control, which are less accurate than visual methods.

"An analysis of fighter loss by type of mission shows that:

(1) Fighter bombing missions have by far the highest rate of loss. This results from the increased exposure to Flak incident to the low "dropping" altitude and the vulnerable "pull-out", well within the effective ceiling of light Flak fire. The rate of loss for this type mission has increased 60% during the last three months covered by this report, so it is particularly imperative that fighter pilots check constantly with their Intelligence Officers on the location of Flak, the best approach to particular targets, and the best evasive tactics to use.

(2) Escort missions have the smallest rate of loss. This is as it should be, what with the higher altitude and the fact that the aircraft being escorted would be the primary targets of the Flak defenses.

(3) Armed reconnaissance, area support, and fighter sweep missions are more than twice as hazardous as escort missions, but only about two-thirds as hazardous as bombing missions.

"In summary it is seen that in the case of both fighters and bombers Flak is responsible for almost all the damage and approximately half of the losses. Also it is seen that bomber losses due to enemy aircraft represent an almost negligible proportion of the total losses, and that enemy aircraft account for only about one-fifth of the combat losses of fighter planes."

c. Though no unit can be singled out to credit, the following happening may be of interest to those AAA units who participated in the BASTOGNE battle (Source: USSTAF Air Int Sum No 62):

"It sounds like a sequence from a Laurel and Hardy comedy, but the radio-operator of a Ju-88 night-fighter insists it's the reason he became a prisoner.

"The plane...was flying a standing patrol in the BASTOGNE area on 27 December, and the radio operator was minding his own business when American AA started popping at it. The pilot took violent evasive action, including a steep dive, which lifted the radio man from his seat and conked his head against the roof. Before he knew what was happening, the plane was pulling out of the dive and he was going in the opposite direction — so fast that he hit the floor, knocked open the escape hatch, and sailed right out into space.

"After that all he had to do was pull the ripcord and surrender to ground troops."

d. If doubt ever existed that the AAA units with the infantry face many of the hazards faced by the units they defend from air attack, the following announcement may suffice. The CO of the 377th AAA Au Bn (M), attached to the 4th Inf Div, has just received the 2d Oak Leaf Cluster to his Purple Heart, for wounds received in action in LUXEMBOURG 3 January 1945.

e. Below is a tabulation of the formal claims submitted and formal awards made to battalions for planes shot down while such units were attached to Third US Army. Awards by other armies are not tallied, therefore some units have more Categories credited to them than shown below.

(1) Brigade and Groups:

	Confirmed Claims	
	Cat I	Cat II
164th AAA Group	36	1
234 AAA Groups	95	27
278th AAA Group	43	16
324 AAA Group	20	6
132nd AAA Group	46	27
119th AAA Group	98	18
36th AAA Brigade #	106	37
TOTAL - - - - - - - - - -	420	132

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* - No longer asgd Third US Army.
# - Includes some for 27th AAA Group.

(2) Battalions:

	UNIT	Formal Claims Submitted Cat I	Cat II	Cat III	Claims Approved Cat I	Cat II	Cat III	TOTAL I & II
1.	411th AAA Gun Bn	48	8	0	41 5/6	11	1	52 5/6
2.	456th AAA AW Bn	35	11	0	30 1/2	13	0	43 1/2
3.	465th AAA AW Bn	34	82	0	24 1/2	15	0	39 1/2
4.	217th AAA Gun Bn	39	4	3	28	9	4	41 1/2
5.	4654 AAA AW Bn *	27	5	0	26	9	4	35
6.	120th AAA Gun Bn	38	3	0	24	5	1	31
7.	119th AAA Gun Bn	24	15	0	23	6	6	30
8.	390th AAA AW Bn (SP)	19	7	0	17 5/6	7	0	24 5/6
9.	469th AAA AW Bn (SP)	24	3	0	23 1/2	2	0	25 1/2
10.	4454th AAA AW Bn *	24	1	0	20	2	2	23 1/2
11.	119th AAA Gun Bn	20	4	1	17 1/2	4	2	21 1/2
12.	777th AAA AW Bn (SP)	21	2	1	18 1/4	2	2	20 1/4
13.	4754 AAA AW Bn *	14	4	0	13	4	2	17
14.	390th AAA AW Bn *	13	1	0	10 7/12	2	0	12 7/12
15.	4524 AAA AW Bn	15	1	0	10	2	0	12
16.	328th AAA Gun Bn	11	1	0	8 1/3	3	1	12 1/3
17.	386th AAA AW Bn	9	4	0	8 1/3	3	1	11 1/3
18.	469th AAA AW Bn (SP)	7	10	0	4	7	1	11
19.	547th AAA AW Bn	11	0	1	8 1/2	1	1	9 1/2
20.	55lst AAA AW Bn	7	4	1	5 1/3	4	1	9 1/3
21.	457th AAA AW Bn	6	5	2	5 1/2	3	1	9 1/2
22.	537th AAA AW Bn	5	7	0	5 1/4	2	1	7 1/4
23.	469th AAA AW Bn	7	0	0	5 1/3	1	0	6 1/3
24.	329th AAA Gun Bn	5	2	0	3 1/4	2	1	5 1/4
25.	6334 AAA A.. Bn	5	2	0	4	1	0	5
26.	387th AAA AW Bn *	3	2	0	2	2	1	4
27.	796th AAA AW Bn	5	0	0	4 1/2	0	0	4 1/2
28.	460th AAA AW Bn (SP)	3	2	0	4	1	0	5
29.	109th A.. Gun Bn	5	0	0	4	1	0	5
30.	635th AAA AW Bn	4	1	0	4 1/2	0	0	4 1/2
31.	449th AAA AW Bn	1	5	0	4	1	0	5
32.	546th AAA AW Bn	2	4	0	3	1	0	4
33.	550th AAA AW Bn	3	2	0	3	1	0	4
34.	776th AAA AW Bn	1	7	0	3	1	0	4
35.	467th AAA AW Bn (SP)	3	2	0	3	2	0	5
36.	782d AAA AW Bn *	2	3	0	1/2	2	0	2 1/2
37.	82d FTA (Fr) *	2	0	0	1 1/3	1	0	2 1/3
38.	2034 AAA AW Bn *	1	2	0	1	1	0	2
39.	40lst AAA AW Bn *	2	0	1	1	0	0	1
40.	549th AAA AW Bn	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
41.	559th AAA AW Bn *	1	0	0	1	1	0	2
42.	795th AAA AW Bn *	1	0	0	1	1	0	2
43.	778th AAA AW Bn (SP)	1	1	0	1/3	0	0	1/3
44.	447th AAA AW Bn *	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
45.	569th AAA AW Bn	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	TOTALS - - -	564	168	14	420	132	65	592

--No longer asgd Third US Army

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain, Jr.
/s/ F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

1 Incl -
Incl No 1 - Aircraft Recognition - FW-190-D and FW-190.

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AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION

FOCKE-WULF 190-D



FOCKE-WULF 190







FOCKE-WULF 190 - Long the backbone of the German fighter forces, the F-W 190 has developed through many different series and sub-types to be one of the two most widely used enemy fighters. For the purposes of recognition, it can be broken down into two main types: the "D" series and the "A", "F", "C", "S", "F" and "G" series.

Series "D" is the "long nose" version. Two sub-types of this series are known, one powered by the DB 603 and the other by the Jumo 213 in-line engines. The latter motor is the more common. The fuselage has been lengthened behind the cockpit to compensate for the increased nose length. Over-all length of the aircraft has been increased by 2'-6". Although no performance details are available on the "D" series, it is believed to have capabilities at least equal to some of our best fighters.

The other series differ from each other mainly in internal characteristics such as tankage volume, radial engine types, armament, radios and armor. Of the "F" and "G" series only a few experimental models were built. The "F" series, an offshoot of the "A" series, is intended primarily for ground attack. For this purpose, extensive belly armor was added. The "S" series, another offshoot of the "A" series, is intended for use as a long-range fighter-bomber and reconnaissance aircraft.

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
AUTH: CG, THIRD US Army
INIT: PRC
DATE: 5 Feb 45

5 February 1945

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 27

Period:
260600A to 020600A

1. SUMMARY OF ACTION

a. One lone plane, venturing into BASTOGNE under cover of darkness, was the sole bit of GAF activity reported in Third US Army area. Once again, miserable flying weather and the urgencies of the Eastern front combined to restrict even normal intruder and reconnaissance missions.

b. Two PAC were observed. One crashed in a densely wooded area, but no damage was reported.

c. Totals for the week, and to date from 1 August 1944, are as follows:

	RAIDS	NO. E/A	CAT I	CAT II
Week	1	1	0	0
To Date	2,465	5,521	519	268
	PAC OVER AREA	PAC ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	2	0	0	0
To Date	199	30	0	3

2. GAF TACTICS NOTES

a. To obtain a variety of viewpoints on recent German air tactics, the S-2s of Army AAA Brigade and of separate AAA Groups were canvassed for comments and conclusions. Lack of space prevents printing these in full, so that extracts, only, appear below.

30th AAA Brigade, S-2

"...Generally speaking, units of this command have been assigned principal missions of defending bridges, supply installations, rails, roadways and airfields in that area bounded by corps rear boundaries and the Army rear boundary and have discovered that these areas are attacked from the air only when conditions in the GAF and the army are such that planes must be committed to attain an important or desperate end.

"...In periods of attack by Third Army forces the missions defended by our units have rarely been attacked, the main activity noted by the AAA protecting them being an occasional reconnaissance mission flown at medium or high altitudes. During this same period of quietude, however, reports from corps AAA units indicate much low-level strafing and bombing of front line troops concentrations and movement.

"On the opposite and unusual side of the picture there is the recent period of German ground offensive, in furtherance of which German air plunged wholeheartedly. During the most active part of this offensive the GAF treated corps and Army areas very similarly. Practically every type of defended area was struck at least once during the offensive, with dumps and convoys as the principal targets, the one exception being the airfield attack on 1 January, near METZ.

"During this period, Me-109s were engaged by Brigade units more than any other type, although a few FW-190s and Ju-88s were reported in the raiding parties on occasion. It was especially interesting to note that the new jet-propelled aircraft were conspicuous by their absence from the Army area during this period.

"...The present Russian offensive has without doubt affected the disposition of the German air force by drawing planes to the East, while sectional bombings by our strategic air force and overrunning of oil fields in the East has hurt the strength of the GAF by depriving it of its most vital supply, fuel.

"The loss of the initiative by the Germans on the West and their return to the defensive will surely result in a period of limited air activity in Army rear areas until Hitler becomes so desperate that he must commit the remainder of his air force to attack every target available to him no matter where it may be located."

106th AAA Group, S-2

(Since 22 October 1944, this Group has provided defense for the City of LUXEMBOURG, Radio Luxembourg, steel mills at DIFFERDANGE and airstrip 97. Until 17 December, air activity was light, consisting chiefly of reconnaissance missions. After that date, activity increased materially.)

"During the period of the German counter-offensive, the battalions attached to the Group engaged as many as 35 enemy flights, totaling 99 E/A in twenty four hours, and a total of 195 enemy flights in the 18 days...

"Seldom has the GAF sent multiplane flights over the area in the past three months, and in only three instances were as many as three enemy planes encountered in one flight. Further, during the entire period in LUXEMBOURG there have been but three 'seen' engagements...

"Some bombing and strafing was experienced while the GAF was operating in force, although there seemed to be no specific objectives for the attacks...On numerous occasions targets engaged by 90mm guns dove to very low altitudes and utilized deep valleys, masked from radar coverage, as routes of escape.

"German pilots employed a ruse not previously experienced by units of the 106th AAA Group. When entering the gun defended areas at low altitudes, colored flares were dropped as soon as automatic weapons opened fire. This undoubtedly was intended to confuse AAA Gunners momentarily, giving aircraft an opportunity to maneuver out of range of the weapons. When fire did not cease, flares of different colors often were dropped..."

27th AAA Group, S-2 (XII Corps)

"In studying GAF tactics (for the period 21 Dec to 1 Feb) two viewpoints were considered, namely that of AAA units in Divisional area and that of AAA units in Corps area...

"Divisional area. The GAF activity was limited to reconnaissance flights and attacks on Field Artillery positions. 75% of engagements were with E/A committing no hostile act and flying at 3,000 ft altitude. In each engagement E/A took evasive action and left the area. 25% of engagements were with E/A committing hostile acts upon Field Artillery and in each case upon being engaged the E/A left the area.

"Corps area. The GAF activity can be resolved into three categories: (1) Attacks on convoys and vehicle concentrations - 50%. (2) Reconnaissance flights - 40%. (3) Attacks on supply installations - 10%. Convoys were always attacked in the vicinity of traffic bottlenecks when vehicles tended to close up. Supply dumps attacked were in the vicinity of the Corps rear boundary. It is believed that there were no attacks on bridges only because there were no large bridges within the Corps.

"Conclusions:

(1) In Division areas the GAF was mainly concerned with reconnaissance.

(2) In Corps area the GAF was mainly concerned with vehicular traffic reported by reconnaissance flights.

(3) The GAF will not continue missions when accurate AAA fire is brought to bear upon them. In other words, 'They don't like it'."

324 AAA Group, S-2 (XII Corps)

"Most of the activity of the GAF during this period (3 December 1944 to 31 January 1945) was directed at harassing the front line troops and division trains. A few attacks were made upon rear installations in an apparent effort to knock out the railway and railroad underpass at ARLON.

"For the attacks on ARLON, the GAF used planes identified as Me-410s and Me-110s, bombing from low altitudes within range of AW fire. One attack made at ARLON during daylight hours took full advantage of low cloud cover to conceal approach and departure from target. In a strafing attack made on the ARLON-LUXEMBOURG road, the GAF used several SEP with one E/A making a strafing attack out of the sun while the others circled providing cover and then followed in a strafing dive after the preceding attacking E/A had regained altitude.

AAA
XX

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"During this period there has been no report of any flights of heavy bombers over the III Corps area."

136th AAA Group, S-2 (XX Corps)

"...The Corps interrogation of several pilots points to the fact that the primary objectives of their effort (during the part of December) were grounded US aircraft.

"The E/A attacking front line troops would usually depart upon being engaged by AAA fire. However, on several occasions the GAF pressed the attack despite effective AAA fire...Divisional troops have reported that when E/A came in over the tree tops with cut motors; the sound resembles that of a Cub plane.

"...The attackers were obviously well informed on terrain, as they were able to fly at great speeds at a very low altitude. Numerous reports state that the attacks were made from 50 feet off the ground. This would indicate that the scattered sorties over the area earlier in the month had gathered sufficient information for a detailed study of terrain features as well as a general appreciation of various Field Artillery installations. It would also indicate that the Luftwaffe had considered an extremely low altitude attack advantageous inasmuch as AAA gunners would easily recognize the hazards of engaging below safe levels and perhaps experience some difficulty. In several instances, enemy planes approached along deep valleys and draws where Field Artillery positions were well defiladed. In many cases the tactical disposition of Antiaircraft defenses, well-sited for a 360° field of fire, precluded the possibility of engaging aircraft that took full advantage of terrain and flew low along these valleys and draws... In one instance during the attack on January 1st, the 537th AAA AW Bn had placed an M-51 mount on the same level as the well defiladed Field Artillery positions. This mount was responsible for the destruction of an Me-109, who undoubtedly was overcome with surprise in finding his avenue of approach fully covered...This incident suggests that although fields of fire would not be 360°, a small percentage of AAA fire power probably should be disposed on equal terrain levels with the Field Artillery to cover the approach of aircraft through the numerous valleys and draws peculiar to this zone of operations.

"Observers over the Corps front during recent action states noticeable leak of the usual evasive action by aircraft engaged by AAA. Perhaps the daring behavior of the Luftwaffe is beginning to far outdistance the experience of its pilots."

113th AAA Group, S-2 (VIII Corps)

"...the majority of air attacks (in our area) during December, 1944 were directed at railroads, marshalling yards, bridges and critical road junctions.

"During the period 010001A January 1945 to 050981 January 1945, a total of 55 raids were reported by AAA units attached to VIII Corps. Types could not be identified in 27 raids. Twin-engined E/A (Me-410s, Me-210s, Ju-88s and Ju-188s) made up 2/3 of the raids. In all instances they attacked singly and generally bombed or strafed from altitudes below 1,000 ft. Twin-engined types observed during daylight hours were in level flight, at altitudes from 2,000 to 7,000 ft and were apparently employed for reconnaissance as no attacks were made.

"No definite conclusions have been drawn from the enclosed summary of enemy air activity...Jet-propelled types as well as the 'old reliable' Me-109s and FW-190s were conspicuous by their absence.

217th AAA Gun Bn (M) - "On the night of 1 and 2 January...an very determined effort was made to get in the BASTOGNE area. Planes came in from all directions using no main approach, and at varying altitudes. Objectives seemed to be troop concentrations and gun positions rather than roads, bridges or other definite objective.

"On the same night, one German A/C came into the IAZ with landing lights on and caused a little confusion to machine gunners at first...

"Since the majority of engagements by this unit have been at maximum altitudes of 2,000 yds, it is believed that a close-in defense is the most desirable for the protection of a specified area. Unless the weather was clear with a bright moon, the enemy was never over in great strength.

"It has been the experience of this unit that, once heavy enemy air activity has ceased in an IAZ, the GAF makes no further attempts at heavy raids if 90mm AAA has been encountered. When heavy AAA is encountered by the GAF, no further effort is made to make a bomb run but, instead, they tend to jettison their bombs and take evasive action.

"Window is still employed by the GAF but it is not cut to our SCR 584 wave-length, nor is it used in sufficient quantities to disrupt tracking by radar.

"The first daylight attack this unit has ever experienced was at 0035, 2 January 1945 after a big night before."

"A" Battery, 695th AAA AW Bn (M) - "At 1803Z3A December, Guns #4 and #3...were attacked by one single-engine fighter strafing the positions from an altitude of 300 - 500 ft. The plane approached #4 Sector position from the West at about 250 mph and very low and attacked from a shallow dive...Plane then leveled off and continued on a straight line to attack #3 (M-51) position. Activity occured on a very dark night... However, pilot of the E/A apparently knew exactly where the two guns attacked were located...as he attacked on a direct extension of a straight line drawn between the positions."

537th AAA AW Bn (M) - "Following is a summary of observations of witnesses of GAF activity in the vicinity of WALDWISSE (WQ-125915) and OBERESCH (WQ-152895) at 0930 hrs, 1 January 1945:

"A number of Me-109s appeared simultaneously at very low altitudes, coming from several directions. The average height above the ground was less than 100 ft. These A/C flew down the valleys and barely skimmed over ridges in order to get down into the next valleys. One Me-109 at one point was reported coming up over a hill, flying about 5 ft from the ground. Because of these tactics, fire units could not engage targets because of the danger of firing into friendly troops and installations. From many positions the planes were below the horizon for almost entire courses. This shows the need for having some AAA weapons emplaced on lower levels down in the valleys, especially in the type of terrain where A/C can fly for some distance down a valley.

"The few two-motored enemy A/C seen recently flew generally on level flight just out of AAcm range or at higher altitudes.

"...A single FW-190 flew over a portion of our lines...apparently on a reconnaissance flight. When engaged the A/C dropped its landing wheels down and left a trail of black smoke. A few seconds later it was glimpsed again flying normally on a level course, with landing wheels up, and not smoking. The reason for this action could not be determined."

b. Below is a tabulation showing the number of actual attacks made against specified targets, and numbers of aircraft involved in making these attacks. By referring to figures previously given in earlier reports for enemy aircraft over the area, it will be seen that many enemy aircraft reported made no attack at all. Thus, for December, a total of 980 E/A were reported but, of these, only 412 were involved in attacks on ground targets. Percentages given are not figured on a basis of all aircraft observed during a month, but only on a basis of those aircraft making attacks.

	NOVEMBER		DECEMBER		JANUARY	
	Number attacks 15 Number E/A attacking - - 30		Number attacks 195 Number E/A attacking - 412		Number attacks 55 Number E/A attacking - 276	
TARGET	% Attacks	% E/A Attacking	% Attacks	% E/A Attacking	% Attacks	% E/A Attacking
Airstrips	0.0	0.0	7.2	3.4	1.9	9.1
Ammo Dumps	0.0	0.0	4.1	1.5	0.0	0.0
AAA Positions	13.3	6.7	6.7	5.8	20.7	25.4
Armd Concentrations	20.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	1.9	1.1
Arty Observation Planes	13.3	26.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bridges	0.0	0.0	1.4	4.9	3.8	0.7
Cities	0.0	0.0	9.2	21.8	11.3	4.3
Command Posts	6.7	3.3	4.6	1.5	0.0	0.0
Convoys and M/T	6.7	6.7	14.9	9.0	5.6	8.3
Engr and Ord Depots	0.0	0.0	2.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
FA Positions	40.0	36.6	7.2	26.2	16.9	21.4
Gasoline Dumps	0.0	0.0	2.6	0.7	0.0	0.0
Railroads and RR yards	0.0	0.0	10.3	3.9	1.9	0.4
Troops & Concentrations	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.5	3.9	0.7
Target Unknown	0.0	0.0	20.2	16.8	32.1	20.6
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

c. In the next table is tabulated the activities of all E/A over Third US Army area, whether attacks were made or not, from the time this Headquarters became operational. These have been broken down to show two periods. During the first period, from 1 August 1944 to 15 December 1944, the German army may be considered to have been continually on the defensive. During the second period, enemy air activity was almost entirely for the purpose of supporting the German counter-offensive and is therefore shown as an offensive period. It will be seen by glancing at the bottom line of the tabulation that most air activity during both periods was for reconnaissance. In order not to be misleading however, it should be stated that the figures for reconnaissance also contains that percentage of E/A which passed over the person reporting and may have made an attack elsewhere, unknown to him, as well as those E/A which actually made an attack the target of which could not, by reason of terrain features, be seen by the observer.

	FIRST PERIOD DEFENSIVE (1 Aug - 15 Dec 1944)		SECOND PERIOD OFFENSIVE (16 Dec 44 - 1 Feb 45)	
	Percent of Attacks	Percent of E/A Attacking	Percent of Attacks	Percent of E/A Attacking
Airstrips	0.0	0.0	1.5	2.1
Ammo Dumps	0.3	0.8	0.7	0.3
AAA Positions	4.0	5.9	2.0	3.0
Armd Concentrations	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2
Arty Observation Planes	0.5	0.4	0.0	0.0
Bridges	21.2	21.9	2.0	1.1
Cities	3.6	3.8	2.0	1.1
Command Posts	0.1	0.1	0.8	0.3
Convoys and M/T	11.3	16.2	2.7	3.3
Dams	2.3	1.7	0.0	0.0
Engr and Ord Depots	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.2
FA Positions	5.0	9.4	1.9	0.9
Gasoline Dumps	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.2
Railroads and RR yards	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.9
Troops and Concentrations	1.1	1.9	0.3	0.2
	54.3%	65.3%	14.5%	13.8%
Targets unknown or no attack made, and Recon Flights	47.3%	34.7%	85.5%	71.8%

d. In the following table column one gives altitudes and types of attack by percentages. The second column gives altitudes at which planes were observed which, however, made no attack so far as was known to the observer. (Covers only the months of November, December, January).

Type of Attack	1. Attack Made	2. No Attack Made
High Altitude (Bombing)	2.3%	.9%
Medium Altitude (Bombing)	3.0%	22.5%
Low Altitude (Bombing)	85.6%	71.6%
Dive Bombing	1.3%	
Strafing and rocket-firing	62.3%	
Unknown	6.3%	4.9%
	100.0%	100.0%

3. MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

a. As an interesting example of the coverage given by the FCC-AAOR (Fighter Control Center-Antiaircraft Operations Room), an occurrence on the night of 27/28 January is illuminating. At 0320 hrs the FCC-AAOR detected an aircraft flying South from LIEGE toward BASTOGNE. It was plotted to the BASTOGNE area and then followed as it turned around and went back North. At 0436 hrs, an aircraft was detected near METZ flying South. This was followed until the track faded. But Seventh US Army, to the South, picked it up and broadcast the plots until it passed out of the Seventh's sector, when the First French Army picked it up and carried the plot almost to the Swiss border. Thus, intelligence on hostile aircraft covered a distance of almost 300 miles, from LIEGE, BELGIUM, to SWITZERLAND.

b. For their outstanding performance in the defense of the airfield near METZ on the morning of 1 January, units concerned have been officially commended in General Orders No 23, this Headquarters, dated 25 January 1945, as follows:

"UNIT COMMENDATION - The following antiaircraft units are commended for their outstanding performance of duty:

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Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 441th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion

"H" Battery, 441th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion
"D" Battery, 441th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion
"A" Battery, 386th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion
"C" Battery, 386th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion
"B" Battery, 446th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (SP)

"On 1 January 1945, twenty five Me-109s struck an airfield near METZ, FRANCE. The enemy aircraft made four attacks on the field during a period of twenty minutes, strafing at ground level and diving from an altitude of approximately fifteen hundred feet. These attacks were met by the gun crews of the above units with typical American fortitude, each man displaying commendable bravery. Defending the field with rapidly developed and extremely effective fire, these units destroyed fourteen enemy aircraft and badly damaged four others. The heroic performance of these units is in keeping with the highest traditions of the service.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON"

c. In the same general orders, the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque was awarded to 261st Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA) for services from 6 August 1944 to 15 December 1944.

d. Attached is a tabulation of "Batting Averages" of AAA units which have been operationally employed under Third US Army.

e. Also attached is the "Aircraft Recognition" manual, covering the models of the P-51.

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain, Jr.
/s/ F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, GSC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

2 Incls -
Incl #1 - Aircraft Recognition - P-51
Incl #2 - Tabulation of AAA Batting Averages

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" & "H"

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AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION



P-51A



P-51 B & C

The P-51 is probably the best single-engined fighter with an inline engine developed in the United States. First of a long line of these aircraft, the P-51A is powered by an Allison V-1710-81 engine developing 1000 HHP at 17,500 feet. It has a maximum speed of 375 mph at 20,000 feet and a Maximum Military Speed of 396 mph at the same altitude. Armament consists of two .50 caliber MG's mounted in each wing. Two 325 lb bombs can be carried externally.

With the advent of the B & C series, the Packard V-1650-3 engine was installed and power boosted to 1120 HHP at 20,500 feet. Increased power resulted in an increased speed of 405 mph at 20,000 feet. Using War Emergency Power, speed can be jumped to 440 mph. M.S.P. can only be used for a short period of time, but is sufficient for the pilot to get away from or to close in on an enemy aircraft. Armament remains the same as does bomb load.



P 51 D

The first major change in silhouette occurred with the D Series in which the usual canopy disappeared and was replaced by a new type canopy giving the pilot better vision and possibly longer life. The Packard engine is still used in this series although the model was changed to the V-1650-7 developing 1230 HHP at 17,000 feet. Maximum speed rose to 443 mph at 30,000 feet and if necessary the M.R.P. speed of 437 mph at 24,000 feet can be used for a short period of time. Armament jumped to three .50 caliber MG's in each wing while the bomb-load remained at two 325 pounders hung externally.

With the H series, maximum quoted speed has risen to 460 mph at 30,000 feet and the M.R.P. of the Packard V-1650-11 powering this ship is 2100 hp. HHP has not been given in recent publications available to this headquarters.

The K series, similar to the D series, is reported to have had a dorsal fairing added to the fin and rudder to increase stability and control. A larger fairing at the leading edge of the wing root has slightly increased the wing area.

Incl No 1 to Hq Third US Army AAA Weekly Int Report No 27

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	UNIT	Batting Averages from 1 Aug 44 to date: TOTAL NO. E/A I & II	ENGAGED	AVERAGE	Batting Averages from 15 Dec 44 to date: TOTAL NO. E/A I & II	ENGAGED	AVERAGE	Relative Standing
1.	481st AAA AW Bn •	1	2	.5000	1	2	.5000	(2)
2.	366th AAA AW Bn •	11 1/3	24	.4722	11 1/3	24	.4722	(3)
3.	777th AAA SP Bn	20 1/4	66	.3068	1	5	.2000	(8)
4.	469th AAA SP Bn	23 1/2	102	.2304	0	1	.0000	(33)
5.	9L7th AAA AW Bn	1	5	.2000	1	5	.2000	(7)
6.	557th AAA AW Bn •	1	5	.2000				
7.	452d AAA AW Bn	12 7/12	67	.1878	3	13	.2308	(5)
8.	398th AAA SP Bn	24 5/6	134	.1793	18	53	.3396	(4)
9.	466th AAA AW Bn	41 1/2	226	.1836	19 1/2	128	.1523	(10)
10.	776th AAA SW Bn •	3	17	.1765	3	17	.1765	(9)
11.	463d AAA AW Bn •	31	190	.1632				
12.	370th AAA Gun Bn	30	184	.1616	12	87	.1379	(15)
13.	387th AAA SP Bn •	5	34	.1470				
14.	119th AAA Gun Bn	21 1/2	166	.1379	8 1/2	58	.1466	(11)
15.	448th AAA AW Bn •	7 1/4	55	.1318	2	4	.5000	(1)
16.	217th AAA Gun Bn	33	268	.1231	9	69	.1304	(16)
17.	445th AAA AW Bn •	22	179	.1229				
18.	411th AAA Gun Bn	52 5/6	434	.1217	11 1/3	80	.1417	(14)
19.	736th AAA SP Bn •	5	42	.1190	5	41	.1220	(18)
20.	459th AAA AW Bn	43	373	.1166	0	16	.0000	(36)
21.	128th AAA Gun Bn	12	105	.1142	1	28	.0357	(30)
22.	457th AAA AW Bn	9 1/3	84	.1111	2	20	.1000	(19)
23.	551st AAA AW Bn	9 1/2	88	.1080	5 1/2	38	.1447	(12)
24.	633d AAA AW Bn	5 1/4	49	.1071	1	17	.0588	(27)
25.	547th AAA AW Bn	11	111	.0991	10	109	.0917	(20)
26.	782d AAA AW Bn •	1 1/3	16	.0833	1 1/3	16	.0833	(21)
27.	459th AAA Gun Bn	6 1/3	85	.0745	6 1/3	85	.0745	(24)
28.	795th AAA SW Bn •	1	14	.0714	1	13	.0769	(23)
29.	469th AAA SP Bn	4 1/2	73	.0616	4 1/2	64	.0703	(25)
30.	546th AAA AW Bn	3	50	.0600	2	10	.2000	(6)
31.	399th AAA SP Bn •	14	240	.0583				
32.	537th AAA AW Bn	7 1/2	136	.0551	2 1/2	16	.1263	(17)
33.	467th AAA SP Bn •	2 1/2	47	.0532	2 1/2	47	.0532	(28)
34.	469th AAA SP Bn	11 1/3	233	.0486	4 1/3	54	.0802	(22)
35.	109th AAA Gun Bn	4	86	.0465	4	86	.0465	(29)
36.	447th AAA AW Bn	3	70	.0428	2	14	.1429	(13)
37.	115th AAA Gun Bn	29	719	.0403	3	99	.0303	(31)
38.	203d AAA SP Bn •	1	27	.0370				
39.	22d FTA (Pr) •	1	33	.0303				
40.	695th AAA AW Bn	4	157	.0255	0	40	.0000	(38)
41.	550th AAA AW Bn	3	157	.0191	2	29	.0690	(26)
42.	778th AAA SP Bn	1/3	29	.0115	1/3	29	.0115	(32)
43.	463d AAA AW Bn •	0	1	.0000				
44.	575th AAA SP Bn	0	3	.0000	0	3	.0000	(34)
45.	447th AAA AW Bn •	0	7	.0000	0	7	.0000	(35)
46.	377th AAA AW Bn	0	17	.0000	0	17	.0000	(37)
47.	565th AAA AW Bn	0	61	.0000	0	61	.0000	(39)
48.	473d AAA SP Bn •	17	Unknown	Unknown				
	TOTALS - - - -	592	5271	161		1505		

• - No longer under control of Third US Army

Incl No 2 to Hq Third US Army AAA Weekly Int Report No 27

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ANNEX NO. 9

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
AUTH: CG, THIRD US Army
INIT: FEC
DATE: 12 Feb 45

12 February 1945

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 28

Period:
020600A to 050600A

1. SUMMARY OF ACTION

a. There were four enemy planes over Third US Army area this week, all during hours of darkness. Only one of these made an attack, strafing a jeep on the road at (PQ4164), near MOINET. The other A/C were observed via METZ, LUXEMBOURG and the 90th Inf Div CP, apparently on reconnaissance missions. AAA engaged two of the four, with no claims resulting.

b. Four FAC were over the area. One of these, a V-1, crashed but caused neither damage nor casualties.

c. Totals for the week, and to date from 1 August 1944, are given below. There will be noted a reduction over totals stated in last week's report. This results from the adoption of a new policy under which raids and planes will henceforth be filtered by Army to eliminate duplications. In accordance with this, past records have been checked and duplications in previous reports eliminated with the result that totals have been reduced. In reporting raids and numbers of aircraft all E/A, whether within range of AAA weapons or not, will, as in the past, be reported.

	RAIDS	NO. E/A	CAT I	CAT II
Week	4	4	0	0
To Date	1,569	3,666	511	252

	FAC OVER AREA	FAC ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	4	0	0	0
To Date	205	30	0	3

2. GAF TACTICS NOTES

a. No new tactics were reported.

b. Interrogation of a Ju-88 pilot recently downed developed that the purpose of GAF night strafing and bombing is to cause convoys to black out, thus making them slow down, as much as for any other reason. Although small frag bombs and six 50-kilogram anti-personnel bombs were carried by the A/C it was not anticipated that raids of this type would cause much serious damage. (Source: USSTAF AIS No 64)

3. MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

a. The note in last week's report on the observed use by a FW 190 of the trick of dropping its wheels and emitting black smoke brings to mind the reminder that such tricks to simulate damage are common practice. FW-190s may easily create smoke by changing to a rich gas mixture and by using their emergency power. Gasoline, injected into the intake manifold after the supercharger as a coolant, will create smoke in burning. Me-190s have a somewhat similar system and in later models a cooling system using a water and alcohol injection produces the same results. AA gunners should not be fooled by this trick and where rapid acceleration accompanies the smoking should be wary of too trustfully making a claim for damaging the A/C.

b. Under General Orders No 31, this Headquarters, two AAA units were cited for their part in the battle around BASTOGNE, during which time they were under attachment to the 101st Airborne Division. These units are Battery "F", 796th AAA AW Bn (SP) and Battery "C", 482d AAA AW Bn (SP). The citation ran to the division and attached units as follows:

"These units distinguished themselves in combat against powerful and aggressive enemy forces during the period from 18 December to 27 December 1944, by extraordinary heroism and gallantry in defense of the key communications center of BASTOGNE, BELGIUM. Essential to a large-scale exploitation of his break-through into BELGIUM and northern LUXEMBOURG, the enemy attempted to seize BASTOGNE by attacking constantly and savagely with the best of his armor and infantry. Without benefit of prepared defenses, facing almost overwhelming odds and with very limited and fast-dwindling supplies, these units maintained a high combat morale and an impenetrable defense, despite extremely heavy bombing, intense artillery fire, and constant attacks from infantry and armor on all sides of their completely cut off and encircled position. This masterful and grimly-determined defense denied the enemy even momentary success in an operation for which he paid dearly in men, materiel, and eventually morale. The outstanding courage and resourcefullness and undaunted determination of this gallant force is in keeping with the highest traditions of the service.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

c. Recently the 38th AAA Brigade has been fostering a series of aircraft recognition schools among the Groups under it. The 214th AAA Group has just finished giving such a course to 166 officers and enlisted men selected on a basis of 4 EM and 1 O per gun battery and 32 EM and 2 O per Automatic Weapons Battery. The duration of the course was two weeks, with the classes lasting 45 minutes each. A Bausher projector, flashing pictures on a screen for periods of 1 to 1/100th of a second, was used with good results. From test records kept it was found that the average recognition ability of the students increased 20%, while at the same time image exposure-time was reduced from 1 to $\frac{1}{2}$ second. As a special incentive Paris passes and monetary prizes were offered to the three EM scoring highest in the course.

d. Attached as inclosure No 1 is the aircraft recognition annex.

/s/ F. P. Chamberlain, Jr
/t/ F. P. CHAMBERLAIN, JR,
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

1 Incl - Aircraft Recognition (Spitfire).

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" & "B"

AA Sec, this Hq (for 38th AAA Brig and attchd units)	- 125
G-1 (Capt Richardson)	- 1
G-2 (Sit)	- 1
G-2 (Air)	- 1
G-3 (Air)	- 1
G-3 (PAD)	- 1
SHAEF, Air Defense Div	- 1
AAO, ETOUSA	- 12
AAO, 6th Army Gp	- 1
AAO, 12th Army Gp	- 2
AAO, 1st US Army	- 1
AAO, 1st Allied Airborne Army	- 1
AAO, 5th US Army	- 1
AAO, 7th US Army	- 1
AAO, 9th US Army	- 1
AAO, 15th US Army	- 1
AAO, Fwd Echn Com Z	- 1
IX ADC	- 1
IX TAC	- 1
XII TAC	- 1
XIX TAC	- 1
A-3	- 1
A-2 (Attn: Maj Vosburg, Maj Hase)	- 2
XXIX TAC	- 1
100th Fighter Wing	- 1
VIII Corps	- 2
113th AAA Gp	- 2
52d AAA Gp	- 2
217th A.A Gun Bn	- 6
1/467th AAA SP Bn	- 1/4
635th AAA AW Bn	- 1/4
6th Armd Div	- 2
777th AAA SP Bn	- 1/4
11th Armd Div	- 2
575th AAA SP Bn	- 1/4
87th Inf Div	- 2
549th AAA AW Bn	- 1/4
90th Inf Div	- 2
537th AAA AW Bn	- 1/4
4th Inf Div	- 2
377th AAA AW Bn	- 1/4
XII Corps	- 2
27th AAA Gp	- 2
452d AAA AW Bn	- 1/4
115th AAA Gun Bn	- 6
457th AAA AW Bn	- 1/4
80th Inf Div	- 2
653d AAA AW Bn	- 1/4
5th Inf Div	- 2
1/459th AAA AW Bn	- 1/4
76th Inf Div	- 2
778th AAA SP Bn	- 1/4
14th Armd Div	- 2
1/459th AAA SP Bn	- 1/4
XX Corps	- 2
112th AAA Gp	- 2
119th AAA Gun Bn	- 6
455th AAA AW Bn	- 1/4
551st AAA AW Bn	- 1/4
99th Armd Div	- 2
1/482d AAA SP Bn	- 1/4
94th Inf Div	- 2
1/459th AAA SP Bn	- 1/4
26th Inf Div	- 2
390th AAA SP Bn	- 1/4
AAO, 64th Fighter Wing (Thru 7th US Army & XII TAC Msg Cen)	- 1
51st AAA Brig, Attn: Maj Colquitt (Thru Spitfire Msg Cen)	- 1
23d AAA Gp (XV Corps)	- 1
275th Ord Maint Co (AA)	- 6
281st Ord Maint Co (AA)	- 6
299th Ord Maint Co (AA)	- 6
309th Ord Maint Co (AA)	- 6
306th Ord Maint Co (AA)	- 6
Brig Gen R. E. Stone, Hq AFF, Army War College, Washington 25, D.C.	- 1

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

SPITFIRE V (Clipped) (Merlin)

SPITFIRE VB (Merlin)



SPITFIRE IX (Merlin)

SPITFIRE XII (Griffon)

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

SPITFIRE [illegible]

Having played a major part in the early stages of the war and still going strong, the Supermarine Spitfire is another of those aircraft which has undergone many changes since the beginning of the war. In general, this aircraft may be grouped by wing design into three types for purposes of recognition:

1. The normal elliptical wing type, used through the Battle of Britain, is fitted with several different models of Rolls Royce engines.

a. The Mark V has a Merlin 45 engine with single radiator under starboard wing.

b. Marks VIII and IX have a Merlin 61 engine with radiator under each wing.

c. The Mark XIV has a Griffon 65SM engine with a radiator under each wing.

2. The clipped wing was developed for high maneuverability at low altitude. This wing type is fitted with two different models of Rolls Royce engines.

a. Mark V (modified) has a Merlin 45 engine with single radiator under starboard wing.

b. Mark XII has a Griffon 11B engine with single radiator under starboard wing.

3. The pointed tip wing was developed for combat at high altitudes. In this type, a slight extension has been fitted to each wing tip in order to provide extra wing area and lift. This type (Mark VII with pressure cabin, and some Mark VIIIs) is always fitted with a Merlin 61 engine with a radiator under each wing.

The Spitfire is in the 400 MPH class. The Mark IX has a maximum speed of 406 MPH at 26,500 feet, the Mark XII, 397 MPH at 18,000 feet and the Mark XIV, 446 MPH at 25,400 feet. Usual armament consists of two 20mm guns and four .30 cal MG's in the wings. Although no performance data or silhouette of it is presently available, it is known that a Spitfire Mark XX is now in use. The maneuverability of the "Spit" can best be characterized in the words of an American fighter pilot who had finished a course at a RAF school. He called it "One of the sweetest ships I have ever flown."

Particular care must be exercised in recognizing this aircraft as it has often been confused with the ME-109 to which, when viewed in certain aspects, it bears a strong resemblance.

Incl No 1 to Hq Third US Army AAA Weekly Int Report No. 28

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HEAD QUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
AUTH: CG, Third US Army
INIT: PBC
DATE: 19 Feb 45

19 February 1945

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 29

Period:
0900GMT to 1606GMT

1. SUMMARY OF ACTION

a. After several weeks of almost complete inactivity, the Luftwaffe aroused itself to the extent of making several small raids. 15 E/A were over the area during the week of which 10, bent upon reconnaissance, appeared in XII Corps zone the morning of 13 February. One of these is reported to have done some strafing of unknown targets in the 78th Inf Div sector. No attacks other than this one were reported. Other enemy planes were detected during night time flying through the THIONVILLE, LUXEMBOURG, DIEKIRCH-ECHTERNACH and ECH LAKE. One of these, flying across both LUXEMBOURG and DIEKIRCH, was shot down by AAA Guns in the latter area and when found proved to be a Ju-88 carrying supplies and considerable mail to the enemy garrison at LUXEMBOURG. Of the 15 E/A reported, 13 were engaged by AAA with results as shown below.

b. 3 PAC were spotted overhead, but all apparently passed over the area as no crashes were reported.

c. Totals for the week, and to date from 1 August 1944, are as follows:

	RAIDS	NO. E/A	CAT I	CAT II
Week	11	15	3	2
To Date	1,980	3,061	514	254

	PAC OVER AREA	PAC ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	3	0	0	0
To Date	206	30	0	3

2. GAF TACTICS NOTES

No new tactics were reported.

3. MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

a. AAA Automatic Weapons units continue to be employed in diversified roles. The 447th AAA AW Bn this week used both 40mm Bofors and .50 cal quad-mounted machine guns to support the advance of the 5th Inf Div. Missions were fired in conjunction with artillery concentrations, or separately, as called for. When visibility permitted, fire was adjusted by infantry forward observers. Pillboxes, road junctions and troop concentrations on hills and down in draws were targets. 40mm tracers also were fired to designate targets for the infantry and to guide them to the targets.

b. At the request of engineers, objects floating downstream and endangering bridges under construction near ECHTERNACH were fired upon and destroyed by firing sections of the 467th AAA AW Bn. Apparently the uses of AA units are endless.

c. During the past week or so, beginning in XII Corps zone the night of 4/5 February, AAA Searchlights have been used in XII and XX Corps sectors to furnish night illumination for the infantry in the form of artificial moonlight. The big, 800 million candlepower lights have been used almost nightly as weather permitted and, once accustomed to them, front line troops have found them to be of great help. Commands of troops and of AAA Group commanders are of particular interest.

d. In XII Corps, illumination was furnished to the 5th Inf Div in its attacks over the SAUER and OUR rivers in LUXEMBOURG. Lighting was also furnished to engineers engaged in bridge-building operations. The Commanding Officer of the 278th AAA Group (XII Corps) stated:

(1) The beam of light in the sky, aimed over their objectives, enabled the troops to keep their sense of direction.

(2) The resulting illumination made it possible for the troops to distinguish trees and obstacles in their path.

(3) The lights enhanced the morale of the troops by eliminating the feeling of "blundering in the dark". After the infantry learned to keep in the shadows produced by the illumination they felt they could see the enemy and not be seen themselves.

(4) During the river crossing of assault boats lights were doused after a ten minute trial as the boats were too strongly illuminated.

(5) When used to illuminate bridge sites for engineers, 5th Inf Division G-3 reported that it enabled them to do more than twice the amount of work, during hours of darkness, than had been possible under blackout conditions.

(6) A training period in a rear area is considered desirable so that the troops can become acquainted with the effect of the illumination and made to realize the amount of light provided. In all cases where the lights have been used, troops have expected more illumination than it is possible to obtain.

e. In XX Corps, lighting was furnished the 26th Inf Div for operations in the SAARLAUTERN bridgehead area. Since these operations were confined almost entirely to street and village combat, the effect of lights upon such activity is of especial interest. The Commanding Officer of the 112th AAA Group (XX Corps), quoting infantry sources, stated:

(1) The city is heavily booby-trapped and mined. It was German practice at night to withdraw from several houses, leaving them thoroughly trapped and mined, and then to reoccupy the following morning. This tactic made it difficult to enter the vacated houses without sustaining casualties, and difficult to take prisoners. However, in one period of three nights' operations with lights not a single casualty was suffered by American patrols, though 2 enemy were killed and 5 PWs taken. In addition, one regiment relieved another coming out of the line, the relief being greatly facilitated by the lights. Furthermore, no casualties were suffered in process.

(2) Combat patrols maintained better control over their members and better direction of movement.

(3) Mined and booby-trapped areas were easily skirted.

(4) Transportation of supplies to forward elements and other installations was considerably aided.

(5) Best results were obtained when patrols were sent out before artificial moonlight was turned on.

(6) Observation and adjustment of artillery and mortar fire was improved.

(7) Vehicular accidents were decreased.

(8) Observation of the enemy's avenues of approach was improved.

(9) Enemy patrols were observed and recognized before they got into our positions.

(10) Observation of enemy vehicles was improved and enabled them to be brought under artillery fire with greater success.

(11) A counterattack by approximately a company of infantry operating in a single city block was halted, facilitated considerably by the use of lights which enabled finer adjustment of artillery and mortar fires than normally.

(12) One disadvantage noted was that the lights favored the enemy when he was located inside buildings and entrenchments, as lights disclosed friendly troop movements to him.

(13) Generally, individuals could be identified at approximately 50 yards.

(14) Vehicles were identified from 100 to 150 yards.

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(15) Vehicles and small bodies of troops were observed but not identified from 200 to 500 yards.

(16) Movements silhouetted by illumination were observed at 1,000 yards.

(17) Observation in a direct line between observer and the source of light was of greater range than 1,000 yards.

(18) After the first night of employment, the troops learned to keep well in the shadow cast by the lights.

f. Prisoner of War interrogation has revealed opinions at some divergence. For that reason, a cross-section of testimony is given below.

(1) Some PWs (266th Div Sector) claimed they liked the lights, as it facilitated their supply. In the matter of feeding, food brought up at night was not spilled, and they thereby got full rations. Food to them is a critical item. They said it also made eating more a pleasure as they could see what they were doing. Lights were further approved as it made our movements easier to detect.

(2) However, (269th Div Sector) lights also were disadvantageous as they caused their own movement to be observed with a result that their own patrol activity was greatly reduced, as was movement behind the lines.

(3) In XII Corps zone, PWs held to similar opinions, with some additions. The general consensus was that light fell on their positions with an intensity of about half moonlight. However, it was considerably brighter when there was snow on the ground.

(4) Neither officers nor men had ever seen any of our personnel silhouetted by the lights.

(5) All PWs interrogated wondered that their own artillery did not fire at the lights. They believed our lights were well-defiladed though one Pv stated he had received the beam directly in the eyes and been temporarily blinded. One PW, an artillery officer, stated that artillery did not shoot at the lights as they served as a warning of impending action and helped them as much as they did us. He could see no reason for destroying something that helped them and took no effort on their part to operate.

(6) A few PWs did not dare leave their slit trenches so long as the lights were on for fear of being observed. One SP even used the light as a beacon to which he walked to desert.

(7) All PWs were a little amused by the use of lights and felt their own people would never have thought of using them in such a manner. (Apparently they were unaware of the German use of some kind of searchlight North of BASTOGNE, in January)

g. Other PWs were interrogated as to the effect upon them of AAA Automatic Weapons fire, with the following results:

(1) The volume of infantry fire (from AAA M-4, Quadruple .50 cal mounts) was such that trench battle positions were useless in any day operation to gunners. Their own fire was limited to unaimed bursts in the general direction of our troops. PW officer prisoners stated that the heavy machine gun fire delivered in that direction made trouble impossible and inflicted heavy casualties on troops of the 106th Volks-grenadier Div caught in the open. (106th Inf Div Gen (1.Ma) reriously reports, 2nd Bn 422nd Inf, which did the fighting in support of the 14th Cav. Group)

(2) Other PW interrogated, (taken from XII Corps front) had all been in or near concrete bunkers. Four of six said the fire was too high, and they could easily walk around under it. They knew of only one man killed, and he was on his way, with another man, to take up a rifle position. The one escapee dropped flat and was able to crawl back to the bunker, though fire in this instance was only two feet off the ground. One in the bunker was slightly wounded when a s[illegible] a block of wood in one of the firing ap[illegible]

(3) One PW a veteran from the Russian front, said the Russians frequently used tracer fire. This veteran welcomed tracer fire because it could be seen and avoided, and once the source could be seen and dealt with. He stated that tracer fire had little or no effect upon morale of seasoned men, and thought the fire would be more effective if no tracer were used.

(4) Most PW apparently were unseasoned, since the voluminous tracer fire had considerable effect upon their morale. Those inside bunkers did not dare to come out; those caught outside said their morale was "crushed."

(5) None of the PWs interrogated had knowledge of the effect of fire on slit trenches or foxholes since, in cases known, fire had either been grazing or had entirely overshot the positions. However, one PW considered himself quite safe from grazing fire when lying in a trench about 16 inches deep, though he did not dare raise his head so long as the fire was going on.

h. The following commendation has been received by the CO, 155th AA AW Bn from the Commanding General, XX Corps:

"I desire to commend the 155th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion for outstanding performance in action against the enemy on 1 January 1945. For 34 minutes during the morning of 1 January 1945, approximately 60 enemy aircraft relentlessly bombed and strafed the field artillery installations which your battalion was defending. High speed diving tactics were, in general, used by the enemy, and he frequently endeavored to distract the attention of the antiaircraft gunners by sending in one planes from a different direction. The lone planes would dive on or near the antiaircraft unit, thus hoping to reduce the effectiveness of the antiaircraft fire on the original target. The antiaircraft gunners remained cool and stood their ground, thereby warding off the enemy. When the encampments had ceased, it was found that neither the field artillery installations nor those of the antiaircraft had sustained any material damage, although subjected to devastating and continuous fire from the high speed enemy planes, none of the personnel of the ground installations were killed and only minor casualties resulted. As a result of the encampment, 10 enemy planes were destroyed, 5 were probably destroyed and 5 were damaged. The success of these few minutes of action is a tribute to the alertness, keenness and efficient manner of performance of the officers and men of your battalion. I desire to express not only my personal thanks to the officers, warrant officers and enlisted men of the 155th Antiaircraft Artillery Artillon, but those of the entire XX Corps for their splendid accomplishment and devotion to duty.

/s/ WALTON H. WALKER
Major General, United States Army
Commanding"

i. The 653d AAA AW Bn for the instruction, as well as amusement, of its personnel issues a weekly paper called the "Anti-Coast". This is a well-liked, two to four page sheet within use of the silhouettes of all concerned. Silhouettes are presented in test form, with answers printed the following week, and are enlivened by various cartoonal drawings. Anglo-American loosy-tongue and slang are dealt with, and current tips also are passed along. It is distributed down to every section.

j. Attached as an Inclosure is the weekly aircraft recognition annex.

/s/ F. P. Chamberlain, Jr.
/t/ F. P. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

1 Incl - Aircraft Recognition (Jet-propelled P-80)

DISTRIBUTION:
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AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION

THIS JET PLANE needs no snarling faces painted on it for frightfulness. Frontal view suggests that P-80 in head-on attack if enemy pilot even see it will look like one of the flying monsters that haunted steaming prehistoric swamps.



The most recent addition to the American "jets", the P-80, is indeed a ship to fill any Americans with pride. It is the second American-built jet propelled aircraft released for publication, the first being the Bell "Aircomet", P-59A. The P-80 is manufactured by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

Description: Single seat, single engine, low wing cantilever monoplane with single fin and rudder. The P-80 is equipped with a tricycle undercarriage and a fullview bubble canopy.

Dimensions: Span 39 feet, length 32 feet, weight 11,950 lbs.

Power Plant: One Halford General Electric 1A0-3 jet propulsion type, developing 3750 lbs. thrust.

Performance: Maximum speed of over 550 mph. Service ceiling over 40,000 feet.

Armament: 6 or more .50 caliber machine guns fixed in the nose.



P-80A
Provisional Silhouette

Incl No 1 to Hq Third US Army AAA Weekly Int Report No 29

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SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible]

4 February 1943

[illegible] REPORT NO. 30

[illegible]
AA-A to CG, USAFIA

1. [illegible]

a. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

The bomb load is 20,000 lbs (internal) at maximum. Some typical loads are 4 x 4000 lb bombs, 12 x 1000 lb bombs or 8 x 2000 lb bombs.

2. DESIGNATIONS OF RECONNAISSANCE (PHOTOGRAPHIC) AIRCRAFT

Designation		Designation
P-38	Beech	Modified P-38
P-38	Douglas	Converted P-38
P-38	Lockheed	Modified P-38 F & G
P-38, B	Lockheed	Similar to P-38 F & G
P-38, B	Lockheed	Similar to P-38 H & J
P-64	North American	P-51, B, C & D
P-7A	Consolidated	P-51
P-8	Bellanca	Mosquito
P-38, B	Boeing	B-17F and B-17G
P-10	North American	B-25
P-13	Boeing	B-29

3. An Air Force officer who accompanied a Naval Task Force on a recent strike, reports that at Saipan naval aircraft encountered a Japanese jet-propelled aircraft. So far as can be ascertained, this makes the first appearance of such Japanese aircraft in a combat theater.

The aircraft appeared quite similar to German jet-propelled planes. Its speed was estimated at approximately 500 miles per hour. No other information is available at the present time.

4. The following outline of Status of British aircraft is based on informal reports and comments made in the U.S. Navy Semi-Monthly News Letter to Staff Recognition Officers:

SPITFIRE: The VIII, IX and XIV are the important models. Stress should be on the IX and XIV at present, and on the new XXII when this bubble canopy model appears.

TYPHOON: Still in use and considered important. Had a large past production. Will evidently be replaced by Tempest eventually.

TEMPEST: Tempest V is the mark of the present operational model. It closely resembles the Typhoon and Tempest II. It differs somewhat recognitionally from Tempest II and will probably be the more important of the two models.

MOSQUITO: High production expected to continue. Two important versions are the solid nose fighter-bomber and the attack bomber version with bulged bomb bay to accommodate a heavy bomb.

BUCKINGHAM: In limited production. Doubtful if it will become an important aircraft.

LANCASTER: Quantity production will continue. Important current model is the III. Lancaster IV with 320 feet span, scheduled to appear soon, will replace earlier versions.

HALIFAX: Halifax III is important current production model. The I is obsolete and II is unimportant. Halifax VII will appear later, with same recognition features as the III.

NOTE: It is considered that types not listed above are obsolescent or unlikely to be seen in the Third US Army area.

(Source of above news: 9th AF Info Int Memos)

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
AUTH: CG, Third US Army
INIT: FRC
DATE: 5 Mar 45

5 March 1945

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 31

Period:
230600A Feb to 020600A Mar

1. SUMMARY OF ACTION

a. Small scale enemy air activity continued this week in Third US Army area. 14 E/A were reported of which 11 appeared in one day over VIII Corps area. The 3 other E/A flew singly and were reported on separate days, 2 in the LUXEMBOURG area and 1 reported by Friendly A/C who observed it over the XX Corps area. All but one of the planes flew at altitudes, with reconnaissance apparently their primary mission. One attack against ground targets was reported, as a single plane observed to strafe unknown targets via BASTOGNE (P-7576) with [illegible] type, if any, unknown. AAA engaged 10 of the 14 airplanes, and claimed probable destruction of 5 as a result.

b. Contrails of 16 PAC (V-2s) were observed over the area. No crashes were reported.

c. Totals for the week, and to date from 1 August 1944 (Corrected) are as follows:

	RAIDS	NO. E/A	CAT I	CAT II
Week	9	14	0	5
To Date	1,589	3,695	514	261
	PAC OVER AREA	PAC ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	16	0	0	0
To Date	238	31	0	3

2. GAF TACTICS NOTES

a. No new tactics were noted.

b. Though the Luftwaffe apparently is not at present to be committed in strength on the Third US Army front, ground activity to the North is drawing considerable of its attention. Of particular interest is the increased proportion of jet-propelled A/C reported by Ninth US Army. Me-262s are the most commonly observed, though He-280s and Ar-234s have also appeared. These aircraft are flying in at altitudes low enough for engagement by automatic weapons fire, and AAA is taking full advantage of opportunities presented to score many claims.

3. MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

a. The 390th AAA AW Bn (SP), on 25 and 26 February, conducted practice firing at ground targets for crews of all M15 and M16 halftracks. The targets were set up at a range of from 600 to 1,400 yds. The purpose of the practice was to demonstrate the problems involved in firing at ground targets at various ranges. Special attention was given to the amount of elevation required in order to deliver accurate fire with the first few rounds at targets at the various ranges, and to emphasize the need for accurate boresighting. As a result of the firing it was found that more accurate fire could be delivered on ground targets with the M15, both initially and for sustained firing. Also, neither the M6 nor the Mk 9 sight is adequate for accurate ground fire".

b. The 119th AAA Gun Bn, finding itself in a proper situation for such employment, recently sited its spare radar in a location for the detection of ground targets moving along roads behind the German lines during darkness. B and D Batteries were given a secondary mission of engaging such targets, their fire being controlled from an FDC at the radar, with communication to the Field Artillery for the securing of necessary clearances. Quite a few vehicles were spotted and engaged, with the result that traffic was stopped in every instance. Actual damage done is unknown, but German nerves must have been severely strained, upon several occasions.

c. Battery A, 482d AAA AW Bn (SP), recently received a unit citation under General Orders 44, this Headquarters, for its part in smashing the German breakthrough effort of December. The citation reads as follows: "During this period (from 17 December - 26 December 1944) Battery "A" was assigned the mission of furnishing ground support to infantry, artillery, and tank destroyer units defending positions against the strong enemy thrust into Belgium and Luxembourg. Facing overwhelming odds with outstanding heroism the Battery fought stubbornly over difficult terrain, inflicting heavy losses upon the enemy. At one time this unit held a sector alone, without immediate support of other arms. The indomitable fighting spirit, the courage and devotion to duty of the officers and men of this Battery are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service."

d. Attached as an inclosure is the Weekly Aircraft Recognition manual.

/s/ P. R. Chamberlain, Jr.
/s/ P. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, GSC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

1 Incl - Aircraft Recognition (AR-234)

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" & "H"

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AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION



AR-234
Provisional Sketches

Incl No 1 to HQ Third US Army AAA Weekly Int Report No 31

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[illegible] Primarily, designed as a fighter and fighter-carrier, the [illegible] was developed [illegible] as a high speed bomber and [illegible] Details of [illegible] are not available. Reports of [illegible] (radio ?) [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]





The above silhouettes of German jet-propelled planes were taken from a recognition manual issued to all officers of the Third U.S. Army by the Chief of the German Air Force.









Inclosure 1 to Third U.S. Army A-2 Weekly Intelligence Report No. 36

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

10 March 1945

Air Force Intelligence Report No. 32

(Periods
2400 to 2400

1. General Situation

a. On the ground front stabilized on the Roer and the Rhine with enemy artillery, tank and infantry activity [illegible] air activity [illegible] air support [illegible] Ninth U.S. Army [illegible] Allied air [illegible] Ninth U.S. Army [illegible] Allied air [illegible] Ninth U.S. Army [illegible] Allied air

SECRET

THE ARMY ANTIAIRCRAFT

OPERATIONS ROOM







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Types of Ju-88s most frequently encountered on the Western Front are the "C" and "R" series. The Ju-188 is a development of the "A", "P" and "D" series and probably represents a transition type between the Ju-88 and Ju-188. This latter plane was intended gradually to replace the widely-used Ju-88 as the GAF's all-purpose aircraft. Marked similarities make it difficult to distinguish types, but close study of the silhouettes below will unocver points of distinction.



Incl No 2 to Hq Third US Army AAA Weekly Int Report No 33

RESTRICTED

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
*AUTH: CG, Third US Army
*INIT: PAC
*DATE: 28 March 1945

28 March 1945

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 34

Period:
160600A to 230600A

1. SUMMARY OF ACTION

a. It was no wonder that Third US Army's advance in the PALATINATE triangle during the past week drew the full, frantic attention of the German Air Forces. With the enemy facing a catastrophic envelopment of all his forces and defensive positions he threw a considerable number of the aircraft available on this front into attempts to slow our drives. Hostile air activity began moderately with attacks on the spearheads of XII Corps' 4th Armd Div. But when the MAHE River was reached and crossed, it increased considerably and remained at a comparatively high level throughout the week, with few exceptions. Artillery and installations supporting and aiding the advance received much attention, and bridges over the MAHE River at HETTENHEIM, BAD MUNSTER and OBERHAUSEN and over the MOSELLE River at HATTENPORT were bombed and strafed. XX Corps' advance along the South flank which rolled up the SIEGFRIED Line and destroyed the entire German static positions drew equal attention the last two days of the period. Traffic on the Autobahn Highway N of KAISERLAUTERN was attacked, as were other targets of opportunity. Elements of divisions under both corps received many attacks. Jet-propelled planes were numerous for the first time in Third US Army area, as both Me-262s and Ar-234s made frequent appearances in [illegible] the intensity of the air attacks, damage [illegible]

DECLASSIFIED

were hit, casualties were few. Most attacks were by daylight with no preference shown for a particular hour, as attacks came throughout the day. A considerable number of these attacks were from altitudes well above the effective range of AAA automatic weapons. However, enough E/A flew at low altitudes to give Antiaircraft gunners a good workout. 72 Cat Is and 45 Cat IIs were chalked up, 51 Cat Is and 40 Cat IIs of these being claimed by XII Corps AAA units, the remainder by XX Corps. In addition, many E/A were claimed to be damaged (Cat III).

b. Reports have not been completely screened for duplications, so that only estimated numbers of raids and E/A appear below. Totals for the week, and to date from 1 August 1944, are as follows:

	RAIDS	NO. E/A	CAT I	CAT II
Week	122	475	72	45
To Date	1,729	4,190	589	307
	PAC OVER AREA	PAC ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	0	0	0	0
To Date	168	31	0	3

2. GAF TACTICS NOTES

No new tactics were noted. Formations sighted varied in size from lone A/C up to groups of 25. Jet-propelled A/C pursued no noteworthy tactics and sometimes flew in mixed formations with standard types so that their special capabilities were, perhaps, thereby somewhat restricted.

3. MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

a. Many of the actions by AAA units this week are deserving of mention. Of particular interest, however, is the report of the 489th AAA AW Bn (SP) which supported the 4th Armd Div's swift advances. Numerous bombing, strafing and rocket attacks were made on elements of the division, its installations and bridges it captured intact, and on the AAA gun sections protecting them. For the most part, E/A involved were Me-109s and FW-190s, with a sprinkling of Me-262s and Ju-188s. Making the most of St Patrick's Day the 489th SP, known as "Murphy's Marauders", engaged 39 of the E/A attacking and claimed 12 Cat Is and 8 Cat IIs. In the three day period from 17 to 20 March, a total of 103 of the E/A attempting to thwart the advance were engaged, of which 25 were claimed destroyed and 19 probably destroyed for a total of 44 out of the 103 fired upon. Sole damage reported from these attacks was done to a one-quarter ton trailer. There were no personnel casualties reported.

b. The 462d AAA AW Bn (M) had, among other missions, the protection of XII Corps artillery units and did considerable firing at enemy aircraft which attacked their area. On 17 March, of 51 E/A observed by them, 30 Me-109s and 6 FW-190s were engaged at altitudes of 1,000 to 3,000 ft. Five were claimed destroyed and 7 probably destroyed. On the 18th, 4 more Cat Is and 2 Cat IIs were claimed out of 14 E/A engaged, giving the 462d a two-day total of 18 claims out of 50 E/A fired upon.

c. Some units saw jet-propelled A/C for the first time this week. In their first few engagements, the deceptively high speeds flown caused many gunners to allow insufficient leads and tracers trailed the targets. However, improvement was rapid and, in proportion to the number of jet planes over, a good many were claimed shot down.

d. AAA units in the advance were almost continually engaged in ground fire missions, as well as in air defense. One outstanding piece of action occurred when a composite platoon of the 390th AAA AW Bn (SP), attached to a 26th Inf Div task force, arrived at the town of AUSSEN to find a bridge there across the PRUM River was blown. Word was received that the bridge in the town of BURSCH, to the South, was intact. The platoon commander offered to take his half-tracks to BURSCH and try to secure the bridge and the plan was accepted by the task force commander. The lieutenant's jeep and three half-tracks raced full speed for the town running machine gun and small arms fire, and dodging hand grenades. The two hindmost of the three half-tracks delivered covering fire, destroying 4 enemy vehicles and killing or wounding 25 enemy soldiers during the mad dash for the bridge. The bridge was reached and found intact. Intense enemy small arms and machine gun fire was directed at the half-tracks from houses across the river, and soon artillery fire fell in heavy concentrations. However, the lieutenant had radioed the task force to come down and secure the bridge and it was held until tanks and infantry reached it and effected their crossing, following which the tracks took cover among the buildings in town.

e. In an attack by the 65th Inf Div on the SIEGFRIED Line city of DILLINGEN, 40mm guns of the 546th AAA AW Bn (M) were emplaced to deliver supporting fires. In order to secure a satisfactory field of fire, approximately 100 trees had to be cut down just prior to the time of the attack, at 0630 hours. Telephone communication was established with an Inf OP, and fire missions were requested from there by the Inf battalion commander. Four enemy gun and one machine gun positions were located by their flashes and silenced by the 40mm's. Numerous pillboxes were also engaged and the entire mission was of such success that advancing infantry drew no fire from any positions in the area fired upon.

f. PWs were taken by everyone this week, it seems. AAA units contributed their share, also, and many prisoners were taken after short, sharp fire fights. Largest number so far reported taken was 500 taken by "A" Battery of the 796th AAA AW Bn (SP) in a few days' time, 300 being taken in one day. On 16 March, platoon elements of the 390th Self-propelled, assisted by 3 TDs, fired into some woods and took 500 PWs, killing in addition over 100 Germans, later found there by an I & R platoon.

g. With the rapid advances on the ground leaving the German populace shocked and frightened, there still remain behind "master race" members with the will to resist, either in or out of uniform. For these, AAA firing sections, isolated as they generally are in open fields and on hilltops, should be particularly on the lookout. All gun crews should be thoroughly instructed in curfew and other restrictive measures placed on the German population so that they will know what to expect, and security and non-fraternization measures should be fully explained and properly emphasized. A reminder is also in order to be on the watch for mining and booby-trapping activities. An occurrence such as that of last December, when a Hq and Hq Btry of an AAA AW Bn billeted in ST AVOLD was blown up by a time bomb, killing 19 and wounding 17 others, is not to be regarded as a present impossibility. In line with this, the following is quoted:

> "a. Attention of all units is called to the danger of time bombs, booby traps and other secreted demolitions in buildings, on bridges, in culverts, at road junctions, etc. With the enemy withdrawing and desirable billeting and CP facilities limited, time-bombing and booby-trapping by the enemy is highly probable. That the enemy is employing these weapons in Third US Army zone has already been confirmed by PW. All units should be warned to take nothing for granted and to exercise every precaution against time bombs and booby traps." (Source: Third US Army G-2 Periodic Rpt No. 282)
>
> "d. This is Enemy Territory. At 0900A, 17 Mar 1945, 8 men were killed and 3 wounded near ELSDORF (F-1760) when members of a Bomb Disposal Squad lifted a box of TNT from a pile of 4 boxes of enemy explosives which had been inspected 15 Mar and found free of mines and booby-traps. The box of TNT had apparently been booby-trapped since its previous inspection. Casualties such as these will continue unless all troops realize that we are in hostile country, surrounded by people who are still our enemies. Our victory over them has only served to increase their animosity towards us. They will regard lack of vigilance on our part as a sign of weakness and be quick to take advantage of it." (Source: First US Army, thru Third US Army G-2 Periodic Rpt No. 282)

h. Attached as an inclosure is the weekly aircraft recognition annex.

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain, Jr.
F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

1 Incl - Aircraft Recognition (Jet-propelled Me-280)

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" & "B"

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AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION

The He-280 is a jet-propelled plane rarely seen on the Western Front, but a reported sighting of it in late February over Ninth US Army suggests a renewal of its acquaintance may be worthwhile.

Heinkel designed this aircraft, first calling it the He-180, from which model the improved He-280 grew. It has a length of 34' 2" and a span of 39' 4" and is powered by two BMW 003 propulsion units slung under the wings.

In performance it rates with the He-262. Estimates of its speed vary from 500 to 600 m.p.h., with endurance judged to be about 40 minutes. It has a minimum climbing speed of 315 m.p.h. and can reach a height of 32,800 ft in five minutes.

Four low velocity 30cm guns are grouped in the fuselage nose.



He 280
Fighter

Span 39' 4" Length 34' 2"

PROVISIONAL SILHOUETTE

Incl No. 1 to Hq Third US Army AAA Weekly Int Report No. 34

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
AUTH: CG, Third US Army
INIT: FKC
DATE: 2 April 1945

2 April 1945

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 35

Period:
230400A Mar to 300600A Mar

1. SUMMARY OF ACTION

a. On the ground during the period, XII Corps' OPPENHEIM bridge-head over the RHINE became firmly established and expanded to such proportions that it no longer could be described by so limiting a term. VIII and XX Corps also crossed and the end of the period saw all Third US Army's units far past the RHINE and deep into GERMANY. The OPPENHEIM crossings were made under many attacks by the Luftwaffe which began last week and carried on into the first three days of the current period. Attacks occurred during early morning hours, but by far the larger number were made from dusk to 0230A hours in the morning. Flights of as many as 20 or more single and twin-engined E/A were involved, with jet-propelled planes used frequently at night to bomb and strafe. Many E/A appeared at altitudes under 5,000 ft, but a sizable number were engaged by AAA units at altitudes from 8,000 to 15,000 ft, and at slant ranges up to 13,000 yds. Troop concentrations, highway traffic, dumps and artillery were frequent targets, but most numerous were attempts to strafe the bridges and hit them with rockets and bombs both by day and by night, with many flares dropped in aid of the bombing. AAA gun sites were attacked and, for the first reported time, a direct hit by an enemy rocket was made on a gun position, when a rocket struck inside a revetment, killing 3 men and severely wounding 5 others. Establishment of an exempted 12/ with ceiling at 15,000 ft permitted AAA to work at full effectiveness as testified by the number of planes destroyed. No bridges were touched, material damage was slight and casualties few. AAA gun battalions as well as Antimatic -empere units saw considerable action and were firing constantly through the night, scoring many kills. On 26 March, activity slackened and thereafter was almost negligible for the remaining four days of the period.

b. Screening of reports has not been completed so that only estimated numbers of raids and E/A appear below. Totals for the week, and to date from 1 August 1944, are as follows:

	RAIDS	NO. E/A	CAT I	CAT II
Week	185	340	79	46
To Date	1,914	4,530	668	353

	PAC OTHR AREA	PAC ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	0	0	0	0
To Date	168	31	0	3

2. GAF TACTICS NOTES

a. Nearly all E/A took violent evasive action both upon entry into a defended area and following engagement by AAA weapons, tactics fostered by the desire for self-preservation which, however, do not lead to bombing accuracy as their lack of effectiveness proved. Zig-zagging was common, but a most typical maneuver was to dive, then climb and circle. Diving turns also were used in avoidance.

b. Dive-bombing tactics were frequently attempted, usually at 45° angles of approach to bridges, and at diving angles varying from steep to fairly flat glide-bombing attempts. Skip-bombing by an Me-109 against objectives via OBERWESEL, near the RHINE, was reported.

c. The 599th AAA AW Bn (M) told of a novel stratagem by an enemy photographic plane. It came in with lights on to attract AAA fire and then dropped magnesium flares, photographing the active AAA defenses below.

3. MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

a. Third US Army's AAA units this week scored their 1,000th enemy plane claimed destroyed or probably destroyed, for an average of better than four planes a day during the 241 days of operations this Headquarters completed on 300600A March.

b. The 129th AAA Gun Bn contributed materially to this accomplishment when, in one night's firing in an exempted IAZ this week, it claimed 17 knocked down and 4 probables and the next night claimed 10 more Cat Is and 4 Cat IIs, making a two-day total of 35 claims. Gun engagements were mostly after dark and at altitudes averaging roughly 6,500 ft, but there were many at altitudes of 10,000 ft and over. However, sufficient E/A flew at low altitudes to give their machine gunners good opportunities, too, and several Categories were claimed by them.

c. A well-placed German 20mm AAA Gun on the East bank of the RHINE above RHEINS had held up the advance of elements of the 347th Inf for two days, after its initial river crossing. The position had a very low silhouette and was approximately 6 ft in diameter, so that it was hard to see or to hit. At the request of the 347th Inf's CO, the 655th AAA AW Bn engaged the target on 26 March, from the West side of the river. The range was 3,300 yds and the target so small and so placed that it could not be seen at that distance, even with binoculars. Indirect firing procedure was accordingly employed, with an Inf OP doing the adjusting. 40mm guns were laid on target, using map data and improvised range and azimuth drums devised by the 655th AW Bn. (See: NTOUSA AAA Notes No 22, and these reports, No 23). Sensings were given by the OP in terms as little as 5 yds range and 1 mil azimuth in attempts to get a direct hit. Single shots were used for adjustment, but fire for effect was done on auto-fire. A total of 88 rounds of 7 Sec 40mm (HE) ammo was fired, of which 9 were reported by the OP as hits, inflicting damage and casualties on the position. Actually, accuracy was higher as several of the rounds burst short of the target due to the tracer burn-out point.

d. Having just completed transporting troops of the 80th Inf Div, a driver of the 653d AAA AW Bn (M) was on his way back to a town in GERMANY to rejoin his unit, one night recently. Outside the town of KUSEL he came upon a parked convoy of jeeps and started by them when vehicles were seen approaching from the opposite direction and he pulled into the jeep line to let them pass. The oncoming manner and odd blackout lights of the first vehicle attracted his attention and, as it went by, he saw it to be a German half-track towing a gun and filled with German soldiers. He immediately pulled out of the jeep line and across the road so that his truck blocked the rest of the oncoming German vehicles. Jumping from his truck cab, he shouted at the occupants of the first truck to surrender, instead of which they grabbed their weapons and a few dashed for some nearby woods. He immediately opened fire over their heads with his tommy gun, which caused them to throw away their weapons and shout "kamerad" in a very convincing manner. His firing attracted some help from the personnel in the jeep convoy and, in all, approximately 300 prisoners were taken from the vehicles and surrounding territory.

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain, Jr
/s/ F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR,
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

1 Incl - Aircraft Recognition (Me-110 - Me-410)

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" & "B"

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AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION

In 1939, the Me-110 was Germany's standard long range, twin-engine fighter. Although now superseded by the Me-410 it is still extensively used as an attack bomber, carrying a surprisingly heavy bomb load for its size. The Me-110, also an older member of the GAF, is nevertheless still rated one of Germany's principal fighter bombers.

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While at first glance, the planes appear similar a little study reveals marked differences. The most striking difference is the design of the tail assemblies. Twin fins and rudders of the Me-110 furnish another noticeable point of distinction, and difference in wing tips is quite apparent. On the Me-410, excellent outlook beyond the fuselage nacelle, which has been shortened. Close inspection will reveal many other differences so that one should never be mistaken for the other.



Me 410 (2-D B 605)
Fighter Bomber

Me 110 (2-DB 605)
Fighter Bomber

Incl No 1 to Hq Third US Army AAA Weekly Int Report No. 35

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ANNEX NO. 11

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
AUTH: CO, Third US Army
INIT: FEC
DATE: 11 Apr 46

11 April 1946

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 36

Period:
300600A Mar to 060600B Apr

1. SUMMARY OF ACTION

a. Enemy air activity showed no sign of abating this week and, in fact, increased considerably over last week's efforts. Improved flying weather permitted the Luftwaffe to react to our penetration of the WERRA River defense line by striking repeatedly at armored spearheads, supporting units, and at bridges. Activity was at a comparatively low scale the first three days of the period, but on 2 April it spurted and a peak effort with approximately 180 planes was reported, dropping thereafter to daily averages of 60-70 E/A over the area. Me-262s were in much evidence the forepart of the period, bombing a bridge over the MAIN River vic GROSSAUHEIM and strafing traffic on the Reichsautobahn vic ALSFELD. After that they were seldom seen and Me-109s and FW-190s, with a light sprinkling of Ju-87s, Ju-88s and Me-410s, came out to attack elements of the 4th Armd Div and supporting units and forward elements of the 6th Armd Div. Quite a number of these passed up the armor to strafe Field Artillery, road convoys and other such targets further back. Only 3 or 4 planes were seen in the rear of Corps boundaries, however. Below KASSEL, assembly areas and artillery of the 80th Inf Div were attacked. AAA attached to other Infantry divisions also had many engagements, sometimes in self-defense as their gun positions were several times attacked. The enemy's air aggressiveness fell off sharply after 2 April and many flights appeared bent more on sight-seeing than anything else as, for example, when a flight of 30 E/A flew along over a convoy making no attacks and lingering in the area until driven off by a flight of friendly fighters. Most E/A flew at low altitudes (100 - 6,000 ft) making a field day for AAA automatic weapons units which, on 2 April, alone, claimed 72 planes destroyed and 32 probables, with many others damaged. Air attacks punctured two pontons of the bridge at GROSSAUHEIM and destroyed a treadway bridge over the WERRA River at CREUZBERG. An attempted bombing of a bridge at GR HERSCHIA over the WERRA was unsuccessful. Some few casualties were caused and other materiel damage was slight.

b. Screening of reports has not been completed so that only estimated numbers of raids and E/A appear below. Totals for the week and to date from 1 August 1944 (corrected) are as follows:

	RAIDS	NO. E/A	CAT I	CAT II
Week	190	490	149	76
To Date	2,068	5,080	871	491

	PAC OVER AREA	PAC ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	0	0	0	0
To Date	168	31	0	5

2. GAF TACTICS NOTES

a. Air tactics appeared standard for the most part, with nothing particularly novel emerging. Pilots indulged their penchant for attacking low from the Rear, out of the sun, in the morning hours and coming in somewhat higher to dive during meantime. Cloud cover was used whenever possible.

b. The 550th AAA AW Bn reported an attack by 12 FW-190s which came out of the clouds in three lines of four planes each to drop fragmentation and demolition bombs on Field Artillery positions. Despite AA fire they remained on their bombing course until bombs were released only after which did they head for the clouds.

c. In the jet-propelled attack on the bridge over the MAIN River vic GROSSAUHEIM, Me-262s came in at 3,500 ft to dive at a 30° angle and speed of 460 mph, dropping anti-personnel bombs.

d. Another tactic not usually employed was reported by the 550th AAA AW Bn. Upon being engaged an Me-109 went into a vertical climb from 1,000 to 4,000 ft and disappeared in clouds. When last seen it was smoking badly, however, indicating this is not the best way to avoid AA fire.

3. MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

a. AW units had many intensive engagements with low-flying enemy planes as daylight strafing replaced last week's night and high-level bombing attacks. Of the 168 claims arising from engagements on 2 April, more than a third were made by the 467th AAA AW Bn (SP). Its fire units, deployed in protection of armored columns, CPs and bridges had their biggest day on record -- perhaps the biggest of any AAA unit in the ETO -- to claim 34 Cat Is and 6 Cat IIs. In addition, another E/A was claimed damaged (Cat III).

b. During a period highlighted by outstanding achievements, at the least outstanding among AAA units was the feat of the 546th AAA [illegible] an Me-109 with one round of 40mm ammo. Weight [illegible] and the plane, a "flamer", crashed a mile away. [illegible] that nothing succeeds like success.

c. Other units performed outstandingly and the 777th AAA AW Bn, a self-propelled organization, had many engagements with E/A attacking leading armored columns of the 6th Armd Div to which it is attached. Only slight damage and casualties resulted from these air efforts but the 777th, on the other hand, is able to boast taking a toll of 25 Cat Is, 19 Cat IIs and 11 other badly damaged.

d. On the ground, AAA units had many skirmishes with enemy foot troops, taking PWs and inflicting casualties. In one instance, half-track section No 220 (one M15 and one M16 track) of the 390th AAA AW Bn (SP) was attached, with other sections, to a task force of the 26th Inf Div having the mission of clearing out by-passed pockets of resistance in the rear of forward elements. The task force had just entered the town of HITZKIRCHEN and section 220 had occupied positions NW and S of there when a column of 200 jerry foot troops approached town from the NW and 300 approached from the S in an evident attempt to encircle and trap the task force. Section 220, having received permission, opened fire on the enemy as soon as they emerged from the woods and were well into the open. As a result, 200 to 300 enemy were killed and wounded and the attack stopped cold. The remainder were later mopped up by the infantry.

e. As further evidence that there is constant need for alertness, a few of the week's occurrences are cited. Civilians, taking advantage of the noise of anti-aircraft firing, used the opportunity to fire rifles at the gun crews nearby and caused several casualties. A firing section of the 455th AAA AW Bn, having just completed an all-day convoy, bedded down for the night in the vicinity of field artillery it supported. At 0400 hours, the guard challenged the source of a noise, which signalled an attack on the section by enemy small arms, machine guns, bazooka and mortar fire. The attack was beaten off but only after one crew member was killed and four seriously wounded and a 40mm gun damaged. A platoon of the 390th AAA AW Bn (SP) while traveling in convoy was ambushed by approximately 200 enemy troops firing small arms and throwing grenades from both sides of the road. One officer and six enlisted men were killed, two were wounded and six listed as missing (two of whom later escaped capture and returned). The half-tracks opened fire and killed 10 enemy and wounded 35.

f. Taking time from their duties of providing AAA defenses for various installations, men of the 551st AAA AW Bn helped the supply services recently by collecting 1,347 empty jerry-cans in one day.

g. Variety is the Spice of Life Dept. In combing an area S of the 76th Inf Div boundary, men of the 778th Self-propelled Bn took 78 PWs, destroyed three 88mm gun positions and de-booby-trapped a searchlight position. The 567th AAA AW Bn: handled 4 Russian soldiers who escaped from a German labor camp; a Belgian, arrested for murder of a Belgian MP and who had been released from confinement by the Germans, was returned to allied custody; took a PW; expedited the needs of an enemy ambulance full of German soldiers and one woman who was about to have a baby.

h. Said the Commanding Officer of the 27th AAA Gp (XII Corps) to the Commanding Officer, 21st AAA Gp (30th AAA Brig), "We are now moving toward the ELBE River where we can share on IAI with the Russians. Please sign a receipt for these bridges over the RHINE." So the 21st AAA Gp command gave a receipt as follows:

OFFENBURG, GERMANY
270800 A March 1946

"Received from the 27th AAA Gp four (4) bridges across the RHINE, with bridges and approaches intact, and the mission of providing AA protection for same."

4. (1) Periods of greatest air activity over Third US Army have always accompanied its periods of greatest advance. Static or slow-moving periods such as those occurring along the MOSELLE River were times of slight air activity. In August, December and March, however, during which months there were rapid advances, AAA communications were not only loaded with activity but stretched by distance to the point where wire communications were nearly impossible, a luxury for the slow. At one time, for example, Third US Army's zone stretched 650 miles from BREST to VERDUN, perhaps the longest Army area in modern history.

(2) As a result, since Third US Army became operational upon the continent, the 38th AAA Brigade and subordinate units and Corps and division units have relied on radio almost exclusively for command and air warning functions. This use of radio has not been confined alone to inter-unit work but has also been the primary means of communication within the various gun and automatic weapons battalions.

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(3) It was in early October, when movement across France slowed down, that a period of trial and correction in AA radio communications for early warning and radio systems took place. The procuring of FM radios from the Fighter Control Squadron solved the long range voice radio problem and no problem existed within gun battalions with their SCR-193 radios or automatic weapons battalions with their SCR-694 and various FM sets, since early December there was not been one roll of wire used for communications within the 37th Brigade except for wire run by AW platoons to their various gun sections and by gun battalions to their batteries when constraints permitted. The use of radio has proved itself invaluable in recent operations, such as when communications were continually maintained between units deployed along the WESEL river and others far back in the RHINE AREA.

(4) Because the 38th AAA Brigade has, of necessity, relied on radio, it has become radio's staunchest supporter among AA units on the continent. Its emphasis on maintenance, proper sighting, net procedure and security in its radio communication radio has become the foundation of its entire operations.

j. Another AAA unit recently passed a milestone in its history, when the 3 rd AAA AW Bn (M), on 19 February 1946, completed its third continuous year of overseas duty. Eleven officers and 110 enlisted men left over from the original battalion departed from the 1st, on 19 July 1943, for Iceland as part of the 61st Coast Artillery (AA). After 1 year of hard, monotonous work on a one hour manning status with fire fighting activity to enliven the time, the unit went to the Marianas where it was separated from the 61st CA Regt and reorganized as a separate battalion. Thereafter, it was trained on new equipment and placed under the tactical operational status defending airfields of the Tenth Air Force. Members of the battalion claim some of the first, if not the first, Category As for shooting down buzz-bombs along the English coast. The unit landed in France with VIII Corps and under Third US Army, participated in the Normandy and Brest campaigns, and is still going strong.

/s/ F. L. Chamberlain, Jr.
/s/ F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR,
Colonel, AC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

1 Incl - Aircraft Recognition (Russian A/C)

DLT 14 AAA:
"A" & "F"

SECRET

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AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION

With this issue of Aircraft Recognition we introduce the Red Air Force. As the Allied advance into central Germany continues, Russian aircraft may be seen on an increasing scale. The standard national marking is a red star.

The two fighter bombers pictured below are currently operational in the Red Air Force. Basically the same in design, the most apparent difference is in the power units. The Lagg 3, which is the older, has an inline engine and a 20mm cannon which fires through the large spinner. The tail wheel is fixed.

The La-5, powered by a radial engine, is in extensive use. It is said to be the USSR's answer to the FW-190 which it closely resembles. Care must be taken not to confuse the two.



LAGG 3
Single-Seat Fighter
Length 28' 10"

LA 5 (Modified)
Single-Seat Fighter
Length 28' 7"

Inel No 1 to Hq Third US Army AAA Weekly Int Report No 36.

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HEAD-QUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
•AUTH: CO, Third US Army•
•INIT: FAC •
•DATE: 16 Apr 46 •

16 April 1946

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 37

Period:
0606000B to 1306000B

1. SUMMARY OF ACTION

a. No new trends were noted in enemy air efforts this week. As Third US Army's divisions thrust across central GERMANY the Luftwaffe, as in the previous week, launched sharp, small-scale attacks at armored spearheads, forward infantry elements, and at the bridges over which the, moved, in efforts to harass and slow the advance. Most activity occurred in XI Corps zone where the 6th Armd and 76th Inf Divs drew considerable attention. A/A were over every day of the week in numbers averaging 50 - 60 per day. Tank and truck columns, field artillery, CPs and miscellaneous targets of opportunity drew attention as almost all aircraft flew by daylight in search of them. A Class III dump vic (H7073) was attacked, bridges over the WERRA river near SPIEKA (H7442) and GERSHENG (H7575), and over the SAALE River vic KOLEN (J7625905), were bombed and strafed. Several CPs were bombed and an airfield near WARNSDORF (H7172) (H8770) was attacked three days running. There was also an attack on a truck convoy of German PWs. A good many planes were over on reconnaissance, but infrequently penetrated deeper than Corps. In the rear areas, A/A were seldom seen and few attacks were made. FW-190s and Me-109s were in great majority of types observed, though a few Me-111s, Ke-110s and jet-propelled Me-262s were seen, a flight of 6 of the latter being reported and several smaller formations. In addition, a few odd, unrecognizable types were reported and one of them, a trainer bearing on the fuselage the lettering "Luftwaffe Schule 1 Dresden Tel 66411", was shot down by small arms fire. Damage from air attacks was not heavy. Two gas-laden C-47s coming in to land were attacked while still some distance from their field and shot down. Other attacks upon the field made within range of protecting AAA were driven off without further damage. Several vehicles were damaged and there were personnel casualties, including an undetermined number of the German PWs who were bombed.

b. Screening of reports has not been completed so that only estimated numbers of raids and E/A appear below. Totals for the week, and to date from 1 August 1944, are as follows:

	RAIDS	NO. E/A	CAT I	CAT II
Week	140	395	85	59
To Date	2,204	5,415	957	500

	PAC OVER AREA	PAC ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	0	0	0	0
To Date	168	31	0	3

2. GAF TACTICS NOTES

a. In attacking the C-47s ferrying gasoline 10 Me-109s and Fw-190s, lying in wait at high altitude, dropped down to engage the slower cargo craft which were approaching the field to land. After shooting down two, they followed in to strafe A/C lining the field. This brought them within range of AAA, however, and they were driven off.

b. A summary of activity received from the 777th AAA AW Bn (SP) for the period 30 Mar - 10 Apr gives interesting data on air tactics employed against the 6th Armd Div, to which it is attached. In part, it states: "The attacks...have been....directed mainly at columns and at forward troop assembly areas. Trains, dumps, bridges and CPs have been attacked very lightly. The damage has been slight considering the large numbers of aircraft involved. There has, of course, been some damage and there have been casualties, but much less than the damage that could have been caused by an aggressive air force. Most of the attacks have consisted of only one pass, the aircraft employing hit and run tactics, and not pressing home a vigorous raid...Most of the flights have consisted of singles and pairs. A few large formations (12 - 20) have been over, but not many. Lately, there has been an increasing trend towards flights of 4 - 6 aircraft; most of these have been attacks. Most of the A/C have been Me-109s or FW-190s. There have been a few jets, both Me-262 and Me-163, and one Ju-87 was reported...The jets all operated singly, and have made attacks...The time of day has not mattered, as planes have been over from dawn to dark. However, the "peak" seems to have been mid-morning (0800 - 1100) and mid-afternoon (1400 - 1600). Very few attacks have been at dawn and dusk." (That the 777th has had ample chance to observe and counter Luftwaffe tactics is attested by the fact that, after screening, for the period mentioned formal claims for 36 Cat Is and 22 Cat IIs were submitted, as well as 8 Cat IIIs.)

3. MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

a. Once again, automatic weapons units enjoyed the larger share of activity as most raids occurred during daylight and at low altitudes, providing them with plentiful targets. The 777th AAA AW Bn (SP), attached to 6th Inf Div, demonstrated sharpshooting ability and during one 18 hour period, engaged 15 of 21 enemy planes scoring 5 Cat Is and 7 Cat IIs. No damage was occasioned to protected FA and Infantry and only one man was wounded despite intensive bombing and strafing. On the preceding day, 6 Cat Is and 6 Cat IIs, plus 2 Cat IIIs were claimed in an equally successful defense.

b. In one five minute period from 1455 to 1500 hours on 10 April, the 590th SP Bn had activity over the 26th Inf Div area comparable to that which they experienced Southeast of BASTOGNE last December. 15 E/A attacked FA positions, Infantry, convoys and an Arty observation plane in sharp strafing attacks only to lose 7 planes which were seen to crash and 2 probables.

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c. Reappearance of jet-propelled A/C this week, after almost complete absence last week recalls the many attacks by jets during the MAAS and RHINE River crossings and makes a glance at their tactics timely. Excerpts from a report of the 413th AAA Gun Bn covering the two crossings state: "In the late afternoon [redacted] and one FW-190 were over the BRETTENHEIM crossing site for 25 minutes. [redacted] dropped bombs in a 50 yd/sec glide from 12,000 ft; the glide began at 15,000 ft. Bombs were not steady, but were characterized by rapid changes in course and speed. Speeds varied from 240 to 500 mph. Possible jets showed rapid acceleration white smoke was seen to come from the engines for a second or two. The rate of climb was high. Heavy AA fire control equipment is fully capable of coping with the jet although jets are difficult to hit due to their ability to make very rapid changes in speed, altitude and direction. No damage was done at the crossing site...On 20 March the peak of enemy air activity over the MAAS crossing was reached. 2 Me-262s and ... were destroyed. The jets were shot down in level steady flight at 15,000 ft...On 21 March 1 Ar-234 at 8,000 ft altitude, vic 400 mph in a dive of 50 yds/sec was engaged and shot down by 90mm fire." The 115th Gun Bn employed its equipment well and in a 6 day period 16 Cat Is and 8 Cat IIs were claimed, most of them engaged at altitudes of 6,000 to 16,000 ft, once again demonstrating the adequacy of the SCR-584 radar and M-9 director to cope with and destroy enemy planes at higher altitudes than normally permitted.

d. An unusual occurrence of recent days has come to notice through the statement of a Chemical Company enlisted man, submitted in support of a formal claim for destruction of an enemy plane. "On the evening of...I was stationed at the RHINE River crossing at OPPENHEIM, GERMANY. The German Air Force came in early in the evening and dropped flares and attacked the bridge by strafing and bombing. Section No. 7 of Btry "D", 599th AAA AW Bn, was firing at a plane and after they hit it it began to fall looking like it was out of control. As it fell towards the ground another German plane came in under it and the two planes collided in the air. There was a big explosion and both planes fell to the ground, burning." A question: should the unit be granted one or two Cat Is?

e. In addition to such defenses as booms and nets, part of the defenses against waterborne demolitions, "Frogfolswimmer" (swimming saboteurs) and the like were provided to the RHINE River crossings at MAINZ, while under Corps control, by Btry "A" of the 465th AAA AW Bn, under XX Corps AA. The Battery Commander was given operational control of 4 searchlights from the 226th AAA S/L Bn, 2 SCR-584 radars borrowed from gun battalions and charged with coordinating the waterborne defense with a platoon of light tanks assigned the same task. The equipment concerned was employed on the West bank as a safety precaution, and fields of fire were so laid out as to avoid endangering engineer personnel working in the vicinity of the bridge. All suspicious objects floating downstream towards the bridge were engaged and destroyed by gun fire. The 40mm gun was found to be especially efficient at this task. Eye-shooting with Stiffbey Stick sights was used with ranges set in, and never more than 3 rounds were required to hit and destroy waterborne targets. The light tanks mounted 75mm guns and employed ammunition with a very sensitive fuse. M51 mounts were not used due to the danger of ricochet. Small arms fire was employed against smaller targets. At night, the radars were used in conjunction with searchlights in picking up and illuminating waterborne targets. The switchboard at the battery CP had a line running to the radar and searchlights, which were on a hot loop, and another hot loop to the tanks with a third loop connecting all AAA fire units employed on the mission, an arrangement which facilitated control and expedited warning of floating targets.

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain, Jr.
/s/ F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
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AUTH: CO, Third US Army
INIT: FRC
DATE: 24 Apr 45

24 April 1945

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 38

Period:
1306008 to 2006008

1. SUMMARY OF ACTION

a. Hostile air activity slackened somewhat as an estimated 202 enemy aircraft flew over the area this week, about halving the effort of the previous period. While a considerable number of daylight attacks were made, the Luftwaffe began reversion to familiar night tactics, strafing lighted vehicles on highways and making other similar nuisance attacks using small flights of aircraft. Columns, assemblies and installations of nearly all Armored and Infantry divisions were bombed and strafed in daytime raids, and Corps Artillery units were several times attacked. With most effort devoted to these targets, there were still many other attacks made, both by day and by night. Class III supply installations vic MEININGEN, HELLESHAUSEN, HURZBURG and HERGADORF, bridges vic UHLAU, KRONACH, HAHAU and other places, and highway traffic all through the area and as far separated as HAHAU and HERSFELD, all were attacked. Night intruders passed through Corps rear boundaries to hit at targets far back. In addition, there was considerable reconnaissance activity. There were few large formations, and 12 FW-190s which strafed Corps Artillery was the largest reported. E/A of all types were seen, including jets, and Ju-52 transports probably used to evacuate personnel from the RUHR pocket. Indicating the low estate to which the once-tough Luftwaffe has sunk was the appearance in front line missions of Arado training planes and composite, "pick-a-back" aircraft. One of these latter was even reported employed for a strafing mission. In one of the Week's outstanding events, an AAA battalion motor sergeant shot down 3 Me-109s and badly damaged a 4th out of 5 engaged, using the single .50 cal machine gun mounted on the cab of his wrecker.

b. Screening of reports has not been completed so that only estimated numbers of raids and E/A appear below. Totals for the week, and to date from 1 August 1944 (corrected), are as follows:

	RAIDS	NO. E/A	CAT I	CAT II
Week	70	202	48	30
To Date	2,274	5,617	989	532
	PAC OVER AREA	PAC ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	0	0	0	0
To Date	168	31	0	3

2. GAP TACTICS NOTES

No new tactics were reported. As usual, the enemy flew in small jagdes and at low altitudes, taking advantage of terrain and clouds and of the sun. At night the planes flew at altitudes so low that gun battalion radars had difficulty in picking them up and little heavy AA fire could be thrown against them.

3. MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

a. With hostile air activity apparently once again on the wane, a short summary of the past month's activity seems not improper. In the thirty-one day period from 15 March through 14 April, Third US Army's Antiaircraft Artillery units engaged many planes, most of which made attacks upon ground targets. While some slight damage was caused and some casualties inflicted, in proportion to the air effort they were poor payment, indeed. In throwing back these many air attacks, AAA units claimed to have destroyed 165 enemy planes and probably destroyed 260, with many others damaged, for a total of 715 Category I and IIs. Biggest day was 2 April when over 100 members of the Luftwaffe were claimed shot down. Biggest day, too, for any individual unit was the same 2 April when a single battalion claimed 40 planes shot down, with an additional one damaged. Ammunition expenditures for the period were as follows:

Caliber	No. rds
90mm	7,855
Pozit (90mm)	857
40mm	44,185
37mm	89,465
.50 cal	1,573,532

b. Oh, Boy! What a Wonderful Day Dept. In a day of accomplishment as full as any yet reported for a single individual, Friday the 13th will probably long stand in the memory of the motor sergeant with Btry "C" of the 465th AAA AW Bn. On that day he was rolling in convoy toward CHEMNITZ when his wrecker was stopped by Engineers at the Reichsautobahn outpass near GERA, requesting assistance of him and the .50 cal machine gun mounted on the roof of his wrecker. Two enemy vehicles had just come into view on a road leading South from the autobahn. The sergeant obliged and set both vehicles afire with his gun. He then reloaded the weapon and took off to catch up with his column. A bit further along he came upon the Btry mess truck bogged down with a flat tire so stopped to help. While so engaged he heard a cry, "Hold onto your hats, boys, here they come," and, looking up, he saw five Me-109s bearing down upon him in single file and at low altitude, straight down the highway. The sergeant climbed once more into the ring mount in time to fire at the second of these aircraft, his gun still warm from the previous ground firing. The plane literally "flew down his gun barrel" and was immediately hit, and crashed within view of the wrecker. The other E/A, apparently uncertain as to what had happened, turned about and once again came down the highway. The foremost plane this time was hit, crashing 300 yds from the other, and, as the remaining three circled, a third, flying low across the road, was hit and crashed a kilometer away. The fourth plane fired at received hits in the motor and was smoking badly as it flew out of sight. The total ammunition expenditure was just a neat 225 rounds. The German belief in mythology and superstition must have been considerably strengthened by the day's occurrences.

c. German composite, or "pick-a-back", aircraft are not an entirely new development though not a great deal is known about them, most information having come from photo interpretation. However, it is believed that this week's occurrence was the first time one ever was reported in so unsuited a mission as strafing. Two and possibly three of these were shot down by automatic weapons units with forward elements of divisions but the destruction of each was so complete little could be told from the wreckage. Composite aircraft ordinarily consist of a Ju-88 surmounted by an Me-109 or FW-190. The Ju-88 is loaded with explosives and is released and guided towards the target by the fighter. While it may be that other twin-engined types than Ju-88s have been used, no other has been definitely identified.

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain, Jr.
/s/ F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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RUSSIAN
AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION

GENERAL

The Red Air Force did not start its development until the middle thirties. The impetus given to the industry by the first five-year plan has brought to the surface several aircraft designers who have evolved and later enforced a definite designing policy and program. The young designers included: Yakovlev - designer of liquid cooled fighters, Lavetchkin - who designed radial engine fighters, Petlyakov - designer of light twin-engined bombers and Tupolev - who specialized in heavy bombardment planes.

DESIGN POLICY

In studying the different planes, operationally used by the Red Air Force, one can divide them into three groups; original Soviet designs, designs inspired by foreign products and finally foreign designs, modified by the Soviets in keeping with their design policy.

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One of the policy-makers is Lt. Gen. Yakovlev, who is a believer that in fighter everything should be sacrificed to weight reduction. This is apparent in all of his designs - the YAK fighter series, which are usually fast and manoeuvrable owing to the almost complete absence of armour. In an interview, pilots of the French 'Normandie', operating on the Soviet front and equipped entirely of French planes, stated that YAKs will easily outperform the Spitfire and the FW-190 and are more pleasant to fly. It is the lightest fighter in the world.

This policy has been extended to American products, which have been modified in USSR. Thus the reason why the Soviet pilots are still swearing by the P-39, which is obsolete with us, is because they removed 1200 lbs of armour out of it and obviously increased the speed and manoeuvrability. On the A-20 and B-25 similar 'disarming' work has been done. Often the nose gun has been removed and replaced by a navigator's compartment.

On the other hand the Soviet designers, who are very conscious of the requirements of the ground support units, believed that a special armored type aircraft had to be developed and the famous Stormovik was designed and built.

Finally the good old American DC-3, which is built in USSR has been modified by an addition of a dorsal turret, just aft of the astral dome.

In discussing the role played by aviation in the war, it becomes clear that the Soviet believe in the use of planes for the most unorthodox uses. Training planes of the 'piper cub' variety have been known to be used as night bombers, and also as air-ambulances, with coffin-like cylindrical containers for the wounded strapped to the wings. Bombers extensively used for guerilla warfare and partisan parachute supply work, etc.

Until very recently there was no such thing as strategic aviation in USSR. They readily admit that their bombing is confined to not more than 200-300 miles from the front and they have a very small number of heavy bombers. Practically no long range reconnaissance is made, the reconnaissance ships photographing only targets in the immediate vicinity of the advancing armies.

Originally the different types of planes were designated by abbreviations of their name types:

IB - (Skorostny Bombardirovschik) stood for light bomber
SB - (Srednay Bombardirovschik) stood for medium bomber
TB - (Tyazhely Bombardirovschik) stood for heavy bomber
U - (Uchebny) stood for training, etc.

In 1940, out of many experimental designs, a few were selected for production, and in 1941, they were designated not any more by types but by the abbreviations of the designers family name. Thus we have the YAK-9 and LA-5 fighters, PE-2 bombers, etc.

FIGHTERS

YAK-1 (Designer: Alex YAKovlev). A single-engine liquid cooled low wing monoplane. Power plant is rated at 1050 hp at 14,800 ft. Normal cruising speed 248 mph at 15,000 ft. Service ceiling is 31,000 ft with normal load.

Armament consists of 2 x 12.7mm fixed machine guns in forward fuselage, 2 x 12.7mm fixed machine guns in the wings and one 20mm cannon firing through the hub. Bomb and rocket racks under the wings.

One of the most currently used operational fighters.

YAK-9. A single liquid cooled engine low wing monoplane. Power plant is rated at 1260 hp at take-off. Normal cruising speed 345 mph at 18,000 ft. Service ceiling is 35,000 ft with normal load.

Armament consists of 2 x 12.7mm fixed machine guns in the forward fuselage and 20mm cannon firing through the hub. A 37mm cannon in place of the 20mm has also been reported.

Considered the best USSR interceptor fighter. The lightest fighter in the world. It is exceptionally manoeuvrable.

An improved version, the YAK-7, has been reported in August 1944. It is practically the same except for slightly different internal wing construction and coolant grille placed in the leading edge of the left wing close to the root.

LA-5 (Designer: Lavotshkin). A single-radial engine low wing monoplane. Power plant is rated at 1600 hp at 17,000 ft. Normal cruising speed 330 mph at 18,000 ft. Service ceiling is 34,000 ft with normal load.

Armament consists of 2 x 20mm fixed machine guns in the forward fuselage and 2 x 12.7mm machine guns in the wings. Also bomb racks under wings.

It is one of the Soviet's newest fighters and is in constant operational use against FW-190's.

An improved version (mostly better aerodynamic streamlining) - the LA-7 has been reported in July 1944.

LAGG-3 (Designers: Livotshkin, Gorbunov and Gudkov). A single liquid cooled engine low wing monoplane. Power plant is rated at 1,100 hp, giving it an estimated maximum speed of 347 mph. It is built of plastic-bonded wood and is smaller than American and British fighters. It is in service in large numbers.

Armament consists of one 20mm cannon firing through the prop hub and 2 MGs on top of nose. It can carry three 56 lb rockets under each wing.

The latest development of this fighter is the LA-5, considered above, which fits a radial engine to the same airframe.

PE-3 (Designer: PEShyakov). A twin engine liquid cooled, low wing monoplane. Power plants are rated at 1050 hp each at 14,800 ft. Cruising speed 266 mph at 16,000 ft. Service ceiling is 27,500 ft with normal load.

Armament consists of 2 x 12.7mm fixed guns in the forward fuselage, 1 x 7.62mm mobile gun in the dorsal part of the fuselage and a 7.6 in the lateral part. Bombs are stored in the nacelles and rockets are carried outside. Later models are reported to have an even heavier armament.

This is a long range fighter developed from the PE-3 dive bomber, and is similar in appearance except for its enclosed nose, as against the PE-2's plexiglass nose.

GROUND ATTACK

IL-2 STORMOVIK (designer: Sergei ILiwushin). A single engine liquid cooled, low wing monoplane. Power plant is rated at 1600 hp at 6,800 ft. Normal cruising speed 235 mph at 7,000 ft. Service ceiling is 23,500 ft with normal load.

Armament consists of 2 x 7.6 and 2 x 23mm fixed guns in the wings, one 7.6 or 12.7mm mobile gun in the dorsal gunner's compartment back of the pilot. Experimental installation of 2 x 37mm guns is reported. There are two internal bomb-bays in each wing root. Bombs over 850 kilg and rockets are carried externally under the wings.

This is the most heavily armored plane in the world. The whole nose, cockpit and gunner's compartment are armored by 5 to 6.5mm armor plate. Windshield is made of 65mm bullet resisting glass. Armored shutter is protecting the radiator, while aircraft is in action.

It is the best known of all Soviet aircraft. It has been effectively used at low levels against ground targets.

Original models had wooden, fabric covered wings and tail. According to latest reports the newer models have metal wings.

SU-2. A single engine radial low wing monoplane. Power plant is rated at 1100 hp at 19,600 ft. Normal cruising speed 245 mph at 21,000 ft. Service ceiling 30,200 ft with normal load.

Armament consists of 4 x 7.6mm fixed guns in the wings and one 7.6mm mobile dorsal gun. Internal and external bomb stowage.

This is a low wall advertised but currently operational ground attack bomber. An improved version is known as the SU-3.

BOMBERS

PE-2 (Designer: PEShyakov). A twin-engine, liquid cooled, low wing monoplane. Power plants are rated at 1350 hp each at 13,500 ft. Normal cruising speed 248 mph at 13,500 ft. Service ceiling is 27,000 ft with a normal load.

Armament consists of 1 x 7.6mm and 1 x 12.7mm fixed guns in the forward fuselage. 1 x 7.6mm dorsal, 2 x 7.6mm lateral and 1 x 12.7mm ventral mobile guns. Bombs are carried both externally and internally.

This is one of the widely used operational light bombers. It has a long thin fuselage with twin fins and rudders.

SB-2. A twin-engined liquid cooled, low wing monoplane. Power plants are rated at 1050 hp each at 14,800 ft. Normal cruising speed 235 mph at 16,000 ft. Service ceiling is 28,000 ft with a normal load.

Armament consists of twin 7.6mm mobile guns in the forward fuselage, one or two 7.6mm mobile dorsal guns and one 7.6mm ventral gun. Bombs are carried internally.

This is one of the newest and most constantly used medium bombers. Subtypes SB-1 and SB-2 have engines which increase the speed to 250 mph at 15,000 ft and 260 mph at 16,000 ft respectively.

DB-3F or IL-4 (Designer: Sergei ILiwushin). A twin-engine, radial low wing monoplane. Power plants are rated at 1100 hp each at 19,700 ft. Normal cruising speed is 265 mph at 21,000 ft. Service ceiling is 30, 700 ft with a normal load.

Armament consists of one 7.6mm or 12.7mm mobile gun in the forward fuselage, one 7.6mm or 12.7mm dorsal mobile gun and ventral 1 x 7.6 or 12.7mm mobile gun.

This is one of the USSR's best bombers.

TB-7 (Designer: Tupolev). A four engine liquid cooled, mid-wing monoplane. Power plants are rated at 1200 hp each at 19,500 ft. Normal cruising speed 232 mph at 20,000 ft. Service ceiling is 24,000 ft with a normal load.

Armament consists of 2 x 7.6mm guns in forward fuselage, 2 x 12.7mm mobile guns in the nacelles, 1 x 20mm mobile dorsal gun and 1 x 20mm mobile tail gun. Turrets in tails of inboard nacelles, with a passageway through the wing to each turret. Main bomb stowage is internal.

This the best USSR heavy bomber and is widely used.

(The above material on Russian aircraft and the Russian Air Force was gathered by United States observers in the USSR during 1944 and 1945. Source: Ninth Air Force thru XIth Army Group.)

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

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AFTR: CG, THIRD US Army
INIT: PAO
DATE: 3 May 1945

3 May 1945

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 22

Period:
2000GMT 29 April to 2706GMT April

1. SUMMARY OF ACTION

a. Despite the mounting seriousness of his position on the ground, the enemy was able to launch but a lessening number of air sorties this week and even the most illiterate member of the Luftwaffe must have seen that the writing on the wall spelled "input". An estimated 180 enemy planes flew over the area in approximately 80 raids, most of which occurred the last three days of the period. In the forepart of the week, activity was mainly at night and consisted of small-scale nuisance strafing raids against headlighted traffic along MSRs, particularly Highways 4 and 26 (ASCHAFFENBERG-SCHWEINFURT-BAMBERG-NUERNBERG) and Highway 8 (ASCHAFFENBERG-WURZBURG-KITZINGEN-NUERNBERG). Targets along these routes such as troop assemblies, Class III supply points and the like also received nuisance attacks, and there were several attacks near LAUF (0-560708) upon similar targets. In addition, three airfields used in landing supplies were strafed in nightime efforts. The last three days saw activity jump sharply and on the final day of the period 80 E/A were over the area on bombing and strafing missions. Most of the latter attacks were along the left flank of the Army in XII Corps zone, the aircraft probably taking off from airfields located NE of there in the vic of PRAGUE. The 11th Armd and 26th Inf Divs and Corps Artillery bore the brunt of these attacks though several other divisions reported activity. And, indeed, throughout the week small flights of enemy planes appeared in all Corps sectors, reconnoitering troop movements and positions and in some instances making short, unaggressive attacks. Aircraft appearing

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were standard types for the most part. Ju-88s, Ju-188s, He-111s and He-110s were frequently used at night and in the daytime Me-109s and FW-190s were used, with a sprinkling of Me-262s and quite numerous other types as Arado trainers, Me-108s and others. Refueled crews were undamaged and casualties reported were from gun operators and pilots of light attacking planes generally on low-level strafing missions.

b. Screening of reports has not been completed so that only estimated numbers of raids and E/A appear below. Totals for the week, and to date from 1 August 1944, are as follows:

	RAIDS	NO. E/A	CAT I	CAT II
Week	80	160	34	18
To Date	2,354	5,797	1,027	550

	P&C OVER AREA	P&C ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	0	0	0	0
To Date	168	31	0	3

2. GAF TACTICS NOTES

No new tactics were reported.

3. MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

a. Hostile activity was spread well over the area so that no individual battalion enjoyed much ample opportunities to score as existed in the previous few weeks. Elements of the 120th AAA Gun Bn were unusually employed in that they were attached to a combat command of the 11th Armd Div for antiaircraft protection, and in such employment had several engagements. From 0650 to 2325 hrs on 26 April, 16 E/A were engaged resulting in claims for 4 Cat Is and a Cat II. The 575th AAA Self-propelled, which is regularly attached to the 11th Armd Div, participated to a greater extent in the shooting and in a period from 2106GCOB to 2615B3OB Apr claimed 12 Cat Is and 4 Cat IIs materially deepening the dent in the Luftwaffe.

b. One recent afternoon, members of a gun section of the 693d AAA AW Bn idly observed several small German boys playing on an abandoned but intact 88mm gun in a section of the city of HOCHBERG. Closer attention was paid when it became apparent the children not only knew how to operate the gun but were earnestly breaking a friendly P-47 overhead. As crew members dashed for the gun the children ran hurriedly off, leaving the gun, which was found cocked and in perfect operating condition and contained a live round in the chamber. It is good to remember these things. When temptation arises to give these "harmless German children" chocolate or gum, remember — you may feed a child secretly planning to blow off your head. It has happened.

/s/ F. E. Chamberlain, Jr
F. E. CHAMBERLAIN, JR,
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
AUTH: CG, Third US Army:
UNIT: FEC
DATE: 8 May 1945

8 May 1945

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 40

Period:
2706GOB Apr to 0406GOB May

1. SUMMARY OF ACTION

a. The rapid disintegration of the German Air Force was typified by the aircraft engaged this week. The stricken beast, writhing in the throes of death, raised its head for a last gasp that spewed up almost the entire aircraft recognition handbook. In addition to ordinary Me-109s and FW-190s, the following types were reported: Ar-69, Ar-234, Ru-181, DO-217, Fi-156, FW-44J, He-111, He-126, He-177, Ju-52, Ju-87, Ju-88, Ju-188, Me-108, Me-210, Me-262. With these specimens, the Luftwaffe flew a rather considerable number of sorties, however, and made several attacks. On the morning of 27 April, approximately 30 E/A flew across XX Corps to enter the III Corps area and bomb and strafe infantry and armored elements. In doing so, these planes passed over the DANUBE River bridgeheads, newly established, for a complete reversal of previous tactics which would have called for attempts on the bridges. Other attacks during the week were made upon a crossing of the NAAB River, vic WERNBERG, ISAR River crossings, an airfield and vehicle assembly vic CHAM, convoys and other similar targets. Reconnaissance was rather extensive and E/A were reported over most division and corps elements and installations, as well as in rear of corps boundaries. Flights of 6 and 8 E/A were noted, though most raids were composed of single or, at most, 2 planes. Almost all activity occurred during daylight, with some occasional night flights.

b. Screening of reports has not been completed so that only estimated numbers of raids and E/A appear below. Totals for the week, and to date from 1 August 1944, are as follows:

	RAIDS	NO. E/A	CAT I	CAT II
Week	54	110	33	5
To Date	2,408	5,907	1,061	555

	P&C OVER AREA	P&C ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	0	0	0	0
To Date	168	31	0	3

2. GAF TACTICS NOTES

A summary of German air reactions as observed in XX Corps zone from 1 Feb to 25 Apr has been received from the 112th AAA Gp. It views air activity as falling into four distinct phases of ground operations by the Corps, the first of which, from 1 Feb to 16 Mar, is a semi-static period with the Siegfried Line from SAARLAUTERN to the SAAR-MOSELLE River confluence still to be overcome. Air activity at this stage of operations was as meagre as to merit no attention. As the offensive began, however, and the Siegfried Line was outflanked at TRIER and rapidly rolled South to KAISERSLAUTERN and beyond, a new stage (phase 2) of hostile air effort began with the GAF attacking convoys and leading tactical elements using 120 E/A in a period from 16 - 29 Mar. Enemy pilots were aggressive, but evasive when engaged by AAA. Clouds and haze were used to mask approaches and for evasion, violent aerobatics being resorted to on days with clear skies. RHINE River crossings were effected at MAINZ and this phase of operations (phase 3, 29 Mar - 3 Apr) saw activity almost double the previous period. GAF reaction was violent, not so much against bridges and bridge areas as against threatening advances of XX Corps armor and infantry. On 2 Apr, 185 E/A were reported over the Corps area. The final phase began 3 Apr with the drive E and E to a point 5 of CHEMNITZ, turning SE on 16 Apr to point on the line BAMBERG, NUERNBERG and widening to a point W of REGENSBURG. The Luftwaffe, no longer able to justify a policy of conservation, went into high gear and against the drive NE nearly trebled the sorties of the previous phase. E/A were overhead constantly, some forming large formations of planes. But hit-and-run tactics were used and there was no indication of the old college try, no do-or-die, in any of these attacks. Few, if any, attacks were pressed in the face of AAA fire and, once engaged, no planes returned for a second attempt. Indeed, a considerable number of pilots apparently flew only to acquire flight pay for sizable formations passed over good targets without dropping so much as a hand grenade. Jet-propelled A/C were used in larger proportions than before, but primarily in reconnaissance roles, with only occasional strafing. During none of these four phases was high altitude bombing reported.

3. MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

a. That all the odd type aircraft flown by the Germans were not as harmless as might appear, is indicated by the experience of the 120th AAA Gun Bn this week. Two Ha-18ls shot down contained loads of explosives and detonating caps (as well as a dead SS officer in one). Such occurrences were not uncommon elsewhere as revealed in the following quote:

"b. Airborne Sabotage. Recurring reports from XII and III US Corps of the discovery of explosives, caps and slow-burning fuse in crashed enemy liaison or training-type planes, plus information of captured German pilots, lays bare some of the details of the desperate last chance enemy plot to conduct organized sabotage in friendly areas by means of amateur airborne

"One German pilot captured by III Corps stated that his was the last of 40 planes flown by volunteer pilots, forming KOMMANDO WENNSTOCK, commanded by Col HERMAN, to take off from AIRRING Airport (Z-9926), W of SALZBURG on mission of sabotage. Pilots are said to carry papers stating that they are discharged from service upon completion of this mission. One pilot stated all planes were training-type HUECKERS-181s with top speed of 160 km per hr..... First US Army reported 3 May several pilots captured in rear areas central portion Army zone; 8 of these planes captured in past 2 days. Interrogation revealed that a unit called KOMMANDO VIENNSTOCK.....had mission of destroying bridges and railroads in Allied rear areas. Explosives were carried and the pilots, some of whom had missions vic their homes, were to proceed home when mission accomplished. According to FW, pilots may wear civilian clothes or GAF uniforms." (Source: TUSA G-2 Periodic No 527, 4 May)

b. With the foregoing black machinations furnishing sinister highlights, other doings of the training-plane pilots provide a romantic lustre bound to appeal to one and all:

"Reminiscent of World War I action was a claim recently awarded for a Piccolor Storch reconnaissance plane. An L-4 from the 71st Armd FA Bn....was flying over a column when they saw a FW-156 flying at tree top level below them. Circling down on the German plane they (pilot and observer) cut loose with their pistols and hit the gas tank....then dove on the Storch, forcing it to the ground where it hit a fence and was demolished. The L-4 landed nearby and captured the two occupants, one of whom had been wounded by the firing." (Source: Ninth US Army AAA ISUM No 31)

c. Yet another battalion has joined the ranks of those select few who shot down a plane with one round. At 0400 hrs on 3 May, a lone Ju-88 flying over positions of D Btry, 497th AAA AW Bn, circled and dove to strafe, heading directly for gun position No 6. The Chief of Section held fire until the range was short, then fired one round getting a direct hit that caused the E/A to burst into flame and crash nearby.

d. The 693d AAA AW Bn reported that 3 of their officers, missing in action since the ARDENNES breakthrough of December, were located in an enemy PW camp near MOOSBURG.

e. As reported briefly last week, two Btrys of the 120th AAA Gun Bn, with a provisional HQ supervising, were attached to the 11th Armd Div in an unusual employment. By lengthening the Btrys, one was always giving AAA protection for the armor and Div CP while the other was left behind to defend supply and service units in the rear against air attack. In ten days' time, the two Btrys moved 385 miles for an average of 38.5 miles per day, with no vehicles out of action due to any mechanical failure.

f. Another notation appearing in the Ninth US Army AAA Issue quoted above is of some interest, as indicating what might have been expected from the Luftwaffe had it been able to stay off the ground:

"Certainly the most interesting of the various airplane factories and airfields uncovered by the XIX Corps was the underground plane manufacturing the complete fuselage for the Me-163. This is a highwing, twin-tail fighter with a single turbo jet mounted above the wing. The crushed remains of one of these planes was located...although no claim was submitted nor was it seen in flight."

For the Antiaircraft Officer:

/s/ A. C. Dunn
A. C. DUNN,
Maj, CAC,
Asst AA Officer.

1 Incl
Tabulation of Formal Claims
Submitted and Claims Granted to Rec.

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Following is a tabulation of the formal claims submitted and formal awards made to battalions for planes shot down while such units were attached to Third US Army. Awards by other armies are not tallied, therefore some units have more Categories credited to them than shown below. This does not represent the final tabulation as some late claims are still in process of preparation and have not been forwarded to this headquarters.

(1) Brigade and Groups:

	Confirmed Claims Cat I	Cat II
30th AAA Brigade ϕ	132	37
16th AAA Group	13	1
234 AAA Group *	95	27
27th AAA Group	280 1/2	79
32d AAA Group *	20	6
112th AAA Group	218	81
113th AAA Group *	143 1/2	34
Unatchd Op or Brig	1	
TOTAL - - - - -	886	265

* - No longer asgd Third US Army
ϕ - Includes some for 27th Group.

(2) Battalions:

	Unit	Formal Claims Submitted CAT I	CAT II	CAT III	Claims Approved CAT I	CAT II	CAT III	TOTAL I & II
1.	489th AAA AW Bn (SP)	126	43	0	117 1/12	8	32	125 1/12
2.	465th AAA AW Bn	97	46	0	77 1/3	31	22	108 1/3
3.	777th AAA AW Bn (SP)	73	33	16	64 7/12	19	26	83 7/12
4.	452d AAA AW Bn	70	24	1	58 5/12	19	11	77 5/12
5.	111th AAA Gun Bn	46	8	0	41 5/6	11	1	52 5/6
6.	135th AAA Gun Bn	46	20	0	34 1/2	16	4	50 1/2
7.	390th AAA AW Bn (SP)	41	12	0	35 7/12	12	5	47 7/12
8.	456th AAA AW Bn	35	11	0	32 1/2	13	0	45 1/2
9.	217th AAA Gun Bn	40	4	3	26	9	4	35
10.	387th AAA Gun Bn	38	4	0	30 1/6	4 1/2	2	34 2/3
11.	537th AAA AW Bn	24	17	2	21 1/4	12	6	33 1/4
12.	6934 AAA AW Bn	29	5	0	24 3/4	7	1	31 3/4
13.	546th AAA AW Bn	24	10	0	26	5	2	31
14.	6634 AAA AW Bn	27	5	0	26	5	1	31
15.	820th AAA Gun Bn	33	3	0	24	6	4	30
16.	559th AAA AW Bn	16	22	0	17	9	10	26
17.	119th AAA Gun Bn	23	4	1	20 1/2	4	2	24 1/2
18.	469th AAA AW Bn (SP)	22	6	0	19 1/3	4	2	23 1/3
19.	467th AAA AW Bn	22	10	2	15 7/12	7 1/2	6	23 1/12
20.	465th AAA AW Bn	24	1	0	20	2	1	22
21.	469th AAA AW Bn	16	10	0	11	10	5	21
22.	778th AAA AW Bn (SP)	17	8	0	11 2/3	5	1	19 2/3
23.	473d AAA AW Bn (SP)	14	4	0	13	4	0	17
24.	120th AAA Gun Bn	22	1	0	13 3/4	3	3	16 3/4
25.	578d AAA AW Bn (SP)	11	8	0	9	7	3	16
26.	398th AAA AW Bn (SP)	16	1	0	16	0	0	16
27.	575th AAA AW Bn (SP)	13	8	0	12 1/4	2	6	14 1/4
28.	386th AAA AW Bn	11	4	0	8 1/3	3	1	11 1/3
29.	547th AAA AW Bn	7	10	0	4	7	5	11
30.	695th AAA AW Bn	4	12	4	5	5	9	10
31.	55 1st AAA AW Bn	11	0	1	8 1/2	1	1	9 1/2
32.	796th AAA AW Bn (SP)	7	4	0	5	4	2	9
33.	448th AAA AW Bn	5	7	0	5 1/4	2	1	7 1/4
34.	559th AAA AW Bn	7	0	0	7	0	0	7
35.	387th AAA AW Bn (SP)	5	3	0	2	3	0	5
36.	468th AAA AW Bn (SP)	6	1	0	5	0	1	5
37.	109th AAA Gun Bn	4	5	0	4	0	1	4
38.	776th AAA AW Bn (SP)	3	2	0	3	0	2	3
39.	467th AAA AW Bn (SP)	2	3	0	1/2	2	1	2 1/2
40.	772d AAA AW Bn	2	0	0	1 1/3	0	0	1 1/3
41.	548th AAA AW Bn	1	1	1	1	0	2	1
42.	559th AAA AW Bn	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
43.	224 FCA Bn (Fr)	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
44.	795th AAA AW Bn (SP)	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
45.	548th AAA AW Bn	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
46.	2054 AAA AW Bn (SP)	2	2	0	0	1	0	1
47.	481st AAA AW Bn	0	1	0	0	1	0	1
48.	548th AAA AW Bn	0	1	0	0	1	0	1
49.	387th AAA AW Bn	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
50.	447th AAA AW Bn	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	TOTALS - - -	1,047	386	31	886	265	185	1,151

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Antiaircraft Section
APO 403

SECRET
AUTH: CO, Third US Army
UNIT: FEC
DATE: 17 May 1945

17 May 1945

AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 41

LAST REGULAR REPORT

Period:
0600B May to 0900B May

1. SUMMARY OF ACTION

a. The last few days of the war in Europe passed with no final show of strength by the Luftwaffe. Its Air Marshal a prisoner, most of its planes grounded, its Bed-check Charlies a thing of the past, the German Air Force lived out its final days in comparative inactivity, waiting for rigor mortis. Its planes flew over in twos and threes making occasional half-hearted attacks, or sometimes loomed our airfields and landed. Often they were escorted by allied fighter craft. Areas of two regiments of the 26th Inf Div were strafed and bombed and DANUBE River targets via INGOLSTADT were strafed. On 8 May, FW-190s and Me-109s strafed DANUBE bridge areas via DEGGENDORF and PASSAU. In the latter attack enemy aircraft included two observation planes which, in a final gesture of defiance, fired "buzy" guns at ground targets. Only damage reported from these attacks was a slight injury to AAA fire control equipment caused by strafing.

b. Screening of all reports has been completed. Final totals for Third US Army operations from 1 August 1944 through 8 May 1945 are as follows:

	RAIDS	NO. E/A	CAT I	CAT II
Week	61	88	22	9
To Date	2,469	6,192	1,081	564

	PAC OVER AREA	PAC ENGAGED	CAT A	CAT B
Week	0	0	0	0
To Date	166	31	0	3

c. Ammunition expended upon its primary mission and in ground firing roles totaled as follows (number of rounds):

	90mm	90mm POZIT	40mm	37mm	.50 cal
AAA firing	56,314	1,531	91,688	63,254	3,797,127
Ground firing	26,245	0	12,607	13,143	1,425,886
TOTAL	82,559	1,531	104,295	76,397	5,223,013

2. GAP TACTICS NOTES

Nothing to report.

3. MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

a. In accumulating scores of 1,081 planes destroyed and 564 probably destroyed - a total of 1,646 - Third US Army's antiaircraft downed better than a fourth of all enemy aircraft observed over the entire Army area, for a percentage of 26.6%. In 281 operational days an average of 5.86 E/A were claimed each day. In addition to these many E/A were damaged.

b. It was on 1 August 1944 at 1458 hours - 2 hours and 25 minutes after Third US Army became operational - that AAA scored its first kill. The 465th AAA AW Bn attached to the 8th Inf Div opened fire on a flight of 15 - 20 Me-109s and knocked one down, the first of a long procession of planes to fall before AAA gun fire. To the 390th AAA AW Bn (SP) goes the distinction of shooting down the last. Three FW-190s were engaged at 2030B on May 8th - an hour and thirty-one minutes before hostilities officially ceased - as they flew over service elements of the 26th Inf Div. One smoked as the tracers caught it, then burst into flames and crashed.

c. In a notable occurrence of the week a chaplain captured a 1s General. While making arrangements to conduct mass in a local monastery the chaplain learned that the General, former CG of Wehrkreis XVII, was in hiding there. He promptly notified his CO and together they took the General prisoner. The chaplain is with the 653d AAA AW Bn.

d. For their many achievements antiaircraft units may well be proud. In particular it is most gratifying to record in these pages the official commendations of high commands for superlative work done in combat. It is noted with pride that of the AAA units serving with Third US Army, several have received a Presidential Unit Citation. For their heroic part in the defense of BASTOGNE under the direction of the 101st Airborne Div, "C" battery of the 628d AAA AW Bn (SP) attached to Res Command, 9th Armd Div, and "B" Battery of the 796th AAA AW Bn (SP) attached to CCB of the 10th Armd Div were awarded the unit citation. In addition, the entire 489th AAA AW Bn (SP) has been recommended by the 4th Armd Div to participate in the unit citation already granted to that division.

e. Attached as an inclosure is a tabulation of the "batting averages" of battalions, based on engagements and claims accruing while such battalions were attached or assigned to this Headquarters. Since all claims have not been finally processed, these do not represent the final figures, but do show increases over last week's report.

f. Also attached as an inclosure is a record of day-by-day enemy air activity over the entire Army area from the beginning of operations to date. These figures represent the screened totals, all duplications in reports of enemy planes having been eliminated so far as possible.

/s/ F. R. Chamberlain, Jr
/s/ F. R. CHAMBERLAIN, JR,
Colonel, CAC,
Antiaircraft Officer.

2 Incls -
Incl #1 - Battalion "batting averages".
Incl #2 - Day-by-day enemy air activity over Army area from the beginning of operations to date.

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UNIT and relative standing	Batting Averages from 1 Aug 44 to date TOTAL NO. I/I	I & II	ENGAGED AVERAGE	Batting Averaged from 1 Feb 45 to date TOTAL NO. I/I	I & II	ENGAGED AVERAGE	Relative Standing (1 Feb to date, only)
1. 444th AAA AW Bn	1		1 1.0000	1		1 1.0000	(1)
2. 481st AAA AW Bn	1		2 .5000				
3. 386th AAA AW Bn	11 1/3	24	.4722				
4. 489th AAA SP Bn	126 1/12	507	.2501	102 7/12	405	.2533	(7)
5. 495th AAA AW Bn	111 1/3	444	.2399	64 5/6	238	.2721	(5)
6. 546th AAA AW Bn	31	111	.2191	28	91	.3076	(3)
7. 574th AAA SP Bn	3	14	.2143	3	14	.2143	(11)
8. 549th AAA AW Bn	1	5	.2000				
9. 559th AAA AW Bn	1	5	.2000				
10. 890th AAA AW Bn	1	5	.2000				
11. 129th AAA Gp Hq Bn	35 2/3	186	.1918	29 1/3	101	.2904	(4)
12. 390th AAA SP Bn	48 1/12	269	.1814	23 1/4	135	.1722	(14)
13. 776th AAA SW Bn	3	17	.1765				
14. 4634 AAA AW Bn	31	190	.1632				
15. 6334 AAA AW Bn	33 3/4	201	.1679	28 1/2	152	.1875	(13)
16. 796th AAA SP Bn	9	57	.1579	4	15	.2667	(6)
17. 120th AAA Gp Hq Bn	30	200	.1500	0	6	.0000	(37)
18. 119th AAA Gp Hq Bn	21 1/2	144	.1493	2	8	.2500	(8)
19. 777th AAA SP Bn	89 7/12	560	.1493	63 1/3	494	.1282	(19)
20. 387th AAA SP Bn	5	34	.1470				
21. 599th AAA AW Bn	7	48	.1458				
22. 217th AAA Gp Hq Bn	37	272	.1360	7	48	.1458	(18)
23. 452d AAA AW Bn	77 11/12	579	.1346	65 1/3	512	.1276	(9)
24. 537th AAA AW Bn	33 1/4	252	.1339	25 3/4	116	.2220	(21)
25. 445th AAA AW Bn	7 1/4	55	.1318				(10)
26. 445th AAA AW Bn	22	179	.1229				
27. 128th AAA Gp Hq Bn	17 1/4	146	.1182				
28. 411th AAA Gp Hq Bn	52 5/6	448	.1179	5 1/4	41	.1280	(20)
29. 456th AAA AW Bn	45 1/2	392	.1161	0	14	.0000	(38)
30. 547th AAA AW Bn	11	111	.0991	2	19	.1053	(24)
31. 778th AAA SP Bn	19 2/3	200	.0984	19 1/3	171	.1130	(23)
32. 449th AAA AW Bn	21	214	.0981	18	144	.1250	(22)
33. 551st AAA AW Bn	9 1/2	102	.0931	0	14	.0000	(39)
34. 457th AAA AW Bn	23 1/12	246	.0895	13 3/4	182	.0755	(29)
35. 550th AAA AW Bn	26	292	.0890	23	135	.1704	(15)
36. 466th AAA SP Bn	23 1/3	267	.0874	12	34	.3529	(2)
37. 572d AAA SP Bn	16	188	.0851	16	188	.0851	(28)
38. 782d AAA AW Bn	1 1/3	16	.0833				
39. 795th AAA SW Bn	1	14	.0714				
40. 575th AAA SP Bn	14 3/4	229	.0644	14 3/4	226	.0653	(30)
41. 468th AAA SP Bn	5	78	.0641	1/2	5	.1000	(25)
42. 398th AAA SP Bn	16	262	.0611	2	22	.0909	(27)
43. 115th AAA Gp Hq Bn	50 1/2	944	.0535	21 1/2	225	.0956	(26)
44. 467th AAA SP Bn	2 1/2	47	.0532				
45. 634th AAA AW Bn	1	19	.0521	1	19	.0521	(31)
46. 635th AAA AW Bn	10	197	.0508	6	46	.1500	(17)
47. 530th AAA AW Bn	2	42	.0476	2	42	.0476	(32)
48. 109th AAA Gp Hq Bn	4	88	.0455	0	2	.0000	(34)
49. 2034 AAA SP Bn	1	27	.0370				
50. 22d FTR (Fr)	1	33	.0303				
51. 566th AAA AW Bn	1	67	.0149	1	6	.1667	(16)
52. 4634 AAA AW Bn	0	1	.0000				
53. 460th AAA AW Bn	0	1	.0000	0	1	.0000	(33)
54. 4334 AAA AW Bn	0	3	.0000	0	3	.0000	(35)
55. 815th AAA AW Bn	0	5	.0000	0	5	.0000	(36)
56. 447th AAA AW Bn	0	7	.0000				
57. 377th AAA AW Bn	0	17	.0000				
58. 535th AAA AW Bn	0	23	.0000	0	23	.0000	(40)
59. 467th AAA AW Bn	0	27	.0000	0	27	.0000	(41)
60. 4734 AAA SP Bn	17	Unknown	Unknown				
TOTALS - - -	1,169	9,204		608	3,933		

Incl #1 to Hq Third US Army AAA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT No 41, 27 May 45.

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DAY-BY-DAY ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY OVER THIRD US ARMY AREA
0112008 Aug 1944 to 0900018 May 1945

Date	August 1944 Raids	E/A	I	II	September 1944 Raids	E/A	I	II	October 1944 Raids	E/A	I	II	November 1944 Raids	E/A	I	II	December 1944 Raids	E/A	I	II
1	14	85	24	9																
2	30	113	29	6	10	57	13	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	32	185	29	20	9	51	4	2	5	8	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	0
4	73	169	15	8	8	13	4	0	2	2	0	1	1	2	0	0	1	2	0	0
5	61	204	5	7	4	5	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	85	111	23	18	2	3	2	0	4	9	5	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	0	0
7	68	189	20	6	4	6	0	1	5	5	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
8	76	225	8	2	8	11	0	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	10	56	3	0	10	18	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	10	56	3	2	1	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11	3	4	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	7	45	3	1	6	11	0	0	8	20	2	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
13	11	21	5	2	2	7	1	0	14	28	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
14	6	12	1	0	2	4	1	0	6	10	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0
15	2	3	3	0	4	5	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16	11	25	9	3	7	12	1	0	3	5	0	0	3	5	0	0	1	1	0	0
17	18	50	18	3	7	12	1	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	5	10	3	2	3	4	0	0	10	16	0	0	5	10	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	13	103	11	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	16	7	2	16	17	5	4
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	78	2	0	0	0	0	0	8	8	4	0
21	32	56	21	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	1	0
22	8	107	24	13	0	0	0	0	6	7	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	0
23	5	79	18	4	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	3	5	0	0	29	29	3	3
24	7	19	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	68	71	8	1
25	1	28	0	0	1	18	1	0	4	6	1	0	0	0	0	0	149	150	16	6
26	4	6	2	0	1	5	0	0	4	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	57	158	17	7
27	2	9	0	1	5	8	0	0	3	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	34	64	7	1
28	6	25	0	1	7	14	2	0	1	1	0	0	2	2	0	0	114	158	26	20
29	3	9	0	0	7	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	5	0	0	30	80	2	8
30	3	8	0	1	7	7	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	8	8	0	0
31	8	11	3	1	0	0	0	0	5	9	2	0	0	0	0	0	56	80	11	6
TOTALS	588	2,000	271	123	105	251	28	15	97	200	16	1	56	85	15	2	548	742	169	87

DAY-BY-DAY ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY OVER THIRD US ARMY AREA
0112008 Aug 1944 to 0900018 May 1945
(Cont'd)

Date	January 1945 Raids	E/A	I	II	February 1945 Raids	E/A	I	II	March 1945 Raids	E/A	I	II	April 1945 Raids	E/A	I	II	May 1945 Raids	E/A	I	II
1	125	243	63	15	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	8	14	0	3	6	8	5	0
2	29	48	7	7	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	63	289	68	32	27	22	14	2
3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	73	17	5	9	11	6	1
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	43	150	39	21	9	14	5	1
5	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	36	137	15	10	2	2	1	0
6	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	27	55	19	4	2	2	0	0
7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	48	130	18	20	6	7	2	1
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	21	70	7	4	65	63	14	2
9	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	2	0	0	5	24	4	4				
10	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	2	0	0	16	62	18	12				
11	0	0	0	0	2	3	0	0	3	3	1	0	11	37	10	7				
12	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	8	20	8	0				
13	2	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	2	0	0	2	2	0	0				
14	6	12	1	0	6	10	1	0	3	3	1	0	20	61	25	14				
15	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	4	4	0	0	14	60	7	6				
16	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	20	0	3				
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7	0	3	10	34	11	3				
18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	47	15	15	9	11	4	2				
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	80	11	7	5	16	1	2				
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	26	5	4	3	3	0	0				
21	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	42	235	48	23	8	9	0	0				
22	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	33	200	80	16	4	6	0	0				
23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	20	7	1	1	1	0	0				
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	38	92	24	16	1	3	0	0				
25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	62	32	9	9	13	3	2				
26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	72	125	36	19	11	17	6	2				
27	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	68	3	2	17	47	11	2				
28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	27	80	18	14				
29	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	31	2	1				
30	0	1	0	0					1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0				
31	0	0	0	0					13	18	2	3	11	15	6	1				
TOTALS	171	316	71	25	23	32	3	8	308	969	407	180	3	4	2	0				
													474	1,182	316	172	95	129	47	12

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Artillery Officer

SUBJECT: After-Action Report, Artillery Section, Headquarters Third United States Army.

TO : Commanding General, Third United States Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Artillery Section, Headquarters Third U.S. Army, commencing with 22 March 1944 and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapters.

2. Third U.S. Army, and the artillery thereof, has operated over many varied kinds of terrain under strikingly diversified climatic conditions. There have been the narrow confines of hedgerows, the relatively open rolling plains, and the rough hills and precipitous valleys of wooded mountain country. There have been the dust of summer, the rains and mud of autumn and spring, the snows and biting cold of winter. There have been swift pursuits of fleeing enemy, repeated assaults of river lines great and small, assaults of defensive positions ranging from hasty field fortifications to the fortress city of METZ and the redoubts of the SIEGFRIED LINE. There have been resolute and unyielding defenses against counterattacks ranging from a handful of infantry with a tank or two to that of an Army Group including a Panzer Army.

3. Against all these conditions the infantry and tankmen of Third U.S. Army have built a record of magnificent success. To this record the artillerymen with the Army have contributed unceasingly and materially. They have consistently received the one real reward of the artilleryman, the appreciation of the supported troops expressed in the words "well done".

Edward T. Williams.

EDWARD T. WILLIAMS
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Artillery Officer

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ARTILLERY SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

The Artillery Section, through its representation of two officers and two enlisted men in the advance party, commenced operations soon after their arrival in the United Kingdom on 28 January 1944. The main body arrived at the headquarters on 22 March. The Section then consisted of seventeen officers, one warrant officer and forty enlisted men. It was organized into four sub-sections, a combined S-1-4, S-2, S-3 and Artillery Air. In addition, there was a Tank Destroyer sub-section composed of attached personnel.

An initial and fundamental question was the determination of the initial disposition of the artillery with the Army. First U.S. Army was advised what artillery units, by caliber and quantity, would be available for assignment to Third U.S. Army. Subject to that limitation, artillery units were requested and included in the Third U.S. Army Troop List as follows:-

4 - Headquarters and Headquarters Batteries Corps Artillery
5 - Field Artillery Observation Battalions
2 - Headquarters and Headquarters Batteries Field Artillery Brigade
20 - Headquarters and Headquarters Batteries Field Artillery Group
12 - Field Artillery Battalions (105mm Howitzer)
8 - Armored Field Artillery Battalions
7 - Field Artillery Battalions (4.5-inch Gun)
19 - Field Artillery Battalions (155mm Howitzer)
10 - Field Artillery Battalions (155mm Gun)
3 - Field Artillery Battalions (155mm Gun, SP)
7 - Field Artillery Battalions (8-inch Howitzer)
4 - Field Artillery Battalions (8-inch Gun)
1 - Field Artillery Battalions (240mm Howitzer)

The employment of corps under the "OVERLORD" plan was necessarily subject to change. It was therefore considered desirable to attach a like quantity and caliber of artillery to each corps. The Field Artillery Annex to the Third U.S. Army Outline Plan accordingly recommended attachment to each of the four corps approximately the following artillery:-

1 - Headquarters and Headquarters Battery Corps Artillery
1 - Field Artillery Observation Battalion
4 - Headquarters and Headquarters Batteries Field Artillery Group
5 - Field Artillery Battalions (105mm Howitzer)
2 - Field Artillery Battalions (4.5-inch Gun)
5 - Field Artillery Battalions (155mm Howitzer)
3 - Field Artillery Battalions (155mm Gun)
2 - Field Artillery Battalions (8-inch Howitzer)

In addition, it was planned initially to retain the two field artillery brigades under Army control with the following artillery units:

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4 - Field Artillery Group Headquarters
3 - Field Artillery Battalions (8-inch Gun)
7 - Field Artillery Battalions (24-pdr Howitzer)
4 - Field Artillery Battalions (105-mm Howitzer)

Much of the artillery to be assigned to the Army had still to arrive from the United States. As units arrived, reconnaissances were made to ascertain as to attachment to corps and as to location of camps and billets. So far as possible, subordinate units were located in proximity both to each other and the superior unit and in the vicinity of ranges and adequate training areas. Grounds, units were oriented and assisted in all matters of supply and distribution of continent administrative orders and commands was arranged through the Adjutant General.

All incoming units had to be equipped with field artillery liaison-type aircraft and their initial issue of Tables of Equipment Air Force equipment. This equipment was requested through and by the Artillery Section, which made the necessary arrangements with both higher headquarters and the Air Force and in turn notified the individual unit as to what items could be drawn and where and when to draw them. Replenishment supplies and equipment likewise were requisitioned through the Artillery Section. In addition, squadron code markings had to be assigned to all artillery aircraft with the Army and the units advised as to when and where to deliver the aircraft to the [illegible] Missile Reclamation and Repair Squadron which performed the work of marking.

Responsibility for the training of artillery units in the United Kingdom was delegated to the several corps. However, it was directed that they would [illegible] certain the following: thorough flight familiarization of all crews; review of basic training; familiarization with new material; calibration of all guns and howitzers; perfection of all specialists in their duties; waterproofing of materiel; service practice; long-range adjustment of artillery fire by high-performance aircraft (Thunderbolt replaced by the term "Arty/P"); counterbattery plans and procedure; operation with an observation battalion used in its normal role; technique of massing of fires with special emphasis upon Serenade (the massing of artillery fires); use of grid-to oblique photographs, night firing; communication to include operation in the Army and Corps Artillery Officer's Radio Nets; aircraft recognition; and defense against chemical attack, mines and booby traps.

In addition, the Artillery Section conducted a school to qualify unit instructors on the use of oblique photographs and assembled and furnished material for the conduct of unit schools. Provision was made for the training of tank destroyer and, in conjunction with the Anti-aircraft Artillery Section, antiaircraft artillery battalions in indirect fire methods.

Due to the widely varying dates of arrival in the United Kingdom, the varying stages of equipment and the difficulty of centralizing unit locations, training periods were staggered and of varying length. Nevertheless, almost all units were afforded at least one and often more opportunities to conduct service practice and firing exercises on the ranges and especially to calibrate weapons.

A number of artillery ranges were available in southern England and in Wales, some for the exclusive use of and under the control of Third U.S. Army, some for use in conjunction with First U.S. Army. The Artillery Section coordinated the use of these ranges by monthly allocations to corps. In addition, an officer from the Artillery Section was placed on temporary duty at Sennybridge Camp, South Wales in the vicinity of which most of the ranges were located. His task was to facilitate use of the range by the various units, including coordination of areas between units, supply of maps and aerial photographs, assistance in reconnaissance for positions and target areas, arrangements for Class I and III Supply of units on the ranges, liaison with the British District Headquarters and coordination with the local farmers. Three of the four corps were able to conduct a corps artillery firing exercise. In all, during the period April to June inclusive the ranges were utilized by more than 100 Third U.S. Army field artillery, tank and tank destroyer battalions.

Preparations for operations of course loomed importantly throughout the planning period. Included in these preparations was the Field Artillery Annex to the Army Outline Plan for "OVERLORD".

Operations Memoranda, copies attached, Annexes 1 - 6 inclusive, were prepared and published on Serenade, Special Basic Note for Artillery and Tank Destroyer Units, Observation of Artillery Fire by Fighter-Type Aircraft, Antitank Measures in Defense and Defense, Field Artillery Intelligence, and Field Artillery Communications and Reports. In addition, training memoranda relating to tank destroyer training, field artillery training for infantry, tank and combat engineer officers, and the use of range facilities were published. Arrangements were made with the Weather Detachment attached to Army and with the Antiaircraft Section for the furnishing of metro data to operations.

The Artillery Section, in conjunction with the Engineer Section, developed plans for operation of an Army Survey Information Center when practicable and a conference of field artillery observation battalion and engineer topographic battalion officers was held to assure proper coordination of their operational activities. The agenda for this conference is attached, Annex 7.

One officer and one enlisted man attended the Theater Intelligence Service School of Battle school and files on German order of battle, as pertinent to artillery units, were built up and maintained. Files were also accumulated on enemy artillery materiel and enemy defenses.

Air OP bulletins were initiated with the publication of Air OP Bulletin Number 1, 20 May, copy attached, Annex 8. (The term "Air OP is used herein to designate field artillery liaison-type aircraft.) Material included routine directives concerning operation of air sections and information on the operation and tactical employment of Air OPs in other theaters.

Ammunition, materiel and equipment for the operation likewise required constant attention through the planning period. After a study of ammunition expenditures in other theaters, recommendations were prepared and transmitted to the Army ammunition officer regarding quantities and types of field artillery ammunition to be requisitioned for the operation. Similarly, basic loads of types of ammunition and fuzes for each caliber weapon were determined, as follows:

WEAPON	PROJECTILE	FUZE*	PROPELLING CHARGE
105mm Howitzer	85% HE 15% Smoke (@ M7; @ T5 ML8) 5 Rounds WP/AT	50% PDF ML8 35% PDF MSL	
155mm Howitzer	50% HE 35% Smoke	72½% M51A1 [illegible] 2½% M54A1 7½% MSL	60% WB 40% SB
4.5-inch Gun	100% HE	70% M71A3 30% M54A1 10% M67A1	50% SC 50% MC
155mm Gun	55% HE 15% Smoke (WP)	10% M67A1 70% M71A1 30% M65A1	
8-inch Howitzer	100% HE	70% M71A3 30% M72A1 10% M67A1	70% WB 30% SB
8-inch Gun	100% HE	70% M51A3 10% T10* 10% M67A1	
240mm Howitzer	100% HE	70% M51A1 10% T10* 10% M67A1	

*Fuze proportions exceed 100% so as to provide a margin.

Subordinate units submitted many requests for equipment in excess of Tables of Organization and Equipment. These were studied to determine their merit and a consolidated field artillery project was prepared and submitted to the appropriate supply section of the headquarters. The more important of the items included in the project and subsequently authorized and issued to artillery units were as follows:-

SCR-193 radio, mounted in 1¼-ton truck - issued one per field artillery and tank destroyer battalion (less divisional and nondivisional), field artillery observation battalion, field artillery and tank destroyer group, and division artillery headquarters and headquarters battery, two per corps artillery headquarters and headquarters battery - for use in the Army and Corps Artillery Officer's Radio Nets.

1¼-ton truck and SCR-510, 608 or 610 radio - issued one per Air OP Section.

¼-ton weapons carrier - issued one per headquarters and headquarters battery, field artillery group, infantry and armored division artillery and corps artillery - for use by Air OP Section.

SCR-536 radio - issued four per field artillery battalion (divisional and non-divisional), field artillery observation battalion and headquarters and headquarters battery, division artillery - for use by Survey Sections.

Power Unit PE-75 - one per all field artillery and tank destroyer echelons, down to and including battalion - for lighting command post tents.

Wire W-110 - five miles per field artillery battalion (divisional and nondivisional) and field artillery observation battalion, twenty miles per headquarters and headquarters battery, field artillery group, division artillery and corps artillery.

In addition to the preceding, after analysis of similar requests by the North African Theater of Operations and by First U.S. Army, the Artillery Section initiated a request, copy attached, Annex 9, for personnel and materiel sufficient to provide an additional forward observer section for each light artillery firing battery and each medium artillery headquarters battery of the divisional artillery. The request was submitted through normal channels to European Theater of Operations and approved.

To secure uniformity of operational practices so far as practicable and so facilitate the transfer, when necessary, of artillery units from one army to the other, an officer was placed on liaison duty with the Artillery Section, First U.S. Army. He reported to First U.S. Army in early April and remained with it throughout its movement to the Continent, returning to Third U.S. Army in mid-July. Likewise, frequent contacts were maintained both with the Artillery Section, First U.S. Army Group and with the Artillery Sections of the several corps.

The initial plan for the lift of artillery units to the Continent was published by higher headquarters with a request that it be studied and changes recommended. First priority in the lift was given to divisions, next corps artillery units being given a low priority, so that in the main they were not scheduled for shipment until after the divisions. Subject to this limitation, the Artillery Section recommended changes in the initial troop list for the lift, notably the acceleration of several field artillery group headquarters so as to assure the presence on the Continent of sufficient headquarters to handle incoming battalions. The order of lift was kept under close scrutiny throughout the planning period and a few artillery units were moved back upon the initiative of either higher headquarters in the United Kingdom or in [illegible], a few moved ahead to meet specialized needs arising on the Continent.

The movement of field artillery liaison-type aircraft to the Continent raised a specialized problem. The Artillery Air Officer established a procedure whereby use of a prevailing airdrome and special overwater flight equipment were obtained and dispatch of a unit's planes by air was coordinated with the unit's movement by water. Instructions were also prepared and published for the truck loading of aircraft in the event that flight to the Continent should not be feasible.

The planning period came to an end with the lift of the Section to the Continent. This was made in two stages, the Section closing in the marshalling area on 29 June and on the Continent on 6 July. Three officers and six enlisted men were left behind in the United Kingdom to continue the Section's duties with respect to units scheduled for later shipment to the Continent and of which some had not yet arrived from the United States.

Meanwhile, several changes had taken place in the composition of the Artillery Section. In May, as part of a change in the Army Headquarters' organization, the Section strength was reduced to fourteen officers, one warrant officer and thirty-four enlisted men with a Tank Destroyer officer attached. Subsequently three enlisted men were released and replaced by radio operators. In June two additional officers, one first lieutenant and one second lieutenant, were assigned to the Section for duty in the Artillery Air sub-section. Thereafter, in July, an officer was designated to serve as Communications Officer paying particular attention to the Army and Corps Artillery Officer's Radio Nets.

One, and later three, aircraft were used continually by the Artillery Air sub-section. No mechanics nor maintenance equipment were available so that maintenance had to be performed by the pilot-crew or "borrowed" from lower units. This procedure was not considered satisfactory and was possible only because the aircraft were new.

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

The pre-operational period on the Continent was largely devoted to the reception and disposition of incoming artillery units as a part of the concentration of the Army for the operation.

An officer from the Artillery Section, with an officer assistant from 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade, and a detail of four enlisted men were stationed at the Utah Beach Transit Area from 5 July to 3 August. This

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detachment acted as liaison between the Army and all incoming Army units and assisted the Army assembly.

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The Artillery Section reconnoitered the artillery portion of the Army assembly areas and met incoming artillery units at the release point and guided them into their assigned bivouacs. Status of personnel and equipment was verified in each unit and, where necessary, action was initiated by the Section to alleviate shortages.

One field artillery observation battalion and one field artillery battalion, both assigned to Third U.S. Army, were attached to VIII Corps then operating in combat under First U.S. Army.

To prepare for the Army's entry into operations, close contact was established and maintained throughout the pre-operational period by personal visit with Twelfth U.S. Army Group, First U.S. Army and VIII, XV and XX Corps.

Of the three officers left in the United Kingdom upon the departure of the main body for the Continent, one rejoined the Section upon the arrival of Echelon V on 19 July. The remaining two officers stayed with Echelon I and did not rejoin the Section until late August. Their function in the United Kingdom was to assure the supply and equipping of Army units scheduled for later shipment to the Continent.

Several important supply problems were presented. A shortage of prime movers for 4.5-inch Gun, 155mm Howitzer and 155mm Gun battalions developed, so that a substitution of tractors in lieu of trucks became necessary. 4.5-inch Gun and 155mm Howitzer battalions were equipped with fifteen M5 tractors each, 155mm Gun battalions with eighteen M4 tractors each. A similar shortage of M21 and 10-ton ammunition trailers was alleviated by the issue of 4-ton and 2½-ton trucks as substitute equipment.

Track equipment for 155mm Gun (SP), 8-inch Howitzer, C-inch Gun and 240mm Howitzer battalions was unloaded at Liverpool, Manchester and Glasgow, often as much as three hundred miles from the unit's station. Such equipment was not capable of moving long distances on hard-surfaced roads because excessive wear of the tracks and bogies resulted. The Transportation Corps was able to move some of the smaller of this equipment by rail. Most of this equipment however was too high and too wide for rail movement. Two ordnance evacuation battalions were equipped with tank transporters and operated directly under the Artillery Section representatives to move this equipment to the units. They were also utilized to transport tanks and tractors to depots for major repairs.

Heavy artillery battalions required instruction and assistance in the maintenance of heavy equipment issued to them upon arrival in the United Kingdom. An ordnance heavy automotive maintenance company was equipped and operated under the Artillery Section representatives for this purpose. The experience of an 8-inch Gun battalion exemplifies the excellent work done by this company. This battalion, equipped with M5 tractors, was given a schedule requiring it to march 150 miles to the marshalling area in less than twenty-four hours. Upon arrival twenty-five bogie tires were found to be seriously damaged. The ordnance heavy automotive maintenance company commander personally procured and delivered replacements to the marshalling area within 24 hours and supervised their installation, thereby enabling the battalion to depart for continental operations as scheduled.

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

1 August. Third U.S. Army became operational at 1900, 1 August 1944. Annex 2 (Field Artillery), copy attached as Annex 10, to Field Order number 1 established the initial organization of the artillery. The situation everywhere was fluid, with VIII Corps commencing to fan out upon the BRITTANY PENINSULA and XV Corps advancing rapidly to the south, so that all artillery was attached to the several corps and none was retained under Army control.

VIII Corps, composed of two armored and two infantry divisions, initially had attached to it from Army one field artillery observation battalion, five field artillery group headquarters, one 155mm Howitzer battalion, three 105mm Howitzer (SP) battalions, five 155mm Howitzer battalions, three 155mm Gun battalions, one 155mm Gun (SP) battalion and one 8-inch Howitzer battalion. The Corps in turn reattached virtually all of its artillery to the divisions, its organization for combat being as follows:-

Attached to 8th Infantry Division -

1 field artillery group
1 105mm Howitzer battalion
1 155mm Howitzer battalion
1 155mm Gun battalion
1 field artillery observation battery

Attached to 79th Infantry Division -

1 field artillery group
2 105mm Howitzer battalions
1 155mm Gun battalion
1 field artillery observation battery

Attached to 4th Armored Division -

1 field artillery group
2 105mm Howitzer (SP) battalions
1 155mm Howitzer battalion

Attached to 6th Armored Division -

1 105mm Howitzer (SP) battalion
1 155mm Gun (SP) battalion

Retained under corps control -

2 field artillery groups
1 field artillery observation battalion (-)
1 155mm Howitzer battalion
1 155mm Gun battalion
1 8-inch Howitzer battalion

4th Armored Division was commencing its advance upon LORIENT (U72) at this time and 6th Armored Division was preparing to move upon BREST (V99).

XV Corps, composed of one armored and two infantry divisions, initially had attached to it from Army one field artillery observation battalion, four field artillery group headquarters, one 105mm Howitzer (SP) battalion, two 105mm Howitzer battalions, five 155mm Howitzer battalions, three 155mm Gun battalions and one 8-inch Howitzer battalion. Corps initially reattached one 105mm Howitzer (SP) battalion and one 105mm Howitzer (truck-drawn) battalion to 83d Infantry Division and one 105mm Howitzer battalion to 90th Infantry Division. The remaining artillery, while retained under Corps initially, moved so as closely to support the Corps advance and operated in effect much as if control had been decentralized to divisions.

XX Corps, in reserve initially, had attached from Army one field artillery observation battalion and two field artillery groups.

6th Armored Division reported that all six 105mm Howitzers (M7) of one battery were destroyed by fire from German 88s.

3 August. 79th Infantry Division replaced 83d Infantry Division in XV Corps. 83d Infantry Division replaced 79th Infantry Division in VIII Corps and began to move into position for the attack upon ST MALO (S71). Artillery attached to these divisions reverted to corps by Army order as soon as their missions could be taken over by other units.

4 August. XV Corps decentralized control of all artillery to the divisions to facilitate its movement in close support of the rapidly moving situation. Organization of the Corps artillery for combat was now as follows:-

Attached to 79th Infantry Division -

2 field artillery groups
1 105mm Howitzer battalion
2 155mm Howitzer battalions
2 155mm Gun battalions
1 8-inch Howitzer battalion

Attached to 90th Infantry Division -

2 field artillery groups
1 105mm Howitzer (SP) battalion
1 105mm Howitzer battalion
3 155mm Howitzer battalions
1 155mm Gun battalion

5 August. XV Corps continued to encounter limited resistance and little firing was done by the artillery with the Corps.

One field artillery group with two 155mm Howitzer battalions and two 155mm Gun battalions was attached to 83d Infantry Division by VIII Corps to support its attack on ST MALO (S71).

Ammunition expenditures by artillery with VIII Corps for the seven-day period ending at 050600 totalled 16,192 rounds 105mm Howitzer, 162 rounds 155mm Howitzer, fifty-three rounds 155mm Gun (SP) and nothing for both the 155mm Gun and 8-inch Howitzer, indicating that during a fast moving situation few calls for fire of the heavier weapons are to be anticipated.

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6 August. A twenty-minute artillery preparation was fired by artillery with 83d Infantry Division in support of its attack on the main defense line around ST MALO (S71). The Division estimated that 6,000 troops were defending the area and reported receiving fire from enemy light artillery and mortars. Some Prisoners of War taken were carrying propaganda leaflets fired by 83d Division Artillery.

The Artillery Section arranged with the Weather Detachment attached to Army to obtain and broadcast metro messages four times daily.

Artillery ammunition was rationed to the Army by Twelfth U.S. Army Group. The Army however did not consider it necessary or desirable to impose rationing upon the several corps because of the light expenditures in the mobile situation and because it was desirable to assist the rapid advance by unrestricted ammunition expenditure when support was needed.

XX Corps was committed. No other artillery being available on the Continent, one 155mm Howitzer battalion and one 155mm Gun battalion, detached from VIII Corps, and one incoming 155mm Howitzer battalion were attached to XX Corps to support its advance. These were in addition to the one field artillery observation battalion and two field artillery groups previously attached to the Corps. Artillery with the Corps was supplemented by the attachment to it of incoming artillery units until by 10 August it consisted of one field artillery observation battalion, three field artillery groups, one 105mm Howitzer battalion, one 155mm Howitzer (SP) battalion, four 155mm Howitzer battalions, one 155mm Gun battalion and one 8-inch Howitzer battalion.

7 August. 83d Infantry Division continued to encounter stiff resistance at ST MALO (S71). Arty/A missions were arranged for the support of the attack.

8 August. 83d Infantry Division turned five captured German 150mm guns (pos U74 area) in ST MALO (S71). The Division reported receiving medium and heavy caliber artillery fire from heavy concrete emplacements upon the islands off ST MALO (S71).

XV Corps continued to advance, occupying LE MANS (V16). All artillery with the Corps continued to be attached to the divisions except for one field artillery group and three battalions in general support with the additional mission of reinforcing 79th Infantry Division.

9 August. VIII Corps Artillery (less attachments to 4th and 6th Armored and 8th Infantry Divisions) was committed in support of 83d Infantry Division attack at ST MALO (S71). This consisted of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VIII Corps Artillery, one field artillery observation battalion, three field artillery groups and eight field artillery battalions. Of these, one was a 155mm Howitzer battalion, two were 155mm Gun battalions, two 8-inch Howitzer battalions, two 8-inch Gun battalions and one 240mm Howitzer battalion.

Successful Arty/A missions in the ST MALO (S71) area included sinking of a two-masted ship in the harbor, a direct hit upon a building suspected of housing a command post and one adjustment upon an ammunition dump followed by explosions lasting thirty minutes.

Shortage of spare and replacement parts for M4 and M5 tractors was becoming critical in XV Corps.

11 August. Stern resistance at ST MALO (S71) continued. Artillery supporting the attack directed heavy fire against the Citadel (S7%4135). Unobserved counter-battery fire succeeded in silencing enemy batteries on the islands. Enemy batteries on the islands resumed firing immediately following aerial bombardment of the islands.

6th Armored Division Artillery fired counterfire successfully during aerial bombardment in support of limited objective attack at BREST (V99).

12 August. XV Corps reported that movement of the Corps had been so fast that it was difficult to keep aerial photographs ahead of the advancing units.

13 August. With the exception of isolated areas, enemy artillery resistance continued light. Enemy artillery was active at BREST (V99), LORIENT (U72) and especially ST MALO (S71) where fire was encountered from all calibers from 88mm to 210mm, including coastal guns turned around to fire inland. The advance north of the LOIRE and to the north and east encountered only sporadic fires from self-propelled assault guns and 88s.

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VIII Corps employed heavy artillery extensively against the concrete fortifications at ST MALO (S771). In one blast 16,135 rounds from [illegible] blew a hole in the twenty-foot thick wall of a casemate. Concrete backed with armor plating, blew a twenty-foot hole in the turret cover and destroyed two 88mm guns emplaced in concrete turrets.

Ammunition expenditures continued light in all corps except VIII Corps which was expending approximately one-third of a unit of fire daily, mainly heavy caliber using CIOC (anti-concrete) rounds. Expenditures for the seven-day period ending at 12/2400 were as follows:-

	VIII Corps	XV Corps	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	37619	10308	4965
155mm Howitzer	20093	361	1208
4.5-inch Gun	4784	58	0
155mm Gun (SP)	1352	-	-
8-inch Howitzer	1352	-	0
Railway Gun	None	12	-
240mm Howitzer	609	5	-

Air OPs, in addition to observation of fires, were used extensively during the first week for the reconnaissance for enemy installations and for artillery survey. Due to the nature of such operations results, in relatively high losses of both aircraft and pilots.

In anticipation of the commitment of XII Corps, one 155mm Howitzer battalion and one 3-inch Gun battalion were detached from XV Corps and one 155mm Howitzer (SP) battalion from VIII Corps, all being attached to XII Corps. Artillery with the Corps was augmented by the attachment of units arriving from the United Kingdom until by 31 August there were attached to XII Corps: one field artillery observation battalion, three field artillery groups, one 105mm Howitzer (SP) battalion, two 105mm Howitzer battalions, four 155mm Howitzer battalions, one 155mm Gun battalion and one 4.5 inch Gun (SP) battalion.

1st August. VIII Corps reported the silencing of all enemy batteries in the ST MALO (S771) area except those on the ILE DE CEZEMBRE (S7716).

1st August. Artillery with XV Corps, now closing in on the ARGENTAN (U21) - FALAISE (U12) gap and also advancing upon DREUX (R99), continued to be decentralized down to the divisions.

XII Corps was advancing west of ORLEANS (P62), encountering light opposition.

1st August. XX Corps Artillery, consisting of three field artillery groups (one 155mm field artillery battalion operating under Corps control), moved into position to fire in support of the Corps' bridgehead at CHARTRES (R36).

1st August. 2d French Armored, 80th and 90th Infantry Divisions, together with their attached XV Corps artillery consisting of a field artillery group, one field artillery observation battery, one 105mm Howitzer battalion, two 155mm Howitzer battalions and one 155mm Gun battalion, were detached and attached to First U.S. Army to exert pressure against and close the ARGENTAN (U21) - FALAISE (U12) gap.

Artillery remaining with XV Corps continued to move in close support of the advance of the 5th Armored and 7Cth Infantry Divisions to secure crossings of the SEINE RIVER in the vicinity of MANTES-GASSICOURT (R56).

XII Corps, advancing on the south flank of the Army, received considerable enemy artillery fire from positions in the wooded areas south of ORLEANS (P62). This fire continued on 1d and 19 August.

The Citadel at ST MALO (S71) capitulated. Its commander and his staff officers "were all at unanimous in stating that it was artillery fire, gradually reducing their defensive guns to a state of helplessness, that brought surrender...precisely all their guns were knocked out one by pre...by artillery, until they had no workable means of defense left."

VIII Corps submitted its estimate of additional heavy artillery needed to support its impending attack upon BREST (V79). It reported the presence there of at least eleven battalions of enemy artillery, most, 280mm and 155mm, including the artillery regiments of the 2Ld and 266th Infantry and 2d Parachute Divisions. It also reported that the coastal guns in the area had been turned inland. Enemy artillery fire to the area to date had been entirely harassing and interdiction.

1st August. XV Corps artillery attacked enemy barges on the SEINE, sinking four with an average expenditure of fifteen rounds per barge. Fires were observed by Air OPs.

1G August. 35th Field Artillery Brigade, one field artillery group, one 155mm Howitzer battalion and one 155mm Gun battalion, all newly arrived in the Continent, were attached to XII Corps to support attack on BREST (V79). Two field artillery groups were attached to XII Corps.

2G August. Seventeen replacement liaison aircraft arrived from the [illegible] depot, the first replacements received to date. 3 additional artillery replacement aircraft remained on order.

Ammunition expenditures for the seven-day period ending at 200600 were as follows:-

	VIII Corps	XII Corps	XV Corps	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	7273	-	20033	2012
155mm Howitzer	2617	-	2435	506
155mm Gun	1260	-	2119	5
155mm Gun (SP)	1544	-	-	-
8-inch Howitzer	1202	-	213	14
Railway Gun	696	-	-	-
240mm Howitzer	109	-	55	-

21 August. XII Corps continued its easterly advance in the vicinity of ORLEANS (P62) and SENS (R66) with its artillery attached as follows:-

Attached to 95th Infantry Division -

1 155mm Howitzer battalion

Attached to 4th Armored Division -

1 field artillery group
1 105mm Howitzer (SP) battalion
3 155mm Howitzer battalions

General support, reinforcing 35th Division Artillery -

1 field artillery group
1 105mm Howitzer battalion
1 155mm Howitzer battalion

General support -

1 field artillery group
1 155mm Gun (SP) battalion
1 155mm Gun battalion

VIII Corps submitted its request for oblique photographic coverage and Arty/R missions in the impending attack upon BREST (V79).

Acute shortages of obturating parts, especially gas check pads, for medium and heavy caliber weapons were reported by all corps.

20 August. XV Corps secured a bridgehead over the SEINE at MANTES-GASSICOURT (R56), using the 79th Infantry Division. One field artillery group consisting of one field artillery observation battery, one 105mm Howitzer battalion and one 155mm Howitzer battalion was attached to the Division and the remaining Corps artillery, consisting of two field artillery groups, one field artillery observation battalion (-), one 155mm Gun battalion, one 8-inch Howitzer battalion and one 240mm Howitzer battalion, fired in close support of the operation. One 105mm Howitzer (SP) battalion and one 155mm Howitzer battalion were attached to 5th Armored Division to support its westward advance along the south bank of the SEINE toward LOUVIERS (R2289).

XV Corps artillery attached to First U.S. Army on 17 August during the reduction of the FALAISE gap (U71) - (U12) returned to Third U.S. Army. The field artillery observation battery was remttached to XV Corps. The field artillery group and four field artillery battalions were retained under Army control temporarily to coordinate their movement to an Army assembly area.

23 August. XX Corps artillery advanced in rear of 7th Armored and 5th Infantry Divisions in support of the seizure of MELUN (S2506) - MONTEREAU (S2712) bridgeheads over the SEINE. Corps artillery consisting of two field artillery groups and six field artillery battalions fired approximately 1,000 rounds in support of 7th Armored Division, including a ten-minute preparation in support of its attack. Two field artillery group and four field artillery battalions supported 5th Infantry Division but no fire other than that of the divisional artillery was requested or needed.

Four large caliber naval guns that were firing upon and delaying XX Corps' bridging operations were attacked and silenced with a Serenade of three volleys, fired by all artillery with the Corps.

VIII Corps announced its organization for the attack upon BREST (V). One 105mm Howitzer battalion was attached to 2d Infantry Division and one field artillery group, consisting of one 105mm Howitzer battalion, one 155mm Howitzer battalion and one 155mm Gun battalion was attached to Task Force B. All the remaining Corps artillery remained under Corps control with units given reinforcing missions. The Corps artillery consisted of one field artillery observation battalion, four field artillery groups, two 155mm Howitzer battalions, two 155mm Gun battalions, two 155mm Gun (SP) battalions, two 8-inch Howitzer battalions, two 8-inch Gun battalions and one 240mm Howitzer battalion.

24 August. XII Corps' advance reached the easterly limit of the area of 1/50,000 map coverage and the Artillery Section arranged for the delivery thereafter of a corresponding number of 1/100,000 maps to the artillery.

XV Corps and all Corps artillery were detached and attached to First U.S. Army.

25 August. VIII Corps attack upon BREST (V79) was launched, preceded by a great artillery preparation. A successful counterflak program was conducted in conjunct...n with the aerial bombardment. An Arty/R mission was fired upon ships attempting to evacuate BREST (V79), the pilot reporting great effect upon three ships and four others set afire. Fifty counterbattery missions were fired.

27 August. Replacement of liaison pilots presented a continuing problem, eight having been requisitioned to date but none received.

Ammunition expenditures continued light in all sectors except VIII Corps at BREST (V79) and at ST MALO (S71), where ILE DE CEZEMBRE (S7516) continued to hold out. Expenditures for the seven-day period ending at 270600 were as follows:-

	VIII Corps	XII Corps	XV Corps*	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	39930	1319	11457	12968
4.5-inch Gun	747	-	-	-
155mm Howitzer	11706	663	2940	3197
155mm Gun	3665	-	784	601
155mm Gun (SP)	909	-	-	-
8-inch Howitzer	1436	81	397	166
8-inch Gun	234	-	-	-
240mm Howitzer	310	-	-	-

*Period ends on 24 August when XV Corps passed to First U.S. Army.

Obturating parts for medium and heavy weapons continued to be critically short. Attrition rates were high as to bogies for tractors M5. No replacement tractors M4 were available.

28 August. Of artillery units incoming to the Continent, one 105mm Howitzer battalion and one 155mm Howitzer (SP) battalion were retained under Army control temporarily to be attached to XV Corps upon its pending return to Army, one field artillery group, one 4.5-inch Gun battalion and one 155mm Howitzer battalion were attached to XX Corps and one 8-inch Howitzer battalion was attached to 83d Infantry Division to assist in the attack on the ILE DE CEZEMBRE (S7516). 35d Field Artillery Brigade arrived and was retained under Army control initially to administer Army artillery battalions temporarily on Prisoner of War duty.

29 August. At the request of 83d Division, Twelfth U.S. Army Group attached one 155mm Howitzer battalion from Third U.S. Army to it to support the attack on ILE DE CEZEMBRE (S7516). 83d Division, reported by this and its organic division artillery, captured ILE DE CEZEMBRE (S7516) on 1 September. Assistant G-3, 83d Infantry Division reported that 8-inch Gun shells had penetrated the concrete side walls (two meters thick) of the troop shelters and made them untenable.

Throughout the period. As one of the guiding principles in the attachment of artillery, it was sought to attach battalions as needed to the corps with which they had trained in the United Kingdom. The limited amount of artillery available on the Continent initially and operational requirements necessitated considerable departure from this principle so that, as additional units arrived, attachments were changed when feasible so as to permit the regrouping of units that had trained together. The guiding factor, however, was always the solution which would best support the accomplishment of the Army mission.

Confronted with the necessity of attaching units to PW escort duty, the Army initially assigned incoming units to this duty. These units were quickly relieved and made available for combat by the assignment to PW duty of three artillery battalions who were awaiting their basic weapons in the United Kingdom and who were brought to the Continent for this purpose.

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The striking fact about the month's operations from an artillery standpoint was, with the exception of the assaults upon the fortress cities of ST MALO (871) and BREST (Y99), the high mobility of the action. Within the space of a month, Third U.S. Army swept on from the vicinity of AVRANCHES (T21) through LAVAL (X62), [illegible] (V16), ORLEANS (P42), CHARTRES (R30), DREUX (R33) and by the end of the month had effected crossings of the SEINE all the way from [illegible] to TROYES (V27) and was approaching the MARNE.

The artillery with the Army did much to assist in accomplishing these striking results. Despite the rapidity of the movement, the artillery was at all times able to maintain its position well forward. As a result, whenever resistance was encountered requiring the use of artillery, the artillery was present and ready for prompt and effective supporting action. Despite the distances involved, basic ammunition loads could be maintained so that at no time was there any real shortage of artillery ammunition to hamper the conduct of the operation. This was made possible partly by the relative lightness of ammunition expenditures as a whole, partly by the untiring efforts of the artillery supply elements and of Ordnance.

Throughout the highly mobile situation extensive use was made of artillery liaison aircraft for all types of communications and reconnaissance as well as the adjustment and surveillance of fires. A notable example occurred during VIII Corps' rapid advance down the west side of the COTENTIN (CHERBOURG) PENINSULA and its deployment across the base of and out upon the BRITTANY PENINSULA. Air OPs were assembled and operated under Corps control on 29 July to 6 August. Their mission was to seek out and report on friendly locations and movements, hostile installations and traffic, road and bridge conditions. Operation over hostile or disputed territory was often necessary so that some damage to materiel was incurred though all personnel escaped injury. On one occasion an Air OP located a tank ambush that was delaying our advancing column, thus enabling its destruction and resumption of the advance.

It was contemplated that in operations assuming personal contact, through the medium of staff visits, would be maintained with subordinate units. The mission of each visit was to secure the current organization for combat including locations down to and including battalion, to obtain all intelligence of an artillery nature, to ascertain ammunition expenditures and the status of personnel and equipment including any acute shortages, and to secure any pertinent information of a more general nature. Upon its return each visiting officer delivered an informal written report of the visit to the night duty officer. He in turn collated this information and prepared a report which was submitted to the Artillery Officer at 0800 daily.

In addition there was usually an official visit made daily to some unit by a member of the Artillery Section of Third U.S. Army representatives. This relief for contacts with the unit's Chief of Staff, G-2, G-3 and G-4, in addition to the artillery, and a verbal report to the Deputy Chief of Staff upon return.

During the fluid stages of the operation these staff visits were virtually the sole means of obtaining accurate and current information. Distances were generally too great for the SCR-193 radio nets and movements too frequent for wire communications to keep up.

The Communications Officer particularly concerned himself with the operation of the Army and Corps Artillery Officer's Radio Nets and, in addition, assisted subordinate units on communications problems in general. The fluid operation entailed great distances and rapid movement, making communications difficult. The Communications Officer accordingly spent much time with the corps artillery in order to assist them. At the request of the Army Signal Officer, the Artillery Section prepared and the Signal Section published radio call signs in SOI for all artillery and tank destroyer units, down to and including battalions, with the Army.

CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

1 September. XX Corps on the Army's north flank had secured REIMS (T27) and CHATEAU-THIERRY (T54), XII Corps had taken TROYES (V27) and secured the crossings of the SEINE at that point and both Corps were continuing their advance preparatory to attacking to secure crossings of the MEUSE. Despite the impending gasoline shortage, all artillery units were able closely to follow the advance. This was accomplished by towing to units only so much gasoline as was required to accomplish the move to the next selected position.

Air OPs disabling in front of our armor were attacked by enemy ground troops who had penetrated the lines in front of our advancing armor. Two aircraft were shot down but the third escaped and was able to warn the infantry of the enemy's strength and location. Air OP Bulletin Number 2 was published; copy attached, Annex 15.

All XX Corps artillery battalions displaced to positions generally two miles west of VERDUN (U26) to support crossing operations.

The attack of the 2d Infantry Division in the BREST (Y99) area was supported by a 45-minute artillery preparation fired by the organic Division Artillery reinforced by three Corps artillery groups having one 155mm Howitzer battalion, one 4.5-inch Gun battalion, two 155mm Gun battalions, two 8-inch Howitzer battalions, two 8-inch Gun battalions and one 240mm Howitzer battalion. Artillery with VIII Corps fired 570 missions, including 136 counterbattery missions, in the 24-hour period ending at 0600.

VIII Corps Artillery utilized a so-called "flash bang" counterbattery procedure that proved very effective in silencing enemy guns emplaced in strongly fortified positions. Single pieces, batteries and, occasionally, even battalions, when not actively engaged upon other missions, were kept laid on known enemy guns. All observation facilities, including ground, air, sound and flash, were coordinated to maintain constant surveillance of the enemy gun positions. Consequently, whenever an enemy gun opened fire it was quickly detected by the observer and the appropriate counter-weapon notified, resulting in prompt counterbattery fire that either destroyed the enemy gun or silenced it by driving its personnel to cover.

2 September. The gasoline supply situation became increasingly critical throughout the Army.

Of units newly arrived upon the Continent, one 240mm Howitzer battalion was attached to 33d Field Artillery Brigade, one 4.5-inch Gun battalion to XV Corps and one towed tank destroyer battalion to XX Corps.

XII Corps, with 80th Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions abreast, effected crossings of the MOSELLE in the vicinity of COMMERCY (N42). 196th Field Artillery Group, consisting of one 105mm Howitzer battalion, two 4.5-inch Gun battalions and one 155mm Howitzer battalion, operated in support of the 80th Infantry Division. 177th Field Artillery Group, consisting of two 105mm Howitzer (SP) battalions and two 155mm Howitzer battalions, operated in support of the 4th Armored Division and fired frequently upon enemy personnel and columns north and east of COMMERCY (N42).

In addition, XII Corps had placed in support of 35th Infantry Division, with a mission of protecting the south flank of the Army, one field artillery group consisting of two 105mm Howitzer battalions and two 155mm Howitzer battalions. The remaining Corps artillery, consisting of one field artillery group, two 155mm Gun battalions and one 8-inch Howitzer battalion, was retained and moved under Corps control because of the fluid situation.

XX Corps, with 7th Armored Division leading followed by the 5th Infantry Division, attacked and secured a bridgehead over the MEUSE at VERDUN (U26). One field artillery group of two 155mm Howitzer (SP) battalions and one 155mm Gun (SP) battalion reinforced the 7th Armored Division Artillery, two field artillery groups of one 4.5-inch Gun battalion and four 155mm Howitzer battalions reinforced the fires of the 5th Infantry Division Artillery and one field artillery group of one 155mm Howitzer battalion, one 155mm Gun battalion and one 8-inch Howitzer battalion fired in general support of the Corps. 90th Infantry Division and its organic artillery were in Corps reserve at REIMS (T57).

3 September. Shortage of gasoline gripped the entire Army with the result that all field artillery units were almost completely immobilized.

VIII Corps Artillery operated night Air OP patrols at BREST (Y99) but with slight success due to the fact that both pilots and observers were inadequately trained in night operations. Training in night operations in the United Kingdom had been planned but proved impossible due to unavailability of the necessary equipment.

VIII Corps received very heavy enemy artillery fire, particularly from 155mm weapons and from the coastal guns defending BREST (Y99). A high percentage of duds was noted in the enemy fire. Artillery with VIII Corps fired 407 missions in the 24-hour period ending at 0600, including 105 counterbattery missions and [illegible] harassing missions.

The seven-day period ending at 2400 on [illegible] was characterized by operations [illegible] with XII and XX Corps [illegible] and by very heavy firing by artillery with VIII Corps, heavily engaged in the reduction of BREST (Y99). Ammunition expenditures were as follows:

	VIII Corps	XII Corps	XV Corps*	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	7814	5998	0	7302
4.5-inch Gun	2402	120	-	0
155mm Howitzer	2439	1067	0	502
155mm Gun	2942	0	0	15
155mm Gun (SP)	2402	-	-	-
8-inch Howitzer	2913	0	0	0
8-inch Gun	556	-	-	-
240mm Howitzer	795	-	0	-

*XV Corps reverted to Third U.S. Army on 30 August but was not committed during the period.

4 September. VIII Corps and all attached field artillery and tank destroyer units were relieved from assignment to Third U.S. Army. This included Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VIII Corps Artillery, one field artillery brigade, two observation battalions, five field artillery groups, eighteen field artillery battalions, two tank destroyer groups and six tank destroyer battalions. In addition, the 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade was attached to Ninth U.S. Army.

The gasoline situation was improving and XX Corps was planning its attack to cross the MOSELLE. In anticipation thereof and to afford added support to the Corps effort, 33d Field Artillery Brigade was released from Army control and attached to XX Corps. At the same time one 155mm Gun battalion, two 8-inch Howitzer battalions and two 240mm Howitzer battalions were also attached to XX Corps. Of these, one 155mm Gun battalion and one 8-inch Howitzer battalion were relieved from XV Corps, one 8-inch Howitzer battalion was relieved from VIII Corps and the two 240mm Howitzer battalions were newly arrived on the Continent.

XX Corps issued its order for the attack on the MOSELLE, providing for the 7th Armored Division to lead followed by the 90th Infantry Division on the north flank and the 5th Infantry Division on the south flank. The artillery organization for support of the attack was as follows:-

General support, reinforcing 7th Armored Division - one field artillery group, consisting of two 155mm Howitzer (SP) battalions and one 155mm Gun (SP) battalion.

Attached to 5th Infantry Division - two 105mm Howitzer battalions.

General support, reinforcing 5th Infantry Division - one field artillery group, composed of two 155mm Howitzer battalions and one 4.5-inch Gun battalion.

Attached to 90th Infantry Division - one 155mm Howitzer battalion.

General support, reinforcing 90th Infantry Division - one field artillery group, composed of two 155mm Howitzer battalions.

General support - one field artillery group consisting of one 155mm Howitzer battalion, one 155mm Gun battalion and one 8-inch Howitzer battalion, and one field artillery brigade composed of one 155mm Gun battalion, two 8-inch Howitzer battalions and two 240mm Howitzer battalions.

XII Corps also launched its attack to secure crossings of the MOSELLE in the vicinity of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73) and NANCY (U81). Strong opposition was encountered and considerable enemy artillery fire was received, mostly from single pieces.

6 September. XII Corps Artillery was organized to support the crossings of the MOSELLE in the following manner:-

One field artillery group, consisting of one 105mm Howitzer battalion, two 4.5-inch Gun battalions and one 155mm Howitzer battalion, together with two 105mm Howitzer battalions and one 155mm Howitzer battalion of the 90th Division Artillery fired in support of the 357th Infantry seeking to establish a bridgehead in the vicinity of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73). One 105mm Howitzer battalion of the 90th Division Artillery, one 155mm Gun battalion and one 8-inch Howitzer battalion in Corps' general support, were supporting the position of the 358th Infantry, which, with a mission to cross the MOSELLE and clear the way for Combat Command A, 4th Armored Division to advance on NANCY (U81) from the northwest, and the 359th Infantry with a mission to cross the MOSELLE and advance on NANCY (U81) from the west.

The 357th Infantry attacked following a fifteen-minute artillery preparation that included seventy-two rounds fired by the 8-inch Howitzer battalion. The 357th Infantry succeeded in getting elements across the river but these were heavily attacked by enemy small arms, mortar and artillery fire that inflicted heavy casualties and forced a withdrawal to the west bank of the river. A 105mm Howitzer battalion operating in support of the 357th Infantry was attacked by enemy counterbattery fire and forced to displace to an alternate position. XII Corps also obtained sixteen enemy artillery locations or duds, all within a spread over a wide front. Enemy artillery activity was confined for the most part to interdiction and harassing fires, note it against our OPs.

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One 240mm Howitzer battalion, newly arrived on the Continent, was attached to XII Corps. One incoming field artillery group was attached to XX Corps.

Ammunition shortages became increasingly critical. The Ammunition Supply Point in support of XX Corps had a fair supply with the exception of 4.5-inch Gun ammunition and all types of fuses, especially 210's. However, the Ammunition Supply Point in support of XII Corps was virtually devoid of all types of artillery ammunition and fuses.

7 September. An additional 240mm Howitzer battalion, newly arrived on the Continent, was attached to XII Corps.

Because of the wide Corps frontage, XII Corps established two Corps Artillery fire direction centers, one operating in rear of the north elements of the Corps and the other in rear of the south elements. Artillery with 90th Infantry Division, both organic and that attached by Corps, was regrouped so as to place four 155mm Howitzer battalions directly under Division Artillery in direct support of the Division and four 155mm Howitzer battalions under a field artillery group also in direct support of the Division. In addition, two Corps Artillery general support battalions had a secondary mission of reinforcing the 90th Infantry Division.

XII Corps attached one 105mm Howitzer (SP) battalion to the cavalry group operating in advance of the Corps with a mission to push on to LUNEVILLE (V09). In one instance this force encountered and attacked an enemy column, the cavalry attacking the front of the column and the artillery firing upon its rear. This combination destroyed thirty-six enemy vehicles and inflicted heavy casualties.

Despite inclement weather conditions, XII Corps operated a constant Air OP surveillance patrol over the entire Corps front.

XX Corps was advancing to the east preparatory to effecting crossings of the MOSELLE in the vicinity of THIONVILLE (V04) and METZ (V05). Increasing resistance was encountered as the advance approached the river and all Corps artillery was displacing forward to render close support to the attack. Meanwhile the advance to the east was increasingly threatened by enemy pressure against the exposed north flank of the Army.

6 September. An investigation was instituted by the Artillery Section, G-4 as to the number of rounds fired by every artillery piece with the Army, with a view to determining the extent of tube life remaining so that the necessity of replacement might be anticipated.

XV Corps Artillery was moving forward into an assembly area on the south flank of the Army. It consisted of an observation battalion, four field artillery groups, one 105mm Howitzer (SP) battalion, three 105mm Howitzer battalions, one 4.5-inch Gun battalion, four 155mm Howitzer battalions and one 155mm Gun battalion.

A mapping project of the SIEGFRIED LINE to a scale of 1/25,000 was initiated, involving 10,000 copies of each of 130 map sheets of which 2,000 copies would be overprinted with the known defensive installations. Four hundred copies of each overprinted sheet were requested for use of the artillery with the several corps.

An acute shortage existed of both M4 tractors and trucks. There was not a replacement truck larger than 3/4-ton available in the Army.

Two 155mm Gun battalions, both awaiting receipt of their primary weapons from the United States, and one towed tank destroyer battalion were presently assigned to Prisoner of War guard duty.

Strong resistance was encountered all along the MOSELLE front from METZ (V05) to NANCY (U71). Two separate areas of resistance to XX Corps became apparent, one to the north in the vicinity of THIONVILLE (V04) and the other south and in the vicinity of METZ. Enemy artillery activity was encountered in both sectors and notably so in the vicinity of METZ. Heavy counterattacks were encountered by 5th Infantry Division on the south flank of XX Corps and by 90th Infantry Division on the north flank of XII Corps.

9 September. The ammunition supply situation improved on all calibers with the notable exception of 105mm Howitzer ammunition which was critically short. Air shipment was requested in the priority 105mm Howitzer, 155mm Howitzer and 155mm Gun.

Very heavy opposition was encountered by both XII and XX Corps. One battalion of the 5th Infantry Division succeeded in crossing the MOSELLE south of METZ (V05) but was immediately pinned down by enemy artillery fire. 7th Armored Division also received heavy enemy artillery fire. Conversely, XX Corps Artillery did perhaps its most active firing to date, over 20,000 rounds being expended on 8 and 9 September. In one instance, one 240mm Howitzer battalion obtained six direct hits out of ten rounds fired on a fort in the METZ (V05) area and succeeded in starting fires. The enemy was making extensive use of the old forts around METZ (V05) and all lighter calibered weapons had proved ineffective against these defenses. 240mm Howitzer were also employed to attack and destroy an enemy airfield.

Because of the wide Corps frontage, Headquarters 33d Field Artillery Brigade was ordered to act as the Corps Artillery fire direction center in the southern half of the XX Corps sector while Headquarters XX Corps Artillery continued to perform this function in the northern half.

10 September. Ordnance maintenance echelons in support of XX Corps developed a successful field expedient for the repair of transmission failures on the M4 tractor. This went far to alleviate the critical shortage of this tractor.

Ammunition supply continued to be critically short, especially in rear of XII Corps. The weekly ammunition ration received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group allocated to the Army approximately one-third of a unit of fire per day in all calibers of artillery weapons.

XV Corps was committed on the south flank of the Army and ordered to secure a bridgehead over the MOSELLE, using the minimum force necessary to protect the south flank. One 155mm Gun battalion and one 8-inch Howitzer battalion were detached from XX Corps and one 240mm Howitzer battalion was detached from XII Corps, all being attached to XV Corps to support it in this operation.

Two tank destroyer battalions arrived on the Continent, thereby completing the lift of all field artillery and tank destroyer units with the Army.

35th Infantry Division, having been relieved by the combat of XV Corps, proceeded forward to rejoin XII Corps in its assault upon the MOSELLE. Activity in the Corps sector was relatively light and the artillery generally was displacing forward to support the Corps attack upon the FORET DE HAYE (U71) and NANCY (U81) on 11 September.

Enemy resistance in the XX Corps area continued strong and well organized. An enemy counterattack against the 5th Infantry Division was broken up by the fires of the 5th Division Artillery and the 33d Field Artillery Brigade.

All artillery with the Army stressed observed fires and held unobserved fires to a minimum in order to conserve ammunition.

Ammunition expenditures for the seven-day period ending at 061000 reflect both the continuing ammunition shortage and, especially in the METZ (V05) area before XX Corps, the strength of the enemy's defenses. Expenditures were as follows:-

	XII Corps	XV Corps*	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	10627	73	30010
4.5-inch Gun	2510	0	842
155mm Howitzer	3017	0	6004
155mm Gun	1608	0	2100
105mm Gun (SP)	-	-	-
8-inch Howitzer	1074	0	1022
8-inch Gun	-	-	-
240mm Howitzer	-	0	87

*XV Corps was not committed until 10 September.

11 September. The ammunition situation continued critical but large incoming shipments due to arrive within two days were expected to relieve the situation.

Air OP patrols proved very effective in minimizing enemy artillery fire, it being found that enemy artillery, to avoid disclosing their positions, would not fire when our planes were in the air.

XII Corps launched the first phases of a coordinated attack. 90th Infantry Division on the north and 35th Infantry Division on the south were to secure bridgeheads over the MOSELLE and the MEURTHE in their respective zones. A task force was organized containing one combat team each from the 35th and 90th Infantry Divisions, to advance in the center and clear the FORET DE HAYE (U71). 4th Armored Division was to advance east on the extreme south flank and then turn north in an enveloping action.

To support this operation, one field artillery group consisting of one 105mm Howitzer battalion, two 4.5-inch Gun battalions and one 155mm Howitzer battalion, was assigned a mission of general support and reinforcing the fires of the 90th Infantry Division Artillery. One field artillery group of two 105mm Howitzer battalions and two 155mm Howitzer battalions was in general support and reinforcing the fires of the 35th Infantry Division. One field artillery group of two 105mm Howitzer (SP) battalions and two 155mm Howitzer battalions was in general support and reinforcing the fires of the 4th Armored Division. The remaining Corps artillery, consisting of one field artillery group, two 155mm Gun battalions, one 8-inch Howitzer battalion and one 240mm Howitzer battalion, fired in general support of the Corps.

Strenuous opposition was encountered, one enemy counterattack being broken up by our artillery fire and another reaching the outskirts of FORT PONT ST VINCENT (U79Q1), on the MOSELLE south of NANCY (U81), before being repulsed. Our forces nevertheless made good progress and the 134th Infantry succeeded in effecting a bridgehead over the MOSELLE southwest of NANCY (U81). Our artillery ceased to fire upon NANCY (U81), the city having been reported clear by the French Forces of the Interior.

12 September. The Army Photo Center opened in the vicinity of ST DIZIER (V96), this being the first time that it was located within range of the SCR-193 radio. One Army Artillery radio set was thereupon established at the Photo Center and the Army Artillery Officer's Radio Net operated for the first time as contemplated, that is, with one set each at the Army CP, the Photo Center and each Corps Artillery CP.

In the XII Corps sector, following a thirty-minute artillery preparation fired by the 90th Division Artillery and the reinforcing 4/4th Field Artillery Group, 90th Infantry Division attacked and effected a crossing of the MOSELLE south of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73) with two infantry regiments. The artillery preparation was fired in barrage fashion against the east bank of the river. Considerable enemy artillery fire was directed at our forward elements and the bridgehead, especially the latter.

XV Corps continued its advance toward CHARMES (Z0576), on the MOSELLE. Some enemy artillery fire was received, mostly interdiction fires on the roads and shells from individual guns directed at our OPs. One liaison plane was destroyed on its landing strip by artillery fire from an enemy battery on the south flank that had been by-passed in the Corps' advance.

13 September. Combat Command A, 4th Armored Division crossed the MOSELLE, passed through the 90th Infantry Division and attacked to the east. It was supported by 4th Armored Division Artillery and also by one 105mm Howitzer (SP) battalion attached by Corps.

35th Infantry Division effected additional crossings of the MOSELLE southeast of NANCY (U81), the Division Artillery and one field artillery group of four battalions supporting the attack, primarily with observed fires directed by ground and Air OPs. Combat Command B, 4th Armored Division also effected a crossing of the MOSELLE to the west of the 35th Division, being supported by four battalions of XII Corps artillery.

Enemy artillery fire in the XX Corps sector was relatively light and was directed against our forward elements and the bridgehead. The bridge at NOVEANT (U7648) was partially destroyed by this fire.

14 September. XX Corps Artillery, still conserving ammunition for its projected attack, was firing approximately ninety-five per cent observed fires. The Corps estimated that it was opposed by between thirty and forty enemy artillery battalions, all 150mm or lighter caliber.

XX Corps Artillery issued its order for the support of the Corps' attack on 15 September, as follows:-

Attached to 90th Infantry Division - one 105mm Howitzer battalion.
General support, reinforcing 90th Infantry Division - two field artillery groups of three 155mm Howitzer, one 155mm Gun and one 8-inch Howitzer battalion and one antiaircraft artillery battalion (-).
General support, reinforcing 90th Infantry Division initially and later reinforcing the 7th Armored Division after it has passed through the bridgehead - one field artillery group of two 105mm Howitzer (SP) and one 155mm Gun (SP) battalion.
Attached to 5th Infantry Division - two 105mm Howitzer battalions.
General support, reinforcing 5th Infantry Division - one field artillery group, consisting of one 4.5-inch Gun battalion and two 155mm Howitzer battalions, and 33d Field Artillery Brigade, consisting of one field artillery group and one 8-inch Howitzer and two 240mm Howitzer battalions.

XX Corps Artillery activity was light as the bulk of the artillery displaced forward to support the attack. Photo interpretation teams attached to the Corps Artillery were proving to be of great value in locating enemy artillery.

In the XII Corps sector, severe counterattacks supported by tanks were launched against the 90th Infantry Division's bridgehead across

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the MOSELLE. All the counterattacks were repulsed and fourteen enemy tanks were destroyed. [illegible] the course of these counterattacks, [illegible] 14th Field Artillery Observation Battalion was overrun and fought as infantry for six hours before being relieved.

Task Force Behrens moved into position east of TOUL (U61) to attack and clear the FORET DE HAYE (U71). One field artillery group of three battalions, in addition to its mission of general support of the Corps, was ordered to reinforce the Task Force.

One towed tank destroyer battalion was relieved from Third U.S. Army and assigned to Twelfth U.S. Army Group.

15 September. XX Corps launched its attack supported by a two hour and fifteen minute artillery preparation. 5th Infantry Division was to expand its bridgehead south of METZ (U85) following which the 7th Armored Division was to pass through and press the attack. 90th Infantry Division was to contain THIONVILLE (U88) and clear the west bank of the MOSELLE. Enemy artillery reaction to the attack was active and was directed particularly against the forward elements of the 90th Infantry Division and against the bridge at NOVEANT (V7664L8).

In the XII Corps sector, NANCY (U81) fell, Combat Command A, 4th Armored Division having swept down from the north on the east side to encircle the city. Both the 35th Infantry Division and Combat Command B, 4th Armored Division effected crossings of the MEURTHE east of NANCY (U81). Little enemy artillery fire was encountered and our artillery activity was moderate. An interesting incident occurred when an 8-inch Howitzer battalion commander happened upon an infantry battalion commander to whom no artillery support was available at the moment. As a result the 8-inch Howitzers fired several missions in direct support of the infantry.

16 September. The general artillery ammunition supply situation, with the exception of 4.5-inch Gun ammunition and T105 fuzes, was more satisfactory than it had been for some time as a result of incoming shipments. That the shortage had been maintained at the critical level and had never become dangerous could be attributed only to the continued close supervision of expenditures by all artillery commanders and to the diligent and unceasing efforts of Army and subordinate ordnance echelons.

An increase in the current ration of 8-inch Howitzer and 240mm Howitzer ammunition was requested and received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group, most of the increase being allocated to XX Corps. XX Corps asked and received authorization to exceed its ration of 155mm Howitzer ammunition, no change in the Army overall ration being necessary due to the relatively light expenditures of this caliber by both XII and XV Corps.

There was considerable artillery activity in XX Corps with the number of counterbattery missions fired by our artillery increasing daily. 7th Field Artillery Observation Battalion had obtained a total of forty-three sound locations and forty-two flash locations in the METZ (U85) area to date. Enemy artillery was especially active in response to the Corps attack and used battalion concentrations for the first time. Much of the enemy artillery was emplaced in the forts surrounding METZ (U85) so that a direct hit upon a relatively small opening was necessary for effective neutralization.

The Corps artillery marked six targets east of METZ (U85) with two rounds of smoke each for attack by our bombers. A counterflak program was conducted by the artillery coincident with the air attack.

In the XII Corps the 90th Infantry Division attacked and succeeded in relieving the 3d Battalion, 315th Infantry which had been isolated beyond ST GENEVIEVE (U8134) for several days. Twenty thousand rounds of small arms ammunition had previously been dropped to this battalion by liaison pilots of the 80th Division Artillery. Five artillery battalions fired four time-on-target concentrations upon enemy assembly areas at the request of the 80th Infantry Division Commander. A shaking enemy counterattack against the Division was broken up by the massed fires of the Division Artillery coordinated with air support.

XV Corps was employing one heavy antiaircraft artillery battalion in a field artillery role. Two counterattacks by infantry and tanks against the 2d French Armored Division at CHATEL-SUR-MOSELLE (V7099) were supported by heavy enemy artillery fire. Both counterattacks were repelled, one being broken up by the artillery fire of the 2d French Armored Division Artillery. 79th Infantry Division encountered little or no enemy artillery opposition.

17 September. Although enemy artillery in the XX Corps sector remained silent for long periods at a time, the forts around METZ (U85) had proven virtually impregnable to our artillery fires and were still capable of heavy and effective fire. In an effort to neutralize the VERDUN GROUPE (V7950) of forts, the Corps allotted a 155mm Gun (SP) battalion the sole mission of maintaining continued fire upon this group, allocating 500 rounds of ammunition for the purpose. This program proved so successful that it was thereafter repeated at the request of 5th Infantry Division. In addition, one 155mm Gun (SP) was moved into position for direct fire upon the fort. Additional 155mm Guns (SP) were subsequently employed in the same manner against DRIANT (V7753) and other forts.

35th Division Artillery moved forward preparatory to crossing the MEURTHE and Corps artillery supporting the Division remained in position south of the MEURTHE firing into the sector from LUNEVILLE (V09) on the east to NANCY (U81) on the west.

Ammunition expenditures for the seven-day period ending at 170600 reflect the generally heavy fighting, both XII and XX Corps having done their heaviest firing to date. The figures are as follows:-

	XII Corps	XV Corps	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	4,0800	18944	4,0963
4.5-inch Gun	4901	154	1876
155mm Howitzer	12271	1389	10845
155mm Gun (SP)	1996	190	839
8-inch Howitzer	-	-	881
8-inch Gun	985	77	1863
240mm Howitzer	422	52	1195

18 September. XX Corps reported increasing enemy artillery activity, especially from FORT JEANNE D'ARC (V7658) and including concentrations of as many as fifty rounds. It was found that even 240mm Howitzers could do no more than temporarily neutralize the forts. 8-inch Howitzers attached and destroyed two enemy railroad trains, near METZ (U85). Fifty per cent or more of the Corps' missions were unobserved fires due to poor visibility.

XII Corps prepared to attack to the northeast with the 4th Armored Division leading, followed by the 35th Infantry Division. Three field artillery battalions, and a part of a fourth, were to be temporarily immobilized in order to provide trucks to motorize the 35th Division. A task force consisting of one combat command, 6th Armored Division and one combat team, 35th Infantry Division was organized to clear the woodland area north of NANCY (U81).

19 September. Enemy artillery activity was light in the XX Corps area, less than 200 rounds being received over the entire front and most of that being directed against the 90th Infantry Division. Corps initiated a program of sharply restricting ammunition expenditures in order to build up a reserve for future operations.

7th Armored Division repulsed a sharp counterattack in its bridgehead east of the MOSELLE. Two Corps artillery battalions were employed east of the MOSELLE to fire in close support of the Division.

Enemy artillery activity was likewise light throughout the XII Corps sector. XII Corps artillery was reasonably active however and no less than seventeen time-on-target missions were fired, mostly in support of 80th Infantry Division. In addition, three sound-on-sound adjustments were fired, in each case the adjustments being followed by a time-on-target concentration fired by four battalions.

20 September. Enemy artillery became active again before the XX Corps, especially against the 5th Infantry Division and 7th Armored Division. Some enemy concentrations numbered as many as sixty rounds. Very little of the fire came from the forts however and the 155mm Gun (SP) emplaced for direct fire upon the forts was achieving good neutralization results.

An Air OP adjusted the fire of XX Corps artillery upon and destroyed one of our liaison planes that had been grounded in enemy territory.

In the XII Corps zone enemy artillery [illegible] very active again, notably against the 80th Infantry Divi[illegible] percentage of duds was encountered in the enemy shells [illegible] Division sector a plan of defensive fires was [illegible] roadblocks to the south and southeast.

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21 September. An enemy counterattack against the 5th Infantry Division was preceded by an artillery preparation of over 300 rounds. XX Corps was conserving all ammunition possible in 90th Infantry Division in order to balance the heavy demands of artillery firing in support of 5th Infantry and 7th Armored Divisions. A sound and flash base was installed east of the MOSELLE in an effort to locate the artillery firing upon these two divisions.

In the XII Corps moderate enemy artillery fire was directed against our OPs and forward elements and there were some indications that the enemy was commencing to withdraw into the FORET DE PARROY (Q10).

XV Corps encountered heavy resistance in the vicinity of LUNEVILLE (V09) and received the heaviest enemy artillery fire that had yet been directed against it. Harassing fires and battery concentrations fell east of LUNEVILLE (V09) and heavy fire was received at FLIN (V2009), on the MEURTHE, and on the river crossing. A 105mm Howitzer (SP) battalion was attached to 2d French Armored Division.

Repeated Prisoner of War interrogations continued to attest the high effectiveness of our artillery fires.

22 September. Nine aircraft and ten pilots were received and assigned to subordinate units. A balance of four aircraft and ten pilots remained on requisition.

Replacement tubes for 105mm Howitzers arrived in quantity and early delivery was expected of replacement tubes for other calibers.

XX Corps experienced reduced enemy artillery activity and held its own firing to a minimum so as to conserve ammunition for the projected attack upon FORT DRIANT (V7753). A coordinated counterbattery program was instituted whereby active enemy locations were attacked simultaneously. On one occasion nine battalions fired upon twelve locations at the same time.

Heavy artillery, 8-inch Howitzers and 240mm Howitzers, of the 35d Field Artillery Brigade fired repeatedly in close support of the 7th Armored Division, the heavy effect of these weapons being well suited for driving the enemy out of positions in buildings. The accuracy of the 8-inch Howitzer made this weapon especially suitable for firing in close support of the leading elements.

The enemy shelled XX Corps' bridge over the SEILLE RIVER with a heavy concentration of mortar and artillery fire.

Enemy artillery was very active in the XII Corps sector. There continued to be frequent reports of many enemy duds. Examination of enemy shell fragments proved them to be of an inferior cast steel construction rather than of forged steel.

XV Corps had heavy enemy artillery fire throughout the Corps zone and especially so at LUNEVILLE (V09) and at the 2d French Armored Division's bridgehead at FLIN (V2089). Thirteen enemy locations were obtained, mostly through photo interpretation or sound.

23 September. One towed tank destroyer battalion closed in the Army area and was attached to XII Corps.

Enemy artillery activity dropped off before XX Corps but showed a marked increase before XII Corps, especially in the southern part of its sector, and before XV Corps. The last continued to encounter very heavy fires at LUNEVILLE (V09) and at the 2d French Armored Division's bridgehead, including one sixty-round concentration. Sound locations established a large concentration of enemy artillery in the southwestern part of the FORET DE PARROY (Q10).

XX Corps Artillery estimated that the enemy was utilizing for the defense of METZ (U85) and its environs, thirty-seven 150mm Howitzers, ninety-seven 105mm Howitzers and Guns, twenty-five 80mm Guns, forty-two 75mm Guns, twenty Infantry Howitzers and thirty Antitank Guns. Of these, Corps counterbattery fire was believed to have destroyed, for the most part by observed fire methods, nine 150mm Howitzers, twenty 105mm Howitzers and Guns, nineteen 88mm Guns and twenty-four 75mm Guns.

A system was instituted whereby in advance of all Arty/R missions, the pilot was briefed by a Corps Artillery Assistant S-2 and was given, when available, a vertical photograph with a 100-yard superimposed grid, one axis of the grid paralleling the Gun-Target line and the other axis being perpendicular thereto at the target. This system was found to enhance both the rapidity and accuracy of adjustment. Also, whenever, possible, one battalion of field artillery was made available to the pilot that he might attack and destroy active enemy antiaircraft guns.

Air OP activity had been sharply restricted for a week or more because of adverse weather conditions, low ceilings and short visibility.

Artillery with XV Corps was being employed as follows:-

Attached to 79th Infantry Division - two 105mm Howitzer battalions.
General support, reinforcing 79th Division Artillery - one field artillery group of two 155mm Howitzer battalions.
General support, reinforcing the preceding field artillery group - one field artillery group of two 155mm Gun battalions.
Attached to 2d French Armored Division - one 105mm Howitzer battalion, one 105mm Howitzer (SP) battalion and one 155mm Howitzer battalion.

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General support, reinforcing 24 French Armored Division - one field artillery group of one 8-inch Gun battalion and one 155mm Howitzer battalion.

General support reinforcing the preceding group - one field artillery group of one 8-inch Howitzer battalion and one 240mm Howitzer battalion.

24 September. Substantial shipments of gas check pads and split rings for the 155mm Howitzer and of 8-inch Gun tubes were received, all of which has been critically short.

One towed tank destroyer battalion closed in the Army area and was attached to XX Corps.

7th Armored Division was withdrawn from the front into an assembly area preparatory to being relieved from the Army. Corps artillery previously reinforcing the 7th Armored Division - one field artillery group of two 155mm Howitzer (SP) battalions and one 155mm Gun (SP) battalion, as well as the division artillery of support and reinforcing the fires of the 5th Infantry Division Artillery.

A strong enemy counterattack was launched against the 4th Armored Division. It was broken up and repelled by artillery fire coordinated with aerial attack.

42d Field Artillery Observation Battalion's flash base in the XII Corps sector located an enemy infantry and artillery assemblage. One 105mm Gun battalion and one 8-inch Howitzer battalion were adjusted and fired two volleys. Three days the enemy reassembled and three days he was dispersed by two volleys from the two battalions. Widespread destruction was the result, with many enemy dead and wounded.

Ammunition expenditures for the seven-day period ending at 240600 reflect the continued strong defense encountered by XII and XX Corps and the stiffening resistance met by XV Corps as it drew forward on the south flank of the Army. Expenditure figures were as follows:

	XII Corps	XV Corps	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	17610	21770	41667
4.5-inch Gun	2711	115	241
155mm Howitzer	7.42	5241	5597
155mm Gun	2096	1691	1106
155mm Gun (SP)	-	-	2003
8-inch Howitzer	1175	269	1277
8-inch Gun	-	-	-
240mm Howitzer	191	171	405

25 September. The ammunition ration for the period 26 September to 1 October was received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group and proved to be the most generous that Third U.S. Army had yet enjoyed. Twelfth U.S. Army Group allocated 8,000 T105 fuses to the Army.

XII Corps maintained neutralizing fires on FORTS DRIANT (U7753) and CHANVE D'AVE (U7756) on a twenty-four hour basis. One hundred fifty-five rounds of 155mm Gun, 100 rounds of 240mm Howitzer and twenty-five rounds of 240mm Howitzer ammunition were fired on FORT CHANVE D'AVE (U7756). A number of direct hits were obtained on the casemates, two being destroyed, and an ammunition dump was exploded. A total of 100 rounds of 155 mm Howitzer was fired upon this concrete shelters and casemates of FORT FRIEDMANN (U7854), ship; concrete was the sole result.

All XII Corps artillery was operating under Corps control, none being attached to the divisions. Three field artillery groups of four battalions each had missions of general support and reinforcing the 80th Infantry, 5th Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions respectively. One field artillery group of three battalions had a general support mission covering the northern part of the Corps front. Two battalions had a general support mission covering the southern part of the Corps front and a field artillery group headquarters acted in the role of a second corps artillery fire direction center in this area.

80th Infantry Division launched a limited objective attack. XII Corps artillery supporting the division fired time-on-target concentrations on all known active enemy artillery locations in the sector.

A considerable increase was noted in the amount of enemy artillery opposed to XV Corps and it was very active. Heavy fires were received, as much centered on our bridge at PONT (U7049) that our engineers were forced to withdraw their equipment. XV Corps artillery fired twenty-three counterbattery missions in all and a considerable reduction in the enemy's artillery activity was noted.

26 September. Letter of Instruction Number 4, Headquarters Third U.S. Army, 26 September 1944, directed that all possible sources of enemy tank data be registered in by all guns with the Army and direct of the Artillery Officer to effect the necessary coordination and to provide the completed information to the Commanding General, XIX Tactical Air Command so as to provide for aerial coordination as well. The necessary directive was prepared and delivered to the Artillery Commanders of XII, XV and XX Corps by artillery liaison plane courier on 26 September. A copy of this directive is attached as Annex 12. The completed maps, in overlay form, showing all avenues of tank approach and the mustered concentrations thereon, were delivered to the XIX Tactical Air Command. Each division and corps was required to deliver ten copies of its overlays to all adjacent divisions and corps.

90th Infantry Division launched an attack on strong points east of JEANDELIZE (U7747), near METZ (OOS). All objectives were secured within three hours. XX Corps artillery supporting the Division fired the normal preparation and supporting missions.

Over 1,000 enemy rounds were fired upon the bridge below NOMENY (U7645) and finally destroyed it. This fire came both from emplacements within the forts and from field places. XX Corps artillery fired thirty-seven counterbattery missions, for the most part unobserved.

35th Infantry Division was committed on the north flank of the Corps in the LUNEVILLE (U61) area. One infantry regiment, supported by three organic artillery battalions, was engaged in clearing BENAMENIL (LC1060).

Strong opposition developed along the entire XII Corps front. Strong resistance and several counterattacks were experienced by 90th Infantry Division and Corps artillery supporting the Division fired ten time-on-target concentrations.

Both the 35th Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions encountered infantry and armored counterattacks, strongly supported by artillery. The enemy fired no less than 225 rounds into the town of ARRACOURT (Q3174) alone. Ten time-on-target concentrations were especially effective in repelling a strong counterattack against Combat Command B, 4th Armored Division and heavy artillery fire assisted in breaking up counterattack against the 4th Armored Division. The enemy was causing his armor north and west of the FORET DE FARAGUT (Q3C) and the 11th Panzer Division was identified in that area.

XV Corps experienced a sharp decline in enemy artillery activity. The Corps artillery fired 2141 missions, almost entirely on a harassing or interdiction nature and of which all but nine were unobserved. Ten counterbattery missions were fired on a total of six active enemy locations. Only minor changes occurred in the organization for combat of XV Corps Artillery, the most notable being that one heavy antiaircraft artillery battalion and one tank destroyer battalion were both being employed in their secondary role as artillery.

27 September. XX Corps experienced an increase in enemy artillery fire, especially from positions within the forts. DRAVEGNIE (U7748) continued to receive much of the enemy's attention, over 500 rounds having fallen on the town within a three-day period. Our artillery continued its neutralization fires against FORT CHANVE D'AVE (U7756) with good effect. Over 100 rounds of 240mm antiaircraft artillery time fire were directed against infantry entrenched in the environs of this fort.

All Corps experienced violent enemy artillery and armored activity. One concentration of forty rounds fell in the 90th Division sector and the 4th and 10th Armored Divisions and three Corps artillery battalions all received heavy artillery fire.

All Corps Air OPs materially assisted the advance of two of our tank columns by patrolling the forward areas and reporting the locations of dug-in enemy tanks by means of dropped messages.

28 September. Pursuant to its request, Twelfth U.S. Army Group was advised that Third U.S. Army wished to reorganize six towed tank destroyer battalions into self-propelled M36 battalions as and when the equipment therefore became available.

Enemy artillery activity in the XX Corps sector reverted to what was considered as "normal", approximately 350 rounds falling over the entire Corps front. The enemy counterattack was broken up by the massed time-on-target fires of the 90th Infantry Division Artillery and four supporting Corps artillery battalions.

5th Infantry Division utilized Air OPs to assist in bombing missions, observing for effect upon the proper targets and even effecting corrections during the course of the missions. Communications were established via Division Artillery and Air Support Party radio channels.

One battalion of the 5th Infantry Division launched an attack against FORT DRIANT (U7753) that was preceded by an artillery preparation fired by 5th Division Artillery and the supporting Corps artillery. The attack reached the moat surrounding the fort before being compelled to withdraw.

29 September. XV Corps, together with 79th Infantry and 2d French Armored Divisions and all attached artillery units, was relieved from attachment to Third U.S. Army. Included therein were Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, XV Corps Artillery, one field artillery observation battalion, four field artillery groups, thirteen field artillery battalions, one tank destroyer group and two tank destroyer battalions.

A [illegible] Tank Destroyer Brigade, one field artillery observation battalion and one 8-inch Gun battalion were relieved from attachment to Ninth U.S. Army and reverted to Third U.S. Army. The observation battalion was thereupon remitached to XX Corps.

4th Armored Division reported an interesting employment of its Air OPs. The advance of each combat command was habitually preceded by an Air OP whose radio had been set upon the command channel of the Combat command. In this way the commander of each combat command at all times had accurate and prompt information of the situation in front of his advance. He often had the Air OP land and take him aloft for a rapid aerial reconnaissance to determine whether and how to deploy the command.

In the XX Corps sector, 83d Infantry Division on the north flank continued its mission of clearing the west bank of the MOSELLE. XX Corps attached one 105mm Howitzer battalion, one 155mm Howitzer battalion and one towed tank destroyer battalion to the Division to support its operations. These were retained under Division control.

Enemy artillery fire against XX Corps was relatively light throughout the sector although there was repeated shelling of our bridge across the LESSEILE at ARNAVILLE (U7547). Only light damage was inflicted upon the bridge. Artillery supporting the 5th Infantry Division massed its fires with good effect upon BILLEDNY (U7643) and LOUVIGNY (U7641) after considerable enemy activity had been observed in both towns.

The XII Corps sector was relatively quiet. A small counterattack by two reinforced companies, protected fairly deeply into the 35th Division area but was driven back and broken up by our infantry supported by massed artillery fires.

30 September. XX Corps estimated that excluding the rare days of unusually high activity, enemy artillery fired approximately 300 rounds per day into the Corps area. This was a striking testimony that the enemy had adopted a stringent policy of ammunition rationing, either because of shortages or to conserve for future operations.

The bridge at ARNAVILLE (U7547) was again shelled heavily.

XII Corps encountered light enemy artillery fires. The Corps was employing the 155mm Assault Gun platoon of a tank battalion in the role of supporting artillery.

XV Corps had fitted eight captured 88mm Guns with American sights and was using them with captured ammunition to supplement our fires.

Throughout the period, The swift advances of the initial period were slowed down and finally brought to a halt by the shortage of gasoline. Gasoline to resume the advance soon became available and the movement was resumed only to encounter an enemy who had fully exploited his brief breathing space to dig in on favorable terrain strongly supported by man-made fortifications. The operation thus changed character and became an assault of a highly organized defensive position.

Our artillery was to mold to have come into its own. Extensive preparations were fired in support of our many full scale and limited attacks. Closely coordinated counterbattery plans were prepared and executed to build up an ascendancy over the enemy's artillery. The enemy's use of the many forts, both old and modernized, presented a most difficult artillery problem. Even our heaviest artillery proved incapable of destroying these fortifications, but excellent neutralizing effect could be and was achieved. In addition there were countless harassing and interdiction missions fired.

Especially effective on appropriate targets were our time-on-target concentrations in which the fires of anywhere from two to ten or more battalions arrived simultaneously upon a single target. The 155mm Gun (SP) proved itself especially well adapted for direct fire use against fortifications and the 240mm Howitzer proved to be an extraordinarily effective weapon even as a close support weapon.

The fullest exploitation of our artillery was unquestionably seriously hampered by the prolonged scarcity of ammunition. However, close and constant supervision of expenditures by all commanders insured that the maximum benefit was realized in relation to ammunition expended.

The enemy's artillery was capably employed and when employed within the forts, as so much of it was, proved very difficult to destroy though it could be and was completely neutralized. The enemy artillery displayed considerable skill upon short bursts from forts, guns, but effective and the massing fire was also made of massed fires of battalion and larger scale. Several enemy counterattacks were supported by violent artillery preparations. Favored targets for the enemy artillery were our leading elements, observation facilities and, above all, our bridges over the MOSELLE and MEURTHE RIVERS. A surprisingly high proportion of duds was consistently noted in the enemy's fires.

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CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

1 October. The 6th Armored Division attacked to the northeast toward CHAMBREY (Q0621) and LEMONCOURT (Q0130). Each combat command included one battalion of the organic divisional artillery. In addition, Combat Command A was reinforced by one 105mm Howitzer and one 155mm Howitzer battalion and Combat Command B by one 105mm Howitzer battalion. The 35th Infantry Division Artillery was prepared to fire in support on call. An extensive counterbattery schedule of eighty-nine missions was fired in support of the attack. Only light enemy artillery resistance was encountered.

XII Corps attached the 286th Field Artillery Observation Battalion to the 33d Field Artillery Brigade.

Ammunition expenditures for the seven-day period ending at 010600 October were as follows:-

	XII Corps	XV Corps*	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	49387	24276	33488
4.5-inch Gun	2121	1806	2693
155mm Howitzer	7742	4365	12504
155mm Gun	2628	3936	2213
155mm Gun (SP)	-	-	3061
8-inch Howitzer	691	673	1515
8-inch Gun	-	-	-
240mm Howitzer	202	226	836

*Period ends on 29 September.

2 October. Enemy artillery was moderately active against XII Corps the heaviest concentration being one hundred rounds in the vicinity of the ARNAVILLE (U7547) bridge. German 155mm Howitzers emplaced in FORT DRIANT (U7753) attacked an Air OP landing strip, adjusting in turn upon and destroying four aircraft and damaging three vehicles.

Artillery with XII Corps was organized as follows:-

Attached to 83d Infantry Division - one 105mm Howitzer battalion and one 155mm Howitzer battalion.

Attached to 90th Infantry Division - one 105mm Howitzer battalion.
General support, reinforcing fires of 90th Infantry Division Artillery - one field artillery group of two 155mm Howitzer battalions.

Attached to 5th Infantry Division - one 105mm Howitzer battalion.
General support, reinforcing fires of 5th Infantry Division Artillery - one field artillery group of one 8-inch howitzer battalion and two 240mm Howitzer battalions (less one battery), one field artillery group of two 105mm Howitzer (self-propelled) battalions and one 155mm Gun (self-propelled) battalion, one field artillery group of one 4.5-inch Gun battalion and two 155mm Howitzer battalions, all operating under 33d Field Artillery Brigade which acted as a second corps artillery fire direction center in the southern part of the Corps sector. 286th Field Artillery Observation Battalion and Battery B, 7th Field Artillery Observation Battalion supported the 33d Field Artillery Brigade. The former was not sufficiently equipped to make and operate full flash and sound ranging installations.

General support - Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, XX Corps Artillery, 7th Field Artillery Observation Battalion (less one battery), and one field artillery group composed of one 155mm Gun battalion, one 8-inch Howitzer battalion, one 240mm Howitzer battery and two batteries, 90mm antiaircraft artillery guns.

In the XII Corps sector 6th Armored Division's attack encountered strong resistance south of LEMONCOURT (Q0830) but this was overcome and all objectives secured. The artillery strongly supported the attack, firing on enemy infantry and armor and including eight time-on-target concentrations.

3 October. XX Corps launched its attack upon FORT DRIANT (U7753). One infantry battalion of the 5th Infantry Division made the attack following a thirty-minute preparation fired by all artillery firing in support of both 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions, a total of twenty-three battalions. The preparation and subsequent supporting fires were directed against both DRIANT (U7753) and the neighboring fortresses of JEANNE D'ARC (U7858) and the VERDUN GROUPE (U7950) which were capable of direct fire upon our attacking forces.

An Air OP adjustment upon one of the DRIANT (U7753) gun turrets illustrated the difficulty of reducing the METZ (U85) forts. Eight direct hits were obtained upon the turret with an 8-inch Howitzer. Within fifteen minutes after the cessation of this firing, the enemy gun resumed firing.

XII Corps encountered considerable small-scale enemy resistance. 80th Infantry Division attacked to occupy the ground upon which to establish an outpost line of resistance. 35th Infantry Division, which had passed through 6th Armored Division to establish a main line of resistance in that sector, experienced sharp local counterattacks in the vicinity of LEMONCOURT (Q0130). The enemy artillery was correspondingly active.

6th Armored Division was withdrawn into an assembly area in the rear but its artillery remained in position with a mission of reinforcing the fires of the 35th Infantry Division Artillery.

4 October. XX Corps' attack on FORT DRIANT (U7753) continued to be supported with all artillery firing in support of both 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions. Enemy artillery was active, the guns of FORT DE MARIVAL (U7755) and BATTERIE MOSELLE (U7753) firing upon our troops at FORT DRIANT and the north turret of FORT DRIANT continuing its fire into GRAVELOTTE (U7558).

83d Infantry Division, continuing on the north flank with its mission of securing the high ground west of the MOSELLE, received considerable enemy counterbattery fire.

The enemy launched a strong counterattack against XII Corps at SIVRY (U8726), preceding which an artillery preparation of over 300 rounds was fired into the town.

A 280mm railway gun made its appearance upon the Army front for the first time, firing into the artillery position areas in the 35th Infantry Division sector on the night of 4 - 5 October.

5 October. One 8-inch Gun battalion newly arrived in the Army area was attached to XX Corps. Battery B, 286th Field Artillery Observation Battalion was relieved from attachment to XX Corps and attached to XII Corps.

Artillery with XX Corps fired heavily upon FORTS DE MARIVAL (U7755) and JEANNE D'ARC (U7858) to neutralize the fire which these forts had been directing upon our troops attacking at FORT DRIANT (U7753). An enemy counterattack forming in the valley between FORTS DRIANT and DE MARIVAL was broken up by our artillery fire.

XII Corps estimated that it was opposed by approximately ten battalions of light and medium artillery. Enemy artillery continued to be fairly active, especially in the vicinity of ARRACOURT (Q1114) and the 80th Infantry Division again encountered strong resistance in the vicinity of SIVRY (U8726).

Both our own and enemy artillery were employing a so-called "sniper" technique whereby a single piece was turned over to a forward observer with which he could probe suspected enemy positions close to our lines. This procedure had the advantage of being in the nature of harassing fire both observed and close in, of minimizing ammunition expenditures and, often, of flushing out a lucrative target.

6 October. Both corps experienced a short increase in enemy artillery activity. Some 400 to 500 rounds fell among our troops at FORT DRIANT (U7753) and a like amount was fired into the vicinity of ARRACOURT (Q1114). Heavy harassing and interdiction fires were encountered along the entire front.

XX Corps artillery continued to fire heavily into FORTS DE MARIVAL (U7755) and JEANNE D'ARC (U7858) in support of the attack upon FORT DRIANT (U7753) and attacked LOUVIGNY (U8641) after considerable activity was observed in the town.

XII Corps artillery was engaged in planning for its support of the projected attack to seize a more favorable defensive line. A very heavy counterbattery program was incorporated into the planned artillery preparation. To insure the effectiveness of this program, a silent policy was inaugurated whereby current counterbattery fires were confined to active enemy locations.

XII Corps artillery organization was as follows:- one field artillery group of four battalions, general support and reinforce 80th Infantry Division Artillery; one field artillery group of four battalions, general support in northern portion of Corps front; one field artillery group of four battalions, general support and reinforce 35th Infantry and 6th Armored Division Artillery with two battalions each; groupment of two field artillery battalions, general support in southern portion of Corps sector; one field artillery group of three battalions, general support and reinforce 4th Armored Division Artillery. In addition, one field artillery group operated as a second Corps Artillery fire direction [illegible]

[illegible] inaugurated an inspection program whereby all [illegible] were to be inspected by both Corps Artillery and group representatives. Representatives of the Army Artillery Section participated in a similar program and inspected every corps artillery battalion. In each case a written report was submitted to the Corps Artillery Commander.

7 October. Three field artillery battalions fired a preparation in support of a successful attack by one infantry battalion of the 83d Infantry Division on the towns of OBERHARMELANGE (L0513) and NIEDERHARMELANGE (L0513).

90th Infantry Division launched an attack on MALSTATT-LES-METZ (U8569) supported by the organic artillery of the Division reinforced by two field artillery groups consisting of five artillery battalions.

XII Corps noted a sharp decrease in the activity of enemy artillery. Artillery opposed to the Corps was for the most part centralized in four general areas, south and east of CHATEAU SALINS (U6925), between BORNEY (U8933) and LEZEY-COURT (U9431), in the vicinity of AULNOIS-SUR-SEILLE (U5630) and at COLINCOURT (Q1711). In general it was employed well to the rear and fired at near maximum ranges upon our forward elements.

Air OPs proved very effective in adjusting mortar fire and excellent results were achieved on close in targets. One artillery group installed an infantry-type radio in a liaison plane to permit direct communication between the pilot and the mortar position. Air OPs also proved effective in locating enemy mortar positions.

8 October. In the XX Corps sector our forces in FORT DRIANT (U7753) launched an attack strongly supported by an artillery preparation. Aerial bombardment followed by an artillery preparation was coordinated in support of 83d Infantry Division's successful attack to clear BUSTERBACH (L0535).

XII Corps launched a coordinated attack employing the 6th Armored, 35th and 80th Infantry Divisions to clear the enemy from the south and west sides of the SEILLE RIVER in the northern part of the Corps sector. An intensive artillery preparation was fired consisting of eighty-nine battalion concentrations upon thirty-three enemy artillery locations from H minus forty-five to H hour, followed by 12½ battalion concentrations on forty-nine enemy artillery locations from H hour to H plus ninety-five. Supporting fires included two eleven-battalion and one ten-battalion time-on-target concentration upon JEANDELINCOURT (U9028). The strong effect of our counterbattery program is demonstrated in the fact that enemy artillery reaction to our attack was light initially and continued so.

Ammunition expenditures for the week ending at 080600 October reflect the generally strong resistance encountered by both corps as well as XX Corps' attack upon FORT DRIANT (U7753). Expenditures were as follows:-

	XII Corps	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	35951	56062
4.5-inch Gun	2241	3865
155mm Howitzer	6031	10717
155mm Gun	3584	1168
155mm Gun (SP)	-	1691
8-inch Howitzer	1311	1060
8-inch Gun	-	153
240mm Howitzer	185	568

9 October. Enemy artillery continued to be very active in the XX Corps [illegible] 400 round concentrations fell in GRAVELOTTE (U7558) and MALSTATT (U8569) respectively and the guns of [illegible] FORT JEANNE D'ARC (U7858) and the VERDUN [illegible] into our forces attacking FORT DRIANT (U7753).

XII Corps' attack encountered only light resistance except at JEANDELINCOURT (U9028) where there was very heavy fighting. Enemy artillery support of his forces was very light.

10 October. There were indications that enemy artillery, in an effort to escape our counterbattery fire, was employing a "Forhelser", a device to eliminate muzzle flash and to disrupt sound ranging by causing the sound to appear to be at a falsely close range.

Enemy guns of the BATTERIE MOSELLE (U7753) were proving difficult

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to destroy. Direct hits by a 155mm Gun (self-propelled) merely bounced off the concrete emplacements and in some cases the enemy guns continued to fire even during the course of our shelling.

XII Corps' attack continued and gained all objectives although 95th Infantry Division encountered moderate resistance at POSSESSE (09689). Enemy artillery was moderately active, one 100-round concentration being received and time fire being directed at the 6th Armored Division. This was one of the few instances of the enemy employing time fire for any purpose other than registration.

11 October. XX Corps experienced a very sharp increase in enemy artillery activity with very heavy concentrations falling in the vicinity of MARIENLLES (08045) and ARNAVILLE (07547) and, somewhat smaller but still heavy concentrations upon our forces at FORT DRIANT (07755) and MALIZIERES-LES-METZ (08569).

Prisoner of War interrogation disclosed that our artillery fire had knocked out a total of six casemated guns at FORT DRIANT (07755). However, all damage had been repaired and smashed parts replaced so that all six guns were again operative.

XII Corps experienced counterattacks at FRESNES EN SAULNOIS (02457) but repulsed them and commenced its hold upon the town. 6th Armored Division was withdrawn into tactical bivouac but the Division Artillery was retained in position firing in support of 95th Infantry Division. Enemy artillery activity was heavy, the largest concentration being some 800 rounds, mostly 150mm, in the vicinity of ARRAGONEY (0111A).

One battery of an 8-inch Gun battalion was detached from XX Corps and attached to XII Corps to assist in the effort to destroy an enemy 280mm railway gun or guns, a weapon that was frequently reappearing throughout the Army area.

12 October. Orders were received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group severely restricting the ration of all field artillery ammunition through 7 November. The reduction was so sharp that both corps were found already to have expended virtually all ammunition of all calibers for the entire period.

83d Infantry Division was relieved from attachment to Third U.S. Army. Two XX Corps artillery battalions previously attached to the Division reverted to XX Corps and were attached to 90th Infantry Division to fire in support of Task Force Polk on what now became the north flank of the Army.

Prisoners of War continued to attest the effectiveness of our artillery fire.

13 October. XX Corps employed a 155mm Gun (self-propelled) to fire by axial precision methods upon the cast turret of BATTERIE HOHELLE (07755) at a range of 1250 yards. High explosive shell with T105 fuse was employed initially to blast away the concrete at the base of the turret, this being followed by shell, armor piercing. One clean penetration was obtained and the turret was effectively put out of action.

XX Corps estimated that it was opposed by a total of six battalions of enemy field artillery and, in addition, employed in the various forts around METZ (085), fifteen 100mm guns, forty 105mm guns, and eighteen 150mm guns. Enemy shelling of the rear areas of our bridgehead became especially severe.

6th Armored Division was withdrawn into tactical bivouac, being replaced in the line by the newly arrived 26th Infantry Division. As the artillery of the 26th Infantry Division had not yet arrived, 4th Armored Division Artillery was attached to and fired in support of the Division.

14 October. Both XII and XX Corps experienced considerable activity upon the part of the enemy's artillery. In the XII Corps sector the enemy's possession of the COTE DE DELME (09955) afforded him commanding observation with the result that our artillery, in order to render close support, was obliged to sacrifice defilade. Enemy counterbattery fire increased accordingly.

Our own artillery fire began to decline sharply as the orders to restrict ammunition expenditures reached the firing battalions.

15 October. Artillery commanders of all echelons strained every resource to conserve ammunition and at the same time attack and destroy otherwise lucrative targets.

XX Corps Artillery issued a directive limiting the use of field artillery ammunition to fire on such counterattacks as endangered the battle position of the supported unit, to counterbattery on active enemy batteries and to observed fires on especially profitable targets. Plans were made to employ tank destroyers, tanks and heavy antiaircraft artillery, the ammunition for none of which was released, as artillery together with captured weapons and ammunition. Interdiction, harassing and searching fires were to be confined to these secondary weapons.

Efforts to conserve ammunition manifested themselves in several ways. For example, artillery with XX Corps which on 12 October had fired ninety counterbattery missions of four or more rounds each, on 15 October fired only six such missions.

Whether because of the decline in our counterbattery fire or because of other reasons, enemy artillery firing increased both in length and number of rounds per concentration. The enemy interdicted the road running west from GORZE (07352) to CHAMBLEY (08651) with observed fires so that it became unsafe for vehicular traffic during daylight hours.

XII Corps' limited attack which began on 8 October was clearly reflected in the ammunition expenditures for the seven-day period ending at 150600 October, as follows:-

	XII Corps	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	43551	26618
4.5-inch Gun	4040	1595
155mm Howitzer	7506	5861
155mm Gun	3981	517
155mm Gun (SP)	-	916
8-inch Howitzer	1442	740
8-inch Gun	29*	153**
240mm Howitzer	301	586

*One battery
**One battalion less one battery

16 October. Our artillery was occupied in surveying in tank destroyers, tanks--including those of the forward observers in armored field artillery battalions--and infantry and chemical mortars for use as artillery. Firing was confined to that of a retaliatory nature.

The full impact of the ammunition restriction was now apparent in both corps. All artillery with the Army fired a total of 794 rounds of field artillery ammunition of all calibers, whereas on 10 October 19,892 rounds had been fired.

17 October. Enemy patrols operating at night increased and on numerous occasions filtered through to artillery position areas. An increase in the enemy's counterbattery fire was noted and was attributed to the activities of these patrols.

18 October. The enemy continued effectively to interdict the GORZE (07352) - CHAMBLEY (08651) road.

Air OP Bulletin Number 3 was published; copy is attached, Annex 13.

19 October. Our field artillery confined its fire to registration. Effective results were obtained with the secondary weapons being employed as artillery.

Twenty rounds from an enemy 280mm railway gun fell in the vicinity of XX Corps' command post at JARNY (06565). This gun or guns appeared at intervals along the entire Army front throughout the month. Favored targets, in addition to JARNY, included HARCY (081) and FORT-A-MOUSSON (073), each of which was shelled three or more times. The effect of the fire was entirely harassing, only very minor material damage being inflicted.

The weapon was skillfully employed, firing almost exclusively within the hours of darkness from positions deep within the enemy lines. No one firing position seemed to have been used more than once and immediately upon the termination of each firing, the gun was removed to a hiding place, apparently one of the several tunnels on the extensive railroad net emanating from METZ (085). There was reason to believe that the fire was adjusted by high burst methods, precisely comparable to our own, employing three observation posts. The weapon, even for so long range a gun, was not overly accurate, having an excellent deflection pattern but excessive range dispersion.

Intense and continued efforts were made to locate and destroy this gun or guns by the artillery of both corps and by the Signal, Engineer and Artillery Sections of this headquarters as well. The extreme ranges at which the weapon was employed made location by ordinary sound and flash methods difficult and, on most occasions, impossible. Numerous suspected locations were nevertheless obtained from a variety of sources including intelligence agents, signal personnel and analysis of aerial photographs. Long-range artillery was employed for forward and high-performance aircraft were extensively utilized to adjust its fires upon these locations, including the tunnels and key points in the railroad net.

20 October. Activity along the entire Army front was limited to patrolling on both sides and both our own and the enemy artillery were relatively quiescent.

95th Infantry Division, newly arrived, began to relieve 5th Infantry Division in the line and two battalions, 95th Infantry Division Artillery, replaced two battalions, 5th Infantry Division Artillery, occupying positions previously prepared but not occupied. 5th Infantry Division Artillery retained control pending completion of the relief.

An Office of Strategic Service agent reported that a large railway gun was in the railroad shops at METZ (085) for repairs. The assistance of 0-3 Air, XX Corps and of the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group was enlisted and an Arty/R mission was flown that same afternoon. The pilot adjusted a 155mm Gun battalion upon the shops, following which 140 rounds were fired for effect, sixty of these under air surveillance. The firing was concluded with six rounds of white phosphorus shell which caused large fires to break out. An agent dispatched to ascertain the results of the firing reported demolition of the gun, twenty-two enemy casualties, and complete wreckage of the area.

22 October. Relief of the 5th Infantry Division Artillery by 95th Infantry Division Artillery was completed and the latter assumed control. Organic artillery units of 5th Infantry Division reverted to a rest and training area in the rear. Organization of artillery with XX Corps remained the same except that Corps artillery battalions previously supporting 5th Infantry Division now supported the 95th Infantry Division.

Expenditures of artillery ammunition for the week ending at 220600 October declined, in consequence of the strict rationing, to little more than one twentieth of what they had been in the preceding week. The figures are as follows:-

	XII Corps	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	2825	576
4.5-inch Gun	172	0
155mm Howitzer	512	41
155mm Gun	178	472
155mm Gun (SP)	-	315
8-inch Howitzer	212	179
8-inch Gun	24*	42**
240mm Howitzer	27	8

*One battery
**One battalion less one battery

23 October. Enemy artillery activity in the XX Corps sector was the lightest of any time within the past month. Because of poor observing conditions, our own fires were largely confined to night harassing missions fired entirely by secondary weapons firing as artillery. Only eight rounds of field artillery ammunition were fired by all artillery with the Corps. XX Corps artillery had a highly integrated observation system functioning, there being no less than seventy ground observation posts and sixty-two Air OPs operative.

24 October. XX Corps continued to experience only very light enemy artillery fire, there being one twelve-hour period during which not a single enemy shell landed throughout the Corps area. There was no indication of any withdrawal of enemy artillery, however, and it seemed probable that for one reason or another a silent policy was being pursued.

XX Corps artillery fired a time-on-target mission upon an enemy troop concentration at AMANVILLIERS (07664) which, from the variety of weapons used, reflected the strenuous attempts of artillery commanders to deliver effective fires despite the strict limitation of ammunition expenditures. This mission was fired by tank destroyers, tanks, German 105mm gun-howitzers, Russian 76.2mm guns, 88mm guns, captured 155mm Schneider howitzers, 90mm antiaircraft guns and 155mm guns (M1).

25 October. Enemy artillery in the XX Corps sector again became active, with very heavy fires being directed at MALIZIERES-LES-METZ (08569) and the bridgehead area south of METZ (085).

XX Corps artillery successfully used 155mm howitzer Schneider ammunition, both captured and of American manufacture, in the 155mm howitzer (M1). This was accomplished through application of a correction factor to the firing tables for the 155mm howitzer (M1).

One field artillery group was detached from XII Corps and attached to XX Corps which then detached two battalions previously attached to 90th Infantry Division and attached them to this group with a mission of general support, reinforcing the fires of the 90th Infantry Division Artillery.

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One armored field artillery battalion and one 8Lcm Howitzer battalion, both previously in a rest area to perform necessary maintenance of equipment, were attached to XII Corps.

27 October. The guns of the VERDUN GROUPE (V7950) of forts fired very actively into the bridgehead area until XX Corps Artillery fired a time-on-target concentration upon the forts. The enemy guns thereafter remained quiet.

XX Corps' efforts to determine the amount of enemy artillery still opposed to it were seriously handicapped by the fact that because of adverse weather conditions, aerial photographs of 8 October were the most recent available.

28 October. The guns of the METZ (085) forts were very active, the fire from the VERDUN GROUPE (V7950) being especially severe and that of FORTS BRIANT (V7753) and JEANNE D'ARC (V7058) moderately so.

One tank battalion being employed as artillery by XX Corps fires a total of fifty missions and 859 rounds during the period.

In the XII Corps center three platoons of a tank destroyer battalion, newly equipped with M36 90mm tank destroyers, were employed for one in an artillery role.

29 October. 90th Infantry Division launched a coordinated attack upon MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U8569) preceded by a thirty-minute artillery preparation fired by the organic Divisional Artillery and seven battalions of supporting XX Corps artillery, the emphasis being placed on counterbattery fires. Enemy artillery reacted strongly to the attack and included some fire coming from guns which had previously remained silent in anticipation of an attack. These were promptly counterbatteried. Air OPs maintained a constant patrol to seek out targets of opportunity and a high-performance aircraft achieved good results on a mission to seek out active enemy batteries in the vicinity of MAIZIERES-LES-METZ.

Artillery ammunition expenditures for the week ending 290600 October indicated the extent to which our artillery, notably that with XX Corps, resorted to captured guns and ammunition to render effective support. Eighty per cent of all artillery ammunition fired by XX Corps had been captured from the enemy. The figures are as follows:-

	XII Corps	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	7086	344
4.5-inch Gun	58	0
155mm Howitzer	989	79
155mm Gun	352	190
155mm Gun (SP)	-	821
8-inch Howitzer	185	331
8-inch Gun	26*	8**
240mm Howitzer	11	194
76.2mm Gun	***	4069
88mm Gun	***	1013
105mm Gun-Howitzer	***	1489
150mm Gun	***	707
152mm Howitzer (Schneider)	***	3096

*One battery
**One battalion less one battery
***Figures not available

30 October. The attack upon MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U8569) continued with only a small portion of the town remaining in enemy hands. Enemy artillery fire following our initial corps artillery preparation declined sharply and thereafter continued desultory. In one instance a 24cm Howitzer fired upon and destroyed a house, causing its occupants, an enemy infantry platoon, to surrender. The house was but 100 yards in advance of our lines.

Enemy artillery activity increased in the XII Corps center with particular emphasis upon our observation posts. One flash observation post was shelled intermittently over a three-hour period with a total of 150 rounds.

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 206th Field Artillery Observation Battalion was detached from XX Corps and attached to XII Corps. The two latter batteries remained attached one to each corps.

31 October. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, III Corps Artillery was attached to XX Corps pending the commital of III Corps. It replaced Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 334 Field Artillery Brigade as a second Corps Artillery fire direction center in the eastern half of the Corps center.

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 334 Field Artillery Brigade was relieved from attachment to XX Corps and attached to XII Corps where it replaced Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 1894 Field Artillery Group in the role of a second Corps Artillery fire direction center.

XX Corps relieved one field artillery group of two 105mm Howitzer (self-propelled) battalions and one 155mm Gun (self-propelled) battalion from the line, moving them to a rest and training area in the rear.

Throughout the period. The first half of the period was marked by XX Corps' attack upon FORT BRIANT (V7753) and XII Corps' limited objective attack to secure a more favorable defensive position, both strongly supported by artillery. Even our heaviest artillery proved relatively ineffectual against the forts in the vicinity of METZ (085), temporary neutralization of their guns being the most that could be achieved.

The last half of the period was one of quiescence to permit the massing of supplies in rear of the Army. With the exception of the limited objective attack on MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U8569), activity was confined to patrol actions. From an artillery standpoint, the stringent rationing of ammunition was outstanding. Resort was had to secondary weapons, including tanks, tank destroyers, antiaircraft guns and captured weapons, in order to render effective support.

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

1 November. Extensive re-shuffling of divisions and their supporting artillery was in progress in XX Corps. 90th Infantry Division was withdrawn into a rest and training area, most of its part of the line being taken over by 95th Infantry Division which moved north. 5th Infantry Division returned from the rest area and was re-committed in its center on the south flank of the Corps, relieving 95th Infantry Division. 10th Armored Division was committed for the first time, being assigned the left flank of the Corps from GRAVELOTTE (V7576) north. In each case the organic divisional artillery accompanied and supported its parent division. Corps artillery organization, positions and missions remained unchanged geographically, the relieving division being substituted for the relieved division and the support continued as before.

Both XII Corps and XX Corps artillery units were already far advanced in their preparations to support the coordinated attacks to be launched soon after expiration of the stringent ammunition restrictions on 7 November. Organization for combat was studied and revised in the light of the attack plans and extensive fire support plans were being prepared. All artillery was to be displaced to support the attacks more effectively and organization, preparation and even occupation of the new positions were already under way. A silent policy was imposed in the new positions and every effort was made to simulate normal activity in the old positions. Two guns per battalion were generally left behind to continue firing and flash simulators and explosive charges were extensively employed in the old position areas.

2 November. XX Corps, in its effort to minimize the effect of the stringent ammunition restrictions, was employing thirty-nine captured artillery pieces as follows:-

4 - 76.2mm Guns (Russian)
10 - 88mm Guns (German)
8 - 100mm Fortress Guns
6 - 105mm Gun-Howitzers (German)
2 - 122mm Guns (Russian)
6 - 150mm Howitzers (German)
3 - 155mm Howitzers (French)

To date the Corps had fired 30,980 rounds of captured ammunition weighing 660 tons and valued at $70Z,391.

80th Infantry Division, in the XII Corps center, launched a successful limited objective attack to seize AMANVOIRY (V9134) and LETRICOURT (V9431). The attack was preceded by a fifteen-minute artillery preparation fired by 80th Infantry Division Artillery, 6th Armored Division Artillery and three light, three medium and one heavy Corps artillery battalion. Enemy artillery reaction to the attack was strong with particularly heavy fire falling in both towns following their capture.

3 November. Enemy artillery activity was light over the entire Army front on this and the two succeeding days. Only the guns of the METZ fortresses, notably those of the VERDUN GROUPE (V7950) and of FORT BRIANT (V7753), were consistently active. Their favored targets continued to be the front-line towns of GRAVELOTTE (V7556) and MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U8569) and the bridge sites of NOVEANT (V7668) and AMANVILLE (V7547).

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5 November. Ammunition expenditures continued to reflect the stringent rationing, the figures for the week ending at 0600 being as follows:-

	XII Corps	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	4343	1948
4.5-inch Gun	124	0
155mm Howitzer	1156	347
155mm Gun	501	409
155mm Gun (SP)	-	174
8-inch Howitzer	54	144
8-inch Gun	9	42
240mm Howitzer	34	98

6 November. Enemy artillery activity increased throughout the Army area, particularly in the northern sector of the XX Corps zone and at PONT-A-MOUSSON (073). Light artillery shelled the latter continuously for two hours, the rounds landing in pairs all over town.

7 November. Enemy artillery continued to be moderately active. Some 300 rounds fell in the vicinity of ALIMONTY (V9895) within a 45-minute period.

Virtually all the artillery with both corps had completed displacing to new positions for support of the forthcoming attacks. In XX Corps this involved a substantial displacement of artillery to the north flank in the vicinity of BOIS D'ORTANGE (V7595) to support 90th Infantry Division's projected crossing of the MOSELLE RIVER in the vicinity of KONINGSMACKER (U9469). In all cases where pieces had been left behind to continue firing from the old positions, plans had been completed for their displacement on the nights immediately preceding the attacks.

8 November. XII Corps launched a coordinated attack at 0600 upon the entire Corps front employing three infantry and two armored divisions. An intensive program of preparation and supporting scheduled fires, prepared by XII Corps Artillery and the supporting 334 Field Artillery Brigade, was fired from H minus 60 to H plus 147. The program was fired initially by all artillery with the Corps supplemented by one medium and four heavy battalions of XX Corps artillery on the latter's south flank. After the first half hour all organic divisional artillery was released for "on call" missions and targets of opportunity in close support of the respective divisions.

The program embraced a total of 380 concentrations fired by an average of two battalions per concentration, the heaviest being a six-battalion, two-volley concentration upon the town of GRINGOMERT (U0330) In all, ninety concentrations were fired upon towns, thirteen on defiles, 190 on enemy artillery locations, forty on enemy OPs, thirty-one on enemy antiaircraft artillery locations, fourteen on assembly areas and one each on a strongpoint and on a farm building.

Upon completion of the prearranged program Corps artillery continued to maintain intense neutralization fires until 1200 hours, firing on targets selected from the schedule of prearranged fires. Thereafter heavy fires were delivered upon call of the supported units.

This intensive artillery support achieved excellent results. It effectively prevented any aggressive enemy artillery reaction to our attack. Only fifteen reports of enemy shelling were received over the entire Corps front and of these all were small concentrations of less than twenty rounds each. In addition, utter and complete disruption of the enemy's communications was occasioned by our artillery fires, a fact amply attested by many Prisoners of War.

Artillery with XII Corps was organized for support of the attack as follows:-

General support, reinforcing 26th Infantry Division - 334 Field Artillery Brigade composed of one field artillery group, one light, two medium and one heavy artillery battalion.
General support, reinforcing 80th Infantry Division - organic artillery of the 6th Armored Division and two field artillery groups of three light, three medium and one heavy battalion.
General support, reinforcing 35th Infantry Division - organic artillery [illegible] Division and two field artillery groups of two light, [illegible] battalion.
[illegible] heavy artillery battalions.

[illegible] 95th Infantry Division to launch a "feint" attack across the MOSELLE in the vicinity of UCKANGE (U8579). The attack started at 1500 hours and was supported by both the organic 95th Division Artillery and the fortress guns of FORT GUENTRANGE (U8307) manned by a Corps artillery battalion.

9 November. 90th Infantry Division attached at 0330 hours to secure a bridgehead across the MOSELLE at KONINGSMACKER (U9469) on the

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south flank of XX Corps. Surprise being considered essential to the night attack, no artillery preparation was fired. A comprehensive program of counterbattery and prearranged fires had been prepared however and was fired by all artillery supporting 90th Infantry Division commencing at H hour and continuing until H plus 120. Strong support was maintained thereafter on enemy artillery locations and upon "on call" missions from the Division.

90th Infantry Division continued to press its bridgehead at UCKANGE (0579) and came after daylight 9th Infantry Division, on the south flank of XX Corps, attached to the east.

Enemy artillery opposition to the XX Corps attacks, and especially to that of 90th Infantry Division, was extremely light. It was clear that our artillery had achieved an overwhelming accendancy. Only the fortress guns in the vicinity of METZ (0895) fired heavily. What little other fire was received came almost entirely from self-propelled guns which were quickly attacked and either neutralized or destroyed.

Organization of artillery with XX Corps for support of the Corps attack was as follows:-

Attached to 90th Infantry Division - one light battalion.
General support, reinforcing 90th Infantry Division - one field artillery group of two medium battalions.
General support in the zone of 90th Infantry Division - organic artillery of the 10th Armored Division, one light and one medium battalion of the 85d Division Artillery together with its attached field artillery group of one medium and one heavy battalion, two field artillery groups consisting of two light and four heavy battalions, one 8-inch Gun battery, eight 100mm fortress guns and two tank destroyer battalions operating in an artillery role.
General support, reinforcing 95th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light and one medium battalion and one battalion equipped with captured weapons.
Attached to 5th Infantry Division - one light battalion.
General support, reinforcing 5th Infantry Division - one field artillery group of three medium battalions.
General support in the zone of 5th Infantry Division - Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, III Corps Artillery and one field artillery group consisting of two heavy battalions and one 8-inch Gun battery.

Despite adverse weather conditions XII Corps' attack made good progress so that most of the artillery was already commencing to displace forward so as to continue in close support. The artillery fired heavily on targets of opportunity throughout the day and instituted a program of intensive harassing and interdiction fires. In order to deny the enemy shelter from the inclement weather, all weapons from the 105mm Howitzer to the 240mm Howitzer were utilized to fire, in addition to the usual supply and command post installations and main supply routes, upon all towns and farm buildings within the range and fire possibilities of the artillery with the Corps. A similar program, adapted to its own tactical requirements, was instituted by XX Corps. The harassing and interdiction program was fired on a 24-hour basis with the fires being intensified at night.

COTE DE DELME (9989), the dominant high ground in the northern XII Corps sector, was shelled steadily for eight hours by 4.5-inch Guns, 155mm Guns and 8-inch Howitzers culminating in an aerial bombardment. 80th Division infantry moved up immediately thereafter to occupy the ridge, finding that the enemy had been forced to evacuate under the heavy artillery and air bombardment.

10 November. Adverse weather and floods gripped the entire Army front. How bridging operations became impossible and, in the XX Corps sector, all but one of the existing bridges over the MOSELLE were destroyed by the high waters. Supply of the bridgehead troops became difficult in the extreme. Field artillery liaison-type aircraft were resorted to. They flew thirty-two missions on this date and an additional sixty-five missions on 11 November, carrying rations, blood plasma and other medical supplies, blankets, wire, radio batteries, and mortar and small arms ammunition to infantry elements of the 90th Infantry Division.

Minor changes were effected in the artillery organization for support to meet the developing tactical situation. Artillery throughout the Army area continued to displace forward though in the XX Corps area artillery movement was necessarily confined to the west bank of the MOSELLE.

The enemy artillery became more active over the entire front. The fires were directed, as usual, entirely upon our forward elements, observation facilities and the bridgehead areas. Enemy concentrations were sporadic and invariably small, the heaviest consisting of twenty-four rounds of 88mm fire into the 90th Infantry Division bridgehead over a forty-minute period.

11 November. The gun battalion of 8-inch Guns assigned to Army was widely deployed so as to employ the extreme long range of this weapon over the widest possible frontage. XX Corps, with the battalion less a battery attached, employed one firing battery in the Corps north sector and the other in the south sector. XII Corps, with one firing battery attached, employed one platoon in its north sector and the other in its south sector. Both corps used the weapon primarily for long-range harassing and interdiction fires on the enemy's extreme rear areas.

Despite the continued floods the attack made progress. CHATEAU SALINS (0595) fell to XII Corps and 90th Infantry Division maintained and expanded its KOENIGSMACHER (9589) bridgehead. 95th Infantry Division attacked to secure another bridgehead at THIONVILLE (0586) strongly supported by captured fortress guns firing upon targets of opportunity.

12 November. The enemy's artillery fires were directed west heavily against 90th Infantry Division on the Army's north flank, were heavy throughout the central areas and declined to a point where they were very light in the southern part of the XII Corps sector.

Floods continued to hamper our bridging operations, a situation upon which the enemy capitalized by strong artillery firing into our bridge sites. The pontoon bridge in the KOENIGSMACHER bridgehead at MALLING (9999) was destroyed by fire from 88mm self-propelled guns. These guns were moved forward under cover of darkness into positions so close to our lines that although the flashes of their firing were perfectly visible, our artillery could not successfully take them under fire. These guns fired throughout the night and finally destroyed the bridge.

90th Infantry Division continued able only to maintain its bridgehead and unable to advance substantially. The infantry was strongly counterattacked by enemy tanks and infantry in the vicinity of KERLING (9989). Tank destroyer support was lacking due to the continued flood conditions. The counterattack was supported by heavy artillery fires initially but these were quickly silenced by the intensive counterbattery fires of XX Corps artillery. All artillery supporting the 90th Division, including that of 10th Armored Division, fired heavily in support of the infantry and a 155mm Gun battalion was especially effective in repelling the tank threat, firing over 300 rounds and in one instance destroying three tanks with only two rounds.

95th Infantry Division, supported by its organic artillery, three heavy battalions of XX Corps artillery and the captured guns of FORT GUENTRANGE (0838?), succeeded in establishing and consolidating its bridgehead at THIONVILLE (0586).

XII Corps experienced an enemy counterattack in the FORET DE CHATEAU SALINS (013) but it was only lightly supported by enemy artillery.

Arty/R pilots advised XII Corps Artillery of a large enemy troop concentration in the northeastern portion of BOIS DE CHATEAU SALINS (0105). 8-inch Guns and Howitzers and 240mm Howitzers fired into the area for twenty minutes following which the enemy armored and infantry elements fled in confusion.

Ammunition expenditures for the week ending at 120600, embracing only four days of the XII Corps attack and three days of the XX Corps attack, amply reflected the heavy fighting in both corps but were indicative only of ammunition availability. The figures follow:-

	XII Corps	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	54891	30212
4.5-inch Gun	6941	1526
155mm Howitzer	9174	9510
155mm Gun	5110	1197
155mm Gun (AP)	-	548
8-inch Howitzer	2581	811
8-inch Gun	71	147
240mm Howitzer	404	295

13 November. Enemy artillery activity decreased generally throughout the Army area. It continued heaviest on the north flank and in the vicinity of the MOSELLE bridgeheads and dropped off to light firing on the south flank of the Army.

The flood waters had commenced to recede, making it possible to construct and place in operation three bridges across the MOSELLE. The bridgeheads at KOENIGSMACHER (9589), THIONVILLE (0586) and UCKANGE (0579) were all expanded and 10th Armored Division commenced its movement across the MOSELLE to pass through the 90th Infantry Division and debouch to the north and west. XX Corps artillery generally displaced to positions immediately west of the MOSELLE, as artillery crossing the river pending completion of the 10th Armored Division crossing.

The effect of our massed artillery fire upon the enemy is implicit in the request by a Prisoner of War that he be permitted to view our "automatic" artillery weapons. The Commanding General of METZ later voiced the same sentiment after his capture.

14 November. The enemy continued his efforts to destroy the MOSELLE bridges in the northern XX Corps sector with artillery fire. He employed both self-propelled guns firing from positions so close as to be virtually within our lines and medium weapons firing at extreme ranges from positions so far in the rear as to be out of range of both our light artillery and our sound and flash bases. The firing was done almost entirely at night by unobserved methods so that small damage was inflicted. Two hits on one bridge represented the sum total of the enemy's efforts and this damage was quickly repaired. Nevertheless the fire fell in sufficient volume to force temporary cessation of bridging operations on several occasions. The heaviest volume of fire received was 180 rounds, mostly of 150mm caliber, in the vicinity of the THIONVILLE (0586) bridge.

Eighteen rounds from a 280mm railway gun landed in the CONFLANS (0634) - JARNY (0656) vicinity where XX Corps CP was still located, thus ending a period of two weeks during which this gun had not fired into the Army area.

XX Corps artillery organization remained substantially unchanged except that 10th Armored Division Artillery was now supporting the Division and had ceased to reinforce 90th Infantry Division Artillery. All artillery operating in support of the 90th Infantry Division was in the process of displacing to positions east of the MOSELLE.

In the XII Corps sector, 35th Infantry Division and Combat Command B, 6th Armored Division launched an attack to secure MORHANGE (8?056). The attack was preceded by a thirty-minute artillery preparation fired upon towns, assembly areas and enemy artillery locations by the organic artillery of both divisions and six battalions of Corps artillery. All XII Corps artillery except that supporting the 26th Infantry Division displaced forward during the day.

Both corps continued their programs of heavy harassing and interdiction fires upon all towns within range. Numerous Prisoner of War reports attested the efficacy of these programs, saying that it was effectively denying use of the towns to the enemy and that they were ordered to evacuate the towns and utilize the wooded areas adjacent thereto. These areas were interpreted into the program accordingly.

15 November. XX Corps continued the process of expanding and joining its bridgeheads. Enemy artillery opposition showed a marked drop, of the bridges only that at MALLING (9959) being shelled and that in much smaller quantity. It seemed evident that the enemy artillery was beginning to withdraw to the east.

35th Infantry Division's attack progressed and was closing in upon MORHANGE (8?056). 26th Infantry Division launched an attack to secure the high ground at HAUBERT (8?615), the attack being preceded by a forty-minute artillery preparation. The attack got off to a bad start however and encountered heavy tank opposition initially. A 155mm Howitzer battalion succeeded in destroying six enemy tanks. An enemy infantry counterattack was broken up by light artillery fire. Thereafter the attack progressed well.

Enemy artillery opposition to XII Corps remained at the level of preceding days except for a sharp increase on the south flank. One enemy artillery concentration upon the 4th Armored Division at BOURG-ALTROFF (8?830) was the heaviest in this Division's experience to date upon the Continent.

Eighteen rounds from a 280mm railway gun landed in the vicinity of the XII Corps CP at CHATEAU SALINS (0595) only twelve hours or so after the CP had been displaced to that location.

Certain experimental sound equipment, whereby a modified SCR-610 radio was used to link the sound microphones to the recording equipment, was set up at the 14th Field Artillery Observation Battalion in accordance with instructions from the War Department.

16 November. Enemy artillery fires opposed to XX Corps continued to decline. 5th Infantry Division was continuing to advance east and north in the vicinity of METZ (0895) and the 95th Infantry Division was attacking on the west bank of the MOSELLE in the vicinity of FORTS BELLART (0775?) and JEANNE D'ARC (0795?). A very strong counterattack against 90th Infantry Division was broken up by our artillery fire which in one instance knocked out seventy per cent of one enemy infantry company even before it could establish contact.

In the XII Corps sector, 80th Infantry Division made local gains against heavy enemy resistance that was strongly supported by artillery. Three counterattacks against the Division were repulsed by the infantry

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and the supporting artillery.

35th Infantry Division seized MANHANGE (Q2056) and the high ground to the east despite active artillery opposition that decreased considerably as darkness set in. It was quite usual in this sector for the enemy artillery fire to decline sharply at night, apparently indicating an emphasis upon observed fires.

Combat Command B, 6th Armored Division launched a limited objective attack in the wake of a thirty-minute artillery preparation fired by the organic Division Artillery and seven battalions of Corps artillery.

17 November. XII Corps' horseshoe around METZ (U85) was gradually closing east of the city with 5th Infantry Division advancing from the south and 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions from the north. Enemy artillery resistance continued to decrease in converse ratio to the increasing threat to the enemy forces in and about the city.

5th Infantry Division encountered two strong counterattacks that were repulsed by the fires of the Division Artillery and its supporting XX Corps artillery. 95th Infantry Division encountered strong organized resistance south of WOIPPY (U8462) and 10th Armored Division, on the northeast flank of the Corps, had a severe three-hour fire fight before taking EISCHMAUKEN (Q0589).

90th Infantry Division encountered strong opposition at METZLEN-WISSE (U9L8C). A concentration consisting of "Battalion fifteen volleys" 4.5-inch Gun, "Battalion ten volleys" 155mm Gun and "Battery five volleys" 8-inch Howitzer was placed upon the town following which the infantry entered unopposed.

A XX Corps Artillery fire mission served to illustrate the speed and efficiency of field artillery communications and fire direction procedure. At 1159 hours the Corps Artillery fire direction center received a request for fire to be completed at 1505 when the infantry would move out. The target was plotted, a battalion selected to fire the mission and the coordinates sent to the battalion. The latter plotted the target, prepared the necessary fire commands and transmitted them to the guns in sufficient time that sixty-seven rounds of 155mm Gun ammunition were fired before expiration of the time limitation.

XII Corps units generally were consolidating and re-grouping in preparation for resumption of the advance. Six Corps artillery battalions displaced forward.

XII Corps Artillery estimated that it was opposed by a total of fifteen battalions of enemy artillery the great bulk of which was concentrated against the north flank of the Corps.

18 November. Enemy artillery resistance to XX Corps continued to decline and became virtually desultory. The horseshoe around METZ (U85) continued to close and heavy harassing and interdiction fires were placed by all artillery with XX Corps on the escape routes out of the city.

XX Corps artillery battalions fired a fifteen-minute preparation of thirty rounds, 240mm Howitzer and 130 rounds, 155mm Howitzer in support of an attack by elements of the 95th Infantry Division upon FORT ST JULIEN (U8961) north of METZ.

Continued adverse weather conditions, including heavy rains, poor visibility and high winds, seriously hampered the efficiency of all counterbattery intelligence agencies, including sound and flash bases and both ground and Air OPs. To counteract this condition, XX Corps Artillery utilized observation battalion personnel to form additional Shellrep teams one of which was attached to each infantry regiment of the 90th Infantry Division.

Adverse weather was also seriously hampering the operation of Air OPs. In addition to six planes lost because of flood waters, one crashed when a sudden localized snow flurry reduced visibility to zero, two were torn from their moorings by high winds and were turned over and two crashed in attempting to take off because of frost formed on their wings. In addition, operations from extremely muddy fields caused mud and gravel to be thrown up on the propellers, causing damage thereto and destroying their balance. A serious shortage of propellers developed in consequence.

In the XII Corps sector 35th Infantry Division attacked to the east. All Corps artillery battalions participated in a schedule of prearranged fires from H minus thirty to H plus forty-eight during which twenty-three towns, ten CPs, twenty-nine enemy artillery locations, five farmhouses and twenty-three woods were attacked. Neutralization fires were continued thereafter on call. Enemy infantry and artillery resistance to the attack was light.

19 November. Enemy artillery activity in the XX Corps sector declined almost to the point of nothingness. All mobile artillery seemed to have been withdrawn from the METZ (U85) area to positions defending the SAAR RIVER.

The enemy made extensive use of smoke pots to cover the roads east from METZ (U85). A closely coordinated program of harassing and interdiction fires was fired upon crossroads and other critical points on the escape routes by 5th and 95th Infantry Divisions' Artillery and their supporting XX Corps artillery battalions, embracing all calibers from the 155mm Howitzer to the 240mm Howitzer. Toward the close of the period the 5th, 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions established contact east of METZ, closing the horseshoe.

Both the 80th and 35th Infantry Divisions in the XII Corps sector encountered rising enemy artillery opposition but the attack to the east continued nevertheless. 80th Infantry Division Artillery and its supporting Corps artillery battalions fired an active counterbattery program following which enemy artillery firing declined and became negligible after dark.

26th Infantry Division attacked to the east. The Division Artillery and four supporting Corps artillery battalions fired a one-hour preparation in support thereof and thereafter fired both scheduled and "on call" missions in support.

Both 4th and 6th Armored Divisions were in XII Corps reserve temporarily and the artillery thereof fired in support of 26th and 35th Infantry Divisions respectively.

In the seven-day period ending at 0600, artillery with both XII and XX Corps did its most active firing since the two corps were committed in August. Nevertheless artillery ammunition was still not available in the amounts required by the operation. Expenditures therefore reflect not so much the requirements of the week's fighting but rather the availability of ammunition. The figures follow:-

	XII Corps	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	99295	74480
4.5-inch Gun	1753	3552
155mm Howitzer	21096	17956
155mm Gun	7088	2955
155mm Gun (SP)	-	533
8-inch Howitzer	4167	2070
8-inch Gun	92	112
240mm Howitzer	284	364

20 November. 5th Infantry Division proceeded with the task of clearing METZ (U85) and the remaining forts in the vicinity thereof. The balance of XX Corps and its artillery commenced to re-group preparatory to resumption of the attack to the east to secure crossings of the SAAR.

10th Armored Division on the northeast flank of the Corps received extremely heavy artillery fire from enemy positions east of the SAAR in the vicinity of MERZIG (Q2094).

In the XII Corps sector, 35th Infantry Division supported by Combat Command B, 6th Armored Division resumed its attack to the east following a 45-minute artillery preparation fired by the organic artillery of the two divisions and four supporting Corps artillery battalions. Light but well organized resistance was encountered so that the supporting artillery continued to fire heavily upon "on call" missions, including several six-battalion time-on-target concentrations.

26th Infantry Division made two limited objective attacks to the east preceded by a thirty-minute artillery preparation fired by the Division Artillery and four supporting Corps artillery battalions.

21 November. 80th Infantry Division attacked and secured three bridgeheads over the NIED RIVER at CREHANGE (Q1550), FAULQUEMONT (Q1750) and PONTPIERRE (Q2Q49). Enemy artillery opposition was light both in reaction to the initial attack and throughout the remainder of the XII Corps front. The continued decline in the enemy's artillery fires indicated a withdrawal of his artillery, probably to positions east of the SAAR.

A check of the current situation as to segregation of artillery ammunition by lot numbers revealed marked improvement both in ammunition arriving at the Army railhead and that arriving at the using units.

22 November. 10th Armored Division, approaching the SAAR on the northeast flank of XX Corps, encountered heavy artillery fires from positions east of the river.

Our artillery fires in the METZ (U85) area had decreased for several days as the enemy forces were increasingly constricted until on this date artillery with 5th Infantry Division did no firing and that with 95th Infantry Division only a very small amount.

A critical shortage of field wire developed throughout the Army. A directive was published to all field artillery units requiring maximum reclamation of wire upon displacement.

Air OP Bulletin Number 4, Annex 14, copy attached, was published.

27 November. All artillery with XX Corps re-grouped and commenced to move into position to support the planned attack to secure crossings of the SAAR. The new organization for combat was as follows:-

Attached to a 5th Infantry Division regimental combat team (containing METZ (U85) forts) - one organic Division battalion and one Corps battalion armed with captured guns.
General support, reinforcing 10th Armored Division - one field artillery group of two light, one medium and one heavy battalion, the last less one battery.
General support in zone of 10th Armored Division - one field artillery group of two heavy battalions and one 8-inch Gun battery.
General support, reinforcing 90th Infantry Division - one field artillery group of one light and two medium battalions.
General support, reinforcing 4th Infantry Division - 5th Infantry Division Artillery (less one light battalion) and one field artillery group of two light and one medium battalion.
General support in zone of 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions - one field artillery group of two medium battalions and one heavy battery.
General support in zone of 26th and 5th Infantry Divisions - one field artillery group of three heavy battalions and one 8-inch Gun battery.
Fire direction center in southern portion of Corps sector - Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, III Corps Artillery.

In the XII Corps sector a heavy counterattack was thrown against 35th Infantry Division. The infantry supported by strong artillery fires repulsed the threat and inflicted heavy losses.

A thirty-minute artillery preparation in support of an attack by 26th Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions was fired by the organic artillery of both divisions and four supporting Corps artillery battalions. Heavy resistance was encountered in the vicinity of ALBESTROFF (Q5537) so that strong artillery fires were continued on call.

28 November. The volume of enemy artillery fire increased throughout the Army area as the advance approached the SAAR. Medium-caliber fire coming from new areas tended to indicate also that the enemy was bringing up additional artillery for his defense of the SAAR.

The enemy launched a night counterattack at HILSPRICH (Q3946), employing 100 infantry and five tanks. Our artillery fired strong defensive fires including one thirteen-battalion time-on-target concentration on the town. Nevertheless the counterattack achieved temporary success, the enemy not being expelled from the town until the next day.

29 November. Enemy artillery was light in the XII Corps sector but continued to increase in XX Corps both as to volume of fires and number of guns firing. Artillery with XX Corps continued to displace to the east. Rain, fog and low clouds, as they had so often in the past month or more, seriously hampered all observation agencies and so compelled firing by unobserved methods almost exclusively.

30 November. XX Corps experienced intense enemy artillery fire so that for the first time since the Corps started fighting, enemy artillery fires against it exceeded its own fires. The enemy fire however declined as usual to almost nothing at night.

Ammunition expenditures for the week ending at 0600 declined appreciably in XII Corps from the preceding week's level and very markedly in XX Corps. The latter was attributable to the extensive reorganization for the advance to the east that followed the fall of METZ (U85). The figures follow:-

	XII Corps	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	74437	37273
4.5-inch Gun	2260	169
155mm Howitzer	15061	5060
155mm Gun	3334	438
155mm Gun (SP)	-	861
8-inch Howitzer	1866	709
8-inch Gun	67	43
240mm Howitzer	300	106

27 November. There was every evidence that the enemy would make a determined stand along the SAAR, strongly supported by artillery. In his defense of METZ (U85) he had employed no weapon of larger caliber than 150mm. Along the SAAR, however, XX Corps had already identified at least one battery of 170mm guns, one 170mm railroad gun and rocket projectors of unidentified calibers.

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80th Infantry Division in the XII Corps sector experienced four enemy counterattacks all of which were repulsed by massed artillery fires.

28 November. Enemy light and medium artillery fire was extremely light whereas heavy long-range artillery fire continued moderate to heavy, indicating that the enemy's more mobile weapons were now joining his heavy artillery in positions east of the SAAR.

5th Infantry Division Artillery was relieved of its mission of firing in support of 95th Infantry Division and reverted to 5th Infantry Division control.

29 November. Both 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions were advancing steadily to the SAAR. The organic divisional artillery and supporting XX Corps battalions rendered strong support despite frequently bad visibility, firing largely upon targets of opportunity, counterbattery missions and harassing and interdiction fires.

Throughout the period. The crushing offensive of 8 - 9 November saw Third U.S. Army return to the attack. Artillery with the Army played a major role as the Army broke out of its positions along the MOSELLE RIVER and commenced its inexorable advance upon the SAAR basin.

The initial artillery preparation in support of XII Corps' attack was perhaps the most massive in the operational history of the Army to date. Forty-two artillery battalions, embracing some 540 guns, participated in these fires.

Bad weather and sudden floods critically endangered the attacking troops initially, notably the infantry elements of the 90th Infantry Division isolated east of the MOSELLE RIVER in the KOENIGSMACHER (U4289) bridgehead. Four days elapsed before a bridge could be completed and tank destroyers moved across the river into the bridgehead. The enemy utilized this period for repeatedly heavy tank and infantry counterattacks against the bridgehead forces. The tenacious defenders, heavily supported by the powerful close-in defensive fires of twenty artillery battalions, successfully repelled every threat.

The subsidence of the floods marked the end of the critical period. By 19 November the encirclement of the fortress city of METZ (U86) was completed and its final reduction in process. Thenceforth the Army drove steadily toward the SAAR.

Despite harsh weather, poor observation and mud, artillery support of the advances was heavy and continuous, embracing scheduled and on call missions, observed and unobserved fires. Especially heavy harassing and interdiction fires were fired at all times, most notably upon the escape routes as the encircling vise closed about METZ (U86).

CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

1 December. 95th Infantry Division's attack to clear the enemy from the west bank of the SAAR RIVER in the vicinity of SAARLAUTERN (Q8079) was preceded by a ninety-minute aerial bombardment coordinated with an artillery anti-flak program. Air OP patrols were flown and all ground observers were alerted to scrutinize all known enemy antiaircraft positions, to search for such others as might become active and to attack immediately all active positions. The bombardment was followed by an intensive artillery preparation fired by all available artillery with the Corps.

XII Corps artillery continued its heavy harassing and interdiction fires, firing on no less than thirty-nine towns and siting the heavy, long-range weapons to attack SAARBRUCKEN (Q6571, SAARGUEMINES (Q6747) and FORBACH (Q5965). Enemy artillery in turn showed an increasing tendency, especially in the XX Corps zone, to attack small towns behind our lines in recognition of our use thereof for command posts and shelter.

2 December. Combat Command A, 10th Armored Division attached supported by 10th Armored Division Artillery to clear the enemy from the west bank of the SAAR RIVER in its zone in the vicinity of MERZIG (Q2094).

Artillery with XII Corps, supporting five divisions, was organized as follows:-

General support, reinforcing 80th Infantry Division with one light and one medium battalion and 4th Armored Division with one medium battalion - one field artillery group of one light, two medium and one heavy battalion.

General support, reinforcing 4th Armored Division - one field artillery group of two light and one medium battalion.

General support, reinforcing 95th Infantry Division - one field artillery group of one light and one medium battalion.

General support, reinforcing 90th Infantry Division - one field artillery group of one light, one medium and two heavy battalions.

General support, reinforcing 4th Armored Division - one field artillery group of one light and two medium battalions.

General support - three heavy battalions plus one battery, 8-inch guns.

Fire direction center in northern part of Corps zone - Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, XII Corps Artillery supported by one field artillery observation battalion with one platoon, topographic engineers attached.

Fire direction center in southern part of Corps zone - Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 33rd Field Artillery Brigade supported by one field artillery observation battalion (less one battery).

3 December. 95th Infantry Division launched an attack to secure a crossing of the SAAR at SAARLAUTERN (Q6079). The attack was preceded by an air strike followed by an artillery preparation fired by the organic artillery of both 95th and 90th Infantry Divisions, three battalions of 5th Infantry Division Artillery and twelve battalions of XX Corps artillery. The attack succeeded, a bridgehead being secured and one of the bridges over the river being seized before it could be demolished. This attack was further supported by fires in the nature of a preparation fired by the 90th Infantry Division Artillery to simulate an attack in the vicinity of BOERINGEN (Q4480).

In the XII Corps sector, 80th Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions also attacked. The organic artillery of both divisions and seven Corps artillery battalions supported this attack with a schedule of preparation fires from H minus forty-five to H plus sixty-three. Enemy artillery positions, towns, command posts and supply points were among the targets attacked.

Ammunition expenditures for the week ending at 030600 continued heavy as Third U.S. Army approached the outer defenses of the SIEGFRIED LINE. The figures are as follows:-

	XII Corps	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	60827	76701
4.5-inch Gun	4474	3540
155mm Howitzer	10534	21582
155mm Gun	5405	4410
155mm Gun (SP)	-	1553
8-inch Howitzer	1954	1656
8-inch Gun	178	73
240mm Howitzer	436	258

4 December. Attacks progressed along the entire Third U.S. Army front. 4th Armored Division's attack, on the south flank of XII Corps, was preceded by an artillery preparation on the towns of DONNERSKEL (Q5734), WALLERSBERG (Q4562), LORENTZEN (Q2949) and the high ground to the north, fired by 4th Armored Division Artillery and four battalions of Corps artillery. In the northern XII Corps sector the attack of 95th and 90th Infantry and 6th Armored Divisions progressed favorably against small arms and mortar fire but only light artillery opposition.

The enemy, apparently believing that XX Corps' main attack would come in the vicinity of MERZIG (Q2094), had massed its artillery in that area. The initial artillery reaction to the 95th Infantry Division bridgehead at SAARLAUTERN (Q6079) had been extremely light. Now however it became increasingly severe so that an estimated 7,500 rounds of light and medium artillery fell in the SAARLAUTERN (Q6079) bridgehead area during the period. The enemy fires were directed particularly at our bridge.

5 December. All artillery with XX Corps was displacing by echelon in close support of the advance of 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions.

Activity of enemy artillery opposed to XII Corps became negligible but that opposed to XX Corps continued to increase. The mass of enemy artillery was concentrated in the vicinity of SAARLAUTERN (Q6079) and enemy fires into the bridgehead area increased to a point of extreme severity. An estimated twenty-five battalions of enemy artillery were in the area and counterbattery measures were seriously hampered by bad weather conditions resulting in a lack of adequate current photo cover.

6 December. 4th Armored Division was relieved in the XII Corps zone by 12th Armored Division, the artillery of 4th Armored Division remaining in position to fire in support of 12th Armored Division.

95th Infantry Division, engaged in heavy street fighting in its bridgehead east of the SAAR, received very heavy artillery support. Fighting was of a house-to-house, street-to-street nature. Whenever one side of the street was cleared, heavy artillery, 8-inch howitzers and 240mm Howitzers, was adjusted by forward observers upon the buildings on the opposite side of the street until a breach was effected. The infantry then dashed into the breached building and cleared the street house-by-house, whereupon the process was repeated. Enemy artillery fires in opposition to the 95th Infantry Division's bridgehead continued violent.

90th Infantry Division launched an attack across the SAAR at FACHTEN (Q4544) at 0430. To preserve surprise, no artillery preparation was fired. However, an intensive schedule of counterbattery fires was fired from H hour to H plus forty-five consisting of approximately 8,000 rounds on thirty-nine enemy artillery locations. Enemy artillery reaction to the attack was extremely light initially but tended to increase gradually, apparently as the enemy shifted and displaced part of the artillery previously firing at SAARLAUTERN (Q6079).

7 December. Enemy artillery fire against the 90th Infantry Division bridgehead continued to increase in intensity whereas that against 95th Infantry Division declined but was still severe.

8 December. The enemy fired flares at the bridge sites in the XII Corps sector and then attacked them with observed artillery fires. The enemy artillery reaction to both the 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions' bridgeheads dropped off sharply to an average of six and fifteen rounds per hour respectively.

Several heavy counterattacks were launched against both XX Corps bridgeheads, all of which were repulsed with the aid of strong fires from the supporting divisional and Corps artillery. A tank and infantry counterattack in the vicinity of MERZIG (Q5396) was broken up by artillery with XII Corps.

Divisional artillery of 26th Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions and four battalions of XII Corps artillery fired a ninety-minute preparation in support of the attack of 26th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions and thereafter fired heavily on call. Subsequently the artillery marked the targets for an air strike in support of the attack.

XX Corps attached one battery each of 155mm Guns (SP) to both 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions for direct fire against pillboxes and fortified houses. Enemy fire knocked out one of these guns whereupon another was brought up, emplaced behind a smoke screen and completed the mission by indirect fire methods.

87th Infantry Division was detached from XII Corps and relieved 5th Infantry Division, investing the remaining METZ (U86) forts. An artillery battalion armed with enemy material, previously attached to 5th Infantry Division, was attached to 87th Infantry Division. Artillery of 5th Infantry Division moved forward to positions on the south flank of XX Corps.

Photographic equipment and personnel sufficient to permit the taking, developing and printing of oblique photographs was delivered to XII Corps Artillery. Continued adverse weather conditions had demonstrated that Air OPs operating from airstrips close behind the lines could take advantage of brief localized breaks in the weather whereas Air Corps planes operating from fields further to the rear were forced to remain on the ground.

9 December. There were increasingly frequent small-scale counterattacks against the FACHTEN (Q4544) and SAARLAUTERN (Q6079) bridgeheads but enemy artillery activity continued to decline. There was occasional shelling of the river crossings with white phosphorus at night, apparently to light up the area to detect any bridging operations.

4th Armored Division Artillery in the XII Corps sector was withdrawn from the line and placed in reserve for necessary re-fitting and maintenance.

A demonstration was conducted in conjunction with XII Corps Artillery to acquaint artillery personnel with XII Corps with the use and characteristics of the new Posit fuze. One 105mm Howitzer battalion, one 155mm Howitzer battery, one 8-inch Howitzer and one 240mm Howitzer were utilized in the demonstration. Results were extraordinarily effective, very few early bursts occurring and the percentage of effective rounds being eighty-nine per cent for the 105mm Howitzer, eighty per cent for the 155mm Howitzer, ninety-two per cent for the 8-inch Howitzer and 100 per cent for the 240mm Howitzer. A similar demonstration was conducted on 10 December in conjunction with XX Corps Artillery for artillery personnel with that Corps.

A total of eighteen Air OPs was lost during the week just ended, this being the highest percentage of loss in any period to date. Of these, five planes were lost due to enemy action, six because of high winds, five in flying accidents and two due to miscellaneous causes. A tendency was noted on the part of the enemy to reverse his prior practice of silencing his artillery and antiaircraft artillery whenever our Air OPs were aloft. In consequence, our Air OPs encountered in-

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ormasing antiaircraft opposition but at the same time were increasingly successful in locating active enemy artillery positions.

10 December. Enemy artillery increasingly interdicted and harassed towns and supply routes in our rear areas utilizing heavy caliber long-range weapons. Fire upon our forward elements continued heavy but was from light caliber weapons exclusively.

The continued heavy fighting was reflected in the ammunition expenditures for the week ending at 100600, though availability continued to be a limiting factor. The figures are as follows:-

	XII Corps	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	70420	79518
4.5-inch Gun	7490	3665
155mm Howitzer	16866	26095
155mm Gun	7015	3765
155mm Gun (SP)	-	1217
8-inch Howitzer	2443	2951
8-inch Gun	132	151
240mm Howitzer	617	442

11 December. 26th Infantry Division for the fourth successive day launched a limited objective attack, each preceded by a brief but intensive artillery preparation fired by the organic Division Artillery and four battalions of XII Corps artillery. All objectives were attained.

XX Corps experienced severe enemy shelling, an estimated 15,000 rounds falling in the Corps area. The enemy utilized all calibers from 105mm to 210mm and shelled BOUZONVILLE (Q1377) with a 380mm weapon. The enemy fires included an intensive four-hour program in the evening upon our rear area installations, including towns, command posts, highways and crossroads. Lack of current photo cover substantially hampered counterbattery measures but nevertheless as strong a counterbattery program as ammunition availability would permit was instituted immediately.

12 December. Improved weather facilitated new photo coverage that materially assisted counterbattery measures. Enemy artillery fires declined sharply in the XX Corps area, due in part to our counterbattery fires and in part to intensive fighter-bomber bombing and strafing of enemy artillery positions.

A strong, night counterattack against the 35th Infantry Division was repulsed by the defensive fires of the Division Artillery and six supporting battalions of XII Corps artillery. Thereafter a thirteen-battalion time-on-target concentration was fired upon GLIMMERSCHEID (Q5957) following which 35th Infantry Division took the town against light resistance and captured many prisoners.

14 December. 87th Infantry Division and its organic artillery were attached to XII Corps and relieved 26th Infantry Division. The latter returned to METZ (U85) to service and re-fit materiel and assumed the mission of containing the remaining METZ forts under the operational control of III Corps. No substantial changes occurred in the organization for combat of artillery with XII Corps other than to substitute in support of 87th Infantry Division Corps artillery that had been firing in support of 26th Infantry Division.

15 December. 80th Infantry Division commenced to move back into line on the south flank of XII Corps, relieving elements of the 12th Armored Division which thereupon reverted to Seventh U.S. Army. To provide for this change and also for the impending committal of III Corps on the SAAR front, artillery with XII Corps was regrouped as follows:-

General support, reinforcing 35th Infantry Division with one light and two medium battalions - one field artillery group of one light, two medium and one heavy battalion.
General support, reinforcing 80th Infantry Division with one light and one medium battalion - one field artillery group of one light, one medium and one heavy battalion.
General support reinforcing 80th Infantry Division - one field artillery group of two 105mm Howitzer (SP) battalions, one medium battalion and one battery of 155mm Guns (SP).
General support, reinforcing 87th Infantry Division with one light and two medium battalions - 334 Field Artillery Brigade with one light, two medium and one heavy battalion attached.
Corps fire direction center in 35th Infantry Division zone of action - Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, XII Corps Artillery with two heavy battalions and one battery of 8-inch Guns attached.
Corps fire direction center in zone of action of 80th and 87th Infantry Divisions - one field artillery group with one heavy battalion attached.
General support - one field artillery observation battalion with one platoon of topographic engineers attached.

Enemy artillery firing into the XX Corps area increased somewhat, especially at the bridge sites, an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 rounds falling in SAARLAUTERN (Q6879) alone.

16 December. III Corps, with 6th Armored Division attached, was committed in the center of the Army front on the SAAR. Attached initially to the Corps were Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, III Corps Artillery, one 105mm Howitzer battalion, one 155mm Howitzer battalion, one 155mm Gun battalion and one 8-inch Gun battery, all detached from XX Corps, and one field artillery group, one field artillery observation battalion, one armored field artillery battalion and one 4.5-inch Gun battalion, all detached from XII Corps.

One 240mm Howitzer battalion was detached from XII Corps and retained under Army control, being utilized on Military Police duty.

17 December. XX Corps reorganized its front with 5th Infantry Division moving in to the north of 95th Infantry Division and taking over the bulk of its zone. Artillery with XX Corps was accordingly re-grouped as follows:-

General support in zone of 3d Cavalry Group and 90th Infantry Division - one field artillery group of two armored field artillery battalions and one medium battalion.
Attached to 90th Infantry Division - one 105mm Howitzer battalion and one battery, 155mm Guns (SP).
Reinforcing 90th Infantry Division - one field artillery group of two medium battalions.
General support in zone of 90th Infantry Division - one field artillery group of two heavy battalions and one 8-inch Gun battery.
Attached to 5th Infantry Division - one 105mm Howitzer battalion and one battery, 155mm Guns (SP).
Reinforcing 5th Infantry Division - one field artillery group of two medium battalions.
General support in zones of 5th and 95th Infantry Divisions - one field artillery group of three heavy battalions.

Enemy artillery opposition to XX Corps bridgeheads was light and, together with fresh photo coverage, reflected a substantial withdrawal of enemy artillery from the area.

Enemy activity in and around the town of FORBACH (Q3905) was strong so that artillery with III Corps attacked the town repeatedly throughout the day. Infantry patrols sent out in this area were accompanied by artillery forward observers to assure prompt artillery support if and when the patrols should be pinned down.

Artillery ammunition expenditures for the week ending at 170600 were as follows:

	III Corps*	XII Corps	XII Corps
105mm Howitzer	1397	55420	55420
4.5-inch Gun	-	2334	2334
155mm Howitzer	54	18617	18617
155mm Gun	-	5504	5504
155mm Gun (SP)	-	-	-
8-inch Howitzer	-	2138	2138
8-inch Gun	-	196	196
240mm Howitzer	-	700	700

*III Corps was committed on 16 December.

18 December. Planning was already in progress whereby Third U.S. Army would wheel to attack the south flank of the enemy penetration developing against First U.S. Army in the LUXEMBURG - BELGIUM area. 10th Armored Division, in XX Corps reserve, was detached from Third U.S. Army, attached to First U.S. Army and moved north to help stem the enemy onslaught.

Enemy artillery opposition to XX Corps increased somewhat, especially against 90th Infantry Division which was advancing in its DILLINGEN (Q2784) bridgehead. The enemy continued to fire strong harassing and interdiction fires at night. By far the bulk of his fire, however, continued to be received during periods of good daylight visibility.

19 December. III Corps was withdrawn from the SAAR front and moved north to the vicinity of ARLON (P6123). 4th Armored and 80th Infantry Divisions, together with their organic artillery, were detached from XII Corps, attached to III Corps and moved rapidly north from positions on the extreme south flank of the Army.

Artillery with the Army was extensively re-grouped to support these offensive operations. There were attached to III Corps one field artillery group, two 155mm, one medium and one heavy battalion detached from XII Corps and two field artillery groups, one light and one medium battalion detached from XX Corps. In addition, one field artillery observation battalion newly arrived on the Continent and assigned to Third U.S. Army was attached to III Corps. All commenced to move immediately and closed in the vicinity of the III Corps Artillery assembly area at VILLERS (U8198) during the night of 19 - 20 December.

To assure continued efficient operations and prevent the confusion inherent to reorganization, III Corps' former area in the SAAR front together with the bulk of the troops therein passed intact to the control of XII Corps. In addition to 6th Armored Division and its organic artillery, this included one field artillery group, one field artillery observation battalion, one light, one medium and one heavy battalion.

Planning was in progress in anticipation of the probable detachment of VIII Corps to Third U.S. Army. This Corps, spread thinly over a wide frontage, had borne much of the brunt of the enemy attack. It was already clear that artillery with VIII Corps had suffered heavy losses so that steps were initiated to determine the scope thereof with a view to expediting replacement.

There was heavy enemy artillery activity throughout the XII Corps sector, especially in the 35th Infantry Division sector at SAARHAUSEN (Q5157). Enemy firing in the XX Corps bridgehead areas was moderate but increased sharply on the north flank of the Corps in the thinly-held area between the SAAR and MOSELLE RIVERS. This fire in one instance was in the nature of an artillery preparation which, coupled with heavy sounds as if of troop movements at night, made apparent an enemy attempt to simulate an attack in that area.

XX Corps Artillery completed an examination designed to test the efficacy of sound ranging of 100 enemy artillery locations in the area between the MOSELLE and SAAR RIVERS originally reported by sound ranging methods. Positive evidence of occupation by enemy artillery or self-propelled weapons was found in seventy-three locations, evidence of possible occupation in thirteen locations and no evidence of occupation in fourteen positions. Fifty-five of the locations as reported by sound were within 150 yards of the actual locations, the remaining forty-five sound locations being further removed.

20 December. 26th Infantry Division, currently at METZ (U85), was attached to III Corps and commenced to move north.

Artillery with III Corps was moving forward into positions to support the planned Corps attack toward BASTOGNE (P5658). Organization for combat of the Corps artillery was as follows:

Attached to 4th Armored Division - two armored field artillery battalions and one medium battalion.
Attached to 80th Infantry Division - one field artillery group of one light and one medium battalion.
Attached to 26th Infantry Division - one field artillery group of one light and two medium battalions.
General support - one field artillery observation battalion, one field artillery group, two medium and one heavy field artillery battalion.

Enemy artillery activity in the XX Corps bridgehead areas built up gradually throughout the day until in the early evening an average of 600 rounds per hour was falling in the HERZOGF (Q3978) bridgehead. At 2200 hours all XX Corps artillery battalions, embracing all calibers from the 105mm Howitzer to the 240mm Howitzer, fired simultaneously upon twelve enemy artillery locations. The enemy firing ceased.

XII Corps was in the process of relinquishing its area on the south flank of the Army to Seventh U.S. Army preparatory to its own movement to the north. 87th Infantry Division was relieved from attachment to XII Corps and Third U.S. Army and assigned Seventh U.S. Army. As were the 334 Field Artillery Brigade and three heavy artillery battalions. Several small-scale enemy counterattacks occurred in the [illegible] corps sector, each preceded by an intensive artillery preparation.

21 December. [illegible] corps, consisting of 9th Armored Division - [illegible] and 10th Armored Divisions - 28th U.S. [illegible] Division, was detached from First [illegible] Army. Also included were Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, XII Corps Artillery, two field artillery observation battalions, [illegible] field artillery groups, one armored field artillery battalion, one 105mm Howitzer, one 4.5-inch Gun, five 155mm Howitzer, two 155mm Gun, one 155mm Gun (SP) and two 8-inch Howitzer battalions. Elements of five of these battalions were operational in the vicinity of BASTOGNE (P5658). The remaining battalions had been widely scattered by the enemy penetration and were being assembled west of FLORENVILLE (P2525) and temporarily employed for the defense of the MEUSE.

Seventh U.S. Army completed its relief of XII Corps on the SAAR and the Corps, together with all attached artillery and 35th Infantry

Division, commenced to move to the north. To assist the change-over, 6th Armored Division and supporting artillery remained in position on the SAAR, being detached from XII Corps and attached to XX Corps.

95th Infantry Division expanded its sector on the SAAR to include that of the 5th Infantry Division and the latter commenced its withdrawal to move to the north. 76th Infantry Division's sector was also extended to include the area from the SAAR west to the MOSELLE [illegible] heavily held by a screen of heavily forced. To support the new organization in its defense of the SAAR line, artillery with XX Corps was regrouped as follows:-

Attached to 95th Infantry Division - one light artillery battalion.
Attached to 76th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light, one medium and one heavy artillery battalion.
General support in area of 76th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one medium and three heavy artillery battalions.
Attached to 26th Infantry Division - one light artillery battalion.
General support in area of 26th Infantry Division - one field artillery group of two medium artillery battalions.
General support in area of 4th Infantry Division - one field artillery group of three heavy artillery battalions.
Attached to 6th Armored Division - one light artillery battalion.

20 December. The situation in the ARDENNES penetration area continued fluid with the enemy artillery advancing by bounds in rear of the infantry and armor prepared to support when the situation stabilized. Fires of the enemy artillery were sporadic and came almost entirely from light calibers including self-propelled weapons, frequently employing direct fire.

VIII Corps Artillery was progressing well with the task of collecting and re-equipping its scattered units, except of course for those in the BASTOGNE (P5668) pocket. It proved possible to fill promptly all critical shortages of Signal, Quartermaster and Ordnance equipment except for motor vehicles and certain primary weapons. One field artillery group, one field artillery observation battalion and three heavy artillery battalions were already in operational condition and were therefore detached from VIII Corps and attached to III Corps to support the latter's offensive.

XII Corps and its artillery units completed their move to the north and closed in the area just east of III Corps. Artillery with the Corps was organized as follows to support the forthcoming attack:-

General support, reinforcing 5th Infantry Division with one light and two medium battalions - one field artillery group of one light, two medium and one heavy battalion.
General support, reinforcing 10th Armored Division - one field artillery group of three light and one medium battalion.
General support, reinforcing 4th Infantry Division with one light and one medium battalion - one field artillery group of one light and two medium battalions.
General support, reinforcing 4th Infantry Division with one medium battalion - one field artillery group of one medium and two heavy battalions.
Attached to 2d Cavalry Group - one light battalion.

One additional field artillery group was employed as a second Corps Artillery fire direction center in the eastern part of the Corps area. Included in this organization for combat were one light and one medium battalion of the 28th Infantry Division. The enemy penetration had separated these battalions from the Division and they had subsequently been recentered in the new XII Corps area. 28th Infantry Division was currently re-grouping along the MEUSE and pending its recommittal to action, these two battalions were temporarily detached and attached to XII Corps.

XX Corps withdrew from two of its three bridgeheads over the SAAR to take up more favorable holding positions. Only the SAARLAUTERN (Q2977) bridgehead was maintained. XX Corps artillery maintained continuous smoke screens to cover these withdrawals. Much of the artillery with XX Corps was engaged in displacing the better to support the new defensive positions.

One armored field artillery battalion was detached from XX Corps and attached to III Corps and one 155mm Howitzer battalion, newly assigned to Third U.S. Army and arrived in the Army area, was attached to III Corps.

21 December. A strong enemy attack upon our troops in the BASTOGNE (P5668) area was preceded by an intensive artillery preparation fired largely by tanks and self-propelled weapons. III Corps' advance to the north was encountering stiff resistance but only slight artillery fires from single pieces of light caliber.

One field artillery group and one 4.5-inch Gun battalion, assigned to First U.S. Army but separated therefrom by the enemy penetration, arrived in the VIII Corps assembly area in the vicinity of FLAMIERVILLE (P5824). Twelfth U.S. Army Group was advised and permission to retain these units was requested. This was granted and the two units were detached from First U.S. Army, attached to Third U.S. Army and in turn reattached to VIII Corps.

10th Armored Division, composed of elements of the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions, attacked following a 45-minute artillery preparation fired by the organic artillery and four battalions of XII Corps artillery. Enemy artillery opposition to the attack was moderate, consisting largely of harassing fires against our leading elements. XII Corps Artillery, in its new area on the LUXEMBOURG front, continued its established policy of intensive harassing and interdiction fires on a 24-hour basis delivered upon all towns and buildings within artillery range that might otherwise afford shelter to the enemy.

Seventh U.S. Army units began to relieve 6th Armored Division on the south flank of XII Corps so as to free this Division too for employment against the penetration in the north.

The one 8-inch Gun battalion with the Army, the three firing batteries of which had been employed on one per Corps basis on the SAAR front, was attached in toto to XX Corps.

22 December. The enemy heavily bombed our troops in the BASTOGNE (P5668) pocket but continued to employ as artillery only light caliber self-propelled and tank weapons. III Corps, employing 4th Armored and 80th Infantry Divisions in its advance toward BASTOGNE, encountered increasingly heavy resistance as its attack progressed to the north.

Enemy artillery opposition to the attack of 5th Infantry and 10th Armored Divisions in the XII Corps area was strong, especially during daylight, and extensive use was made of 210mm Nebelwerfers. The enemy launched two strong counterattacks both of which were repelled with the help of strong support from artillery with XII Corps.

All artillery with XX Corps was engaged in organizing for defense of the SAAR line, reconnoitering and organizing both alternate and delaying positions. Enemy artillery in this sector was generally quiet.

Artillery ammunition supply became increasingly critical in consequence of the movement of the great bulk of Third U.S. Army to the north. Supply units followed with maximum speed but delay in their opening in the northern area was inescapable in view of the great distances and great amount of supplies involved. For several days but a single Ammunition Supply Point was available to III, VIII and XII Corps between them so that stocks became and remained extremely low. The nearest Communications Zone depot available involved approximately a forty-hour round trip for the ammunition trains and so was utilized only in occasional emergencies. Close contact was maintained between Ordnance and Artillery personnel at both the corps and army levels and in consequence of the diligence of all concerned, the situation had so eased by 26 December that it was not thereafter a problem.

The Posit fuse having been released for operational use by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, the limited quantities already available within the using units were initially used for light harassing and interdiction fires. Use of the new fuse expanded considerably as increased ammunition stocks were moved up into the northern sector.

Artillery ammunition expenditures for the week ending at 240600 remained substantially as heavy as in preceding weeks which, in view of the fact that the greatest part of Third U.S. Army was moving at some time or other during the week, indicates the severe nature of the fighting. Expenditures were as follows:-

	III Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	9647	50157	51349
4.5-inch Gun	427	1793	2002
155mm Howitzer	2452	16741	12652
155mm Gun	1130	2227	2378
155mm Gun (SP)	-	4053	1050
8-inch Howitzer	261	-	1207
8-inch Gun	26	-	116
240mm Howitzer	-	193	542

24 December. VIII Corps artillery units, except for those within the BASTOGNE (P5668) pocket, continued to re-group and rehabilitate in the area west of FLAMIERVILLE (P5824) while at the same time assisting to screen the approaches to the MEUSE. VIII Corps Air OPs maintained continuous reconnaissance patrols north, northeast and northwest of BASTOGNE (P5668).

Severe enemy attacks employing large numbers of tanks were all successfully repulsed by the forces in the BASTOGNE (P5668) pocket, in some instances after dangerous local penetrations. Radio communication was successfully established between the approaching 4th Armored Division and the BASTOGNE forces and this medium was utilized to enable both 4th Armored Division and III Corps Artillery to fire extensively in support of the encircled forces.

A sharp decrease in enemy artillery fires occurred throughout the XII Corps area but Nebelwerfer fires continued to be very active.

Seventh U.S. Army completed taking over the southern portion of the XX Corps area on the SAAR, relieving 6th Armored Division which thereupon moved back to METZ (U85) for re-fitting and maintenance. One light field artillery battalion previously attached to 6th Armored Division was relieved and attached to 95th Infantry Division.

A compilation of counterbattery records revealed that XX Corps had been opposed at one time or another by twenty separate types of enemy field artillery weapons. These ranged in caliber from 75mm and 76.2mm to 380mm and included weapons, in addition to German, of French, Russian and Italian origin.

26 December. Combat Command B, 4th Armored Division succeeded in establishing contact with the 101st Airborne Division and other units in the BASTOGNE (P5668) pocket. ASSENOIS (P5454), the last barrier separating the two forces, had been attacked with an artillery concentration of four battalions, ten volleys upon the heels of which the infantry and armor moved into the town against shattered resistance. 4th Armored Division Artillery and supporting III Corps artillery had continued to fire in support of the forces within the pocket prior to the juncture. The last stages of 4th Armored Division's advance had been accomplished against the most intense opposition and enemy artillery fires received had been the most severe ever experienced by this Division.

Both 26th and 80th Infantry Divisions were engaged in heavy fighting. 80th Infantry Division Artillery fired a thirty-minute preparation in support of the attack of the 317th Infantry. A night counterattack against the 319th Infantry was broken up by two artillery battalions firing their normal barrages. 26th Infantry Division Artillery and six battalions of III Corps artillery participated in several time-on-target concentrations upon ESCHDORF (P7044) following which infantry took the town in a pre-dawn attack.

35th Infantry Division, en route north, was attached to III Corps. 10th Armored Division, with the exception of its elements in the BASTOGNE (P5668) area, was relieved from XII Corps and moved back to METZ (U85) for refitting. 6th Armored Division was attached to XII Corps and commenced moving north from METZ.

The enemy fought a stubborn delaying action against XII Corps' advance toward the SAUER RIVER. Bitter house-to-house fighting occurred in BERDORF (L4035), strongly supported by our artillery and with only light enemy artillery opposition. On no less than four separate occasions concentrations of enemy infantry were attacked and dispersed by our massed artillery fires.

The picture of artillery losses in the penetration area had by now clarified and showed that losses, while severe, were not as heavy as might have been anticipated. Major losses of primary weapons included, each in separate battalions, seventeen 105mm Howitzers (SP), five 106mm Howitzers, ten 4.5-inch Guns, one 155mm Howitzer, eleven 155mm Howitzers, one 155mm Gun, three 155mm Guns and nine 8-inch Howitzers. Seven of the 8-inch Howitzers had been recovered by First U.S. Army and were en route to Third U.S. Army through Ordnance evacuation channels. Other losses included 148 trucks of less than two and one-half tons, 100 trucks of two and one-half tons or greater, twenty-three M5 tractors, fifteen M4 tractors and twelve liaison-type aircraft. There were in addition large losses of Signal, Engineer and Quartermaster equipment, both personal and organizational. Artillery personnel of both corps and army worked in constant and close coordination with the supply services and virtually all items proved to be quickly replaceable and were so replaced. Delay in replacement was encountered only in the case of 4.5-inch Guns, 155mm Howitzers, 155mm Guns and the larger trucks.

One field artillery group and three artillery battalions, each composed of negro enlisted personnel, had suffered personnel losses that could not be replaced, there being no negro artillery personnel replacements available in the Theater. Permission was therefore requested to de-activate one battalion so as to provide replacements for the remaining two battalions and the group. Pending War Department approval thereof, Twelfth U.S. Army Group authorized that the personnel of the one battalion be placed on special duty to bring the other units concerned back up to strength. Transfer of this battalion's equipment on a similar basis was also authorized.

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Due to the lack of replacement 4.5-inch Guns, permission was also requested to convert the 4.5-inch Gun battalion into a 155mm Howitzer battalion. This however was refused by Twelfth U.S. Army Group because of a comparable shortage of 155mm Howitzer and the relative availability of ammunition in the two calibers.

27 December. Heavy fighting continued in the BASTOGNE (P5668) area with heavy enemy counterattacks against the left side of 4th Armored Division's narrow corridor into the former pocket. Strong artillery support was employed, all counterattacks were beaten back and the corridor was firmly established. Numerous enemy artillery units had been identified in the area through Prisoners of War, but enemy firing continued to be confined to that of tanks and self-propelled weapons. The troops in the pocket were placed under the operational control of VIII Corps and 17th Airborne Division relieved the latter in the mission of protecting the approaches to the MEUSE. It was apparent however that the stand at BASTOGNE had dulled the power of the enemy penetration and that it had lost its momentum.

Two strong counterattacks were also launched against 26th Infantry Division but both were repelled by the fires of the Division Artillery and six battalions of supporting III Corps artillery. Our artillery fires were extremely active throughout this area and were measurably aided by clear weather and air observation.

80th Infantry Division, one field artillery group, one light battalion and one medium battalion were detached from III Corps and attached to XII Corps, which thereupon reorganized its artillery for combat as follows:-

General support, reinforcing 80th Infantry Division - one field artillery group of one light, one medium and two heavy battalions.
General support, reinforcing 4th and 5th Infantry Divisions each with two battalions - one field artillery group of one light and three medium battalions.
General support, reinforcing 2d Cavalry Group - one field artillery group of one light and two medium battalions.
Corps fire direction center in zone of 80th Infantry Division - one field artillery group with one heavy battalion attached, supported by one field artillery observation battalion with one platoon of topographic engineers attached. 6th Armored Division Artillery and one field artillery group of two armored field artillery battalions were to respond to calls of this group for fire from present positions.
Corps fire direction center in zones of 4th and 5th Infantry Divisions and the corresponding sector - Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, XII Corps Artillery with two heavy battalions attached and one field artillery observation battalion in support.

Included in this organization for combat were two heavy battalions that were detached from XX Corps and attached to XII Corps.

Enemy artillery activity in the XX Corps sector was virtually negligible, the bulk of it falling in SAARLAUTERN (Q2879) and amounting to only 100 rounds over the 24-hour period. Enemy air activity was widespread throughout the Corps area, however, with numerous instances of bombing and strafing of troop columns, supply points, command posts and artillery positions.

Elements of two field artillery observation battalions which had fallen back into Third U.S. Army's area in the wake of the enemy penetration were detached and attached to First U.S. Army and commenced their movement north.

28 December. The enemy reverted to a defensive attitude in the VIII Corps sector in the vicinity of ST HUBERT (P5161). Two organic artillery battalions of the 26th Infantry Division previously operational with XII Corps were detached and rejoined the Division under VIII Corps. One field artillery group, one field artillery observation battalion, one armored field artillery battalion and two heavy artillery battalions, all previously operating with III Corps, were detached and reattached to VIII Corps.

Enemy artillery activity in the III Corps area declined sharply and was extremely light, coming from single pieces.

XII Corps' attack to the SAUER RIVER took ECHTERNACH (L0535). Extremely heavy enemy troop and vehicular movements in DIEKIRCH (P5642) were attacked with massed time-on-target concentrations and dispersed with heavy casualties. An estimated thirty battalions of enemy artillery were opposed to XII Corps firing heavy harassing and interdiction fires and, occasionally, large counterbattery concentrations. Four liaison-type aircraft were lost to enemy artillery fire that landed on the 80th Infantry Division airstrip.

In the XX Corps sector, enemy artillery activity continued light and enemy air activity heavy. The enemy aircraft showed no disposition, however, to attack our Air OPs.

29 December. 6th Armored Division was detached from XII Corps and attached to III Corps.

A sharp counterattack was launched against 80th Infantry Division but was broken up by the defensive fires of the Division Artillery which inflicted many casualties and resulted in the taking of a substantial bag of prisoners. Enemy artillery opposing XII Corps continued to fire largely upon our supply and communications routes.

30 December. VIII Corps, employing the recently attached 11th Armored and 87th Infantry Divisions, attacked at 0730 in the direction of ST HUBERT (P5161) and HOUFFALIZE (P6171). 101st Airborne Division in the area of BASTOGNE (P5668) supported the right flank of the operation and 28th Infantry Division the left flank. No artillery preparation was fired and no fire contact with the enemy was established until late in the day in the vicinity of REMAGNE (P3955) where heavy fighting developed. The town changed hands several times before we finally secured it and enemy artillery reaction to its capture was prompt and severe. VIII Corps Artillery was organized to support the attack as follows:-

Attached to 87th Infantry Division - one light battalion.
General support, reinforcing 87th Infantry Division - one field artillery group of two medium battalions.
Attached to 11th Armored Division - one armored field artillery battalion.
General support, reinforcing 11th Armored Division - one field artillery group of one medium and one heavy battalion.
Attached to 28th Infantry Division - one light battalion.
Attached to 101st Airborne Division - two medium battalions.
General support - one field artillery observation battalion, one field artillery group and one heavy battalion.

Included in this organization were one light and one medium battalion of the 28th Infantry Division which were attached to other divisions.

III Corps re-grouped its artillery to support its offensive to cut off the enemy pocket southeast of BASTOGNE (P5658) as follows:-

Attached to 26th Infantry Division - one medium battalion.
Attached to 35th Infantry Division - one medium battalion.
Attached to 6th Armored Division - one field artillery group of two armored field artillery battalions and two medium battalions.
General support - one field artillery group of one medium and three heavy battalions.

An extremely heavy tank counterattack was launched against the 35th Infantry Division, pressing against the enemy pocket from the south. All III Corps and divisional artillery, including that of the 4th Armored Division, fired in support of the defense and the counterattack was smashed with heavy losses.

XII Corps continued its program of intensive harassing and interdiction fires, employing ammunition in the ratio of one-third fuse quick, one-third fuse delay and one-third Posit fuse. Initial results with the Posit fuse seemed extraordinarily effective though so much of the firing with this fuse was done with unobserved methods that no positive evaluation could yet be made.

31 December. Enemy artillery firing was relatively light in the BASTOGNE (P5658) area but increased heavily against 87th Infantry Division, notably in the vicinity of NOMERT (PL553). Severe enemy counterattacks were launched against MOIRCY (P3757) and ACULA (PL357) but were repulsed with strong support from divisional and supporting VIII Corps artillery and the attack continued.

III Corps artillery fired strongly to repulse a heavy dawn counterattack against 26th Infantry Division which was pressing against the northeast shoulder of the enemy pocket southeast of BASTOGNE (P5658). Observation was excellent and artillery with the Corps fired repeatedly on numerous enemy tank and troop concentrations. Our advancing troops subsequently counted in excess of 100 enemy dead in one such area. Enemy fires, and particularly those of Nebelwerfers, increased considerably and continued to be primarily harassing and interdictory in nature.

Ammunition expenditures for the week ending at 310600 reflect the generally heavy firing in the ARDENNES area, the figures being as follows:-

	III Corps	VIII Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
75mm Howitzer	1211	10242	-	-
105mm Howitzer, M2	77680	20536	84328	25061
105mm Howitzer, M3	-	1395	-	-
4.5-inch Gun	2941	0	2660	645
155mm Howitzer	18685	8025	31520	7336
155mm Gun	6941	1259	6053	998
155mm Gun (SP)	-	2025	-	993
8-inch Howitzer	1135	0	819	1205
8-inch Gun	-	-	-	122
240mm Howitzer	-	-	247	403

Throughout the period, the outstanding events of the month, from a field artillery standpoint, were of course the swift change in direction of Third U.S. Army's attack and the series of successful attacks to the north that followed.

The enemy attack was launched against First U.S. Army on 16 December. Within forty-eight hours Third U.S. Army was on the move. The left flank corps of the Army became the right flank and the Army attack shifted a full ninety degrees from due east to due north. In all, two corps and eight divisions, together with fifty-three artillery battalions made the move from the SAAR RIVER to the ARDENNES, a move of eighty or more miles including the crossing of the MOSELLE RIVER over but three available bridges. Despite the magnitude of the movement, all artillery units succeeded in following closely behind the supported units and without exception fired in prompt and effective support.

By 20 December 4th Armored and 80th Infantry Divisions were advancing to the attack in combat formation, closely followed by eighteen battalions of field artillery. Additional divisions and additional field artillery battalions entered the ever-intensifying struggle immediately upon arrival in the area so that by 27 December, when the relief of BASTOGNE (P5668) had been firmly established, three divisions and no less than thirty-five field artillery battalions were engaged in the action. These battalions were firing in the neighborhood of 19,000 rounds of ammunition daily.

The BASTOGNE operation was but one facet of the Army's general offensive in the ARDENNES for both XII and VIII Corps were rapidly committed in the area, the former immediately as its troops arrived from the south, the latter as soon as its scattered troops had been assembled and re-fitted. XII Corps, employing three divisions and fifteen battalions of Corps artillery in support, attacked on 23 December and drove gradually but steadily forward through eastern LUXEMBOURG to clear the enemy south of the SAUER RIVER. III Corps attacked following the relief of BASTOGNE (P5658) to clear the strong enemy forces from the pocket south and east of BASTOGNE, employing three divisions with ten battalions of Corps artillery in support. VIII Corps, which had conducted the defense of the MEUSE coincident with its re-fitting, attacked west of BASTOGNE on 29 December with three divisions and ten battalions of Corps artillery to drive to the north and east. The period thus ended with heavy offensive fighting in progress along the entire ARDENNES front with heavy supporting fires from the artillery with the Army.

CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

1 January. Heavy fighting was in progress throughout the ARDENNES area. VIII Corps' left flank encountered a determined enemy, strongly supported by artillery, in the vicinity of ST HUBERT (P5161) and HATRIVAL (P6959). A strong enemy counterattack was directed against CHENOGNE (PL867). VIII Corps' right flank effort to maintain and extend the BASTOGNE (P5668) [illegible] heavily opposed and subjected to repeated enemy counterattacks preceded by intensive artillery preparations therefor. [illegible] from those in support of counterattacks, were [illegible] exceptionally strong enemy air at NEUFCHATEAU [illegible] bridges at FLORENVILLE (P6525) and LA CUISINE (P6520).

III Corps was heavily engaged in the [illegible] and obliterate the enemy pocket southeast of BASTOGNE (P5658). [illegible] Armored Division, with four battalions of III Corps artillery [illegible], was driving against the northwest shoulder of the pocket. 35th and 26th Infantry Divisions, each with one battalion of III Corps artillery attached, were driving against the pocket from the south and northeast respectively. Four battalions of III Corps artillery were in general support of the action.

Three strong counterattacks were launched against 26th Infantry Division but all were repulsed with strong artillery supporting fires. 35th Infantry Division Artillery, reinforced by the organic artillery of 4th and 6th Armored Divisions and five battalions of III Corps artillery, fired extensively upon the towns of LUTREBOIS (P5653), LUTREMANGE (P5850) and VILLERS-LA-BONNE (P5750). Two large concentrations of enemy tanks were also attacked and dispersed with at least two tanks known to have been destroyed. Enemy artillery in the III Corps area fired only moderately but Nebelwerfer fires were heavy, in one instance an estimated 240 rounds falling in HONVILLE (P5547) within a period of less [illegible]

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On the eastern flank of the ARDENNES area XII Corps continued its offensive to close upon the SAUER RIVER against strong resistance. The enemy strongly defended its bridgehead at HASSELBURG (L1124). Enemy artillery was especially active against 5th Infantry Division, including some counterbattery fires, but was relatively light throughout the balance of the Corps area. Artillery with XII Corps continued its accustomed program of long-range harassing and interdiction fires upon all towns in enemy territory and also fired extensive counterbattery fires.

The rough character of the ARDENNES terrain and the heavy snow unnecessarily canalized enemy movement to a very few primary highways replete with defiles, bridges and similar bottle necks. Extreme cold weather forced the enemy into towns making them most profitable targets. An extensive program of long-range harassing and interdiction fires was therefore instituted upon all towns, crossroads and highways in the enemy area. Artillery with III, VIII and XII Corps all participated in this program with particular emphasis being paid, pursuant to instructions from Twelfth U.S. Army Group, to the HOUFFALIZE (P6171) - BASTOGNE (P5656) road from HOVILLA (P5844) to the road junction at (P6187IC). In accordance therewith one 155mm Gun battalion was attached to the 101st Airborne Division and emplaced far forward in the BASTOGNE sailient to interdict this stretch of highway.

2 January. The enemy attitude in the VIII Corps area continued to be one of aggressive defense including several counterattacks which were repulsed with the assistance of heavy fires from our supporting artillery. Artillery with VIII Corps intensified its harassing and interdiction program, firing a total of 4,135 rounds upon two railroad stations, four towns, and sixty-seven road junctions in a program coordinated with that of XXX British Corps on its left. Enemy artillery activity was relatively light with the exception of 15cm, 17cm and 21cm weapons firing harassing missions into the BASTOGNE (P5658) salient from the west, north and east. Our forces in the BASTOGNE area were also subjected to heavy enemy air attack.

28th Infantry Division relieved 17th Airborne Division from its mission of protecting the approaches to the MEUSE RIVER and the latter moved forward to relieve 11th Armored Division and Combat Command A, 9th Armored Division which reverted to VIII Corps reserve.

In the III Corps area heavy counterattacks against 6th Armored Division in the vicinity of MICHAMPS (P6142) were smashed by the massed artillery fires of 6th Armored Division Artillery together with important support from artillery with VIII Corps, including that of 101st Airborne Division. A large tank and infantry concentration forming in the vicinity of HARDIN (P6056) was likewise dispersed by the artillery fire of these units.

Both 35th and 26th Infantry Divisions attacked following an extensive artillery preparation fired by the organic divisional artillery and supporting III Corps artillery. The Corps preparation fires were concentrated upon eighteen enemy artillery locations in consequence of which enemy artillery reaction to the attack was but moderate. The organic artillery of the 80th Infantry Division and one heavy artillery battalion, all attached to XII Corps, joined in the preparation fired for the 26th Infantry Division attack.

Enemy artillery fires in the XX Corps sector were desultory with the exception of moderate fire upon the extreme south flank of the Corps. 95th Infantry Division Artillery and one battalion of attached XX Corps artillery joined in the preparation fires for a limited attack on the north flank of XV Corps, attached to Seventh U.S. Army.

3 January. 17th Airborne Division relieved 11th Armored Division in the VIII Corps area, the organization of the artillery with VIII Corps remaining substantially unchanged. Heavy enemy counterattacks against the 87th Infantry and 11th Armored Divisions were repulsed with the assistance of the defensive fires of the organic divisional artillery.

There was a sharp increase in firing by the enemy artillery. An unsuccessful counterattack against LONGCHAMPS (P5363) was supported with the fires of 15cm weapons. Enemy harassing fires fell in the vicinity of BASTOGNE (P5658) and at RECHTVAL (PL558) and 101st Airborne Division received heavy Nebelwerfer fires.

A severe enemy counterattack, employing fifty tanks supported by a regiment of infantry, was launched against the BASTOGNE (P5658) salient in the vicinity of HONVILLE (P5464) and LONGCHAMPS (P5363). A one-hour preparation of extremely heavy artillery and mortar fires upon our forward elements preceded the enemy attack. All available artillery with both VIII and III Corps fired in support of the defense. The enemy nevertheless succeeded in a temporary penetration of both towns before being contained and driven back.

High winds, snow and fog adversely affected both observation and wire communications. Icy roads and snow seriously hampered initial laying, maintenance and recovery of wire. Many breaks in wire were caused by tracked vehicles and there was also considerable evidence of sabotage, one line being cut in no less than eleven places. Radio communications however were generally good despite the adverse weather conditions.

35th Infantry Division in III Corps area continued to press strongly against the south flank of the enemy pocket southeast of BASTOGNE (P5658), this offensive being supported by the organic artillery of 35th and 26th Infantry Divisions, 4th and 6th Armored Divisions and all III Corps artillery battalions. Artillery with III Corps fired an extensive program of harassing and interdiction fires. Enemy artillery activity consisted largely of harassing and interdiction fires on road junctions and towns in III Corps rear areas. Extremely heavy fire came from the enemy pocket southeast of BASTOGNE but consisted almost entirely of enemy self-propelled artillery and infantry cannon, the field artillery in the area apparently having displaced to the northeast.

4 January. 87th Infantry and 17th Airborne Divisions attacked on the left flank of VIII Corps in the wake of small-scale artillery preparations. Vigorous enemy opposition was encountered including both tank and infantry counterattacks, strongly supported by enemy artillery. These were repelled after minor penetrations with the assistance of sharp fires from the organic divisional artillery. In one instance an infantry officer adjusted the defensive fires of 87th Infantry Division Artillery entirely by sound to repel an enemy counterattack.

Large scale enemy counterattacks continued in the area of the BASTOGNE (P5658) salient and one was able to achieve a temporary penetration of CHAMPS (P5162) before being expelled by 101st Airborne Division with the assistance of the organic divisional and supporting VIII Corps artillery. Heavy concentrations of enemy troops in the vicinity of LONGCHAMPS, indicative of a second and coordinated counterattack, were heavily attacked by massed artillery fires which succeeded in keeping them off balance. No counterattack was launched in that area. 6th Armored Division, attached to III Corps, assisted the defensive fires of 101st Airborne Division.

The activity of enemy artillery opposed to III Corps increased, especially against the forward elements of 6th Armored Division, and included a twenty-minute preparation for a counterattack. The massed fires of seven artillery battalions were instrumental in repelling the counterattack. 26th Infantry Division also experienced a severe enemy counterattack but this too was repulsed with the assistance of the fires of the Division Artillery and four III Corps artillery battalions.

One 155mm Howitzer battalion, assigned to Third U.S. Army and newly arrived in the Army area, was attached to III Corps.

5 January. The tempo of enemy artillery fires in the VIII Corps area continued to increase, especially in the BASTOGNE (P5658) area, and consisted of harassing and interdiction missions as well as some massed fires against our forward elements.

Artillery with 87th Infantry Division fired heavily to repel an enemy tank counterattack and also attacked several enemy troop assemblages with time-on-target concentrations. A strong night counterattack against 17th Airborne Division at WILLERONT (P5659) achieved localized gains before being halted with heavy losses to our forces.

Artillery with 101st Airborne Division fired upon a large-scale counterattack while forming and so completely dispersed the enemy that the counterattack was not launched. All artillery with 6th Armored Division, attached to III Corps, shifted its direction of fire 3200 mils to support the defensive fires of 101st Airborne Division, attached to VIII Corps. 6th Armored Division Artillery and four battalions of III Corps artillery in support thereof also fired strongly to repel counterattacks against 6th Armored Division in the vicinity of HARDIN (P6056).

35th Infantry Division continued to attack from the south with heavy artillery support in the vicinity of MARLANGE (P6049), TAVERNY (P6051), VILLERS-LA-BONNE (P5750) and LUTREMANGE (P5950). Strong counter-mortar fires were also fired.

BERLE (P5652), a heavily fortified enemy strongpoint, blocked the advance of the 26th Infantry Division. Accordingly an 8-inch Howitzer battalion made a precision adjustment upon each of the town's twenty-four houses in turn. The town was demolished.

Artillery with III Corps was organized for combat as follows:

Attached to 6th Armored Division - one field artillery group consisting of two armored field artillery battalions and two medium battalions.
Attached to 35th Infantry Division - one medium artillery battalion.
Attached to 26th Infantry Division - one medium artillery battalion.
General support - one field artillery observation battalion and one field artillery group consisting of two medium and two heavy battalions.

Activity in the XII Corps zone consisted largely of vigorous patrol actions supported by increased enemy artillery and by heavy XII Corps artillery. An estimated seventeen battalions of enemy artillery were opposed to the Corps, emplaced well behind the enemy lines in defensive dispositions.

To assure the fullest and most effective support of our attack upon the enemy pocket southeast of BASTOGNE (P5658), orders were issued directing XII Corps Artillery to support III Corps by fires from positions within its zone, VIII Corps Artillery to support III Corps by counterbattery fire or known hostile artillery positions, necessary coordination to be accomplished by command liaison between the Corps Artillery Commanders concerned.

6 January. In the VIII Corps sector 87th Infantry Division attacked to secure TILLET (PL959). An extensive schedule of prearranged supporting fires was fired by the organic artillery of the 87th Infantry, 17th Airborne and 11th Armored Divisions and seven battalions of supporting VIII Corps artillery. The fires were placed upon the town and all roads leading thereto. Good observation prevailed and strong fire support continued upon both targets of opportunity and prearranged targets. The enemy conducted an aggressive defense heavily supported by light caliber self-propelled artillery fires upon our leading elements. The fighting was violent and the town changed hands repeatedly before it was finally secured on 10 January.

No less than four counterattacks were launched against 6th Armored Division in the III Corps area. The defensive fires of the organic and supporting artillery of 6th Armored and 101st Airborne Divisions, the latter attached to VIII Corps, played a large part in repelling these attacks.

80th Infantry Division launched a surprise pre-dawn attack without artillery preparation. Enemy artillery reaction to the attack was strong and prompt but a prearranged schedule of counterbattery fires fired by XII Corps artillery quickly achieved and maintained artillery superiority so that initial objectives were rapidly secured. The enemy counterattacked vigorously but was repelled by the organic division artillery firing its normal and two emergency barrages.

In pursuance of its program of long-range harassing and interdiction fires, XII Corps Artillery emplaced one 155mm Gun far forward for the purpose of harassing the towns of BITBURG (L1353) and TRIER (L2129).

7 January. VIII Corps' offensive on its left flank continued with the artillery firing several preparations for localized attacks as well as defensive fires to repel counterattacks. The long-range harassing and interdiction fires of artillery with VIII Corps were continued with increased emphasis upon the road net leading into HOUFFALIZE (P6171).

Artillery with III Corps participated extensively in the defensive fires of both VIII and XII Corps to repel sharp enemy counterattacks. The organic artillery of 6th Armored Division and four attached III Corps artillery battalions fired in support of 17th Airborne Division, attached to VIII Corps. Organic artillery of 26th Infantry Division and one attached III Corps artillery battalion fired in support of 80th Infantry Division, attached to XII Corps.

The enemy having been cleared south and west of the SAUER RIVER in the Corps zone, artillery with XII Corps was reorganized to support its defense and the planned attack to the north, as follows:

General support, reinforcing 80th Infantry Division with two light and one medium battalion - one field artillery group consisting of two light, one medium and one heavy battalion.
General support, reinforcing 5th Infantry Division with one light and two medium battalions - one field artillery group consisting of one light, two medium and one heavy battalion.
General support, reinforcing 2d Cavalry Group with one light battalion and 4th Infantry Division with two medium battalions - one field artillery group consisting of one light and two medium battalions.
Corps fire direction center in eastern part of Corps zone - Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, XII Corps Artillery with one heavy artillery battalion attached and one field artillery observation battalion in support.
Corps fire direction center in western part of Corps zone - one field artillery group with one heavy battalion attached and one field artillery observation battalion in support.

9Lth Infantry Division, newly assigned to Third U.S. Army and newly arrived in the Army area, was attached to XX Corps. 90th Infantry Division was detached from XX Corps and commenced to move north to the ARDENNES area. One light artillery battalion was detached from 90th Infantry Division and attached to 9Lth Infantry Division. Enemy artillery activity was negligible throughout the XX Corps area.

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Artillery ammunition expenditures for the seven-day period ending at 070600 January represented the most intensive firing in the operational history of Third U.S. Army to date, a total of 430,619 rounds being fired. The heavy volume i. attributable entirely to the fighting in the ARDENNES area. Fire in support of XX Corps' holding operation on the SAAR front being relatively light. Prisoner of War reports and inspection of the battlefield bore witness to the devastating effect of our artillery fire on German forces in the salient. Personnel and vehicle casualties were extremely high and there can be no doubt that the effectiveness of the artillery massed on the south of the ARDENNES salient contributed greatly to breaking the back of the German offensive. The figures are as follows:

	III Corps	VIII Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
75mm Howitzer	-	34073	-	-
105mm Howitzer, M2	120825	70176	58498	19915
105mm Howitzer, M3	-	4135	-	-
4.5-inch Gun	6460	4820	2821	729
155mm Howitzer	30209	14751	22195	6132
155mm Gun	8627	-	5911	984
155mm Gun (HP)	-	2829	-	642
8-inch Howitzer	2540	-	1967	517
8-inch Gun	-	-	-	0
240mm Howitzer	-	-	556	167

8 January. Although heavy fighting developed in the course of VIII Corps' offensive on its left flank, enemy artillery activity declined sharply. A limited objective night attack by 17th Airborne Division encountered no enemy artillery reaction and an enemy counterattack that succeeded in temporary occupation of BOIREHUE (P5859) was not supported by artillery. A strong enemy night counterattack employing eighteen tanks was launched in a southwesterly direction from FLAMIERGE (P4961). It was repelled by 17th Airborne Division with a total of nine tanks destroyed.

A heavy four-hour counterattack against III Corps east of HEFFLE (P5857) gained some ground initially. A vigorous artillery preparation was fired following which a dawn attack by 6th Armored Division succeeded in regaining and consolidating the original positions. Artillery with III Corps, including that of the 20th Infantry Division, also fired in support of XII Corps to repel an enemy counterattack in that area.

Enemy artillery was active against the forward elements of XII Corps on its north flank but the east flank along the SAURE RIVER remained quiet. XII Corps' program of harassing and interdiction fires, although substantially curtailed to conserve ammunition, nevertheless continued intensive.

Air OP Bulletin Number 5, Annex 15 copy attached, was published.

9 January. III Corps launched a coordinated attack to cut off and eliminate the enemy pocket southeast of BASTOGNE (P5658), employing 6th Armored, 35th Infantry and 26th Infantry Divisions. 90th Infantry Division, newly attached to III Corps, passed through and attacked on the right flank of the 26th Infantry Division. The attack was heavily supported by all artillery with III Corps firing both prearranged and on call missions against enemy infantry and artillery installations together with harassing and interdictory fires on the enemy's rear areas. Six battalions of XII Corps artillery also fired in support of III Corps' attack. Enemy artillery reaction to the attack was surprisingly light with indications that the bulk of the enemy artillery in the pocket south of a line running from HARDIN (P6056) to HOTEUX (P6752) had been withdrawn.

Coordinated with III Corps' attack was an attack on the right flank of VIII Corps by 101st Airborne Division and 4th Armored Division, preceded by a short but intensive artillery preparation upon enemy artillery locations. Artillery with VIII Corps also fired a brief preparation on enemy artillery installations in support of the III Corps attack.

Enemy artillery activity in the XX Corps area continued to be light, an average of approximately 100 rounds per day landing throughout the entire Corps area. Artillery with 95th Infantry Division joined in the artillery preparation for a local attack made by Seventh U.S. Army.

10 January. VIII Corps artillery attacked seventeen enemy antiaircraft artillery positions in support of an air attack upon HOUFFALIZE (P6171). An Air Force attack upon FLAMIERGE (P4761) flushed fourteen tanks and an estimated 500 infantry out of the town which were then attacked by both the Air Force and VIII Corps artillery.

87th Infantry Division succeeded in seizing and securing TILLET (P4259), advancing upon the town under cover of a smoke screen maintained by the organic division artillery and supporting VIII Corps artillery. 101st Airborne Division's attack west of HOVILLE (P5864) encountered strong opposition, including extremely heavy artillery and mortar fires. Improved weather conditions facilitated observation and resulted in intensive observed fires upon targets of opportunity in support of our attack.

III Corps' attack continued against increasing enemy artillery opposition chiefly from Nebelwerfers and high velocity light caliber self-propelled and field guns. The enemy's fire was concentrated upon the forward elements of our advancing troops, especially against those of the 90th Infantry Division in the vicinity of HELE (P6552).

11 January. Following the fall of TILLAY (P4259) the enemy withdrew rapidly on the left flank of VIII Corps so that the initial objective of ST HUBERT (P5161), together with BATHYAL (P4959) and the high ground in the vicinity thereof, was secured. The enemy continued to harass our forces in the BASTOGNE (P5658) salient with both medium and heavy caliber weapons but hostile artillery fires in the remainder of the VIII Corps area were light.

Enemy artillery reaction to III Corps' attack continued to increase, especially against the forward elements of 90th Infantry Division, with fires frequently reaching the intensity of battalion concentrations. Large-scale enemy withdrawals from the pocket commenced so that III Corps artillery placed heavy harassing and interdiction fires on all escape routes.

Enemy artillery fires were moderate to light in the XII Corps area, the bulk of them being directed against the 80th and 5th Infantry Divisions on the left flank of the Corps and extensive use being made of Nebelwerfers. 80th Infantry Division occupied BOCKHOLZ (P7548). Artillery with XII Corps sent fire to BOLLENDORF (L0140) and then attached the town with time-on-target time fire concentrations to inflict heavy casualties upon the fire fighters.

12 January. Despite enemy withdrawals on the left flank of VIII Corps, extremely heavy fighting continued on the right flank. The 101st Airborne Division took FLAMIERGE (P4961) but the enemy continued to hold FLAMIERGE (P4761). An enemy tank attack against 11th Armored Division was smashed by combined air and artillery support.

Artillery with VIII Corps was reorganized to press the pursuit of the withdrawing enemy, as follows:-

Attached to 87th Infantry Division - one light artillery battalion.
General support, reinforcing 87th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of two medium battalions.
Attached to 17th Airborne Division - one armored field artillery battalion.
Reinforcing 17th Airborne Division - organic artillery of 11th Armored Division.
General support, reinforcing 17th Airborne Division - one field artillery group consisting of two medium and one heavy battalion.
Attached to 101st Airborne Division - one armored field artillery battalion and two medium battalions.
General support - one field artillery group of two heavy artillery battalions.

III Corps' attack to close the pocket southeast of BASTOGNE (P5658) continued with the enemy artillery increasing the intensity of its fires on the leading elements but declining elsewhere. An estimated twenty-five battalions of enemy artillery were opposed to the Corps attack. Two battalions of light field artillery, one battery of medium artillery and one 4.2-inch chemical mortar platoon were coordinated to maintain a continuous smoke screen for one hour in the vicinity of HARDIN (P6056) while tanks of the 6th Armored Division moved to and occupied the high ground to the northwest. The successful completion of this maneuver resulted in quick capture of the town and the attack moved on to the vicinity of BRAS (P6255). The enemy pocket was substantially liquidated with heavy losses inflicted upon the enemy in both personnel and material.

Organic artillery of 26th Infantry Division attacked two batteries of enemy artillery with observed fires. All but one of the enemy guns were destroyed in their original positions. The one exception was able to withdraw from its position but was attacked and destroyed on the road. Heavy harassing and interdiction fire, particularly upon WILTZ (P7153) by III Corps artillery continued.

13 January. VIII Corps Artillery's harassing and interdiction fires against HOUFFALIZE and the HOUFFALIZE (P6171) - HOVILLE (P5864) road were intensified in view of the enemy withdrawal on the extreme left flank of the Corps.

The enemy attempted to bring twenty-five tanks south on the LONG-CHAMPS (P5365) - BASTOGNE (P5267) road to meet 11th Armored Division's advance north upon the axis of the road. The approaching enemy was engaged by a combination of air, artillery and tanks, six enemy tanks being destroyed and the remainder dispersed. In consequence, 11th Armored Division's attack advanced to the outskirts of BASTOGNE where house fighting developed.

Enemy artillery fires on the right flank of VIII Corps continued heavy despite displacement of the enemy's artillery to the rear by bounds. 101st Airborne Division was heavily shelled, particularly its infantry components, and the enemy also employed some counterbattery fire with occasional uses of time fire. The road leading northwest from BASTOGNE (P5658) was heavily attacked with observed enemy artillery fires that occasioned some damage. 101st Airborne Division Artillery and VIII Corps artillery in support thereof fired heavily in support of the Division which captured POIX (P5062) and stormed BOIS JACQUES (P5962) against heavy opposition.

A noteworthy example of effective air-ground coordination occurred in connection with an VIII Corps Artillery Arty/A mission. Upon completion of the mission the pilot was asked to verify a report of enemy armor moving south into HOUFFALIZE (P6171). The pilot located a mixed column of sixty vehicles, both armored and general purpose, moving into the town and adjusted on VIII Corps artillery battalion thereon. The adjustment was followed by a three-battalion time-on-target concentration upon the town. The pilot also vectored in a squadron of fighter bombers to bomb and strafe the enemy column. In the meantime he circled the area, locating two antiaircraft batteries that attacked our aircraft and adjusting two 155mm Gun battalions thereon. The destruction of the enemy column was virtually complete.

5th Infantry Division launched a limited objective attack in the vicinity of TETTINGEN (L0402) following an artillery preparation fired by the organic division artillery and two battalions of XX Corps artillery. Two XII Corps artillery battalions also participated in the preparation, firing for a ten-minute period upon the strongpoint towns of AIXE (L0504), HEMMG (L0403) and FREUDENLAND (L0906) and for twenty minutes upon enemy mortar locations. Artillery reaction to the 90th Division attack was light but there was some shelling of our artillery positions by enemy aircraft.

One 155mm Howitzer battalion was detached from VIII Corps and attached to XII Corps.

14 January. VIII Corps' direction of attack switched from the northeast to the east. Three enemy counterattacks were directed at FOY (P5702) with strong support from enemy self-propelled and direct-laying weapons. Artillery supporting 11th Armored Division fired heavily to assist in repelling these attacks and our position at FOY was successfully consolidated. Enemy harassing fires of the BASTOGNE (P5658) area continued and there was an increased volume of enemy shelling of our forward elements. 101st Airborne Division succeeded in taking HOVILLE (P5864) but a heavy enemy antitank reaction compelled a temporary withdrawal from the town despite the strong supporting fires of artillery with VIII Corps. 11th Armored Division successfully occupied BERTOGNE (P5267).

An VIII Corps 155mm Howitzer battalion attacked a concentration of eleven enemy tanks and effected the destruction of five thereof.

87th Infantry Division was detached from VIII Corps, attached to XII Corps and commenced its movement accordingly.

In the III Corps area, artillery with III Corps joined forces with the air support to attack heavily the enemy withdrawing from HAGARET (P4959) and the vicinity.

Artillery with XII Corps fired a small-scale coordinated program wherein the enemy was first attacked with artillery propaganda shells, then serenaded with a propaganda broadcast following which heavy artillery fires were placed in rear of the enemy forward elements to facilitate desertion.

5th Infantry Division's attack in the SAAR - MOSELLE triangle continued, again following a preparation fired by the Division Artillery and two battalions of XX Corps artillery with two battalions of XII Corps artillery also participating. The attack was successful in taking the towns of TETTINGEN (L0402) and BUTZDORF (L0405).

XX Corps Artillery employed roving guns extensively for long-range harassing and interdiction fires throughout the month. Positions close behind the forward elements, often with 300 yards thereof, were prepared surveyed in advance. Both 155mm Howitzers and 155mm Guns [illegible] occupying these positions briefly to fire upon towns [illegible]. The positions were then immediately [illegible] and were seldom used a [illegible] to attack all towns that could be [illegible].

Artillery ammunition expenditures [illegible] week ending at 140600 January declined from the preceding weeks totalling 249,284 rounds. The

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decline is to be attributed in part to the less intensive fighting that followed the capture of THIONVILLE (P4500) and ST MIHIEL (P3511) and the elimination of the enemy pocket southwest of METZ/DIEDENHOFEN (P5606). The decline however had set in even prior to these events due to the fact that the amount of ammunition available necessitated conservation and close supervision of expenditures. The figures follow:-

	III Corps	VIII Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
75mm Howitzer	-	25400	-	-
105mm Howitzer, M2	78663	54700	34980	12022
105mm Howitzer, M3	-	4736	-	-
4.5-inch Gun	1076	1677	1528	693
155mm Howitzer	20665	15393	13405	4504
155mm Gun	7675	5440	4459	1147
155mm Gun (SP)	-	1477	-	756
8-inch Howitzer	1904	88	1290	403
8-inch Gun	-	-	-	79
240mm Howitzer	-	-	558	237

15 January. Advances were general throughout the VIII Corps area as the enemy withdrew under cover of strong delaying forces. VIII Corps forward elements were approaching HOUFFALIZE (P6171) and occupied BOVIGNY (P6704) and CHAPLAIN (P7407). The enemy withdrawal was accompanied by a marked decline in its artillery fires.

Following a strong artillery preparation upon personnel, strongpoints, assembly areas, hostile artillery locations and the towns of OUBOURCY (P6111) and HOCHAMPS (P6106), 5th Armored Division attacked to secure BASTOGNE-CAMPS (P6557) and the high ground to the northeast. An air strike upon LOMBYVILLE (P6406) was followed by heavy harassing and interdiction fires by III Corps artillery throughout the night upon all routes leading into the town. 6th Armored Division attacked and secured the town the following morning.

Heavy and confused fighting prevailed in the southeast corner of the SAAR - MOSELLE triangle where 94th Infantry Division attacked following an artillery preparation to secure the towns of HERMIS (L0604), BORG (L0600) and WIES (L1005). Enemy counterattacks against TETTINGEN (L0403) and BUTZDORF (L0405) were repulsed with strong supporting artillery fires. Enemy artillery activity in this area showed a gradual steady increase.

16 January. VIII Corps advanced rapidly in pursuit of the withdrawing army on its left flank and established contact with VII Corps in the vicinity of HOUFFALIZE (P6171) though the town did not fall until the next day. All available artillery placed heavy harassing and interdiction fires on the few escape routes still available to the enemy leading east from HOUFFALIZE (P6171).

Determined enemy resistance was encountered on the right flank of VIII Corps in the vicinity of BOURCY (P6404), the enemy defense of the town being strongly supported with the fires of both field artillery and self-propelled weapons.

Sharp enemy counterattacks against the 90th Infantry Division were repelled and heavy casualties inflicted by the massed artillery fires of 90th and 94th Infantry Divisions. Thereafter 90th Infantry Division Artillery massed its fires in time-on-target concentrations on the town of NIEDERWAMPACH (P4406) following which the infantry took the town at a cost of two casualties as against 300 prisoners taken. Enemy artillery opposed to III Corps continued to decline sharply both in volume of fires received and in locations reported and there was every evidence that displacement of enemy artillery to the northeast was continuing.

One combat command of 10th Armored Division, including one organic artillery battalion, that had been operational under VIII Corps in the BASTOGNE (P5668) area was detached and moved to rejoin the Division in the vicinity of METZ (U85).

17 January. 101st Airborne Division on the right flank of VIII Corps attacked following a strong artillery preparation on enemy artillery locations, enemy strongpoints and the town of BOURCY (P6403). Enemy artillery reaction to the attack was severe but the town was seized and secured against relatively light ground resistance.

VIII Corps' objective having been taken, the Corps reorganized while defending upon a line HOUFFALIZE (P6171) - HARDIGNY (P6804) - BOURCY (P6404) with a plan of artillery defensive fires prepared accordingly. 17th Airborne Division relieved elements of the 11th Armored Division and the 101st Airborne Division in the line and the latter assembled in Corps reserve.

A heavy harassing and interdiction program was conducted on this date and subsequently upon all escape routes available to the enemy out of the ARDENNES area. This program was fired by all available artillery of VIII, III and XII Corps and in addition the artillery of First U.S. Army participated heavily within its zone. First U.S. Army was requested to place maximum harassing and interdiction fires within the Third U.S. Army area east of the 75-grid line and north of the 70-grid line, this area being beyond the maximum range of any weapons with Third U.S. Army. The lateral limit of this area was subsequently moved east as our advancing troops forced acceleration of the enemy withdrawal and enabled artillery with Third U.S. Army to displace forward.

A major counterattack developed against 90th Infantry Division with all available artillery with III Corps firing in defense. An estimated twelve tanks were destroyed and 500 enemy troops killed or wounded.

XII Corps attacked to the north at 0330 to clear the enemy west of the SIEGFRIED LINE within the Corps area, 4th, 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions being employed in the assault. To preserve the surprise element of the attack, no artillery preparation was fired. However all artillery with the Corps participated in an intensive four-hour schedule of preprranged fires commencing at H hour. In addition to all enemy artillery locations the schedule embraced fourteen command posts, two observation posts, six supply dumps, twenty-four defiles, twenty-one towns and nine heavy weapons locations. Artillery supporting 80th Infantry Division on the west flank of XII Corps participated heavily throughout the schedule of preprranged fires so as to screen the direction of the main effort. Initial enemy artillery reaction to the attack was light but intensified on the succeeding day, particularly against the bridgeheads of the 4th and 5th Infantry Divisions across the SAUER RIVER.

Artillery with XII Corps fired strongly in support of the attack, the missions consisting of both on call fire upon targets of opportunity and preprranged missions in the nature of localized preparation fires. The scale of the artillery support is best illustrated by the ammunition expenditures of the artillery with the Corps which totalled 5,835 rounds on the day preceding the attack, 13,716 rounds on the day of the attack and 22,041 rounds on the succeeding day.

18 January. 28th Infantry Division was relieved from VIII Corps and [illegible] Army. 10th Armored Division, re-fitting in the vicinity of METZ (U85), was relieved from XX Corps and Third U.S. Army.

One armored field artillery battalion, one 8-inch Howitzer battalion and one 4.5-inch Gun battalion all of which had suffered heavy losses during the enemy penetration and which had been re-fitting under the supervision of VIII Corps, were re-committed to the VIII Corps front. The 4.5-inch Gun battalion was temporarily equipped with 155mm Howitzers due to a current shortage of 4.5-inch Guns in the Theater.

35th Infantry Division, less certain elements, was detached from III Corps and attached to XX Corps, moving to METZ (U85) for rest and maintenance. One organic light artillery battalion of 35th Infantry Division was temporarily attached to and fired in support of 6th Armored Division.

Both 6th Armored and 90th Infantry Divisions launched local attacks following brief but intensive artillery preparations fired by the organic division artillery and III Corps artillery in support thereof. Artillery with III Corps fired heavily upon harassing and interdiction missions on all road junctions, bridges and other critical points on the enemy's escape routes and also conducted an intensive counterbattery program.

Heavy localized fighting persisted in the southwestern corner of the SAAR - MOSELLE triangle where 94th Infantry Division, on the left flank of XX Corps, and the enemy continued to contest the towns of TETTINGEN (L0404), BUTZDORF (L0405), HERMIS (L0604), BORG (L0600) and WIES (L1005). Artillery fires in support of 94th Infantry Division were strong, as is indicated by ammunition expenditures of artillery with XX Corps which totalled 12,470 rounds on 18 January as against only 2,966 rounds on the preceding day. The enemy artillery was also very active, firing an estimated 500 rounds in support of an enemy counterattack at TETTINGEN alone.

19 January. The attack in the XII Corps sector drove gradually forward with heavy artillery support. One 240mm Howitzer battalion fired no less than thirty-four missions in close support of 5th Infantry Division.

20 January. Enemy artillery fires were light throughout the ARDENNES area as the withdrawal continued in the face of VIII and III Corps' close pursuit and as XII Corps drove steadily forward.

101st Airborne Division was relieved from III Corps and Third U.S. Army.

After a full month of relative quiescence enemy artillery in the XX Corps area erupted with a violent schedule of early morning artillery fires into the SAARLAUTERN (G2879) bridgehead. These fires were in the nature of an artillery preparation and were accompanied by long-range heavy caliber fires in our rear areas notably at BOULONVILLE (Q1377) and RICHEMONT (Q1168). XX Corps artillery responded with an intensive schedule of twenty-three counterbattery missions, largely observed, following which the enemy artillery relapsed into its accustomed state of quiet. No enemy attack developed.

Long-range medium caliber enemy projectiles of a new type fell in and around the city of LUXEMBOURG (P81). This was the eighth time since 31 December that this area which included the Army Forward Command Post had been attacked with the harassing fires of this weapon, approximately 150 rounds being expended in all with relatively small material and personnel damage.

In retaliation for the shelling of LUXEMBOURG (P81), XII Corps artillery employed a 155mm Gun well forward in the Corps area to attack the city of TRIER (L2109). This gun delivered an estimated eight rounds upon TRIER for every round falling in and around the city of LUXEMBOURG.

21 January. Both VIII and III Corps were attacking, the former in its zone on the left flank of the Army and the latter with the objective of seizing the high ground southeast of ST VITH (P9588). Artillery with both Corps displaced frequently in the support of the pursuit.

Enemy artillery activity continued in the XX Corps area and strongly supported a night counterattack against the 94th Infantry Division in the vicinity of HERMIS (L0604) and TETTINGEN (L0404). The organic divisional artillery and two battalions of XX Corps artillery fired extensive defensive fires. 95th Infantry Division launched a limited objective attack in the XX Corps bridgehead area at SAARLAUTERN (G2827) supported by a preparation fired by XX Corps artillery upon enemy artillery locations. The objectives were quickly attained.

Artillery ammunition expenditures for the week ending 210600 January remained approximately the same level as the preceding week. The period was marked however by a striking increase of artillery fires in the XX Corps area in consequence of the heavy fighting in the SAAR-MOSELLE triangle and by somewhat of a decrease in the ARDENNES area in view of the enemy's withdrawal. The figures are as follows:-

	III Corps	VIII Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
75mm Howitzer	9043	-	-	-
105mm Howitzer, M2	16754	62218	53551	33249
105mm Howitzer, M3	870	-	-	-
4.5-inch Gun	1343	1527	2126	57
155mm Howitzer	5015	16062	25400	10579
155mm Gun	2098	5722	6485	1564
155mm Gun (SP)	1220	-	-	845
8-inch Howitzer	659	1321	2068	759
8-inch Gun	-	-	345	176
240mm Howitzer	-	-	989	160

22 January. The rapid pursuit of III and VIII Corps and the relentless pressure of XII Corps' attack intensified the pace of the enemy's withdrawal from the ARDENNES bulge to the point that it became a rout. Artillery Air OP pilots and Arty/R and Tac/R pilots all reported heavy enemy vehicular concentrations jammed up in the vicinity of the few available crossings of the OUR RIVER, notably at ESCHDORF (P8657) and DIEKIRCH (P8755). These concentrations of transport were immediately and persistently attacked throughout the day by all available aircraft of the XIX Tactical Air Command as well as by all available artillery with the Army. The carnage resulted in the estimated destruction of in excess of 1,800 enemy vehicles of all types.

XII Corps' attack continued with heavy artillery support. A 45-minute artillery preparation was fired by ten battalions of XII Corps artillery in addition to the organic artillery of the 4th, 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions.

Artillery with XII Corps was organized in support of the attack as follows:-

General support, reinforcing 80th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of two light, one medium and one heavy battalion.
General support, reinforcing 4th Infantry Division with one medium battalion and 5th Infantry Division with one light and two medium battalions - one field artillery group consisting of one light and three medium battalions.
Corps fire direction center in western portion of Corps zone - one field artillery group with two heavy artillery battalions attached and one field artillery observation battalion in support.
Corps fire direction center in eastern portion of Corps zone - Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, XII Corps Artillery with one heavy battalion and one 8-inch Gun battery attached and one field artillery observation battalion in support.

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Heavy fighting continued in the SAAR - MOSELLE triangle with 94th Infantry Division attacking in the vicinity of NEUNIG (L0624) with extensive support from its organic artillery and two battalions of XX Corps artillery. The latter fired 360 rounds into an enemy occupied antitank ditch which was thereafter overrun by our troops who found forty enemy dead and took six prisoners of war.

23 January. Enemy traffic at the various crossings of the OUR RIVER was again heavy, particularly at EISENBACH (P8657) and the attack thereof by both artillery and air was resumed with excellent results.

5th Infantry Division experienced several pre-dawn counterattacks in the vicinity of NACHTMANDERSCHEID (P9451) all of which were repulsed with the assistance of strong supporting fires from the organic artillery.

24 January. The withdrawing enemy made a temporary stand in the XII Corps area at WASSERBILLIG (L1124) so that heavy house-to-house fighting developed before 87th Infantry Division succeeded in taking the town. Enemy artillery activity in this area was generally light. Two heavy artillery battalions with XII Corps attacked a concentration of enemy tanks on the road and destroyed twelve.

An analysis of the enemy's employment of heavy caliber long-range guns against XX Corps revealed that two or three weapons of different calibers firing from different positions were habitually employed to attack the one target in an effort to confuse our counterbattery agencies. 240mm, 280mm and 380mm weapons had all been repeatedly employed against BOULONVILLE (Q1377). Eighty-two rounds, the equivalent of some fifty-two tons, had fallen in this area.

26 January. Pursuit of the fleeing enemy continued and his delaying forces having been driven in, patrols of both III and VIII Corps reached the OUR RIVER. The planned reorganization of the Army to continue the attack to the east was instituted forthwith. On this and immediately succeeding days 87th and 4th Infantry Divisions were detached from XII Corps and attached to VIII Corps, 76th Infantry Division detached from VIII Corps and attached to XII Corps, 95th Infantry Division detached from XX Corps and attached to VIII Corps, 17th Airborne Division detached from VIII Corps and attached to III Corps, 26th Infantry Division detached from III Corps and attached to XX Corps and 90th Infantry Division detached from III Corps and attached to VIII Corps. The net result of these changes was to weight VIII Corps on the left flank of the Army with five divisions, leaving XII Corps with four divisions and III and XX Corps with two divisions apiece. Artillery with the Army was reorganized in comparable fashion, one medium and one heavy artillery battalion being detached from III Corps and two medium and one heavy artillery battalion being detached from XII Corps, all being attached to VIII Corps. In consequence of the re-grouping, artillery with Third U.S. Army was now organized in the following proportions:-

Attached to VIII Corps - four artillery groups, three light artillery battalions, seven medium artillery battalions and six heavy artillery battalions.
Attached to III Corps - three field artillery groups, two light battalions, five medium battalions and two heavy battalions.
Attached to XII Corps - four field artillery groups, four light battalions, four medium battalions, three heavy battalions and one 8-inch Gun battery.
Attached to XX Corps - three field artillery groups, three light battalions, three medium battalions, four heavy battalions and one 8-inch Gun battalion less one battery.

An artillery observer detected a large enemy troop and vehicle concentration in the process of withdrawing from WEISWAMPACH (P8172). The town was immediately attacked with the massed fires of a six-battalion time-on-target concentration employing quick, delay and time fuzes in equal proportions. Elements of 6th Armored Division advanced to the perimeter of the artillery fire which was then lifted and the town taken against shattered opposition.

27 January. One headquarters and headquarters battery, field artillery group was detached from XX Corps and Third U.S. Army.

Only light resistance was encountered throughout the ARDENNES area and artillery opposition continued to decline. Artillery with VIII Corps participated in the preparation fires for an attack to the south by XVIII Airborne Corps, attached to First U.S. Army.

Air OP Bulletin Number 6, Annex 16, copy attached, was published.

28 January. The enemy had resisted most strongly upon the shoulders of the ARDENNES salient to cover his withdrawal in the center. Consequently, artillery ammunition expenditures for the week ending at 280600 reflect light firing in VIII Corps on the north flank of the Army that gradually intensified to heavy firing on the south flank of the ARDENNES area. The figures follow:-

	III Corps	VIII Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
75mm Howitzer	-	3004	-	-
105mm Howitzer, M2	32220	7982	66999	31125
4.5-inch Gun	2219	513	1687	-
155mm Howitzer	11407	4052	22102	10451
155mm Gun	4349	3453	5512	1148
155mm Gun (SP)	-	1746	-	3089
8-inch Howitzer	623	419	2407	841
8-inch Gun	-	-	295	309
240mm howitzer	-	-	71	26

29 January. There was an increase in enemy artillery activity in the VIII Corps area with some harassing fires being received in the vicinity of ST VITH (P9696) and strong artillery opposition to our crossings of the OUR RIVER at STURBACH (P8676) and WEISWEILERHAUSEN (P8674). Artillery with VIII Corps fired extensively both on harassing and interdiction and on counterbattery missions. Artillery activity, both friendly and enemy, throughout the remainder of Third U.S. Army area was light.

26th Infantry Division, which had been relieved from III Corps, was attached to XX Corps and went into position in the vicinity of the SAARLAUTERN (Q2879) bridgehead.

30 January. 17th Airborne Division Artillery displaced and occupied positions 3,500 yards east of the OUR RIVER.

A small scale enemy counterattack against the 90th Infantry Division was dispersed by the artillery fire of the organic division artillery before it could reach our forward positions. A battery of enemy artillery harassed bridging operations in the 90th Division area but it was silenced by a five-battalion time-on-target concentration fired by VIII Corps artillery.

Throughout the period. The first part of the month was marked by extremely heavy fighting throughout the western ARDENNES as VIII Corps drove back the point of the enemy penetration and III Corps smashed the desperately held enemy pocket southeast of BASTOGNE (P5656). In all, sixty-nine divisional and non-divisional artillery battalions, later increasing to seventy-seven, supported Third U.S. Army's offensives in the ARDENNES. The bulk of this artillery was capable of, and did in fact, fire strongly in support of the offensives in the vicinity of BASTOGNE. The volume of artillery support in this area was the highest in the operational history of the Army to date, particularly in the week ending at 070600 January when artillery with the Army fired 401,393 rounds in the ARDENNES. The volume of artillery support was less heavy in the following week, 249,284 rounds being expended in this area, due in part to the enforced deterioration of the enemy resistance in the western ARDENNES and in part to limited ammunition availability.

The latter part of the month was characterized by heavy fighting in the eastern ARDENNES as XII Corps gradually drove back a determined enemy fighting strongly to cover his withdrawal further to the north. Artillery support in this area was strong and constant. III Corps and VIII Corps were in rapid pursuit of the fleeing enemy with their artillery advancing by bounds in close support. Artillery fires here were largely harassing and interdictory on the enemy's escape routes with occasional periods of heavy firing in support of localized actions to drive in the enemy's delaying forces.

At the end of the period Third U.S. Army, and all artillery therewith, had completed re-grouping and was again approaching the main defenses of the SIEGFRIED LINE along its entire front. The smashing of the December counteroffensive had been completed.

CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

2 February. Enemy artillery was moderately active against VIII Corps, notably against 4th and 90th Infantry Divisions. Strong enemy resistance, employing coordinated small arms, mortar and artillery fires, was encountered by 4th Infantry Division on the high ground south of HADSCHEID (P9786) and west of BLEIALF (P9683). Following a sharp fire fight the enemy was driven back into BLEIALF and was there repeatedly attacked with massed time-on-target artillery concentration. VIII Corps Artillery also made extensive use of 155mm Guns and 240mm Howitzers for long-range harassing fire upon traffic bottle necks and enemy troop and supply installations in the vicinity of PRUM (L0679).

VIII Corps experienced only light enemy harassing fires upon its forward elements, these fires coming largely from 12cm mortars and from single guns emplaced in the high ground east of the OUR RIVER. Artillery with III Corps was organized for combat as follows:-

General support, reinforcing 6th Armored Division - one field artillery group consisting of two armored field artillery battalions and one 155mm Howitzer battalion.
General support, reinforcing 17th Airborne Division and 6th Cavalry Group - one field artillery group consisting of three 155mm Howitzer battalions.
General support - one field artillery group consisting of one 4.5-inch Gun battalion and two 155mm Gun battalions.

To enhance and assure the accuracy of massed artillery fires, XII Corps required that group and division artillery commanders utilize all periods of relative inactivity periodically to check for both timing and accuracy. Such check fires were to be directed against enemy-occupied towns, thereby tying into the Corps harassing and interdiction program. Full report of results to the Corps Artillery Commander was required. Comparable measures were adopted by the remaining corps with the Army.

Artillery with XX Corps attacked a concentration of twelve enemy tanks east of KREUZWEILER (L0306) with a seven-battalion time-on-target concentration, destroying three and dispersing the remainder. Both VIII and XX Corps employed 8-inch Howitzers extensively for the attack of pillboxes with excellent results, effective penetrations being obtained.

3 February. VIII Corps encountered moderate resistance on its north flank as it continued the process of clearing the SIEGFRIED LINE and took the towns of LOSCHEIN (L0396), KREMINKEL (L0493) and ROTH (L0491). 4th Infantry Division, supported with repeated time-on-target concentrations fired by the Division Artillery, cleared BLEIALF (P9683) and continued its advance against weakened opposition.

One field artillery group, one field artillery observation battery, two 155mm Howitzer battalions and one 155mm Gun battalion were detached from VIII Corps and from Third U.S. Army.

The enemy instituted a moderate to heavy harassing and interdiction program against III Corps with particular emphasis upon the main north - south highway on the high ground west of the OUR RIVER as well as towns and observation facilities in the vicinity of HOSINGEN (P8258).

III Corps artillery continued its accustomed program of strong scale harassing and interdiction fires placed upon all enemy-held towns and buildings within range of the artillery with the Corps. XX Corps artillery continued to utilize 155mm Howitzers as roving guns firing from positions far forward in order to harass and interdict the enemy's extreme rear areas.

4 February. 4th Infantry Division in the VIII Corps area breached the initial SIEGFRIED LINE defences on the southern end of the SCHNEE EIFEL ridge in the vicinity of BRANDSCHEID (P9881) following an early morning surprise attack without prior artillery preparation. The defending enemy infantry was largely supported by tanks and self-propelled guns but had little artillery support. VIII Corps artillery rendered close support for the attack with emphasis upon neutralization of enemy observation posts and harassing fires upon possible enemy reserves in draws and towns in the immediate vicinity.

XII Corps was engaged in planning for its offensive to secure crossings of the SAUER RIVER and attack to the north. Artillery with the Corps was organized for support of the attack as follows:-

General support, reinforcing 80th Infantry Division with two light battalions and one medium battalion - one field artillery group consisting of two light and two medium battalions.

General support, reinforcing 5th Infantry Division with two medium battalions - one field artillery group consisting of two medium battalions and one heavy battalion. (One light battalion of the 76th Infantry Division was also given a mission of reinforcing the 5th Infantry Division.)
General support, reinforcing 2d Cavalry Group with one light and one medium battalion - one field artillery group consisting of one light, one medium and one heavy battalion and one 8-inch Gun battery.

Ammunition expenditures for the week ending at 040600 February reflected the stern fighting as VIII Corps entered and commenced to clear the SIEGFRIED LINE defenses, the occasionally sharp but essentially localized fighting in the SAAR - MOSELLE triangle and the SAARLAUTERN (Q2879) bridgehead in the XX Corps zone, and the generally light fighting throughout the remainder of the Army area. The figures are as fol-

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	III Corps	VIII Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
75mm Howitzer	7093	-	-	-
105mm Howitzer, M2	3444	28013	14502	27299
4.5-inch Gun	1137	2344	1421	-
155mm Howitzer	6407	12177	3499	7880
155mm Gun	803	3188	1247	1075
155mm Gun (SP)	-	1426	-	1725
8-inch Howitzer	-	2865	474	800
8-inch Gun	-	-	222	223
240mm Howitzer	-	229	-	193

5 February. 95th Infantry Division and its organic artillery, in XIII Corps reserve, was relieved from VIII Corps and from Third U.S. Army.

VIII Corps, having accomplished its initial objective with the capture of BRANDSCHEID (P9981), reorganised for continuation of the attack to complete penetration of the SIEGFRIED LINE defenses and to secure PRUM (L0679) and PRUMFELD (L0074). Artillery with the Corps was organised to continue support as follows:-

Attached to 87th Infantry Division - one light battalion.
General support, reinforcing 87th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of two medium battalions.
Attached to 4th Infantry Division - one light battalion, one medium battalion and one battery, 155mm Gun (SP).
General support, reinforcing 4th Infantry Division with one medium battalion - one field artillery group consisting of two medium battalions and one heavy battalion.
Attached to 90th Infantry Division - one armored field artillery battalion, one medium battalion and one battery, 155mm Gun (SP).
General support, reinforcing 90th Infantry Division with one medium battalion - one field artillery group consisting of one medium battalion and two heavy battalions. (One 8-inch Howitzer battery to be available to 90th Infantry Division for direct support missions.)
General support - one field artillery group consisting of three heavy battalions. (One 8-inch Howitzer battery thereof to be available to 4th Infantry Division for direct support missions.)

Both enemy and friendly artillery fires were light in the III and XII Corps zones, due in part to the passive enemy and in part to rain and ground fog that restricted observation to 200 yards or less. Much of the artillery with XII Corps was displacing to new positions whence to support the forthcoming attack.

One 155mm Gun (SP) battery was detached from XX Corps and attached to XII Corps.

A forward observer in the XX Corps zone located enemy machine guns firing from positions within a house and made a precision adjustment thereon with 105mm Howitzers. The adjusted coordinates were then transmitted to an 8-inch Howitzer battalion whose first round obtained a direct hit and demolished the house. This technique was frequently utilised in an effort to conserve 8-inch Howitzer ammunition.

6 February. An estimated ten battalions of light artillery and four battalions of medium artillery were opposed to VIII Corps. Enemy fires were generally moderate with extremely heavy rocket fires late in the period in the vicinity of HELENENFELD (P9985) and BRANDSCHEID (P9981).

4th Infantry Division's attack to expand its hold on the SCHNEE EIFEL ridge continued. A sharp counterattack was repulsed with the heavy fires of supporting divisional and VIII Corps artillery and HASCHEID (P9577) was taken. Enemy artillery heavily shelled the town in prompt reaction to its capture.

90th Infantry Division attacked following a brief but intensive artillery preparation fired by three battalions of XX Corps artillery and by 90th Infantry Division Artillery. Enemy artillery reacted only lightly to the attack and the objective, the town of SIRK (L0504), was quickly taken.

7 February. XII Corps launched a coordinated attack to secure crossings of the SAUER RIVER. A heavy artillery preparation, involving an expenditure of approximately 29,000 rounds of ammunition, was fired from 0130 to 0600 by all Corps and division artillery battalions and in addition by three battalions of III Corps artillery. The preparation embraced 280 missions on enemy artillery locations, 137 on enemy command posts and 102 on enemy-occupied towns. Upon conclusion of the preparation fires the divisional artillery reverted to close support of the respective divisions and the Corps artillery fired a program of heavy harassing and interdiction fires on towns and enemy command posts until 1200 hours. Enemy artillery activity increased considerably in reaction to the attack with emphasis upon harassing and interdiction fires in the bridgehead areas, particularly against the 80th Infantry Division. XII Corps artillery fired a heavy program of counterbattery fires including a total of forty-eight Serenade missions throughout the period.

Three moderate-scale tank and infantry counterattacks were launched by the enemy in the late afternoon and night against the 5th Infantry Division in the area north and northeast of ECHTERNACH (L0535). All were broken up and repulsed with the assistance of the massed fires of the 5th Infantry Division Artillery.

Artillery forward observers located a large-scale enemy counterattack forming against VIII Corps in the vicinity of (L0518??). An eight-battalion time-on-target was placed upon and dispersed the enemy formation.

8 February. The enemy, resisting strongly against VIII Corps' penetration into the SIEGFRIED LINE, was compelled to yield gradually before the heavy and increasing pressure. The enemy defense was supported by moderate to heavy artillery fires, particularly emphasising direct fire upon our forward elements and including extensive harassing fires in the rear areas with heavy concentrations upon several towns. A strong counterattack of battalion strength that sought to retake HASCHEID (P957?) was repulsed after prolonged fighting in which artillery with VIII Corps participated heavily. The advance of the 4th Infantry Division continued with strong artillery support and developed into a serious threat to PRUM (L0679).

XII Corps' attack continued with strong local preparations being repeatedly fired in support of division attacks. Heavy machine gun and small arms fires were encountered at the river crossing sites with moderate enemy artillery support. The bulk of the enemy artillery apparently had displaced to alternate positions following the initial Corps artillery preparation. Location of the new positions was considerably hampered by adverse weather conditions resulting in poor visibility, lack of photo cover and difficulty in sound ranging. Silent periods to facilitate sound ranging were imposed upon our own artillery fires in consequence of which considerable success was achieved in locating the enemy artillery. Artillery liaison planes flew forty-one missions to supply 5th Infantry Division units temporarily isolated on the north bank of the SAUER RIVER.

9 February. Artillery with VIII Corps fired strongly in close support to assist in repelling repeated enemy counterattacks against the 4th Infantry Division, particularly in the vicinity of HINDENBURGLEN (L0480). Enemy artillery fires were generally light but the counterattacks were strongly supported by heavy mortars.

Both 6th Armored and 17th Airborne Divisions succeeded in establishing bridgeheads over the OUR RIVER in the III Corps zone. The 6th Armored Division crossing was facilitated by a one-hour artillery smoke screen covering the assault troops after they had been pinned down by heavy small arms and machine gun fire. III Corps Artillery initiated extensive harassing and interdiction fire upon all crossroads and avenues of approach east of the OUR RIVER.

Artillery with XII Corps continued to fire heavily in support of the Corps attack and repeatedly fired brief but intensive preparations in support of division attacks. Enemy artillery reaction to the attack continued to increase and included considerable heavy mortar and Nebelwerfer fires, notably against the bridge sites of the 80th Infantry Division in the vicinity of HORSDORF (P9643) and WALLENDORF (P9642). Artillery with XII Corps continued its program of extensive harassing and interdiction fires upon all enemy-held towns and buildings up to the extreme range of the artillery with the Corps.

Twenty-five British 25-pounder (3.45-inch) field gun-howitzers were issued on a loan basis to XII and XX Corps.

10 February. Two companies of enemy infantry, supported by an estimated fifteen tanks, were observed assembling west of PRUM (L0679) preparatory to a counterattack against the 4th Infantry Division. The concentration was attacked by a five-battalion time-on-target concentration following which fire was adjusted by observed methods and the area repeatedly swept with bracket fire methods. An estimated fifty per cent casualties were inflicted upon the enemy and eight tanks were destroyed.

155mm Guns (SP) were used extensively in close support of the infantry to reduce and destroy the many enemy pillboxes. In VIII Corps one battery each of these guns had for some time been attached to 4th and 90th Infantry Divisions respectively. XII Corps had attached one battery to the 90th Infantry Division and one platoon each to the 5th and 76th Infantry Divisions. The weapon proved eminently satisfactory for the purpose and one XII Corps battery effected the destruction of nine pillboxes on this date alone.

III Corps, together with Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, III Corps Artillery, and 17th Airborne Division and the organic artillery thereof were relieved from Third U.S. Army.

6th Armored Division and 6th Cavalry Group were detached from III Corps' 4th attached to VIII Corps as were one field artillery observation battalion, three field artillery groups, one light, five medium and two heavy artillery battalions.

Enemy fires were light throughout XII Corps zone except for extremely heavy fires upon the 5th Infantry Division bridge site. Four battalions of XII Corps artillery in addition to one battalion of the 5th Infantry Division fired a thirty-minute "on call" preparation embracing fifteen missions upon enemy-held towns and strongpoints and five missions upon enemy artillery locations.

11 February. Artillery with VIII Corps was reorganised for the support of the Corps as follows:-

General support - Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VIII Corps Artillery with two observation battalions attached and one field artillery group functioning as an auxiliary fire direction center.
General support, reinforcing 87th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light, one medium and two heavy battalions.
General support, reinforcing 4th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light, two medium and one heavy battalion.
General support, reinforcing 90th Infantry and 11th Armored Divisions with one medium battalion each - one field artillery group consisting of two medium and two heavy battalions.
General support, reinforcing 6th Armored Division with one medium battalion - one field artillery group consisting of two medium and two heavy battalions.
General support, reinforcing 6th Armored Division with one medium battalion and 6th Cavalry Group with one light and two medium battalions - one field artillery group consisting of one light and three medium battalions.

The enemy launched night counterattacks against 4th Infantry Division at KLEINLANGENFELD (L1086) and WILWERATH (L0984) in an attempt to reduce VIII Corps' bridgehead over the PRUM RIVER. Both counterattacks were repulsed with the assistance of the defensive fires of artillery supporting 4th Infantry Division and toward the close of the period the enemy had largely withdrawn from PRUM (L0679).

HEINSFELD (L0277) and HATZERATH (L0177) were both heavily attacked with the massed fires of artillery supporting 90th Infantry Division. Enemy activity in the towns ceased in consequence thereof and both were taken against demoralised opposition.

Fifteen rounds of 30cm shell fell in the VIII Corps area in the vicinity of (P9929&2) from a weapon believed to be firing from the general vicinity of JUNKERATH (L1894). This was the first instance of the enemy's use of a weapon heavier than 15cm in caliber since the cessation of the action at BASTOGNE (P5658).

Artillery ammunition expenditures for the seven-day period ending at 110600 February reflected the very heavy fighting that followed XII Corps' attack across the SAUER RIVER and the increasingly heavy fighting as VIII Corps penetrated ever more deeply into the SIEGFRIED LINE defenses. The expenditures are as follows:-

	III Corps	VIII Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
75mm Howitzer	9517	-	-	-
105mm Howitzer	8405	63480	86716	37434
4.5-inch Gun	760	2257	3557	-
155mm Howitzer	9559	17227	25069	11001
155mm Gun	1814	3484	7166	1568
155mm Gun (SP)	-	971	789	650
8-inch Howitzer	-	3325	3047	713
8-inch Gun	-	-	286	34
240mm Howitzer	-	193	-	72

12 February. VIII Corps occupied PRUM (L0679) with no resistance other than from small enemy pockets and snipers within the town. Heavy mortar and artillery fires were received within the town but enemy fires were light throughout the balance of the Corps zone.

Operations throughout the Army zone and particularly in the VIII Corps area were seriously hampered by the prolonged thaw and the resultant impassable conditions even on primary roads. One 4.5-inch Gun battalion was utilised to assist engineers of VIII Corps with road maintenance and repair.

13 February. A strong counterattack against 80th Infantry Division, attached to XII Corps, was repelled by the defensive fires of artillery supporting the Division assisted by the heavy fire of four

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VIII Corps artillery battalions upon the towns of HOMPERICH (P9448) and GRENDERICH (P9349).

Enemy artillery fires opposed to XII Corps continued to decrease. Favorable weather and good observation conditions enabled XII Corps artillery to fire extensively upon targets of opportunity. Artillery with the Corps fired a total of sixty-four counterbattery missions during the period of which thirty-eight were observed and the remaining twenty-six were fired during darkness and consequently were unobserved.

Enemy fires in the XX Corps zone were light and showed an unaccustomed tendency to concentrate almost entirely upon our ground observation posts. Large numbers of enemy troops were observed moving into DERLEN (Q5477), following which the town was heavily and repeatedly attacked by 26th Infantry Division Artillery and three battalions of supporting XX Corps artillery.

14 February. 10th Armored Division, in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force reserve in the vicinity of METZ (U85), was attached to Third U.S. Army and to XX Corps.

Activity throughout the XX Corps area to date had been generally static. Enemy artillery fires had been extremely light consisting for the most part of harassing fires upon our forward elements with occasional concentrations directed at our observation posts. XX Corps artillery had fired brief but intensive missions in support of occasional local objective attacks in the SAARLAUTERN (Q2879) bridgehead and in support of the 94th Infantry Division in the SAAR - MOSELLE triangle. An estimated twelve to fourteen battalions of enemy artillery were opposed to XX Corps spread more or less evenly over the entire Corps front.

The enemy's increasingly acute shortage of manpower was repeatedly manifested as enemy artillerymen fighting in an infantry role were captured in ever larger numbers.

15 February. VIII Corps experienced moderate enemy artillery fires, the strongest being in the zone of the 87th Infantry Division where both medium and heavy caliber fires were received. Artillery with VIII Corps fired a total of fifty-five counterbattery missions during the period. 6th Armored Division Artillery was employing eighteen 105mm assault guns and found them to be generally effective weapons against all types of artillery targets.

An estimated twelve battalions of enemy artillery were opposed to XII Corps, the fires of which were concentrated generally upon our forward elements and bridge sites with extremely little harassing of our rear areas. The bulk of the enemy's firing generally occurred at dusk when poor visibility tended to hamper retaliatory counterbattery fires.

94th Infantry Division Artillery and two battalions of XX Corps artillery fired a 5,000-round preparation for a limited objective attack in the SAAR - MOSELLE triangle. Enemy artillery reaction was modest.

16 February. VIII Corps resumed its attack to clear the enemy west of the PRUM RIVER and to effect a junction with XII Corps in the vicinity of HAUBL (U0464). Artillery organization in support of the attack remained substantially unchanged. The artillery fired strongly in close support of the attack as well as many missions of a counterbattery or harassing and interdiction nature.

An Arty/R pilot on a mission for VIII Corps Artillery located twelve enemy tanks in the vicinity of HOUSHEIDEL (P9259). A 155mm Gun battalion was adjusted and upon completion of the adjustment a 155mm Howitzer battalion and a second 155mm Gun battalion joined in the fire for effect, a total of eleven battalion volleys being fired. Excellent effect was reported by the pilot.

17 February. Interrogation of a Prisoner of War elicited advance information of a strong enemy counterattack directed at PRUM (U0679) to be preceded by a coordinated preparation of small arms, mortar and artillery fire commencing at 1000 hours. Artillery with VIII Corps accordingly fired a heavy harassing program upon all known enemy artillery locations commencing at 0955 and continuing to 1015. Heavy enemy small arms and mortar fires commenced promptly at 1000 hours but no enemy artillery fire was received and no enemy counterattack was forthcoming.

XII Corps modified its artillery organization so as to utilize one field artillery group as the Corps fire direction center in the western portion of the Corps zone while Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, XII Corps Artillery continued to operate in this capacity in the eastern portion of the Corps zone. Enemy artillery activity in the Corps area increased somewhat in reaction to the attacks of 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions and included strong interdiction fires on the main road leading into BONTHEIM (U0535). 80th Infantry Division's attack was preceded by a 45-minute artillery preparation upon enemy artillery and troop installations fired by the organic division artillery and [illegible] battalions of XII Corps artillery. The attacks of both divisions were strongly supported by close "on call" artillery fires.

18 February. VIII Corps' attack caught one enemy infantry division in the process of relieving another with the result that quick initial progress was made and the capture of GROSSKAMPENBERG (P9174) and KIRCHFELD (P9273) was accomplished against confused resistance. Enemy defense stiffened thereafter and the attack encountered moderate artillery opposition. 87th Infantry Division on the north flank of the Corps encountered moderate enemy harassing fire upon towns close behind our forward elements, notably KERSCHEIDT (L0393) and HERRENORM (L0967). Both 90th Infantry Division and 11th Armored Division received sharp enemy antitank and infantry gunnen fires as they approached KRINFELD (P9275) and LEIDENBORN (P9172) respectively.

9th and 80th Infantry Divisions attached to the north in the XII Corps sector following extensive preparation fires. Enemy artillery reacted sharply to the attack with fires largely from single pieces.

Several small-scale enemy counterattacks were launched against 26th Infantry Division in the SAARLAUTERN (Q2879) bridgehead, all of which were broken up by the defensive fires of the Division Artillery.

Artillery ammunition expenditures for the period ending at 180600 February were as follows:-

	VIII Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
British 25-pounder	-	404	1305
105mm Howitzer	39732	76207	22611
155mm Howitzer	927	1202	-
155mm Gun	12710	16783	9047
155mm Gun (SP)	2242	4780	1119
8-inch Howitzer	504	559	304
8-inch Gun	1278	1643	-
240mm Howitzer	6	-	88

One 8-inch Howitzer battalion was relieved from XII Corps and attached to XX Corps.

19 February. 94th Infantry Division attacked at 0400 to clear the SAAR - MOSELLE triangle supported by a strong program of scheduled fires fired by the Division Artillery and five XII Corps artillery battalions. The first fifteen minutes of scheduled fires were directed exclusively upon enemy command post and communications installations. Thereafter all known enemy artillery locations were heavily attacked and neutralized and a twelve-hour harassing and interdiction program was fired on roads and approaches to the battlefields. Subsequent Prisoner of War interrogation brought out the fact that these fires effectively and completely disrupted the enemy's fire communications network and contributed materially to the rapidity of the advance.

10th Armored Division commenced to move from METZ (U85) to attack in the SAAR - MOSELLE triangle on the north flank of 94th Infantry Division. One 155mm Howitzer battalion which had been detached from VIII Corps and attached to XX Corps and one 155mm Gun (SP) battalion were both attached to 10th Armored Division.

20 February. All VIII Corps divisions attacked following an intensive counterbattery program upon twenty-five hostile artillery locations. Artillery with the Corps also fired a very heavy harassing program upon the bridges over the PRUM RIVER and the road net leading thereto.

XII Corps artillery fired an intensive prolonged counterbattery preparation in support of 26 Cavalry Group's attack across the MOSELLE RIVER. Strong and increasing resistance encountered at WINCHERINGEN (L0313) was attacked heavily by the supporting artillery and collapsed, following which the town was taken with little difficulty. 5th Infantry Division continued its advance toward the PRUM RIVER with the assistance of strong artillery support fires.

One 155mm Gun (SP) battery was detached from XII Corps and rejoined its parent battalion in XX Corps. One 8-inch Howitzer battalion was assigned to Third U.S. Army and attached to XII Corps.

21 February. All VIII Corps divisions continued their attack against varying degrees of resistance. 90th Infantry Division encountered high velocity direct fires in the vicinity of LICHTENBORN (P9666). 4th Infantry Division received heavy fires after nightfall from self-propelled guns and rockets emplaced on the high ground east of the PRUM RIVER. 11th Armored Division captured BOSCHEID (P9563) against light enemy artillery fires whereas the forward elements of 9th Armored Division encountered heavy artillery fires in their [illegible] (P9562) and DAHNEN (P9665). An extremely heavy night counterattack was launched against 6th Armored Division in this area but was repulsed with the assistance of heavy defensive fires from the divisional artillery and four battalions of VIII Corps artillery.

Artillery with VIII Corps fired a total of thirty-two counterbattery missions and utilized the smallest observation conditions to fire extremely heavily in close support of the advances. In addition, an extensive harassing and interdiction program was fired against towns, supply points, and road nets in the enemy's rear areas, with particular emphasis upon the crossings of the PRUM RIVER.

Enemy artillery activity in the XII Corps zone continued to be light. 9th Infantry Division Artillery and four battalions of XII Corps artillery fired a preparation for a renewal of the Division attack and subsequently fired several time-on-target concentrations upon enemy troop concentrations in addition to extensive fires upon enemy artillery locations and enemy-occupied towns. 80th Infantry Division likewise was accorded heavy artillery support included in which were sixteen smoke missions and sixteen time-on-target concentrations.

Enemy artillery activity in opposition to the XX Corps advance in the SAAR - MOSELLE triangle was generally light. Artillery with the Corps was organized in support of the attack as follows:-

Attached to 10th Armored Division - one 155mm Howitzer battalion and one 155mm Gun (SP) battalion.
General support, reinforcing 94th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of two light and one medium battalion and one 155mm Gun battery.
General support in the zones of 10th Armored and 94th Infantry Divisions - one field artillery group consisting of three heavy battalions.
General support, reinforcing 26th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light, two medium and one heavy battalion.

22 February. The fires of enemy artillery activity opposed to VIII Corps declined substantially as the enemy displaced its artillery to positions echeloned in depth between the PRUM and the KYLL RIVERS. Following its accustomed practice, the enemy emplaced light and medium weapons far back in the rear areas so as to fire upon our forward elements at extreme ranges while minimizing the probability of retaliatory counterbattery fires. VIII Corps artillery continued to fire strongly in support of the advances, utilizing observed fire methods to attack enemy armor, strongpoints and infantry and also firing defensively against small and medium scale counterattacks. No less than forty-seven targets of opportunity were attacked in support of 90th Infantry Division alone and the consequences thereof were seven enemy tanks destroyed, four tanks damaged and fifteen vehicles destroyed in addition to severe personnel casualties.

Artillery opposed to XII Corps continued to consist of approximately twelve battalions. This artillery was employed most actively against forward elements of the 5th Infantry Division but was tending to taper off both here and throughout the Corps zone.

23 February. 94th Infantry Division succeeded in establishing two bridgeheads over the SAAR RIVER. The Division was accorded heavy artillery support upon targets of opportunity including an instance when a 105mm Howitzer battalion was adjusted upon a concentration of some 200 enemy infantry forty of whom were killed. Enemy artillery reaction to the attack was prompt, relatively heavy fires being received at the crossing sites although enemy fires were generally light throughout the remainder of the XX Corps zone. Several severe counterattacks were launched against the bridgehead forces but all were successfully repelled with the assistance of heavy supporting fires, both observed and unobserved, from the divisional artillery and three battalions of XX Corps artillery. An extensive harassing program in support of the bridgehead forces was instituted upon all enemy routes of approach thereto.

24 February. One 4.5-inch Gun battalion and one field artillery observation battery were attached to XX Corps and one 155mm Howitzer battalion was attached to XII Corps, all having been detached from VIII Corps. One 8-inch Gun battery was detached from XII Corps and rejoined its parent battalion in XX Corps. 33d Field Artillery Brigade was detached from Sixth Army Group and attached to XII Corps.

Artillery with XII Corps was organized to support the Corps attack across the PRUM RIVER as follows:-

General support, reinforcing 4th Armored Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light and two medium battalions. (80th Infantry Division was to follow 4th Armored Division and the artillery thereof was to respond to the latter's calls for fire.)
General support, reinforcing 9th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light, one medium and one heavy battalion and

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one battery, 155mm Gun (SP).

General support, reinforcing 76th Infantry Division - one field artillery brigade consisting of one medium and two heavy battalions.

Corps fire direction center in zones of 4th armored and 90th and 5th Infantry Divisions - one field artillery group with one heavy field artillery battalion attached.

Corps fire direction center in zones of 76th Infantry Division and 26 Cavalry Group - Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, III Corps Artillery with one light and one medium battalion attached.

Both 76th and 5th Infantry Divisions attacked and secured crossings of the PRUM RIVER following sharp artillery preparations fired by the supporting divisional and Corps artillery. Enemy artillery reaction was generally light with fire increasing in the 76th Infantry Division zone but declining elsewhere throughout the XII Corps area. The attacks were accorded strong artillery support with heavy time-on-target concentrations on Nebelwerfers, infantry, strongpoints, mortars, vehicles and machine guns.

XII Corps' attack encountered relatively light artillery fires, the bulk of which were harassing fires on the forward elements of 10th Armored Division in ZEMMER (L1206) and ATH (L1415), and upon 94th Infantry Division's bridge site at TABEM (L1706).

Artillery liaison-type aircraft proved essential in supplying the isolated 4th Ranger Battalion, attached to 94th Infantry Division. Fifty-six sorties were flown in the face of heavy enemy machine gun fire to drop ammunition, rations, medical supplies and blankets to the troops isolated at SINNIG (L1709).

90mm tank destroyers and 105mm Howitzers were frequently employed in coordination to attack and reduce pillboxes. The artillery was first adjusted upon the pillbox, following which the tank destroyer attacked the pillbox with direct fire methods to effect penetrations and force the personnel into the open, whereupon the artillery immediately fired for effect against personnel.

25 February. One field artillery group was attached to XX Corps and one 8-inch Howitzer battalion was attached to XII Corps, both being relieved from VIII Corps.

4th Armored Division attacked in the XII Corps area. To maintain surprise, no artillery preparation was fired but time-on-target concentrations were placed in turn upon all towns and strongpoints immediately prior to the assault thereof. At least twenty such concentrations were fired during the period with the divisional artillery and four supporting Corps battalions joining in. With the assistance of this support, the Division advanced to and captured KITTLINGEN (L1156). 5th Infantry Division kept pace on the south flank of 4th Armored Division and was likewise accorded strong artillery supporting fires.

Enemy artillery fire in the XX Corps area decreased sharply, the fire being lifted from the bridgehead areas and approaches thereto and being placed instead upon the forward elements of 10th Armored and 94th Infantry Divisions. Exceptionally strong enemy counterattacks were launched against 94th Infantry Division in the vicinity of (L1711) and (L1811). Both were repulsed after sharp fighting strongly supported by 94th Infantry Division Artillery and three battalions of supporting Corps artillery.

Artillery ammunition expenditures for the period ending at 250600 February were as follows:-

	VIII Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
British 25-pounder	-	685	2777
105mm Howitzer	52961	102219	48166
4.5-inch Gun	843	1450	242
155mm Howitzer	17027	26799	16590
155mm Gun	4831	6587	3452
155mm Gun (SP)	785	447	1123
8-inch Howitzer	4066	3989	2681
8-inch Gun	-	-	384
240mm Howitzer	44	-	815

26 February. 90th Infantry Division was relieved from VIII Corps and placed in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force reserve. One armored field artillery battalion was detached from VIII Corps and attached to XII Corps.

The enemy having generally been cleared from the Corps zone west of the PRUM RIVER, VIII Corps resumed its attack to the east to seize HALLSCHLAG (L0997), ORMONT (L0997) and the high ground southeast of KRONEBERG (L1096). Artillery with the Corps was organized in support as follows:-

General support, reinforcing 87th Infantry Division and 4th Infantry Division with one 155mm howitzer battalion each - one field artillery group consisting of one light battalion, two medium battalions, one 155mm Gun (SP) battery and one 240mm Howitzer battery.

General support, reinforcing 4th Armored Division and 4th Cavalry Group with one 155mm Howitzer battalion each - one field artillery group consisting of two armored field artillery battalions, two medium battalions and one 155mm Gun (SP) battalion (less one firing battery).

General support - one field artillery group consisting of one armored field artillery battalion, one medium battalion and one heavy battalion.

Corps Artillery fire direction center - Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, VIII Corps Artillery with two field artillery observation battalions (less one letter battery) in support and one field artillery group attached consisting of one 4.5-inch Gun battalion, two 155mm Gun battalions and one 240mm Howitzer battalion (less one firing battery). One field artillery group was employed as an auxiliary Corps fire direction center.

VIII Corps' rapid advance toward the KYLL RIVER continued against light artillery opposition with strong fires from our supporting artillery. 4th Armored Division Artillery and Corps artillery in support thereof fired extensively upon many targets of opportunity, including tanks, self-propelled and antitank guns and personnel. Time-on-target concentrations were fired upon four towns in the division zone of advance and harassing and interdiction fires were placed on eighteen towns. Organic and Corps artillery supporting 5th Infantry Division continued to fire strongly upon enemy artillery locations, infantry dispositions and Nebelwerfers.

The enemy launched extremely heavy counterattacks against the 5th Ranger Battalion, attached to 94th Infantry Division. Defensive artillery fires were powerful, a single XX Corps artillery battalion firing no less than twenty-six missions in support of the 4th Ranger Battalion's successful defense. Three additional XX Corps battalions and the organic artillery of 94th Infantry Division also participated heavily in these defensive fires.

27 February. 6th Armored Division established a bridgehead over the [illegible] in the VIII Corps zone against moderate resistance. Enemy artillery reaction to the attack was prompt and considerable harassing fires were received in the bridge sites at LUXBACH (L2072) and HELMSHAUSEN (L2069).

Artillery of VIII and XII Corps combined to conduct a coordinated anti-flak program of continued neutralizing fires upon four heavy antiaircraft batteries on the route of approach of 1,200 heavy bombers belonging to the eighth U.S. Air Force. The fires were conducted for approximately ninety minutes as the bombers flew into Germany and were repeated on the return flight.

Strong "on call" preparation fires were continued on towns and strongpoints in the XII Corps zone as 4th Armored Division continued its advance and turned to the north. FLIESSEM (L1459), MATTENHEIM (L1258) and MATZEN (L1457) were attacked with massed time-on-target fires of six battalions immediately prior to the armor's assault thereof.

Two 155mm Howitzer battalions and headquarters and headquarters battery, one field artillery observation battalion were detached from VIII Corps and attached to XII Corps.

28 February. VIII Corps launched a coordinated attack to take the high ground west of the KYLL RIVER in the Corps zone and to effect a junction with XII Corps in the vicinity of OBERSKEN (L1070). Enemy artillery reaction to the attack was moderate to heavy and included considerable mortar and rocket fires. The bulk of the enemy fire was directed against our river crossings and leading elements. Heavy prolonged fighting occurred along the entire Corps front, particularly in the vicinity of ORMONT (L0997), KLEINLAMSCHEID (L1196) and SACKSCHEID (L1369).

4th Armored Division encountered heavy opposition in the woods south of SCHWARZLICH (L1363) which were strongly defended with infantry reinforced by antitank guns, machine guns and mines. Eleven time-on-target concentrations in which six artillery battalions participated were fired in support of the armor's attack upon the woods.

10th Armored Division swung north in the XX Corps zone in the direction of TRIER (L2129). Enemy artillery fires in opposition to the attack were generally light, consisting almost entirely of observed fires against the leading elements of 10th Armored Division and upon the towns of MALBERGERF (L2212) and BRUNIG (L1512).

Analysis of Arty/L missions for the month disclosed that of a total of eighty missions requested, forty-two could not be flown because of unfavorable weather conditions and thirty-eight were flown of which twenty-seven were successful. Eleven missions were unsuccessful, seven because of weather, one because of communications failure and three for other reasons. The twenty-seven successful missions attacked a total of forty-two targets.

Throughout the period. The month of February saw Third U.S. Army steadily and relentlessly drive its way through the vaunted defenses of the SIEGFRIED LINE against an enemy who extracted the maximum advantage from the heavy defensive terrain and many river lines that had to be crossed.

Artillery with the Army proved a useful and versatile aid in the reduction of the thousands of pillboxes encountered. 90mm tank destroyer guns and 105mm Howitzers were employed as teams, the former by direct fire to blast a penetration, the latter by indirect fire to destroy the fleeing personnel. 155mm Guns (SP) were employed in a direct fire role with outstanding success. The 8-inch Howitzer against demonstrated its high worth as a powerful precision weapon.

The river lines of the OUR, the SAUER, the PRUM and the SAAR, all ably and aggressively defended, added to the difficulties of the assaulting forces. A coordinated attack was necessary to effect the reduction of each. These attacks were uniformly accorded the heaviest kind of artillery support consonant with the availability of ammunition. In some cases a very heavy artillery preparation was fired, in others the preparation was omitted to preserve the surprise element of a night assault. In all cases the jump-off of the attack was the signal that touched off an extremely heavy program of coordinated scheduled fires as well as close support fires on call.

Throughout the month the artillery continued its program of relentless harassing of all enemy dispositions that could be brought within range. No movement could be made with impunity, no troop assembly or supply dump was safe, nowhere could the constantly harassed enemy find surcease.

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CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

1 March. 10th Armored Division completed the capture of TRIER (L2090) which thus became the first large German city to fall to Third U.S. Army. 76th Infantry Division driving south effected a junction with the armor north of the city thereby encircling and assuring the destruction of the enemy forces still manning the SIEGFRIED LINE positions west of TRIER. Enemy artillery fires throughout the XX Corps zone were light with the bulk of them being directed against our forward elements in the vicinity of ZEMM (L2411).

Heavy fighting was in progress on the extreme north flank of the Army, notably in the vicinity of ORMONT (L0997), where 87th and 4th Infantry Divisions continued to drive their way through the highly organized defenses of the SIEGFRIED LINE. Enemy artillery activity in this area ranged from moderate to heavy with particularly extensive use of rockets upon both our leading elements and upon our supply routes and installations. Artillery with VIII Corps fired heavily in close support of the attacking forces as favorable observation conditions enabled the extensive use of observed fires upon targets of opportunity.

Ten battalions of artillery with XII Corps fired a ten-minute preparation on SEFFERWEICH (L1363) and the wooded area to the north, following which a 4th Armored Division tank battalion assaulted and seized the town, taking some 200 prisoners and suffering no casualties. Artillery with XII Corps fired numerous time-on-target concentrations upon targets of opportunity in support of the advances of the 4th Armored Division. Enemy artillery fires in the Corps zone ranged from light to moderate and tended to decrease in inverse proportion to the progress of our attack.

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3 March. Heavy fighting continued in the VIII Corps zone as the 87th Infantry Division pushed forward from CREUTZ (L0093) against determined resistance and cleared sixty-two pillboxes. The enemy continued to utilize rockets on a large scale and divisional and supporting VIII Corps artillery continued to support the attack with massed observed fires upon targets of opportunity.

Enemy artillery activity increased sharply in the XX Corps zone and included 170mm guns firing into IRSCH (L2525) and KIRF (L2411). XX Corps Artillery instituted an extensive counterbattery program embracing twenty-two enemy artillery locations following which the severity of the enemy fires declined.

3 March. 87th Infantry Division continued its slow but inexorable progress through the SIEGFRIED LINE in the VIII Corps zone reducing an additional twenty-eight pillboxes. Both 6th and 11th Armored Divisions effected substantial advances against extremely light enemy artillery opposition, the former crossing the KIMS RIVER and capturing HETTELDORF (L0973) and the latter seizing FLAMISCHEN (L1179) and the high ground to the east.

76th Infantry Division Artillery together with three battalions of supporting XII Corps artillery fired a two-hour artillery preparation in support of the Division attack to secure bridgeheads over the KYLL RIVER in the vicinity of PHILST (L2046) and OBERHOFEN (L2245). Moderate enemy resistance coupled with a sharp increase in enemy artillery fires was encountered but the bridgehead was firmly established with the assistance of strong observed and harassing fires from supporting artillery. A severe counterattack against 4th Armored Division's bridgehead east of the KYLL RIVER was repelled with the assistance of strong artillery defensive fires.

Artillery with XII Corps was organized to support the crossings of the KYLL RIVER and the continuing offensive to the east as follows:-

General support, reinforcing 76th Infantry Division with one light and two medium battalions - 334 Field Artillery Brigade consisting of one light, two medium and one heavy battalion.
General support, reinforcing 4th Armored Division with one light and two medium battalions - one field artillery group consisting of one light, two medium and one heavy battalion.
General support, reinforcing 5th Infantry Division with one light and two medium battalions - one field artillery group consisting of one light, two medium and one heavy battalion.
Corps fire direction center in zones of 4th Armored and 5th Infantry Divisions - one field artillery group consisting of one field artillery observation headquarters battery and one field artillery observation letter battery with one heavy artillery battalion attached.

Corps fire direction center in zone of the 76th Infantry Division - Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, XII Corps Artillery with one field artillery observation battalion (less one letter battery) attached.

4 March. Artillery with VIII Corps fired extensive harassing and interdiction missions upon all bridges over the KYLL RIVER in support of 11th Armored Division's attack and upon all road junctions and critical traffic points in the vicinity of BUDESHEIM (L1461) and WALLERSHEIM (L1379).

XII Corps encountered generally light enemy artillery opposition with the exception of moderate mortar and artillery concentrations against 76th Infantry Division's forward elements in the bridgehead area. Two small-scale counterattacks against the bridgehead were readily repelled with the assistance of the Division Artillery.

Air CP Bulletin Number 7, copy attached, Annex 17, was published.

Artillery ammunition expenditures for the seven-day period ending 060600 March reflect generally heavy fighting throughout the Army front as VIII Corps and XX Corps continued to push through the SIEGFRIED LINE and XII Corps crossed the KYLL RIVER. Expenditures were as follows:-

	VIII Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
British 25-pounder	-	132	1990
105mm Howitzer	46855	49190	43877
4.5-inch Gun	561	3928	4858
155mm Howitzer	13861	20094	12975
155mm Gun	4179	2964	1489
155mm Gun (SP)	1476	-	374
8-inch Howitzer	2261	4160	2337
8-inch Gun	-	-	202
240mm Howitzer	83	-	368

5 March. 90th Infantry Division attained the VIII Corps objective with its capture of DREHBORN (L1970) and continued on to clear HOMMERICHEN (L2075) and MORLESBACH (L1872). Enemy reaction to the fall of these towns included severe artillery, rocket and mortar fires, mostly from positions northeast of the KYLL RIVER. VIII Corps Artillery initiated an extensive counterbattery program following which LINSCHEID (L2180) was taken without opposition.

6th Armored Division was detached from VIII Corps and assembled in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force reserve. Artillery with the Corps was thereupon organized to support the continuing Corps attack as follows:-

Attached to 4th Infantry Division - one medium battalion.
General support, reinforcing 87th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light, two medium and one heavy battalion.
General support, reinforcing 90th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light and two medium battalions.
General support, reinforcing 11th Armored Division and to be attached thereto upon call - one field artillery group consisting of one armored field artillery battalion, one medium battalion and one 155mm Gun (SP) battalion.
General support - one field artillery observation battalion with one field artillery observation letter battery attached and two field artillery groups consisting of four heavy battalions.

In a desperate attempt to restore the unhinged defenses of the SIEGFRIED LINE, the enemy launched the first in a series of heavy counterattacks that persisted until 10 March against 10th Armored and 94th Infantry Divisions in XX Corps' northern bridgeheads over the SAAR RIVER. The enemy employed extensive artillery fires in support of the counterattacks and occasionally preceded them with severe artillery preparations. These fires were directed largely against our forward elements with a secondary emphasis upon the river crossings in the vicinity of SAARBURG (L1413) and TABEN (L1706). XX Corps Artillery fired extensive counterbattery programs throughout the period and both Corps and divisional artillery rendered material aid with intensive planned and observed defensive fires. In one instance seven artillery battalions attacked a large group of enemy infantry assembling in the vicinity of (L2803) to counterattack, dispersing it with heavy casualties.

6 March. Five battalions of artillery with VIII Corps fired a 500-round, ten-minute artillery preparation upon enemy mortar positions and observation posts east of the KYLL RIVER following which 90th Infantry Division executed a successful crossing. The Corps artillery continued to support the attack with extensive harassing and interdiction fires upon the crossings of the KYLL RIVER and upon supply routes and installations east of the river. The bridgehead was firmly established despite intensive enemy direct fire of high velocity weapons against the crossing sites.

4th Armored Division captured a bridge intact at OBERSTADTFELD (L3175) and immediately fanned out to press the attack to the east. 11th Armored Division in the VIII Corps sector effected a comparable breakthrough on the succeeding day. Both divisions advanced rapidly, for the most part running rough-shod over small isolated pockets and occasionally encountering sizeable determined enemy groups whereupon brief but sharp fire fights ensued. One such instance occurred at MULHEIM (L2709) where 4th Armored Division encountered strong enemy anti-tank fires that were attacked and neutralized by the accompanying artillery. Similarly supporting artillery was of material assistance in overcoming entrenched infantry and tanks that sought to hold 11th Armored Division near KEIPENAG (L4297).

Enemy artillery opposition to the advances was virtually non-existent, the great mass of the enemy artillery having been overrun by the speed and power of the armored spearheads. Divisional and Corps artillery displaced rapidly to follow closely behind the leading tanks and armored infantry and in the few heavy localized engagements, rendered extremely effective fires in close support upon targets of opportunity. The armored advances swept on. 4th Armored Division reached the RHINE RIVER on 8 March with 11th Armored Division establishing a junction with First U. S. Army and clearing AMDERHACH (F7604) on 9 March.

7 March. 99th Infantry Division and one 8-inch Howitzer battalion, both newly arrived and assigned Third U.S. Army, were attached to XII Corps and VIII Corps respectively.

8 March. One 8-inch Howitzer battalion, newly arrived and assigned Third U.S. Army, was attached to XX Corps.

XII Corps continued to encounter only light harassing enemy artillery fires. The Corps was opposed by an estimated six battalions of enemy artillery of considerably diminished effectiveness because of destroyed and overrun but unreplaced materiel. There was evidence that most enemy artillery of foreign manufacture, including Russian and Italian weapons, had been withdrawn to collecting points east of the RHINE RIVER due to the exhaustion of available ammunition.

9 March. One field artillery group headquarters, newly arrived and assigned Third U.S. Army, was attached to XX Corps. One 155mm Gun battalion, its basic weapons having arrived, was relieved from duty with the Provost Marshal, Third U.S. Army and attached to XII Corps.

The tactical situation in the VIII Corps zone continued fluid with no evidence of organized resistance east of the RHINE RIVER. Opposition west of the river consisted entirely of wandering bands of isolated enemy troops and occasional snipers. The rapidity of the advance and the lack of organized resistance offered few targets for the accompanying artillery and supporting fires were consequently light. The bulk of VIII Corps artillery was assembled in rendezvous area to inaugurate a brief program of maintenance in preparation for rapid movement to the east.

Third U.S. Army artillery attacked enemy shipping on the RHINE RIVER for the first time, one XII Corps artillery battalion sinking one tugboat and two barges. Stern enemy resistance at GROSSLITTGEN (L3358) and MUSCHEILER (L3356) was smashed with the assistance of heavy fires from the accompanying artillery. Enemy artillery fires were generally light throughout the XII Corps zone with the exception of moderate to heavy direct fire from the vicinity of NEUERKIRCH (F8002).

10 March. XII Corps' advance along the north bank of the MOSELLE RIVER continued unchecked with great quantities of enemy materiel and supplies being overrun, a single task battalion capturing seventy-one enemy artillery, antitank and antiaircraft weapons. Enemy artillery fires opposing our advances were light, the heaviest concentrations being light caliber fires at NEHLINGEN (L4354) and NONNGUSEN (L4355). Artillery with XII Corps displaced frequently in close support of the leading elements and also fired a large-scale program of harassing and interdiction missions upon enemy escape routes to the east and southeast and upon all enemy-occupied towns that could be brought within range.

11 March. VIII Corps artillery did no firing during the period as all Corps artillery moved eastward to take up positions along the west bank of the RHINE RIVER. Only light enemy artillery fires were encountered from positions on the east bank of the river, the heaviest concentration consisting of mixed light caliber artillery and mortar fires in the vicinity of URMITZ (F8402).

Motorized infantry having followed closely behind the leading armor and having turned south after the RHINE was reached, XII Corps had now cleared the north bank of the MOSELLE RIVER from KOBLENZ (L8095) to CARDEM (L6775). The infantry fighting had been almost entirely a matter of scraping up isolated pockets by-passed by the advancing armor and involved heavy fighting only in isolated instances. Organic and corps artillery had moved in close support of the motorized infantry and rendered heavy and effectual assistance in the dissolution of the few pockets of resistance.

The city of LUXEMBOURG (P81) again was shelled by a 280mm railroad gun, one round of which landed in immediate proximity to Third U.S. Army's Command Post. Damage generally was slight despite two military and an estimated ten civilian deaths. XX Corps Artillery obtained several sound locations and fired heavy long-range counterbattery missions to silence the enemy weapon.

Artillery ammunition expenditures for the week ending 110600 March reflected the continuation of stern fighting in the southern portion of the Army zone as XX Corps repulsed numerous counterattacks. In the remainder of the Army area artillery ammunition expenditures declined fifty per cent from the level of the preceding week as a result of the sweeping advances and highly fluid tactical situation. The figures are as follows:-

	VIII Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
British 25-pounder	-	184	1038
105mm Howitzer	22691	18817	50528
4.5-inch Gun	510	3203	2690
155mm Howitzer	5752	897	12283
155mm Gun	2377	2615	1239
155mm Gun (SP)	277	-	816
8-inch Howitzer	379	2381	2444
8-inch Gun	-	-	158
240mm Howitzer	32	-	461

12 March. 4th Infantry Division, 6th Armored Division, two 155mm Howitzer battalions and one 155mm Gun battalion were detached from VIII Corps and relieved from assignment to Third U.S. Army. One field artillery group headquarters, two 4.5-inch Gun battalions and one 155mm Gun battalion were detached from VIII Corps and attached to XII Corps.

General regrouping and mopping up of isolated enemy remnants was in progress throughout the VIII and XII Corps zones. XII Corps Artillery

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attacked the railroad yards at KOBLENZ (L9095) for the first time and these fires were thereafter continued on a heavy scale.

90th Infantry Division was relieved from XII Corps and attached to XX Corps and the artillery thereof displaced to forward positions so as to support the impending attack of the Division.

13 March. 90th Infantry Division was detached from VIII Corps and attached to XII Corps.

XX Corps attacked in force out of its northern bridgeheads over the SAAR RIVER. Artillery with the Corps was organized in support of the attack as follows:-

General support, reinforcing 26th and 80th Infantry Divisions - one field artillery group consisting of one light, one medium and one heavy battalion.
General support, reinforcing 80th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light and one medium battalion.
General support, reinforcing 26th Infantry Division initially and 10th Armored Division when committed - one field artillery group consisting of one light and two medium battalions.
General support, reinforcing 14 Cavalry Group - one field artillery group consisting of one light battalion and one 155mm Gun (SP) battalion.
Attached to 65th Infantry Division - one medium battalion, one 8-inch Howitzer battalion and one 8-inch Gun battery.
General support - one field artillery group consisting of two heavy and one 8-inch Gun battalion (less one battery).

A two hour artillery preparation preceded the attack in the zone of the 26th Infantry Division with extensive preparations also being fired in support of the 80th and 90th Infantry Divisions. A large-scale demonstration including heavy artillery fires was staged by the 65th Infantry Division at SAARLAUTERN (Q2877) to simulate an attack in strength in that area and so divert attention from the main attack. Numerous small-scale counterattacks were encountered but the attack progressed favorably with the assistance of strong close-in fires from the supporting artillery. A notably heavy concentration was that placed upon the town of WADERNATH (Q2377) by 26th Infantry Division Artillery and three battalions of XX Corps artillery. The large scale of artillery support of the attack was reflected by the expenditure of 27,716 rounds of ammunition by artillery with XX Corps on this date.

14 March. Battery A, 298th Field Artillery Observation Battalion was detached from VIII Corps and attached to XII Corps where it rejoined its parent organization.

VIII Corps received extremely light enemy artillery fires consisting of small-scale shellings in the vicinity of BUBENHEIM (L8697) and in the outskirts of ANDERNACH (F7404).

XII Corps attacked south to secure crossings of the MOSELLE RIVER southwest of KOBLENZ (L9095). The attack was preceded by a one-hour artillery preparation concentrated almost entirely on towns to the immediate front of the assault waves of the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions. Rapid initial progress was made to the vicinity of ALKEN (L7982) and BURGEN (L7778) before stiffening resistance was encountered. Artillery with the Corps fired extensive harassing and interdiction missions in continuing support of the attack as well as many missions for destruction or neutralization of targets of opportunity. All enemy escape routes were also heavily attacked by our artillery fires.

89th Infantry Division effected an additional crossing of the MOSELLE RIVER in the XII Corps zone on 14 March in the wake of a 50-minute, five-battalion artillery preparation. The attack encountered only light initial resistance and advances were rapid.

4th and 11th Armored Divisions passed through the infantry bridgeheads and fanned out to the south to resume the swift pursuit and envelopment of the disorganized and utterly confused enemy forces. The pattern of armor closely accompanied by supporting corps artillery and followed by motorized infantry, also closely accompanied by supporting artillery, was resumed and large advances were swiftly made. An especially sharp fight was encountered by the armor in the vicinity of BAD KREUZNACH (M0919) where the enemy made a determined stand in an effort to hold the north flank of his escape routes to the east across the RHINE RIVER. The accompanying artillery rendered strong assistance with heavy supporting fires and after heavy fighting the backbone of the enemy stand was broken and the advance was resumed.

15 March. One field artillery group headquarters, newly arrived and assigned Third U.S. Army, was attached to VIII Corps.

Artillery with VIII Corps generally displaced to new positions from which to support the impending attack across the MOSELLE RIVER against KOBLENZ (L9095) and the enemy forces defending on the west bank of the RHINE RIVER. 11th Armored Division Artillery (less one battalion) was placed in support of the 4th Cavalry Group screening the left flank of the Corps generally along the RHINE RIVER. Enemy artillery fires in the Corps zone were light and scattered, increasing slightly during the hours of darkness. Heavy caliber artillery fell at RUDESHACH (L8476).

XII Corps' advance continued rapidly against disorganized resistance. The enemy attempted large-scale withdrawals of his forces to the south and east that heavily taxed the available road net and resulted in extreme traffic congestion. The traffic jams were heavily attacked by all available artillery with XII Corps with numerous time-on-target concentrations and extremely heavy casualties were inflicted.

Artillery with XX Corps continued to fire heavily in close support of the Corps attack and excellent progress was made along the entire front. Supporting artillery fires inflicted heavy casualties upon the enemy. Enemy artillery reaction to the attack became increasingly light with indications that the bulk of the enemy artillery had been either overrun and destroyed or forced to withdraw.

16 March. VIII Corps employed the 97th Infantry Division to effect crossings of the MOSELLE RIVER immediately southwest of KOBLENZ (L9095). Enemy artillery fires in reaction to the crossings were initially light and were concentrated for the most part upon the crossing sites. The attack was supported by the close-in fires of the supporting artillery upon targets of opportunity, coupled with a counterbattery program upon enemy artillery locations in the triangle formed by the RHINE and MOSELLE RIVERS south of KOBLENZ. The Corps Artillery also instituted a program of long-range harassing and interdiction fires upon the autobahn on the east bank of the RHINE leading northwest toward First U.S. Army's bridgehead in the vicinity of REMAGEN (F4629). Isolated instances of heavy street fighting occurred in KOBLENZ and a determined stand was made by a small group of enemy in the ancient fortress of FORT CONSTANTIN. Artillery forward observers moved with the leading infantry elements to adjust heavy observed fires upon close-in enemy strongpoints. KOBLENZ was cleared and all resistance overpowered on 18 March.

The XII Corps front continued highly fluid as the attack progressed rapidly to the south and southeast. A combination of air and XII Corps Artillery attacked enemy at empts to evacuate his forces by ferrying across the RHINE RIVER at BOPPARD (L8981), sinking eight barges and four steamboats, all heavily loaded.

The attack in the northern portion of the XX Corps zone continued with all divisions making rapid progress especially in the area east of BERNCASTEL (Q2994). All divisions were strongly supported with close-in artillery fires as well as preparation fires in support of localized assaults. 65th Infantry Division attacked in the SAARLAUTERN (Q2870) area with heavy artillery support and effected an expansion of the bridgehead. Enemy fires throughout the Corps zone were light and, as was customary, were directed largely upon road nets and probable observation posts and included some harassing of the towns of GREIMERATH (L2307) and KELL (L2315).

17 March. 89th Infantry Division was attached to Third U.S. Army and VIII Corps.

90th Infantry Division advanced rapidly south along the east bank of the RHINE RIVER in the XII Corps zone and cleared BOPPARD (L8981). Artillery with the Division fired numerous observed missions upon river shipping used to ferry personnel and equipment and destroyed five barges.

Organized resistance in front of XX Corps finally collapsed in the face of the relentless and ever-increasing pressure of our heavily attacking infantry. 10th Armored Division passed through the infantry and went on to BIRKENFELD (L5917) as this portion of the Army front also became highly fluid. One fleeing enemy vehicular column four kilometers long in the vicinity of OBERSTEIN (L5907) was attacked by combined air and long-range artillery with XX Corps and utterly destroyed.

18 March. 11th Armored Division continued its rapid advance in the XII Corps zone against sporadic opposition with 80th Infantry Division following in trace behind the armor to clear by-passed enemy pockets. Enemy artillery reaction as the attack progressed was light to negligible throughout the Corps zone. A platoon-scale armored counterattack against 4th Armored Division was detected by an air OP while in the process of forming. Observed fires of three XII Corps artillery battalions were adjusted upon and dispersed the enemy concentration, destroying or immobilizing sixteen tanks and additional vehicles of other types.

XX Corps generally was reorganizing in preparation for continuation of the Corps attack to the east and southeast. Most artillery with the Corps displaced to new positions whence to support the impending attack. 10th Armored Division engaged in heavy fighting northwest of ST WENDEL (Q5977) with heavy supporting fires from the accompanying artillery. Enemy artillery fires increased considerably in the 65th Infantry Division zone as it continued to press forward out of the SAARLAUTERN (Q2877) bridgehead and cleared BILLINGEN (Q2964).

12th Armored Division was attached to Third U.S. Army and to XX Corps. Artillery with the Corps was thereupon organized for support of the continuing attack as follows:-

General support, reinforcing 26th and 80th Infantry Divisions - one field artillery group consisting of one light, one medium and one heavy battalion.
General support, reinforcing 10th Armored Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light and two medium battalions.
General support, reinforcing 12th Armored Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light and two medium battalions.
General support, reinforcing 65th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one medium and one heavy battalion.
General support - one field artillery group consisting of three heavy battalions.

Artillery ammunition expenditures for the week ending at 180600 were extremely heavy as XX Corps launched its powerful attack to break out of the defenses of the SIEGFRIED LINE, moderately heavy as XII Corps effected its crossings of the MOSELLE and advanced to the south, and generally light as VIII Corps held the left flank of the Army along the RHINE RIVER and cleared KOBLENZ (L9095). The expenditures were as follows:-

	VIII Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	10091	53657	90342
105mm Howitzer, M3	-	-	1362
4.5-inch Gun	280	2211	2525
155mm Howitzer	3857	15527	29035
155mm Gun	745	5898	3459
155mm Gun (SP)	471	-	2074
8-inch Howitzer	585	2114	4804
8-inch Gun	-	-	461
240mm Howitzer	76	-	744

19 March. Enemy artillery fires in the VIII Corps area increased as the enemy occupied positions on the far bank of the RHINE RIVER east and northeast of KOBLENZ (L9095). Artillery with VIII Corps fired extensive counterbattery missions following which the enemy fires declined considerably. The Corps artillery also continued its heavy harassing of the enemy's attempted water-borne passages of the RHINE RIVER.

11th Armored Division encountered determined resistance as the enemy fought a strong delaying action in an effort to hold his flanks while seeking to extricate the forces rapidly being enveloped by our armored spearheads. Extensive road blocks, destroyed bridges and anti-tank fire were encountered, particularly at WOLFSHEIM (M2211) and POLEKHEIM (M1417). Both self-propelled and antiaircraft guns were used to supplement the defenses of the road blocks and 11th Armored Division Artillery and three battalions of supporting XII Corps artillery fired in strong support of the Division's advance. Enemy resistance throughout the remainder of the XII Corps zone was disorganized and sporadic and was devoid of enemy artillery support.

Resistance in the XX Corps zone disintegrated rapidly as swift advances were registered in the northern portion of the Corps zone. These advances completely outflanked the SIEGFRIED LINE and enabled 65th Infantry Division to press forward out of the SAARLAUTERN (Q2877) bridgehead, thereby culminating a determined enemy stand of four months' duration. Enemy artillery fires were negligible throughout the XX Corps zone and our artillery, displacing frequently to accompany the rapidly advancing armor and infantry, received but few calls for supporting fires.

20 - 22 March. This period was marked by swift armored advances by-passing great enemy cities which were then assaulted and seized, occasionally after severe fighting, by motorized infantry following the armor. WORMS (M4417) and KAISERSLAUTERN (M0394) fell on 20 March, LUDWIGSHAFEN (M5198) on 21 March and MAINZ (M1854) on 22 March. Moderate resistance was encountered both at KAISERSLAUTERN and LUDWIGSHAFEN and particularly heavy opposition necessitating the repeated employment of localized artillery preparation fires was encountered before MAINZ was taken by assault.

20 March. Artillery with VIII Corps fired extensive missions of all types, including counterbattery fires upon fifty-seven enemy artillery locations, harassing and interdiction fires and numerous observed fires upon targets of opportunity including personnel, vehicles, rail-

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road trains and enemy observation posts. Enemy artillery opposition to XII Corps' advance continued negligible with a few isolated rounds of light caliber fire falling in the vicinity of the bridge sits at (M2342). There was however a very considerable enemy air reaction against the leading elements of 4th Armored and 90th Infantry Divisions.

21 March. One 8-inch Howitzer battalion, newly arrived and assigned to Third U.S. Army, was attached to XX Corps.

Enemy artillery opposition to VIII Corps continued extremely light along the entire Corps front but for moderate employment in a ground role of antiaircraft guns firing from positions east of KNELLMÜNSTER (L8195). Excellent observation facilitated VIII Corps' extensive artillery fires upon the enemy's frantic searches for escape routes and heavy casualties were inflicted.

22 March. Third U.S. Army crossed the RHINE RIVER. The initial crossing was effected by 5th Infantry Division on the night of 22 - 23 March using surprise tactics under cover of darkness with no artillery preparation fires. The bridgehead was rapidly and successfully consolidated and expanded to a depth of approximately five miles with the assistance of extremely heavy supporting artillery fires on targets of opportunity. 5th Infantry Division Artillery and supporting XII Corps artillery also fired a large-scale program of harassing and interdiction fires on all enemy routes of approach to the bridgehead. The rapidity of our advance to the river and the prompt crossing had denied the enemy opportunity to coordinate his defenses with the result that initial enemy artillery reaction to the crossing was but light to moderate and came largely from light caliber self-propelled weapons. There was however a strong enemy air reaction with repeated bombing and strafing of the bridgehead areas.

28th Infantry Division was relieved from attachment to VIII Corps and Third U.S. Army. 76th Infantry Division was relieved from assignment to XII Corps and was assigned to VIII Corps.

Enemy artillery fires in the VIII Corps zone were light except for moderate concentrations upon the 87th Infantry Division from 88mm gun positions on the east bank of the RHINE RIVER. Artillery with VIII Corps fired extensive counterbattery fires upon enemy artillery and antiaircraft locations in the vicinity of BECHELN (L9988) and KAISERBACH (L9998) and also harassed enemy troop concentrations, command posts and supply routes on the east bank of the river including a Gestapo Headquarters in HERXHEIM (M8002).

Opposition stiffened considerably on the southeast flank of XX Corps with 10th Armored Division encountering particularly heavy resistance in the vicinity of NEUSTADT (M2984) as the enemy sought to hold open his last escape route over the RHINE RIVER at SPEYER (M5079). The remainder of XX Corps continued its swift pursuit of the fleeing and disorganized enemy so that divisional and reinforcing Corps artillery with 12th Armored and 26th, 69th and 80th Infantry Divisions fired not a single mission during the period. One Corps artillery battalion in support of these units displaced no less than four times during the period as the bulk of the Corps closed upon the west bank of the RHINE RIVER. All enemy artillery in the Corps zone west of the river was considered completely eliminated with at most a negligible amount having escaped to the east bank.

A letter was published to all subordinate field artillery and tank destroyer units embracing the observations and recommendations of a civilian technical observer who served on temporary duty with the Artillery Section, Third U.S. Army. This observer had spent long periods of time with the using units in accordance with a schedule coordinated by Third U.S Army Headquarters. He conducted unit schools for enlisted technicians in the alignment and operation of field artillery radios and also sought out the problems of the using units with the equipment in the field and analyzed the various field expedients that had been adopted, including the suggestion of many of his own.

Planning for XII Corps' attack across the RHINE RIVER had included contemplated use of artillery liaison airplanes to transport assault infantry. A full-scale test was conducted during which one infantry company, complete with all organic weapons and basic ammunition loads, had been transported over a comparable distance in a period of approximately ninety minutes employing twelve aircraft. It was planned to transport three rifle companies and one heavy weapons company, all fully equipped, in an estimated period of not more than three hours employing ninety field artillery aircraft. All necessary pilots and aircraft were assembled and the operation was cancelled only because of the extremely rapid advance made by the initial water-borne troops in consequence of which the air-borne operation became unnecessary.

23 March. A sharp increase occurred in enemy artillery fires in the XII Corps zone the bulk of which was directed against 5th Infantry Division's bridgeheads across the RHINE RIVER. The enemy fires emanated almost entirely from antiaircraft guns employed in a ground role as a substitute for the decimated enemy artillery. 5th Infantry Division Artillery reinforced by three battalions of XII Corps artillery fired a large-scale preparation early in the period and thereafter there were intensive fires upon close support missions. A strong counterattack at TREBUR (M4847) was repulsed with the assistance of heavy defensive artillery fires and an enemy OCS battalion forming to counterattack at (M5049) was smashed by the combination of heavy artillery fires followed by strong air bombing and strafing. Throughout the period no less than thirty-three time-on-target concentrations were placed on enemy artillery locations, infantry entrenched and enemy assembly areas. The bridgehead was expanded despite increasingly stern opposition to a depth of three to eight miles over a twelve mile front and 4th Armored Division commenced to pass through the infantry to fan out to the east.

24 March. General regrouping and movement were in progress to conform to changes in Third U.S. Army's boundaries and consequent changes in the various corps boundaries. 10th and 12th Armored Divisions were detached from XX Corps and from Third U.S. Army. 6th Armored Division was assigned to Third U.S. Army and attached to XII Corps. 11th Armored Division was detached from XII Corps and assigned to XX Corps. 89th Infantry Division was detached from VIII Corps and assigned to XII Corps. One light, one medium and one heavy artillery battalion were attached to VIII Corps, the first two having been detached from XX Corps and the last from XII Corps.

25 March. VIII Corps effected crossings of the RHINE RIVER using 76th and 87th Infantry Divisions in the vicinity of RHEINS (L9186) and BOPPARD (L8981). Heavy opposition was encountered initially with a severe enemy artillery reaction consisting of harassing and interdiction fires upon the bridge sites by light and medium antiaircraft guns, mortars and a few artillery pieces. VIII Corps artillery had displaced forward to new positions from which to support the attack and fired extensively in close support as well as continuing its large-scale harassing and interdiction program on enemy road nets and ground installations east of the river. The bridgehead was effectively consolidated and additional crossings were made by 89th Infantry Division in the early morning of 26 March at WILNICH (L9774) and KAUB (M0265). The new crossing encountered heavy fighting with intensive artillery fires upon the crossing sites from antiaircraft guns employed in a ground role.

4th Armored Division advanced to the east with what was fast becoming accustomed rapidity, overrunning the city of DARMSTADT (M6541) and continuing on to the MAIN RIVER where three major bridges were captured intact in the vicinity of HANAU (M9570) and ASCHAFFENBURG (M0154). Enemy efforts at demolition of one of these bridges prior to its capture had been successfully prevented by the use of long-range heavy artillery time fire upon the bridge. 5th Infantry Division cleared HEUSENSTAMM (M4854) and advanced generally north to close upon the MAIN RIVER. Enemy resistance throughout the XII Corps zone returned to its familiar pattern of disorganization and enemy artillery fires were negligible. There was however considerable bombing and strafing of the bridge sites in the zones of 4th Armored and 90th Infantry Divisions by enemy aircraft.

Ammunition expenditures for the week ending at 250600, generally moderate in reflection of the fluid tactical situation in both VIII and XX Corps, continued heavy as XII Corps effected its crossing of the RHINE RIVER. The figures are as follows:-

	VIII Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	17030	40904	23485
4.5-inch Gun	1965	695	0
155mm Howitzer	4202	12211	4000
155mm Gun	1229	4665	417
155mm Gun (SP)	722	-	442
8-inch Howitzer	1610	2192	940
8-inch Gun	-	-	72
240mm Howitzer	123	-	151

26 March. VIII Corps continued to advance in its bridgehead against moderate opposition with the bulk of both the divisional and Corps artillery displacing to new positions east of the RHINE RIVER. Intensive harassing fires were placed upon the important highways and road junctions, and a total of eighty-two counterbattery missions was fired by artillery with the Corps. Enemy artillery fires were directed almost exclusively upon the bridge sites.

XII Corps encountered stern opposition at SACHSENHAUSEN (M6467) accompanied by heavy but inaccurate enemy artillery fires. 4th Armored Division's bridgehead at HANAU (M9570) was subjected to repeated heavy enemy counterattacks likewise supported by heavy enemy artillery fires. XII Corps Artillery accordingly inaugurated extensive counterbattery fires.

27 March. 6th Armored Division effected a crossing of the MAIN RIVER at FRANKFURT-AM-MAIN (M6769) following which elements of the 5th Infantry Division passed through the armor to engage in strong house-to-house fighting within the city. Small arms and automatic weapons fire was heavy but the defending troops were almost entirely without artillery support. Artillery with XII Corps fired extensively in support of the action and undertook destruction fires upon the telephone exchange and the main power plant at the request of 6th Armored Division. Fighting within the city continued sporadic until all resistance was finally overcome on 29 March.

4th Armored and 90th Infantry Divisions encountered moderate enemy artillery fires on the south flank of XII Corps, coming almost entirely from heavy antiaircraft guns and tanks with the bulk of the fire falling in the vicinity of the bridge sites at (M8668) and (M8566). Artillery with XII Corps fired extensively throughout the Corps zone with considerable emphasis upon counterbattery missions.

28 March. 6th Armored and 5th Infantry Divisions were relieved from assignment to XII Corps and assigned to XX Corps. 11th Armored and 26th Infantry Divisions were relieved from assignment to XX Corps and assigned to XII Corps. No substantial changes in artillery organization occurred as units supporting the relieved divisions took up support of those newly attached.

One field artillery group headquarters, one 155mm Gun (SP) battalion, one 8-inch Gun battalion and one 240mm Howitzer battalion were relieved from XX Corps and placed under the Provost Marshal, Third U.S. Army to assist in guarding and policing the extended lines of communication and to assist in the control and evacuation of the overwhelming number of displaced persons and liberated slave workers within the Army area.

4th and 6th Armored Divisions passed through the bridgeheads over the MAIN RIVER to the north and raced swiftly forward, the former clearing GRUNDBERG (G8621), LAUTERBACH (H1727) and HERSFELD (H3853) and reaching the WERRA RIVER by 31 March while the latter drove north to and effected a crossing of the EDER RIVER southeast of KASSEL (C2004). Resistance to the advances was disorganized, few missions being fired by our accompanying artillery and enemy artillery fires being scattered and sporadic.

VIII Corps pressed forward out of its bridgehead against resistance now disorganized but for a single strong stand by enemy elements west of WIESBADEN (H5665). A sharp fight developed supported by heavy fires delivered by artillery with VIII Corps. Corps artillery was otherwise relatively inactive due to the light character of the opposition, the absence of targets and the proximity of friendly troops. Contact was established with First U.S. Army advancing to the south and WIESBADEN was cleared so that the enemy troops resisting to the west were pocketed and rapidly liquidated on the following day.

30 March. 71st Infantry Division was assigned to Third U.S. Army and attached to III Corps.

Throughout the period. The month was a period of highly fluid action with staggering enemy casualties and tremendous territorial gains that rivalled and even surpassed the great successes of August 1944 in that these most recent drives carried Third U.S. Army from the fringes into the very heart of the enemy's homeland. For the artillery it was a stern test of mobility successfully resolved as all weapons closely followed and leading armor and infantry to render prompt and effective support. It was a period of light to moderate friendly artillery fires in overall volume, of violent fires on the few occasions when needed to smash a determined enemy.

The month saw crossings of the KYLL, MOSELLE, RHINE and MAIN RIVERS. The initial RHINE crossing was effected using speed and surprise and no artillery preparation. Most of the remaining crossings were preceded by severe artillery preparations and in all the assault waves were accorded strong and effective fires in close support as the bridgeheads were effected and consolidated.

Great enemy cities fell to Third U.S. Army, some after little or no resistance, some after severe fighting in which the preparation and close supporting fires of our artillery played a major role. Early in the month our defensive artillery fires had rendered invaluable assistance in breaking up the repeated attempts of a desperate enemy to restore the unhinged defenses of the SIEGFRIED LINE in the lower SAAR basin. Also it was a period of intense harassing and interdiction fires as our artillery lashed the repeatedly enveloped enemy in his frantic search for escape routes.

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CHAPTER II
APRIL OPERATIONS



2 April. The 4th Armored Division and the remainder of the VIII Corps artillery continued their advance against scattered enemy resistance. Fires from tanks and self-propelled guns were received in the vicinity of [illegible]. The field artillery group supporting the 4th Armored Division placed fires on several villages and road junctions. Time-on-target concentrations and harassing fires on [illegible] were delivered by [illegible] 155mm howitzers and one [illegible] were fired by the artillery of the 4th Armored Division. In the VIII Corps rapid forward movement precluded effective artillery [illegible] due to slow resupply and maintenance and intelligence which was inconsistent with moving operations along the Fulda River.

3 April. No strong enemy artillery activity was reported during the day as the Army front continued to be quite fluid.

One medium battalion in the II Corps fired a concentration on enemy troops causing the surrender of fifty German soldiers.



The artillery of the VIII Corps was organized for combat as follows:-

[illegible] Corps, consisting of an Infantry Division - one field artillery [illegible] one light and one heavy battalion.

[illegible] Corps, consisting of the 4th Armored Division - one field artillery [illegible] one light and one heavy battalion.

[illegible] Corps, consisting of the 26th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light and one heavy battalion, general support with one medium and one heavy battalion reinforcing [illegible] Corps, consisting of the 1st Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light and one heavy battalion, general support with one medium and one heavy battalion reinforcing [illegible] Corps, consisting of the 9th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light and one heavy battalion, general support with one medium and one heavy battalion reinforcing [illegible] Corps, consisting of the 5th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light and one heavy battalion, general support with one medium and one heavy battalion reinforcing [illegible] Corps, consisting of the 2nd Armored Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light and one heavy battalion, general support with one medium and one heavy battalion reinforcing [illegible] Corps, consisting of the 8th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light and one heavy battalion, general support with one medium and one heavy battalion reinforcing [illegible] Corps, consisting of the 42nd Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light and one heavy battalion, general support with one medium and one heavy battalion reinforcing [illegible] Corps, consisting of the 28th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one light and one heavy battalion, general support with one medium and one heavy battalion reinforcing [illegible] Corps, consisting of the 3rd Armored



[illegible] was thrown when air [illegible] artillery [illegible] of the [illegible].

10 April. The 49th Infantry Division received considerable artillery fire. A total of [illegible] were fired in the area of the 49th infantry division. [illegible] and other fires on enemy troop concentrations, [illegible] property and [illegible]. [illegible] were fired by the 49th artillery [illegible] in the [illegible] area. [illegible] and interdiction missions were fired by XIII [illegible] artillery units.

11 April. Enemy artillery fire was light and scattered and again was principally from [illegible] weapons. [illegible] of XIII [illegible] artillery [illegible] of the 49th Division Artillery [illegible]. The 49th [illegible] division artillery [illegible] in the XIII [illegible] area [illegible] a [illegible] on the [illegible] [illegible] of enemy troops [illegible] in their [illegible] fire on the [illegible] [illegible] on the enemy for a [illegible].

Air [illegible] of XIII [illegible] were white. Some light anti-aircraft fire was observed during the [illegible] but [illegible] [illegible] was [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of fire missions [illegible] normal [illegible] of fire, [illegible] reconnaissance, [illegible], and [illegible] missions.

12 April. Light enemy artillery fires were received by XIII Corps units. Counter-battery fire was [illegible] in the 49th Infantry Division area in the vicinity of [illegible].

VIII Corps troops attacked east in the vicinity of [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the advance met a determined artillery fire of [illegible] and [illegible] artillery. XIII [illegible] artillery [illegible] the advance [illegible] the east [illegible] light scattered enemy [illegible] fire.

13 April. Throughout the XIII Armored Division, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] fires [illegible] [illegible] artillery fires [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

22/600) April as the fluid tactical situation continued. The expenditures were as follows -

	VIII Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
155mm Howitzer	6474	7154	4872
4.5-inch Gun		146	124
155mm Howitzer	4147	2014	1[illegible]
155mm Gun	2[illegible]	749	477
155mm Gun (GP)	721	-	-
8-inch Howitzer	533	174	882



23 April. III Corps artillery units initiated route reconnaissance preliminary to movement to forward assembly areas. With one exception, which was received from assignment to [illegible] Third U.S. Army, 14th Armored Division was assigned to First U.S. Army and III Corps.

Artillery of the XI corps was organized for combat as follows:

General support, reinforcing 26th Infantry Division - one 155 mm artillery group consisting of one battalion of 155 mm guns and one medium battalion.
General support, reinforcing 78th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one medium and two heavy battalions.
General support - one field artillery group consisting of one medium and two heavy battalions.
General support, reinforcing 13th Armored Division when committed - one field artillery group consisting of five medium battalions.

24 April. III Corps artillery units began to go into forward assembly areas as did most artillery units of the XI Corps.

Artillery battalions of the 69th and 78th Infantry Divisions were active in firing harassing and interdiction missions. Several groups of enemy troops were dispersed, and one ammunition dump was destroyed.

One field artillery group of III Corps consisting of one medium and one heavy battalion was attached to 13th Armored Division.

25 April. No activity was reported in the III Corps zone and little activity of consequence in the XI Corps zone as artillery battalions continued their displacements forward into positions. In the XII Corps zone the 97th Infantry Division attacked with artillery support being furnished by divisional and supporting corps artillery units. The 26th Infantry Division artillery fired on ferries, antiaircraft guns, vehicles and personnel along the [illegible] River.

26 April. III Corps artillery units continued displacement and preparation of positions in support of corps operations. The 97th Infantry Division Artillery supported an attack on [illegible] with a thirty-minute preparation.

27 April. With the Army front generally along the [illegible] River line the enemy took advantage of the [illegible] which afforded this obstacle to increase his artillery activity. Self-propelled weapons and some field artillery pieces of light caliber harassed the river line towns, particularly [illegible]. The field artillery observation battalion with the III Corps secured thirteen sound locations of which all but two were single guns and all of light caliber. III Corps units overran ninety field artillery pieces of 155mm caliber, and twenty-one guns of 270mm caliber were found at [illegible].

III Corps artillery units retained under Corps control were organized for combat as follows:-

General support - one field artillery group consisting of one heavy battalion.

General support, reinforcing 26th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of one heavy battalion.
General support, reinforcing 69th Infantry Division - one field artillery group consisting of two heavy battalions.

One medium artillery battalion, reinforcing the 69th Infantry Division in the XII Corps zone fired time-on-target concentrations on [illegible] road, [illegible] and [illegible] in order to neutralize a three-gun enemy battery. The 81st Infantry Division artillery fired smoke concentrations in preparation for the crossing of the [illegible] River, then fired harassing missions on road junctions in towns in the smoke screen. Artillery with III Corps effectively fired on targets being used by the enemy to withdraw his troops across the [illegible] River.

28 April. Counter-battery artillery fire was employed along the army front particularly in the zones of the 11th Armored Division and 26th and 69th Infantry Divisions. Resistance was not strong and all units made good progress.

One medium artillery battalion was relieved from attachment to III Corps and assigned to duty with the Provost Marshal, Third U.S. Army.

29 April. Six groups of time fires were fired in support of the 69th Infantry Division attack on the [illegible] airfield. Some of these groups of concentrations were set up on call and were fired as the situation warranted. Counter-battery fire by artillery fired on the 81st Infantry Division area affected the siting of the [illegible] River. One battalion of the 81st Infantry Division artillery fired a fifteen-minute preparation prior to the attack on [illegible] and repulsed an attack by enemy tanks and infantry. One division started assembling in the vicinity of [illegible].

Artillery ammunition expenditures for the week ending 29/24 April showed a very slight increase as Third U.S. Army started to [illegible] the [illegible] Border. The expenditures were as follows -

	III Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
155mm Howitzer	1443	1354	11649
4.5-inch Gun	121	144	474
155mm Howitzer	414	41	4411
155mm Gun	248	474	2[illegible]
8-inch Howitzer	74	491	882



30 April. A preparation for the 13th Armored Division's assault across the [illegible] River was fired by one medium Corps artillery battalion. One divisional artillery battalion of the 13th Armored Division fired 1,892 rounds during the day in preparation for the same river crossing operation. 86th Infantry Division Artillery fired sixty-eight missions during the day, expending 1,549 rounds of ammunition.

One heavy battalion of the III Corps was placed on line of communication duty within the Corps. One medium battalion was relieved from attachment to XX Corps and attached to Third U.S. Army for line of communication duty. One medium battalion was relieved from attachment to XX Corps and placed on duty with the Provost Marshal, Third U.S. Army.

The War at the Front. The month of April was characterized by the rapid disintegration of German resistance. Our artillery units followed



close behind infantry and armored forces as they swept north to KASSEL [illegible] and east to the [illegible] and the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN border. Action was heavy in certain areas, such as [illegible] and in many other towns. Artillery played a short but effective role in forcing surrenders. Since resistance frequently developed in the vicinity of towns our divisions soon developed techniques of combining convincing bombardments with propaganda leaflets giving surrender instructions to town burgomeisters. Initially the division wrote their own leaflets and distributed them over the enemy by artillery shells or by liaison aircraft. Later in the month standard leaflets were made available to all units.

The shift in the direction of attack together with the transfer of one corps to First U.S. Army and the movement of another corps from the [illegible] to Third U.S. Army required a redistribution of artillery units. As the Army moved rapidly south to [illegible] both corps and divisional artillery battalions demonstrated their ability to move rapidly over great distances and be in position to fire upon and destroy enemy opposition wherever it appeared.

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

Artillery action in the month of May 1945 was characterized by pursuit operations similar to those of April. Control of artillery units was decentralized and most corps artillery units were employed in reinforcing the fires of divisions. Artillery was used to crush resistance in certain towns and cities, to fire preparations for river crossings, to break up small-scale counterattacks, and to prepare the way for the smash through the thin line along the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN border in the drive on PILSEN.

As the month progressed, more and more units were shifted to missions such as security guard for lines of communications and processing Prisoners of War. By 08/2400 May, twenty-five battalions and group headquarters had been assigned such missions by the Army and corps.

1 May. In the III and XX Corps zones divisional and corps artillery units supported operations in the crossing of the [illegible] RIVER. The III Corps Artillery placed a heavy battalion on line of communication duty and XX Corps Artillery changed the mission of one group with two heavy battalions to general support, reinforcing the 65th Infantry Divi-

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[illegible] in preparation for night crossing operations. On the left flank of the Army, the [illegible] Infantry Division [illegible] against heavy resistance and [illegible] the Army to reach its objectives. Division Artillery fired missions [illegible] On the extreme [illegible] the [illegible] Armored Division [illegible] to the XII Corps. The [illegible] Armored Division [illegible] with [illegible] and a medium battalion [illegible] a battery within nearly [illegible] until our troops entered the town.

4 May. In the Austrian Tirol, the Army [illegible] artillery activity as the 14th Armored Division [illegible] Infantry Division, advanced [illegible] XII Corps artillery [illegible] the Division [illegible] the 103d Infantry Division, [illegible] Armored Division [illegible] 88's [illegible] and wrecking [illegible] vehicles.

In the left flank [illegible] the Army, a small [illegible] consisting of one tank, two [illegible] and [illegible] was [illegible] Infantry Division [illegible] of [illegible]. The attack was [illegible] artillery fire and [illegible] observed missions were fired on [illegible] and [illegible] tanks.

5 May. Two battalions of III Corps artillery were shifted to occupational [illegible] duties. [illegible] battalions were also relieved, following the [illegible] of the [illegible] Division artillery [illegible] by XX Corps units [illegible]. Artillery in support of crossings of the [illegible] while engaged in operations in Austria [illegible] continued to draw enemy fire. Two [illegible] were destroyed as resistance in the town collapsed.

In the III Corps zone, units of one field artillery group supporting the easternmost attack of Combat Command A, 11th Armored Division, situated on a hill at [illegible], were [illegible] five times by [illegible] but our forces [illegible] in [illegible]. The enemy continued [illegible] shelling.

When the 86th Infantry Division was transferred from III Corps to Seventh U.S. Army, one light and one medium artillery battalion which had been reinforcing the fires of the Division remained with the Corps.

6 May. The III Corps, having reached the objectives, split its artillery in place [illegible] maintenance duties and preparation [illegible] the artillery to occupational responsibilities. One field artillery group of XX Corps fired [illegible] targets in support of the 11th Armored Division, destroying [illegible] and [illegible] an enemy column [illegible] by halt). Another group of XX Corps artillery moved its three heavy battalions to assembly areas and released its trucks to [illegible] the infantry of the 103d Infantry Division. Harassing and interdiction fires were fired on the left flank of the Army.

Minor adjustments were made in the organization for combat and missions of XII Corps artillery units as shown below in anticipation of the commitment of the 14th Armored Division.

General [illegible] 14th Armored Division when committed - one [illegible] artillery [illegible] battalions of light and one medium battalions. General support [illegible] Infantry [illegible] and one [illegible] artillery group [illegible] one field artillery group [illegible]

[illegible] light, one [illegible] and one heavy battalion.

General [illegible] Infantry Division with [illegible] and one medium battalion [illegible] artillery [illegible] battalions.

[illegible] fire [illegible] the [illegible] Infantry and [illegible] battalions.

The V Corps artillery headquarters and headquarters Battery, V Corps Artillery were assigned [illegible] Army and prepared to attack eastward.

5 May. Corps artillery units of XII Corps were [illegible] in order [illegible] the [illegible] Infantry Division, [illegible] Armored Division [illegible] Infantry Division [illegible] artillery [illegible] XII Corps artillery [illegible] the Division [illegible] the 103d Infantry Division, [illegible] Armored Division [illegible] 88's [illegible] and wrecking [illegible] vehicles.

In the 86th Infantry Division sector, reorganizations were being com-



pleted for the surrender of the entire 12th Panzer Division, while in the zones of the 14th Armored Division Infantry Divisions hostile artillery activity increased. Attacks [illegible] objective fires and [illegible] were [illegible] active [illegible] the vicinity of [illegible] counter-[illegible] fires were [illegible] of [illegible] and other [illegible] and interdiction fires were placed on [illegible] and [illegible] by [illegible] one field artillery [illegible], supporting the attack of Combat Command A, 14th Armored Division.

6 May. The III Corps Artillery continued reorganization of its [illegible] and [illegible] artillery units of XII Corps were relieved [illegible] at Oetzal Bay to provide an additional 110 trucks for motorization of infantry units.

Aggressive action continued in the zones of the XII and V Corps but artillery fires were relatively light. Two combat [illegible] of the 14th Armored Division crossed [illegible] assembly areas to pass through elements of the 86th and 44th Infantry Divisions and one field artillery group took up its [illegible] mission. In the 86th Infantry Division sector artillery prisoners of war disclosed that they had been employed as infantry but stated that they had no knowledge of any hostile artillery in the Division sector. The activities of Czechoslovakian patriots made necessary some restraint in the firing of our [illegible] pieces except where hostile activity was observed. In the V Corps zone organic artillery of the 1st and 97th Infantry Divisions fired fifty-three missions to support the attack toward [illegible]. Practically no fires were necessary on the part of the 42d Infantry Division Artillery and the 106th Armored Group Artillery, while the 7th Armored Division Artillery units were in an assembly area.

In its organization for combat in this operation, the V Corps Artillery had decentralized control of its battalions in anticipation of rapid movement. The main effort was made by the 97th Infantry Division to which was attached one field artillery group with an observation battery, one medium battalion and one battalion of 155mm Guns (self-propelled). On Corps order, the 106th Armored Division passed through the 97th Infantry Division, taking with it one battery of the 155mm self-propelled battalion. On the north, one artillery group of one medium, one light and one 155mm gun battalion was attached to the 1st Infantry Division which was also supported by Combat Command A of the 7th Armored Division. South of the main effort, the 42d Infantry Division Artillery was reinforced by the attachment of one field artillery group with two medium and one 155mm gun battalion. One armored field artillery battalion had been attached to the 102d Cavalry Group which was operating rear areas in reserve and the remainder of Corps artillery, a group headquarters and an 8-inch Howitzer battalion were on security guard.

Ammunition expenditures for the week ending 060800 May were relatively light, but they reflected the short preparations fired to protect river crossings and the early employment of light and medium artillery together with a few volleys of 8-inch howitzer that [illegible] all resistance. The figures are as follows:-

	III Corps	V Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
105mm Howitzer	657	12,277	1,902	102
[illegible] Gun	0	-	0	-
155mm Howitzer	347	2,744	618	505
4.5 Gun	160	193	1,526	258
155mm [illegible]	-	612	-	-
8-inch Howitzer	36	148	66	148

7 May. The organic artillery of the 71st and 80th Infantry Divisions [illegible] forward to provide close support but only two artillery missions were requested. Only three artillery missions exceeding 50 rounds were fired by the 1st Infantry Division Artillery in the III Corps zone as the enemy continued mass surrenders. In the XII Corps zone, the 14th Armored Division advanced to its objective against light resistance from dismounted troops and artillery fires decreased accordingly.

8 May. The only artillery activity in the Army was the firing on hostile tanks and infantry by the 76th Infantry Division Artillery.

In the III Corps zone artillery had been redisposed for occupational duties while the artillery of the XII and V Corps remained in firing positions and assisted the divisions in receiving prisoners of war.

The collapse of German resistance just prior to the actual cessation of hostilities and the severe restrictions on our troops from further advances resulted in extremely light ammunition expenditures for the



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last ten days of the campaign. The figures are as follows:

	HE Rounds	WP Rounds	HE Losses*	WP Losses*
105mm Howitzer	0	450	0&3	1&3
4.5-inch Gun	-	-	-	-
155mm Howitzer	0	40	0	0
155mm Gun	0	0	-	-
155mm Gun (SP	-	0	-	-
8-inch Howitzer	0	0	2&	0

Throughout the period. In this last eight days of the attack on GERMANY and her German allies, a powerful western army advanced at any point it desired, cutting deep into a numerically strong but morally disorganized enemy. Air spit fires from strong fast tank columns by air destruction or surrender to local strongpoints. Where rivers had been or towns were strongly defended, sufficient artillery was immediately available to blast out resistance or to host river crossings. This demonstrating of power and mobility in our heavy, more even after a drive across GERMANY, broke any remaining will to resist. As the enemy became more disorganized and his units smaller and more isolated, an increase in number of artillery units to 1/4 a squadron passing lines of communication while their trucks carried on carrying the new supplies. [illegible] field artillery battalions and [illegible] artillery [illegible] artillery with Third U.S. Army, [illegible] over the battalions and three groups were performing duties other than their primary mission.

ARTILLERY TO THE RHINE

The Third U.S. Army became operational with [illegible] field artillery pieces of 105mm caliber or larger excluding tank destroyers, anti-aircraft artillery, and infantry weapons. In the course of the campaign the number fluctuated from a low of 324 pieces on one occasion to 1,044, at the end of hostilities. From the start of the campaign, [illegible] rounds of ammunition which [illegible] tons were fired at the enemy. In addition, approximately [illegible] rounds of captured artillery ammunition were fired from eighty-seven captured weapons of which [illegible] were fired from 15 August to 8 May [illegible] there were wide variations in artillery ammunition expenditures, [illegible] 105 mm howitzers [illegible] operations necessitated the issue of [illegible] per gun per day, while [illegible] 7 November, when the supply of ammunition to the Army was substantially reduced, expenditures [illegible] 105 mm howitzers [illegible] compared with the [illegible] rounds available. The average daily [illegible] at the height of the [illegible] action. It was [illegible] artillery ammunition [illegible] tons, at 420,000 rounds during the week of 31 December - 7 January.



During 231 days of continuous operations, artillery batteries have been called upon every emergency of the campaign. They have demonstrated their superiority over German artillery in both static warfare and have shown their ability to keep pace with infantry under all sorts of terrain and weather conditions. Our guns and weapons have fired on targets which include everything in the German Army and even boats and barges of the German Navy. Every type fire was used and every means of observation exploited. The [illegible] time-on-target fire of seven battalions proved effective in destroying enemy artillery, [illegible] the way for infantry and armor [illegible] their objectives in a town. The [illegible] counter-preparation fire, massive artillery concentrations [illegible] fire in close support of infantry and armor [illegible] breakthrough.



Artillery units with Third U.S. Army demonstrated not only their ability to move their personnel and fire power, but also to maintain communications under even the most adverse conditions. Artillerymen were cross-trained and given [illegible] so that they could perform [illegible] service. The [illegible] artillery units were frequently [illegible] of enemy wire during the advance. The extremely wide frontage of the fall and winter warfare [illegible] artillery [illegible] the Army's rapid advances through FRANCE and GERMANY, [illegible] due in large part to their role in providing communications for speedy fire missions.

The Air OPs in the course of the campaign have proven an auxiliary to the primary mission of artillery observation and have been a vital factor in the high [illegible] of American artillery. The Thirties seventy-seven of these planes were flown from England to France with [illegible] and since the beginning of operations [illegible] have been flown. Of these many thousands were missions for the adjustment of fire on area, [illegible] while [illegible] were reconnaissance and patrol flights along the front lines or in enemy territory. In the conduct of our tremendous fire [illegible] artillery intelligence, the Air OPs have been particularly effective. The very [illegible] artillery aircraft has often been sufficient to silence enemy batteries. Artillery aircraft have been used to spot [illegible] infantry units, for reconnaissance [illegible] of enemy-held terrain and in pursuit operations have proved as observation at the head of armored and infantry columns.

Enemy countermeasures against the Air OPs have not been consistently effective. With extensive air-craft, artillery air-strips, antiaircraft and small arms fire, the enemy has destroyed less than one Air OP for every thousand hours of operation. The necessity of operating from small and unsuitable fields, of carrying observation and maintaining patrols in all weather, and--for the major part of the campaign--the lack of proper aviation fuel have added to the hazards of Air OP operations. The work of the 42d Mobile Reclamation and Repair Squadron in the maintenance and repair of aircraft and the procurement of Air Force supplies has contributed materially to the success of the Air OPs.

At the close of operations, 280 aircraft and 340 pilots, the largest number of Air OPs under the control of one army in the theater, were operating with Third U.S. Army artillery units. All units were at full strength in pilots and in aircraft, with surplus pilots attached to many divisional groups and a small reserve of aircraft under Army control.

The German Army employed nearly every artillery weapon in Europe and air and water assault equipment types were found in Third U.S. Army, from light calibers ranging from 75mm to 240mm. While the commonly known weapons were not used extensively in our area, a new weapon of heavy artillery caliber was used to remain the city of LUXEMBOURG and con-

ventional railroad artillery struck communication centers along the entire front. One minor railroad gun, which probably had never been fired, was found with a tube between 100 - 150 feet long and a 31-inch bore. In spite of these resources, our artillery has maintained ascendency over the hostile artillery at all times, even including the effective fortifications at BREST, in the defense of METZ and the SAAR RIVER during the fall of 194[illegible] and in the Germno offensive of December towards BASTOGNE. Our ordnance units have counted 3,906 destroyed or captured guns of 75mm caliber or greater from 1 August 1944 to 8 May 1945.

The tactical employment of German artillery was considerably hampered by the operations of our Air Force and our effective counter-battery artillery fires. Complete artillery regiments became fewer and fewer after the battle of Northern France and mixed weapons appeared in battalions and even in batteries. Our Air Force presented the Germans with difficult supply problems which caused apparent ammunition shortages at the gun positions together with increasingly frequent improvisations in weapons and organization which made their artillery less and less effective. The Volks Artillery Corps appeared and disappeared in five months and after the crossing of the RHINE, tanks, self-propelled guns, antitank and antiaircraft weapons supplied the bulk of the enemy's artillery resistance.

The German artillery intelligence network was broken. Pieces but managed to reform between the SAAR and the RHINE. Their ground observation facilities were good and their field artillery observation battalions were as highly organized as our own. At one time it is known that there were three observation battalions and two observation batteries operating on the Third U.S. Army front. The enemy's estimates of our artillery were as valiant in certain stabilized phases of the campaign, yet they were unwilling to fire sufficient ammunition on any but the most urgent front line targets.

The German lack of air observation, the complete breakdown of their communications under the weight of our preparation fires, their unwillingness to spend ammunition, their reliance on the self-propelled and other high velocity guns and the ineffectiveness of their harassing fires by long-range heavy weapons proved to be the undoing of their artillery. Our artillery intelligence net, Air OPs and our speedy concentration of fire [illegible], neutralized or destroyed the enemy weapons in action and freed our weapons for missions directly supporting our infantry and armor.



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CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

[redacted]

1. General. During the campaign in Europe it has been reaffirmed that a [illegible] search must be made to locate artillery positions, personnel, arms, command posts and lines of communication. Agencies that have proven of value for this purpose are as follows:

Photo Interpretation
Field artillery observation battalions
Artillery Air OPs
Sound ranging
Artillery photos
Prisoners of War interrogation teams
Military Intelligence interrogation teams
Aerial artillery teams
Intelligence gathered from all aerial sources

Close cooperation and frequent liaison between artillery units and [illegible] agencies are essential if complete and reliable artillery and artillery [illegible] information is to be obtained.

2. [redacted] Experience has proven that the [illegible] problem is an [illegible] one. A [illegible] search for [illegible] and artillery units must be made [illegible] ways to be [illegible]. The [illegible] search for [illegible] artillery [illegible] way, [illegible] to the [illegible].

3. [redacted] [illegible] groups

[illegible]

4. [redacted] [illegible]

5. [redacted] [illegible]

6. [redacted] [illegible]

7. [redacted] [illegible]

8. [redacted] [illegible] means of [illegible] headquarters.

9. [redacted] [illegible] general [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

the ammunition problem. Since there are so few 4.5-inch gun battalions, they cause unnecessary complication. Actually, 155mm or 8-inch howitzer battalions would have been more effective and it is felt that there is no real place for the 4.5-inch weapon in our artillery as constituted.

20. Time Fire on Bridges. The employment of time fire or Pozit ammunition to cover the approach to bridges in many cases proved a means of capturing bridges intact. The intention of the enemy to blow a bridge at the last moment was nullified by taking the bridge under fire in such manner ten to fifteen minutes before the arrival of the tanks. Damage to the bridges was negligible and the enemy was prevented from placing demolitions or setting off some already placed and friendly tanks were able to approach the bridge site, cross the bridge and secure it against further enemy ground action.

21. Artillery Support for Armor. When the deepest armored thrusts can have immediate light and medium artillery support from corps. Each armored division was normally reinforced by an artillery group consisting of one light self-propelled battalion and two medium battalions which were placed under operational control of the division. With the divisional artillery this permitted placing two light self-propelled and one medium battalion in support of each combat command. As the artillery group was not attached to the division, admin strative and supply problems were not added to the division's burdens.

In the light of experiences of the campaign it is highly desirable to have a battalion of 155mm howitzers (self-propelled) as an organic part of an armored division. Tractor-drawn howitzers rendered very good support and a self-propelled unit of similar characteristics should improve this.

22. Corps Artillery Support of Mobile Operations. Heavy artillery--usually two battalions--was pushed forward behind the armor as rapidly as possible. Often a corps fire direction center accompanied these units, thus providing additional fire support for the armored thrusts within a few hours. One battalion of 155mm gun (self-propelled) per corps should be available for any necessary use. These weapons are particularly useful in attack of fortified positions. One battalion of 8-inch guns within an army of three corps is desirable. The additional range of such a weapon is useful in many cases for particular targets such as enemy railroad guns and distant towns and bridges. The mobility and accuracy of this weapon leave much to be desired.

23. Use of Field Artillery Observation Battalions. When more than one observation battalion per corps was available, the extra one was split between the two or more corps having the widest area. Theoretically, observation battalions operate far short of the desirable theory in most of the operations. Particularly in the fast moving armored units did the observation battalions see little employment. First priority must be given to the development of a more effective means of locating hostile batteries and mortars than is now provided by sound locators. Radar offers the best possibilities.

24. Present Methods and Training are Sound. The superior performance of artillery units was adequate proof of the efficiency of our artillery training and methods and the adequacy of our equipment and organization. Improvement in effect can be obtained by more emphasis in development of methods of, and training in, the attack of various types of targets and the surveillance of fire for effect on all targets. This is the weakest phase in artillery conduct of fire.

25. Adjustment by High Performance Aircraft. Efficient utilization of the fire power of long-range artillery requires that high performance aircraft be made available for its adjustment. Experience has shown that the procedure for obtaining and conducting Arty A missions must be prescribed and carefully followed. This procedure should be prescribed by the highest level in the theater to assure uniformity when units are transferred from one army to another. The automatic daily allotment of several Arty A missions to each corps is desirable to facilitate planning. Impromptu missions in excess of the automatic missions should be available. The method outlined in Operations Memorandum Number 4, Headquarters Third U.S.Army, dated 25 April 1945, have stood the test of combat. (See Annex 5)

26. Communications. Uniformity of codes and ciphers throughout the artillery with the army is necessary in order to facilitate handling of radio and telephone traffic between artillery headquarters and to make easier the rapid establishment of communications in the case of units changing attachment. In order to secure this uniformity, distribution from army level should be established for the following Signal Operations Instructions items to the level indicated for each:

Down to and including all field artillery battalions:

Radio call signs.
Telephone directory names and unit code group designations.

Artillery Blinds.
Artillery radio authentication code (Playfair method).
Map coordinate code (Playfair method).
M-209 converter.

Down to and including division artillery headquarters and corps field artillery battalions:

Frequency assignment lists.
Miscellaneous items such as pyrotechnic code, panels, daylight and darkness charts, etc.

The army artillery section should cooperate with the army signal section in preparing radio call signs and is responsible for the distribution of items named above.

The Army Artillery Officer's Radio Net is necessary for the transmission of photo interpretation data between corps artillery and the army photo center, the exchange of intelligence and operations data between adjacent corps and up to army headquarters, for special liaison, and for coordination of Arty A missions. The equipment should consist of one SCR-193 at each corps artillery fire direction center, one SCR-399 at army photo center, one SCR-399 at army headquarters as Net Control Station.



SUPPLY

27. Ammunition Requirements. Recommendations for operational ammunition requirements were submitted but actual delivery in quantity and types of ammunition did not approach the planned requirements. Delivery of adequate ammunition of the proper type at the right time must be insured prior to an operation. It is too late to correct errors after the operation begins.

28. Segregation of Ammunition Lots. During the first months of the operation segregation of ammunition by lot number was entirely unsatisfactory. This condition existed at the ports and reserves, at Army ammunition supply points and depots and in unit trains. Every agency from factory to the artillery battery must be thoroughly conscious of the necessity of keeping ammunition lots segregated and furnishing ammunition of uniform lot numbers.

29. Balance of Supply Rates. Experience in this and other theaters of operations has proven that original War Department maintenance supply rates for ammunition were not properly balanced by quantity and type. The proportion of ammunition by type furnished a theater should approach the following:

Weapon	Rds per tube per day	Proportion of types	Proportion of types of fuses
Gun, 4.5-inch, Field	28	95% HE	40% M51A3 6% M55 45% M67 2% T105
		5% WP	
Charge, propelling, 4.5-inch gun		60% SC 40% RC	
Gun, 155mm, self-propelled M12A1-10 and Field, M1	25	93% HE	67% M51A3 8% M55 5% M67 10% T105
		2% HC 5% WP	
Gun, 8-inch, Field	10	100% HE	95% M51A3 5% M67 15% T105
Charge, propelling, 8-inch gun		35% SR 65% WP	
Howitzer, 105mm, M2A1, Field and self-propelled	45	84% HE	75% M51A3, M5 25% M55
		7.0% WP 2.0% HC 1.4% Cld 0.2% TRAC	
Howitzer, 155mm, M1, Field	33	91% HE	80% M51A3 15% M55 5% M67 15% T105
		6% WP 2% HC 1% Clc	
Charge, propelling, 155mm howitzer, M1		40% M,A1 10% WP	
Howitzer, 8-inch, field	25	100% HE	45% M51A3 5% M67 10% M55 10% T105
Charge, propelling, 8-inch howitzer		75% WP 25% SR	
Howitzer, 240mm, M1, field	15	100% HE	65% M1A3 5% M67 20% T105

30. Basic Load Charts. Type and tonnage of ammunition vehicles varied widely between units. This and special operational requirements made impracticable the rigid adherence to published basic load charts. Nevertheless, basic load charts are necessary in counting an operation and for new units arriving in the theater during the operation. Authority to depart from basic loads as the operation dictates should be delegated to corps and division commanders.

31. Coordination with Army Finance. Since corps artillery commanders frequently called upon the Army Artillery Officer for data on availability of quantity and type of ammunition in Army supply points, it was necessary that a daily report of stockages in army ammunition supply points, depots and railheads be given the Army Artillery Officer by the Army Ammunition Officer.

Target levels of ammunition for each corps are planned by the Army Ordnance Officer so as to provide adequate quantity and type of each caliber and still make economic use of oversized transportation facilities. He must have timely information on artillery organization for combat.

32. Ammunition Reports. Ammunition expenditure reports are necessary to the Artillery Officer and the Ordnance Officer as a basis for operational planning and it was found that such reports must be made by corps daily and weekly.

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33. Availability of Ammunition. Ammunition availability vitally affects operations. At one stage of the campaign offensive operations were completely stopped for four weeks because of an ammunition pipeline suddenly depleted with all artillery virtually silent. Supervision of ammunition expenditure is necessary when ammunition supply is not plentiful. Corps artillery commanders are entitled to know the ammunition availability picture even though ammunition is not actually rationed.

The ammunition allocation system was never followed in Third U.S. Army. At certain critical periods it was found that some supervision was necessary but only on a round-per-gun-per-day basis based on actual and forecast availability. Allotment of ammunition should be made to the several corps on a round-per-gun-per-day basis as the difference in mission between one corps and another is usually provided for by the artillery allocated to each corps.

34. Vehicles for Ammunition. Tractors and trailers are not practicable for ammunition resupply. Trucks are most desirable for this purpose because they are most easily supplied and maintained and because they perform satisfactorily under difficult conditions of weather and terrain. Field artillery battalions should be issued trucks in sufficient tonnage to provide for ammunition resupply without using trailers.

Ammunition frames are not practicable since they reduce the ammunition basic load. They should be eliminated from tables of equipment.

35. Posit Fuze. From 1 January 1945 to 18 March 1945, artillery with Third U.S. Army expended 175,114 rounds of cannister ammunition, Posit fused. This represents 7.5% of the total expenditure of all types of howitzer ammunition. The greatest deterrent to the use of Posit fuzes in daylight has been the danger to friendly artillery liaison planes. Availability of projectiles and fuzes would have permitted greater expenditures. With the longer delay element incorporated in the fuze, expenditure of Posit fused ammunition will no doubt exceed 10% of all expenditures.

36. Anti-concussion Device. An anti-concussion device for the protection of cannoneers' ears in gun units was found to be very beneficial. The device developed in Third U.S. Army was an individually constructed acrylin ear plug and was processed under the direction of the dental service. More than 1,700 pairs of these plugs were fitted and used prior to 1 May 1945. The device practically eliminates the concussion effect and fatigue was greatly reduced when the device was worn. Hearing is not impaired. The telephone can be used and normal conversations carried on. Speed of firing was increased by the use of this device. This device should be produced in quantity for issue to all field artillery gun battalions.

AIR OP

37. Equipping and Planning. Aircraft and other Army Air Force table of organization and equipment items, and first and second echelon maintenance parts and supplies must be issued to units in order of established priority and records kept showing status of major items of equipment for each unit. If Army Air Force equipment is not unit loaded, but is pre-shipped, it should be in complete pack-ups, which may be called "projects". Projects should be complete upon issue, however some will not be. Requisitions made by units direct to Air Force depots lead to duplication of issue, mistakes and confusion, and no centralized follow-up may be had. A controlled initial issue requisitioning procedure must be established so that all requisitions are processed through the Army Artillery Air Officer, who must provide coordination, control, and follow-up.

Depending upon the type operation contemplated certain special equipment may be necessary. For instance, it was necessary to procure and distribute pyrotechnic pistols, life preservers, one-man life rafts and auxiliary fuel tanks to each aircraft flying across the Channel. It was not necessary to procure one per aircraft as this equipment was turned in immediately upon arrival on the Continent, transported back to the United Kingdom and re-issued. Such equipment must be procured either through normal or special supply channels or manufactured locally and procurement action initiated as early as possible as unforeseen delays always develop.

38. Special Training. During the equipping period and during all staging, flight training must be emphasized with special attention given to procedures dictated by the forthcoming operation. In the flight across the Channel it was necessary for all pilots to be able to follow the simple procedure of holding a steady compass course for a relatively long period of time over water. To this end all units had cross-country flight training; some made practice over-water flights. A prime requisite for all such flights is a properly compensated compass and an accurate deviation card in each aircraft. Special emphasis was given these items in the staging period.

39. Liaison with Air Force Supply Agencies. Frequent personal checks by the Army Artillery Air Officer should be made to insure that the proper supply levels and pack-ups are being accumulated and cared for. The Army Artillery Air Officer must do all in his power to establish the existence of the army, its requirements and its problems to the proper Air Force personnel. After this lesson was learned, Air Force supply to this command improved greatly. Definite plans must be established through channels in writing with the proper Air Force agencies well in advance of the operation for continued resupply of parts, equipment and supplies.

40. Corps Artillery Supervision. Corps Artillery Air Officers should be required to exercise general supervision over operations of subordinate units. Such supervision will provide more efficient control of Air OPs and enhance a generally standardized operating procedure. Much can be accomplished in this manner toward helping the weaker air sections and pilots toward a higher standard. Groups and divisions are the front line operating sections and the Corps Artillery Air Officer should work to keep all sections abreast of the latest technical advancements and refinements and to provide a link between the Army Artillery Air Officer and lower units' Artillery Air Officers to aid the flow of administrative information, replacement, maintenance requirements, etc.



41. Records. Complete records covering personnel and aircraft of all units in the army must be kept by the Army Artillery Section. Assignment, transfer and reinforcement of pilot personnel must be expedited and recommendations pertaining thereto must be immediately available in order to keep units up to strength 100% of the time. Record of dates of pilots' physical examinations must be complete, otherwise long lapses in required examinations will become prevalent. Individual pilot time must be recorded for general statistical purposes and for planning fatigue reinforcement requirements. Individual aircraft records must be kept showing total time of, major repairs to, each assignment of and each individual marking on, and final disposition of each aircraft of the command. This information is necessary to efficient assignment and replacement of aircraft made necessary by operational losses and fatigued or "war weary" aircraft, and for planning for future requirements.

42. Operations and Status Reports. Operational and status reports should be submitted monthly by each division artillery headquarters covering all division artillery air sections and by each corps artillery group and field artillery battalion headquarters covering its own organic air sections only. If headquarters higher than battalions submit operational and status reports covering assigned and attached corps artillery battalions, all battalions are not reported due to the constant shifting of these units among higher headquarters. Each corps artillery unit must be responsible for its own reports. These reports should show pilot, mechanic, and observer personnel; individual pilot time; aircraft and individual aircraft time, markings and condition; operational missions by type and number flown; developments, special problems and new operational procedures. Statistics compiled from these reports are essential to future planning.

Because of the fact that the Aircraft Accident Report, War Department Army Air Force Form 18, does not record all information necessary for the specialized Air OP type of operation, a form was devised and entitled "Air OP Loss Report". This form is designed to reduce paper work and to expedite replacements, and at the same time furnish the necessary information for classification of the accident, compilation of statistics for future planning, and completion of records pertaining to the equipment and personnel involved.

43. Squadron Code Markings. The published purpose of squadron code markings was to enable friendly units and personnel to identify their own aircraft when airborne and to lessen the possibility of the use of a Cub behind our lines by the enemy. Actually it has been proven that its main uses are identification of the aircraft by friendly Air OP crews on the ground and in the air and differentiation between aircraft in the air by friendly artillery units. It was necessary to issue an order prohibiting ground units from taking any liaison type aircraft under fire because of periodic "scares" that the enemy was using a Cub of a certain number behind our lines. In no case was this proven the fact.

44. Army Flight Surgeon. A flight surgeon should be available at least in army headquarters and preferably one in each corps. The duties of a flight surgeon with the army should be:-

a. To know and observe the Air OP pilots in the command.

b. To recommend to the Army or Corps Surgeon policies of relief, rest, and treatment as may be indicated.

c. To contact battalion surgeons and indoctrinate them in the care of the pilot and in the special problems of operational stress and fatigue, and to elicit their cooperation in referring personnel to the flight surgeon for special study.

d. To supervise routine and special physical check-ups.

45. Reinforcement Pilots. Personnel were not available in sufficient quantities to meet the requirements of all units of the Army. Pilot reinforcements arrived at intervals and were only in sufficient quantity to bring units back up to strength after a period of being understrength. Reinforcements should be available on a basis of:-

a. A calculated percentage for combat, operations and other losses per month.

b. At least a 10% standing pool for rotation of pilots to rest centers so that units may be maintained up to strength.

c. At least three per cent per month for rotation of pilots to other field artillery jobs.

Operations

46. Flight Altitudes. With the German Air Force operating as it did during this campaign, Air OPs discarded the original doctrine of flying at not over 600 feet altitude and in the general locality of the battery positions. [illegible] continue to fly with relative impunity over the front lines and [illegible] well into enemy territory at 2,500 to 3,500 feet altitude. [illegible] observation on difficult targets.

47. Air OP Missions. Artillery [illegible] provided a most important means of observation to the field artillery. [illegible] patrol over the division front from dawn to dusk is of [illegible] in locating targets of opportunity and discouraging enemy artillery activity. Certain conditions of poor weather, such as low ceilings and restricted visibility have proven very hazardous to Air OP operations. Spearheading of armored columns with an Air OP very greatly accelerates the progress of the column. The Cub, flying as far as two or three miles ahead, finds road blocks, condition of bridges, enemy dispositions, etc. This type of operation is very costly in aircraft as it is necessary to use unreconnoitered landing strips in the immediate vicinity of the column

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[illegible] interfere. Careful [illegible] these [illegible] Air Officer [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

ANNEXES

ANNEX NO. 1

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

22 April 19

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM)
NUMBER 1)

SERENADE

1. The purpose of the procedure outlined herein, which will be designated as SERENADE, is to expedite the massing of all available fires within a corps sector in extreme emergency, when lack of time precludes prearrangement of fire. The following SERENADE procedure will be followed by all units of this command.

a. Normally a request for SERENADE will originate with a forward observer who transmits to the battalion fire direction center the following:

		Example
(1)	The code word SERENADE, which indicates that three (3) volleys are to be fired.	SERENADE
(2)	Coordinates of the center of the area to be covered.	J301794
(3)	Nature of target.	40 tanks

b. The battalion fire direction center will transmit the request by telephone to the division artillery fire direction center. If the division artillery commander (or corps artillery group commander) or his authorized representative decides that the target warrants calling for fires in addition to those of his divisional (or group) artillery, he transmits over the corps artillery radio net to the corps artillery fire direction center his request for SERENADE. He includes the desired time at which the concentration is to fall. Normally Corps and Division Artillery Commanders should realize that an allowance of ten to twelve minutes must be made to insure that all battalions will be ready, and more time will be required if checks are necessary. Time must be synchronized periodically, and each battalion firing will make its own allowances for time of flight so that all projectiles arrive simultaneously in the target area. If surprise fire is not desired because of the exigencies of the situation, the words "when ready" will be used and firing commenced as soon as possible. Example of division (or corps group) artillery request for SERENADE:

SERENADE

J301794

40 tanks

1435 (or "When ready")

c. If the target is deemed sufficiently profitable, the corps artillery fire direction center assigns the mission to all headquarters whose fire capabilities permit, and who are not engaged on a more important mission. (Note: All corps and division artillery units will have been alerted upon hearing the transmission for SERENADE over the corps artillery radio net.)

d. Firing procedure:

(1) Each battalion, firing with its normal sheaf, and centered on the coordinates given, fires three (3) volleys at center range.

(2) Targets of more than 400 yards in width or depth are covered by including an additional set of coordinates in the request for SERENADE. When more than one set of coordinates are given, the method of attack will be in the order announced.

e. If the forward observer decides that it is necessary to continue the firing on the target, he reports "REPEAT SERENADE". The battalion fire direction center will relay the request by telephone to the division artillery (or corps artillery group) fire direction center. If the division artillery commander (or corps artillery group commander) or his authorized representative decides the request is warranted, he will transmit over the corps artillery radio net "REPEAT SERENADE".

Each battalion previously assigned the mission will repeat the firing without delay or further confirmation unless directed otherwise by its higher artillery headquarters.

f. Extreme care must be exercised to insure the accuracy of location on any request for SERENADE. This is the responsibility of commanders of all echelons handling such requests. They will be responsible that the coordinates given are accurate and that friendly troops are not endangered by the shoot. In addition, they are responsible that the requests are justifiable, and that the target warrants such an expenditure of ammunition. If there is any question as to the location of the target and adjustment of fire is necessary the mission "SERENADE" becomes one not of SERENADE but of adjustment and a request for additional fires and reinforcement.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ H. W. Hartman
/s/ H. W. HARTMAN
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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ANNEX NO. 2

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

24 April 1944

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM)
NUMBER 2)

SPECIAL RADIO NETS FOR ARTILLERY AND TANK DESTROYER UNITS

A. Army Artillery Radio Net - SCR 193

1. Composition of net - five (5) stations.

a. Army artillery headquarters (Net Control Station)
b. Each corps artillery headquarters.
c. Army air photo interpretation center.

2. Purpose of net.

a. To facilitate the exchange of artillery intelligence between the army artillery headquarters and the corps artillery headquarters, and between adjacent corps artillery headquarters.

b. To coordinate the fires of the artillery with the army.
c. To transmit from the air photo interpretation center, the results of air photo interpretation.

3. Operation of net.

a. Each station will be in the net continuously.
b. Corps artillery headquarters will call direct to the army air photo interpretation center station for photo information. This information will be disseminated to field artillery and tank destroyer units of a corps over the Corps Artillery Radio Net.

4. General.

a. Corps artillery S-2's should promptly transmit over the Army Artillery Radio Net, information of the enemy, as received, over the Corps Artillery Radio Net.
b. This net is not intended to replace the command net, but is to be used to provide a direct channel for artillery intelligence within the Army.

B. Corps Artillery Radio Nets - SCR 193

5. Composition of net.

a. All headquarters of field artillery units with the corps down to and including battalions.
b. All headquarters of tank destroyer units with the corps down to and including battalions.
c. Liaison officers with other units as directed by the corps artillery officer.

6. Purpose of net.

a. To promptly collect and disseminate artillery and tank destroyer information throughout the corps.
b. To expedite the massing of fires of the artillery and tank destroyer units with the corps.
c. To coordinate and obtain clearances for fire by division artillery in sectors of adjacent divisions and by corps artillery in sectors of supported divisions.
d. To provide quick lateral communication for obtaining supplementary observation on suspected hostile installations.
e. To provide corps artillery headquarters the means of disseminating air photo interpretation information direct to all subordinate field artillery and tank destroyer units.
f. To adjustment antitank warning within the command.
g. To transmit corps synchronized time.
h. Additional uses as prescribed by the corps artillery officer.

7. Operation of net.

a. The following stations are authorized to transmit and will remain in the net continuously:
(1) Corps artillery headquarters (Net Control Station)
(2) Corps artillery fire direction center.
(3) Division artillery headquarters.
(4) Field artillery and tank destroyer group headquarters.
b. Each field artillery and tank destroyer battalion with the corps will be in the net from 0600 hours to 2000 hours daily. These stations will not transmit but will stand by in the net and log the information received. These units will comply with calls for massing of artillery fire.

8. General.

a. This net is not intended to replace the command net but to supplement it, and to facilitate communication between field artillery and tank destroyer units with the corps.
b. Division artillery and group S-2's should promptly disseminate over the net, all information of the enemy, including the source of such information.

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c. Units may operate the net with the SCR 284, pending receipt of the SCR 193.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ R. W. Hartman
/s/ R. W. HARTMAN
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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ANNEX NO. 3

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

25 April 1944

OPERATIONS (SIGNAL TRAFFIC)

MAGIC 3)

OBSERVATION OF ARTILLERY FIRE BY FIGHTER-TYPE AIRCRAFT

1. References. - Section V, FM 105 and Chapter 1, FM 6-140.

2. General. - Fighter-type aircraft may be needed to adjust long-range artillery when the target is not visible to ground observers or artillery air OPs. When this need arises, the corps artillery commander will direct the air support officer at corps headquarters the necessary instructions to complete a mission (see paragraph 3). The air support officer reports to air support headquarters by radio and may note the mission. Air support headquarters decides whether the mission can be flown. In the way, set is approved the pilot is furnished the necessary information to effect the mission. If necessary, the artillery member of the reconnaissance group or the air support officer may be sent to the aircraft to brief the pilot.

3. Required information for mission. - The information given to the air support officer at corps headquarters, preliminary to arranging a mission, should include:

a. The end purpose of the mission, whether observation of a prearranged concentration, adjustment of fire on a selected target.

b. Nature and exact location of target.

c. Magnetic bearing of gun to target line, to nearest five degrees.

d. Time of impact of artillery fire on target (for prearranged concentrations).

e. Time element - The time interval between the pilot's command to fire and the instant the burst appears at the target. Time elements include the time in flight of projectile, transmission time, and all other factors, which will be determined and estimated by the corps fire-direction center.

f. Type of ammunition (high explosive, smoke, or both).

g. Identity of artillery unit which will fire the mission.

h. What battery or battalion is to fire adjustment (if an adjustment is to be).

i. Number of rounds to be fired for effect.

j. Any other information considered pertinent to the success of the mission, i.e. height of the battery, etc.

4. Communication.

a. Radio. - The vehicular VHF radio set from the air support party will be operated, whenever, the corps fire-direction center. The pilot, upon taking off, will establish radio contact with the vehicular VHF radio set from the air support party and will report when ready to observe. Air support officer will handle ground communication for all to ground and ground to air.

b. Wire. - The corps fire-direction center will establish telephone communication with the vehicular VHF radio set from the air support party. The pilot's sensings and commands are relayed by telephone to the corps fire-direction center, thence by telephone direct to the unit designated to fire the mission.

c. The normal method of communication will be two way R/T employing the vehicular VHF radio set from the air support party and the set in the fighter-type aircraft.

d. Pilots will check communication with the vehicular VHF radio set from the air support party when airborne at a given time prearranged prior to sortie.

e. Where possible an alternate channel will be designated prior to mission.

5. Missions. - Two types of mission are flown.

a. Observation of a prearranged concentration. - The mission consists of observing and reporting by a single sensing, the overall effect of a prearranged concentration of a specified target. Example: Target is a specific road junction, concentration to fall at 1500 hours. The pilot observes the concentration and sums up its effect in one sensing, such as: "Effect good" or "200 over", or "100 right, 200 short". If possible, he should observe the corrected firing and report final effect.

b. Adjustment of fire. - The mission consists of adjusting the fire, by successive sensings, to place the center of impact on the target.

6. Method for adjustment of fire.

a. Sensing. - The sensing of a burst (or group of bursts) is reported in two parts:

(1) Deflection sensing: Yards right or left of the gun to target line, measured at the target.

(2) Range sensing: Yards over or short of the target, measured along the gun to target line.



b. Importance of gun to target line. - It is most important for the pilot to visualize at the ground the direction of the gun to target line. Otherwise, he cannot distinguish between the deflection and range elements in his sensing; that is, he is unable to make an accurate report and the mission is wasted.

c. Procedure. - In reporting his sensing, the pilot should endeavor at first to bracket the target quickly. There is a natural tendency to underestimate, which leads to "creeping" toward the target with the resulting waste of time and ammunition. If the first burst is so far off that the gun to target line may be crossed, make a wide deflection change; for example: "400 right", "Repeat Range".

d. Number of guns. - As prearranged, adjustment may be with one, two or all guns. When more than one gun is used, the method of fire is by volley (guns firing simultaneously). When volley fire is used, the pilot senses the center of the group of bursts as a single burst or main point of impact. For example: "400 right", "Repeat Range".



e. Smoke. - It may be prearranged to fire the initial round with white phosphorus smoke, as an aid to the pilot. If the pilot fails to locate HE bursts, he may report: "Lost, fire smoke".

f. Completion of adjustment. - Adjustment is completed when the deflection is sensed on the gun to target line and the target lies inside of a 200-yard range bracket. Upon completion of a mission the pilot transmits: "Mission accomplished". The corps fire-direction center causes the ground station to transmit: "No further need of you". The plane then returns to the airdrome.

7. Example (two way radio procedure).

(Call Sign: Able) Pilot to Ground	(Call Sign: Baker) Ground to Pilot	Remarks
Baker from Able - Ready to observe		Plane arrives in area. Pilot orients himself and reports in.
	Able from Baker - Battery is ready	Pilot knows five constant and gives command to fire so that he will be in position to observe at time of burst.
Fire		Battery is always fired on command of the pilot.
	Battery has fired	Information for pilot that battery has fired.
200 Left 400 Over		Sensing
	Roger - Wait	Guns are corrected and prepared to fire.
	Battery is ready	Report to pilot to enable him to get in position to observe second burst.
Roger - Wait		
Fire		
	Battery has fired	
100 Right 200 Short		
	Roger - Wait	Guns again corrected based on last sensings.
	Battery is ready	
Roger - Wait		
Fire		
	Battery has fired	
100 Over Fire for Effect		Pilot requests "Fire for Effect" having split 200 yd range bracket. He indicates deflection is correct by not sensing deflection ("Range is always sensed").
	Roger - Wait	All batteries are corrected with latest sensing.
	Baker firing for effect Able firing for effect Charlie firing for effect	Each battery is fired as soon as possible. Pilot is notified as each battery commences fire for effect.
Mission accomplished		Sensings are made to correct individual batteries that are not on the target (i.e. "Charlie 100 right, repeat range"). If more fire is needed, pilot requests "Repeat fire for effect".
	No further need of you	Pilot returns to base.

Note: The pilot may find it impossible to continue the mission due to enemy interception. He transmits, "Unable to continue mission", and returns to base.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ R. W. Hartman
/s/ R. W. HARTMAN
Lt. Col, A.G.D.
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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Arty
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ANNEX NO. 4

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

9 June 1944.

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM)
NUMBER 15)

ANTITANK MEASURES IN OFFENSE AND DEFENSE

1. GENERAL.

a. Antitank Officers. The following officers are designated as "Antitank Officers" of their respective units. They will be assisted by an officer from the highest attached tank destroyer headquarters.

Division - Division Artillery Officer
Corps - Corps Artillery Officer
Army - Army Artillery Officer

b. Available Antitank Means.

(1) The antitank means in divisions, corps, and army will be highly coordinated and disposed in depth. All available antitank means including attached artillery, antiaircraft, tank and tank destroyer units will be employed. In addition, maximum practical use will be made of demolitions, obstacles (natural and artificial), road blocks, tank traps, and mines.

(2) Each smaller unit will dispose its antitank means initially for the sole protection of the unit, coordination with higher and adjacent echelons will follow, so as to present an all-round antitank defense.

2. WARNING SYSTEM.

a. The primary means of transmitting information of impending or actual armored attacks will be by broadcast directly over the special Army and Corps Artillery SCR 193 Radio Nets. Each station will be in each net continuously. (This is a change in the instructions for the Corps Artillery Net contained in Operations Memorandum No 2, TUSA, 21 April 1944).

b. This information will be transmitted by voice. Each warning will be repeated three times. Warning messages will be modified "Flash Fox" type messages. For "Fox" type messages, see Paragraph No 2, Signal Circular 42-1, Prearranged Code. These messages will be transmitted in the clear. Essential elements of the broadcast will be:

(1) Number of tanks.

(2) Identification (type of tanks).

(3) Location of tanks expressed in grid coordinates (clear).

(4) Direction of movement.

(5) Speed of movement.

(6) Time reported.

c. Upon completion of the transmission only the following stations will receipt, in the order listed below:

Div Arty Headquarters (from right to left).
FA Brig Headquarters
TD Brig or Group Headquarters

Using other means of communication, each of the above headquarters will assure themselves that their subordinate units have received the message. It is the responsibility of corps artillery headquarters, division artillery headquarters, and direct support artillery battalions to transmit the message by fastest practicable means to corps headquarters, division headquarters and infantry regimental headquarters respectively.

d. In addition to the special antitank warning net, tank warnings will be sent by normal telephone and radio nets, supplemented by messenger or other means if available.

3. TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT.

a. Tactical employment will be in accordance with the following:

(1) FM 100-5, Pars 250-254, 591-594, 634-642, 679-695 inclusive.

(2) Letter TUSA, AG 370.2 TD, 17 April 1944, Subject: "Employment of Tank Destroyer Units."

(3) Paragraphs 27 and 28 of Letter of Instruction #5, TUSA, 20 May 44, "Use of Armored Divisions."

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/
H. C. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-3.

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ANNEX NO. 5

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM:
NUMBER 8:

27 May 1944.

FIELD ARTILLERY INTELLIGENCE

1. GENERAL.

Field Artillery is unique among ground arms in its possession of both trained observers and a highly developed communications system and therefore it is an important agency for the collection and dissemination of information. This memorandum is issued to assure aggressive and efficient performance of their intelligence functions by all field artillery units of this command, and embraces doctrine that has been tested and proven in combat.

2. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES - FIELD ARTILLERY.

Intelligence agencies include the battalion, the group, the division, the brigade, and artillery sections of Corps and Army. Additional sources of information include the superior, subordinate, supported, reinforcing, and adjacent units. Also there are specialized agencies, such as field artillery observation battalions and detachments, AAF air observation, air photo interpretation teams, radio intercept and radio position finder units. Each artillery echelon will exploit to the utmost all available agencies.

There must be a constant aggressive flow of traffic through these agencies in both directions. Information is pushed in and up to the higher echelons, intelligence down and out to the lower echelons.

The examination and interpretation of information that transposes it into combat intelligence is exclusively the function of echelons higher than the battalion. The battalion is the keystone in the intelligence arch.

3. SCOPE.

Intelligence duties of the field artillery battalion fall into two equally important categories, those specifically assigned, and those habitually performed.

S-2, whether of army, corps, or division, in formulating the search for information, will assign certain items to the artillery. These will come to the battalion in the form of definite requirements specifying precisely what information is desired and time desired. Battalion compliance will be aggressive and prompt.

The remaining intelligence duties, those which must be regularly performed in every field artillery unit for it to be wholly effective, are all-inclusive. They embrace every aspect both of the enemy and of the terrain not under our control.

The duties of battalion personnel are clear. They must aggressively seek information at all times. They must report promptly, accurately and fully. They must not interpret.

4. SPECIFIC DUTIES.

Certain items of information of a type that will most often come within the purview of artillery personnel merit detail discussion.

a. Friendly and Enemy Forward Elements. No information has greater importance than the current location of our own, and the enemy forward elements. The current location of at least our own forward elements must be on all firing charts at all times. Observers and liaison officers will aggressively seek out and report the locations of forward elements. Report will be made of all changes. If there be no change, negative reports will nevertheless be made at regular intervals.

b. Fire Missions. A target worth firing upon has high intelligence value. Each unit must therefore insure that the S-2 is promptly advised of all fire missions. Coordination between S-2 and S-3 is essential. One method, used successfully, has been to place the S-2 and situation map physically within the fire direction center.

c. Targets. Observers will promptly report all possible targets, whether for artillery or other weapons, and even though not taken under fire, the information will be transmitted laterally and to higher headquarters.

d. Enemy Activity. The slightest activity, no matter how small or seemingly insignificant, is indicative of the enemy's plans and intentions and so assumes intelligence value. Observers therefore will seek out information. Liaison officers will press the unit they are with for all possible information and promptly transmit it to their own CP. Certain more important activities to be sought out and reported include:

(1) Enemy Movements.

(2) Enemy Dispositions.

(3) Inactivity. Enemy inactivity has high significance. Accordingly, reports must be submitted by all observers at regular intervals, even though the report may be negative. In addition to its intelligence value, the negative report insures that the observer is functioning and has working communications. Care is necessary in making negative reports. For example, "No enemy observed" is accurate; "No enemy", in the absence of a thoroughgoing reconnaissance, is an unwarranted conclusion.

e. Enemy OPs. Enemy OPs, both artillery and of other arms, will be sought out with industry and imagination. Every effort will be made to locate them accurately.

f. Enemy Artillery. The location of enemy artillery is a matter of especial concern to all artillery units, for early ascendancy over hostile artillery is essential to success in combat. All artillerymen will consequently be on the lookout for enemy artillery. Reports on hostile artillery will be made as complete as possible.

g. Shelling Reports (Shelrep). Reports of enemy artillery fire received are a most important source of counterbattery intelligence. It is a function of infantry, artillery and all other branches to render such reports as promptly, accurately and as completely as possible.

h. Enemy Aircraft, Armored or Chemical Activity. Artillery units in addition to the usual defensive measures, must recognize the importance of immediate transmission of full information through normal and flash intelligence channels.

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1. Prisoners and Captured Material. The field artillery battalion is neither equipped nor organized for handling prisoners of war, or captured materiel. It will constitute the methods of processing to be followed by field artillery and their units. Speed in delivery to the rear is imperative as prisoners give maximum information only if interrogated before the shock of capture or injury wears off.

j. Effect of our fires. Study of the effect of our fires by observers serves both as a check upon our efficiency and as a source of valuable information. Enemy positions that have been overrun will be carefully inspected wherever possible.

5. IMPROPER PRACTICES.

Combat experience demonstrates the serious failures occasioned by certain practices. Accordingly, all artillery battalions will insure that:

a. The S-2 or a qualified assistant will remain at the CP (FDC) at all times. The S-2 will not be detailed to extraneous duties.

b. The S-2 will maintain frequent contact with observers and liaison officers.

c. The S-2 will insure that liaison officers transmit information, available at their station, to the artillery channels.

6. REPORTS.

Intelligence reports must be carefully prepared and contain what was observed, (that is, the observer), where it was, when it was seen, and a statement of its significance. What, When, Where, What Enemy, and Who, are the irreducible minimum.

7. REPORTS REQUIRED.

Each corps artillery headquarters and artillery brigade headquarters will submit the following report to the army artillery officer:

"Daily counterbattery report" closing at (see operations annexes), and including:

(1) Enemy artillery activity.
(2) Enemy artillery dispositions.
(3) Ammunition expended by the battery.
(4) Deletions from the battery list No ____
(5) Additions to the battery list No ____
(6) General.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

THOR J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

s/
H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, AGD
AC of S, G-1

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ANNEX NO. 6

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

26 June 1944

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION:

NUMBER: 23

SECTION I. Field Artillery Communication.
SECTION II. Field Artillery reports.

SECTION I

FIELD ARTILLERY COMMUNICATIONS

1. RADIO.

a. Call Signs and Frequencies. Call signs for all stations operating in Third US Army net and the frequencies thereof will be published by the army, corps or division SOI. If an artillery unit changes attachment, the unit Communication Officer will, as early as practicable, coordinate all frequency allocations with the Signal and/or Communication Officer of the new superior unit.

b. Voice and CW Procedure. Frequencies have had to be so closely allocated that no interference will be anticipated using voice procedure. Army, corps and, sometimes division nets such as school and rear areas of the ZI, will operate using voice procedure wherever possible. But all stations will be prepared to operate with CW procedure whenever voice operation proves unsatisfactory.

c. Silvan. Silvan is the only secrecy code authorized for use in the artillery SCR or with Army Artillery Officer Radio Nets. Cipher settings and key centergrams for use by all stations in all artillery nets, except intra-battalion nets, will be published in Third US Army SOI.

d. Authentication Code. Third US Army SOI will publish an authentication code for use of brigade, and will be published exclusively by the Army Artillery Officer and the Corps Artillery Officer Radio Nets.

e. Composition of Nets. Field artillery brigade headquarters, all operating army artillery, will normally be the net control station of the army Artillery Radio Net. Army artillery battalions will also be in the army Artillery Radio Net. But artillery assigned a secondary mission of reinforcing a particular corps or unit thereof, in that case their SCR 193 radios will operate in the Corps Artillery Radio Net.

Only one SCR 193 radio of headquarters and headquarters battery, Corps artillery, need be operated in the Corps Artillery Radio Net. This station will serve as NCS.

f. Serenade. Division artillery or group headquarters will normally transmit the request for Serenade by radio so as to alert all units. Corps and division artillery headquarters however frequently can and should assign the mission by telephone.

g. Artillery Air OPs. It is recommended that all artillery liaison planes align their "F" bands on their respective battalion's FM channel, their "A" bands on the FM channel of the respective division artillery, corps artillery or artillery brigade.

2. WIRE.

Each corps will reserve two channels on the corps switchboard for the use of the field artillery brigade regardless of whether the brigade is supporting the corps or not.

When tank destroyers are used in their secondary role as reinforcing artillery, the field artillery battalion will establish wire communication with the attached or reinforcing tank destroyer unit.

SECTION II

FIELD ARTILLERY REPORTS

1. GENERAL.

The following reports are required:

a. To Army Artillery Officers:

From	Subject	Remarks
Corps Arty Comdr, Arty Brigade Comdr	Arty CPs & Air OP Landing Strips	When - as changes occur. Contents - location of Corps, Brigade, Div, and Group Arty CPs, and location of Air OP landing strips of own units.
	Daily Counter-battery Report	When - Daily. Contents - See FUSA Opns Memo No 6, subjects "Field Artillery Intelligence".
	Intelligence	Critical information of enemy in so far as enemy artillery, equipment installations, and assemblies, etc., immediately by most expeditious means available.
	Unit Efficiency	When - upon relief of Army Arty unit from attachment to Corps or Brigade. Contents - brief statement covering operations of unit, general efficiency status of personnel and equipment, and recommendations for maintained combat units.
	Consolidated ammunition expenditure report	Copies of ammunition reports as are compiled by Corps will be furnished Army Arty Officer
All Arty Officers	General	Submit, at any time, views, observations or suggestions as to FA or CA operations, techniques, or equipment. May be published in AIB.
Corps, Brigade, Div & Group Arty Air Officer	Aircraft monthly operations report	When - 5th day of each month. Contents - See Annex 7 to Administrative Order No 1, Third US Army

b. To Mobile Reclamation and Repair Squadron.

Corps, Brigade, Div, & Group Army Air Officer	Damage of aircraft (requiring repairs beyond field repair capabilities)	See paragraph 6 c, Annex 7, to Administrative Order No 1, Third US Army

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

THOR J. GAFFEY
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

s/
H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, AGD
AC of S, G-1

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ANNEX NO. 7

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 405

AGENDA FOR SURVEY CONFERENCE, TUSA

1. Plan for the recovery and extension of survey control by combined efforts of Survey Platoons and Field Artillery Observation Battalions during operations.

2. Operation and function of the Army Survey Center.

3. Discussion of Corps SIC operations with relation to paragraph 2.

4. Technical discussion:

a. Value of trig lists.

b. Available maps.

c. Trig lists to be supplied to troops

(1) Time supplied

(2) Form of data

d. Survey technique.

PLAN FOR THE RECOVERY AND EXTENSION OF SURVEY CONTROL BY COMBINED EFFORTS OF SURVEY PLATOONS AND FIELD ARTILLERY OBSERVATION BATTALIONS DURING OPERATIONS

1. GENERAL:

a. An Army plan involving control for armies as large as France, Belgium, Holland and Germany presents problems for the Corps Engineers. If executive, there are a definite and mostly automatic system (Modern methods of less value) and otherwise. They do, however, require time and highly trained personnel.

b. First lately for us, control has been carried out by various plotting and army units to whose operation accustomed first triangulation by Cassini in the early 19th century. These are and are to be seen adjusted and the points placed in the proper positions. This information is on Table 1 the form of trig lists which have been established in comparative tests.

c. While it is true that some of these positions may be out a plus or minus 10 meters, this use of the positions as given should not affect the accuracy required for artillery use.

2. The problems to be solved by this plan are as follows:

(1) The organization of Survey Platoons (Corps and Army) with the Observation Battalions so that the proper breakdown of personnel will produce the maximum operating efficiency.

(2) Define the command of units within the breakdown.

(3) Define the function of each unit and its responsibilities.

(4) Standardize technique so that each step is carried out with a minimum of time and effort.

(5) Show by example the actual effect of the various types of errors on the final result.

3. ORGANIZATION:

a. Topographic Section (Engineer Section).

b. Army Survey Center (Survey Platoon, Engineer Topographic Battalion).

c. Survey Information Center (Corps Survey Platoon and Observation Battalion groups).

4. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. The Topographic Section will assemble, evaluate and distribute the trig lists for the Army operational areas.

(1) It will supervise and direct the activities of the Army Survey Center.

(2) It will file copies of all new, revised and captured trig lists as they are received from any source in the theater, sending the original of these to the Army Survey Center, SHAEF, for consolidation, that not appropriate, if additional necessary, into trig lists (SHAEF).

b. The Army Survey Center will be responsible for the recovery and extension of points completing the major net.

(1) It will furnish Corps with points with which to start lower order nets.

(2) It will establish azimuth and furnish to Corps the angles and distances between the main triangulation and first order for use by Corps SIC.

(3) It will act as a reserve to Hq, Corps SIC when necessary.

(4) It will tie in Corps nets where differences exist.

(5) It will supply control to Artillery, under established Army control. This may or may not be accomplished together with an SA observation battalion.

c. Survey Information Center

(1) Will extend lower order surveys, from the major net furnished by Army Survey Center, to Corps, Division and Battalion Areas.

(2) The SIC will be in charge of the 20 of the Field Artillery Observation Battalion. The Engineer Survey Platoon (Corps) will be attached to the SIC as needed. It will be the responsibility of the Army Engineer to see that its function is so used that is in accordance with the general scheme of this plan. It will be the responsibility of the 20, Field Artillery Observation Battalion, that the talents of the Survey Platoon be utilized to the extent set forth in paragraph 4 c. (1) above and not used as a check on work done by Artillery personnel.

5. TECHNIQUE:

a. The methods to be used by ASC will conform to standard practice for 1:5000 accuracy or better.

(1) Azimuths are to be based on star observations which will be made during daylight whenever possible.

(2) Computations by graphical or logs to be made in field with final check at headquarters.

b. Corps SIC

(1) Triang lists will be carried out by these units whenever possible and will be run in order of major nets.

(2) The 4th traverse will probably be used in most circumstances. The order of traverse should be that an accuracy of 1:5000. This can be accomplished by double reading of the angles, single chaining with stadia checks, and star observations for azimuth.

(3) With proper training, survey of this order can be obtained with a minimum of personnel.

(4) Points where accuracy is below 1:5000 should not be furnished to units of Division or higher.

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(5) For work from Division to Battalions, control should be held to accuracy of 1:3000 or better, and usually will consist of lines of transit traverse with either star or [illegible] Computations should be sufficiently accurate to [illegible] instrument accuracy.

(6) In the event that time permits the establishing of lines from Battalions to gun positions, there can be run with a transit, with distances by stadia, or by graphic plane table methods. The accuracy to be held to 1:750 or higher and computation made by logs or slide rule.

5. ERRORS AND THEIR EFFECT:

a. An error of plus or minus 10 meters in the starting point will not affect the accuracy of fire provided an astronomic azimuth is taken at start of line.

b. The results of a possible error of plus or minus 10 meters between two stations, occurring at right angles to the line between them, if used for an azimuth without an astronomic observation, is shown in Table I (attached).

c. Errors due to temperature changes are tabulated in Table II (attached).

d. It should be noted that these errors are cumulative, and unless corrections are made, they can cause errors of 1:3000 or more, depending, of course, upon the temperature at the time of survey.

ANNEX NO. 8

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 405

SECRET
Auth: CG, 3d US Army, GO
Initials: [illegible]

AIR OP BULLETIN) 20 May 1944
NUMBER 1)

1. General. This bulletin is intended as a means of dissemination of all types of information or value in the training and administration of Artillery Air OP Sections, and in the maintenance, operation and tactical employment of field artillery aircraft. Efficient operation of the Air OP means increased striking power of the field artillery. Any information that is received by this headquarters which is sent to the Army Artillery Air Officer, Headquarters Third United States Army, APO 405. These bulletins will be classified only as may be required by the local security situation, and distribution will be made so that all concerned may receive information promptly and have it available for ready reference.

2. Operating Procedure. For the information and guidance of all concerned, a copy of Annex Number 2 to Administrative Order Number 1, this headquarters, dated 11 April 1944, in format attached as Inclosure 1.

3. Supply Procedure. Requisitions will be made on SOS, Third Tactical Air Depot, APO 140, and dispatched to Army Artillery Air Officer for approval. (Reference paragraph 3, Annex 2 to Administrative Order No 1, this headquarters, dated 11 April 1944.) If the requisitioning Air Officer so desires, the words "hold for pick up" may be entered in the requisition space on the face of the requisition. The Army Artillery Air Officer will notify the unit when equipment is ready for pick up. Otherwise equipment will be shipped to unit or an intermediate point for pick up. ASC requisitions are covered in Inclosure 1. The following is extracted from paragraph 2 b (10) (c), Administrative Order Number 1, this headquarters: "Requisitions will not be classified. The heading on the requisition will include only: 1. The Organization's serial Number, (recent arrivals who have not yet been assigned an SOS serial number, will use their shipment task force number), 2. geographical location, 3. railhead designation, and 4. telephone number. Organization designation (name) and APO number will not be placed on requisitions under any circumstances. 5. Unclassified requisitions will be enclosed in double envelopes when mailed. The inner envelope will be addressed and stamped "Confidential". The outer envelope will be ad-

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dressed and will also bear the return address (name and APO number of the unit)." Blank second sheet paper may be used for the carbon copies of requisitions. Space for signature of approving officer on Form 109 should be left blank.

4. Engineering.

a. Higher echelon maintenance. Requests for higher echelon maintenance and pick up of aircraft damaged beyond local repair should be directed to the Engineering Officer, or the Assistant Engineering Officer, Third Tactical Air Depot, telephone number Wantage 200, extension 300 or 309, in accordance with paragraph 6 e, Inclosure 1.

b. Spark plugs. Difficulty in removing spark plugs has been encountered in certain cases where no anti-seize compound has been applied to the threads of the plug upon installation. To prevent this, the following compound should be applied sparingly, care being taken to keep the electrodes free of grease:

Compound, Anti-seize, Mica Base; Class OC-B
Specification AN-VV-A-576
Stock Number 7510-0-52000

One-pound cans are available on requisition through normal artillery air supply channels. Caution should be exercised to insure that only mica base anti-seize compound is used on spark plugs as other types will cause freezing.

c. Compasses. All aircraft compasses must be swung at least once every 100 hours of flying time or 90 days, whichever period is shorter, and frequently oftener under press of tactical use. This is most easily accomplished by following instructions contained in Technical Order 05-15-5. All compasses of new aircraft issued in this theater have shown marked deviation from the compass correction card installed, up to as much as 40 degrees in some cases.

d. Technical Orders. Requisitions for Technical Orders should be made direct to the Army Artillery Air Officer. It should be borne in mind that the supply of Technical Orders is very limited and cinemegraph copies only will be available.

e. Blank forms. Requisitions for blank forms should be made in the same manner as requisitions for parts and supplies.

5. Training and Operations.

a. SD 1C. Paragraph 5 a, Annex No 7 to Administrative Order No 1, this headquarters, requires that British SD 1C be requisitioned and is quoted in part: "Units will submit requisitions in accordance with provisions of Circular 77, Headquarters AFHQ, dated 18 December 1943." For the information of those who have not yet placed such a requisition, Circular 77 has been replaced by Circular 30, Headquarters AFHQ, dated 16 March 1944. Requisitions should be in letter form and must be through channels.

b. Pilot Training. Navigation training is important at the present time, for as Lt Col [illegible] says, "In the United Kingdom is different from that in the United States. A combination of unfamiliar maps, strange terrain, lack of prominent identifiable terrain features, and large distances in the air speeds of new aircraft delivered to units has accounted for pilots becoming lost. Compass errors can be corrected by a simple swinging as explained in Technical Order 05-15-5. This should be done immediately after delivery of new aircraft and again toward the end of the first month's operation. Thereafter, the interval between swinging should be not greater than that recommended in Technical Order 05-15-5 and as short as conditions warrant. Pilot proficiency training should be accomplished under full load conditions. A solo hop and a fully loaded hop are the two different aircraft in making short field landings and takeoffs. Unit commanders and pilots should realize this, and full load practice complete with passenger and radio or the equivalent weight should be emphasized. Several accidents have resulted from pilots landing in too small fields and then cracking up on taking out. In flying out of a questionable field it is not often impossible to first give it a solo try and then return to pick up the passenger or proceed to a larger field.

c. Observer Training. The following is quoted from First U S Army Artillery Information Service, February 1944:

"Methods of training will vary with the policies of the division artillery commanders, the time, the areas, terrain and facilities available. Only suggestions of more or less general application can be laid down, but briefly, selection of instructors should be made with the utmost care and the training program outlined by them should be worked out in the fullest possible detail to cover all phases from basic instruction to completion of the observation course by intensive aerial firing.

Certainly a brief period should be allowed for 'conditioning' flights in which the candidate will learn the maneuvers of a plane, its flight characteristics, and how physically and mentally to adapt himself thereto. These preliminary hops should gradually merge into orientation flights during which the student will learn the differences in the appearance which varying terrains present when viewed from the air. He will learn to judge distances from various altitudes and will gradually acquire the knack of tying in ground patterns as seen from the air with the map depiction of those same patterns. His aerial map reading will begin to be automatic rather than studied.

"More intensive training should be started in joint identification. The observer must be taught and must learn how, speedily, and accurately, to locate on a map, an indicated point on the ground as well as the easier task of spotting on the ground, from the air, an indicated map point. The length of time necessary to teach this will vary with each individual. Highly skilled instruction is necessary but no candidate should be considered qualified until he is thoroughly competent in this most important phase of aerial observation.

"Observation of maneuvers and emplacements of friendly troops from normal altitudes and distances will aid the development of this all-important knack of target identification. Talks by battle-trained observers and study of aerial photos, obliques in particular, will help. The student must be shown how to search an area for the usual ordinances of enemy batteries and other emplacements. He must be told their customary tactical dispositions. He should be taught to 'spot' a gun's flash and how, hastily but accurately, to pin point it on the ground as a prerequisite to locating its position on a map. This he will learn is vital, because of the long time lag' will be seen but once, while the gun itself is difficult, even impossible, to detect.

"When this stage of training is successfully completed, and not until then, the student will be ready to begin actual observation and conduct of fire from the air. First he should be shown burst patterns, should learn what smoke, high explosive, ricochets and time fire look like from the air. He should learn the appearance of normal shell and become accustomed to judging bursts and range deflection deviations from widely varying angles and altitudes. He will learn the differences between range rounds of 50, 100, 200, 400, and 800 yards as viewed from a plane, and should soon be able to tell that of like on the ground and in his own mind regardless of the tanks and burns he may see walking. He will begin to estimate time of flight and so to indicate to his pilot the approaches desired to permit best observation.

"Once all this has been mastered the actual conduct of fire will prove simple. The very few variations from normal forward observer procedure and technique will present no difficulties to the student, who, as he must, already knows how to shoot.

"In the final analysis, of course, only actual missions in combat will produce skilled and experienced observers. Completion of a course such as has been briefly sketched will, however, develop trained officers who will readily, quickly and smoothly assimilate battle experience.

"The artillery of any division should have a constant available pool of from six to twelve observers so trained, in addition to such pilots as may also be trained artillery officers. (Experience has shown conclusively, incidentally, that it is almost impossible for a pilot to fly a plane in combat and observe for artillery purposes at the same time, hence no reference is made to efforts which have been made to combine the two functions.) Whenever pilot is training should be carried out to increase this nucleus or to provide for replacements to maintain such a quota.

"The term 'pool' as here used does not imply a separate group, detached from the individual battalions. What is actually meant is that there should be at least two, preferably three, qualified observers available at all times within each battalion."

The following extract from Employment of Field Artillery, II Corps, in the Sicilian Campaign is noteworthy:

"Units that had trained officers for the specific job of air observer were able to obtain maximum use of their Air OPs. These units reported a large number of successful air missions. Units that used untrained air observers experienced difficulty in successfully employing their Air OPs. These units reported only a small number of successful missions."

6. Accidents.

a. Aircraft accidents continue and the causes are all traceable to one of the following:

(1) Pilot error.

(2) Overloading of aircraft.

(3) Unauthorized persons flying aircraft.

(4) Carburetor icing.

(5) Contour flying in strange areas.

(6) Low altitude aerobatics.

b. In order that personnel concerned may learn from others' misfortunes, a brief summary of major accidents with comments by the Army Artillery Air Officer will be published in Air OP Bulletins.

c. Recent accidents.

(1) Pilot, with mechanic as passenger, was contour flying"...plane struck power line and crashed. Power line was low over an open field and was partially hidden as it blended in perfectly with the turrets." It was stated that a reconnaissance of the area had been made.

Comment: None.

(2) Two pilots, ferrying an aircraft to their home station, became lost and landed in a small field to ascertain their location. This field was approximately seventy yards long with a pole line along the road and trees a short distance beyond. In the take off the pilot (with passenger) cleared the wires but crashed through the tops of the trees, and landed beyond them in the characteristic tail or spin attitude: nose end and wing tip first. This resulted in fatal injury to the pilot flying and serious injury to the other pilot.

Comment: Upon becoming lost, one is apt to get more or less excited or apprehensive, and it must be remembered that under such conditions, judgment is apt to suffer. Therefore, pick a large field, or pick a small one and be content to pull the wings off and live to tell.

(3) Pilot and passenger on a cross country flight became lost and landed in a small field to obtain directions. The field, however turned out to be too small and on take off the pilot was unable to clear a stone fence. The aircraft was ruined but pilot and passenger were unhurt.

Comment: None.

(4) Extracted from First Lettow Sutton Army Air OP Bulletin No 3, of 16 March 1944:

"(1) Pilot and passenger were operating out of a field outside of a barrage balloon area. An observation barrage balloon was located near the side of the field and was not visible to the pilot as the balloon was in the overcast at 500 feet. In circling the field the aircraft wing struck the cable which constituted a leading edge to the front spar, stalling the aircraft. With full throttle, the pilot went forward on the stick and tried to disengage from the cable. He was unable to do this so he throttled back and spiraled down with the cable still in the wing, crash landing to the top of a tree. The passenger was unhurt and the pilot suffered minor head injuries.

"Comment: The pilot by maintaining flying speed and keeping his head was able to effect a good forced landing with only minor injuries to personnel.

"(2) Recently a pilot, after making several low drags over a strange field in order to plan his approach, made a power approach or assumed, cleared the edge of the field and touched down on the slight positive slope of the field. The pilot was unable to check his landing roll due to wet slippery grass (it having rained earlier in the day) and the aircraft skidded into a stone fence resulting in major damage to the aircraft, however, the pilot and mechanic were uninjured.

"Comment: Precautious about landing in small fields that require braking to stop roll when the conditions of the ground is likely to be slippery.

"(3) While pilot and observer were flying at about 1,000 feet altitude, two miles northwest of [illegible], the engine started to lose RPM due to carburetor icing. Heat was immediately applied, but the engine did not pick up RPM. At about 400 feet altitude the engine cut out completely and the pilot prepared to make a forced landing. On the approach end of the field selected were trees and the supporting poles of a high tension line running along the edge of the field. The pilot, unable to see the wires flew into them, stalling the aircraft which crashed on its nose. Pilot and passenger were both injured, the pilot sustaining serious injuries. The aircraft was demolished.

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"Coment: Except when the maximum RPM is required for short periods of time, carburetor that should always be used when outside temperatures are between -60C and +20C. Carburetor icing conditions prevail at this time of the year in the UK. WHEN IN DOUBT USE CARBURETOR HEAT."

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ R. W. Hartman
/t/ R. W. HARTMAN,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

1 Incl
Incl 1 - Annex #7 to Adm O #1, Hq TUSA, 14 Apr 44.

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ANNEX NO. 9

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 300.2 (FA) - OPNCW 25 April 1944.

SUBJECT: Forward Observer Sections for Infantry Division Light Artillery Battalions.

TO : Commanding General, ETOUSA, APO 887, U S Army.

1. Recent campaign experiences indicate that 65 to 75 per cent of all artillery targets are provided by forward observers. In addition, a high percentage of tactical information originates with these observers.

2. Present T/O & E for artillery do not provide sufficient personnel and equipment to function as organized forward observer sections without reducing below the tactically minimum the battery personnel now authorized. It is therefore felt that certain field artillery units should be authorized appropriate increases in order to fully perform their missions.

3. The following is recommended as the essential personnel and equipment for a forward observer section:

a. Personnel:

1 - 1st Lieutenant, FA
1 - Sergeant (T/O)
1 - Technician 5th grade, operator, radio (177)
1 - Driver (345)

b. Equipment:

2 - Radio Set, SCR 536
1 - Radio Set, SCR 610
2 - Telephone, EE-8-A
2 - Wire Unit, on Reel Unit RL-39 (miles)
2 - Tool Equipment, TE-22, sets
1 - Stove, gasoline, portable vehicle type
2 - Binoculars, M7
1 - Telescope, observation, M5
3 - Carbine, cal. .30, M1
1 - Pistol, cal. .45
1 - Truck, ¼-ton, C & R
1 - Trailer, ¼-ton

4. It is recommended that tables of organization be changed to provide that forward observer sections be assigned on the basis of one per medium battalion headquarters battery (T/O & E 6-36) and one per firing battery in light battalions (T/O & E 6-27 and T/O & E 6-167).

For the Commanding General:

/s/ Hugh J. Gaffey
/t/ HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff.

ANNEX NO. 10

SECRET

ANNEX 2 TO FO 1, THIRD US ARMY

FIELD ARTILLERY

Hq Third US Army
APO 403, ETO
0112OCB Aug 44

Maps: GSGS 4249, 1/100,000 sheets 6F, 7F, 6G, 7G.

1. See FO 1, Hq Third US Army.

2. General mission - arty with each corps will aggressively support the attack with all available means.

3. a. Arty with the corps

(1) VIII Corps

12 FA Obsn Bn
17th FA Gp
19th FA Gp
26th FA Gp
*333 FA Gp
667 FA Bn (105 H)
964 FA Bn (155 H)
*777 FA Bn (155 H)
665 FA Bn (155 H)
*969 FA Bn (155 H)
559 FA Bn (155 G)
761 FA Bn (155 G)
734 FA Bn (155 G)
*979 FA Bn (8" H)
17th FA Bn (155 G - SP)
[illegible] FA Bn)
69 Armd FA Bn) Attached at time and place to be designated by CG, VIII Corps
69th Armd FA Bn)
[illegible] Armd FA Bn)
177 FA Bn (155 M))

249 FA Bn (240 M) available for attachment on request in present location vicinity of BRICQUEBEC (1303)

(2) XV Corps

3 FA Obsn Bn
6th FA Gp
11th FA Gp
17th FA Gp
24th FA Gp
[illegible] Armd FA Bn
258 FA Bn (105 H)
693 FA Bn (105 H)
155 FA Bn (155 H)
209 FA Bn (155 H)
961 FA Bn (155 H)
974 FA Bn (155 H)
[illegible] FA Bn (155 G)
[illegible] FA Bn (155 G)
731 FA Bn (155 G)
989 FA Bn (155 G)
*999 FA Bn (8" H)

270 FA Bn (240 M) available for attachment on request in present location vicinity of BRICQUEBEC (1303)

(3) XX Corps

5 FA Gp)
83 Armd FA Bn) Attached VIII Corps at time and place
695 Armd FA Bn) designated by CG, VIII Corps
69[illegible] Armd FA Bn)
177 FA Bn (155 M))

(4) Coordination between corps -

Location of sound and flash bases, OPs, and fires in adjacent corps and army zones of action will be coordinated where necessary by Corps Arty Comdrs.

Communication will be established and liaison officers exchanged by adjacent corps arty and by flash divi-

[illegible]

(1) Organization -

269th and 270th FA Bns remain in present location until further orders.

e. Arty with the army.

(1) Ammunition - To be announced.

(2) Obsn -

Ground, air, map and photo recn will be pushed with view to maintaining maximum support as attack progresses.

Arty/R will be available for search, adjustment and surveillance missions.

Air OP will maintain counter flak patrols during Arty/R missions and close support air bombardment.

(3) AA and AT -

Use of AA and TD units to reinf arty to fire harassing and interdiction missions at the discretion of Corps Comdrs.

4. See FO 1.

a. Am depots

(1) VIII Corps - To be announced.

(2) XV Corps - To be announced.

5. See FO 1.

* Colored personnel

PATTON
Comdg

OFFICIAL:

c/
MADDOX
C-3

DISTRIBUTION: Same as FO 1 plus 1 copy each to VIII, XV, XX Corps Arty.

SECRET

ANNEX NO. 11

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

1 September 1944

AIR OP BULLETIN)
)
NUMBER 2)

1. GENERAL. This bulletin is intended as a means of dissemination of all types of information in the training and administration of Artillery Air OP Sections, and in the maintenance, operation and tactical employment of field artillery aircraft. Efficient operation of the Air OPs means increased striking power of the field artillery. Any informa-

DECLASSIFIED

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tion that is desirable to pass on to other units should be sent to the Army Artillery Air Officer, Headquarters Third United States Army, APO [illegible]. These reports will be used locally, or required by the Information and Education Section, for historical purposes.

2. ADMINISTRATION.

a. Operations and Status Reports. Each corps artillery headquarters, [illegible] Army Artillery Air Officer, [illegible] and consolidate all artillery reports. All reports of aircraft of the Army Artillery Officer's as to remain in the headquarters or in helping the [illegible] must report showing the fixed [illegible] of the Army artillery Air Observation Section as prescribed by the Chief of the Air Corps. In addition to the requirements set forth in section [illegible] of the directive, the following status report will be rendered [illegible] and will show:

(1) Personnel

(a) Pilots. Each assigned pilot by name, rank, serial number, organization and total number of hours in aviation.

(b) Mechanics. Each assigned mechanic by name, rank and serial number and organization. [illegible] will not be included unless graduates of the Airplane Mechanics Course, Field Artillery, School.

(c) Number of pilots authorized, and number of mechanics authorized.

(2) Aircraft

(a) Aircraft by type, AAF serial number, squadron code marking and organization to which assigned. Detailed time, and condition or extent, good, fair, poor, unserviceable) of each aircraft will be indicated.

(b) Time. Total number of hours flown by all aircraft during period of the report.

(3) Maintenance.

(a) Major repairs or maintenance performed locally. Show aircraft by serial number and extent of work accomplished.

(b) Aircraft turned in to M.R.& R. Squadron for major repair, maintenance or salvage (show aircraft serial number).

(4) Missions (number of missions in each category):

(a) Adjustment of fire - combat.

(b) Reconnaissance - combat.

(c) Patrol - combat.

(d) Night - combat.

(e) Other - combat (state nature).

(f) Training.

(g) Administrative.

(5) Miscellaneous.

(a) Maintenance or supply difficulties.

(b) Explanation of new uses made of aircraft.

(c) Explanation of any changes made in aircraft or allied equipment, that have been found beneficial.

b. Operation of Artillery Air Fields. When circumstances [illegible] artillery air fields [illegible] Army artillery, division artillery and field artillery group and brigade headquarters will be transmitted direct to the Army Artillery Air Officer without delay upon location or relocation of such fields.

c. Accidents and Accident Reports.

(1) Report of major aircraft accidents will be made direct, or through Corps Artillery Air Officer, to Army Artillery Air Officer within twenty-four hrs. If accident by the most expeditious means available. Prompt reporting will insure dispatch of pickup crew and replacement of aircraft. Report will include:

(a) Aircraft serial number and/or squadron code marking.

(b) Pilot's name.

(c) Location of accident.

(d) Exact location or point where pickup crew may meet guide.

(e) Nearest town.

(f) Name of corps, division, brigade or group Artillery Air Officer of unit in which aircraft is assigned.

(g) Condition of aircraft with especial reference to destruction by fire.

(2) Crash pickup. Damaged aircraft requiring third or fourth echelon maintenance will not be used by crash pickup crew. Crash pickup crew will be dispatched from M.R.& R. Squadron immediately upon receipt of report as required in paragraph 2 c. (1) above. Guard will be placed on crashed aircraft until aircraft is removed. Guard will be placed at point specified at time agreed upon to meet pickup crew and will remain there until crew arrives.

d. Communication channels. Artillery Air Officers of corps, division, brigade, field artillery group and separate battalions will communicate direct with Army Artillery Air Officer on all routine matters pertaining to Artillery Air Service. All written communications addressed to [illegible] for the attention of the Artillery Air Officer in any headquarters should be marked "Artillery Air Officer". Whether headquarters be [illegible] Air Service Group, Air Depot, Air Base, or Wing headquarters only the "Air Officer" should be mentioned to avoid delay in delivery.

e. Award of Pilot Air Medal. Circular 59, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, May 11, 1944, is quoted for the information and guidance of all concerned:

"59. Field Artillery, Pilots and Observers qualify for the award of the Air Medal by either:

"a. Any single meritorious act while participating in aerial flight, or

"b. Thirty-five (35) sorties.

"(1) A sortie is an flight in which the airplane is attacked by enemy aircraft or any intense flight which involves either:

"(a) Adjustment of artillery fire on an enemy installation;

"(b) Surveillance of artillery fire on an enemy installation;

"(c) Registration of artillery fire on an enemy installation; or

"(d) Front line reconnaissance of at least one hour duration.

"(2) Credit for sorties.

"(a) Credit for only one sortie will be given regardless of any combination of the above missions which may be accomplished on any one flight.

"(b) Credit for a sortie will be given only when every effort for the accomplishment has been made. Such credits will be specified and approved by the battalion, group, brigade, division, corps or army artillery commander."

3. SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE.

a. General. The 43d Mobile Reclamation and Repair Squadron has been designated to perform higher echelon maintenance and act as technical adjutant for Air Service of the Third US Army. Corps artillery Air Officers will be notified of the location of this unit as its moves from place to place. Generally this unit will move to each new location to give work to the service and the section will be tactically located at the Army Air Strip.

b. Higher Echelon Maintenance Policy. Until such time as the M.R.& R. Squadron accumulates sufficient backlog of work, it is prepared to accomplish any maintenance which cannot be expeditiously handled by Air Service units in the field. Units operating to keep an aircraft active, and having on aircraft requiring an engine change or which would be faced with the probability of having a grounded aircraft for a prolonged period, should notify the M.R.& R. Squadron in such a case which will be called upon to perform the necessary maintenance. However, normal maintenance which can reasonably be accomplished by units will not be done by the M.R.& R. Squadron.

c. Supply. All items of supply which are consumed in the process of use, such as safety wire, cotter pins, fabric, dope, etc., will be supplied on Form 61a, which will be made out by the requisitioning unit and presented direct to the M.R.& R. Technical Supply Officer. All parts will be issued only upon presentation of a like damaged part; i.e., to obtain a propeller, or landing gear, a broken or otherwise unserviceable propeller or landing gear must be turned in. It is contemplated that division, corps, brigade, group and only separate battalion Air Section representatives draw supplies at the M.R.& R. base. Battalions should habitually obtain supply through their respective division, brigade, or group Air Section.

d. Replacement.

(1) Aircraft. All replacement aircraft will be made available at the M.R.& R. Squadron through the Army Artillery Air Officer. No aircraft will be issued without proper squadron code marking. Requests for replacement aircraft will be made direct to Army Artillery Air Officer by most expeditious means available and will include:

Organization (by code name or name of Air Officer).

Squadron code or serial number of aircraft to be replaced.

Status of unserviceable aircraft (damaged, burned, lost).

Particulars of accident.

Pilots and observers names and injuries, if any.

Location of aircraft to be replaced.

(2) Personnel. Requests for replacement pilots will be made direct to Army Artillery Air Officer by most expeditious means available and will include:

Organization (by code name or name of Artillery Air Officer).

Name of pilot to be replaced.

Reason replacement is necessary.

Particulars of accident.

e. Unserviceable Air Force Equipment.

All unserviceable aircraft or parts thereof will be turned in to the M.R.& R. Squadron as soon as practicable. If the case of aircraft to be turned in for salvage or repair of major damage sustained in an accident, report will be made in accordance with paragraph 2 c. (1) above. When any aircraft or engine is turned in for any reason, [illegible] forms (1 A Log, 41a, 41b, 61a) will be turned in with it. These forms will be maintained up to date at all times. No parts will be removed from unserviceable aircraft to restore other aircraft to flying status (cannibalism) unless such parts are not available from like, in which case the unserviceable aircraft from which parts are removed will be stripped of all usable parts while aircraft is turned in for salvage. Each aircraft turned in will be complete with all unserviceable or unserviceable. In no case will aircraft be considered to contain defective spare parts kits. If unserviceable parts will be taken from the aircraft preservation as serviceable parts. All available records will be turned in with the aircraft. [illegible] or engine [illegible] or [illegible] engines will be turned in completely reassembled.

f. Unsatisfactory Report (URs).

Air Force equipment defective design or basic defects due to faulty material, workmanship, or shop operation, and failure of [illegible] under normal use will be reported promptly on URs to the Army Artillery Air Officer. URs will consolidated and forwarded through the Army Air Force channels. Unless otherwise directed, defective parts and assemblies will be tagged as defective and turned into the M.R.& R. Squadron.

g. Spare Engines and Spare Parts.

Spare engines (complete), all cowls, tail surfaces, ribs, and struts may be turned into the M.R.& R. as desired. The immediate availability of this equipment decreases necessity of maintaining such items on hand in units.

4. OPERATIONS.

a. Flights to United Kingdom.

No artillery aircraft will be flown to the United Kingdom

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without prior approval and clearance through the Artillery Air Officer, this headquarters.

b. Squadron Code Markings.

(1) The purpose of squadron code marking is to:

(a) Enable friendly units and personnel to identify their own aircraft when airborne.

(b) Lessen the possibility of the use of a Cub behind our lines by the enemy.

(2) It is the responsibility of all concerned that:

(a) No field artillery aircraft be flown without proper squadron code marking.

(b) Any aircraft believed to be missing or lost over enemy territory be reported direct by the most expeditious means available to the Artillery Air Officer, this headquarters.

(c) Any field artillery aircraft observed displaying questionable squadron code markings be reported direct by the most expeditious means available to the Artillery Air Officer, this headquarters.

(d) Pilots should not circle any particular spot or small area unnecessarily as this draws suspicion upon the aircraft concerned.

(3) Certain squadron code markings at variance with those in use on artillery aircraft will be seen in forward areas on L-4 and L-5 aircraft. These are:

BC - 1 (through 10)
BR - A (through Z)
9S - A (through Z)
6C - A (through ZZ)

An L-1 aircraft may be seen operating in forward areas.

c. Flying Uniform. Leggings will not be worn by pilots or observers while flying. Hooks thereon are apt to catch in rudder cables and on projections in the aircraft. Abandoning of aircraft in flight is reported to have been impaired thereby. Heavy boots, or shoes, and other footgear that has any tendency to bind between rudder pedals and fuselage members next to pedals, will not be worn by pilots while flying. Paratroop boots or the equivalent well broken in are satisfactory in the smaller sizes; low quarter shoes are most satisfactory. Low or stiff, heavy boots make it very difficult for any but a short person to operate the brakes properly.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ R. W. Harbeson
/t/ R. W. HARBESON
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

DISTRIBUTION:
H - to include:
on Div Arty Hq
on Corps Arty Hq
on FA Gp Hq
on FA Bn
1 - Arty O, Central Gp of Armies, APO 655
1 - Arty O, First US Army, APO 230
1 - Arty O, Ninth US Army, APO 339
50 - Arty O, Third US Army, APO 403

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ANNEX NO. 12

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Artillery Officer
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Date: 26 Sep 44
Init: ETW

26 September 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Artillery Commanders, XII Corps
XV Corps
XX Corps

1. In compliance with paragraph 3, Letter of Instructions No 4, this headquarters, dated 25 September 1944, it is desired that all corps artillery commanders prepare without delay overlays to the scale of 1/50,000 for prearranged concentrations on all possible avenues of tank attack for all artillery with the corps.

2. Concentrations will be numbered consecutively from north to south within each corps zone of action.

3. The following blocks of numbers are allotted to corps:

XX Corps - 1 to 999
XII Corps - 1000 to 1999
XV Corps - 2000 to 2999

4. The location of each concentration will be indicated by its center point and concentrations will be appropriately numbered.

5. Necessary registration and survey will be conducted by all artillery whose fire possibilities permit to insure accurate massed fire on the prearranged concentrations. Data for each concentration will be placed on data sheets arranged in logical sequence to aid the battery executives. Registration or metro corrections will be kept up to date.

6. Adjacent corps and division artillery commanders will be furnished ten (10) copies of each appropriate overlay. Thirty (30) copies will be furnished this office for distribution to echelons of XIX Tactical Air Command. Additions or changes to the plan will receive the same distribution.

/s/ EDWARD T. WILLIAMS
Colonel, FA
Artillery Officer

Copies to:
G-3 this hq
G-3 Air, this hq
XIX TAC

SECRET

ANNEX NO. 13

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

18 October 1944

AIR OF BULLETIN)
NUMBER 3)

1. AD INVESTIGATION.

a. Operations and Status Reports. These reports will be submitted in duplicate so as to reach this headquarters on or before the tenth of each month covering the operations of the previous month. Subject matter required is covered in paragraph 2 a, Air Of Bulletin Number 2, this headquarters, dated 1 September 1944, and in addition hours flown by each pilot for the period will be included. A sample form for local reproduction and use if desired is attached hereto as inclosure number 1.

b. Accident Reports.

(1) Paragraph 2 a, Air OF Bulletin Number 2, this headquarters, dated 1 September 1944, is rescinded.

(2) Any incident resulting in loss of or major damage to aircraft, or loss of or major injury to a pilot, or observer, will be reported in accordance with the provisions of letter, Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, file AG 373.2 (Arty), subject: "Field Artillery Air Of Loss Reports", dated 12 September 1944, with first indorsement, this headquarters, dated 21 September 1944. Three copies of "Air Of Loss Report" form are attached to each copy of subject letter. Additional copies may be obtained from Corps Artillery Air Officers or either echelon of the L R & R Squadron.

(3) Preliminary report of any incident resulting in loss of or major damage to aircraft, or loss of or major injury to a pilot or observer will be made by most expeditious means available to Army Artillery Air Officer, direct, by the Artillery Air Officer of the corps, division, group or separate battalion concerned; prompt reporting will expedite replacement. Information given will be:

(a) Pilot (Name of and result to).

(b) Aircraft (Serial number and squadron code marking of and result to).

(c) Location of aircraft.

(d) Whether or not L R & R Squadron has been notified (see paragraph 1 d, below).

c. Separate Battalions. For all purposes in connection with Air OP activities, separate battalions are only those battalions not operating under a corps artillery, division artillery, field artillery brigade or field artillery group headquarters.

d. Crash Pickup. Damaged aircraft requiring third or fourth echelon maintenance will be picked up by the appropriate echelon of the 43d L R & R Squadron. Artillery air officer of corps, division, field artillery brigade or group concerned will initiate action by contacting 43d L R & R Squadron either direct or through the Army Artillery Air Officer. Information in items (1) - (5) below will be reported and provision made for a guide to lead crash truck from the L R & R Squadron location, or from other agreed upon meeting point to the location of the damaged aircraft.

(1) Aircraft serial number.

(2) Pilot's name.

(3) Location of aircraft.

(4) Location of point to meet guide.

(5) Condition of aircraft.

e. SD 533; SD 158.

(1) Letter, Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, subject: "Discontinuance of Distribution", dated 25 September 1944, states that distribution of SD 533 (CONFIDENTIAL) and Amendments, to field artillery units as pertaining to field artillery Air OPs has been discontinued. All copies of this publication now in the hands of field artillery troops will be returned to AG Publications, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, APO 887, U S Army.

(2) All copies of SD 158, "Routing Recognition and Identification of Aircraft", parts 1, 2 and 4 with amendments thereto, in the hands of field artillery units will be returned to AG Publications, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, APO 887, U S Army.

2. SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE.

a. General. So much of paragraph 3 a, Air OF Bulletin Number 2, this headquarters, dated 1 September 1944, as prescribes one section of the 43d L R & R Squadron will be habitually located at the Army Air Strip is rescinded. Each echelon will be located so as to render the best service to the corps which that echelon supports.

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b. Engine changes. Several engines turned in to 434 M R & R Squadron for exchange have been stamped since removal from aircraft. Moisture condensation within cylinders owing to open spark plug holes had caused rusting of cylinder walls. Engines so damaged cannot be rebuilt, as oversize pistons are not available. When engines are removed from aircraft for exchange or temporary storage, the following preparations will be accomplished:

(1) Remove oil from sump, wire drain plug to engine and insert dehydrator plug from new engine or reinstall drain plug.

(2) Through the spark plug openings, spray the valves with corrosion preventive compound, Spec AN-VV-C, or, if not available, introduce a small quantity of engine oil into each cylinder and then rotate crankshaft through several revolutions to insure that the exhaust valves and guides are filmed with oil.

(3) Reinstall either spark plugs or the shipping plugs removed from new engine. Do not leave spark plug holes or oil sump drain hole open.

4. OPERATIONS.

a. Restricted Area. General Order No 90, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, dated 11 September 1944, states: "The airspace above the city of Paris is hereby declared a restricted area. No airplane will be operated below 3,000 feet within such area, except when operationally required."

b. Fatigue. Pilot fatigue must be given careful consideration in planning operations. Some pilots of this command logged over 100 hours during the month of August. Experience in other theaters in the type of flying done by artillery pilots, and experience in other military aviation activities, point to the fact that use of pilots must be restricted and conserved. Results of pilot fatigue do not necessarily show up in easily recognizable forms but in an increasing accident rate, reduction in efficiency and in a reduced ability to evaluate quickly a set of circumstances and react to the dictates of good judgment. Few pilots will admit that they have flown too much during a period. It is believed that by careful evaluation of all contemplated missions with a view to eliminating those which could be accomplished by some other means and by consolidating patrol missions, individual pilot time may be reduced to a minimum of sixty hours per month or lower.

c. Weather.

(1) The arrival of winter weather conditions will bring new problems to Air OP Operations. Expected daily averages and minimums of temperature will warrant certain protective measures for aircraft engines. Insulation of oil sumps with non-inflammable material and closure of the control air intake opening in the engine cowling are advisable as soon as conditions warrant. (In no case will metallic or other shields be affixed to forward edges of cylinder barrels or heads as any modification to existing baffle assembly will disturb the aerodynamic function of the baffles and uneven cooling and "hot spots" within the engine will result.) Pilots should be increasingly alert to recognize signs of carburetor icing. Outside air temperature ranging from plus 20°F to plus 70°F is critical for formation of ice and under certain conditions of low temperature it can be caused in the O-170-3 engine by application of heat. During Air OP operations in September two fatalities were the direct result of engine failure due to carburetor icing.

(2) Sufficient snow to impede operations is not expected during October, November and December, but rain will make some fields too hazardous for take-offs and landings. Hazy cover in some degree is expected to be continuous. Surface winds of intensity sufficient to overturn or damage unmoored aircraft must be prepared for. It is the direct responsibility of all ground crew chiefs to securely tie down aircraft each night.

(3) The following are averages of weather observations made during the past twenty years in the Eastern France - Western Germany region during the months shown:

	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan
Surface Winds:				
Less than 1 mph	15%	20%	20%	16%
1 - 7 mph	67%	64%	62%	70%
8 - 18 mph	16%	14%	14%	14%
Greater than 19 mph	Occasional in all months			
Winds aloft (1500 feet)				
0 - 15 mph	66%	58%	57%	59%
15 - 31 mph	29%	33%	36%	33%
32 - 47 mph	7%	6%	6%	4%
Greater than 47 mph	2%	3%	11%	3%
Frequency of ceilings 1,000' or less days per month	4	6	6	2
Frequency of bad visibility (1 mile or less at 0700 hours) days per month	7	10	11	7
Precipitation .01" or more (days per month)	9	7	8	8
Snow (days per month)	2	3	3	6
Temperature				
Mean daily minimum (°F)	43	36	30	27
Mean daily average (°F)	51	42	37	37

d. Enemy Antiaircraft Artillery. Following battle lessons are reported by the Artillery Air Officer of the 6th Armored Division:

"(1) Cubs cannot fly higher than tree-top level against mechanically controlled antiaircraft batteries. Every time the Germans shot at us they had us translated for range. Their deflection was off each time, however, and as a result we suffered no casualties.

"(2) The Germans normally fired one 'feeler' round for range and then fired salvos consisting of 3, 6 or 8 rounds.

"(3) The Germans will hold their fire until they are sure you are in range.

"(4) The Germans will follow you to zero elevation and then shoot a salvo of low airs at the point you entered the zero elevation with the hope of catching you on the ground. For this reason you must contour into your field and also stay away from friendly installations.

"(5) The Germans are wise to our principal maneuver, the Diving Turn. When they fire the first salvo it appears as if they then decrease the elevation and fire another hoping that you will execute the diving turn and run into the burst. We found the best evasive maneuver against heavy antiaircraft is an irregular flight path horizontally and vertically away from the gun.

"(6) It is our opinion that Cubs should be flown only as a last resort against positions that have heavy antiaircraft."

e. Operations in Armored Units. Extracts from a discussion of combat operations as submitted by the Artillery Air Officer of the 4th Armored Division:

(1) "Ever since this division started its rapid movements our Cubs have been used to make reconnaissance for the heads of our columns. This has proved to be one of our most useful jobs. We operate on patrol on a common channel, and any unit is free to call us direct for information. This has been especially helpful to the tanks and cavalry. On many occasions we have landed in a field next to the column and taken the Combat Commander up. He was able to weigh the situation in a matter of minutes and issue orders from the plane. This has saved us much valuable time. The pilots have all noticed an increase in the speed of our advance, either on foot or in vehicles, if a plane is near the head of the column, especially if it can get out a short distance in front of the column. One of our big difficulties has been keeping the landing field up with the column. Enemy closed in behind us as soon as the tail of the column passed, making it necessary to move the field often. Also the fact that the second field back from the road often contained enemy limited us greatly in our selection of fields.

(2) "All of the above are a problem peculiar to only armored divisions but I believe that reconnaissance is a job at least as important as our artillery work.

(3) "We have also located many targets for P-47s, and made adjustments on several and marked them for the Air Corps by smoke."

f. Other Types of Missions. 5th Infantry Division reports: "Planes have been used to deliver maps by air to infantry and artillery CPs speeding delivery by several hours. They have been used to take oblique photos of areas for ac attack on these areas. They have corrected dive bombers by the Air Support Party monitoring airplane channel, and radioing corrections to the high performance aircraft...The following are the approximate results of Air OP operations during September:

Enemy guns destroyed	10
Enemy batteries located	61
Enemy batteries neutralized	50
Enemy casualties	Unknown

Generally, most of the Air OP adjustments of fire have been registration and counterbattery. Some adjustments have been made on enemy personnel with excellent effect."

5. ACCIDENTS.

a. Air OP losses, both in aircraft and personnel, have been greatest during the initial operational period of field artillery units. Subsequent losses, although fewer in number, continue in the ratio of one flying accident loss to one enemy action loss. The majority of flying accidents, unfortunately, have been the result of pilot error. It is believed that these accidents are not due to any lack of technique or proficiency of the flight concerned, rather, they are the result of failure to make a correct consideration of the elements and hazards involved in a particular situation. Extracts of Air OP Loss Reports follow:

(1) 5 Aug 1944. A pilot with observer and radio took off uphill toward a hedgerow on a hot afternoon. Aircraft failed to clear hedgerow. Injuries to pilot: Lacerations of head and face, evacuated to hospital. Injuries to observer: Shaken up. Disposition of aircraft: Salvaged.

(2) 7 Aug 1944. Pilot took off with battalion commander on reconnaissance mission. To clear house at end of strip pilot climbed aircraft too steeply, stalled out over house and fell in trees beyond. Injuries to pilot: None. Injuries to observer: Bruises. Disposition of aircraft: Salvaged.

(3) 9 Aug 44. Two pilots and two observers were flying blood plasma to an isolated infantry unit. Planes collided in mid-air and fell in enemy territory. Injuries to pilots: Fatal. Injuries to observers: Fatal. Disposition of aircraft: Destroyed.

(4) 10 Aug 44. Pilot and observer flying on mission collided in mid-air with aircraft from another unit. Injuries to pilots: Fatal. Injuries to observer: Fatal. Disposition of aircraft: Destroyed.

(5) 5 Aug 44. Aircraft struck high tension lines in landing approach. Injuries to pilot: None. Disposition of aircraft: Salvaged.

(6) 13 Aug 44. "...while taking off, aircraft hit a soft spot on the strip, nosed over on its back." Injuries to pilot: None. Disposition of aircraft: Engine and instruments salvaged, remains burned by air section.

(7) 13 Aug 44. Pilot landed aircraft directly behind another plane. To avoid running into aircraft ahead of him, pilot used brakes too strongly, nosed over on back. Injuries to pilot: None. Disposition of aircraft: Repaired.

(8) 15 Aug 44. After making high drag of strip located in field studded with anti-glider poles, pilot made landing approach into wrong portion of field. Right wing struck pole. Injuries to pilot: None. Disposition of aircraft: Repaired.

(9) 18 Aug 44. On landing, pilot dropped plane in from approximately two feet off the ground. Wheels hit soft spot and sank into ground, causing aircraft to nose over. Injuries to pilot: None. Disposition of aircraft: Replaced. Comment: Many an otherwise serviceable airstrip is made dangerous by continued rain.

(10) 20 Aug 44. Pilot landed on bench near MONT ST MICHEL. Wheels sank in soft sand, plane nosed over on its back. Injuries to pilot: None. Disposition of aircraft: Repaired.

(11) 31 Aug 44. Pilot left aircraft while engine was running. In a sudden gust of wind aircraft started moving, flew into hedgerow. Disposition of aircraft: Repaired.

(12) 5 September 1944. Pilot riding in jeep, went out to look for other battalion pilot shot down by enemy action four days previously. Pilot and three others killed by enemy ground troops in ambush.

(13) 28 September 1944. Pilot and observer took off on reconnaissance mission in fog. At approximately 100 feet the carburetor evidently iced up and motor failed. Steep climb caused aircraft to stall out when engine failed. Pilot did not recover from stall, and the plane struck ground nose down. Injuries to pilot: Fatal. Injuries to observer: Fatal. Disposition of aircraft: Destroyed.

(14) 20 Sep 44. Pilot took off on patrol mission. In take-off tail wheel picked up several wires lying on ground and aircraft was dragged down into scrub pines at end of strip. Injuries to pilot: None. Injuries to observer: None. Disposition of aircraft: Repaired.

b. From the above summaries it is evident that with forethought on the part of the pilot and action in accordance with the dic-

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tutes of good judgment, such accident would have been avoided.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ L. L. Mealy
/s/ L. L. MEALY,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Asst Adj Gen

1 Incl
Incl 1 - Suggested form for Air OP Operations and Status Reports.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Inclosure 1 to Air OP Bulletin Number 3

S E C R E T
(when Filled in)

HEADQUARTERS _____
(unit)

APO ___, US Army

_____
(date)

SUBJECT: Monthly Air OP Operations and Status Report.

TO : Commanding General, Third United States Army.
(Attention: Artillery Air Officer).

1. In compliance with instructions of Air OP Bulletin Number 2, HQ TUSA, dated 1 September 1944, following report is submitted.

a. Assigned pilots:

(name)	(grade)	(serial no)	(organization)	(total hours)	(hrs this period)

b. Assigned mechanics:

(name)	(grade)	(serial no)

c. No pilots authorized ___ d. No pilots on hand ___

e. No mechanics authorized ___ f. No mechanics on hand ___

g. Aircraft:

(type)	(serial no)	(eq code)	(orgn)	(total hrs)	(condition)

h. Total no. hours flown by all aircraft during this period _____.

i. Change of status of aircraft, or major repair or maintenance performed locally.

(number)	(SCM)	

j. Missions flown during period (number only)

(1) Adjustment of fire, combat missions ___
(2) Reconnaissance, combat missions ___
(3) Patrol, combat missions ___
(4) Night, combat missions ___
(5) Other, combat (state nature) ___
(6) Training ___
(7) Administrative ___

k. Maintenance or supply difficulties _____
_____.

l. New uses made of aircraft _____
_____.

m. Changes made in aircraft _____
_____.

n. Battle lessons and experiences _____
_____
_____.

o. Awards and/or decorations to personnel _____
_____.

Artillery Air Officer

Incl 1 to Air OP Bulletin 3

ANNEX NO. 14

C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

22 November 1944

AIR OP BULLETIN)
NUMBER 4)

1. ADMINISTRATION.

a. Personnel Losses. Frequent instances of failure to report loss of pilots or mechanics due to sickness or injury have occurred. All concerned are reminded that losses, either in personnel or aircraft, even though not the result of an aircraft accident, should be reported without delay on Field Artillery Air OP Loss Report. Distribution of report is as previously directed, i.e., original through channels to Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, duplicate to Artillery Air Officer, this headquarters, triplicate to be retained in unit files.

b. Physical Examination for Flying. War Department Circular No 250, dated 14 June 1944, directs that all field artillery pilots currently on active flying status be given a physical examination for flying (WD AGO Form 64) at least once each year. Physical examinations will be conducted by Army Air Forces flight surgeons or aviation medical examiners upon oral or written request of the field artillery unit commander or unit surgeon. A report, to accompany the November Air OP Operations and Status Report, will be prepared by each field artillery unit and will show the date and place of the last physical examination for flying of each assigned pilot.

c. Equipment in Excess of T/O & E. Certain vehicles and radio equipment in excess of T/O & E were authorized for Air OP Sections to meet operational requirements. For description and allowances of this equipment see letter, HQ TUSA, AG 400.5L GNMCW, subject: "Equipment in Excess of T/O & E" dated 24 July 1944.

d. Changes to T/O & E.

(1) Recent changes to T/O & Es of corps artillery, division artillery and field artillery group headquarters and headquarters batteries provide for the following:

(a) Deleted:

(b) Authorized:

	Item	Allowance
1.	Mechanic, army airplane and engine (747) Tec 5	1
2.	Helmet, flying, summer, type AHH-15	3
3.	Helmet, flying, winter, type AN3-1c, or helmet, flying, intermediate, type A-11	3
4.	Kit, interpreter, photographic, type F-2	1
5.	Tent, command post, complete (w/ pins and poles) for airplane maintenance	1

(c) Changes authorizing above additions are enumerated below:

1. Corps: CL to T/O & E 6-50-1, 7 Aug 44.
2. Inf Div: CL to T/O & E 6-10-1, 16 Jun 44.
C5 to T/O & E 6-10-1, 26 Jul 44.
3. Group: C5 to T/O & E 6-12, 7 Aug 44.

(2) Changes to T/O & E of headquarters and headquarters battery of 105mm howitzer battalion, 155mm howitzer battalion, or 4.5-inch gun battalion, provide for the following:

(a) Deleted:

1. Ground crew helper, Pvt SSN 521.

(b) Authorized:

	Item	Allowance
11.	Mechanic, army airplane and engine (747), Tec 5	1
2.	Helmet, flying, summer, type AHH-15	2
3.	Helmet, flying, winter, type AHH-1c	2
4.	Kit, photographic, interpreter, type F-2	1

(c) Changes authorizing above additions are enumerated below:

1. 105mm howitzer battalion: CL to T/O & E 6-26, 16 Jun 44.

2. 155mm howitzer or 4.5-inch gun battalion: C6 to T/O & E 6-36, 16 Jun 44.

e. Materiel Status Reports. Some units have included reports on current status of AAF equipment of air OP sections in the Monthly Materiel Status Reports required by letter this headquarters, AG 400 (5-3) SHCCB-J, subject: "Overseas Supply Reports", dated 8 April 1944, as amended by letter this headquarters, same file and subject, dated 12 June 1944. Information on air force equipment is not required in these reports.

f. Air OP Slides Card. Use of Unit Card #1 as an Air OP Slides card for all Army units is contemplated. This card contains only numbers, letters of the alphabet, "Switch on", and "Switch off", thus making 192 squares which can be filled in with appropriate words. It is desired that corps, division, brigade and group artillery air officers submit by informal memorandum to the Artillery Air Officer, this headquarters, a list of terms that they consider should be included on this Slides card, so that a comprehensive and usable card may be prescribed for Army wide use.

2. ENGINEERING, SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE.

a. Supply Procedure.

(1) Items of AAF equipment for Artillery Air OP sections

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will be obtained only from the 43d M R & R Squadron.

(2) Exchange of unserviceable AAF equipment may be made direct at M R & R Squadron by Corps, Division, Brigade and Group Artillery Air Officers or their representatives, or by pilots of battalions which are not attached to a Corps, Division, Brigade or Group headquarters.

(3) Requisitions for equipment other than that procured on an exchange basis will be made on AAF Form 1c in triplicate, using blank paper for duplicate and triplicate copies. Basis for requisitions will be either initial issue, replacement or combat losses, or quotation of specific authorization. The requisition will be signed by the Corps, Brigade, Division, group or separate battalion air officer, and will bear the following certificate: "It is hereby certified that the foregoing items represent shortages of authorized equipment and that the quantities shown are not in excess of authorized allowances." Requisitions will be made on the 43d M R & R Squadron and sent through the Army Artillery Air Officer for approval. For additional requirements on requisitions for winter flying clothing see paragraph c e below. Notification that supplies or equipment are ready for pick-up at the M R & R will be given to unit concerned by the Army Artillery Air Officer.

(4) All requisitions on 43d M R & R Squadron dated prior to 1 October 1944 for any class of authorized AAF equipment on which delivery has not been made as of this date will be considered void. Units will submit new requisitions in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) above.

b. Cold Weather Operation of Engines.

(1) With the arrival of winter weather, all pilots and mechanics should attach increasing importance to engine warm-up procedure. Cold oil circulates poorly and operation of cold engines in excess of 1200 RPM causes excessive wear and increased maintenance. When possible, warm-up should consist of the following:

(a) After starting engine, operate for at least four minutes at 700 - 800 RPM.

(b) Increase RPM to 1100 - 1200 and continue warm-up until indicated oil temperature commences to rise.

(c) Increase RPM to 1400 - 1500 for two minutes, after which magnetos may be checked and engine run up.

(2) Protracted glides should be avoided as the combination of cold outside air and V-80 fuel causes engines to load up easily. Descents should be made with partial throttle when possible, or frequent clearing of engine with good strong application of power. At least one recent accident was caused by engine failure directly attributable to engine loading up.

c. Oil Sump Insulation. A non-inflammable material for heat insulation of oil sumps, lines and air heater assemblies and tubes is being procured and will be available in the near future at the M R & R Squadron. Notification of its availability will be given units by the Army Artillery Air Officer.

d. Snow Skis. To provide for emergency operation of field artillery aircraft in the event of unusual snow conditions, a number of sets of skis for L-4 aircraft have been ordered. Delivery has been deadlined for 1 January 1945. Further information on availability and issue will be forthcoming.

e. Winter Flying Clothing. Authorization of winter flying clothing for artillery air observers on flying status has been requested. Pending publication in the very near future of instructions on requisitioning procedure, further requisitions for clothing should be held in abeyance.

f. Plexiglas for side windows. One-eighth inch Plexiglas or Lucite is being made available for installation in door and left side windows of L-4s to replace the present poor quality windows. This material will greatly improve visibility for observers but does not have as good shatter-proof qualities as the old transparency. As only small amounts of the stock become available at a time, the Army Artillery Air Officer will coordinate its installation. Units desiring the installation will so notify the Army Artillery Air Officer, who will indicate a date upon which aircraft of that unit may be flown to the M R & R Squadron for the necessary work.

3. OPERATIONS.

a. Flight Operations. The following information on Air OP Flight Operations has been compiled from the records of three months of combat operations. It is presented here as a means of acquainting all pilots with the scope of Air OP activities in the Army as well as for the lessons that may be learned from a study of past operations.

(1) Pilots flying time.

(a) August. The average flying time per pilot during the month of August was 48.4 hours. Fifty per cent of pilots in the Army flew between 36 and 62 hours. The highest flying time reported was 100 hours, the lowest 4 hours. 10,660 missions were flown averaging 59.1 minutes per mission.

(b) September. The average flying time per pilot during the month of September was 45.6 hours. Fifty per cent of the pilots in the Army flew between 38 and 54 hours. The highest flying time reported was 140 hours, the lowest 4 hours. 8,872 missions were flown averaging 60.6 minutes per mission.

(c) October. The average flying time per pilot during the month of October was 36.7 hours. Fifty per cent of the pilots in the Army flew between 27 and 45 hours. The highest flying time reported was 69 hours, the lowest 4 hours. 6,866 missions were flown averaging 65.5 minutes per mission.

(d) Excessive time. Flying time in excess of 70 hours was reported by 37 pilots for the month of August, and by 13 pilots for the month of September. No flying time in excess of 70 hours was reported for October.

(2) Air OP Losses. For purposes of this report, losses are defined as any damage to an aircraft necessitating replacement or repair by the M R & R Squadron. Fifty-one per cent of all losses are attributable to pilot error, 39.4 per cent to enemy action, and the remaining 9.2 per cent to miscellaneous causes such as engine failure, structural failure or unknown causes. During this period, one aircraft was destroyed in flight when struck by an artillery shell. No aircraft have been lost to friendly antiaircraft fire.

Operational Losses	Per cent of total losses
Takeoff (pilot error)	22.4
Landing (pilot error)	17.3
Ground handling (pilot error)	4.1
Other (pilot error)*	7.1
Engine failure	4.1
Structural failure (not in flight)	2.1
Total operation losses	57.1
Combat losses	
Enemy aircraft while in flight	9.2
Enemy ground fire while in flight	17.3
Enemy aircraft while on ground	5.0
Enemy ground fire while on ground	10.2
Friendly ground fire while in flight	1.1
Other**	2.1
Total combat losses	42.9

*Unclassified pilot error losses include four aircraft destroyed and one damaged in mid-air collision, one aircraft landed in enemy territory and abandoned, and one aircraft destroyed in a crash resulting from a tailspin.

**Unclassified combat losses include two aircraft that failed to return from combat missions. Cause unknown.

b. Night flying. Night operation of Air OPs is not favored by this headquarters for the following reasons.

(1) Involved coordination is necessary with both night fighter units and antiaircraft artillery units and identification procedure of these units would be disrupted by night flying L-4s.

(2) Extensive preparations and special facilities are necessary.

(3) Weather during the winter months will rarely approach the perfect conditions necessary.

(4) Hazard to pilots and observers not trained for night flying is not justified by operational necessity.

c. Battle Lessons and Experiences. That tactics and technique of field artillery air observation methods are still being developed is evidenced by the commendable submission in Monthly Operations and Status Reports of hitherto unpublished information, ideas, and unusual experiences. Although certain of these may not necessarily be applicable to all situations, all are the result of combat operations and will be published herein for careful consideration by all Air OP personnel. Reports of corroborative or contrary experiences are particularly desired in order that the validity of the indicated battle lessons may be determined.

(1) "A word of warning to the wise concerning selection of fields. Many units selected fields in our last operation that did not afford all weather operation. Not realizing that the situation would become so stable they suddenly found themselves bogged down when it started raining. A few accidents can be attributed to the fact that some fields were too short and too soft. It was also found that vehicles should not be allowed to drive all over the landing strip as the ground becomes cut up after a few times which ruins the field. A dismount point should be used." - Artillery Air Officer, XII Corps.

(2) "During the rainy season keep all vehicles off the field and taxi strip. The ruts destroy the field and strip." - 696 Armd FA Bn.

(3) "Many times the enemy will not fire his artillery while we are in the air. However, when making a turn, we have noticed gun flashes many times and have been able to locate them. The enemy evidently believes we are blind during a turn." - 282 FA Bn.

(4) "Advantage found in having observer face to the rear due to the fact that he can spot enemy machine gun emplacements when they fire at the plane while we are getting away from the fire." - 945 FA Bn.

(5) "While firing mission in our sector on or about 20 October 1944 noticed Cub flying in our direction, about five miles away. Upon passing us both pilot and observer were looking in direction of target area, having no knowledge of anyone else being in the air." - 278 FA Bn.

Note: Four pilots and three observers have been killed in mid-air collisions in Third US Army operations.

(6) "The enemy is evidently going back to his old trick of allowing a Cub to fly over an area without being fired upon, and then when the pilot has gained confidence in the safety of the area, unexpectedly opening fire. He will also fire flak into a certain spot on the area, and then wait for a Cub to fly through that area." - Artillery Air Officer, 5 FA Gp.

(7) "It has been found that enemy artillery becomes active during the hours when daylight is just breaking and at dusk in the evening. At these times gun flashes can be seen best by Air OPs. To take advantage of this, air OPs begin operations as soon as possible in the morning and stay up as long as light permits in the evening, noticing suspected enemy battery locations. Many counterbattery missions have been successful by use of this procedure." - Artillery Air Officer, 80th Infantry Division.

(8) "A form of flash warning for enemy artillery or mortar fire is being used with good results. The message originates with the forward observer, goes by radio direct to Battalion CP then to Air OP. Message is brief and gives coordinates of point where shells are falling to nearest 500 yards and the suspected direction of the enemy battery. The Air OP then has a direction in which to look, and can sometimes pick up the enemy battery before the concentration is completed." - Artillery Air Officer, 80th Infantry Division.

(9) "Experience in this headquarters has shown that grouping and close coordination among local field artillery units has resulted in a more efficient coverage on this front. Pilots have flown less hours and on a definite schedule thus enabling the section to coordinate time and repairs. What is most important is the control of traffic along the front. On many occasions the sky along the front has become dangerously cluttered with L-4s. As many as ten Cubs have been noted flying in an area which should allow no more than three." - Artillery Air Officer, 183 FA Gp.

(10) "The German antiaircraft adjust on clouds and shoot at Air OPs that fly near them. They shoot at two planes that are close together quicker than they will at single planes. They do not shoot at planes if they are just flying up and down the front. They do shoot if the plane starts making short circles as if it was looking at one point or preparing to adjust." - Artillery Air Officer, 4th FA Gp.

4. ACCIDENTS.

a. Enemy Artillery Fire. On 2 October 1944, four aircraft of one FA group were destroyed on the ground by enemy artillery fire from FORT DRIANT. Approximately 100 rounds fell during the hour and thirty

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minutes shelling and crews were unable to evacuate the aircraft. Effective accuracy of the fire was possible because the landing strip was not defiladed and the enemy had excellent observation.

b. Friendly Artillery Fire. The problem of avoiding the trajectories of friendly artillery and mortar fire, under present conditions of masses of artillery on a continuous front, has not been solved. The coincidence of flight paths of aircraft and shells, although rare, has occurred five times, twice fatally, in this command. In some instances shells have struck aircraft without detonating.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ L. L. Manly
/s/ L. L. MANLY
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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ANNEX NO. 15

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AIR OF BULLETIN)
NUMBER 5)

8 January 1945

1. ADMINISTRATION.

a. Flying pay for observers. Regulations governing flight pay, qualifications for flight duty, and flight requirements have been collected and published in War Department Technical Manual 12-250, dated 1 March 1943. Bulletins 28 and 30, War Department, 1942, specify that flying pay for field artillery Air OP observers (non-flying officers) is a flat sum of $60 a month.

b. Renewal of observers flying status.

(1) Requests for renewal of orders requiring officers and enlisted men to participate in aerial flights should be submitted to the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, through the headquarters, attention: Artillery Officer. Each such request will contain the name of the officer or enlisted man concerned and will cite the order which currently requires him to participate in aerial flights as a field artillery aerial observer.

(2) Initial recommendations for placing field artillery aerial observers on flying status or requests for substitution of aerial observers will continue to be prepared and submitted through command channels in accordance with the provisions of Letter, Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, 373.2 (Arty), dated 21 August 194_, subject: "Orders requiring participation in aerial flights", and 1st Indorsement thereto, this headquarters, dated 15 September 194_.

2. ENGINEERING, SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE.

a. BA 39 and BA 40 batteries. Periodic checks of radio batteries are necessary to prevent radio failure in flight. Voltage tests give an indication of the useful remaining life of batteries. To check the BA 39 battery, which supplies power for the transmitter, place panel switch in "Plate" position. To check the BA 40 battery, power source for the receiver, place panel switch in "Fil" position. Batteries should be replaced when the panel meter indicates less than "20". The BA 39 is in use only when transmitting and has a correspondingly longer life. Design of the SCR 500 and SCR 609 precludes any voltage drain on the batteries when the switch is off. However, dirt and moisture on the battery and microphone plugs or in the microphone switch can cause slight leakage of current. Plugs must be kept clean and batteries should be disconnected when radio is not in use.

b. Drain grommets. Condensation and freezing of moisture within wings and fuselage of aircraft with consequent alteration of flying characteristics may be expected during winter if drain grommets in the trailing edge of wings and tail end of fuselage are not kept open. Periodic checks of these openings should be made and all dirt and mud removed.

c. Snow on wings. Wings of L-4 aircraft standing on the ground will not withstand the stress imposed by some snow loads that may be expected to fall during the coming months. Sufficient snow may fall during one night to cause collapse of unsupported wings. Simple props to be used beneath wings at the lift strut fittings must be made available for use when necessary. Alert crews or guards should also remove snow as it falls during heavy storms.

d. Wind damage to a raraft. During a two-week period from 20 November to 4 December nine aircraft of Third US Army units were damaged or destroyed when they were torn loose by high winds from inadequate or non-existent moorings. These results indicate that insufficient precautions are being taken against the unusual weather conditions prevailing during winter months. In some instances 3-foot mooring stakes were pulled out of soft ground by repeated jerks caused by strong gusts. Darts of the D-1 mooring kit in some cases were inverted and pulled out of the ground by the unusual force of the wind. Experience has proven the following methods necessary:

(1) Moor aircraft tail into the wind.
(2) Tie control stick forward.
(3) Keep tie down ropes snug.
(4) Do not use the type D-1 rods and darts in muddy ground ground or during strong winds.
(5) Engineer wire entanglement stakes of the corkscrew type should be procured for each aircraft. They are readily inserted or withdrawn from the ground and will withstand tensions which pull up type D-1 rods or other wood or metal stakes.
(6) Always tie down an aircraft when it is left alone.

e. Frost on wings. The aerodynamic efficiency of an airfoil is altered when its shape or the character of its surface is altered. A coating of frost or ice on wings or propeller may speedily render an aircraft incapable of flight. Frost on wings so roughens the surface as to interfere with the smooth flow of air over the wing and lift drops sharply. During the present cold weather season three aircraft of this command crashed immediately upon takeoff because of frost or ice coated wings. Material is now being procured for use in making wing covers to keep off frost and snow so that aircraft may be immediately ready for flight at any time.

f. Records to accompany aircraft. When an aircraft is transferred, detached on temporary duty to another unit, or returned to the M R & R Squadron for major or minor repairs, all forms and records will accompany the aircraft. These forms and records include Forms 1 and 1a, 41b, 60a and 60b, and 61. Their presence with the aircraft is necessary for the availability of previous flying time, maintenance, and operational information; and recording of additional inspections, maintenance or repair concerning the aircraft and engine.

g. Engine failure. The danger involved in an engine failure on takeoff is recognized by all pilots. Such failures are primarily due to freezing temperatures, and two of the possible causes have been ascertained. These two causes are not apparent during starting and warm up, but become evident during full throttle operation of engines. Water in gasoline will freeze and partially close the line between tank and gascolator bowl. This results in a metered flow of fuel which will not support full throttle operation longer than a few seconds. Precautions: Run engine at full throttle at least one minute before takeoff. A second cause of engine failure is vacuum lock in the fuel tank. Consumed fuel is replaced by air entering through the gas tank cap. Ice or snow sometimes freezes around the gas cap and prevents entrance of air into the tank. Although the fuel gauge may rise and fall normally, thereby showing that the cap is not frozen fast, the ice effectively seals the passage and air cannot enter the tank. When the hydrostatic pressure is equalled by the vacuum in the fuel tank gasoline ceases to flow to the carburetor and failure results. Precautions: Check for presence of ice in or around gas cap, run engine at full throttle for one minute before takeoff.

h. Exchange of propellers. Continued use or exposure to weather will sometimes warp or twist the blades of propellers to the extent that the pitch is altered sufficiently to reduce maximum RPM of the engine. When it is desired to exchange such "slow" propellers the aircraft will be flown to the M R & R Squadron, where the inspection and exchange will be accomplished.

3. OPERATIONS.

a. Battle lessons and experiences. The following extracts from Air OP Operations and Status Reports for November are reproduced for the contribution they may make to the combat wisdom of both pilots and observers.

(1) "A probable fatal accident was averted by the use of flare and flare gun when pilot, sent on a late mission, lost way on return to a new strip after his adjustment of fire. Many times Cubs return to strip with too little daylight margin. We believe a flare run and flares issued to each separate battalion is a good military investment for the prevention of accidents caused by aforementioned circumstances." - CO, 284th Field Artillery Battalion. (Comment: Consideration must be made of possibility of revealing location of airstrip to the enemy through use of such signals.)

(2) "About ninety per cent of all adjustments made from the air by this battalion on enemy artillery installations were located in a small group or groups of trees that do not show on a 1/50,000 scale map." - Air Officer, 278th Field Artillery Battalion.

(3) "Shellreps may be taken fairly accurately from the air." - Artillery Air Officer, 410th Field Artillery Group.

(4) "The Artillery Air Officer of this headquarters, after a recent inspection of air sections operating under Corps Artillery, found that over 80 per cent of aircraft inspected had not had compass corrections made since the aircraft were assembled at Mobile Reclamation and Repair Squadrons." - Artillery Air Officer, III Corps.

(5) "The III Corps Artillery Air Section has for over a week's period used a hard surface road for an airstrip. Muddy fields have hampered our artillery Air OP operations considerably during the last month. The use of a hard surface road for operation has proven excellent. Our planes have well camouflaged positions on the road sides and can quickly be taxied to the road strip. The use of this road has given us an all-weather strip and we have found that maintenance has almost been cut in half as we no longer have to pull wheels and clean brake drums weekly, or clean pyralin and fabric after every flight, or clean the mud from the air filter daily. Our use of the road has not tied up normal traffic operation for periods exceeding three minutes." - Artillery Air Officer, III Corps.

(6) "Be extremely careful in selection landing strips and mooring of airplanes. This Group has had two airplanes damaged by poor fields and one by poor moorings." - Artillery Air Officer, 410th Field Artillery Group. (Note: This report is typical of others submitted by units facing a common difficulty.)

(7) "A liaison pilot of the 195th Field Artillery Group claims to have flown farther into Germany than anyone else in a like type of aircraft. Losing his way in the haze and fog he flew to a point some twelve or fifteen miles behind the enemy lines.

"The pilot took off from the group airstrip in the vicinity of THIONVILLE (9685) at 2130, 5 November on a routine displacement to the new airstrip near EVENDORFF (0459). Because of poor visibility he was flying a compass course instead of using landmarks. Some twenty-five or thirty minutes later he decided he had passed his check point and...was lost. Attempting to orient himself he lost altitude and circled through a clearing in the haze and fog and saw below a sizeable city on a river. Thinking it was a Moselle River city he continued to circle until he was greeted by a volume of antiaircraft fire. He dodged and banked to miss the fire and headed east to get protection over a large woods. The town he had seen later proved to be BESSENBERG (1690BC) and the river the SAAR.

"Still flying east at the 1500-foot ceiling he tried to orient himself, but the 1/50,000 Thionville sheet map...wouldn't fit the terrain and ground features below. He continued to fly east until he saw a railroad (2595) and then decided upon a southward course over the open country, trying to avoid centers of population. During this time he contacted...the Group Air Officer and reported his situation. From this time on he was in constant contact by radio with the Group Air Officer and described, as he flew along, the terrain features and landmarks. By studying his map on the ground the Air Officer decided the last Cub must be east of the SAAR River, but about this time the pilot was more interested in dodging the lively reception given him by German antiaircraft gunners located in MERZIG (2059) and MERCHINGEN (2359).

"Upon sighting and reporting the prominent 'Y' east of the SAAR River (2518) his exact location became evident to the Air Officer, who guided him back into friendly territory. He first sighted American Armor in SCHWEINDORFF (1598) and landed on an artillery airstrip near MALSTATT (0798) a very relieved and lucky pilot. He had been in the air for over two hours and had flown over enemy territory at least half the time.

"Battle lesson: When flying over enemy territory avoid populated areas, stick to the woods and open country. When flying through small arms fire and ack-ack, change course and altitude often. Be sure your radio and compass are in good working order at all times." - Artillery Air Officer, 195th Field Artillery Group. (Comment: This

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unconventional homing method saved both pilot and aircraft from loss or capture and reflects well deserved credit upon both Air Officer and pilot for their initiative and presence of mind in a highly unusual situation.)

(d) "Flew supplies to infantry, and evacuated wounded from position isolated behind enemy lines (347 missions)." - Artillery Air Officer, 95th Infantry Division.

(e) "Necessary to supply troops assaulting Fort EISENHOWER (during flooding of Roer River). Suits dropped about 5000 pounds of supplies to infantry assault battalion. Of these supplies 1500 pounds were a high explosive compound, fuses and detonators to be used in blowing doors and pillboxes. Rest of supplies was food, blankets, radio batteries, medical supplies and maps with a plan of the fortress. All flights were made at housetop height over the town of BASSENHEIM, about one-third of this town was in enemy hands at the time the flights were made. Two reasons made it impractical to fly higher, first, the explosives had to be dropped from a low altitude to keep them from exploding, second, the fortress was protected by 20mm antiaircraft. We found the guns could not be depressed sufficiently to attack the ships when they were hedgehopping." - Artillery Air Officer, 90th Infantry Division. (Comment: Although no losses were incurred this was a hazardous operation and should be attempted only when all other means fail. Although the antiaircraft defenses mentioned above were ineffective other 20mm antiaircraft installations are not necessarily subject to like limitations.)

b. Selection of airstrips. Unnecessary exposure to a variety of hazards through injudicious selection of airstrips has been a major contributing factor to the total of aircraft destroyed or damaged recently. Flying accidents, due in large part to inadequate or dangerous airstrips, and enemy artillery fire have caused losses which preclude the maximum employment of Air OPs demanded by current operations. Procurement of replacement equipment is expected to be increasingly difficult. To reduce avoidable losses the following considerations must govern the selection of airstrips.

(1) Airstrips must be adequate. Pilots landing and taking off in overloaded aircraft in sometimes difficult flying conditions should not be confronted with a field that is either too small, too wet or muddy, unmarked with ponds, obstructed by fences, trees, ditches or holes, laid out on a difficult slope, or one which has a constant cross-wind. It is appreciated that available fields meeting such specifications are difficult to locate but failure to improve established fields by removing obstacles and reducing other hazards can not be condoned. Fences and trees adjacent to the strip should be removed when advisable, and holes filled in.

(2) Air OP installations are high priority targets for enemy artillery. Loss of nineteen aircraft of Third US Army units to enemy artillery or mortar fire is ample evidence of the necessity for reduction of this hazard. Defilade of the airstrip and dispersion of the aircraft must be consistent. Some losses occurred from stray rounds incidental to the shelling of other targets adjacent to the airstrip. Do not locate near bridges, towns, crossroads, or other likely targets.

(3) A once long dormant Luftwaffe is no guarantee of freedom from air attack. The activity of the GAF is unpredictable, and recent attacks in force are possible of repetition in other areas. Standards of camouflage and concealment, and efficiency of local defense measures have long been permitted to deteriorate. A well located, properly prepared machine gun must be constantly ready for aggressive use.

(4) Proximity to the unit CP must be of secondary importance to the requirements listed above. The consequent difficulties of communication, messing, shelter and supply which may be involved must not influence the selection of an airstrip to the extent that aircraft and personnel are in constant jeopardy. When safety exists only to the rear then airstrips should be so located. It is not desired to restrict the aggressive employment of Air OPs; however, conservation by all possible means of both pilots and aircraft has become necessary, in order that the new indispensable function of the Air OPs continues undiminished.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ R. W. Hartman
/s/ R. W. HARTMAN,
Lt. Col., A.U.S.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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Army
XIV

ANNEX NO. 16

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AIR OP BULLETIN) 27 January 1945
NUMBER 6)

1. ADMINISTRATION.

a. All artillery Air OP pilots should be given an opportunity to read these bulletins.

b. Special report on observers. It is desired that a separate report, to accompany the monthly Air OP Operations and Status Report for January, be submitted by each unit showing the serial observers who are currently on flying status or observers for whom flying status has been requested. Report will show name, rank, and serial number of each officer or enlisted man concerned, the period of flight status authorized, and the file number of the orders which authorized such status. The following example is furnished:

1st Lt John C. Smith, 0111111, FA From 1 January - 30 June 1945, per letter, Headquarters ETOUSA, subject: "Orders", file AG 300.4 (20 Jan 45) ML55, dated 20 January 1945.

c. Distinctive marking of aircraft.

(1) Pursuant to directive contained in change 5 to Operations Memorandum Number 15, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army, distinctive markings (black and white stripes) will be removed from all field artillery and liaison aircraft of this command at the earliest practicable date. Subordinate headquarters will not prescribe any markings for field artillery or liaison aircraft. Should there be a requirement for distinctive markings, application will be made to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force through this headquarters.

(2) The removal of these distinctive markings in no way affects the presently prescribed national markings, which will continue to be carried on aircraft.

(3) Aircraft of Allied manufacture may be seen with or without distinctive markings (black and white stripes); this does not necessarily indicate that the aircraft is hostile.

d. Status of mechanics. Recent changes to T/O & Es of headquarters and headquarters batteries of corps artillery, division artillery, field artillery groups, 105mm and 155mm howitzer and 4.5-inch gun battalions have deleted the air section ground crew helper and substituted therefor an airplane and engine mechanic (747) in the grade of Technician Fifth Grade. (See Air OP Bulletin Number 4, dated 24 November 1944.) Similar changes for heavy battalions have not as yet been received. When the formerly authorized ground crew helper (591) has become proficient through practical experience in all the duties of an airplane and engine mechanic (747) and is considered competent by the artillery air officer, this military specialty should be entered on the Soldier's Qualification Card. In this regard see War Department Circular Number 20, dated 17 January 1944. Successful completion of prescribed course of study at any army service school is not a prerequisite to a rating of airplane and engine mechanic (747) if the necessary proficiency has been attained through practical experience. Assistant mechanics who have been rated 747 will be shown on the Air OP Operations and Status report as such even though they may not hold the grade of Technician Fifth Grade authorized.

2. ENGINEERING, SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE.

a. Winter oil. Temperatures experienced thus far and to be expected this winter do not justify the use of an engine oil lighter than 1065. Non-detergent aviation oil of proper winter grade is available at the 424 Mobile Reclamation and Repair Squadron; procurement of oil from other sources is not advisable. Quartermaster POL dumps stock only detergent oils (which dissolve the paint lining of the continental C-170-5 crankcase), and non-detergent oil obtainable from other depots may be of improper viscosity.

b. Cold weather starting suggestions.

(1) Two men, one at propeller, second at controls.

(2) With switch off, pull engine through eight compression strokes, priming meanwhile.

(3) Advance throttle slightly just before starting.

(4) Continue priming after engine is started until smooth operation is obtained. Caution: Have fire extinguisher handy.

(5) Ice may foul the gaps of spark plugs and prevent starting altogether. For this and also a simple engine heater see subparagraphs (2), (3) and (6), under "Battle Lessons and Experiences".

c. Additional signal equipment. SCR 593 radio receivers have been made available for issue to headquarters and headquarters batteries of corps, brigades, airborne, armored and infantry division artilleries, and field artillery groups. The receiver is to be used to monitor the AAA enemy aircraft warning nets. Instructions for procurement of these sets are contained in Circular Number 5, this headquarters, dated 20 January 1945.

d. Extract from Field Artillery and Tank Destroyer Summary Number 15, Ninth US Army, dated 15 January 1945 -- "The Artillery Air Officer, XIII Corps Artillery, has reported the following method of snow and ice removal from aircraft wings and tail surfaces: 'Attach a hose to the exhaust of a motor vehicle. Remove two inspection plates from wing. Insert the hose in one of the inspection holes. The circulating warm air not only melts the ice but leaves the surfaces dry. If an attachment to the hose to "spread out" the warm air can be fashioned, direct application to the surfaces will also be successful in accomplishing the task quickly.'"

e. Aircraft cleaning. Oil, or a mixture of gasoline and oil will not be used as a cleaning agent to remove dirt and mud from dope and fabric surfaces. Surfaces so treated become softened, lose their resiliency, and the fabric is slowly rotted. After a period of such deterioration recovering of the aircraft becomes necessary. The interiors of aircraft often accumulate an unnecessary additional cargo of discarded maps, loose tools, ropes, hand grenades, dirt, etc. The additional weight carried and the possibility of aileron control jamming by loose objects is good reason for periodic inspection and clean-up.

f. Air Corps supplies to artillery units. Headquarters Ninth Air Force Service Command has instructed Headquarters 2d Advanced Air Depot Area that Air Corps supplies will not be issued direct from depot groups to artillery units without a written request from the appropriate mobile repair and reclamation squadron or from the appropriate Army Artillery Air Officer. For proper supply procedure see paragraph 2 a, Air OP Bulletin Number 4, this headquarters, dated 22 November 1944.

3. OPERATIONS.

a. Battle lessons and experiences.

(1) The following report from a field artillery group is reproduced for the excellent exposition it makes of the advantages of a system whereby all air observation sections come under close operational supervision of the Group Air Officer.

"The CO of this headquarters has instituted a plan which has shown excellent results for a period of one month's operation.

"The CP tent is installed on the field, complete with stove, and is used as an immediate headquarters for pilots and observers. (In this weather, the tent and stove are a must.) Inside the tent is a bulletin board on which are kept an operations map and all latest G-2 and air information data. Pilots and observers inspect the board and map before each flight and return after each flight to leave a written report of their observation.

"An operations man is kept on duty in the tent and has the job of briefing the pilots on the situation, both enemy and friendly. He keeps flight personnel advised of the organization for combat. He keeps an overlay of the front lines, unit boundaries, and gun positions with their lateral limits of fire. All enemy information is kept on this map too. As a result, each pilot and observer takes his flight with complete and late knowledge of the situation and can more intelligently observe and shoot.

"The operations man keeps close liaison with Group S2 for S-2 and S-3 information.

"I believe that this system will alleviate one of the major troubles of the Air OP. Air sections are normally far removed from their CPs and personal contact for pilots and observers is too often lost. Losses in Air OP have been the result, in many cases, of ignorance of the situation. Pilots must know where the front lines are,

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the plan of attack, and the mission of the battalion, those sections of the front where enemy activity with small arms and AA is apt to be heaviest, and information of the enemy's capabilities in his terrain.

"Given this information, the Air OP can fly with a marked degree of improved observation and safety." -- Air Officer, 183d Field Artillery Group.

(Comment: This plan presupposes the use of a common airstrip by all aircraft of the attached battalions. Many units employ a similar or modified version of the organization outlined above. Additional advantages are better control and coordination of the use of aircraft, pooling of facilities, and closer supervision of aircraft maintenance.)

(2) "If planes won't start after a cold damp night check the spark plugs for formation of ice in the gaps. One morning all eight plugs on one engine would not fire due to ice formations in the gaps." -- Air Officer, 965th Field Artillery Battalion.

(3) "Preheating of engine utilizing vehicle exhaust fumes reduces cold weather starting difficulties." -- Air Officer, 512th Field Artillery Battalion.

(4) "It has been found that by using the fine meshed tank camouflage net instead of the regular truck camouflage net formation of frost on the wings and control surfaces can be abolished. This facilitates preparation of planes for early morning flights and reduces the danger of accidents due to frost (on wings)." -- Artillery Air Officer, 5th Infantry Division.

(5) "Aluminum welding rod used as a gas gauge will not rust and has been found to be more satisfactory than the factory installed gauge in the L-4H airplane." -- Air Officer, 204th Field Artillery Group.

(6) "Due to the low temperatures encountered recently, the water that gets into the fuel tank from condensation, etc., will freeze and choke off the fuel to the carburetor. This was experienced three mornings before the cause was determined and each time the tank was drained but some of the ice remained. The mechanic was able to thaw the fuel system out thoroughly by connecting a piece of hose to the exhaust of a vehicle and playing the hot exhaust gases along the fuel tank and fuel lines until all traces of water and ice were gone. By carefully straining all fuel as it is used and keeping the tank full we hope to minimize the amount of water that collects in the fuel system... Airplane gave trouble with symptoms of icing up during flight. A forced landing was avoided by applying carburetor heat immediately and pumping fuel in to the engine by rapid strokes of the primer before the propeller stopped windmilling." -- Air Officer, 204th Field Artillery Battalion.

(7) "It is becoming more difficult to pick up enemy guns by their flash, however, we have picked up some guns by their smoke rings rising behind woods and tree lines on calm days. The enemy appears to be using more decoys for his artillery, requiring us to fly higher in an effort to pick them up. When flying at comparatively high altitude, it is extremely important that Air OPs get flash warnings of all enemy aircraft in vicinity." -- Air Officer, 252d Field Artillery Battalion.

(8) "SCR, radio hookup with local AAA gives excellent enemy aircraft warning. All aircraft should operate on common channel and acknowledge receipt of warning before they 'hit the deck'." -- Air Officer, 195th Field Artillery Group.

(9) "We have found that when firing on snow covered terrain the observer can find his first round more easily if a round of high burst is fired." -- Artillery Air Officer, 6th Armored Division.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ R. W. Hartman
/t/ R. W. HARTMAN,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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ANNEX NO. 17

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Date: 4 Mar 45
Initl: Hw

4 March 1945

AIR OF BULLETIN)
NUMBER 7)

1. ADMINISTRATION.

* * * * * * * * * * *

2. ENGINEERING, SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE.

* * * * * * * * * * *

3. OPERATIONS.

a. Battle lessons and experiences.

(1) "The SCR-593 radio, recently authorized to corps, division and group headquarters has a definite latent communication value to air sections of these units. The 'A' channel affords a direct contact with the AAAIS enemy aircraft warning system. This channel is of instant value to the plane and eliminates the inevitable 'middle man' and delay which can be dangerous.

"The 'B' channel can be lined up on an SCR-193 frequency and is a big step in long-range communications for air sections. It is realized that the SCR-577 is a receiver only. This fault is minor when it is realized that emergency messages or orders can be sent back to air sections, left behind and out of 500-600 series radio range, for distances as great as twenty miles. This group has often made displacements of twenty miles and communication and liaison is lost, adding confusion to the abandoned section. Now we have control and even though it is a one way affair, it is a big improvement over nothing at all." - Artillery Air Officer, 183d Field Artillery Group.

"We have installed an intercommunication system in our planes and now consider interphone almost indispensable." - Artillery Air Officer, 5th Armored Field Artillery Group.

(2) "During the past month one of our pilots had an accident at another artillery field. The pilot was hospitalized and our battalion was not notified until sixty hours later. When pilot did not return that night we assumed that he was either lost or had a forced landing. Due to the fact that we were not notified, the division and group planes spent one and one half days searching for the plane...When an accident occurs on another field, I believe it is the responsibility of the senior officer of that field to notify the unit concerned as soon as possible." - Air Officer, 696th Armored Field Artillery Battalion.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ R. W. Hartman
/t/ R. W. HARTMAN
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

ANNEXES 1 & 2. (omitted)

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

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Engineer
APO 403

SUBJECT: Transmittal of After-Action Report of the Engineer Section.

TO : Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, APO 403.

1. Transmitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Engineer Section, Headquarters Third U.S. Army, beginning with the arrival of the Engineer Section at Camp Peover, Cheshire, England, on 23 March 1944, and continuing through the planning phase, the pre-operational phase on the Continent, and the campaigns of Normandy, Northern France and Germany.

2. The work of the Engineers of Third U.S. Army during these campaigns covered all normal engineering work in support of an Army in combat, including breaching of enemy obstacles; location and removal of mines; assault crossings of rivers; floating and fixed bridging; road maintenance and construction; construction of prisoner of war enclosures; rehabilitation of damaged billets and hospitals; water supply; camouflage; fire fighting; mapping, including reproduction and distribution; furnishing of engineer intelligence data; furnishing of engineer supplies and maintenance of engineer equipment, and many other miscellaneous engineer tasks. Of all the engineer work done, the largest single item was bridging.

JOHN F. CONKLIN,
Brigadier General, U S Army,
Engineer.

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ENGINEER SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart

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

ADMINISTRATION

Operates the Section message center.

Maintains the Section correspondence files.

Consolidates the Daily Logs of the several Sub-sections, and incorporates them into the Section Log.

Coordinates thru G-1 all administrative personnel actions affecting engineer troops with the Army, including allotment of school quotas.

Coordinates thru the Headquarters Commandant all details connected with the local defense, movement, office supply and operation of the office establishment of the Engineer Section.

Coordinates thru the Headquarters Commandant all matters of military discipline affecting enlisted personnel of the Engineer Section.

Coordinates thru the Adjutant General the distribution of Engineer Technical publications.

Supervises the use of transportation allotted to the Engineer Section.

Performs, in addition to the above, all functions of an administrative nature necessary to the comfort and orderly conduct of the Section.

INTELLIGENCE

Collects, evaluates and disseminates engineer intelligence pursuant to policies established by the Army Engineer or prescribed by higher authority.

Arranges through G-2 for the collection of engineer intelligence from Army intelligence agencies.

Maintains a reference library of technical, geographical and geological data pertinent to present or prospective operations.

Maintains maps to reflect the current status of the engineer intelligence situation.

Supervises and controls the operations of Engineer Technical Intelligence Teams assigned to Army Headquarters.

Designs, in consultation with other Sub-section Chiefs, engineer intelligence reporting devices and procedures to insure complete coverage, by reconnaissance agencies, of data essential to engineer operations, and initiates their promulgation to units concerned.

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Outlines training objectives and prescribes standards of technical proficiency to be attained by all Engineer troop units with the Army.

Prepares plans for the disposition of Army Engineer Troops, coordinating with G-3 as such plans affect tactical displacement, and with G-4 as they affect troop movements.

Prescribes the nature and scope, and supervises the conduct of training undertaken by Army Engineer troop units.

Coordinates through the Administrative Officer the distribution of training publications.

Conducts training inspections and tests of engineer troop units with the Army.

Keeps the Engineer informed of current Engineer troop dispositions by maintaining the Engineer Troop Disposition Map.

Drafts the engineer paragraphs of and the engineer Annexes to Field Orders.

SUPPLY

Computes Class II engineer requirements for the Army.

Assembles, evaluates, and consolidates all engineer supply requirements, initiates their procurement, and follows up to insure their delivery in the desired quantities, at the proper places, on time.

Coordinates through G-4 the preparation of the engineer supply plan and drafts engineer paragraphs and annexes to Administrative Orders.

Takes all necessary action to effectuate the Engineer Supply Plan.

Maintains stock records of engineer items of supply and keeps the Engineer currently informed of the status of engineer supply.

Prepares the Engineer Equipment Maintenance Plan for the Army and coordinates through the Engineer Operations Officer the disposition of Engineer Maintenance Companies with the Army.

TECHNICAL

Prepares estimates of the const. requirements of the Army; translates these estimates into phased bills of materials and labor requirements and transmits them to the Supply Officer and to the Operations Officer, respectively, for procurement.

Draws plans and specifications for specific const. projects as directed by the Army Engr.

Develops plans for the const., repair, maintenance, and operation of utilities necessary to the functioning of the Army.

Prescribes standards of const., maintenance, and operation of communications (except signal) and utilities.

Supervises the execution of const, maintenance, and operational tasks charged to agencies, other than Engineer Troop Units, operating under direct control of the Army Engineer.

Inspects for technical proficiency, the execution of Engineer operational tasks by Engineer Troop Units with the Army.

Collects detailed engineering data and prepares engineering plans pertaining to: Fortifications, minefields and barriers; demolitions; assault of fortified zones; camouflage; floating bridges; water supply.

Reconnoiters the available road net and recommends action necessary to fully exploit its capacity with a minimum of attendant maintenance.

Maintains schedules, progress charts, and operations maps to reflect the current status of all const., maintenance and utility operations under supervision of the Sub-section.

Acts as consulting agency for Army on technical engineering matters.

Discharges all functions pertaining to the acquisition and disposal of Real Estate delegated to the Engineer by higher authority.

TOPOGRAPHIC

Plans and supervises the procurement, production, storage, and distribution of maps, map substitutes, photographs, charts and models for the Army.

Coordinates the survey activities of the Corps Topographic Companies and the Army Topographic Battalion to the end that the survey requirements of the Army as a whole are best satisfied.

Works in close liaison with the Army Artillery Officer in formulating survey plans so that full utilization will be made of the combined survey means available to Army.

Prepares, subject to G-2 approval, the Army Map Plan as an Appendix to Field or Administrative Orders.

Supplies the reproduction needs of Army Headquarters.

Maintains records affecting accuracy of maps and survey control in current use and takes active steps to immediately disseminate corrections to affected unit headquarters.

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CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

On 23 March the Engineer Section moved into the Forward Echelon of Headquarters Third U.S. Army at CAMP PEWSER.

The Section, upon its arrival, consisted of twenty-eight officers, one warrant officer, and forty-three enlisted men, organized under T/O [illegible], dated 17 July 1943. Functional chart of the organization is shown on the preceding page.

Here began a period of intensive planning covering troop phasing requirements, terrain analyses, bridge requirements, river crossing sites, road studies, traffic circulation plans, computation of all engineer supply requirements up to D plus 90, and survey and mapping plans. Strategic terrain analyses were prepared from a study of all available data on the region of Northwest France, north of the LOIRE River and west of the SEINE River, and later extended to cover the area south of the LOIRE. Annex [illegible]. A special study was also made of these same regions as to their suitability for tank warfare. Each of these studies was published by A.C. of S. G-2 in a series of Target Area Analyses.

In computing the bridging requirements for the operations contemplated by Third U.S. Army, an arbitrary roadnet of Class 70 and Class 40 roads was selected, in accordance with the policy established in "OVERLORD" for roads to be provided and maintained within the assault zone. This policy proposed the following as normal road requirements for planning purposes:

(a) One Class 40 road per front line division forward of Corps rear boundary.
(b) One Class 70 road and one Class 40 road per Corps in rear of Corps rear boundary.
(c) Lateral roads at 11 mile interval in rear of Corps rear boundary, alternately Class 70 and Class 40.

After selecting the most suitable roadnet based on the above policy, the bridging requirements were estimated on the assumption that all bridges would be destroyed and would require replacement. Where data on stream widths were not available, the probable bridge requirements were calculated from the size of the drainage areas above the crossing sites. It was estimated that during the period D plus 29 to D plus 90 standard 13½-foot double-double Bailey bridges would be required.

All major rivers were carefully studied to determine the most suitable crossing sites. The widths of the river, depth of water, condition of the riverbed and nature of the banks, as well as the adequacy of the roadnet leading to the crossing site, were taken into consideration.

Road studies comprised such items as road widths, surfacing, sharp curves, and other critical restrictions. From these road studies tentative traffic circulation plans were prepared, with the realization that the final traffic circulation plans must be based on actual ground reconnaissance.

Class II supplies were calculated logistically, based upon the troops to be assigned. Class IV supplies were calculated from intelligence data, map studies, and capabilities of engineer troops to be assigned. Requisitions were sent in to include supplies up to D plus 90. Four light pontoon companies were equipped with Bailey bridges prior to embarkation and all combat battalions were equipped with D-7 tractors in addition to T/E.

In April the 1581st Engineer Survey Liaison Detachment was assigned to Headquarters Third U.S. Army and attached to the Engineer Section. This detachment of five officers and nine enlisted men was incorporated into the Engineer Section and was charged with the planning and supervision of map reproduction, supply and distribution; and surveys.

A plan for the recovery and extension of survey control by combined efforts of Survey Platoons and Field Artillery Observation Battalions during operations was adopted and published as an Operations Memorandum (Annex 2).

Map distribution on the Continent was covered by an Operations Memorandum published 11 June (Annex 3). This memorandum outlined the procedure for distribution of maps in the United Kingdom to troops leaving for the Continent, both build-up or in assault, as well as for distribution on the Continent. This depot closed operations at ALTRINCHAM on 3 July and opened on the Continent in France after the arrival of Headquarters Third U.S. Army.

Several relief models were constructed for study of Western France and certain fortified islands. Third U.S. Army having no model making detachment, the models were constructed by three enlisted men of the Army Topographic Battalion. Photographs were made of these models and halftone reproductions made at a final scale of approximately 1/50,000. These models were used extensively by staff sections for planning and later in operations. They were forwarded to the War Department after operations extended beyond their area of coverage. The halftone "mosaic mosaics" made from the originals were distributed down to and including regiments. They were also later used to supplement and illustrate G-2 Order of Battle reports and the "OVERLORD" War Report.

At about the same time the terrain models were being constructed, considerable interest was demonstrated in third dimensional Vectography and, at the request of the A.C. of S, G-2, an officer from the Topo Subsection was assigned the task of investigating facilities for their production in large quantities. Visits to [illegible] and HIGH WYCOMBE, England, revealed a plant in the process of completion capable of producing 75,000 vectographs per month. These facilities were utilized by the G-2 Section for several orders of considerable size and the results were received with enthusiasm. However, the eventual fast pace of the campaign, coupled with the fact that vectographs could only be supplied from the United Kingdom, made their use impractical.

Prior to leaving the United Kingdom it was realized that there should be a reproduction unit with Army Headquarters to take care of the many small rush jobs required. It was believed that there would be many situations when the Engineer Topographic Battalion, because of its space requirements and relative immobility, would be located at a considerable distance from Army Headquarters. In forming this reproduction detachment, it was decided to take a press trailer with a Harris 40" x 22½" lithographic press, a camera van and a 2½-ton truck, together with the necessary personnel consisting of one officer and nine enlisted men, all from the Army Topographic Battalion. This detachment proved to be of immense value in turning out rush jobs for Army Headquarters and in relieving the Army Topographic Battalion of many small jobs which might have interfered with the larger reproduction work of the battalion.

During this entire planning phase the training of all Third U.S. Army engineer units in the United Kingdom was continuously checked and coordinated. Periodic inspections were made and deficiencies in training corrected as rapidly as possible. Training activities were largely concentrated on Bailey bridging, construction and maintenance of roads, mines and booby traps, including the use of the non-metallic mine detector, and waterproofing of vehicles. Training Memorandum No. 2, issued 17 April (Annex 4), covered the objective and scope of engineer training during this period. The Engineer Battalion of the 2nd French Armored Division was trained in the use of Bailey and U.S. Floating Bridging.

Procurement directives covering the acquisition of real estate, billeting, (Annex 5) and hiring of civilian labor (Annex 6) were drawn up in consultation with Headquarters European Theater of operations memorandum (Annex 7).

On 27 June the 2890th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team, consisting of three officers and six enlisted men, joined the Engineer Section, being attached to the Intelligence Subsection. The mission of this team was to search for and examine captured enemy materiel and to send to higher echelons for further examination and evaluation samples of any new type equipment located. The team was also immediately to disseminate to troops any information of value pertaining to new types of enemy engineer materiel.

After Headquarters Third U.S. Army moved to a concentration area near SOUTHAMPTON, the Engineer Section moved to SOUTHAMPTON on 4 July and embarked for the Continent.

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

The Engineer Section landed on UTAH Beach in an LST the evening of 6 July, from which beach the Section moved to a bivouac area near NEHOU (T-1998) on 7 July.

The period from date of landing to the start of operations was principally devoted to final stages of planning. Reconnaissance of roads was made in the major portion of the captured region of France to acquire actual data for comparison with the road information used during preliminary planning stage in England. Although it was found that the Germans had not destroyed as many bridges as was contemplated no major changes were made in the estimated bridging requirements.

Bridging and other engineer material requirements were estimated for the period D plus 90 to D plus 120 during this final planning phase.

Shortly after arrival on the Continent, a reconnaissance of bivouac areas was made for the concentration of engineer units. The arrival of the units was coordinated and arrangements were made for guiding them from the beaches to bivouac in the concentration area in the vicinity of BRICQUEBEC (O-1304). During the period from 7 July to 1 August, the following engineer units arrived:

UNITS	ARRIVAL	UNITS	ARRIVAL
1092d Engr Util Det	7 July	993d Engr Trdwy Br Co	22 July
168lst Engr Surv Lm Det	7 July	66th Engr Top Co	22 July
2d Bn Engr C Bn	13 July	2894th Engr TIT	22 July
666th Engr Top Co	14 July	18th Engr Hv Pon Bn	23 July
2896th Engr TIT	14 July	528th Engr L Pon Co	23 July
133d Engr C Bn	14 July	15th Engr C Bn	24 July
652d Engr Top Bn	16 July	168th Engr C Bn	24 July
1117th Engr C Gp	16 July	994th Engr Trdwy Br Co	24 July
1101st Engr C Gp	16 July	88th Engr Hv Pon Bn	25 July
970th Engr Maint Co	17 July	996th Engr Trdwy Br Co	25 July
509th Engr L Pon Co	18 July	1303d Engr GS Regt	25 July
514th Engr L Pon Co	18 July	2877th Engr TIT	26 July
1277th Engr C Bn	18 July	997th Engr Trdwy Br Co	26 July
994th Engr Trdwy Br Co	18 July	87th Engr Hv Pon Bn	27 July
459th Engr Depot Co	18 July	1240th Engr FP Plat	27 July
1107th Engr C Gp	19 July	2890th Engr TIT	27 July
529th Engr L Pon Co	19 July	165th Engr C Bn	28 July
660th Engr L Equip Co	19 July	24th Engr C Bn	28 July
1411th Engr MS Co	19 July	553d Engr Hv Pon Bn	30 July
632d Engr L Equip Co	20 July		

These units concentrated on training in mines and booby traps and performing maintenance of equipment. The Technical Intelligence Teams under Army and corps gave lectures and demonstrations to all engineer units on new enemy mines and antipersonnel devices that were being encountered on the front of the VIII Corps, which corps was in operations at that time under First U.S. Army.

After arriving on the Continent but before becoming operational, the survey elements of the Army and corps were ready for action. But it appeared that the tactical situation would not require engineer participation to augment the observation battalions. However, plans were accomplished to make their services immediately available if and when the occasion arose.

The Army Map Depot opened on the Continent at BRICQUEBEC (O-1304) on 19 July for issuance of operational maps in limited quantities only, in that operational maps were not authorized Army prior to its becoming operational.

On 31 July, Forward "A" Echelon of the Engineer Section moved from the vicinity of NEHOU (T-1998) to an assembly area 12 miles northeast of MONTSURVENT (T-2064) prior to becoming operational on 1 August.

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

I - OPERATIONS

When Third U.S. Army became operational, the engineer mission was to support the operation through normal engineer functions. Division, corps and Army engineer troops were to be responsible for all engineer work within their respective areas; with the exception of installation of bulk POL facilities, reconnaissance and reconstruction of rail and port facilities, which were responsibilities of engineer troops of Communications Zone; and the construction of air fields, which was the responsibility of the Air Force.

From the start the operations were characterized by rapid advances and equally rapid changes in attachments of engineer troops to meet the changing situation.

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Engineer Operational Instruction No. 1, defining areas of responsibility for army engineer troops, was published as of 0200GB August. At this time the disposition of engineer troops was as follows:

VIII Corps

116th Engr C Gp
117th Engr C Gp
4th Engr C Bn
125th Engr C Bn
154th Engr C Bn
196th Engr C Bn
203d Engr C Bn
540th Engr L Pon Co
541st Engr L Pon Co
543rd Engr L Pon Co
622nd Engr L Equip Co
94th Engr Maint Co
994th Engr Trdwy Br Co
997th Engr Trdwy Br Co
66th Engr Top Co
2893d Engr Tech Int Team

XV Corps

111th Engr C Gp
11th Engr C Bn
165th Engr C Bn
1457th Engr C Bn
540th Engr L Pon Co
993rd Engr Maint Co
994th Engr Trdwy Br Co
666th Engr Top Co
646th Engr L Equip Co
2897th Engr Tech Int Team

III Corps

2897th Engr Tech Int Team

XX Corps

664th Engr Top Co
2897th Engr Tech Int Team

Army

111th Engr C Gp
204th Engr C Bn
528th Engr L Pon Co
87th Engr Hv Pon Bn
89th Engr Hv Pon Bn
180th Engr Hv Pon Bn
556th Engr Hv Pon Bn
613th Engr L Equip Co
Co A, 4th Engr Com Bn
2nd Engr C Bn
136th Engr JS Regt
72nd Engr Gp Trk Co
643d Engr Top Bn
47th Engr Depot Co
994th Engr Trdwy Br Co
613th Engr L Equip Co
111th Engr MS Co
139th Engr Fill Det
1st Engr Surv Co Det
1st Engr FF Plat (Atchd XV Sea Supply Co)
2893d Engr Tech Int Team
997th Engr Trdwy Br Co

The 111th Engineer Combat Group was placed in support of the VIII Corps, followed by the 143d Engineer General Service Regiment in the Army area.

On 5 August the four Engineer Heavy Pontoon Battalions under the 111th Engineer Combat Group were detached in order to perform essential hauling of engineer Class IV supplies. The 994th Engineer Dump Truck Company was also detached from the 111th Engineer Combat Group and attached to the 143d Engineer General Service Regiment to lend mobility and hauling facilities to the regiment.

By 7 August the XV Corps had become operational and the XX Corps was concentrating preparatory to becoming operational. Two combat groups, six combat battalions, three light equipment companies, one camouflage company, two dump truck companies, one light pontoon company, and one treadway bridge company were assigned to Third U.S. Army from First U.S. Army. On 7 August Engineer Operational Instruction No. 2 was issued with the 111th Engineer Combat Group being attached to XX Corps and the 1109th Engineer Combat Group concentrating under Army. The 1117th Engineer Combat Group was placed in support of XV Corps and the 143d Engineer General Service Regiment in support of VIII Corps, both operating in the Army area.

On 9 August Engineer Operational Instruction No. 3 was published. At this time the 151st Engineer General Service Regiment had concentrated on the Continent and was available for operations and was placed behind the 1117th Engineer Combat Group supporting XV Corps. The 143d Engineer General Service Regiment remained in support of VIII Corps and the 1st Engineer General Service Regiment was concentrating to support operations. The 111th Engineer Combat Group was attached to XV Corps and the 113th Engineer Combat Group was attached to XX Corps.

On 11 August Engineer Operational Instruction No. 4 was published, placing the 1340th Engineer General Service Regiment on the south flank and assigning the 111th Engineer Combat Group, with four heavy pontoon battalions, the mission of coordinating and effecting the movement of engineer Class IV supplies.

On 13 August Engineer Operational Instruction No. 5 was published, at which time the 111th Engineer Combat Group was attached to XII Corps. The 151st Engineer General Service Regiment was assigned the mission of supporting the XV Corps, the 1st Engineer General Service Regiment the XX Corps, and the 143d Engineer General Service Regiment remained in support of VIII Corps.

On 15 August Engineer Operational Instruction No. 6 was published. At this time the VIII, XV, XX, and XII Corps were all in operation, and the bulk of engineer troops assigned Third U.S. Army had arrived on the Continent.

The 130lst, 1303d, and 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment were placed in support of the XII, XV and XX Corps, respectively, and the 111th Engineer Combat Group was actively engaged in moving forward engineer Class IV supplies.

On 19 August Engineer Operational Instruction No. 7 was published, effecting the detachment of one combat battalion from VIII Corps and two combat battalions, one treadway bridge company and one light equipment company from the XV Corps and their attachment to XII Corps. 111th Engineer Combat Group and the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment. Missions remained unchanged.

On 21 August Engineer Operational Instruction No. 8 was published, effecting the attachment of Hq & Hq Co, 1135th Engineer Combat Group to XII Corps, one treadway bridge company to XV Corps and Hq & Hq Co, 1107th Engineer Combat Group to Army. The 1135th Engineer Combat Group was given the mission of concentrating prepared to support either XII or XX Corps. The mission of the 111th Engineer Combat Group, 1st, 1303d, and 1306th Engineer General Service Regiments remained unchanged.

On 24 August Engineer Operational Instruction No. 9 was published. At this time XV Corps reverted to First U.S. Army, together with all corps engineer troops. The 1107th Engineer Combat Group was assigned the mission of performing all engineer work in the zone of the Army supporting the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment and the 1137th Engineer Combat Group, respectively.

II - CONSTRUCTION

Roads and Bridges.

One of the most critical problems confronting the Engineer, Third U.S. Army, at the start of operations on 1 August was the selection and maintenance of an adequate network of north-south roads through a very narrow zone over which the entire Third U.S. Army and supporting supplies must pass. The zone of action established for this Army consisted of a narrow strip along the western coast of the CONTENTIN Peninsula, varying in width from ten to twenty miles. This zone was cut deeply on the west by three tidal estuaries, one at the south of the DIGUE River near ST. JAMES (T-4457), and the other two at the mouths of the SEE and SELUNE rivers near AVRANCHES (T-2417). Only two principal north-south highways extend through this area and these converge in and follow the same route through COUTANCES (T-2457) and AVRANCHES (T-2817).

At ST. JAMES (T-2447) it was found possible, by extensive bridging operations and continuous maintenance of a secondary road on the west of ST. JAMES (T-4457), to separate these two routes and eliminate this first potential bottleneck.

In the town of GRANVILLE (T-1134), the existing highway followed narrow winding streets which were definitely unsuitable for military traffic. This condition was corrected by selection and repair of the two one-way by-pass routes immediately to the east of GRANVILLE (T-1134).

The greatest restriction through which this Army was forced to move all troops and supplies was at AVRANCHES (T-2817), where the zone narrowed to ten miles or less. All axial highways within this zone converged on AVRANCHES (T-2817) and then followed only one principal route south for five miles to PONTAUBAULT (T-3010). The town of AVRANCHES (T-2717) itself was badly demolished from bombing and the streets were full of debris, which engineer troops expeditiously cleared from the principal streets. The bridge over the SEE River at AVRANCHES (T-2817) was captured intact; however, the bridge at PONTS (T-2718) was demolished. This latter bridge was rapidly repaired to accommodate two-way Class 40 traffic by using a Bailey bridge on one-half of the roadway and sections of treads from a treadway bridge company on the other half of the partially demolished structure. These treads were removed as soon as possible by constructing a Class 70 fixed timber trestle bridge alongside the partially demolished structure. While this timber bridge was under construction by the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment, one soldier was killed and five injured as a result of enemy bombing.

The enemy attempted nightly to bomb these critical bridges, including the bridge over the SELUNE River near PONTAUBAULT (T-3010), as a countermeasure to the possibility that one of these three vital structures might suffer a direct bomb hit, every possible crossing within the narrow zone of the Army was reconnoitered. The results revealed four north-south local gravel roads to the east of AVRANCHES (T-2817) on which the bridges were found intact. These alternate routes were very narrow, winding and rough; but were considered usable in an emergency.

It was found impracticable to attempt to bridge these estuaries at any point west of AVRANCHES (T-2817) and west of Highway N 176 at PONTAUBAULT (T-3010), due to the extreme width and the large tidal fluctuations.

Realizing that the success of accomplishing the mission of Third U.S. Army depended upon the continued flow of troops and supplies through this narrow funnel, an existing railroad bridge over the SEE River at AVRANCHES (T-2817) was prepared to accommodate highway traffic. A treadway bridge was placed across the SELUNE River about 300 yards upstream from the existing masonry arch bridge near PONTAUBAULT (T-3010).

As soon as this defile was passed, the road net available to the Army extended to the west, south and east, providing excellent routes of advance in those directions.

Once the breakthrough was accomplished, the combat troops moved so rapidly that enemy destruction of bridges was only a small percentage of that contemplated in the planning stage. The town of FOUGERES (T-3879) has been badly damaged by bombing and artillery fire, but the debris was rapidly removed from the more important thoroughfares, bomb craters filled and military traffic was kept rolling with a minimum of delay. FOUGERES (T-3879), having eight principal highways radiating from the city similar to the spokes in a wheel and without suitable by-pass routes, was immediately recognized as a major traffic problem. A study was made of this city and a traffic circulation plan devised and submitted for approval. This plan was immediately adopted and its execution materially improved the flow of traffic through this city.

The BRITTANY Peninsula and the area south to the LOIRE River was exploited so rapidly that the majority of the bridges were captured intact and the roads were found in very good condition. Engineer road and bridge work in this area consisted principally of patrolling the roads with maintenance crews to check the condition of the roads and to make immediate repairs to critical spots, such as shell craters or bombed bridges. Very little enemy action of this nature occurred other than in the restricted area around AVRANCHES (T-2817).

In executing the movement to the east and southeast, it was found that the enemy had destroyed all the bridges across the MAYENNE River with the exception of two bridges south of LAVAL (T-6846), one at MA SSAY (T-7027), and the other at CHATEAU GONTIER (U-7219). Five Class 40 Bailey bridges were immediately placed across the river, two of which were in LAVAL (T-6846), one at the crossing of GC 3 near ENTRAMMES (T-7698), one at CHANGELLAY (U-7405), and one at LE LION (U-7147). With the mass of supplies flowing through LAVAL (T-6846), it was decided to construct an additional Bailey bridge at LAVAL (T-6846) of Class 70 to accommodate the Class 70 vehicles which were used to transport ammunition from one Army dump to another. A Class 24 one-way trestle bridge was also constructed in LAVAL (T-6846) to accommodate the civilian traffic, thus permitting the Bailey bridges to be used to the maximum extent by military vehicles only. Many of the bridges over the SARTHE River were also destroyed or partially destroyed by the enemy. At LE MANS (V-4062) all bridges, except one two-way stone arch bridge, was destroyed. One Class 40 Bailey bridge was constructed in LE MANS (V-4062) to provide for a more complete utilization of the highway net leading through LE MANS (V-4062). By-pass routes to the north and south of LE MANS (V-4062) were also found and used on which existing bridges had not been destroyed.

In the drive to the SEINE River many of the major bridges were found demolished, but were rapidly replaced by first constructing Bailey bridges.

Because of the extended supply routes, every effort possible was made to replace the Bailey bridges with fixed timber bridges or steel I-beam bridges of local materials in order to keep pushing the Bailey bridges forward for re-use by the Corps and Division Engineers.

The reconnaissance information was consolidated and traffic circulation diagrams prepared and submitted for approval and execution. Throughout the rapid advance of this Army it has been impracticable to obtain current road and bridge information through normal intelligence channels. To offset this handicap, each engineer combat group and general service regiment under Army control, but in support of corps, were instructed to push their reconnaissance agencies forward through the zone of corps responsibility and report their reconnaissance data direct to the Army. In addition to these sources of information, three officers from Army engineer units were given the special mission of projecting road and bridge reconnaissance as far forward as enemy action would permit.

The normal bridging requirements were about two sixty-foot bridges

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



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Class 40 Double-Single Bailey bridge across the ARNO River at EMPOLI. Length 260 Ft. Built by the 1302nd Engineer General Service Regiment 30 August 1944.

Since the 5th Division planned to cross the TIBER river south of MONTERIANO (R-4667), it was necessary to have a suitable crossing over this stream, so a railroad bridge just south of MONTERIANO (R-4667) was planked and was used by the infantry and lighter vehicles and an old civilian pile bridge at MILE 268 RIBBI (T-5068) was strengthened to carry heavier loads. This bridge was too weak for tank loads, and XX Corps ordered the 88th Engineers to construct another heavy pontoon bridge near this site.

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in the vicinity of COURTALAIN (W-0464), approximately one mile north of the town. Reconnaissance was made on 17 August. The site was located on a stream in a large pasture. It was rectangular in shape and was approximately 750,000 square feet in size.

On 22 August the necessity for a new prisoner of war enclosure was indicated in the vicinity of NEMOURS (A-1070). Work was started on 24 August and completed on 28 August. Because of a lack of concertina wire, the 1341st Engineer General Service Regiment was given the task of dismantling and returning to the depot all wire contained in the BRUYAS (2-2833) site.

III - SUPPLY

Class II and IV engineer supplies, for which pre-scheduled requisition had been submitted, were arriving on the beaches by 1 August and were being stockpiled by Advance Section Communications Zone. Requisitions for Class II and IV supplies for depot stocks were submitted to Advance Section and a representative of the Supply Subsection of that headquarters assisted in securing release of all available supplies. The most serious problem which presented itself was the question of transporting these supplies from beach dumps to the Army depot, which was to be located in the vicinity of LE MANS (T-2066). The railroads as yet were not in operation. To overcome this situation, four Army heavy ponton battalions were organized under an engineer combat group into a Provisional Transportation Group, and by this means supplies were picked up at beach dumps and transported to the Army depot. By the afternoon of 1 August approximately 3,000 tons of engineer supplies were stocked at the depot in LE MANS (T-2066). Two corps dumps were established primarily for storing Class IV supplies and a small amount of other Class IV supplies. Heavy ponton transportation was used for hauling these supplies. No. 1 corps dump was located at ST. AUBIN DE TERREGATTE (T-3102) and No. 2 in the BRITTANY Peninsula in the vicinity of ST. MALO (G-4614).

The next movement of the Army depot was from LE MANS (T-2066) to LE MANS (T-4062). This movement was accomplished by heavy pontion battalions, which were at the same time continuing to pick up supplies at the beach dumps.

On 25 August the Army depot was advanced to PUISEAUX (A-1070). At this time Advance Section Communications Zone had been able to secure the assignment of sufficient trucks and rail facilities to transport supplies into CHARTRES (A-4062), and in some cases even up to the Army depot.

The average daily tonnage which was hauled by the four heavy pontion battalions was approximately 1,500 per day from 1 August to 25 August. One of the most serious problems encountered was securing replacements of treadway bridging. About 24 August Communications Zone established Army area trucking trucks loaded with M-4 and M-2 treadway bridging. This bridging was short certain essential parts, and it was necessary to dispatch trucks to beach dumps to secure these parts. Another serious shortage of material was in water purification equipment. The front line combat battalions were losing equipment due to enemy action and replacements were very difficult to secure. By the end of August this situation had been relieved slightly. Electric lighting equipment was also short in the early stages. However, several German installations were found to be stocked with electric equipment and were taken over by the Supply Section, electric equipment being issued as required. Several large stock piles of timber were also captured, which eliminated the necessity of transporting large quantities of timber. In most cases, this captured timber was in short lengths, and it was still necessary to bring in a certain amount required for bridging in the Army area.

IV - MAPS

From 6 July to 1 August, when Third U.S. Army was non-operational, the maps covering France were all controlled by First U.S. Army. Communications Zone had two advance depots at "UTAH" and "OMAHA" beaches, but these were also under First U.S. Army control.

The lack of access to these stocks by Third U.S. Army became at once a serious handrance. Staff planning requirements could only be met by going to First U.S. Army, securing a release, then going to both of the depots for a pickup.

During this time every effort was made through Third U.S. Army G-2 and through Engineer and Signal channels of Twelfth U.S. Army Group to secure the release of these maps in operational quantities. However, no maps were released in operational quantities until Third U.S. Army became operational. Map distribution on an operational basis started at 1100A, 1 August, in the middle of a field located two miles northeast of MONTSURVENT (T-2064).

To expedite emergency mapping on the movement south in the event that Army became operational arrangements had been made for divisional breakdown of maps separately carried on trucks as follows:

1 Armored Division) Covering Brittany Peninsula to its
1 Infantry Division) western edge (VIII Corps area).

1 Armored Division) Covering area south from COUTANCES (T-2457)
1 Infantry Division) to the general line of LAVENT (G-7231,-
BANTIES (G-0554), (XV Corps area).

In addition to receiving the above maps, as planned, there arrived from Communications Zone in the field referred to above eight truck loads of maps, scale 1/50,000 and 1/25,000, covering the BRITTANY Peninsula from ST. MALO (G-8614), west. With these maps on hand, the First Tank Destroyer Brigade was supplied in operational quantities for its initial mission. Approximately sixty per cent of these maps were delivered to the unit's tivouac area at 0900, 2 August, and the remainder at 1500 of the same day. Because of a change of mission, these maps were returned the following day. It later developed that this was but one of the many instances in which it became necessary, because of a change in the tactical situation, to remap the same unit.

During the time that the above was accomplished, the first Third U.S. Army Map Depot was set up in a residence located at MONTSURVENT (T-2064), under operational conditions.

During the month of August the following personnel were used to augment the regular Third U.S. Army Map Depot personnel:

Four officers and two enlisted men from the 1668st Engineer Survey Liaison Detachment
One platoon from the 293rd Engineer Combat Battalion from 1 to 8 August
Survey Platoon of the 65.nd Engineer Topographic Battalion from 7 August to September

The following movements were made by Third U.S. Army Map Depot:

From BRICQUEBEC (G-1364) to MONTSURVENT (T-2064) - 2 to 4 August
From MONTSURVENT (T-2064) to PUISEAUX (T-3879) - 7 to 8 August
From PUISEAUX (T-3879) to LE MANS (T-4062) - 16 to 17 August
From LE MANS (T-4062) to PUISEAUX (A-1070) - 23 to 24 August

A reproduction project consisting of twenty-six sheets, 1/25,000 topographic maps in the vicinity of COUTANCES (T-2457)-AVRANCHES (T-4851), commenced on 28 July, was completed and delivered to the Army Map Depot on 3 August in quantities ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 copies of each sheet.

On 6 August a reproduction project consisting of fifteen sheets, 1/25,000 topographic maps in the vicinity of BAIN DE BRETAGNE (A-9924), commenced on 31 July and completed and delivered to the Army Map Depot in quantities of 1,200 copies of each sheet.

CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

I - OPERATIONS

On 1 September the disposition of engineer troops was as listed below, having been changed by engineer operational instruction No. 10, published at 2XXXA0 August, and the assignment of two treadway bridge companies to First U.S. Army:

VIII Corps	XV Corps (cont'd)
11st Engr C Gp	509th Engr L Pon Co
113th Engr C Gp	537th Engr L Pon Co
15th Engr C Bn	94th Engr Trdwy Br Co
44th Engr C Bn	99ist Engr Trdwy Br Co
153th Engr C Bn	66th Engr Tow Co
204th Engr C Bn	28th Engr TIT (2)
540th Engr L Equip Co	1st Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn
969th Engr Maint Co	

XV Corps	Army
511th Engr C Pon Co	113th Engr C Gp
99th Engr Trdwy Br Co	1137th Engr C Gp
665th Engr Top Co	133rd Engr GS Regt
28ist Engr TIT (2)	1303d Engr GS Regt
2d Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn	1306th Engr GS Regt
	61st Engr C Bn
XII Corps	145th Engr C Bn
111th Engr C Gp	148th Engr C Bn
113th Engr C Gp	249th Engr C Bn
133d Engr C Bn	293d Engr C Bn
166th Engr C Bn	609th Engr L Equip Co
167th Engr C Bn	632d Engr L Equip Co
248th Engr C Bn	5208th Engr L Pon Co
613th Engr L Equip Co	976th Engr Maint Co
72d Engr L Pon Co	948th Engr Trdwy Br Co
511th Engr L Pon Co	572d Engr Gp Trk Co
99ist Engr Trdwy Br Co	76ath Engr Gp Trk Co
999th Engr Trdwy Br Co	77ath Engr Gp Trk Co
67ad Engr Tow Co	87th Engr Hv Pon Bn
28ist Engr TIT (2)	84th Engr Hv Pon Bn
4th Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn	160th Engr Hv Pon Bn
	551st Engr Hv Pon Bn
XI Corps	553d Engr Hv Pon Bn
11.3d Engr C Gp	652d Engr Tow Bn
143rd Engr C Gp	43.st Engr Depot Co
135th Engr C Bn	294th Engr TIT (2)
15.th Engr C Bn	1611th Engr MS Co
156th Engr C Bn	1612th Engr MS Co
179th Engr C Bn	12.4th Engr FP Plat
204th Engr C Bn	1644th Engr FP Plat
4.0th Engr C Bn	168ist Engr Surv Un Det
6.3d Engr L Equip Co	1692d Engr Util Det
96ist Engr Maint Co	Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn (a)

XII and XIII Corps, which were abreast facing northeast, were being supported by the 113th Engineer General Service Regiment and the 1137th Engineer Combat Group, respectively. These two units were, in turn, supported by the 133d Engineer General Service Regiment and the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment. The VIII Corps, which was cleaning up the BRITTANY Peninsula, did not require the support of army engineer troops.

At 1800GOB September, Engineer Operational Instruction No. 11 was published, effecting the transfer of one combat battalion from XX Corps to XII Corps, one treadway bridge company and one heavy pontion battalion from Army to XII Corps and two heavy pontion battalions from Army to XX Corps. XV Corps, with supporting corps engineer troops, had reverted back to Third U.S. Army, and the 133rd Engineer General Service Regiment was placed in support thereof. The VIII Corps, with all supporting corps engineer troops, was transferred to Ninth U.S. Army. The mission of the 1137th Engineer Combat Group, 1137th Engineer Combat Group, 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment, and 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment remained unchanged.

At 212000A September, Engineer Operational Instruction No. 12 was published, effecting the transfer of one treadway bridge company from XII Corps to XV Corps, the attachment of one treadway bridge company to XII Corps, and the transfer of one light pontion company and one heavy pontion battalion from Army to XV Corps. Missions of Army troops remained unchanged.

At 300BUG September, Engineer Operational Instruction No. 13 was published. At this time the XV Corps, with all supporting corps engineer troops, had been transferred to Sixth Army Group, effective 242400A, and the 133d Engineer General Service Regiment, previously in support of XV Corps, was placed in support of the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment. The missions of the remainder of the Army Engineer troops remained unchanged.

II - CONSTRUCTION

Roads and Bridges

The terrain over which engineer units of Third U.S. Army were responsible for road and bridge work during the month of September was dissected by such major rivers as the MARNE, the MEUSE, and the MOSELLE, together with numerous smaller streams and canals. During this period of operations enemy bridge demolitions continued to improve both in quality and in the number of bridges destroyed. This was particularly true after Third U.S. Army operations, because of critical shortages of gasoline, were materially slowed down, allowing the enemy more time to prepare and execute bridge demolitions. As a result, practically every bridge over rivers, streams and canals were destroyed that would present an obstacle to our further advance. The

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every bridge over the main streams in the area was demolished, and though the streams were generally at a low level during this period, it was necessary to maintain the main highway bridges on the Traffic Circuit intact, since bottlenecks created at by-passes at these points were undesirable for the movements taking place because enemy air activity was always a threat. The start of the rainy season further kept the traffic busy on the roads.

The state of the AB Arms area was not so disruptive as that existing in the south, since, with the exception of bridges at [illegible], and minor crossings over the AISHB, which could be forded, the principal bridges as far east as YB1484 (L-2965) had been overcome and repaired intact. This was particularly fortunate along the coast (Highway YA8435 [illegible] road), since this highway was to be the main army maintenance supply route to Aba and the Hall Arms as well.

The Sittang River crossing at the point where north to south met the east to west, encountered and, as before, all the bridges had been destroyed except, unfortunately, the main highway bridge through Pegu [illegible]. The crossing was expedited by the construction of treadway bridges [illegible] and a ferry. However, once this river had been crossed, the nature of the [illegible] country afforded further advantages.

The [illegible] was very thoroughly [illegible] with [illegible] and [illegible] by the many valleys traversed by [illegible] for the [illegible] to [illegible] a flood season.

[illegible] of [illegible] passed of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

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necessary to leave in all the bridges, since even a short interruption to communications might have been critical at this time.

South and west of NANCY (U-8611), the XII Corps objective, each of the many areas of the MOSELLE presented an individual crossing problem and the initial crossings had to be made by the Infantry in assault boats or by wading. The advances were made under direct artillery and small arms fire and as an indication of the intensity of the fighting, about seventy assault boats were damaged or lost in this area alone.

In the northern section of the corps area, a crossing was attempted near PONT-A-MOUSSON (U-7725), but it was unsuccessful. Subsequently, a successful crossing was made at DIEULOUARD (U-7828), where the MOSELLE flows through a long, wide flat valley, commanded on all sides by high hills. Successful Infantry crossings were made here and the crossing was exploited by putting in several floating bridges. After the bridges were pushed over, the task of defending the bridges was thrust upon the small Infantry force, the heavy pontoon battalion, and some combat engineers. In this manner the bridgehead was held for several days until NANCY (U-8611) was finally captured and Infantry and Armored columns came in and cleared the area.

In NANCY (U-8611), destruction of bridges was complete. Not a single route over the canal and MEURTHE River was left intact, and in all eleven bridges had to be constructed to provide adequate traffic circulation through the town.

Following the fall of NANCY (U-8611), the project of putting in a bridge at PONT-A-MOUSSON (U-7735) was again started, since it was planned to make this a main axial highway and possibly the Army main supply route. However, the east bank was still held by the enemy and one of the officers surveying the crossing was killed by a sniper. The area was finally cleared and an 800-foot bridge was erected at the town using existing piers. The bridge consisted of two Bailey bridges joined by a long stretch of I-beam bridging. An additional obstacle to the building was the fact that the vicinity of the bridge was heavily mined, and it was necessary to clear the area before work could begin. The project was completed in sixty hours of continuous work by the 249th Engineers, and as can be seen in the photographs, it was a major accomplishment.





800 ft Bailey and Steel I-Beam Bridge Constructed By 249th Engineer Combat Battalion at PONT-A-MOUSSON (U-7735) Across the MOSELLE River

Once the MOSELLE had been crossed in force, bridges again came into the picture east of the river, but no major obstacles blocked the way.

XV Corps entered the operational stage back with Third U.S. Army on 5 September, and had the MARNE, MEUSE and MOSELLE River to cross. The principal crossings were made at CHAUMONT (X-3977), NEUFCHATEAU (Z-4979) and CHAMES (U-4976), respectively.

VIII Corps operations under Third U.S. Army on the BREST Peninsula were completed on 5 September, when this corps was transferred to Ninth U.S. Army. No major bridging operations were reported during this period, since the principal task was the siege of BREST (V-9599) and other cities in the BREST Peninsula.

Other Construction.

As during the month of August, the only other construction of any importance during September was prisoner of war enclosures.

On 1 September work was started by the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment on a prisoner of war enclosure at EPINAL (T-9829). At this site the standard prisoner of war enclosure, 750 feet square, was constructed. This standard was developed after experimentation as to size and arrangement of interior pens and was approved by the Provost Marshal Section.

Because of the shortage of barbed wire, all salvagable wire was picked up and delivered to Engineer Dump No. 6 at CHALONS (T-5465).

On 6 September the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment was given a work order to construct a standard prisoner of war enclosure in the vicinity of FREMEN (U-4657). Reconnaissance was made on 9 September, construction started the following day, and work was completed 11 September.

Because of the approach of inclement weather and the availability of quarters, the next prisoner of war enclosure was located in the French artillery barracks in TOUL (U-6410). Buildings were encircled with wire of the triple concertina, with some exceptions, where four-strand wire was constructed. Box-type latrines were constructed over holes twenty-four inches in diameter by twelve feet deep. Two water tank platforms and four guard towers were constructed. This work was performed by the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment. The work order was issued on 18 September, reconnaissance was made on 19 September, and work completed on 21 September.

III - SUPPLY

As of 1 September two Army Engineer supply installations were being operated by the 459th Engineer Depot Company and two Quartermaster Service Companies. These were Engineer Depot No. 5, located in the vicinity of JUSSEAUX (X-1070), stocked with Engineer Class II, IV and V supplies and spare parts; and Advance Engineer Supply Point No. 6, supporting XII, XX and XV Corps, located in the vicinity of CHALONS (T-5445), and stocked with Class IV Engineer supplies, consisting mainly of Bailey bridging. Class II and Class IV Engineer supplies, with the exception of Bailey bridging, were transported to Army Engineer depots by Advance Section Communications Zone and Army transportation. Bailey bridging was being brought into Army depots by Communications Zone truck transportation.

On 7 September a new supply procedure was instituted by Communications Zone whereby supplies furnished each service of the Army were based on a daily tonnage allocation. The Engineers were allocated forty-three long tons daily for all classes of supplies. Daily requisitions representing this tonnage were submitted to A.C. of S., G-4, Army, for forwarded them to the 24th Regulating Station. From there they were routed to the G-4 Section, Advance Section Communications Zone. Such items as were available in Advance Section Communications Zone Engineer depots were filled and the remaining items extracted to Communications Zone. Supplies were forwarded to Army trainheads and railheads by Communications Zone transportation. Items on the daily requisition which were filled by Advance Section Communications Zone were forwarded to Army Engineer depots by Advance Section Communications Zone transportation, augmented, when necessary, by Army transportation.

Daily tonnage allocation to the Engineers was increased to seventy-three tons on 12 September, since it was found that forty-three tons were not sufficient to supply Third U.S. Army units with Engineer supplies. A special allocation of 3,554 long tons for Bailey bridging was obtained from Communications Zone. This bridging was moved to the Army area by special bridge trains dispatched directly from the NORMANDY Base Section.

Third U.S. Army Engineer Depot No. 7 was established for all classes of Engineer supplies in the vicinity of FREMEN (U-4657) on 8 September. Since this depot was located well forward in the Army area, it was designed to service both corps and Army troops.



Engineer Depot No. 7 at FREMEN (U-4657)

All inter-depot movements of Engineer supplies continued to be performed by the 119th Engineer Combat Group and attached units. Because of the rapid movement of the Army, this work required the constant use of approximately 170 2½-ton trucks. At all times priority was given to the movement of bridges. At no time was there a shortage of bridging available to the corps.

In the area occupied by the Army during this period, considerable quantities of captured Engineer materials were encountered. A system was established whereby all captured supplies would be used to the maximum extent. Units reporting captured supplies immediately placed guards and reported the location to the Army Engineer. In order to relieve corps of most of this work, teams made up from the 273d Engineer Combat Battalion were assigned to each corps for the purpose of making complete inventories and maintaining guards. Materials were issued to all troops on the approval of corps or Army Engineer. One officer and two enlisted men from Advance Section Communications Zone were attached to the Engineer Supply Section for the purpose of coordinating the transfer of captured Engineer materiel from Army to Advance Section Communications Zone, which also assisted in guarding captured dumps in the Army area. Captured Engineer supplies, particularly lumber, electrical supplies, and explosives were found to be extremely useful during this period of operations.

First rail shipments of Engineer supplies directly to the Army area were received at VERDUN (U-2965) railhead on 19 September.

Army Engineer Depot No. 8 was opened at TOUL (U-6410) on 26 September. Inside storage was available for Class IV supplies. Prior to this time no inside storage had been used. Railway facilities were also available which enabled rail shipments to be received direct from Communications Zone and Advance Section Communications Zone.

In general, quantities of Engineer supplies received from Communications Zone and Advance Section Communications Zone were adequate to supply the Army. Principal shortages consisted of topographic supplies, paint, spare parts, and bridge flooring. By the end of September there was a decided shortage of bridge lumber because of the fact that most captured lumber dumps had been exhausted. Efforts were started to take advantage of local saw mills for the production of bridge materials.

A shortage of second and third echelon spare parts prevailed throughout the first two weeks in September. However, by 20 September second and third echelon coverage on approximately twenty types of Engineer equipment had been obtained. All spare parts were transported by Army transportation from Advance Section Communications Zone Spare Parts Depot at PARIS (R-0544). Because of the comparatively small demand for spare parts during the rapid advance of the Army, the shortage of spare parts was not a major problem.

Battle Losses of equipment were confined primarily to river crossing equipment, such as Brockway bridge trucks, assault boats, treadway bridging and pontoon bridging. This equipment was replaced from Army and Communications Zone depot stocks.

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over the period 1 September to 30 September, inclusive, 6AF long tons of Class II, IV and V items, 4 long tons of Class IV, and twenty-two long tons of Class V engineer supplies were received into Army depots from Communications Zone and Advance Section Communications Zone.

During the month of September, the average stock on hand in all Army supply installations by classes and by days of supplies was as follows:

Type of Supplies	Tonnage on Hand	Days of Supply
Class II	[illegible]	2
Class IV	[illegible]	39
Class V	341	3

IV - MAPS

A reproduction program was in progress during all the month of September. First priority work was the [illegible] Project [illegible], covering the [illegible] in front of Third U.S. Army. The facilities of the 41st Engineer Topographic Battalion, 40th Engineer Topographic Company and the 23rd Engineer Topographic Company were used. The program consisted of the [illegible] of 1,000,000 copies each. In addition, [illegible] were printed in sixty-four [illegible] each. With the movement of the Army into Germany it was necessary to [illegible] maps from the area covered by the [illegible] to meet the situation of the Army. This consisted of fifty-seven [illegible] of 1,000 copies each. During this period the situation developed that large scale maps were needed in the [illegible] area. A [illegible] and a [illegible] project was started. These consisted of thirty-nine quadrangles of 8,000 copies each.

In addition to the reproduction work of the Army units, reproduction of [illegible] maps was carried on in PARIS (S-5446), with facilities [illegible] by the 653rd Engineer, Third U.S. Army, and supervised by an officer from this section. This was necessary because Third U.S. Army [illegible] area of which no coverage of the scale was available. It was felt that precautions had to be taken immediately to alleviate this [illegible]. Several days after this project was started, and covering the period I area began to arrive through normal channels and the PARIS (S-5446) plant was closed.

A planimetric map from air photos was made by the 653rd Engineer Topographic Battalion, as a test, in seventy-two hours.

A photomosaic project of nineteen sheets covering the area around [illegible] was [illegible] and completed during the month. Reproduction of these sheets amounted to 8,000 copies each.

A chart was requested by the Army Commander covering the area east of [illegible]. Work was undertaken by the 41st Engineer Topographic Battalion and the chart delivered in eight days.

To assist the Artillery, a project consisting of six 1/100,000 quadrangles was [illegible] trig data. The plotting, checking were done [illegible] Army area production, consisting of 1,000 prints, was done by the Communications Zone plant in PARIS (S-5446).

A system for transposing German trig data to existing theater grid was established by Third U.S. Army in conjunction with Twelfth U.S. Army Group. Work on a graphic solution covering this transformation was carried on.

Several captured map and supply installations were visited during the month. Eight captive truck loads of paper and topographic supplies were sent to the engineer depot.

Conferences were held in PARIS (S-5446), REIMS (T-3080), Twelfth U.S. Army Group and at this Headquarters on map supply and distribution. As a result of these contacts, map supply for Third U.S. Army for the entire month was complete and complete. Maps were being received through normal channels by the end of the month.

Contacts were made with divisions. At the 5th Infantry Division, when the Commanding General desired 1/50,000 maps in an emergency, these were [illegible] Twelfth U.S. Army Group and reproduced by the 653rd Engineer Topographic Battalion.

A letter was sent out cautioning various groups against the use of captured maps, calling their attention to the differences in grids and the possible complications which might arise from their use.

V - INTELLIGENCE

With the military situation moving rapidly, efforts were concentrated upon securing all available information of our interested area deep in our front in Eastern France and Southwestern Germany. The information in which we were mainly concerned was as follows:

a. Topography and roads.
This was to include all terrain analyses indicating areas and roads which favored cross country movement of tracked vehicles and those areas which did not.

b. Rivers.
This was to include width of rivers, velocity, type of river bed, condition of banks, and those areas which were favorable for assault crossings, and those which were not. The rivers of main interest were the MOSELLE, the MEURTHE, the SAAR, and the RHINE.

c. Bridges.
This was to include the location, type, length, width and strength of each bridge, with water gap and existing road net.

All such information available was obtained, appraised, compiled and disseminated to all Third U.S. Army Engineer units. The source of such information was two-fold. Higher headquarters and our own resources, which included the Photo Center, Third U.S. Army, and the 28[illegible]th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team.

The following intelligence data were distributed to various units within this Army:

a. Topography and roads.
There were fifteen terrain studies of various areas, including I.S.T.U. reports and Terrain area maps, issued.

b. Rivers.
There were eleven different studies and reports issued.

c. Bridges.
There were three different bridge reports issued. With reference to bridge reports, it is to be noted that many of the river reports also contained reports on bridges. Bridge studies based on recent photography were issued on the SAAR and RHINE river bridges.

The 28[illegible]th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team prepared a mine chart, [illegible] the various types of German teller mines with the new non-removable igniter. Since this was based on the actual finding and examination of the igniter, a wide distribution throughout the Army was made. The unit was occupied also with the examination of enemy mines at [illegible] (T-5446), [illegible] (U-4464), and [illegible] (U-4670). Items of exceptional interest which were examined were the German seven-inch rifle grenade and the German "J" Heavy Pontoon bridge.

VI - WATER SUPPLY

Nineteen Army water points and three water distribution points for Army troops were opened during the month of September.

Operation of eleven Army water points and one water distribution point, four of which had been opened in August, was assumed by the [illegible]th Engineer Water Supply Battalion of Advance Section Communications Zone. Operation of an Army water supply mobile unit in the city of ORLEANS (W-6442) was discontinued on 2 September.

The [illegible]th Engineer Water Supply Company, assisted by the 687th Engineer Water Supply Battalion of Advance Section Communications Zone, started on 5 September supplementing the water supply of the city of ETAIN (U-4770) by hauling an average of 55,000 gallons of water per day and delivering it to the water system. Approximately one-half million gallons of water were added to the city supply.

The water supply system of the city of NANCY (U-8611) was inspected and the water was declared unsuited for Army use for drinking and cooking.

By the end of the month, five Army water points and two water distribution points were furnishing approximately 140,000 gallons of water per day, including that supplied to the city of ETAIN (U-4770).

Water supply points were located in the close proximity of Evacuation hospitals, with the view of providing uninterrupted water supply to these units. Convalescent hospitals, Medical air evacuation holding units, and prisoner of war enclosures were supplied by haulage to their storage tanks.

VII - CAMOUFLAGE

On 1 September the four platoons of the [illegible]AP Company, 602nd Engineer Camouflage Battalion, were attached to [illegible] VIII, III, IV and XX Corps.

The operations of the platoons consisted of continuous inspection of corps units and divisions, making corrections, advising and assisting in camouflage matters. Their chief findings related to supply shortages. In order to correct deficiencies the supply situation was investigated and estimates submitted indicating material requirements for immediate use.

The company commander and technical sergeant camouflaur gave their attention to the camouflage of the area of Third U.S. Army Headquarters, making periodic aerial and ground inspections of the area. Interpretation of aerial photographs was the principal method of obtaining information relative to the camouflage of areas inspected, although during the latter part of the month, inclement weather made aerial inspection impossible.

On 5 September, a German camouflage net factory at SEMS (I-6965) was investigated, but because of lack of supervising personnel, it was not reopened.

On 16 September the second platoon reverted to company control from VIII Corps and was used in improving the camouflage of Rear Echelon of Army Headquarters. Improvement in the camouflage of the area was achieved by continuous inspection. It was found that inspection personnel achieved best results when they could show the personnel of units inspected aerial photographs of their own area.

The Camouflage Coordinator, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, inspected units of XX Corps.

On 21 September the survey of Army camouflage requirements was completed and an estimate submitted indicating requirements for the month and for a sixty-day period following. During the month the supply of camouflage nets was greatly increased by shipments from Advance Section Communications Zone, nets being obtained through turn-in by Advance Section Communications Zone and by increased supply from England and the United States.

On 23 September inspection of Rear Echelon of Army Headquarters revealed improvement in camouflage practice, although inclement weather had caused the area to become unduly marred and muddy.

On 30 September the 3rd platoon returned to company control after attachment to XV Corps.

Under the conditions prevailing at the end of September, with units quartered in towns, a change in camouflage policy and practice was necessary. These changes were dealt with by individual contact by inspection personnel, so that units inspected would learn the new principles involved when camouflage was practiced in towns rather than in wooded terrain.

VIII - FIRE DEFENSE

The Headquarters Sections and Type No. 2 units of both Engineer Fire Fighting Sections remained attached to Ordnance Groups for protection of Class V depots. The six type No. 1 units assisted the Quartermaster Gas Supply Companies, to which they were attached, in setting up fire defense and remained with them for fire protection.

In addition to the fire protection furnished, the commanders of the units inspected all ammunition supply points and assisted, when necessary, in setting up fire defense. Careful attention was given to preventive measures and no fires occurred during the month.

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CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

I - OPERATIONS

There were very few major changes in the disposition of engineer troops throughout the month due to the static situation. The 130th Engineer General Service Regiment and the 1137th Engineer Combat Group remained in direct support of the XX and XII Corps and were, in turn, supported by the 130lst and 1303d Engineer General Service Regiments, respectively. The 1134th Engineer Combat Group continued its mission of coordinating depot hauling activities.

On 2 October the 178th Engineer Combat Battalion arrived from the NORMANDY Beach and was attached to the 1137th Engineer Combat Group.

On 5 October the 87th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion reverted from Seventh U.S. Army to the control of Third U.S. Army and was attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group.

On 8 October one platoon of the Light Equipment Company attached to the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment was detached therefrom and attached to the 130lst Engineer General Service Regiment to equalize the equipment available.

At 152000A October Engineer Operational Instruction No. 14 was published. At this time major disposition of engineer troops remained unchanged. The 528th Engineer Light Ponton Company, 998th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company and the 3d Platoon, Company A, 602d Engineer Camouflage Battalion reverted from Seventh U.S. Army to the control of Third U.S. Army, effective this date, and the 1354th Engineer Dump Truck Company had arrived from the NORMANDY Beach.

Effective 18 October, changes in the attachments of the four Engineer Dump Truck Companies were effected to provide for the attachment of one Dump Truck Company to each of the three Engineer General Service Regiments and the Engineer Combat Group under Army.

At 231400A October Engineer Operational Instruction No. 15 was published effecting the above noted transfers and the attachment to the XX Corps of the 996th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company, which unit had been assigned Third U.S. Army from First U.S. Army, effective 20 October.

Starting 25 October, a three-day school in floating equipage to include construction of the Class 70 floating Bailey bridge, use of storm boats, tandem M-2 assault boats (powered), rafts and ferries, was commenced. A schedule was drawn up for all Army Engineer troops to attend, taking one battalion, or the equivalent, each three day period.

Effective 27 October, the 55lst Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion was relieved from assignment to Third U.S. Army and assigned to Ninth U.S. Army.

The disposition of Engineer troops at 312400A October was as follows:

XII CORPS

1137th Engr C Gp
1135th Engr C Gp
139d Engr C Bn
154th Engr C Bn
166th Engr C Bn
167th Engr C Bn
248th Engr C Bn
613th Engr L Equip Co
72d Engr L Pon Co
513th Engr L Pon Co
995th Engr Trdwy Br Co
997th Engr Trdwy Br Co
553d Engr Hv Pon Bn
673d Engr Top Co
4th Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn
2897th Engr TIT (C)

XX CORPS

1143d Engr C Gp
1139th Engr C Gp
135th Engr C Bn
160th Engr C Bn
179th Engr C Bn
204th Engr C Bn
206th Engr C Bn
623d Engr L Equip Co
961st Engr Maint Co
509th Engr L Pon Co
537th Engr L Pon Co
991st Engr Trdwy Br Co
996th Engr Trdwy Br Co
180th Engr Hv Pon Bn
664th Engr Top Co
1st Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn
2898th Engr TIT (C)

ARMY

1134th Engr C Gp
1137th Engr C Gp
130lst Engr GS Regt
1303d Engr GS Regt
1306th Engr GS Regt
145th Engr C Bn
178th Engr C Bn
188th Engr C Bn
249th Engr C Bn
293d Engr C Bn
609th Engr L Equip Co
632d Engr L Equip Co
976th Engr Maint Co
528th Engr L Pon Co
548th Engr L Pon Co
998th Engr Trdwy Br Co
572d Engr Dp Trk Co
764th Engr Dp Trk Co
770th Engr Dp Trk Co
1354th Engr Dp Trk Co
87th Engr Hv Pon Bn
88th Engr Hv Pon Bn
652d Engr Top Bn
459th Engr Depot Co
1511th Engr WS Co
1512th Engr WS Co
Co A (-), 602d Engr Cam Bn
2890th Engr TIT (R)
1237th Engr FP Plat
1240th Engr FP Plat
1661st Engr Surv Ln Det
1092d Engr Util Det

II - CONSTRUCTION

The road maintenance work performed by engineer troops during the month consisted of cleaning out ditches to improve drainage, removing mud from surface of asphalt pavements, patching of raveled areas in these paved roads and the construction of access roads into bivouac areas and supply installations.

Some sections of pavement on main supply routes became badly raveled and "chuck holes" developed, which necessitated patching to insure the safe and continued smooth flow of supply traffic over these vital arteries.

To accomplish this necessary extensive patching, two central mixing plants were operated, one in the vicinity of ETAIN (U-4770) and the other at TOUL (U-6410). These two asphalt mixing plants produced several hundred tons of premix asphaltic patching material which was used on road repairs within reasonable hauling distance from the plants. Several German rolling kitchens were utilized as melting pots for asphalt and tar and the aggregate mixed by hand with this hot binder to supplement the production of the central mixing plants.

After utilizing all available crushed aggregate at the TOUL (U-6410) plant and in the absence of any available rock crus-r, an experimental patching mixture was developed, using pit-run sand-gravel and cement. The sand-gravel was excavated from a pit adjacent to the central mixing plant at TOUL (U-6410) and contained about the correct amount of water to hydrate and cure the cement. The only action necessary was to add cement to the pit-run sand-gravel and mix about forty-five seconds in the same rotary drum mixer as had previously been used for mixing asphalt and crushed gravel. Captured German cement was used for this purpose and proved successful as an expedient method of patching "chuck holes" in asphalt pavements.

The continued rainy weather during October necessitated a considerable amount of work at the entrances to bivouac areas and supply points, many of which had been located along main supply routes. This work was of two kinds: First, the mud carried onto the main highways had to be cleaned off continuously to prevent accidents resulting from the slippery roads; secondly, the access roads leading off the main paved highways had to be gravelled in order to prevent mud being carried onto the main roads and also to facilitate movement in and out of the otherwise muddy area. This work was a continuing task for all units because of the continued moving of units and the lack of sufficient engineer equipment to improve the situation at all points at once. In order to utilize the skills of engineer troops in more essential work, French civilians were hired to shovel the mud off the roads in most instances. Because of the vast amount of mud on the roads, it was also necessary to improvise plows and drags to help keep them clear. However, as the number of bridging projects was reduced toward the end of the month, more equipment became available for this purpose and good results were obtained by preparing access roads to areas ahead of occupancy.

Other engineer work consisted of removing mines and booby traps from roads and areas to be occupied by supply installations; also the repair of buildings and water systems of evacuation hospitals.

During the month, the following bridges were constructed by Army units:

Type	Number	Total Length-Feet
Bailey Bridges	17	2,300
Treadway Bridges	13	650
Timber Bridges	1	9,000
Infantry Support Bridges	1	200

Bridging operations in October required a relatively small amount of tactical bridging as compared with previous months, but a substantial amount of permanent bridging was constructed. The principal tactical bridges were the Bailey bridges constructed on the SEILLE River by XII Corps units. Since, however, the front line was so close to the MOSELLE River along the entire front, most of the bridges constructed to replace tactical bridging could well be called tactical bridging. Of the bridges constructed over the MOSELLE, the pile bridge at ARNAVILLE (U-7647) is perhaps the most noteworthy. It was an unusual day when work could proceed without interruption by artillery fire directed at the site. Though accurate at first to the point of damaging some of the unit's equipment, work could proceed without direct interference from shelling by re-establishing a smoke screen across the valley north of the bridge site.



2-WAY PILE BRIDGE OVER THE MOSELLE AT ARNAVILLE (U-7647) SHOWING SMOKE SCREEN IN THE BACKGROUND

When the forward movement of the Army temporarily stopped, the bridging situation was surveyed and immediate steps taken to replace all tactical and temporary bridging with high level permanent bridging. This work was the major task of all Army units during the month. It was well worthwhile, since a short period of high water, late in the month, indicated that the temporary low-level bridges would not have been capable of permitting an uninterrupted traffic flow. Ponton and treadway bridging, however, were held available for any contingency.

All the permanent type bridges were of pile bent construction and each one represented a distinctly individual task in its construction, first, because the number of pile drivers available was relatively small; secondly, the policy was to use all possible local materials, such as I-beams, lumber, etc. This policy, though requiring some ingenuity, worked out satisfactorily.

One casualty occurred during the month. An existing concrete civilian bridge at PEMPEY (U-8221), to which a military bridge had been connected, failed by the collapse of a concrete pier brought about by the swift water during a rise. Debris from the demolished section of the original bridge which had fallen into the stream, blocking a substantial part of the water opening and therefore imposing an unusual and severe scouring action on the already weakened member, was a contributing factor to its collapse. A completely new pile bridge is being constructed at an adjacent site.

During the month three other projects were engaged in, namely, the floating equipage school; the destruction of ETANG DE LINDRE Dam (Q-2832); and the establishment of a flood warning system in the MOSELLE watershed. The destruction of the ETANG DE LINDRE Dam (Q-2832) was done to prevent the enemy from creating a flood on the SEILLE River. The destruction of the dam was so carried out that a controlled flood was created, thus not damaging any military installations. A large measure of credit in providing this protection is due to the 1135th Engineer Combat Group, which unit took a major part in controlling the waters by judiciously sandbagging critical spots.

Since the watershed of the MOSELLE River is subject to serious flooding, a system of gaging stations was established, to be used for providing information needed both for planning of bridging and tactical requirements.

III - SUPPLY

Third Army Engineer Depot No. 8 at TOUL (U-6410) and Depot No. 7 at FRESNES (U-4657) continued in operation during the month. All classes of engineer supplies were stocked in Depot No. 8, but only Bailey bridging in Depot No. 7.

Because of the static tactical situation and the nearness of the Army Depot to the corps and forward army engineer depots were not established. [illegible] supply points containing bridging material

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THIRD U.S. ARMY FORESTRY OPERATIONS

Lumber was also stockpiled in two lumber depots, one in the XII Corps area and the other in the II Corps area. The final issue of civilian and army vehicles was to the 3rd Replacement Depot. A high survival rate of vehicles was maintained by the army engineers. In addition maintenance instructions issued to the operating troops from the Third Army Engineer's office, was aimed to supply lubricants to give an assured safety factor of nothing.

Expendable items of engineer Class II supply were the hardest to secure. A serious impairment in the supply of saws and saw blades, and vehicle parts were evident. Only a part of these requirements received during the month. The supply of heavy equipment continued to be adequate. A shortage of mechanical power was encountered during the month, but local procurement of axles prevented this shortage from becoming a critical one.

Third Army Engineer Report No. 7 was issued on 30 October. The 113th Engineer Combat Group, with attached units, was used as the transporting agency for inter-theater movement of supplies, movement of

Third Army Air Corps dated 6 October (Annex No. 8). This circular contained new air distribution tables revised to accommodate new and special units.

Reproduction facilities included a battery of printing presses and lithographic equipment in the Army area. A total of 1,56 sheets of the 1:25,000 series were printed. Sixteen of these sheets were overprinted with the defense overprints.

The Army Map Depot handled approximately seventy tons of maps during the month. During the month liaison was maintained with the topographic unit of the army and with the Topographic Branch, Engineer Section, Twelfth Air Force, Army, in order to coordinate effectively the topographic functions of Third U.S. Army.

V - OPERATIONS

As the situation remained static during the month of October, the functions of the Directorate pertained to a matter of detail than previously. Measures were for specific areas and particularly of our immediate front, rather than long term army territory as theretofore experienced.

To assist in training in the Defenses of the MAGINOT Line, numerous French officers were interviewed and questioned. In addition French officers were secured for the purpose to provide first-hand information from those actually manning the defenses of the MAGINOT Line and also were well versed with the documents used.

The Air Liaison Officers were tasked with the supply personnel with air photographs of the [illegible] Sea and various documents pertaining to the terrain to enable them to arrive at a decision whether or not the [illegible] Division. This survey was also responsible for the preparation of wind data on the field warming system used in the Maginot Line area.

Considerable effort was exerted during the month to compile base maps of the Silver Star area for [illegible] sites. This was accomplished with a [illegible] photographic material on the [illegible] the assistance to the Army. Valuable studies in the way of [illegible] were completed by the Third Army Photo Center on individual target and [illegible] sites.

The Photo Center also furnished the First Special Mine Study as specified by this section, including sheet Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, which was a photographic interpretation of proposed water supply routes from the present line to the Seine River.

Maps and aerial photographs witnessed the issuance of Engineer Intelligence Publication No. 1 and Engineer Information Notes No. 1 to all Third Army engineer units. The arrival of ill-supplied for a complete issue of [illegible] ultimately [illegible] ended for their areas and the issue for [illegible] already. The issue distribution of intelligence publications as mentioned, for a higher head, orders was also carried out to the proper [illegible].

[illegible] Castle of Luxembourg, Belgium, Texas left [illegible] Army [illegible] and [illegible] Third Army Corps [illegible] Engineering, the [illegible] and started a training program for the [illegible] with Army engineer units consisting of [illegible] demonstrations of [illegible] and [illegible] plans and [illegible] were also formulated [illegible] so that future training may be [illegible].

VI - WATER SUPPLY

The supply of water in the Army area during the month presented problems that [illegible] encountered during normal use. The [illegible] was a license, and high water caused heavy pollution in all rivers and streams.

Because of the inability of the portable units to produce more than [illegible] million of water in twenty-four hours of continuous operation at ten gallons per minute, and because it was impracticable, in many instances, to [illegible] over twenty-four hour periods, additional water points for additional water supply equipment for each portable unit. This additional equipment consisted [illegible] gallon tanks, canvas, storage, one filter unit [illegible] purification unit and two [illegible], trailer, fifty five gallons per minute. For the mobile unit, two 5,000 gallon tanks, canvas, storage, and one pump, 4 meter, 22 gallons per minute, were requested.

Twelve Army water points and four water distribution points for Army troops were opened during the month. The 113th Engineer Water

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Supply Battalion, of Advance Section Communications Zone, assumed operation of one water point and First U.S. Army assumed operation of another. By the end of the month, four Army water points and four water distributing points were furnishing approximately 95,000 gallons of water per day. These points were operated by the two Army water supply companies. Medical air evacuation holding units and prisoner of war enclosures were supplied by hauling water to their storage tanks.

VII - CAMOUFLAGE

Camouflage inspections during the month were continuous. Failure to use wired paths and roads was one of the most common defects, with the result that some areas were badly treaded up. Most units showed need for additional garnishing in nets, and corrective measures were taken; however, because of the shortage of garlands, the process was slow.

Since most units other than front line were billeted, one of the principal functions of camouflage personnel was to render assistance in blacking out and in enforcement of blackout discipline.

VIII - FIRE DEFENSE

The Engineer fire fighting section's operations for the month were similar to those of previous months. Units remained attached to Quartermaster gas supply companies and Ordnance units operating Class III supply points, Class V supply depots, and railheads. They assisted in setting up fire defense at all of these types of installations and stayed at the installations to provide immediate protection. In addition to the fire protection furnished, the commanders of the sections inspected all ammunition supply points and assisted, when necessary, in setting up fire defense.

Advance Section Communications Zone moved the 1232d Fire Fighting Section into NANCY (U-8501) for protection of military installations established there during the month. One fire truck unit and one trailer unit were installed in the city, one on the west side of town and one on the east side. The other two trailer units of this section were located in TOUL (U-6410), mainly for protection of hospitals.

Arrangements were made for the NANCY (U-8501) civilian fire department to furnish assistance, if needed, in extinguishing fires in military installations. In turn, the military fire fighting units in NANCY (U-8501) were to assist the civilian fire department, when practicable, but would not assume responsibility for a civilian fire except insofar as it might affect a military operation or installation.

Careful attention having been given to preventive measures, no fires occurred in military installations during the month. Assistance in extinguishing fires was given to three trucks which caught fire from unknown causes near Class III Supply Point No. A1, located four miles southwest of NANCY (U-8501) on Highway N 74, and to one truck which caught fire while backing over smoldering trash at a trash dump located two miles west of TOUL (U-6410) on Highway N 4. Assistance was also given to extinguishing civilian fires consisting of a burning hay barn at ST. NICOLAS (U-9404), six miles south of NANCY (U-8501), a chimney fire in a civilian dwelling in NANCY (U-8501), and a burning shed in ST. MAX (U-8913), just northeast of NANCY (U-8501).

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

I - OPERATIONS

The major disposition of Engineer troops at the beginning of this period remained unchanged. The XX Corps was supported by the 1306th and the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiments in that order, while the XII Corps had the 1137th Engineer Combat Group and the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment for support. The 1134th Engineer Combat Group continued its mission of coordinating hauling depot stocks and experimenting with special river crossing equipment and devices.

Tactical guarding of bridges over the MOSELLE and MEURTHE Rivers from ARNAVILLE (U-7647) south to the Army boundary and a main supply route in the Army area, amounted to a considerable problem. Corps was made responsible for those bridges forward of its rear boundary, while Army troops were given those designated by the Army Engineer. Guard personnel required for the fifty-four bridges during the second week of November aggregated sixty squads daily; for the last two weeks of the month for the twenty-odd bridges, approximately twenty squads were needed.

At 141200A November, Engineer Operations Instruction No. 17 was published, effecting the following transfers and attachments:

1367th Engineer Dump Truck Company attached to 1134th Engineer Combat Group.
981st Engineer Maintenance Company attached to XII Corps.
88th Engineer Heavy Pontoon Battalion attached to XX Corps.
1006th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company to 1134th Engineer Combat Group.

On 15 November, Naval Unit N-2 reported to Army and was attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group the following day. At this time also the 633rd Engineer Light Equipment Company arrived from the NORMANDY Beach and the Company, less one platoon, was attached to the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment; the platoon was attached to the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment.

During the latter part of this month, XX Corps was successfully reducing and at the same time by-passing the METZ (U-8656) forts. The 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment was actively engaged in bridging operations at THIONVILLE (U-8765) and METZ (U-8656) on the MOSELLE. To provide support for the advance of XX Corps to the east, the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment was by-passed around the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment and placed in support of the XX Corps; the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment meanwhile prepared to take the line of the MOSELLE and to support the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment. The missions of the 1137th Engineer Combat Group and the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment in the III Corps zone remained unchanged.

On 22 November, the 998th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was attached to the XII Corps and on 25 November, the 1006th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was assigned to the Ninth U.S. Army.

Disposition of Engineer troops as of 302400A November was as follows:

XII CORPS	ARMY
1119th Engr C Gp	1134th Engr C Gp
1135th Engr C Gp	1137th Engr C Gp
133d Engr C Bn	145th Engr C Bn
150th Engr C Bn	178th Engr C Bn
166th Engr C Bn	188th Engr C Bn
167th Engr C Bn	249th Engr C Bn
248th Engr C Bn	293d Engr C Bn
613th Engr L Equip Co	1301st Engr GS Regt
72d Engr L Pon Co	1303d Engr GS Regt
513th Engr L Pon Co	1306th Engr GS Regt
995th Engr Trdwy Br Co	609th Engr L Equip Co
997th Engr Trdwy Br Co	632d Engr L Equip Co
998th Engr Trdwy Br Co	633d Engr L Equip Co
673d Engr Top Co	508th Engr L Pon Co
981st Engr Maint Co	528th Engr L Pon Co
553d Engr Hv Pon Bn	976th Engr Maint Co
2897th Engr TIT (C)	572d Engr Dp Trk Co
4th Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn	764th Engr Dp Trk Co
	770th Engr Dp Trk Co
III CORPS	1354th Engr Dp Trk Co
2940d Engr TIT (C)	1366th Engr Dp Trk Co
	1370th Engr Dp Trk Co
XX CORPS	87th Engr Hv Pon Bn
1103d Engr C Gp	662d Engr Top Bn
1139th Engr C Gp	459th Engr Depot Co
135th Engr C Bn	1511th Engr MS Co
160th Engr C Bn	1512th Engr MS Co
179th Engr C Bn	1230th Engr FP Plat
264th Engr C Bn	1240th Engr FP Plat
266th Engr C Bn	1092d Engr Util Det
623d Engr L Equip Co	1681st Engr Surv Lo Det
509th Engr L Pon Co	Co A (-), 602d Engr Cam Bn
537th Engr L Pon Co	2870th Engr TIT (A)
991st Engr Trdwy Br Co	Naval Unit N-2
996th Engr Trdwy Br Co	
664th Engr Top Co	
961st Engr Maint Co	
68th Engr Hv Pon Bn	
180th Engr Hv Pon Bn	
2898th Engr TIT (G)	
1st Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn	

II - CONSTRUCTION

Roads and Bridges

Bridging activities of Third U.S. Army during November exceeded those of any previous month. Unusually heavy rainfall during this period twice flooded the MOSELLE Valley, washing out some bridges and inundating approaches. This required the construction of 120 Bailey bridges, 111 treadway bridges, sixty-five timber spans and two heavy pontoon bridges; Army units also built thirty-four culverts, light rafts and ferries, four Infantry support rafts and three foot bridges, a grand total of some four and one-half miles.

During the first week of this month, only semi-permanent timber bridging over the MOSELLE and MEURTHE Rivers was required at various points between ARNAVILLE (U-7647), PONT ST. VINCENT (U-7902) and LAMBYVILLE (U-8908). Bridges at VLAVIENY (U-8698), TOUL (U-6410), VANDIERES (U-7541), PAGNY (U-7544) and ARNAVILLE (U-7647) were completed, and an excellent network of crossings was available throughout the Army area. It was during the three following weeks that the bulk of the November bridging activities took place.

When the drives of the XII and XX Corps were launched, tactical bridging requirements were again taxed heavily. In the XII Corps zone, crossings were made over the SAAR and SEILLE Rivers, employing normal methods for such operations; however, the retreating enemy, capitalizing on the unusual precipitation, blew craters and culverts at such low spots that actual bridging was necessary to span these gaps. This resulted in an unusual expenditure of Bailey bridging, and at one time during the month, 3,900 feet of crossings of this type were in place in the XII Corps area alone.

In the XX Corps area, as part of the first phase of operations, the 5th Infantry Division was assigned the mission of encircling METZ (U-8658) from the south. This involved crossing the SEILLE and MOSELLE Rivers, and at the beginning of the operation, existing bridges over the MOSELLE at ARNAVILLE (U-7647), PAGNY (U-7544), VANDIERES (U-7541) and PONT-A-MOUSSON (U-7735) appeared adequate. Continued rains, however, caused other rivers in the area to rise to flood heights, the greatest since 1920, flooding the entire plain across the MOSELLE Valley, and washing out all bridges except the one at PONT-A-MOUSSON (U-7735), a high level structure. Even this bridge was temporarily out of use because of the unusual amount of rainfall, but this interruption was of short duration and did not materially affect the accomplishment of the assigned mission.



HIGH WATER ON APPROACH ROAD AT PONT-A-MOUSSON



DIKES USED TO CONTROL HIGH WATER AT PONT-A-MOUSSON

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PONT-A-MOUSSON BRIDGE DURING HIGH WATER



VANDIERES BRIDGE WITH WATER RISING



VANDIERES BRIDGE AFTER FLOOD HAD COVERED APPROACHES AND BAILEY BRIDGE HAD BEEN PULLED BACK TO SAVE IT FROM DAMAGE



RISING WATER PILE BRIDGE OVER THE MEUSE RIVER AT TOUL



PILE BRIDGE AT TOUL TAKEN OUT BY FLOOD



PUMPEY BRIDGE OPENED TO TRAFFIC 6 NOVEMBER. WITHSTOOD ALL HEAVY FLOODS

On the north flank of the corps, the 90th Infantry Division was to cross the river and meet the 5th Infantry Division east of METZ (U-8658). Because of the flood, this juncture was delayed several days; initial crossings in the north sector were made in storm boats at CATTENOM (U-9291) and MALLING (U-9593), while a feint was made by the 95th Infantry Division at UCKANGE (U-8679). At CATTENOM (U-9291), an attempt was made to put in an Infantry support bridge, but the current was so swift that it was swept away. Soon thereafter, the water rose to such a height at the bridge site that the approaches were submerged three feet, the river overflowing the country side as much as three miles in places.

Meanwhile, the 99ist Engineers continued erecting a Treadway bridge at MALLING (U-9593) in spite of rising water and intermittent, well-placed artillery fire. With this bridge across and its abutment raised, trucks and supplies were loaded on trailers and towed across by prime movers with freeboards in excess of fifty-four inches until the water receded enough to allow normal passage of vehicles over the bridge.



TREADWAY BRIDGE AT MALLING

Enemy artillery, again firing on this crossing, destroyed eleven floats. Repair of the bridge was begun immediately, but the current tore it loose, carrying it a short distance away. Fortunately, only relatively minor damages resulted. Since the water was beginning to fall, it was then decided to construct a treadway ferry at this site, and approximately a battalion of armor was crossed by this means, when the ferry was hit by artillery fire and sank.

Another bridge was then started, but since the water was now receding quite rapidly, a bridge at CATTENOM (U-9291) was begun and was finished before the one at MALLING (U-9593). Construction at MALLING (U-9543) proceeded uninterrupted by artillery fire until the bridge was completed. It was then fired upon by enemy artillery, but was not hit.



M-1 TREADWAY BRIDGE OVER MOSELLE RIVER AT CATTENOM LENGTH 600 FT - PICTURE TAKEN DURING PROTECTIVE SMOKE SCREEN



FLOATING BAILEY BRIDGE AT CATTENOM WHICH REPLACED THE TREADWAY BRIDGE

During this period, with the water too high to permit use of bridges, supply and the evacuation of the wounded were effected by the use of storm, powered assault and utility boats, all of which proved invaluable expedients.

At THIONVILLE (U-8785), meanwhile, construction was started by the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment on a 200-foot double triple Bailey bridge to span a gap on a destroyed highway bridge. The small bridgehead here was held chiefly by Engineer troops, but with their organic weapons they could not drive back the German mortars, long-range machine guns and artillery which kept up harrassing fire for thirty-six hours, despite a good smoke screen. This bridge was completed before two final bridges at MALLING (U-9593) and was used to cross part of the 10th Armored Division. To augment this crossing, and to provide a factor of safety, floating Bailey bridges were constructed at both THIONVILLE (U-8785) and at CATTENOM (U-9291).

At UCKANGE (U-8679), a heavy ponton bridge was built by the 69th Engineers to provide a crossing for the 95th Infantry Division. This site was the object of enemy artillery fire and actual construction was thus delayed for forty-eight hours.

After the fall of METZ (U-8658), the 180th Engineers built a heavy ponton bridge and several floating Bailey bridges over the MOSELLE to afford passage through the city.

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LAUNCHING THE DOUBLE TRIPLE BAILEY BRIDGE UNDER PROTECTIVE SMOKE SCREEN AT THIONVILLE



ABOVE BRIDGE NEARING COMPLETION



THE FLOATING BAILEY BRIDGE CONSTRUCTED AT THIONVILLE OVER THE MOSELLE - CLASS 40 - 600 FEET LONG



VIEW OF FLOATING BAILEY BRIDGE AT THIONVILLE AFTER THE SMOKE SCREEN WAS LIFTED



HEAVY PONTON BRIDGE OVER THE MOSELLE AT UCKANGE, TROOPS CROSSING UNDER PROTECTION OF A SMOKE SCREEN



ANOTHER VIEW OF THE UCKANGE BRIDGE



BLOWN BRIDGE AT METZ



ANOTHER BLOWN BRIDGE AT METZ SHOWING THE STARTING OF A BAILEY BRIDGE TO CROSS THE GAP

The above bridges had just been completed when a second flood, even greater than the first one, inundated the area. The crossings were maintained without loss, but their access roads were completely flooded and could not be used.

Rafts were used in the crossing at MALLING (U-9993), but were not too successful principally because the site was poorly suited to their employment. A steep hill rose from the river and made the construction of an adequate ramp impossible.

While actual bridge construction was the principal activity of Army engineer troops during this month, maintenance of roads was also a considerable problem. During the period, with excessive rainfall, mud on roadways constituted not only a hazard but did much to impede traffic.

The removal of mud tracked onto the surfaces of main supply routes by Army vehicles leaving bivouac areas, supply depots and parking lots was the largest single item under road maintenance. Road graders, improvised drags of logs and steel I-beam construction, were employed in this work. In some places, however, manual labor was required to shovel thin coats of mud from the road.

Although maintenance work on roads in the Army area consisted primarily in clearing mud from roads, repairing wearing surfaces, building new access roads and providing additional lateral and longitudinal drainage taxed the capabilities of general service troops.

Repairs to wearing surfaces of roads in the Army network were carried on as extensively as the weather and volume of traffic would permit. Excessively heavy traffic over most of the roads caused numerous pot-holes to develop and many of the edges began to ravel and crack. Such patching was accomplished by the operation of a "pre-mix plant," consisting of kettles improvised for mixing and heating asphalt and aggregate.

Access roads were constructed mainly in and near the military cemeteries at ANDILLY (U-6420) and LIMEY (U-6533), in addition to several approach roads to crossings, to supply depots, and to hospitals. This consisted principally of spreading and rolling gravel and stone on roads and parking areas.

To release engineer troops for more essential employment, French civilian labor was used extensively.

III - SUPPLY

Third U.S. Army Engineer Depot No. 8 at TOUL (U-6418) continued to operate as the principal depot servicing the Army. Bridging and lumber dumps were operated by the III Corps and XI Corps in their respective areas.

Army Engineer Depot No. 9 was established on 27 November in the vicinity of HELLACK (J-1754), to be used as an advance storage area for Bailey bridging and Engineer Class IV supplies.

Engineer depot stock was replenished from Communications Zone and Advance Section Communications Zone Engineer depots by both rail and Army truck transportation. A total of 1,728 tons was transported by Communications Zone rail and 2,429 tons by Army truck. All rail shipments were made to the TOUL (U-6418) railhead. Truck transportation of Engineer supplies was coordinated by the 1134th Engineer Combat Group with transportation from the following Engineer units:

87th Engineer Heavy Pontoon Battalion
293d Engineer Combat Battalion
548th Engineer Light Pontoon Company
558th Engineer Light Pontoon Company
1369th Engineer Dump Truck Company
1370th Engineer Dump Truck Company

On numerous occasions it was found necessary, because of congested rail conditions west of PARIS (S-0545), to dispatch Army transportation to Communications Zone depots in the NORMANDY Base Section. This long distance hauling by truck was found to be unsatisfactory and was suspended. The maximum economical hauling distance from Communications Zone and Advance Section Communications Zone depots to Army depots was found to be from 100 to 150 miles. To expedite the release, shipping and loading of critical supplies in the Communication Zone depots, it was found necessary to send officers to Communications Zone depots.

In [illegible] handling supplies forward from rear supply installations [illegible] Engineer Combat Group was responsible for the movement [illegible] railroad [illegible] points, the move-

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vert of timber from civilian sawmills to engineer depots, and the movement of bridging materials to corps dumps. An estimated tonnage hauled of these items is as shown below:

	Short Tons
Collection of captured material	800
Movement of timber from sawmills	700
Movement of bridge material to corps dumps	2,100

The supply of bridge timber remained critical. Twenty-nine civilian sawmills produced a total of 1,500,000 board feet measure of timber for the Army. The civilian contractor Forestry Company, operating with two sawmills still units, delivered 900,000 board feet measure of bridge timber to the army, while a total of 600,000 board feet measure was received from civilian sawmills. This production was far below the requirements for the army, which was estimated at 2,500,000 board feet measure per month. Efforts were then made to increase production of civilian sawmills. The Eighth Corps Combat Group was assigned the mission of supervising all civilian mill operations. The Corps Engineer Forestry Supply Depot operated on a trade-in-for-duty basis to the army for timber. Only meager supplies of captured timber had been encountered during the month.

Items from Ordnance depots during the month were mainly items of assault river crossing equipment. As the result of battle losses, an acute shortage developed in the supply of assault boats, M-2, Infantry support rafts, foot bridges, wire rope, and wire rope clips.

The supply of spare parts and Class II Engineer items improved considerably. Spare parts for Mercedes bridge trucks were still nonexistent. Arrangements were made to supply spare parts to the IX Air Force. One officer and ten enlisted men were attached to the Spare Parts Platoon of the 49th Engineer Depot Company to assist in the storage and issue of additional spare parts.

RHINE River crossing requirements were compiled and assembling of equipment was begun. Contracts for the manufacture of the following special equipment was placed with civilian concerns:

Bridge bolts
Steel shovels
Hooks, spanner, treadway
Steel bearing plates
Pulley bows, Bailey bridge, ponton
Drift pins and bolts
Metal signs
Saddles, treadway bridge, M-2
Beizes, treadway bridge, M-2

The 778th Engineer Maintenance Company, in addition to the normal maintenance of Engineer equipment, manufactured the following equipment:

Assault boat pins
Traffic signs
Brackets for Bailey pontons
Screw plows
Pile driver attachments for 3/4 yard shovels

The principal problem of Engineer maintenance was that of maintaining generators in hospitals. To teach preventative maintenance, an inspection team was furnished by the 778th Engineer Maintenance Company and assigned the task of making periodic inspections of hospital generators.

Sufficient local supplies of steel "I" beams and piling were encountered to satisfy all fixed bridging requirements in these materials.

The 16 30th Engineer Gas Generating Unit, an Advance Section Communications Zone unit, was set up to generate oxygen and acetylene gas at Engineer Depot No. 8. This unit, together with civilian sources, supplied commercial gas to meet Third U.S. Army requirements and reduced a shortage which formerly existed.

Captured engineer material during the month consisted of steel "I" beams, sheet metal, utility supplies, hardware, wire rope, plywood, and electrical supplies. Reconnaissance parties continued to operate in corps and Army area. All usable supplies were concentrated in captured material collection points and placed under guard. One point was designated for each corps.

The average stock of Engineer supplies on hand in all Army engineer supply installations by classes during the month of November was as follows:

CLASS	TONNAGE (LT)
II	[illegible]
IV	12,195
V	473

IV - MAPS

Early in November recommendations were prepared for submission to the Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, for providing each Army with map depot detachments similar to the one set up under T/BAE 5-500 on the basis of one per corps.

During the latter part of October specifications had been drawn up covering the revision of 1/25,000 maps, 5025 G, series, in the area assigned by Twelfth Army Group. This area covered the Army front east to the RHINE River, north of latitude 49° 16'. This project was turned over to the Army Topographic Battalion and covered the revision of the sheets with respect to woods, culture and major changes in hydrography. Intelligence photography at a scale of 1/10,000 was the main source of new information, supplemented by basic photo coverage at various scales ranging from 1/8,000 to 1/15,000. During the month twelve sheets were completed and reproduced and work was done on all the remaining fifty-three sheets. The addition of the woodland to the 1/25,000, 5025 G, series, in the Army area was completed during the month. This project was initiated in September, covered forty-seven sheets, and involved a color separation of the wooded areas.

Compilation and reproduction of a special road map, scale 1/250,000, was initiated during the month due to the lack of such a large scale road map in Germany. This map had many special features and is based upon the operational 1/250,000 5025 4346 series.

Requests for terrain models during the month were limited to the 1/50,000 scale pressed models secured through Twelfth Army Group.

Four conversion graphs for rapid conversion of German Gauss-Kruger rectangular coordinates to Theatre Nord de Guerre grid coordinates were prepared and published.

Total maps received during the month approximated thirty-five tons, or 779,000 sheets, while maps issued to Army units totaled fifteen tons, or approximately 285,600 sheets.

V - INTELLIGENCE

In the month of November the main concern was to obtain information on the SAAR Region for dissemination to all Army units concerned. Two original reports from the Office of the Chief Engineer, European Theater of Operations, namely, "Selected Routes in SAAR Territory" and "Special Reconnaissance in SAAR Territory" were distributed to Army units. Another study, "Special Road Study, Sheet U1, XE 831824EM" was prepared and issued to Army units. In addition, the ETO Report No. 47", "Crossings of the SAAR River," was received from the Office of the Chief Engineer, European Theater of Operations, and distributed.

Since units in the field were encountering more and more enemy minefields, distribution of various mine and booby trap charts was made. Two charts on mines, one on the Tellermine and the other on the Anti-Tank Topmine, were produced and issued.

Engineer Intelligence Notes Numbers 8 and 9, together with Engineer Intelligence Bulletin No. 7, were published and issued to all Army Engineer units.

In addition, for planning and future use, the section obtained and distributed various intelligence data and studies. Such studies included the "SAUER River Hydrology Study," "Effects of Snow on Roads in Southwest Germany Study," "Report on Water Supply of METZ," and "ML Pontoon Gear Equipment Manual". Also, Technical Bulletin No. 132, Office of the Chief of Engineers, "The Snake M-2" and Training Bulletin No. 23, "The Mark 2 Longer" were reproduced and issued to all Engineer units.

The 2899th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team continued to give lectures and demonstrations on German mines and booby traps to Third U.S. Army units for the first two weeks during the month. They then followed behind the advance of field units to examine captured German Engineer dumps. Upon discovery of the new German Anti-Tank Topf Mine, they proceeded to examine this mine and aided in the preparation of the Topf Mine Chart.

VI - WATER SUPPLY

During the month Army troops operated sixteen water points. The total consumption was approximately 3,000,000 gallons. Water was delivered to army hospitals and prisoner of war enclosures and supplying of water to the city of METZ (U-8658) was continued.

VII - CAMOUFLAGE

The five platoons of Company "A", 602d Engineer Camouflage Battalion engaged in various activities during the month. Headquarters platoon remained attached to Army, the first platoon was with IX Corps, the second and third with Army, while the fourth platoon was attached to the III Corps.

During this period, Headquarters platoon was engaged in re-garnishing, repairing and replacing camouflage nets belonging to Headquarters Third U.S. Army, and continued this project until all nets were brought up to the desired standard.

The first platoon was engaged principally in inspecting Field Artillery units. This included recommendations for improvement of concealment and suggestions for obtaining nets, of which there was found to be a shortage.

In addition to the above, the first platoon investigated the use of smoke, generated to screen engineer bridge building activities. The Commanding Officer of the 206th Engineer Combat Battalion was interviewed and his observations are reported here.

It was believed that better use could have been made of smoke screens than was possible with the limited equipment on hand at that time. Of eighteen smoke generators, twelve at a time were normally in operation for periods of from eight to ten hours. This small number of units, coupled with periodic shortages of fuel, was sufficient only to cover a small area, with a wind velocity in excess of two miles per hour, the screen thus produced was too thin to obscure observation.

The second platoon engaged in developing methods of snow camouflage for the 64th Fighter Wing. This method consisted of pattern painting of white shrimp nets with white and olive drab paint. The Wing had several radar installations on snowy ridges and had become definitely snow-camouflage-conscious.

The third platoon experimented with a two-piece hooded snow-camouflage suit of fabricated white muslin. It was estimated that the Army units would require 972 suits, based on one suit for each man of a twelve-man patrol per battalion.

The fourth platoon inspected Field Artillery units principally, checking especially on track-marks of organic vehicles. Nothing else of an unusual nature marked the activities of the unit during the month.

VIII - FIRE DEFENSE

Army fire fighting units were attached to Quartermaster gas supply companies and Ordnance units operating Class III, Class V and railhead installations. They assisted in setting up fire defense at these types of installations and furnished protection to gasoline, ammunition and other installations in the order of priority listed here.

The 1232nd Engineer Fire Fighting Platoon, assigned to Advance Section Communications Zone, furnished fire protection for NANCY (U-8461) and vicinity. This platoon also assisted Army in providing protection for Class III installations when they were too numerous and widely separated for immediate protection to be given completely by Army units.

With a view to requirements for closer protection of Class III and V installations when they are located in Germany, arrangements were made with Advance Section Communications Zone for them to assist in furnishing protection for these installations as required in future operations.

Seven fires occurred, none of which resulted in serious military damage.

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CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

I - OPERATIONS

The major disposition of Engineer troops at the beginning of this period was essentially the same as in the past, with the exception that the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment completed by-passing the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment and was in support of XII Corps and was, in turn, supported by the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment. In the XII Corps zone the 1137th Engineer Combat Group remained in support of the XII Corps and was, in turn, supported by the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment. The 1134th Engineer Combat Group continued its mission of coordinating depot haulage activities and experimenting with special river crossing equipment. Complete disposition of troops was as follows:

XII CORPS	III CORPS
1117th Engr C Gp	296?d Engr TIT (C)
1135th Engr C Gp	
111?rd Engr C Bn	ARMY
150th Engr C Bn	1134th Engr C Gp
166th Engr C Bn	1137th Engr C Gp
167th Engr C Bn	149th Engr C Bn
248th Engr C Bn	188th Engr C Bn
613th Engr L Equip Co	178th Engr C Bn
72d Engr L Pon Co	249th Engr C Bn
513th Engr L Pon Co	293d Engr C Bn
995th Engr Trdwy Br Co	1301st Engr GS Regt
997th Engr Trdwy Br Co	1303d Engr GS Regt
998th Engr Trdwy Br Co	1306th Engr GS Regt
673d Engr Top Co	609th Engr L Equip Co
981st Engr Maint Co	632d Engr L Equip Co
553rd Engr Hv Pon Bn	673d Engr L Equip Co
2897th Engr TIT (C)	548th Engr L Pon Co
4th Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn	528th Engr L Pon Co
	976th Engr Maint Co
	572d Engr Dp Trk Co
XI CORPS	764th Engr Dp Trk Co
1103d Engr C Gp	776th Engr Dp Trk Co
1139th Engr C Gp	1364th Engr Dp Trk Co
135th Engr C Bn	1369th Engr Dp Trk Co
160th Engr C Bn	1370th Engr Dp Trk Co
179th Engr C Bn	87th Engr Hv Pon Bn
204th Engr C Bn	652d Engr Top Bn
206th Engr C Bn	459th Engr Depot Co
623d Engr L Equip Co	1511th Engr MS Co
909th Engr L Pon Co	1512th Engr MS Co
537th Engr L Pon Co	1239th Engr FP Plat
991st Engr Trdwy Br Co	1240th Engr FP Plat
996th Engr Trdwy Br Co	1050d Engr Util Det
664th Engr Top Co	168?st Engr Surv Lo Det
961st Engr Maint Co	Co A (-), 602d Engr Cam Bn
88th Engr Hv Pon Bn	2890th Engr TIT (R)
180th Engr Hv Pon Bn	Naval Unit N-2
2898th Engr TIT (C)	
1st Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn	

On 3 December the advance of both the XI and XII Corps was proceeding satisfactorily to the northeast and at 1800A that date Engineer Operational Instruction No. 19 was published, establishing new areas of responsibility for Army engineer troops. Missions remained unchanged.

On 5 December the III Corps became operational with the mission of completing the reduction of the remaining forts at METZ (U-8658). In order to provide Engineer assistance, the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment, which was supporting the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment, was given the additional mission of supporting the III Corps.

On 9 December the push of the XI and XII Corps to the northeast continued and III Corps mission remained unchanged. Engineer Operational Instruction No. 20 was published on this date at 1800A establishing new areas of responsibility for Army engineer troops. Mission remained unchanged.

On 11 December the 1134th Engineer Combat Group started two-day schools for 22½ horsepower outboard motor operators to provide a minimum of 110 operators per letter company of at least two battalions of the 1137th Engineer Combat Group. Because of operational activities, only one company at a time could be sent to this school. The school closed 13 December after instruction had been provided to the lettered companies of the 188th and 249th Engineer Combat Battalions of the 1137th Engineer Combat Group.

On 14 December the reduction of METZ (U-8658) had been completed, and the III Corps was assigned a zone of action in the center of the Army zone. On this date at 1800A Engineer Operational Instruction No. 21 was published establishing new areas of responsibility and shifting the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment from support of the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment to support the III Corps and attaching the 178th Engineer Combat Battalion to the III Corps.

On 15 December the 676th Engineer Light Equipment Company arrived from the beach and was attached to the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment. The 633d Engineer Light Equipment Company (less 2d platoon) was detached from the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment and attached to the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment.

By 19 December the drive of the Germans in the EASTERN (P-5558) area had split the First U.S. Army and reached such proportions that the III Corps, which had not yet become actively engaged on the SAAR River front, was shifted to the north in the ARLON (P-6122) area. To provide engineer support for its drive, the 1137th Engineer Combat Group with the 145th, 188th and 249th Engineer Combat Battalions, the 770th Engineer Dump Truck Company, the 632d Engineer Light Equipment Company, the 995th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company, and the 72d and 513th Engineer Light Pontoon Companies from the XII Corps, were all attached to and moved into the zone of the III Corps. The 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment was placed in support of the XII Corps. The VIII Corps, had had been on the south flank of the first U.S. Army, was cut off and came under operational control of Third U.S. Army, together with its corps engineer troops of two Combat Group Headquarters, four Combat Battalions, one Light Equipment Company, two Light Pontoon Companies, one Topographic Company and one Technical Intelligence Team (Combat). Two of the VIII Corps Combat Battalions, the 168th and 44th, were badly mauled, suffering fifty and seventy-two percent casualties, respectively, and were no longer effective.

On 20 December the 183rd Engineer Combat Battalion, which had arrived from the beach and had been temporarily attached to the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment, was detached therefrom and attached to III Corps. The 553rd Engineer Heavy Pontoon Battalion and the 998th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company were detached from XII Corps and attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group.

On 20 December the German drive had reached break-through proportions, and the XII Corps was shifted from its westward drive and moved to the LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) area, facing north. The Sixth U.S. Army Group took over the area vacated by the XII Corps, and the 1117th Engineer Combat Group, with the 167th and 248th Engineer Combat Battalions, passed to their control.

On 21 December operational activities of the XII Corps to the north in the LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) area necessitated withdrawal from the XI Corps, which corps had the mission of holding the SAAR River line in their zone, of the 1103rd Engineer Combat Group, 160th Engineer Combat Battalion, 204th Engineer Combat Battalion, 909th and 537th Engineer Light Pontoon Companies, and the 996th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company and their attachment to the XII Corps.

On 23 December the 998th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was relieved of attachment to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group and attached to III Corps to support its operations. To provide haulage facilities for engineer Class II and IV supplies forward to the new area of operations, the 88th and Company "B" of the 180th Engineer Heavy Pontoon Battalions were detached from the XI Corps and attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group.

On 24 December the 991st Engineer Treadway Bridge Company (less one platoon) was detached from XI Corps and attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group for refitting and placed in Army reserve.

On 25 December the situation had become somewhat stabilized and Engineer Operational Instruction No. 22 was published at 0900A effecting the above noted changes. At this time the VIII, III, and XII Corps were abreast on the ARLON (P-6122)-LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) line facing north and the XI Corps was on the right flank along the SAAR River facing northeast. The 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment was in support of the XII Corps, the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment was supporting both the VIII and III Corps and the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment was patrolling the majority of the Army area with priority of work being to support the XI Corps barrier plan. The 262d Engineer Combat Battalion reverted to Third U.S. Army from First U.S. Army and was attached to VIII Corps.

On 26 December, the 974th Engineer Maintenance Company reverted from First U.S. Army to Third U.S. Army and was attached to VIII Corps.

On 27 December, the 243d Engineer Combat Battalion arrived from the port of ROUEN (W-1915) and was attached to the III Corps.

On 28 December, the 991st Engineer Treadway Bridge Company (less 1st platoon) had completed refitting and was attached to the VIII Corps.

On 29 December, the 88th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion (less Company "B") was alerted and moved to XII Corps, effective 31 December, to support contemplated operations.

On 30 December, the 44th and 168th Engineer Combat Battalions, which had been badly mauled during the initial break-through, were detached from VIII Corps and attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group for reorganization and refitting. To offset this loss and furnish Engineer support for projected operations, the 243rd Engineer Combat Battalion was detached from III Corps and attached to VIII Corps.

On 30 December, the 996th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company and the 995th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company were interchanged between the XII and III Corps, respectively, in order to support an interchange of Armored Divisions.

On 31 December, the light equipage platoon of the 72d Engineer Light Ponton Company was detached from the III Corps and attached to the XII Corps to build up engineer means of the XII Corps for contemplated operations.

II - BRIDGES AND ROADS

During December the amount of bridging constructed by Third U.S. Army engineer units was in excess of 20,000 feet, despite the fact that during the last fifteen days of the month very few bridges were put in, since the changed tactical situation existing after 15 December involved mass troop movements principally over bridges previously constructed. An analysis of the bridging is as follows:

TYPE	NUMBER	LENGTH IN FEET
Bailey Bridge (Fixed)	101	7,660
Heavy Ponton Bridge	2	700
Infantry Support Bridge	4	1,000
Timber Bridge	122	7,810
Treadway Bridge (Fixed)	80	2,810
Treadway Bridge (Floating)	7	1,210
Total	316	21,190

In addition to this construction more than a hundred culverts were repaired, over 1,000 feet of footbridges were constructed, and twenty or more rafts of various types were constructed and operated. Three floating bridges over the MOSELLE River constructed in November were also maintained during this period.

The chief water obstacles encountered during the month were the SAAR, NIED, and BLIES Rivers and their tributaries. All of these streams were more of an obstacle than would normally be expected, inasmuch as the incessant rains had raised them to flood stage. The flooding in XII Corps zone was further aggravated by numerous small lakes formed by the dams that had been constructed as part of the SIEGFRIED Line. To alleviate the flooding from this cause, many of these dams were destroyed when captured. The enemy utilized the high water by extensive cratering of the roads and destruction of culverts on a scale greater than any previously encountered.

The major assault river crossing operation of the month was that engaged in by XI Corps on the SAAR River. With the exception of the extraordinarily fortunate seizure of the main highway bridge at SAARLAUTERN (Q-2804) shown in photograph below, every other attempt to cross or to bridge the river was strongly contested by the enemy.



HIGHWAY BRIDGE ACROSS SAAR RIVER AT SAARLAUTERN

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The bridge at SAARLAUTERN (q-[illegible]) was taken in a secret night crossing by assault elements of the [illegible] Infantry Division, and though it was an excellent bridge, it was never of any great value as a crossing, since as soon as the Germans discovered that it had been captured, they began a barrage of direct observed artillery fire from the high ground on the east bank of the river of such intensity that practically no traffic could make the crossing.

To overcome this restriction, an infantry support bridge and a footbridge were constructed at a nearby site, but both of these were destroyed by direct artillery fire before any value could be derived from them.

Concurrently, crossings were attempted at DILLINGEN (q-[illegible]) and infantry troops were successfully crossed, but the attempts to put in a treadway bridge were repulsed by enemy artillery fire.

The only tactical bridge that remained in for any appreciable time was an infantry support bridge at LISDORF (q-2879), which remained in for thirty-six hours before it was knocked out by enemy artillery fire.

Similar bridging attempts were made at SAARLOUIS (q-2862), FREMTEN (q-2584), and DILLINGEN (q-2784), but all were equally unsuccessful because of the intensity and accuracy of the artillery fire. Losses in personnel and equipment were extremely heavy at all these crossings.

During the entire operation, from the time the first troops were loaded until the operation was suspended, because of the changed tactical situation existing after 15 December, rafts and boats, usually operated at night, served as the only supply and reinforcing line across the river.

Of the tactical bridges constructed during the month, the largest was the double-triple Bailey bridge at HEMMELTDORF (q-1783), shown in the photograph below.



180-FOOT DOUBLE TRIPLE BAILEY BRIDGE OVER SIEG RIV AT HEMMELTDORF

At the end of the month, due to the changed tactical situation, activity in XII Corps consisted of maintaining and holding the bridgehead at SAARLAUTERN (q-2882) and DILLINGEN (q-2784). No further major crossings were attempted.

In XII Corps once no single line proved to be so defensible as the SAAR line in XX Corps, but the crossing of the SAAR and BLIES were strongly contested at every point.

The most important bridge and the most difficult to build was the 160-foot double single Bailey bridge at SARREBRUCHEN (q-5454), shown in the photograph below. This bridge was built under direct artillery fire, and work had to be stopped many times because of the intensity of the fire.

At SAARALBE (q-4844), a heavy pontoon bridge was initially constructed for the crossing of the 35th Infantry Division, and a floating treadway was put in over the BLIES River at REICHEIM (q-4959).

About 22 December, the XII Corps was shifted to a new area of operations as a result of the changed tactical situation, and from this time until the end of the month bridging did not play an important part in these operations.

Tactical bridging constructed by III and VIII Corps was incidental to other operations and did not involve any major tasks during

period. The bridge constructed over the SAAR [illegible] River at FLORENVILLE (P-4676) is shown below:



BAILEY BRIDGE OVER SAAR RIVER AT SARREBRUCHEN



BRIDGE OVER THE SEMOIS RIVER AT FLORENVILLE

The major part of new permanent timber bridging was contained generally in the areas between the MOSELLE and SAAR Rivers, though a small amount of bridging was accomplished in the LUXEMBURG (P-6413) area as the month drew to a close.

In the following photographs are shown typical examples of the bridges constructed:



TIMBER TRESTLE BRIDGE OVER MOSELLE RIVER IN METZ

DECLASSIFIED



PILE BENT BRIDGE OVER SEILLE RIVER IN METZ



PILE BENT BRIDGE OVER MOSELLE RIVER AT TWINVILLE

Since the river was about 300 feet wide at this point, the timber bridge was constructed from the remains of an existing timber bridge in the foreground at an angle, over to the remains of the old stone bridge to which the Bailey is connected. This solution saved a substantial amount of lumber and piling, since by doing this, the amount of bridging required was cut from 400 feet to 200 feet.



PILE BENT BRIDGE AT FALKENBERGHOF OVER NIED

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TIMBER TRESTLE BRIDGE OVER SEILLE RIVER AT DIEUZE



PILE BENT BRIDGE OVER NIED RIVER AT PONT LA CHAUSSY



TIMBER TRESTLE BRIDGE AT DIEDENDORF OVER THE SAAR RIVER



PILE BENT BRIDGE OVER SAAR RIVER AT KESSASTEL



TIMBER TRESTLE BRIDGE AT FRIESTROFF OVER NIED RIVER



TIMBER TRESTLE BRIDGE OVER SAAR RIVER AT SAAR UNION



PILE BENT BRIDGE OVER SAAR RIVER AT SAARALBE



TIMBER TRESTLE BRIDGE OVER NIED RIVER AT LANDROFF

Maintenance work on bridges, for the most part, consisted of driving piles for ice fenders, replacing bracing members weakened by flood waters, depositing additional rip rap around the base of bents that had begun to scour, regrading and resurfacing approaches that had been damaged under the impact of excessively heavy traffic.

Most of the road work undertaken during the month consisted of maintenance of main supply routes. New roads constructed were mainly access roads to Ordnance depots, supply points, hospitals and military cemeteries. Mud on the highways did not constitute the problem it presented in November, since falling temperatures and frozen ground lessened the amount of mud tracked on the roads.

Maintenance work on roads included filling in craters, sweeping roads and shoulders for mines, repairing blown culverts, reconnaissance for new routes, stockpiling sand along main highways in anticipation of ice conditions and the preparation of drags and plows for removal of snow from the roads.

III - SUPPLY

During the first half of December major efforts were devoted to the accumulation of special equipment for the RHINE River crossings. A considerable number of items were procured from local sources. The status of certain issue items required for this project, however, remained critical. This was especially true of light equipage. The MOSELLE River crossings had proved extremely costly and all units were short this equipment to meet their requirements. During the latter part of the month some small shipments were received and some table of equipment shortages were filled.

A concerted effort was made by the 1134th Engineer Combat Group to place all available civilian sawmills in production. A noted increase in output of bridge lumber was the result. Communications Zone furnished an officer for the purpose of assisting in the procurement of lumber and he proved to be a material help. A release was obtained from Communications Zone for two million board feet of lumber from Southern Line of Communications for the month of December. An Engineer platoon was dispatched the latter part of the month to load out by rail, and shipments against this release were started. Another release for three million board feet of lumber was received for January. Two corps dumps were taken over by Army, using depot personnel. These dumps were stocked with Bailey bridging and lumber.

As the result of the enemy penetration on 17 December, the axis of supply for Third U.S. Army was altered by approximately ninety degrees. This resulted in large quantities of supplies being shipped by rail and truck in order to meet the situation. A Class IV dump was selected in the vicinity of ESCH (P-7301) and a Class II and IV depot site was selected at ARLON (P-6122). Supplies were generally moved in sufficient quantities and in time to satisfy the troops. Large demands for explosives and fortification materials were made. It is estimated that 400 tons of explosives were issued during this period. Several large stocks of captured fortification materials were available for immediate issue.

Large demands were received for snow suits and white camouflage paint. Production of suits by civilian mills was initiated, using the supervision of Company "A", 602d Engineer Camouflage Battalion. Carbide slag was found to be suitable for use as white paint. This slag is being supplied to all units from local sources.

IV - MAPS

During the month approximately sixty tons of maps were received. Approximately fifty-seven tons were issued to Army and corps units.

Sixty-three sheets of revised editions of the G503 AAA series, scale 1/25,000, were declared operational by Third U.S. Army during the month.

Because of the sudden breakthrough of enemy forces on the left flank of Third U.S. Army and the resulting change in the Army boundary, the following corps and divisions were mapped during the period 18 December to 28 December for an area previously north of Army boundary: III, VIII, and XII Corps; 4th, 5th, 26th, 28th, 35th, 80th, and 87th Infantry Divisions; 4th, 6th, 10th and 11th Armored Divisions; 17th and 101st Airborne Divisions.

On 19 December, III Corps opened their map depot at ARLON (P-6122) with instructions from Army to temporarily service all units in the area, even though they were not under corps control.

On 20 December arrangements were made with Twelfth U.S. Army Group temporarily to use the Communications Zone Advance Map Depot

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at VERDUN (U-2865) for servicing directly Third U.S. Army troops. A standing operating procedure was established on 22 December for operating under this temporary arrangement without losing control of the critical stock available in the new Army area.

On 25 December the advance Third U.S. Army map depot was opened at LONGWY (P-5905) to service Third U.S. Army troops in the usual manner. The temporary arrangements for servicing Army units made with the III Corps map depot at ARLON (P-6122) and the Communications Zone Advance Depot at VERDUN (U-2865) were discontinued. Although the Army Map Depot at NANCY (U-6411) was closed as a distributing point on 29 December, it was retained as a temporary storage point for maps that were not of immediate interest to Army.

The recent change in Third U.S. Army operational area necessitated a considerable enlargement of the current reproduction program. No 1/25,000 map stocks were available in the new area, which meant that entire Army reproduction facilities had to be thrown into the task of providing immediately the sheets needed for the new operation. Difficulty was encountered during the first few days in obtaining complete sets of medallions for sheets immediately required, and it was found necessary to reproduce some of them in monochrome only. In no case were three sheets printed with a green medallion, inasmuch as First U.S. Army did not make that color separation. To date, sixty-six sheets of this new area have been printed and distributed. Quantities printed ranged from 10,000 to 18,000 copies of each sheet.

During the month several requests for papier mache pressed models, scale 1/50,000, were received and filled. An order for three terrain models, scale 1/25,000, covering the RHINE River from BINGEN (B-1252) to MANNHEIM (B-5798) was placed with the Engineer, Twelfth U.S. Army Group. The first model of this series was received and later turned over to Sixth U.S. Army Group because of changes in the tactical boundaries.

V - INTELLIGENCE.

For the major portion of the month this section was able to concentrate on engineer intelligence data on enemy equipment new to troops of Third U.S. Army. This new data took the form of enemy engineer equipment, such as the "J-Feder 50A" (Time Delay Igniter), German Anti-Lifting Device (Entlastungszunder) and "Tarnlade" (Explosive Coal). The first two items were encountered in the area of the Seventh U.S. Army. Charts were produced and distributed to all Army units on these three items, while further details were given in Engineer Intelligence notes and bulletins published by this section.

In the course of the rapid change of the tactical situation, information was obtained and disseminated to cover the Army's new area of responsibility. A road and bridge study, scale 1/500,000, covering eastern Belgium, Luxembourg and Western Germany to the RHINE River was also prepared and distributed.

To aid the corps engineers and commanding officers of Army Engineer Combat Groups in preparing for the crossing of the RHINE River, the section obtained and distributed such studies as "RHINE River Study (RI 10)", RHINE River Hydrology Study (Office of the Chief Engineer, European Theater of Operations) and a "Study of Bind Characteristics Along the RHINE River." In addition, in conjunction with the Third U.S. Army Photo Interpretation Detachment, a dossier of certain bridge sites on the RHINE River was completed. This dossier included photo interpretations, traces, stereopairs and other data taken from French documents for each bridge site. This study was distributed to each corps engineer and commanding officer of the Army Engineer Combat Groups.

During the month Engineer Intelligence Notes No. 10 and Engineer Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 8, 9, and 10 were produced and distributed to Army engineer units.

The 3970th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team (Research) concerned itself mainly with experimenting with equipment to detect the "J-Feder 50A." In turn, it also gave lectures, prepared and distributed posters and charts to front line troops who were encountering these devices. Reports of these experiments were furnished the A.C. of S, G-2, Third U.S. Army, and to higher headquarters. Other items of enemy engineer equipment with which the team concerned itself were the Tarnhohle (Explosive Coal), the adapters used with French Light Anti-Tank Mine Igniters, and the Artillery Shell Mine.

VI - WATER SUPPLY

During the month Army troops operated twenty water points. The total water treated was approximately 4,000,000 gallons. Operation of three Army water points was assumed by Advance Section Communications Zone. Deliveries of water to Army hospitals and prisoner of war enclosures were made by the 151lth and 1512th Engineer Water Supply Companies. Supplying of water to the city of METZ (U-8658) was continued.

Ever since arriving on the Continent, it has been realized that the standard method of treatment of water outlined in existing field manuals was not satisfactory on the Continent. Because of the danger of the presence of cysts of endamoeba histolytica in the water supply sources which were not completely removed in ordinary methods of treatment of water by the use of the Army water supply set, a modification of the sets and general treatment method were adopted. After considerable time and experimentation, this new method of treatment was adopted by the entire European Theater of Operations and is covered in Headquarters European Theater of Operations Technical Training Bulletin No. 30, dated 1 January 1945.

In this treatment, the first precautionary measure taken is to allow one hour for the coagulation, settlement and prechlorination of the raw water. Another precautionary step is the reduction of the output of the water purification units. The portable unit is operated at a rate of not more than ten gallons per minute, while the mobile unit may be operated at a rate of not more than sixty gallons per minute. The method of treatment of water, using the table of equipment portable unit, is as follows:

(1) Raw water is drawn from the source by the pump and passed through the purification section, where it is chlorinated to at least two parts per million and placed in a floc tank, a 3,000 gallon canvas tank, where floc is formed by the addition of alum and soda ash.

(2) The floc tank is allowed to stand for one hour and then the water is drawn off through the filter by a booster pump at a rate not to exceed ten gallons per minute if one filter is used, or twenty gallons per minute if two filters are used.

(3) The water is stored in a second tank for dispensation to units. The water being dispensed has a residual chlorine content of 1/4 parts per million or greater. The water being dispensed has a chlorine content of two plus parts per million. Rechlorination is performed at the clear tank if it is necessary in order to keep the content up to the required level.

(4) All rates of flow are measured by watch and container, as the pressure gauges on the filter cannot be relied upon for accuracy. The sand in the filter unit is inspected at frequent intervals to insure the presence of the proper amount of sand. The filter is backwashed with water from the clear tank at a rate of fifteen to twenty gallons per minute. One filter unit has a maximum output of 12,000 gallons per day for twenty hours operation.

(5) With the use of an additional floc tank, it is possible to settle one batch of water for an hour in one tank while the other is being drawn through the filter.

(6) If greater demand is placed on the water point, two units are used in parallel.

(7) The optimum pH of the water is determined by the "jar test" and is used for determining the coagulation treatment required and to test for the presence of chemical warfare agents.

(8) Samples of treated water are submitted to Medical Laboratories for analysis monthly or at least at each change of source of water supply.

(9) Records of amount of water produced and the residual chlorine content at dispensing points are kept on an hourly basis. Mobile units are capable of producing 72,000 gallons in a twenty-hour period.

VII - CAMOUFLAGE

The two primary missions of the Camouflage Company during the month were pattern painting of vehicles and production and distribution of snow suits.

Pattern painting of vehicles for snow camouflage was accomplished with the use of the residue from the generation of acetylene gas, a lime-like substance found in dump piles in a dry state which, when mixed with water and applied with brushes as a thick paste and allowed to dry, provides a white coat which is not injurious to metal or tarnage. The material washes off with water and chips off to a certain extent, but is entirely satisfactory for the purpose. Three sources of supply were available: One operated by the 1st platoon, located with the 644th Engineer Topographic Company at THIONVILLE (U-6705); one operated by the 4th platoon, located with III Corps at LUXEMBOURG (P-6413); and one at Engineer Depot No. 13. Sufficient material was available at these sources to satisfy army requirements.

A two-piece snow camouflage suit with hood and ties around the waist, wrists and ankles was designed, to be manufactured in two sizes in order to satisfy size requirements for the majority of men. Material was secured from civilian sources in Belgium, in addition to Army sources. Five civilian factories were employed; three located in HERVES-MAISONS (U-7903) produced approximately 1,000 suits per day; one located at HATANGE (U-7883) produced approximately 100 suits per day and was operated by XX Corps; and one located in LUXEMBOURG (P-6413) and operated by III Corps furnished 1,000 suits per day. In addition, three Quartermaster salvage companies were producing suits, together with two Chemical Warfare Maintenance units. Approximately 800,000 meters of material were obtained, enough to produce 130,000 suits. By the end of the month 7,847 suits had been produced, and 1240 suits were received from the Quartermaster which were considered satisfactory for issue. In addition, XII Corps had produced approximately 3,400 suits for their own use in the LUXEMBOURG (P-6413) factory, from which Army received 50% of the output.

At the end of the month, the 1st platoon was attached to XX Corps, the 2nd platoon was split into two groups, one on duty with VIII Corps and one assisting in the camouflage of the 563d Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion; the 3rd platoon was split, one group with III Corps, and one group inspecting and assisting in camouflage of the LUXEMBOURG (P-6413) area; and the 4th platoon was attached to XII Corps.

VIII - FIRE DEFENSE

Army Fire Fighting units were attached to Quartermaster gas supply companies operating Class III installations to provide immediate protection. They also assisted in setting up fire defense at Class V and railhead installations.

The 1232d Engineer Fire Fighting Platoon (Advance Section Communications Zone) furnished fire protection for NANCY (U-6501) and vicinity. This platoon also assisted Army in providing immediate protection for Class III installations when they were too numerous and widely separated for immediate protection by Army units. Advance Section Communications Zone also assisted Army in giving immediate protection to some Class V installations.

Fire protection for LUXEMBOURG (P-641) and vicinity was furnished by the LUXEMBOURG (P-6413) City Fire Department, which is very capable and cooperative, and by the fire truck unit attached to the 1092d Engineer Utilities Detachment of this headquarters.

One major fire occurred when enemy aircraft strafed decoming point No. 438, located at HAMC ZEULLES (U-6678), France on 22 December. Approximately 100,000 gallons of gasoline were destroyed out of 800,000 gallons at the dump. Twenty minutes after strafing the dump, planes returned and strafed men fighting the fire.

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CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

I - OPERATIONS

The major disposition of Engineer troops at the beginning of this period remained unchanged. The 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment remained in support of the VIII and III Corps, the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment in support of the III Corps, the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment in support of the XX Corps and the 1134th Engineer Combat Group continued its mission of coordinating depot hauling activities and experimenting with special river crossing equipment.

On 2 January the 282d Engineer Combat Battalion arrived from the port of ROUEN (M-1916) and the 993d Engineer Treadway Bridge Company reverted from Sixth U.S. Army Group and both units were attached to XII Corps to support its contemplated northward drive.

Effective 3 January the 961st Engineer Maintenance Company was detached from XX Corps and attached to III Corps to provide maintenance facilities for that corps. On the same date Company "B" of the 180th Engineer Heavy Pontoon Battalion was detached from the 1134th Engineer Combat Group and attached to XX Corps to provide necessary heavy bridging. The 1129rd Engineer Combat Group arrived from the port of ROUEN (M-1916) and was attached to III Corps.

Engineer Operational Instruction No. 23 was published on 3 January establishing new areas of responsibility.

The 280th Engineer Combat Battalion arrived from the port of ROUEN (M-1916) and was attached to III Corps effective 7 January. The 187th Engineer Combat Battalion and the 281st Engineer Combat Battalion arrived from the port of ROUEN (M-1916) on 8 January and were attached to XX Corps effective 10 January to rebuild engineer means in that corps for the establishment of barrier zones.

The 1152d Engineer Combat Group arrived from the port of ROUEN (M-1916) on 10 January and was attached to XX Corps. In order to provide necessary bridging support for a shift in armored divisions, the 993d Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached from XII Corps and was attached to XX Corps effective 12 January, and the 1st Platoon of the 991st Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached from XX Corps and attached to VIII Corps. In addition, the 998th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached from III Corps and placed in Army reserve under the 1134th Engineer Combat Group on 13 January.

On 13 January the Light Equipage Platoon of the 72d Engineer Light Pontoon Company was detached from XII Corps and returned to its parent unit under III Corps, since the contemplated operation of the XII Corps failed to materialize.

Engineer Operational Instruction No. 24 was published on 15 January. The 249th Engineer Combat Battalion arrived from the port of ROUEN (M-1916) and was attached to XX Corps on 16 January. In order to provide maintenance facilities for XX Corps, the 2d Maintenance Platoon of the 961st Engineer Maintenance Company was temporarily attached to XX Corps.

Because of renewed operational activities of the XII Corps, the Light Equipage Platoon of the 72d Engineer Light Pontoon Company was released to XII Corps on 18 January on a temporary basis. In order to provide bridging support for the 4th Armored Division, which was released to XII Corps on 16 January, the 995th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company passed from the control of Third U.S. Army and was assigned to the Sixth U.S. Army Group on 19 January.

By 21 January the 44th and 168th Engineer Combat Battalions had refitted and reorganized to the extent that they were once again operational and were reattached to VIII Corps. The "bulge" was being effectively reduced and VIII and III Corps were pivoting to the east, with the XII Corps driving to the north. An inter-Army boundary between First and Third U.S. Armies on the north and inter-Group boundary between Twelfth and Sixth U.S. Army Groups were established effective 22 January. Engineer Operational Instruction No. 25 was published on the same date establishing new areas of responsibility.

On 22 January the 168th Engineer Light Pontoon Company, which had been performing hauling, was detached from the 1134th Engineer Combat Battalion and attached to the XX Corps for tactical operations. To offset this loss of hauling facilities, the 72d Engineer Light Pontoon Company was detached from III Corps and attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group. Engineer Operational Instruction No. 26 was published on 27 January.

II - ROADS AND BRIDGES

By far the largest single item of engineer road work performed was the maintenance required to keep the roads in the Army area open. Numerous, although light, falls of snow kept the road network covered for the entire month. Prompt and efficient snow removal from the main supply routes by Engineer units, using snow plows, drags, and borrowed civilian rotary plows, assured an uninterrupted circulation of traffic. This was of vital importance, since during the month there was a very large amount of regrouping and relocation of tactical units.



M-4 Caterpillar on Arsdorf-Boulade Road Clearing Snow Drifts



M-4 Caterpillar Tractor Clearing Snow on Arsdorf-Boulade Road

Sub-freezing temperatures were experienced throughout practically all of January. This necessitated constant and continued sanding of those stretches of road where icing conditions were most likely to prevail. Most of this sanding was done in the manner shown in the photograph below, where the sand was spread manually over the surface of the road by men walking behind the upraised body of slow-moving dump trucks.



Application of Sand to Road Just North of Route Les Ell, Luxembourg

In addition to this, roads were maintained, cleared and sanded--many times on a twenty-four-hour basis of operation for Army supply points, air strips, hospitals, and ammunition depots.

A total of 1,100 miles of road was thus maintained. Concurrently with this snow and ice removal program, many road craters were filled, stretches of newly captured roads were swept for mines, and anti-tank ditches filled.

The amount of semi-permanent timber bridging erected during the month was considerably less than in December. A compilation of the total amount of all bridging is as follows:

TYPE OF BRIDGE	NUMBER	TOTAL LENGTH IN FEET
Fixed Bailey Bridges	50	3,770
Floating Bailey Bridges	2	960
Fixed Treadway Bridges	37	1,412
Floating Treadway Bridges	2	280
Timber Bridges	53	2,721
Heavy Pontoon Bridges	1	160
Infantry Support Bridges	12	-

One of the most important timber bridges built was the one constructed by the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment on Route N-51, north of FLORENVILLE (P-2525) over the SEMOIS River near MESNIL (P-3824). This was a 118-foot, one-way, Class 70 - two-way, Class 40 bridge that opened additional main supply routes for both III and VIII Corps.



Bridge Site Route N-51 Vicinity of Mesnil



Completed Bridge Route N-51 Vicinity of Mesnil

Other timber bridges were built in the area to the east of METZ (U-8658) in ROUZONVILLE (J-1378), and KEDANGE (U-9879), permitting the release of Bailey bridging. Two eight-foot Bailey bridges on the main supply route through ETTELBRUCK (P-8240) were replaced by one-way, Class 70 - two-way, Class 40 timber spans by the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment.

Under construction at that time was a timber bridge to replace two Bailey bridges over the MOSELLE River in METZ (U-8658), and a timber trestle overpass on Route N-418 on the railroad tracks in THIONVILLE (U-8685).

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The principal streams encountered by the III and VIII Corps in their drive to close the ARNSDORF salient were the ERKEN and the L'OGNON Rivers and their tributaries. Two of the largest tactical bridges built by corps engineer troops in this sector were the 100-foot triple-single Bailey bridge constructed by the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment over the ERKEN River in the vicinity of FLORENVILLE (P-2525) and the 110-foot triple-single Bailey bridge built over the L'OGNON River near ORTHEVILLE (P-4366), built by the 202d Engineer Combat Battalion.

Because of the static condition of the front, an appreciably smaller amount of tactical bridging was placed in the XX Corps area during this month than during the previous month. The only bridge of any appreciable size erected in this sector was the floating Bailey bridge constructed at ECKANCH (Q-6679) to replace the heavy pontoon bridge at this point. The remainder of the bridges consisted mainly of short Bailey and treadway bridges of from twenty to fifty feet, built over road craters and blown culverts.

The bulk of tactical bridging of any outstanding size was accomplished by the XII Corps engineer units in their sector of the ARNSDORF salient. These bridges were constructed principally over the SAUER and SURE Rivers and their tributaries in the vicinity of DIEKIRCH (P-8742) and ETTELBRUCK (P-8240) to support the assault crossings of these rivers by elements of the 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions. Every bridge in ETTELBRUCK (P-8240) was destroyed by the retreating enemy, necessitating the construction of four Bailey bridges.

This system of bridges consisted of two eighty-foot, double-single Bailey bridges, one ninety-foot, triple-single Bailey bridge, and one 130-foot, double-double Bailey bridge.



Eighty-Foot Double Single Bailey Bridge South of Ettelbruck on Route N-26



Eighty Foot Double Single Bypass Bailey Bridges over Sure River



130 Foot Double-Double Bailey Bridge over Railroad Tracks and Ninety Foot Triple-Single Bailey Bridge over Sure River in Ettelbruck

Just north of ETTELBRUCK (P-8240) in the vicinity of GOSSELDANGE (P-7648), the 1135th Engineer Combat Group put three Bailey bridges over the SURE River to support the advance of the 5th Infantry Division. These three tactical crossings consisted of one 110-foot, triple-single Bailey bridge, one 130-foot, double-double Bailey bridge, and one 140-foot, triple-single Bailey bridge.

At DIEKIRCH (P-8742), further east of ETTELBRUCK (P-8240) on the SURE River, the 1135th Engineer Combat Group erected a 160-foot heavy pontoon bridge, and in GILSDORF (P-8842), the next town on the same river, Engineer troops constructed a 144-foot infantry support bridge and a 120-foot treadway bridge. This treadway bridge was damaged by artillery fire on the morning of 20 January, killing several men, and has since been replaced with a 140-foot, double-double Class 40 Bailey bridge.



160 Foot Treadway Bridge Over Sure River At Diekirch



144-Foot Infantry Support Bridge Over Sure River at Diekirch



120-Foot Treadway Bridge South of Diekirch over Sure River Damaged by Artillery Fire - Built by 1135th Engineer Combat Gp

[illegible] further east within the tactical bridging was put across the river at [illegible]. They were a forty-foot, single-single [illegible], a 140-foot, triple-single Bailey bridge and an [illegible] bridge. In addition to the aforementioned [illegible] bridges, numerous smaller [illegible] were constructed over blown culverts and craters.

Tactical bridging was also necessary in such isolated towns as HALSDORF-DONNELDANG (P-7216), ESCH SUR LA SURE (P-7047), and LUTZHAUSEN (P-6747), which towns are located in the mountainous area lying to the northwest of ETTELBRUCK (P-8240).



Ninety-Six Foot Treadway Bridge on Route 15 at Heiderscheidergrund



Eighty-Foot Double-Single Bailey Bridge at Esch Sur La Sure



Seventy Foot Double-Single Bailey Bridge at Lutzhausen

Also during the month XII Corps engineer troops constructed a 360-foot Class 40 floating Bailey bridge at ECKERICH (Q-0198) over the MOSELLE River to replace the ferry that had been in operation at this point.

XII [illegible]

The [illegible] of engineer equipment to the Army during the month of January [illegible] of [illegible] tactical bridging, [illegible] of tactical bridges and [illegible] equipment. Every available [illegible] tion of engineers were used to [illegible] bridges for [illegible] in forming a barrier in the [illegible] of enemy breakthroughs. Large quantities of barbed wire and [illegible] were issued for [illegible] tions.

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As the result of battle losses, it was necessary to re-equip two divisions, four Engineer combat battalions, one Engineer light equipment company, two Engineer light pontoon companies and a number of Field Artillery units.

Large demands were made on the Army depots for battle replacements for Class II Engineer supplies, particularly Engineer sets. Many of these requirements were filled with material evacuated from Advance Section Communications Zone Engineer Depot E-513 at LIMAUMONT (P-3149) at the time that this depot was in danger of being overrun during the enemy winter offensive. Without the supplies thus obtained, serious lack of equipment shortages in combat units would have remained unfilled at a critical time in the tactical situation.

Good quantities of heavy equipment were released from Advance Section Communications Zone depots during the latter part of the month. After being issued to troops, this equipment practically completed the reorganization of all combat battalions in the Army.

Lumber requirements and productive capacity of all Armies were discussed at a meeting held by Communications Zone. The purpose of the meeting was to coordinate the supply of lumber between Armies. It was decided that Third U.S. Army should continue to receive lumber from Southern Lines of Communication to augment other sources. The first shipments of previously allocated lumber from Southern Lines of Communication were received at Army depots during the last half of January.

Because of limited bridge building activities early in the month, depot stocks of tactical lumber increased to over a million board feet. However, toward the end of the month, heavy issues sharply reduced this stock.

Average stocks of engineer supplies on hand in all Army depots during the month were:

Class II - 625 long tons
Class IV - 13,500 long tons
Class V - 720 long tons

Class II and Class IV were issued from Depot No. 14 at ARLON (P-6412), while bridging and tactical lumber were issued from Depot No. 13 at ESCH (P-7901). An advanced dump, supporting III and VIII Corps and stocking bridging and lumber, was opened at BASTOGNE (P-5244). For the first time during operations, civilian labor was employed in Army Engineer depots. A total of sixty men were continuously employed at Depots Nos. 13 and 14.

All Engineer supplies except heavy equipment were delivered to Army Engineer depots by rail. Heavy equipment was moved forward mostly by Army trucks. In a few instances, movement of supplies was made by Advance Section Communications Zone trucks. Inter-depot movement of supplies and delivery of lumber from sawmills to depots continued to be handled by the 113th Engineer Combat Group, to which unit the following organizations were attached:

87th Engineer Heavy Pontoon Battalion
553d Engineer Heavy Pontoon Battalion
249th Engineer Combat Battalion
548th Engineer Light Pontoon Company
528th Engineer Light Pontoon Company
136th Engineer Dump Truck Company
1370th Engineer Dump Truck Company

Approximately 1,630 tons of Engineer supplies were moved to Army Engineer depots from Communications Zone during the month. Army trucks transported 1,864 tons of Engineer supplies to Army Engineer depots, excluding inter-depot movements.

During the month the amount of maintenance required on Engineer equipment was gradually increasing. This was attributed to normal wear and tear resulting from continuous use of the equipment. At a meeting of all commanding officers of Engineer maintenance companies of Third U.S. Army, a standard procedure was established whereby Engineer maintenance companies would act in the capacity of sub-depots for second echelon spare parts for units which they serve. With the exception of certain components of second echelon spare parts and tools for repair sets, the supply of spare parts was adequate.

During the month, a total of fifty-nine contracts were processed. The majority of these were in connection with items necessary for camouflage, modification of bridges and RHINE River requirements. Contracts which involved the fabrication of any items were complicated by the fact that most contractors were lacking stock or raw materials.

In the fabrication of the M-2 treadway saddles, twenty-two separate contracts had to be processed in order to procure the materials necessary for their construction. All of this material had to be hauled by Army transportation and delivered to the contractor. In addition to this, the contractor had to be supplied with coal for the forges, carbide for the production of acetylene, and welding rod. To procure these items, it was necessary to process additional contracts with civilian firms, using Army transportation for delivery to the contractor.

The fabrication of treadway supporting spacers involved additional problems. Since the production of these required overtime work, it was necessary to secure the approval of the French labor officials. Authority for the consumption of additional electric power for the contractors also had to be arranged for through French officials.

The production of oxygen, acetylene, nitrogen and carbon dioxide were less complicated, but still involved the procuring of raw materials and use of Army transportation. Either coke or carbide was required by the contractors for the production of these gases. The residual from the production of acetylene was found to be satisfactory for camouflaging of vehicles.

Materials for snow suits were procured from contractors in PARIS (S-0544), EPINAL (T-0413) and BRUSSELS (J-6255), together with some local firms.

IV - MAPS

No new mapping was undertaken during January. Work consisted primarily of revision of existing maps.

A color separation project of the GSGS 4414 series of maps in the Third U.S. Army zone of advance was undertaken. It consisted of seventy-nine sheets and involved the separation of woodlands. Eighteen sheets of this project were completed and prepared for reproduction.

Five sheets of the GSGS 4414 series were revised, color was separated, and the maps prepared for reproduction. The Army Topographic Battalion was plotting defense overprints from photographs annotated by the Army Photo Center. The plotting of this data with respect to the basic map was accomplished by means of reflecting projectors.

A map distribution table for an armored division was prepared on the basis of Third U.S. Army map allowances to facilitate distribution to divisional units by the division map depot.

The reproduction program consisted primarily of 1/25,000 scale maps. A total of 114 sheets were reproduced in quantities ranging from 10,000 to 18,000 each, a total of approximately 1,687,000 copies.

Ninety-four gelatin reproduction jobs were turned out for a total of 5,375 copies.

Terrain model requests were limited to the 1/50,000 scale pressed papier-mache type. These models were secured from the Office of the Chief Engineer, Headquarters Communications Zone.

The Army Survey Center performed several miscellaneous survey missions, including a telephone pole line and radar sites. The river gauges at TOUL (U-6410) and METZ (U-8658) were re-established on the normal null elevations.

V - INTELLIGENCE

The task of obtaining new data on bridges and bridge sites on a different sector of the RHINE River was commenced. This information was to be maintained in the form of a dossier with stereopairs of the bridge and bridge sites, photo interpretations and traces to include the road net on both the east and west banks of the river.

Various studies such as "Leveling System on or near the RHINE River," "Road and Bridge Study, East of the RHINE River," "Climate of Southern Germany," were distributed to interested units. Engineer Intelligence Notes No. 1 and Engineer Intelligence Bulletin Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were produced and distributed to Army Engineer units.

The 2690th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team (Research) continued to search for and examine German engineer equipment. Such equipment as the new type magnetic shape charge, three kilogram demolition charge, "Bruttstreamer," and portable flamethrower were examined. The team also gave lectures and demonstrations on mines and booby traps to several Engineer units.

VI - WATER SUPPLY

During the month Army troops operated fourteen water points and five water distributing points. Army water points produced approximately 3,650,000 gallons of water during this period. The 151th and 1512th Engineer Water Supply Companies delivered water to prisoner of war enclosures and Army hospitals. Supplying of water to the city of METZ (U-8658) for civilian consumption was discontinued after the city system had been repaired.

VII - CAMOUFLAGE

Pattern painting of vehicles for snow camouflage was continued, and by the end of the month approximately ninety percent of all armored vehicles had been painted.

The production of snow camouflage suits was speeded up as much as possible so that by the end of the month approximately 50,000 snow suits had been issued.

The problem of camouflaging radar installations was difficult because such installations were of necessity situated in open fields on high ground. The best that could be hoped for was to make the site less conspicuous by paying particular attention to track discipline. In a typical case of camouflaging a Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion, the entire installation, except the sounding devices, was covered with a steel net, well garnished and spray painted white. The result was an inconspicuous white mound which gave ample room for movement, thus concealing traces in the area. The sounding devices which rotated continuously and a few scattered sheds were painted white. Tracks leading to the area were kept to a minimum and vehicles were parked in the nearby woods. Additional snowfall was advantageous, because the snow piled up on the mound to add to the illusion.

Inspections were carried out continuously and reports submitted periodically. The units inspected show a marked interest in winter camouflaging and did their best to act upon all recommendations made. To effect camouflage in their areas, pattern painting, dispersion and strict track discipline were practiced.

VIII - FIRE DEFENSE

Army fire fighting units were attached to Quartermaster gas supply companies operating Class III installations to provide immediate protection. They also assisted in setting up fire defense at Class V and railhead installations and were available on call to give assistance throughout the Army area.

Advance Section Communications Zone provided only a very small amount of immediate protection to Army installations, since units formerly employed in the Army area were required for their own use during the German counterattack.

Fire protection for LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) and vicinity continued to be furnished by the LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) City Fire Department and the fire truck unit attached to the 1092d Engineer Utilities Detachment of this Headquarters.

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











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270-Foot Bailey Bridge Across Sure River at Echternach



300-Foot Bailey Bridge Across Sure River at Bettendorf



250-Foot Bailey Bridge Across Sure River at Hallendorf



300-Foot Bailey Bridge Across Sure River at Echternach



140-Foot Bailey Bridge Across Our River at Vianden



200-Foot Bailey Bridge Across Our River at Roth



120-Foot Bailey Bridge Across Our River South of Roth

Following this crossing, the advance was pushed eastward through extremely rugged country with steep-sided rocky cliffs toward the PRUM River. The advance in this area was impeded by numerous craters, and in some sectors as many as six fixed treadway or Bailey bridges had to be constructed in a single mile.

As the advance continued, Bailey bridges and footbridges were constructed over the PRUM River at ORSFELD (L-0652), BETTINGEN (L-0450), and PEFFINGEN (L-0446).



Bailey Bridge Across Prum River at Bettingen



Bailey Bridge Across Prum River at Peffingen

A rapidly advancing column of the Fourth Armored Division overran and captured a bridge across the NIMS River at RITTERSDORF (L-1156), as shown in the photograph below:



Bridge Across Nims River at Ritterdorf

By the end of the month the advance to the east had temporarily subsided and strong advances were being made astride the PRUM, NIMS, and SAUER Rivers toward the south. A heavy pontoon bridge was constructed across the MOSELLE River at WORMELDANGE (L-0413) as a lateral route between XII Corps and XX Corps.

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Heavy Pontoon Bridge Across Moselle River at Bormeldange

On the north of the Third U.S. Army front, VIII Corps' direction of advance lies more particular to the courses of the [illegible] and SAAR Rivers, and though their assault crossings were not so costly, the rugged terrain with streams flowing in practically all of the valleys, required a large amount of Bailey bridging. Bailey bridges over the [illegible] River were constructed at [illegible], RIESCHEID (L-8667), DASBURG (L-8472, OBERANVEN (L-8678), BOUR-MEILAN (L-8478) and three bridges at AUEL (L-8886).



Timber Trestle Bridge which replaced Bailey Bridge Across Our River at Diekirch



Bailey Bridge Across Our River at Ettelbruck



Bailey Bridge Across Our River at Oberhausen



Bailey Bridge Across Our River at Burg-Reuland



Bailey Bridge Across Our River at Auel



Second Bailey Bridge Across Our River at Auel



Third Bailey Bridge Across Our River at Auel

South of the MOSELLE River, 12 Corps, which had been holding the SAARLAUTERN (L-2880) bridgehead, suddenly crashed through the switch position of the SIEGFRIED Line running from METTLACH (L-1800) to MERZIG (P-0104) and raced up the triangle between the MOSELLE and SAAR Rivers, crossed the SAAR, and at the end of the month threatened TRIER (L-2129).

The breakthrough of the SIEGFRIED Line by the 94th Infantry Division and the 10th Armored Division was aided by a daring crossing of the MOSELLE River by the 5th Rangers, which unit crossed the stream near WORMELDANGE (L-0413) and made a very successful diversion of the main effort. Following this crossing a floating treadway bridge was constructed at REMICH (P-0106).



Floating Treadway Bridge Across Saar River at Remich

When the forces reached the SAAR, a crossing was attempted by the 94th Infantry Division near TABEN (L-1805) and SERRIG (L-1609). This was so successful that a treadway bridge could be put in at TABEN (L-1805) at an early hour.



Treadway Bridge Across Saar River at Taben

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Another treadway bridge was constructed at SERRIG (L-1609) and this bridge was successfully maintained intact in spite of enemy fire.



Treadway Bridge Across Saar River at Serrig

Farther north in the vicinity of SAARBURG (L-1513) and OCKFEN (L-1614), another assault crossing was executed. When the bridgehead had been expanded sufficiently, two heavy pontoon bridges were constructed there.





One Way Traffic
Heavy Pontoon Bridges Across Saar River at Saarburg

Hazardous bridging experiences during the month were the removing and salvaging of four floating Bailey bridges from the MOSELLE River. Because of the sudden breakup of the ice on the river, high flows stretching completely across the stream swept down and damaged several of the floats.

In addition to tactical bridging, timber trestle bridges were erected in close support of corps. The 130Sd Engineer General Service Regiment built a number of permanent timber bridges to support III Corps operations. At DIEDENDORF (P-9742) a fixed timber bridge was completed over the SAUER River on 3 February.

At BOLLENDORF (L-0140) a 285-foot timber trestle bridge over the SAUER River was completed and opened to two-way Class 40 traffic on 19 February.



285-Foot Timber Trestle River over Sauer River at Bollendorf

A 230-foot timber trestle bridge was constructed across the SAUER River at REISDORF (P-9642) in five days, the bridge being opened to all types of military traffic on 20 February.

At ECHTERNACH, even before the Bailey bridge was completed, a two-way pile bent bridge was started on 21 February. When completed, this was a 670-foot bridge.



Timber Trestle Bridge at Ucsange

Roads

Road maintenance, repair and reconstruction work during the month was a much greater engineering task than that of any previous comparable period. Frost action during the early part of the month rendered many miles of roads impassable, particularly in the VIII Corps sector and the vital supply routes in support of this corps.

All available engineer troops were used on road maintenance and reconstruction work. In addition, approximately 3,000 civilian laborers and 550 prisoners of war were employed with hand tools to open drainage ditches and to assist in repair of road failures.

General Construction

General construction included building and maintaining liaison air strips and laying landing mats thereon; construction of prefabricated shelters and command posts for infantry troops; constructing gun emplacements and digging in searchlight units; clearing fields of fire for artillery; and leveling and sanding a firing range.

Repair and maintenance of buildings used by XX Corps Rest Camp, and buildings occupied by the 107th Evacuation Hospital, 110th Evacuation Hospital and by the 7th and 65th Field Hospitals were carried on.

Two hundred duckboards for M-1938 footbridge were constructed during the month. Road marking signs and traffic direction signs were made and painted.

III - SUPPLY

The change in the tactical situation from one of defense to that of offense resulted in the issue and expenditure of large quantities of river-crossing equipage. This reduced materially the Army reserve of this equipment being accumulated for the projected RHINE River crossing. Battle losses in assault boats and power utility boats contributed most in reducing the reserve.

As the result of the deterioration of main supply routes in forward areas, demands were made on depots for road materials, graders, rock crushers, road rollers and sheepfoot rollers. With the exception of rock crushers, most equipment was obtainable from Army and Advance Section Communications Zone. The shortage of rock crushers was generally offset by the production of crushed rock from civilian crushers.

Materials and equipment for the RHINE River crossing continued to be assembled. Shortages still existed, but indications were that the majority of equipment would be available in sufficient time for the operation.

As in the previous month, large quantities of heavy equipment were received from Advance Section Communications Zone depots and issued to troops. Sufficient shops, motorized, general purpose, were received to complete the equipping of all Engineer Combat Battalions, including Armored Battalions.

Four heavy cranes ranging in capacity from 1½ to 2 cubic yards arrived and were issued to General Service Regiments. They were primarily intended for use in the RHINE River crossing operation; however, they proved very helpful in the erection of fixed bridges currently under construction, in addition to giving the crews of these regiments a chance to become familiar with the operation of these cranes.

Heavy equipment not available in quantities required included rock crushers, small cranes, tar kettles and road graders, both towed and self-propelled. Requirements for these items were particularly high because of road deterioration.

Another effect of the bad road condition was a tremendous demand for picks and shovels used by civilians to supplement labor on the road program. Depot stocks of these items were soon exhausted; however, quantities sufficient to handle the situation were acquired by borrowing from Ordnance and by emergency pick-ups from Advance Section Communications Zone and Communications Zone depots.

To meet the requirements for crushed rock, three civilian crushers were operated at full capacity. These crushers all utilized blast furnace slag which was crushed and loaded in rail cars for shipment to forward railheads. Daily capacities of these plants were:

Plant No. 1	270 tons
Plant No. 2	460 tons
Plant No. 3	440 tons

Depot stocks of small Class II items, such as hammers, hatchets, files, welding and cutting sets and small tools in general, reached a dangerously low level. This condition was largely the result of the non-receipt of items requisitioned from Communications Zone. Toward the end of the month increasing quantities of supplies were being delivered from Advance Section Communications Zone Depot R-517T and Depot No. R-514. This materially relieved the Class II shortage.

Quantities of lumber received and issued during the month were as follows:

Acquired from local civilian mills	534,792 BFM
Supplied by 139lst Engineer Forestry Company	216,547 BFM
Received from Southern Lines of Communications	102,350 BFM
Consumed in bridge construction	780,567 BFM

An increased demand for heavy I-beams (15" to 24" in depth with lengths up to 52 feet) was noted during the month. It was possible, however, to supply all requirements.

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The majority of engineer supplies were delivered to Army depots by rail. Rail facilities were available at Engineer Depot No. 13 for bridging and lumber and at Engineer Depot No. 14 for Class II supplies. Approximately 5,031 tons of engineer supplies were received by rail from Advance Section Communications Zone and Communications Zone Depots.

Considerable Army rail transportation was utilized for the movement of engineer supplies, consisting mainly of lumber, steel I-beams and road materials from Army Depots to Advance engineer depots serving corps.

Approximately 11,866 tons of engineer supplies were moved by the 1134th Engineer Combat Group, using transportation of the following engineer units:

553d Engineer Heavy Pontoon Battalion
88th Engineer Heavy Pontoon Battalion
567th Engineer Light Equipment Company
293d Engineer Combat Battalion
1366th Engineer Dump Truck Company

Transportation of supplies consisted of hauling logs to civilian saw mills, moving lumber from sawmills to engineer depots, transporting heavy engineer equipment from Advance Section Communications to Army depots, and moving supplies forward to advance engineer supply points.

The amount of maintenance required on engineer heavy equipment continued to increase, resulting in a large number of dead-lined machines. This situation was relieved considerably with the location of an engineer base shop company of Communications Zone approximately forty miles in the rear of the Army depot. Prior to this time it had been necessary to send equipment needing fourth and fifth echelon repairs approximately 200 miles to the rear. An adequate supply of spare parts and table of equipment replacement equipment were available to the Army.

During the month a total of sixty-one contracts were processed by the Purchasing and Contracting Section. The majority of these contracts were for RHINE River project material and modification of present bridging equipment. Contracts for a total of 11,000 treadway supporting spacer bars were placed with civilian firms. By the end of the month 2,500 had been delivered to engineer depots.

Contracts for the modification of seven Bailey bridges were placed with civilian firms. Two bridges were completed during the month. A total of 43,000 tons of crushed slag was contracted for. Approximately 10,000 tons were shipped to forward areas by rail.

A list of major items under contract at the end of the month follows:

ITEM	QUANTITY
Anchors	293
Brackets, outboard, assault boat, M-2	100
Brackets, outboard, treadway ferry	50
Guard, finger, Bailey bridge	250
Modification of Bailey bridge parts:	
Clamps	294
Ramp, bottom	55
Ramp, plain	84
Sway Brace Extension	190
Transoms	200
Parts for Bailey bridges:	
Bolt, chord	1,000
Pin, panel	1,000
Shoes, pile, cast steel	1,200
Supporting spacer bars, Treadway M-2	7,000
Transom spacing blocks for Bailey bridge	100

IV - MAPS

No new mapping was undertaken during the month. All mapping consisted primarily of revision of existing maps.

The color separation project, GSGS 4414, was completed during the month. Third U.S. Army units now had available three-color maps throughout the entire Army area at a scale of 1/25,000. Two sheets were revised and prepared for reproduction during the month.

In the Army area east of the RHINE River a project consisting of the selection of operational editions was assigned to the Army Topographic Battalion. The project consisted of forty-two sheets, GSGS 4414.

Corps photomapping facilities produced numerous photomaps and large scale tactical maps.

A total of eighty-eight tons of maps was received during the month. Approximately eight tons were issued to Army units, eighteen tons to corps units, and the stock on hand at the end of the month was approximately 223 tons.

Recommendations were received from the army and corps topographic units for changes in existing tables of organization and equipment. These changes were submitted to higher headquarters, together with the recommendations of the Engineer Section. If approved, these changes would provide adequate facilities for map distribution and survey within the Army.

Terrain models, scale 1/50,000, of the papier-mache type were secured from the Office of the Chief Engineer, Communications Zone. Terrain models, scale 1/250,000 covering most of Germany were requested for staff planning by the G-2 Section of this headquarters. These models will be made by the Engineer Model-Making Detachment of the Office of the Chief Engineer, Communications Zone.

The Army Survey Center performed several survey missions, including radar sites. In addition, they supplied the III Corps Artillery with level data and rotated survey squads with the XII Corps engineer survey elements.

The reproduction program during the month consisted mainly of 1/25,000 and 1/50,000 scale maps. Seventy-five sheets of the 1/25,000 scale maps were reproduced for a total of approximately 1,041,000 copies. An additional thirty-four sheets were overprinted with additional colors. Ten sheets of the 1/50,000 scale 25th 4th series were reproduced in quantities averaging 7,500 copies each for a total of approximately 75,000 copies.

V - INTELLIGENCE

During the month information on the topography and rivers of the EIFEL Region was gathered and disseminated. Also, information on the OUR, SAUER, PRUM, KYLL and LIESER-BACH Rivers was sent to interested units.

Engineer Intelligence Notes No. 3 and Engineer Intelligence Bulletin No. 4 were produced and distributed to Army engineer units. In addition, 10,000 booklets on German mines and booby traps were sent to Army units.

The 2890th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team continued the policy of examining enemy engineer equipment, such as the 3 kg ball charge; the large Schu mine; adapter for the "S" mine igniter; demolition conversion kit; Italian friction igniter, and a new type electric igniter. Samples of each of these devices were sent to the Office of the Chief Engineer, Communications Zone. A new method of minefield laying by the Germans was also discovered and information on this method was disseminated to all units. The team also continued to give lectures and demonstrations on booby traps to units of the Army.

VI - WATER SUPPLY

During the month Army troops operated thirteen water points and six water distributing points. These water points produced approximately 3,560,000 gallons of water during this period. The 151ith and 1512th Engineer Water Supply Companies delivered water to prisoner of war enclosures and Army hospitals.

VII - CAMOUFLAGE

With the advent of warmer weather and the melting of snow, the painting of armored vehicles for snow terrain was discontinued. The deactivated carbide residue used on the vehicles was removed by the use of water and brushes.

The manufacture of snow suits was discontinued toward the end of the month, all fabric previously cut having been processed, and the suits delivered.

Camouflage of the radar unit of the 563rd Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion was re-converted to summer type, using drapes and nets.

Posters, designed to awaken interest in and to promote consciousness of the need of camouflage, were produced and distributed. Camouflage face paint in green and brown of a theatrical grease paint type was distributed to troops.

VIII - FIRE DEFENSE

Army units were attached to Quartermaster gas supply companies operating Class III installations to provide immediate protection. In addition, they assisted in setting up fire defense at Class V and railhead installations and hospitals, and were available on call to give assistance throughout the Army area.

Advance Section Communications Zone did not furnish any immediate protection for Army installations during the month. Fire protection for LUXEMBOURG (F-8413) and vicinity continued to be furnished by the LUXEMBOURG (F-8413) City Fire Department and the fire truck unit attached to the 1092d Utilities Detachment of this headquarters.

One trailer-pump unit pumped water from the OUR River over a 300-foot cliff to a regiment of the 76th Infantry Division for five days to relieve hand-carrying of water by the regiment.

IX - COMMENDATION

The following letter was received from the Army Commander and forwarded to all Third U.S. Army Engineers:

"HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Commanding General
APO 403

5 February 1945

SUBJECT: Commendation.

TO : The Army Engineer Officer, Third Army.

1. Please accept for yourself and pass on to the officers and men of your units the sincere appreciation and admiration of all the other elements of the Third Army for the work you have accomplished.

2. Over countless rivers and tank ditches in flooded Lorraine you constructed and maintained innumerable bridges. You cleared and reconditioned thousands of miles of road.

3. Your work in the recent operation in Belgium and Luxembourg has been equally outstanding and has been accomplished under still more intolerable conditions of weather and terrain.

4. Without the stimulus of combat, yet suffering losses from enemy fire, you have built the bridges lacking which the German penetration could not have been obliterated.

5. Each and every officer and man of the Third Army Engineer Units is hereby highly commended for the superior manner in which his tasks have been performed.

6. You will apprise all units concerned of the contents of this letter.

s/t/ G. S. PATTON, JR.,
Lieut. General, U.S. Army,
Commanding."

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CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

I - OPERATIONS

The major disposition of engineer troops at the beginning of this period remained unchanged. The 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment remained in support of the VIII Corps, the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment in support of the XII Corps, the 1301st Engr GS Regiment in support of the XX Corps and the 1134th Engineer Combat Group continued its mission of coordinating depot haulage activities and experimenting with special river crossing equipment.

In order to provide flexibility of Army support to the Corps the 1123d Engineer Combat Group, including the 145th, 183d, 188th and 249th Engineer Combat Battalions and the 770th Engineer Dump Truck Company, was detached from VIII Corps and placed in support thereof under Army control, effective 2 March. To provide equipment for this group, one platoon of the 609th Engineer Light Equipment Company was detached 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment and attached thereto.

On 2 March the 87th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion was detached from XX Corps and attached to 1134th Engineer Combat Group to be reloaded and held in Army reserve.

On 2 March the 285th Engineer Combat Battalion, which had been operating in an Infantry role in the XII Corps, reverted to Engineer control and remained attached XII Corps.

At 031800A March Engineer Operational Instruction No. 30 was published effecting the above noted transfers and assigning new areas of responsibility. By this time the push of the VIII Corps to the east was proceeding satisfactorily and the 1123d Engineer Combat Group was in support thereof and in turn supported by the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment. The missions of the 1303d and 1301st Engineer General Service Regiments and the 1134th Engineer Combat Group remained unchanged.

Effective 3 March the 96lst Engineer Maintenance Company, less 1st maintenance platoon, was detached VIII Corps and attached XX Corps to provide maintenance facilities to that Corps.

Effective 4 March the 513th Engineer Light Ponton Company was detached VIII Corps and attached to XX Corps, which corps was pushing steadily to the east.

Effective 7 March, the 2d platoon of the 996th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached VIII Corps and attached XII Corps to support its operation which was progressing rapidly to the east, north of the MOSELLE River.

The 2d platoon, 729th Engineer Depot Company arrived on 071200A March and was attached to 459th Engineer Depot Company.

Effective 9 March the light equipage platoon of the 509th Engineer Light Ponton Company from the 1134th Engineer Combat Group and the remainder of the 996th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company from VIII Corps were attached to XII Corps to support its planned assault of the MOSELLE River.

On 10 March the 658th Engineer Light Equipment Company arrived from the LE HAVRE (L-4828) area. This company was not employed operationally as it was attached to Seventh U.S. Army by Twelfth U.S. Army Group to be moved by 15 March. The unit moved out of Third U.S. Army area on 15 March.

On 10 March, Company A, 87th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion, and on 14 March the remainder of the battalion, were detached 1134th Engineer Combat Group and attached to XII Corps.

At 101800A March, Engineer Operational Instruction No. 31 was published effecting the above noted transfers and establishing new areas of responsibility. By this time the VIII Corps was being pinched out on the north and the XII Corps was moving rapidly to the east. In order to support the XII Corps operation the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment was pulled out from behind the 1123d Engineer Combat Group and placed in support of the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment to permit them to push up into the XII Corps area. The missions of the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment and 1134th Engineer Combat Group remained unchanged.

On 10 March the 178th Engineer Combat Battalion was detached VIII Corps and attached XX Corps effective 11 March.

By 12 March the drive of the XII Corps had reached break-through proportions, and it accordingly was given the mission of turning south across the MOSELLE to out-flank the German forces in front of the XX Corps, south of the MOSELLE. Once again Third U.S. Army engineers faced the task of providing engineer means to force the MOSELLE River. At 180OA March 12 Engineer Operational Instruction No. 32 was published assigning new areas of responsibility and pushing the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment well forward into the XII Corps area. Missions of all Army troops remained unchanged.

On 14 March the 1367th Engineer Dump Truck Company was detached VIII Corps and attached 1134th Engineer Combat Group to support its haulage activities.

Effective 16 March the 1st maintenance platoon of the 96lst Engineer Maintenance Company was detached VIII Corps and attached XX Corps to complete the transfer of this company.

On 16 March the 1258th Engineer Combat Battalion, which had been operating in an infantry role in XX Corps, reverted to Engineer control and remained attached to XX Corps.

At 161800A March Engineer Operational Instruction No. 33 (Annex No. 9) was published assigning new areas of responsibility. By this time XII Corps had successfully crossed the MOSELLE River and was pushing aggressively to the south just west of the RHINE River. Engineer missions remained unchanged.

The 1700th Engineer Combat Battalion arrived from the LE HAVRE (L4828) area on 17 March and was attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group to assist in the salvage of tactical bridging and its return to depot stock.

Effective 18 March the 88th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion, less Company B, was relieved from attachment to III Corps and attached to 1134th Engineer Combat Group in order to pick up tactical bridging in place and complete basic bridge load from depot stock.

On 18 March the 1010th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company arrived from the LE HAVRE (L-4828) area and was attached to the XX Corps to support its operations.

Effective 20 March, the 511th Engineer Light Ponton Company was detached VIII Corps and attached XII Corps.

By 20 March, the 88th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion had completed loading and it was detached 1134th Engineer Combat Group and attached to XII Corps effective that date to provide additional bridging over the MOSELLE.

Effective 20 March, the 770th Engineer Dump Truck Company was detached 1123d Engineer Combat Group and attached to 1134th Engineer Combat Group to provide increased depot haulage facilities to meet the moving situation.

By the night of 10 March the plans of the XII Corps for assault of the RHINE were being completed and the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment was alerted to move up necessary materials and erection crews for one anti-personnel boom over the RHINE River. On 20 March the Regiment was instructed to move up the remaining anti-personnel and anti-barge materials which had been assembled at AESP No. 8 to provide a total of four each.

By 20 March, the drive of the XII Corps had again reached break-through proportions and the 1123d Engineer Combat Group including the 183d, 145th and 249th Engineer Combat Battalions was attached thereto to provide adequate engineer support. The 2d platoon of the 609th Engineer Light Equipment Company was relieved of attachment from the 1123d Engineer Combat Group and attached to the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment effective the same date.

The plans of the XX Corps for assault of the RHINE River were also being completed and the 188th Engineer Combat Battalion was detached 1123d Engineer Combat Group and attached to XX Corps effective 20 March to provide additional engineer support.

The light equipage platoon of the 509th Engineer Light Ponton Company was detached XII Corps and attached XX Corps effective 21 March.

On 21 March the 1535th Engineer Dump Truck Company arrived from the LE HAVRE (L-4828) area and was attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group to support its haulage activities.

On 22 March the 264th Engineer Combat Battalion and the 1270th Engineer Combat Battalion arrived from the LE HAVRE (L-4828) area and were attached to the 1126th Engineer Combat Group, the advanced detachment of which had closed into the Army area 18 March with the main body of the 1126th Engineer Combat Group closing in on 26 March. The 1126th Engineer Combat Group was placed in support of the VIII Corps.

The 1154th Engineer Combat Group arrived from the LE HAVRE (L-4828) area on 22 March and was attached to the XX Corps effective that date.

At 221800A March, Engineer Operational Instruction No. 34 was published establishing new areas of responsibility and placing the 1126th Engineer Combat Group in support of VIII Corps. By this time the VIII Corps on the north had been given the mission of crossing the RHINE in the vicinity of BOPPARD (L-8981), the XII Corps had completed its plan for assault of the RHINE in the OPPENHEIM (M-4439) area and jumped off at 222200A March and the XX Corps had been pinched out on the south by shift of inter-group boundary. Consequently, the 178th and 188th Engineer Combat Battalions were detached effective 22 March from XX Corps and attached VIII Corps to support its RHINE operations. The 1010th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached XX Corps and attached to 1134th Engineer Combat Group as Army reserve and to complete reloading from depot stock. On 24 March this company was attached VIII Corps.

On 23 March the 2727th and 2728th Engineer Light Equipment Companies arrived from the LE HAVRE (L-4828) area and were attached to the 1126th Engineer Combat Group and 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment respectively. Effective upon release by the 2728th Engineer Light Equipment Company, the 2d platoon of the 676th Engineer Light Equipment Company was detached 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment and attached 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment.

On 23 March the 1012th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company closed into the Army area from the LE HAVRE (L-4828) area and was attached to the VIII Corps to support its operations on the RHINE River.

Effective 24 March, the 2d platoon of the 997th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached XX Corps and attached XII Corps to support its RHINE and MAIN River operations.

Effective 24 March, the 548th Engineer Light Ponton Company, less light equipage platoon, was detached XX Corps and attached VIII Corps to support its RHINE River operations.

Effective 24 March, the 87th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion was detached XII Corps and attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group for the purpose of hauling floating Bailey bridges from AESP No. 8 to the RHINE River.

Effective 24 March, the 287th Engineer Combat Battalion was attached to 1125th Engineer Combat Group, which group closed into the Army area from LE HAVRE (L-4828) on 25 March. The 287th Engineer Combat Battalion closed into the Army area on 26 March.

On 26 March the 181st Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion arrived from First U.S. Army and was attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group for the purpose of hauling floating Bailey bridging from AESP No. 8.

On 26 March, the 1266th Engineer Combat Battalion arrived from the LE HAVRE (L-4828) area and was attached to the 1125th Engineer Combat Group, which had been given a task mission of picking up rear area tactical bridging no longer needed for operations and hauling it forward.

By 26 March the XX Corps was given the mission of crossing over the XII Corps and crossing the RHINE in the vicinity of MAINZ (M-3856). To support its operations the 997th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached XII Corps and attached XX Corps effective 26 March.

By 26 March the XII Corps had successfully crossed the RHINE and was pushing rapidly to the north and east. To provide for construction of three floating Bailey bridges over the RHINE at MAINZ (M-3856), OPPENHEIM (M-4439), and BINGEN (M-1252), the 1123d Engineer Combat Group with the 145th, 183d and 249th Engineer Combat Battalions were detached XII Corps and reverted to Army control for this mission.

At 282400A March Engineer Operational Instruction No. 35 was published effecting the above noted transfers and assigning new areas of responsibility and missions as follows:

a. 1123d Engineer Combat Group: Construct Class 60 floating Bailey bridges at MAINZ (M-3856), OPPENHEIM (M-4439) and BINGEN (M-1252) and maintain all bridges upon completion over RHINE River in zone.

b. 1125th Engineer Combat Group: Perform all engineer work in zone and support 1126th Engineer Combat Group.

c. 1126th Engineer Combat Group: Perform all engineer work in zone and support VIII Corps.

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d. 1134th Engineer Combat Group: Continue coordination of depot haulage activities and coordinate and control the delivery and operation of Naval LCVP's and LCM's in the RHINE River operations.

e. 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment: Perform all engineer work in zone, support XI Corps, construct all anti-personnel and anti-barge booms in RHINE River in Army zone and construct fixed bridge over RHINE River at OPPENHEIM (M-4439).

f. 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment: Perform all engineer work in zone, support XII Corps, continue assistance to Naval Unit M-2 and construct fixed bridge over RHINE River at MAINZ (M-3856).

g. 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment: Perform all engineer work in zone, construct barge bridge over RHINE River and be prepared to support 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment.

h. Separate Army Units: No change.

Effective 27 March the 178th Engineer Combat Battalion was detached VIII Corps and attached 1123d Engineer Combat Group.

On 29 March, the 1130th Engineer Combat Group closed into the Army area. This group headquarters was not employed operationally, as it was relieved of assignment to Third U.S. Army, 31 March, and assigned Fifteenth U.S. Army.

By 29 March, VIII Corps had successfully crossed the RHINE and the 1012th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached therefrom and reverted to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group as Army reserve.

By 31 March the needs of the VIII and XII Corps permitted the re-grouping of the light pontoon companies. Accordingly, the 548th (-) Engineer Light Pontoon Com.any was detached VIII Corps and attached XI Corps, the light equipage platoon of the 547th was detached VIII Corps and reverted to Army reserve with its parent organization and the 511th was detached XII Corps and attached VIII Corps.

As of 31 March the disposition of engineer troops was as follows:

VIII CORPS	
1102d Engr C Gp	
1107th Engr C Gp	
35th Engr C Bn	
44th Engr C Bn	
159th Engr C Bn	
160th Engr C Bn	
188th Engr C Bn	
243d Engr C Bn	
1242d Engr C Bn	
527th Engr L Pon Co	
511th Engr L Pon Co	
628th Engr L Equip Co	
665th Engr Top Co	
1369th Engr Dp Trk Co	
974th Engr Maint Co	
991st Engr Trdwy Br Co	
1010th Engr Trdwy Br Co	
2693d Engr TIT (C)	

XII CORPS	
1135th Engr C Gp	
1137th Engr C Gp	
133d Engr C Bn	
150th Engr C Bn	
166th Engr C Bn	
204th Engr C Bn	
282d Engr C Bn	
285th Engr C Bn	
58th Engr Hv Pon Bn	
528th Engr L Pon Co	
537th Engr L Pon Co	
613th Engr L Equip Co	
673d Engr Top Co	
991st Engr Maint Co	
995th Engr Trdwy Br Co	
996th Engr Trdwy Br Co	
2969th Engr TIT (C)	
4th Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn	

XI CORPS	
1139th Engr C Gp	
1152d Engr C Gp	
1154th Engr C Gp	
135th Engr C Bn	
146th Engr C Bn	
179th Engr C Bn	
206th Engr C Bn	

XX CORPS (cont'd)	
245th Engr C Bn	
281st Engr C Bn	
1258th Engr C Bn	
513th Engr L Pon Co	
548th Engr L Pon Co	
6434 Engr L Equip Co	
668th Engr Top Co	
961st Engr Maint Co	
993d Engr Trdwy Br Co	
997th Engr Trdwy Br Co	
2898th Engr TIT (C)	
1st Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn	

ARMY	
1123d Engr C Gp	
1149th Engr C Gp	
1130th Engr C Gp	
1134th Engr C Gp	
1301st Engr GS Regt	
1303d Engr GS Regt	
1306th Engr GS Regt	
41st Engr C Bn	
178th Engr C Bn	
183d Engr C Bn	
249th Engr C Bn	
264th Engr C Bn	
287th Engr C Bn	
293d Engr C Bn (-)	
1266th Engr C Bn	
1270th Engr C Bn	
1700th Engr C Bn	
871st Engr Hv Pon Bn	
553d Engr Hv Pon Bn	
539th Engr L Pon Co	
669th Engr L Equip Co	
676th Engr L Equip Co	
2727th Engr L Equip Co	
2728th Engr L Equip Co	
662d Engr Top Bn	
572d Engr Dp Trk Co	
764th Engr Dp Tr Co	
770th Engr Dp Trk Co	
1354th Engr Dp Trk Co	
1366th Engr Dp Trk Co	
1367th Engr Dp Trk Co	
1535th Engr Dp Trk Co	
976th Engr Maint Co	

ARMY (cont'd)	
1012th Engr Trdwy Br Co	
4578th Engr Depot Co	
2d Plat, 729th Engr Depot Co	
1511th Engr WS Co	
1512th Engr WS Co	
1239th Engr FF Plat	

ARMY (cont'd)	
1240th Engr FF Plat	
2890th Engr TIT (R)	
Naval Unit M-2	
Det B, 329th Harbor Craft Co	
1407th Engr Mobile Slt Team	
Co A (-), 602d Engr Cam Bn	

II - CONSTRUCTION

Bridges and Roads

During the month of March river crossing operations engaged in by Third U.S. Army exceeded those of any previous month and were believed to have equalled or exceeded those executed by any other Army in the history of warfare. In addition to the crossings of such streams as the SAAR and the MOSELLE, the RHINE itself--the mightiest of Europe's rivers--was crossed by assault for the first time in modern history.

The RHINE was crossed not only once but four times in a succession of assault crossings that completely overwhelmed and smashed the enemy.

As an anticlimax to these crossings, the MAIN River, a river comparable to the MOSELLE, was crossed in a series of operations which, had it not been for the fact that the RHINE overshadowed all others would have been looked upon as a major crossing operation.

The amount of bridging completed during the month was as follows:

TYPE OF BRIDGING	NUMBER	TOTAL LENGTH
Bailey bridge (fixed)	99	10,150
Bailey bridge (floating)	8	3,840
Heavy Pontoon bridge	6	3,170
Infantry Support bridge	3	200
M-2 Treadway bridge (floating)	25	11,574
M-2 Treadway bridge (fixed)	96	3,744
Fixed bridges	104	11,415
Total	341	44,073

Further means of crossing were provided by the use of rafts, Naval craft (LCVP's and LCM's) and amphibious tanks on a scale never before used.

The initial crossings during the month were those made over the PRUM and KYLL Rivers by VIII and XII Corps, respectively, and of the SAAR and MOSELLE by XI Corps.

The crossings of the PRUM and KYLL were hard-fought, bitter battles over relatively minor streams. Since, however, they were strongly defended and were tied in with the Siegfried defenses, the relative importance of the crossings was high. These rivers bisected the path to the RHINE and it was through the bridgeheads established over them that the armored drive to the RHINE passed. Once these bridgeheads were established, and the 4th Armored Division started rolling eastward, bridging in the area to the north and east of KYLLBURG (L-1761) became relatively unimportant, since most of the bridges and overpasses from there to the RHINE were captured intact. Southwest of KYLLBURG (L-1761) to the MOSELLE River, a number of smaller bridges and overpasses were destroyed over the SPITTZER and SAUR Rivers. However, since the advance proceeded at a slower tempo because of the fiere resistance encountered, these demolitions were not serious obstacles.

Simultaneously with the crossings of the PRUM and KYLL, the 10th Armored Division of XX Corps passed across the SAAR River over bridgeheads at SERRIG (L-1509), SAARBURG (L-1414), and ORTEN (L-1715) and so swiftly overran TRIER (L-2129) that a fine 1,100-foot existing highway bridge was captured intact. They then continued on along the north bank of the MOSELLE, where a crossing of the KYLL River was forced.

These operations concluded the first of four phases of the stream crossing operations of the month and found Third U.S. Army in complete control of the north bank of the MOSELLE River, as well as the area to the east and south of it as far east as the HUNSER River.

At this time the XII Corps turned to the south and in a beautifully executed river crossing operation smashed across the MOSELLE River between TRIER (L-6976) and MATZENPORT (L-7782). This crossing was executed by the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions.



Treadway Bridge Under Construction Under Cover of Smoke at Matzenport on Moselle River

Initial crossings were made secretly at night in paddled assault boats and reinforcements were then poured over in storm boats, Infantry support rafts and treadway rafts. The commanding points of the terrain set up as targets for the Infantry to seize and to prevent enemy observation of the crossing sites were taken at an early hour in the first day, and by 1900 of the day the assault started, two Class 40 bridges had been constructed and ready for use, and still a third bridge was completed shortly thereafter. Through this bridgehead the 4th Armored Division again roared to the south, racing to BAD KREUZNACH (M-0934) on the NAHE River where, though the bridges had been destroyed, a crossing was made on a railroad bridge.



Bailey Bridge over Nahe River at Bad Kreuznach

In this dash, most bridges and overpasses on the way were captured intact and those that were destroyed were quickly spanned with either fixed treadway or Bailey bridges.

As the bridgehead over the MOSELLE was expanded to the west, still another crossing was made in the vicinity of BULLAY (L-5563), where a heavy pontoon bridge was constructed, and over which the 11th Armored Division stormed to run along the flank of the 4th Armored Division. Then the 4th Armored, after consolidating, started again and practically cleared the west bank of the RHINE as far south as WORMS (M-4515), with the exception of pockets at GERMERSHEIM (M-5438) and MAINZ (M-3856). Simultaneously with these pushes, XX Corps troops forced a way down the east bank of the SAAR and rolled up the Siegfried Line in this sector. To support these operations, floating bridges were constructed over the SAAR at MERZIG (L-9295) and METTLACH (L-1701). The bridging east of here to the RHINE did not present any further unusual difficulties, since the advances were so fast that bridges and overpasses were either captured intact, or, since the GLAN, SIMMER and NAHE streams were either narrow or fordable in these reaches, no real delay was produced.

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Concurrently with this activity, VIII Corps executed still another assault crossing of the MOSELLE River, between HATZENPORT (L-7782) and KOBLENZ (L-9096). Here again the Infantry crossed in paddled assault boats and were reinforced by storm boats, powered assault boats and rafts. Treadway bridges were constructed at WINNINGEN (L-8491) and KOBERN (L-8090). The 87th Infantry Division crossed and quickly captured KOBLENZ (L-9096).



Treadway Bridge over Moselle River near Kobern



Floating Bailey Bridge over Moselle River near Kobern

This ended the second phase of the river crossings for the month and found Third U.S. Army holding the entire west bank of the RHINE from KOBLENZ (L-9096) to LUDWIGSHAFEN (R-5298). The crossing of the RHINE presented the next problem for the month, and there began for Third U.S. Army Engineers the task of the greatest technical and supply problems so far engaged in.

As early as August 1944, when it became apparent that the crossing of the RHINE might take place in the not too distant future, the Engineer Section established a special staff section to plan for the operation. By September preliminary estimates of equipment and materiel needed had been calculated and ordered, and a preliminary plan of action drawn up, based on the troops then available and the stretch of the river lying within the Army zone of advance. Later, when it was learned from conferences with higher headquarters that certain troops and equipment could be expected to be available, a plan of action providing crossings with FRANKFURT (M-6666) and DARMSTADT (M-6642) as the targets, was drawn up. Included in the plan was an analysis of all troop and equipment requirements which served as a guide for training specific troops to execute certain missions.

The crossings were to be made initially by XII and XX Corps, but XII Corps alone finally was committed to the task, and executed a crossing of such superior merit that it could well serve as a model for all future crossings. The plan called for a crossing in the vicinity of NIERSTEIN (M-4342) at a site selected many months before. Here a good network of roads intersected from the north, east, south and west, and a bridge with a floating center section and several ferry sites were located here.

The terrain was good from the XII Corps standpoint, since hills and a town masked approaches on the east side of the river, while a long, flat, open plain extended from the east bank several miles from the river, as can be seen from the photographs illustrating the crossing.

The plan for the crossing was that a single division would make the crossing and that all engineer work was to be executed by Corps Engineers or Army Engineers, depending generally upon previously planned tasks outlined in the Army plan.

Though the crossing was planned for 22 March, the SHAEF area was only cleared of the enemy on 20 March, at which time the critical supplies raced eastward through a hitherto forbidden area over roads that had to be cleared and streams that had to be bridged as they came. An attempt to run convoys up the north bank of the MOSELLE following the path of XII Corps would have been still slower and more difficult.

The staging of the operation by the XII Corps was handled by the 115th Engineer Combat Group, and in accordance with the Corps Engineer's plan, approximately 100 storm boats and motors, 300 assault boats and motors, life belts and other pertinent items were assembled by the corps in addition to the T/E equipment of approximately 500 boats and 100 motors. To back the operation with troops, one heavy pontoon battalion (minus one company) was initially attached to the Corps for use in refing operations; the remainder of the battalion and one other battalion having approximately 400 outboard motor operators, three treadway bridge companies, two light pontoon companies, plus light equipment platoon and seven battalions, were attached as well. Still another unit, one-half of Naval Unit No. 2, consisting of twelve LCVP's and their crews, were attached and pioneered the use of Naval craft in assault river crossing operations.

The historic crossing action started at 2200 with the 11th Infantry Regiment, supported by the 204th Engineer Combat Battalion, making a secret crossing in paddled assault boats. Wave after wave was crossed, with over 200 assault boats shuttling continuously throughout the night. By dawn a substantial part of all the Infantry in the 5th Infantry Division had crossed. At this time the LCVP's of the Naval unit had arrived and by 0730 twelve LCVP's were in the water and ferrying personnel, light vehicle and supplies, and evacuating wounded at such a rate that assault boats were no longer needed.



Infantrymen Board LCVP at Nierstein



LCVP Loaded with Infantry Crosses Rhine near Nierstein



Five LCVP's in Action near Nierstein



Jeeps Debark on East Bank of Rhine at Nierstein
(Note type of beach - no work was required to permit vehicles to use it)



Ambulance Debarks from LCVP on East Bank of Rhine at Nierstein
(Note beach)



Infantrymen Board LCVP at Nierstein on West Side of the River
(Note Ferry Landing from which Boats Operate)

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

















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During the day a heavy ponton bridge was started by the 87th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion and by 240130 March, a 1280-foot Class 24 bridge was ready for traffic. By 0700 of the same date it had been reinforced to carry Class 40 loads.



Heavy Ponton Bridge Under Construction at Nierstein



Traffic Rolls Over Heavy Ponton Bridge at Nierstein

During the construction, a 150mm shell hit directly in the center of the bridge, but fortunately failed to explode. Aside from piercing the deck and a ponton and delaying the construction, it caused no important damage.

Through this bridgehead of the 5th Infantry Division, the 4th Armored Division raced off so swiftly to the east that HANAU (M-8571), thirty miles away, was reached in one day. To speed the traffic at still a faster rate, still another treadway bridge was ordered to be put in and work was started on 24 March and the bridge shown above was opened at noon on 25 March.



Treadway Bridge at Oppenheim

By 27 March five divisions had passed over these three bridges, as well as supplies and necessary supporting troops. The rate at which traffic crossed can be determined from the fact that the entire 6th Armored Division crossed in 16-3/4 hours. During the period from 24 March to 31 March, 60,000 vehicles crossed over these bridges at OPPENHEIM (M-4439).

Aside from the actual problem of building the bridges, the protection of them posed several problems which required special equipment and training, but this had been anticipated and fortunately the enemy was unable to halt the construction of or damage the bridges. The following security measures were employed:

a. Air protection. For the initial nine days of the operation, air cover was constantly maintained over the bridges.

b. Waterborne assault. Anti-personnel nets of the British Admiralty netting type were installed to aid in the capture of "Chasse" swimmers who, intelligence sources had indicated, might be attacking the bridges.

Subsequent to the original tactical crossings, plans had been made to replace the floating treadway bridges by floating Bailey bridges and by 29 March, six days after the initial bridging had begun, sufficient material was on hand to permit a floating Bailey bridge to be started. This was opened for traffic on 31 March.



Floating Bailey Bridge at Oppenheim

Simultaneously, equipment and material were being assembled by the 130lst Engineer General Service Regiment for the construction of a fixed bridge.

At the same time, in addition to the crossing of the XII Corps, plans were readied to support a crossing of the VIII Corps in the great gorge which runs from BINGEN (M-1252) to OBERLAHNSTEIN (L-9189). This stretch of the river presented difficult crossing problems and the problem of putting in a bridge caused some concern. Once ground reconnaissance had been made, however, the river did not seem so bad as studies had indicated.

The same base of supply as was used for XII Corps crossing operations was used here. The hundreds of boats and motors required had to make the long run over even more tortous terrain--the HUNSRUCK Mountains--to put the supplies in the corps depot. Also, twelve of the twenty-four LCVP's of the Army had been allocated to the corps for the operation. Since they had been routed to the vicinity of ALKEN (M-2726)



LCM's on the Road to Participate in Assault Crossings of the Rhine

in the expectation of crossings being made as originally planned, they now had to be routed over the hills to the north. Fortunately, the time factor was adequate to enable them to make this move and they were ready and in position by H-hour, due to the excellent work of the Naval Unit staff and that of the 1134th Engineer Combat Group.

The crossing plan of VIII Corps called for an assault crossing to be made in paddled assault boats by the 87th Infantry Division, with one crossing in the vicinity of NIEDER (L-9287) and other crossing at BOPPARD (L-8981). The crossing at BOPPARD (L-8981), however, was to be the main crossing site and the bridge was to be put in here. The initial wave crossed satisfactorily in each place, but strong enemy resistance was encountered at the north crossing site from enemy artillery and small arms and this was subsequently abandoned when it became apparent that the BOPPARD (L-8981) crossing was successful. Though six LCVP's had been allocated by the corps to take part in this operation, none were actually committed until about twelve hours after the assault started, since the advisability of using them at all was being carefully weighed, especially since if they had been knocked out on the way to site, the only approach road might have been blocked by them. Once in the water, however, they performed excellently as ferries and moved over great numbers of men, light vehicles and equipment, as well as evacuating the wounded. Once these were in the water, the need for the powered assault boats and storm boats which had been used up to this time was ended. It is estimated that 5,000 men and 400 vehicles were carried by the Navy alone.



Equipment Being Loaded Under Smoke Screen on LCVP's During Assault Crossing of Rhine River at Boppard



Infantry Assault Troops Board an LCVP at Boppard on the Rhine River

Infantry support rafts and M-2 treadway rafts had been also constructed earlier in the day and these were used to carry over light vehicles and tanks respectively.

An M-2 treadway bridge was started by 0800 on the morning the assault crossing was made, and by 0930 of the following day it was completed.

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Treadway Bridge at Boppard in the Rhine Gorge

As previously mentioned, the technical difficulties produced by the stream made construction difficult, inasmuch as two standard power utility boats and two horse power outboard motors could scarcely handle the five ponton M-2 rafts. The LCVP's proved to be invaluable here in supplementing the power boats, as their powerful engines were able to breast the swift current.

While this operation was still underway, another crossing was started by VIII Corps on the night of 25-26 March at ST. GOAR (L-9873) and OBERWESEL (L-9967).

The pattern of the previous crossings was followed at ST. GOAR (L-9773) with paddled assault boats, making the initial crossings with powered assault boats carrying the succeeding waves.



Assault Troops Crossing Rhine River at St. Goar

This crossing was strongly resisted, however, and since only negligible resistance had been encountered at OBERWESEL (L-9967), the main crossing forces were shifted to OBERWESEL (L-9967), where they crossed and outflanked ST. GOAR (L-9873). When finally captured, it was found that ST. GOAR (L-9873) had been held by a relatively small force, but it was well equipped with automatic weapons that were well placed and skillfully concealed in the steep cliffs which line the stream.

At OBERWESEL (L-9967), the crossing was made with relatively light resistance, though sporadic artillery fire fell intermittently in the area. The initial crossings here, too, were made by paddled assault boats, followed by powered craft. Here, however, though the Naval craft were available, because of the difficult approach roads, they were not put into action until the afternoon. In the meantime, a fleet of ten DUKW's did a heroic job of transporting troops and supplies and in all made 236 crossings.

However, as soon as six LCVP's and six LCM's had been put into the water, the entire complexion of the picture changed, for they passed troops and equipment over the river at such a rate that within forty-eight hours nearly an entire division with all its vehicles and equipment had been carried over.



DUKW Transports Assault Troops over Rhine River at Oberwesel

This ferrying operation quickly supplied enough troops and armor so that ST. GOAR (L-9873) was cleared by the morning of 27 March and a treadway bridge was started on the same day and completed about thirty-six hours later.



Tanks Cross Treadway Bridge at St. Goar on the Rhine River



Armored Car Debarks from LCM at Mainz

This operation was slow, but the swift current and the poor anchorage made it a most difficult job. To assist in anchoring a bridge and as in construction as well, a one-inch steel aerial anchor line was emplaced and the bridge initially fastened to this. Subsequently, the anchorage was supplemented by heavy barge anchors.

The fourth crossing was executed by XX Corps at MAINZ (M-3856) in a difficult and strongly resisted operation. The initial waves of the 80th Infantry Division crossed secretly in paddled assault boats, while the succeeding waves crossed in double assault boats and storm boats powered with outboard motors. Flanking fire from 20mm flak weapons on the Island had been completely cleared. It was here that the Navy again demonstrated its ability to be most useful and effective in a crossing operation by providing a crossing means so swift and of such capacity that the enemy can be quickly overwhelmed. Soon after the Naval craft hit the water, they poured over a continual stream of troops, vehicles and tank destroyers in the early crucial hours that the enemy artillery was silenced and further ferrying and bridging was able to proceed without interference.



Infantry Crossing in LCM at Mainz



Troops and Vehicles Disembark from LCM at Mainz



Supply Vehicles Boarding an LCM at Mainz

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From the time the first craft went into operation at H plus 3½ until the treadway bridge was open at H plus 34, the Navy transported an estimated 7,000 troops and 600 vehicles. This was a magnificent performance, inasmuch as the river was about 2,000 feet wide at this point and the distance traversed from the loading point on the near shore to the unloading point on the far shore was nearly a mile. About fifteen minutes was required for a crossing cycle.



M-2 Treadway Bridge at Mainz - 1896 feet long; so far as known this was the longest tactical bridge ever built

Even after the completion of the bridge, the Naval craft were still used as ferries to carry empty vehicles and evacuate the injured, since the treadway bridge was used exclusively for one-way traffic heading toward the enemy.

The treadway bridge at MAINZ (M-3856) was a monumental structure, being 1,896 feet long and probably the longest tactical bridge ever constructed.

The crossing at MAINZ (M-3856) was coordinated with a simultaneous crossing of the MAIN River just east of the confluence of the MAIN and the RHINE at MAINZ (M-3856) by other elements of the division. The assault waves on the MAIN crossed in paddled assault boats with a build-up following in powered assault and storm boats and on Infantry support and M-2 treadway rafts which were able to be constructed at an early hour, since the enemy was quickly overwhelmed by the crossing forces. This crossing was not so strongly opposed as that at MAINZ (M-3856) and an M-2 treadway bridge was started at 0700 of the day the assault started and was completed by 1900 that evening. It was 624 feet long.



M-2 Treadway Bridge at Hochheim

This ended the assault phase of the Rhine operations. At this time, Third U.S. Army held the entire west bank of the RHINE River and the east bank as well from OPPENHEIM (M-4439) to KOBLENZ (L-9096) with the exception of a pocket on the east side which, though little enemy activity had been noted, had not been physically cleared.

The following items were pertinent to all the crossings:

a. The same pattern of executing the crossing and providing defensive measures described for the XII Corps crossing was, in general, followed at the other sites with minor modifications, as determined by the individual characteristics of the site.

b. All crossings were made secretly without artillery preparation.

c. Outboard motor boats attracted enemy fire whenever used.

d. When LCVP's and LCM's are available, the quantity of troops and equipment that can be ferried in them is so great that very close coordination must be established between them and traffic control authorities in charge of the crossing, since much valuable transport time may be lost waiting for loads.

e. The standard power utility boats were not powerful enough efficiently to serve as general work boats in a stream as swift as the RHINE, though two of them, aided by two outboard motors, can readily navigate a five-ponton raft with M-2 pneumatic or heavy ponton. Because of their lack of power and to supplement the number which was available, both LCVP's and LCM's were used to aid in the construction of the bridges.

Immediately following the assault phase, construction of the floating Bailey bridges to release the tactical bridging for use farther forward was begun. As previously noted, a floating Bailey bridge had been constructed at OPPENHEIM (M-4439) by 31 March and at the same time the general service regiment scheduled to construct a permanent type fixed bridge at OPPENHEIM (M-4439) started work at the site, even though the assault crossing had been made only seven days previous and the companies employed had to complete projects on the SAAR River--some eighty miles to the rear--on which they had been unable to start until 19 March, when the breakthrough was made.

Similarly at MAINZ (M-3856) a floating Bailey bridge was started on 29 March, the day after the assault crossing. This bridge was completed, but because of the extremely swift current--6.6 feet per second flowing at the site--its capacity was initially limited to Class 35, until extra pontons could be placed in each bay in the swift water sections and false bows provided for all the boats. This swift water was not the normal rate of flow at MAINZ (M-3856), but it was caused when the three center spans of road bridge were dropped into the stream, causing a partial damming. This caused the water gap to be restricted and consequently the water about 100 yards from each shore about one-half mile downstream of the wrecked bridge flowed at a substantially faster rate than usual. However, because of the road network, this particular stretch was the most suitable for traffic flow and therefore both floating bridges were constructed at this point. Once additional anchorages had been provided, the bridges offered no unusual problems of maintenance other than could be expected on bridges of such length.



Floating Bailey Bridge on Rhine River at Mainz

On 30 March the 130lst Engineer General Service Regiment began the construction of a 1,050 foot steel stringer pile bent bridge at OPPENHEIM (M-4439). On 29 March, the day following the assault crossing, the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment began construction of a timber bridge on the site of the destroyed bridge, with the wreckage of the former bridge being utilized, where practicable, as a foundation for the bridge. This site was selected primarily because it was felt that a bridge could be built here in about one-third of the time that would be required to construct an entirely new bridge, particularly since the length of an entirely new bridge would be close to 2,000 feet, whereas the gap in the damaged bridge was only 1,050 feet. Time was the deciding factor in this decision, since at any time after 1 May the start of the summer high water could be expected, and it was decided that a permanent structure should be finished by this date, since the usual accumulation of debris accompanying the flood would probably make it impossible to maintain floating bridges.



Partially Destroyed Highway Bridge at Mainz

As a further safety factor, the LCM's and LCVP's that had been used in the assault operation were still held on the river for emergency use. They still proved to be invaluable in assisting in the building and maintenance of bridges and the nets and booms, and present plans contemplate keeping them as emergency craft for ferrying if needed.

In addition to the bridges described above, another floating Bailey bridge was constructed at BINGEN (M-1252) and still another one was begun at LORCH (M-0561) to be used as a corps tactical bridge, but construction was subsequently halted when the advance of the forces progressed so far beyond the river that it lost its original importance.



Bailey Bridge over Rhine River at Bingen



Floating Bailey Bridge under Construction at Lorch

As noted previously, XII Corps plunged on across the RHINE at such a rate that its armor in the space of a few days had smashed across the MAIN River at HANAU (M-8771) and near FRANKFURT (M-6660) and at both places floating treadway bridges were constructed to aid the advance.

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Treadway bridge at [illegible]



Heavy [illegible] bridge at [illegible]

In addition a [illegible] bridge was [illegible] and a fixed [illegible] over a [illegible] at the [illegible] Both [illegible]. These [illegible] were [illegible], however, and the forces then swept northward toward the [illegible]



[illegible] over the [illegible] of [illegible]

[illegible] was constructed [illegible] by the [illegible] engineers [illegible] of [illegible] and [illegible] was [illegible] and [illegible] was [illegible] and [illegible] was



Timber Trestle Bridge under Construction across Rhine River at Wesel

During the first half of this period, the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment was still engaged in the maintenance, repair and reconstruction of main supply routes in the AHLEN (P-6123)-BASTORNE (P-9657) area. These roads were those damaged because of the sudden thaw in the early part of February. This regiment utilized 750 prisoners of war and 350 civilians in this work. Road base materials of crushed slag were brought in by rail from MOHANDE (P-6306) mill and steel mill at LUNEN (P-5805).

Other road work included removing log obstacles at entrances to villages, filling over trench tank obstacles, and repairing craters, in addition to usual road maintenance and repairs.

III - SUPPLY

The rapid movement of the Army to the RHINE River and the tactical crossing of that river by three corps required the movement of enormous quantities of tactical and fixed bridging materials from assembly areas in Engineer Depot Nos. 8, 13 and 14 to forward depots supplying the corps and, at times, directly to bridge sites. At the final crossing of the RHINE, the supply line for engineer materials extended approximately 143 miles. The majority of equipment required was on hand in Army depots, but the principal problem was that of moving material forward at a rapid rate and at the same time displacing depots forward in time to receive these supplies. A total of 4,926 tons of engineer bridging, excluding fixed timber bridge material, was moved to forward areas by Army truck over the period from 22 March to 31 March. The tonnage was composed of floating Bailey bridge, fixed Bailey bridge, treadway bridge, and light floating equipage.

With the exception of truck-mounted cranes, the supply of heavy equipment was sufficient to satisfy demands. Four of these cranes were received from Advance Section Communications Zone on a loan basis for use during the RHINE crossing operation when rapid loading and unloading of bridging material were of prime importance.

Adequate stocks of tactical bridging were on hand in Army depots or en route from Communications Zone depots to support the RHINE operation. I-beams and lumber also were available in sufficient quantities.

The demand for crushed rock and equipment for repairing roads diminished during the month to practically zero due to a combination of better weather and the fact that the tactical situation moved out of the general area of bad roads in LUXEMBURG (P-8411) to the more stable German roads. Production of crushed rocks from civilian sources was completely suspended.

Depot stocks of Class II items improved generally, but a definite shortage continued on specific small tools, such as hammers, hatchets and files.

The footage of fixed bridging material consumed during the month was approximately double that used for the previous month. A total of 3,030 tons of steel consisting of 14" and 20" steel I-beams was used. The majority of steel was acquired from local steel mills operated by Advance Section Communications Zone.



Steel Yard at Engineer Depot No. 13 at Asch

Listed below is pertinent information on Army depots in operation during the month:

Depot No.	Type	Average Tonnage
8	Rhine River Bridging	6,000
10	Class IV and Bridging	800
13	Class IV and Bridging	8,000
14	Class II and IV	3,200
16	Class IV & Bridging	400
17	Class IV and Bridging	400
18	Class IV and Bridging	200
19	Class IV and Bridging	400
20	Class IV and Bridging	600
21	Class IV and Bridging	675
22	Class IV and Bridging	150
23	Class IV and Bridging	600
24	Class IV and Bridging	400
25	Class V and Bridging	300
26	Class V and Bridging	400



Engineer Depot No. 13 at Asch

An acute shortage of cranes and depot personnel was experienced because of the large number of depots operated by the Army. A total of eighteen motorized and crawler cranes were used. These were augmented by a large overhead crane at Engineer Depot No. 13, which was used to handle steel I-beams, timbers and piling. One additional Engineer depot platoon was attached to the Army during the month. This unit was used to load out RHINE bridging at Engineer Depot No. 8.

All engineer supplies were delivered to Army Engineer Depots No. 13 and 14 from Advance Section Communications Zone and Communications Zone Depots by rail. Forward movement of practically all supplies from these two depots to Advance Engineer Depots supporting the corps was performed by the 113th Engineer Combat Group, using the transportation of the following units:

87th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion
181st Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion
553d Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion
1700th Engineer Combat Battalion
509th Engineer Light Pontoon Company
770th Engineer Dump Truck Company
793d Engineer Combat Battalion (Less one company)
13564th Engineer Dump Truck Company
13567th Engineer Dump Truck Company
13574th Engineer Dump Truck Company
3459th Quartermaster Truck Company
3799th Quartermaster Truck Company
3988th Quartermaster Truck Company
4051st Quartermaster Truck Company
651st Quartermaster Truck Company

A total of 7,900 tons of engineer supplies was hauled by the above units during the month.

Engineer maintenance of heavy equipment continued at a high rate. However, a large amount of equipment requiring the 4th echelon maintenance and above was evacuated to the Advance Section Communications Zone base shop, thus relieving Army engineer maintenance companies of higher echelon maintenance.

A special maintenance crew operated in the bridge field at Engineer Depot No. 13 for the purpose of repairing light floating equipage. The repair work done by this crew contributed immensely in providing materials for river crossing operations. A summary of equipment repaired during the month is as follows:

Floats, pneumatic	374
Boats, reconnaissance	53
Boats, storm	41
Boats, assault, M-2	283
Boats, power, utility	10



Repairing Power Utility Boat

IV - MAPS

No new mapping was undertaken during the month. All mapping consisted primarily of revision, color separation, and checking existing 1/25,000 scale maps against available photography for discrepancies which would make the maps operationally dangerous.

Five sheets of the G2G3 4414, 1/25,000 scale maps were revised during the month. This revision consisted of various sheets throughout the Army area which were found to contain errors of sufficient magnitude to necessitate the action.

Color separation work on the 1/25,000 scale, G2G3 4414 series maps was continued in the Army area. However, because of the nature of the tactical operations, multi-colored maps were not printed beyond the bridgehead operations east of the RHINE River.

A compilation of a gazeteer from the 1/100,000 scale maps was assigned to the 652nd Engineer Topographic Battalion, but progress on this project was negligible because of other operational commitments of a more urgent nature.

The color separation of three sheets of the new 1/200,000 scale

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road maps of Germany was undertaken and completed. Specifications were outlined by the Office of the Chief Engineer, Communications Zone. This project was given top priority, in order that the maps might be completed in time to be of use to field units.

Eighty sheets, OSGS 4414 series, 1/25,000 scale maps were checked against available aerial photographs to determine their operational efficiency prior to reproduction. The photography was of such a small scale that only major topographic features could be accurately checked. No serious errors were noted.

The photomapping facilities of the Corps Topographic Companies were not utilized by the Army. Special maps and map substitutes and supplements were prepared under the direction of the Corps Engineers.

The Army Survey Center was assigned the mission of supplementing existing trig in the area north and east of BITBURG (L-1353). However, this area was immediately left in the rear by the rapid advance of Third U.S. Army and the project cancelled before completion. Enough control was established to substantially strengthen the trig in this area before the project was terminated.

During the month the Army Survey Center established geodetic control for five radar stations. One of these missions consisted of accurate location of targets on a bombing range for the XII Tactical Control Group (Provisional).

Five survey technical targets were investigated. Only one of these, a captured German map depot at MAINZ (M-3954), Germany, yielded any data of importance.

A field check of sheet 6402, OSGS 4414 series, scale 1/25,000 map was undertaken. Results of this field check have not been compiled.

A survey party from the Army Survey Center, assigned the mission of furnishing astronomical azimuth for the XII Corps artillery, was maintained during the entire month.

A total of eighty-eight tons (approximately 2,047,000 sheets) of maps were received during the month. Over four tons (approximately 95,296 sheets) were issued to Army units and ninety-three tons (approximately 2,118,044 sheets) issued to corps units.

During the middle of the month, when Third U.S. Army was making rapid advances, corps and divisions changed areas of operations on short notice. Units had to be mapped well in advance of their immediate objectives with wide areas of coverage. The result was a daily consumption of maps greater than for any other operation since Third U.S. Army became operational.

The rapid advance of adjacent armies made liaison with adjoining Armies' Topographic Sections a matter requiring careful coordination in the exchange of bodilines, color pulls and printed stocks. In order to satisfy the enormous consumption of maps used during the month, it was necessary to utilize to the utmost all available reproduction facilities. Corps topographic companies used approximately 50% of their reproduction facilities to augment that of the Army Topographic Battalion in the reproduction of operational maps.

An additional phase in the reproduction program consisted in the initial printing of Third U.S. Army After Action Report. Since operational demands upon Army reproduction facilities did not permit full scale diversion to this report, it was necessary to farm out a portion of the work to two outside units.

V - INTELLIGENCE

During the month the rapid and ever-changing tactical front necessitated a more extensive coverage of intelligence data with respect to the topography, roads and rivers of Germany. With the completion of a study of the area in the vicinity of ST. GOAR (L-9873), data on the RHINE River was procured, prepared and distributed during a preceding month. However, a special assault crossing study was prepared and given to the Corps Engineer concerned.

A road and bridge study covering the general area from BONN (P-5537) on the north, to WEINHEIM (G-5983) on the south, to MERSCHEID (S-4801) on the east, and to FULDA (R-3718) on the north, was prepared and distributed to corps, divisions and Army units. Additional publications such as the ISTD "Topography, Road and Bridge Studies" to cover the area from the German border east to WURZBURG (R-5935) and north to KASSEL (C-2207); "Terrain Appreciation Central Germany - Part A and B; "Terrain Diagrams of West Central Germany" and "Detailed Description of Crossing over the MAIN River" were issued to all interested units.

Such miscellaneous studies as the "Railways of Germany and Commerce in Germany," were also distributed.

During the month Engineer Intelligence Notes No. 3 and Engineer Intelligence Bulletins No. 5 and No. 6 were produced and issued to corps, divisions and engineer units.

New engineer units coming in the Army area were given all available data and also booklets and posters on enemy mines and booby traps.

The 2890th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team continued to devote its time to the gathering of information on enemy engineer equipment of all types and the dissemination of such information as was deemed necessary to the engineer troops in Third U.S. Army. Also new items of interest which were desired by the Engineer Board at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, were located and subsequently forwarded to the Office of the Chief Engineer, Communications Zone, for shipment to the United States. Among these items were new type treadway pontons, new large type Schu mines, wooden anti-tank mines, German pontons and a small German water pump. To keep up with the tactical situation, the unit moved to a forward command post in the city of TRIER (L-2129, Germany. From this point the unit broke up into small parties of three men each to explore installations and enemy dumps in and around that city. No new items of enemy engineer equipment were found; however, some quantities of equipment which were in short supply for training purposes were located and sent to the rear areas. Among these were Topfmine igniters, Riegel mines, Schu mines and light panzer mines.

VI - WATER SUPPLY

During the month Army troops operated thirty-one water points and four water distributing points, in addition to corps and divisional water points. These water points produced approximately 4,218,000 gallons of water during this period. Seven mobile units and eighteen portable units were used for producing water. Twenty-eight 700-gallon tankers and four 1,900 gallon trailers were used for hauling water to installations and six 1,900 gallon trailers were used for storage at installations. The ever-increasing number of prisoners of war and displaced persons greatly increased the amount of water hauled. Action was taken in getting municipal water systems to operate in sections of cities in which Army installations were located. This not only provided sufficient water for sanitary purposes but also reduced the amount of water to be hauled.

VII - CAMOUFLAGE

During the month the second in a series of camouflage posters, designed to awaken an interest in, and consciousness of, the need for camouflage, was distributed.

The first platoon inspected the bridge crossing over the RHINE at MAINZ (M-3854) during the early period of operation. Smoke screens were effectively used to conceal the bridge and concentration of approaching traffic. Additional operations of this platoon included the discovery in ALSFELD (R-0840), Germany of approximately 7,900 rolls of German camouflage grass-garnished chicken wire, colored in dark green and brown. The rolls were approximately three feet wide and thirty feet long, and are not considered useful, as the material is of the type that is normally used to conceal permanent installations and there is a sufficient supply of American materials on hand. The platoon further assisted units of XX Corps in inspection and assistance in camouflage problems.

VIII - FIRE DEFENSE

Army units remained attached to Quartermaster gas supply companies operating Class II installations to provide immediate protection. In addition, they assisted in setting up fire defense at Class V and railhead installations and hospitals, and were available on call to give assistance throughout the Army area.

Advance Section Communications Zone did not furnish any immediate protection for Army installations during the month.

Fire protection for LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) and vicinity continued to be furnished by the Luxembourg City Fire Department and the fire truck unit attached to the 1092d Utilities Detachment of this headquarters. The latter unit furnished protection for Third U.S. Army forward command post, while the 1240th Fire Fighting Platoon's fire truck unit located at gasoline supply point No. 9, in TRIER (L-2129) furnished protection for the rear command post in TRIER (L-2129) during the latter part of the month. No major fires occurred during the month.

CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

I - OPERATIONS

At the beginning of this period, the VIII Corps was supported by the 1126th Engineer Combat Group, which unit was, in turn, supported by the 1125th Engineer Combat Group; the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment was in support of XI Corps; the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment was in support of XII Corps, and the 1134th Engineer Combat Group continued coordinating hauling activities and delivery and operation of Naval LCVP's and LCM's in the RHINE River operations.

Agreement was made with Advance Section Communications Zone for their troops to take over designated routes of communications west of the line MAYEN (L-6392)-SINZIG (L-8555)-OBERSTEIN (L-7123) effective 3 April. Engineer Operational Instruction No. 36 was published on 1 April establishing new areas of responsibility to be effective 3 April and placing the 1125th Engineer Combat Group in support of the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment and the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment in support of the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment.

On 3 April the 668th Engineer Light Equipment Company reverted to Third U.S. Army from Seventh U.S. Army and was attached to the 1125th Engineer Combat Group. Effective the same date the 1298th Engineer Combat Battalion was detached from XX Corps and attached to the 1125th Engineer Combat Group and the 1252d Engineer Combat Battalion was detached from VIII Corps and attached to the 1126th Engineer Combat Group.

Effective 4 April the 995th and 1010th Engineer Treadway Bridge Companies were interchanged between the VIII and XII Corps. Naval Unit N-2 was detached from the 1134th Engineer Combat Group and was attached to the 1123d Engineer Combat Group. Engineer Operational Instruction No. 37 was published on the same date.

On 7 April the 1012th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached from the 1134th Engineer Combat Group and was attached to the 1123d Engineer Combat Group to support its mission of maintenance of the RHINE River bridges. The 509th Engineer Light Pontoon Company was detached from the 1134th Engineer Combat Group and attached to the XX Corps.

Effective 9 April the 995th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company and the 997th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company were interchanged between the VIII and XX Corps. Engineer Operational Instruction No. 38 was published on 9 April. The 1125th Engineer Combat Group was placed behind XX Corps, relieving the 1126th Engineer Combat Group of the dual mission of supporting both XX and VIII Corps and the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment was placed in support of the 1126th Engineer Combat Group.

On 14 April the 183d Engineer Combat Battalion was detached from the 1123d Engineer Combat Group and attached to the 1126th Engineer Combat Group in support of the VIII Corps. On 16 April the 1349th Engineer Dump Truck Company and the 995st Engineer Treadway Bridge Company were detached from VIII Corps and attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group to assist in hauling.

On 17 April Third U.S. Army was assigned a new zone of action, necessitating regrouping of troops. The VIII Corps and supporting troops reverted to First U.S. Army effective 22 April and took over the area of the XX Corps. The XX Corps was crossed over both VIII and XII Corps and turned south, and the III Corps and supporting troops reverted from First U.S. Army to Third U.S. Army and placed on the right flank. Engineer troops supporting VIII Corps, consisting of the 1102d and 1107th Engineer Combat Groups, the 35th, 44th, 159th, 166th, 188th and 243d Engineer Combat Battalions, the 511th and 527th Engineer Light Pontoon Companies, the 628th Engineer Light Equipment Company, the 997th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company, the 666th Engineer Topographic Company and the 2893rd Engineer Technical Intelligence Team (Combat) reverted to First U.S. Army and Engineer troops supporting III Corps, consisting of the 1111th and 1159th Engineer Combat Groups, 91st, 284th, 291st, 299th, 300th and 1262d Engineer Combat Battalions, 72d and 540th Engineer Light Pontoon Companies, 629th Engineer Light Equipment Company, 998th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company, 672d Engineer Topographic Company and 2942d Engineer Technical Intelligence Team (Combat) reverted from First U.S. Army to Third U.S. Army. The 249th Engineer Combat Battalion was detached from the 1123d Engineer Combat Group and assigned the mission of maintaining the RHINE River bridges and removing tactical RHINE River bridges. Engineer Operational Instruction No. 39 was published on 17 April effecting the transfers referred to above.

On 19 April Naval Unit N-2 was detached from the 1123d Engineer

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Combat Group and attached to the 249th Engineer Combat Battalion.

Effective 20 April the 1126th Engineer Combat Group was interchanged with the 1152d Engineer Combat Group. Also, the 525th Engineer Light Pontoon Company arrived from the port of LE HAVRE (L-4827) and was attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group. Effective 23 April the 528th Engineer Light Pontoon Company was detached from the 1134th Engineer Combat Group and attached to III Corps, and the 546th Engineer Light Pontoon Company was detached-III Corps and attached the 1134th Engineer Combat Group. On 21 April the 991st Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached from the 1134th Engineer Combat Group and attached to III Corps to support its operations. On 22 April the 974th Engineer Maintenance Company was detached from VIII Corps and attached III Corps.

Effective 24 April the 678th Engineer Light Equipment Company reported from Ninth U.S. Army and was attached to the 1123d Engineer Combat Group.

On 25 April the 1482d Engineer Maintenance Company arrived from the port of LE HAVRE (L-4827) and attached to the 113kth Engineer Combat Group. On 25 April Engineer Operational Instruction No. 40 was published establishing new areas of responsibility.

On 29 April the 183d Engineer Combat Battalion was detached from the 1123d Engineer Combat Group and transferred to Fifteenth U.S. Army. On 29 April Engineer Operational Instruction No. 41 was published.

Disposition of Engineer units on 30 April was as indicated below:

III CORPS

1111th Engr C Gp
1159th Engr C Gp
51st Engr C Bn
284th Engr C Bn
291st Engr C Bn
299th Engr C Bn
300th Engr C Bn
1262d Engr C Bn
70d Engr L Pon Co
325th Engr L Pon Co
629th Engr L Equip Co
672d Engr Top Co
974th Engr Maint Co
991st Engr Trdwy Br Co
998th Engr Trdwy Br Co
2d Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn
2943d Engr TIT (C)

XII CORPS

1135th Engr C Gp
1137th Engr C Gp
133d Engr C Bn
150th Engr C Bn
166th Engr C Bn
204th Engr C Bn
282d Engr C Bn
289th Engr C Bn
613th Engr L Equip Co
981st Engr Maint Co
996th Engr Trdwy Br Co
1010th Engr Trdwy Br Co
526th Engr L Pon Co
537th Engr L Pon Co
898th Engr Hv Pon Bn
673d Engr Top Co
4th Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn
2949th Engr TIT (C)

XV CORPS

1126th Engr C Gp
1139th Engr C Gp
1154th Engr C Gp
135th Engr C Bn
160th Engr C Bn
179th Engr C Bn
206th Engr C Bn
245th Engr C Bn
281st Engr C Bn
623d Engr L Equip Co
961st Engr Maint Co
993d Engr Trdwy Br Co
995th Engr Trdwy Br Co
509th Engr L Pon Co
513th Engr L Pon Co
664th Engr Top Co

XX CORPS (contd)

1st Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn
2898th Engr TIT (C)

ARMY

1123d Engr C Gp
1125th Engr C Gp
1134th Engr C Gp
1152d Engr C Gp
1301st Engr 35 Regt
1303d Engr 35 Regt
1306th Engr 35 Regt
145th Engr C Bn
178th Engr C Bn
249th Engr C Bn
264th Engr C Bn
287th Engr C Bn
293d Engr C Bn
1252d Engr C Bn
1258th Engr C Bn
1266th Engr C Bn
1270th Engr C Bn
1700th Engr C Bn
609th Engr L Equip Co
658th Engr L Equip Co
676th Engr L Equip Co
678th Engr L Equip Co
2727th Engr L Equip Co
2728th Engr L Equip Co
1012th Engr Trdwy Br Co
548th Engr L Pon Co
976th Engr Maint Co
1482d Engr Maint Co
572d Engr Gp Trk Co
764th Engr Gp Trk Co
770th Engr Gp Trk Co
1354th Engr Gp Trk Co
1366th Engr Gp Trk Co
1367th Engr Gp Trk Co
1369th Engr Gp Trk Co
1535th Engr Gp Trk Co
87th Engr Hv Pon Bn
551st Engr Hv Pon Bn
553d Engr Hv Pon Bn
459th Engr Depot Co
2d Plat, 729th Engr Depot Co
652d Engr Top Bn
Co A (-), 602d Engr Cam Bn
1511th Engr MS Co
1512th Engr MS Co
1239th Engr Firefighting Plat
1240th Engr Firefighting Plat
1661st Engr Surv Co Team
1092d Engr Util Det
Naval Unit N-2
2890th Engr Tech Int Team (Research)
1107th Engr Sit Maint Det

Effective 23 April, the 551st Engineer Heavy Pontoon Battalion closed into the Third U.S. Army area from Ninth U.S. Army and was attached to 1134th Engineer Combat Group.

II - CONSTRUCTION

Bridges and Roads

During April the bridging constructed by Third U.S. Army averaged nearly 1,900 feet per day, as is shown in the following table:

Type	Number	Length
Fixed Bailey Bridges	132	13,090
Floating Bailey Bridges	3	5,548
Heavy Pontoon Bridges	3	430
Infantry Support Bridges	4	640
Fixed Treadway Bridges	83	4,620
Floating Treadway Bridges	23	6,624
Timber Trestle Bridges	146	13,706
Total	394	44,670
Daily average	13	1,489

Initially, the greater part of the bridging consisted in completing two fixed bridges across the RHINE and in providing passages over or around the numerous damaged overpasses and underpasses on the FRANKFURT (M-6860)-DARMSTADT (F-2090) Autobahn, since for the first half of the month this road was literally the backbone of the Army.

Most of the obstructions were individually inconsequential. They could either be by-passed or could quickly be spanned with a Bailey bridge. A few small floating bridges were required on the FULDA, WERRA, SAALE and ELSTER Rivers. But aside from a costly fire fight on the WERRA River, the crossings were accomplished rather easily and with dispatch. A contributory factor was that all of the streams were low at that time and nearly all were fordable. In the following photographs are shown representative bridges constructed during this period:









Four Views of Fixed Bridge Taken during Construction on Site of Demolished Highway Bridge at MAINZ (M-3856). This Bridge was Completed in Twenty Days.





Two Aerial Views of the Fixed Bridge across the Rhine River at OPPENHEIM (M-4A39). This bridge was completed in Twelve Days.



Double Treadway Bridges over Saale River South of Jena

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Treadway Bridge over Danube River at Regensburg



Bailey Bridge over Danube River at Regensburg

In addition to the major crossings mentioned above, crossings of the NAAB and ALTMÜHL Rivers were also major operations. Since, however, the crossings were only lightly opposed, the construction of bridges involved no real problem.

The policy of replacing treadway bridges with Bailey bridges and Bailey bridges with permanent bridges was again followed. The Engineers were sorely pressed at times to provide permanent structures to replace the tactical bridges as quickly as needed. The change of direction of the Army, the large requirements for Assault Equipment in crossing the DANUBE River, and the very long distances involved between the main Army supply depots and the forward dumps made supply a difficult problem. Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that bridging rolled some 200 miles from the dump to the construction site, it was always on time.

In addition to the previously described two fixed bridges and tactical bridges constructed across the NAAB River by units under Army control, sixty-one fixed timber bridges were constructed totaling 7,000 feet.

On the Autobahn highway east of BAYREUTH (G-7797) a two-way timber bridge, 120 feet long, was constructed, using Bailey bridge panels as steel truss stringers because of the shortage of steel I-beams for stringers. A special report has been prepared covering this unusual project, as illustrated by the pictures below.



View of Autobahn Bridge East of Bayreuth Showing Bailey Bridge Panel Stringers





View of Autobahn Bridge East of Bayreuth Showing Bailey Bridge Panel Stringers





View of Autobahn Bridge East of Bayreuth Showing Bailey Bridge Panel Stringers

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View of Autobahn Bridges East of Bayreuth Showing Close-Up View of Bailey Bridge Panel Stringers and Timber Bent Pier



View of Overpass under Construction Using V-Trestle Piers near Waldrach



View of Overpass under Construction Using V-Trestle Piers near Waldrach



View of Completed Bridge on N-40 West of Frankfurt



View of Strengthening Bridge in Hof



Bridge under Construction at Hannover



Bridge Being Completed in Hof



View of 330-foot Fixed Bailey Bridge Constructed on Autobahn near Leira



Fixed Timber Bridge Being Constructed under Bailey Bridge near Geinhausen



Completed View of Fixed Timber Bridge Constructed near Geinhausen



View of 392-foot Fixed Timber Bridge under Construction at Bingen on N-9



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View of Road Timber Trestle [illegible] Bridge [illegible]



View of Road Timber Trestle [illegible] Bridge [illegible]



View of Road Timber Trestle under construction Across the Werra River at Wartha



View of Completed Bridge across the Werra River at Wartha



Picture Showing Method of Strengthening Damaged Autobahn Bridge with Crib

With improved weather conditions and the rapidly moving tactical situation, road maintenance became an item of secondary importance during this period. The roads in the FRANKFURT (B-6666)-JENA (J-7066) area were generally in very good condition. The autobahn highway paralleling the army axis consisted of two twenty-eight foot concrete lanes, by-passing all towns and villages. The few major bridges that were destroyed on this highway were by-passed by constructing detours. This arterial highway carried over eighty percent of the army traffic.

[illegible] in the rear areas and the repair of [illegible] were [illegible] with help of [illegible] and [illegible] were furnished from [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]



Heavy Shop Developed by 976th Engineer Maintenance Company

IV - MAPS

The photomapping facilities of the Army Topographic Battalion were engaged in miscellaneous revision and color separation work. Gazeteers compiled on the 1/100,000 scale G5738 4416 series covering Sheets M-3, P-3, Q-3, R-3, P-4, Q-4 and R-4 were completed.

The remaining forty-five sheets of the 1/25,000 scale topographic maps in the color separation project were completed. This separation included the forestry and drainage.

Emergency road maps were prepared from captured German road maps at a scale of 1/300,000. Roads were numbered and marginal information changed to conform with existing policies in utilizing these maps. This project consisted of six sheets.

The Army Survey Center investigated approximately twenty reported survey targets. Assistance was furnished to the Houghteam in exploiting the targets which contained trig and map data. A system of cooperation was worked out between the Army Survey Center, the CSS Survey Target Team and the Houghteam, so that duplication of effort was eliminated.

Some valuable photomapping instruments were discovered and exploited. One officer from this unit spent four days getting this equipment ready for shipment to the United States.

Consumption of maps continued at a high rate. Army reproduction facilities were augmented by the Corps Topographic Companies who used approximately 50% of their facilities. Reproduction was further augmented by the Topographic Battalion assigned to Fifteenth U.S. Army, which unit ran nine 1/50,000 scale maps, for a total of 62,000 copies.

Approximately 300 different sheets of the 1/25,000 scale maps were reproduced for a total of 1,553,000 copies. Nine sheets of the emergency road map were reproduced for a total of 304,000 copies. Seventy-eight sheets of the 1/50,000 scale maps were run for a total of approximately 947,000 copies.

Total maps received during the month were 4,815,275; issued to Army units, 210,995; to corps units, 2,219,525; stock in depot at end of month, 2,838,400 sheets.

On 5 April a new program was outlined for the reproduction of the 1/50,000 Bavarian series for pending operations to the southeast. During the month, map depots were moved as follows:

Third U.S. Army Map Depot from MAINZ (M-3856) to GOTHA (J-1865) on 18 April and from GOTHA (J-1865) to BAMBERG (O-2549) on 22-24 April.

Communications Zone Advance Map Depot from TRIER (L-2129) to MAINZ (M-3856) on 5 April.

Arrangements were made on 19 April with Sixth U.S. Army Group for transferring to Third U.S. Army large stocks of 1/50,000 and 1/100,000 maps covering the eastern half of Bavaria.

V - INTELLIGENCE

A change in the tactical advance of Third U.S. Army necessitated a complete re-issue of Engineer Intelligence data to Corps Engineers and to Army Engineer units.

Information on the terrain and topography in the Army area of advance was furnished by the distribution of studies such as the "Terrain Appreciation of Southeastern Germany," covering an area bounded on the west by a line PASSAU (M-6292)-STRAUBING (N-7113); on the north by a line FREYUNG (M-6232)-AMBERG (N-2201); on the east the Czechoslovakian and Austrian border; and on the south the frontier between Austrian Tirol Mountains and the Bavarian Alps; "Topography of Austria," and a terrain map of Western Czechoslovakia and Austria.

Information on crossing sites and bridges on the FULDA, SAALE, FRANKISCHE REZAT, SCHWABISCHE REZAT, REGNITZ, PEGNITZ, DANUBE, ISAR and INN Rivers was furnished to all interested units. Also information on the rivers in Western Czechoslovakia and rivers and bridges in Austria was supplied to Corps Engineers.

In addition to the above-mentioned studies, a combined road and river study, "Southeastern Germany," was prepared and given a wide distribution throughout the Army.

Such miscellaneous studies as the "Topography of the Redoubt Area," and "Rapid Airfield Construction in Western Czechoslovakia and Austria," were also distributed.

During the month Engineer Intelligence Notes No. 4 and Engineer Intelligence Bulletin No. 7 were produced and issued to corps, divisions and engineer units.

The 283Oth Engineer Technical Intelligence Team continued its normal operational activities of reporting on new types of enemy engineer equipment encountered during the period, and the examination of pertinent enemy installations, including dumps, assembly plants, factories, etc.

Two new items of great interest were picked up by corps teams and forwarded to the team for research and dissemination, one being the new Topfmine "S" and the other a completely new type of delay igniter. This igniter is a five-minute delay igniter which can be set to detonate from one to five minutes after the pin has been removed.

Numerous factories were investigated and reports were subsequently made to the Chief Engineer, European Theater of Operations. This unit also attempted to keep all headquarters informed as to the location of usable engineer supplies. Many large quantities were encountered and reported.

VI - WATER SUPPLY

Potable water was delivered to camps and enclosures containing many thousands of Allied prisoners of war, displaced persons and enemy prisoners of war, in addition to other installations. This additional load on water production and transportation, together with equipment tied up temporarily in other Army areas occasioned by the shifting zones of action, resulted in all available water production and equipment being utilized to the fullest extent. Sufficient mobile production units were not available; therefore, portable units using two filters or two portable units with one unit using two filters were used at a water point to meet the demand and operate within the allowable filter rate of 10 gallons per minute for portable unit filters. Fifty 250 gallon water tanks were located and placed in Allied prisoner of war camps and prisoner of war enclosures for storage. Platforms were constructed and 3,000 gallon canvas tanks placed thereon were also used for storage facilities in these installations.

During the month Army troops operated forty-five water points and ten water distributing points. These water points produced approximately 9,676,000 gallons of water during the month. A total of eight mobile units and twenty-six portable units were used for producing water. Thirty-nine 700 gallon tankers and fourteen 1,500 gallon trailers were used for hauling water to installations.







Three Views of Water Supply to Prisoner of War Enclosures

VII - CAMOUFLAGE

The mission of the Army Camouflage Company was to support the operation through the assistance, technical advice, and execution of camouflage missions in the Third U.S. Army sector. The first, second, and fourth platoons continued in support of the corps to which they were attached. The chief concern was supply, which suffered greatly because of the rapid movement and long supply lines. Camouflage materials were relocated at Engineer Depot No. 99, where two enlisted men continued to handle records and stocks of camouflage supplies. Materials remained in short supply, large quantities being in transit from rear dumps.

Two German camouflage installations were inspected. On 5 April a former partially concealed airport approximately five miles west of FRANKFURT (M-6768) was inspected, and on 12 April a dummy airfield near WALTERHAUSEN (J-0560) was inspected. This installation was a very good example of German camouflage. It was located in a steeplechase grounds

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[illegible] the attack [illegible] the [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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Treadway Bridge across Isar River at Landau



Treadway Bridge over Isar River at Moosburg

Thereafter, with one more big river to cross, the III and XX Corps speedily pushed on to the INN River, a formidable river 400 to 700 feet wide, for which plans for a major assault crossing were made. Fortunately, however, the speed of the advance had demoralized resistance and passages were possible over existing structures in each corps, a bridge being captured by III Corps and two dams by the XX Corps. Again bridges were quickly put in at PASSAU (J-2213), SCHAERDING (Q-2100), and BRAUNAU (Z-9377) and the march to the south continued by XX Corps alone, since III Corps had reached its final river to cross.



Heavy Pontoon Bridge over Inn River at Passau

XX Corps pressed rapidly toward LINZ (V-8787), Austria, capturing most of the bridges over the TRAUN River intact on the way. At LINZ (V-8787) the existing highway bridge over the DANUBE shown in the photograph below was captured, though credit for this went to XII Corps which, abreast of XX Corps, had raced down the east bank of the DANUBE River to arrive at LINZ (V-8787) just before XX Corps. Also, while on the way, the heavy ponton bridge shown in the photograph below was put in over the DANUBE River at PASSAU (Q-2213) by XII Corps.



Highway Bridge over the Danube River at Linz



Heavy Ponton Bridge across the Danube River at Passau

From LINZ (V-8787) onward both corps pressed southeastward with but little hindrance from destroyed bridging until on 8 May, with XX Corps already partially across the INN River, the word of final victory halted tactical bridging operations of Third U.S. Army in the Battle of Germany.

The major fixed bridge construction included bridges across the DANUBE, ISAR, and INN Rivers. Fixed timber bridges were under construction across the DANUBE River on the Autobahn highway at INZELL-DORF (T-7125), on N-16 at WINDORF (T-8526), on N-8 and 15 at REGENSBURG, on N-11 at DEGGENDORF (U-8239), and on N-12 at PASSAU (J-2213). The existing highway bridge across the DANUBE River at LINZ (V-8787) was captured intact. Construction was also begun on fixed timber bridges across the ISAR River at PLATTLING (U-7733) on N-8, at LANDSHUT (U-2505) on N-11, at MOOSBURG (Z-1194), and across the INN River at SCHAERDING (Q-2100).



Bridge over Danube River in Linz Captured Intact



Bridge across the Inn River at Scharding. Bailey bridge across demolished spans.



Bridge across Danube River at Deggendorf under construction



Bridge across the Danube River at Passau under construction

During this period a 200-foot fixed timber bridge was completed on the Autobahn highway south of NURNBERG (U-4300). Piers on this two-way bridge averaged fifty feet in height.

Road maintenance, which included asphalt patching, leveling and surfacing craters, and drainage improvement, was inaugurated to preserve the existing surfaced arterial highways. Prior to this time the movement of the Army was so rapid that very little attention could be devoted to this work, since the major task was constructing fixed timber bridges to improve traffic circulation and relieve tactical bridging for operations ahead.

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Labor Construction

With the ever-increasing tonnage of prisoners of war surrendering, and the inability of overtaxed rations zone to remove them from the Army area as readily as before, release of the long distances to be covered and the large numbers of prisoners to be transported, the problem of housing and feeding the prisoners of war became a "must" mission of high priority.

Accordingly, Army engineer and Type engineer troops were called upon to construct enclosures to hold about 400,000 prisoners. Through the prisoners themselves were used to a maximum on the work, the operation of getting materials from local sources and providing water, sanitation and shelter for sanitary facilities required a considerable amount of engineer work and troops.

By this time it became known that Army and Corps would eventually have more engineer troops than they could employ to advantage. Accordingly, many of the engineer troops were released to the Communications Zone to facilitate the setting up of permanent bases established by the Engineer Section so that by 8 May Phase III of World War II, involving the occupation of Germany and the evacuation of displaced persons and liberated prisoners of war, was underway from the standpoint of the engineers.

III - SUPPLY

Supplying forward bridge troops with tactical bridging and assault equipage, and following up depot stocks of Class II, IV and Bridging at Depot No. 14 were the major functions of the Supply Subsection during this period.

Ten new trucks and trailers were received from Advance Section Communications Zone in order to alleviate the critical shortage of this item. Total Table of Equipment strength of Bailey bridge construction trucks remained at approximately forty vehicles.

Depot stocks of Bailey bridge, treadway bridge, and assault equipment, although low, were adequate to support the advance. There were no demands on the Army depot for tactical timber.

Listed below is pertinent information on Army depots in operation during 1 May through 8 May

Depot No.	Location	Type Supplies	Average Tonnage
14	Perth, Germany	II, IV and Bridging	[illegible]
43	Amberg, Germany	IV and Bridging	700
44	Straubing, Germany	IV and Bridging	700
45	Dreeding, Germany	IV and Bridging	200
46	Straubing, Germany	IV and Bridging	200
47	Moosburg, Germany	IV and Bridging	200

Depots were set up on New Engineer Maps, 1:50,000 scale, and an inventory taken on equipment supplied. Units under army were guarding and inventorying depots throughout the area.

The engineer railhead was moved from Augsburg (U-4754) to Freising (U-4844), where railheads could be situated directly on the Army depot. Initial requests were submitted for increased materials as soon as requirements for higher priority materials were known. Movement of supplies into forward depots was handled by the Assistant Engineer Section Group and attached units.

Engineer maintenance facilities were greatly increased by the addition of the 14th Engineer Maintenance Company. This unit operated close to the Army depot and performed third and fourth echelon work, in addition to servicing returned enemy equipment, such as generators. Spare parts supply remained adequate.

IV - MAPS

The Army Survey Center completed seven reported survey targets. A few of these targets yielded unfavorable results and survey data which were all turned over to the troopteam. Two targets contained photogrammetric and survey instruments which were passed to the rear through map distribution channels and turned over to the troopteam.

Control was furnished for three different radar stations. As there were no existing trig lists for these areas based on the Bessel grid, it was necessary to use captured German data and convert the rectangular coordinates from German Soldner-Krueger to World Polyconic coordinates.

A revision program consisting of twenty-six sheets of the Bavarian 1/50,000 series maps was assigned to Third U.S. Army by Twelfth Army Group. Photographs were received and work was begun on this project.

A project was initiated to produce 1/50,000 scale maps of Bavaria with the political boundaries overprinted thereon. This entailed transposition of the boundaries from existing smaller scale maps onto the 1/50,000 scale maps. The facilities available limited the speed of this project and therefore no completion date was set.

Arrangements were made for town plan compilation of occupational areas. G-2 listed the towns for which town plans were desired. G-5 and all corps were requested to aid in securing reproducible copies of these towns to be used as a basis for reproduction. The reproduction and consumption of operational maps abated somewhat. Pertinent statistics on maps received and issued during the period are listed below:

Total maps received during the period:

Scale	Tons	Sheets
1/25,000	0.0	- 0 -
1/100,000	11.7	233,950
1/50,000	26.3	525,500
1/200,000	6.0	120,750
Miscellaneous	1.7	34,440
Total	45.7	914,640

Scale	Tons	Sheets
Issued to Army Units:		
1/25,000	0.0	- 0 -
1/50,000	2.9	59,062
1/100,000	1.8	36,340
1/200,000	1.2	24,051
Miscellaneous	0.7	14,474
Total	6.6	132,307
Issued to Corps Units:		
1/25,000	0.0	- 0 -
1/50,000	9.6	193,000
1/100,000	9.7	194,050
1/200,000	2.9	57,100
Miscellaneous	1.5	29,729
Total	23.7	473,879

Stock in depot - 9 May

1/25,000	22.1	530,400
1/50,000	40.4	808,000
1/100,000	22.2	844,000
1/200,000	11.1	222,000
Miscellaneous	19.2	384,000
Total	134.3	2,788,400

Three charts showing the reproduction and consumption of maps by Third U.S. Army since becoming operational on 1 August are shown in Annex No. 10. It is interesting to note the cycles of map consumption in relation to the tactical situation.

V - INTELLIGENCE

Studies on the Topography of Bavaria and Austria, Roads of Austria and Bridges of Austria were distributed to interested units.

Engineer Intelligence Bulletin No. 8 was produced and issued to Corps, Divisions and all Engineer units.

The 2990th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team continued to examine enemy engineer depots and factories for the recovery of material necessary for technical research. An enemy Goliath Demolition tank was examined and a report rendered to higher headquarters.

VI - WATER SUPPLY

Because of the enormous numbers of displaced persons and prisoners of war in the Army area, it became necessary to supplement the water haulage facilities of the two water supply companies with improvised equipment. For this purpose, 21-ton trucks were mounted with captured German tanks and fitted with pumps. All available water production equipment was utilized to its fullest extent during this period. Flatforms with 3,000-gallon canvas storage tanks were placed in prisoner of war enclosures.



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CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

I. TROOP LIST.

For the type of operations encountered in this theater, the following list of Engineer troops is considered ideal for Field Army:

A. Troops attached to each Corps:

(1) Two Engineer Combat Groups, each consisting of:

Engineer Group Headquarters
Three Engineer Combat Battalions
One Engineer Light Equipment Company
One Engineer Dump Truck Company

(2) One Engineer Maintenance Company.

(3) One Engineer Topographic Company.

(4) Two Engineer Light Ponton Companies, loaded with fixed Bailey bridge.

(5) One Engineer Treadway Bridge Company per each armored Division of Corps, plus one additional Engineer Treadway Bridge Company per Corps, to provide bridging for Infantry divisions.

B. Troops assigned to Army:

(1) One Engineer Combat Group directly in support of each front line Corps, each Engineer Group consisting of:

Engineer Group Headquarters
Three Engineer Combat Battalions
One Engineer Light Equipment Company
One Engineer Dump Truck Company

(2) One Engineer General Service Regiment directly in support of each Army Engineer Combat Group in support of front line Corps. To each regiment should be attached one Engineer Light Equipment Company and one Engineer Dump Truck Company.

(3) Two Engineer Maintenance Companies.

(4) One Engineer Topographic Battalion.

(5) One Engineer Depot Company.

(6) Two Engineer Water Supply Companies.

(7) Four Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalions.

(8) One Company of Engineer Camouflage Battalion.

(9) Four Engineer Fire Fighting Platoons.

(10) One Engineer Utilities Detachment.

(11) One Engineer Survey Liaison Team.

(12) An urgent need was found for an Engineer Service Group which can handle and coordinate Army supplies and their transportation.

(13) One Engineer Forestry Company.

(14) One Gas Generating Unit.

II. ENGINEER OPERATIONS.

A. Simplicity of Orders.

(1) Attachment, detachment and movement orders issued by Army to Army Engineer troops were made simple and concise, usually by telephone or through liaison officer and confirmed by simple field message. Attachment and detachment orders were subsequently confirmed through command channels.

(2) Instructions for engineer work were best given by overlay, assigning areas of responsibility and containing instructions in five-paragraph field order form. Specific tasks were given by written job orders with priority of work indicated.

B. Sequence of Bridging.

(1) Bridging operations be t adapted to support a rapidly advancing army are in the following sequence:

1. Construction of floating treadway or heavy ponton bridges immediately following the initial assault crossing.

2. Construction of fixed Bailey bridge to replace floating bridge which in turn can be moved forward to support future operations.

3. Replace Bailey bridge with a two-way Class 40, one-way Class 70 fixed timber bridge. Bailey bridge is then removed and hauled forward to corps bridge dump.

C. Major River Crossings.

(1) In assaulting major river crossings, such as the MOSELLE or RHINE, corps should be assigned the task and necessary troops attached to accomplish the mission. Prior to the crossing, selected troops should be given special training in the erection of anti-barge booms and anti-personnel nets and booms.

(2) When practical, especially during a rainy season, gaging stations should be established upstream of crossing sites to warn of impending rises. Reports on possible flooding should be available before the assault crossing is made, as well as for subsequent usage.

(3) Supply of assault and bridging material is the most critical factor in all crossing operations. Because of the bulk of this type equipment, the moving of it is a time-consuming task, and it is imperative that, once a river crossing becomes imminent, every effort be immediately started to move the required equipment to the vicinity of the proposed crossing. Supplies should be based on providing a 100% reserve in assault boats and other items of assault equipment. Reserves of bridging can be smaller, but on strongly resisted crossings, losses up to 50% can be expected. The number of crossings made per stream is variable, but for planning, materiel to support a division crossing every ten miles of stream length should be provided.

(4) In executing assault crossings, secret crossings, i.e., those made without artillery preparation, were, in general, more successful than those made with preparations.

(5) Paddled assault boats, even in swift rivers, are the most suitable craft for crossing the assault troops. The noise of the motors in powered craft attracts the attention of the enemy and heavy shells draws fire. Powered craft have been used successfully for feints, and can be used once small arms fire has been cleared from the crossing site; they are extremely valuable for evacuating wounded and for supply.

(6) Naval craft LCVP's and LCM's are invaluable as a crossing means on major rivers 600 or more feet wide. The volume of troops and supplies that can be transported by them is far greater than that which can be supplied by any other practical means until a bridge is built. However, unless very close coordination is established between them and the traffic control authorities in charge of the crossing, much valuable transport time will be wasted waiting for loads.

(7) Smoke is an invaluable adjunct in river crossings, but must be employed to screen a large area surrounding the exact crossing site to be most effective.

(8) Before bridge construction is started, houses and other possible observation posts within sight of the crossing site must be definitely cleared of enemy observers.

(9) "Shellrep" teams are valuable at bridging sites so that counter-battery artillery fire may be quickly employed.

D. Bridging.

(1) Treadway bridges are the preferred tactical bridges because of their speed of erection, slight maintenance requirements, load capacity and ability to withstand swift currents. However, aggressive, intelligent traffic control is necessary to assure the complete utilization of the capacity of this type of floating bridge.

(2) The Heavy Ponton bridge has a slightly higher traffic capacity than the treadway bridge, but because of the transportation required, the lower load capacity and its inability to take heavy loads in swift currents, it is definitely not the equal of the treadway bridge.

(3) The floating Bailey bridge has a higher traffic and load capacity than the treadway bridge, but because of the transportation required and the time required for construction, it is not regarded as being as suitable a tactical bridge as the treadway, but is regarded as being a very desirable replacement bridge for the treadway.

III. SUPPLY.

Supply activities required the augmentation of the Engineer supply installations with an Engineer Combat Group to coordinate depot haulage. It was also necessary to utilize the hauling facilities of two or three Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalions and several Dump Truck and Light Ponton Companies. To obviate utilizing combat engineer units on service functions, an Engineer service organization is urgently needed. Such an organization should consist of an Engineer Service Group Headquarters with attached transportation units equipped to haul Engineer depot stocks, and Engineer Service Companies for the operation of railheads, dumps, etc.

The present Depot Company T/O & E should be revised to include one more depot platoon and at least ten crane operating teams.

IV. MAPS.

Experience gained in operations on the Continent has proved that map supply and distribution can be adequately and efficiently accomplished within Army for either a fluid or static situation through the medium of an Army Map Depot, one Corps Map Depot for each Corps, and one Division Map Depot for each Division. To properly operate the Army Map Depot, it is recommended that the Map Storage and Distribution Section of the Headquarters and Service Company for an Engineer Topographic Battalion (Army) be increased. It is likewise recommended that a Map Storage and Distribution Section be added to the Engineer Topographic Company (Corps). Adequate personnel are available in the Engineer Combat Battalion of the Division to operate the Division Map Depot. By having the Army and Corps Map Depot personnel as part of the respective Army or Corps Topographic unit, overhead personnel for administration and messing can be absorbed by the parent unit. Furthermore, the parent unit provides a reserve of personnel and transportation during peak activities so characteristic of mapping during the more rapid advances of mobile warfare. Normally, all technical branches of the topographic units, survey, photomapping and reproduction, are not operating full capacity at all times.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX NO. 1

TOP SECRET
AFHQ: G5, TUSA
DNT: DMT
DATE: 5 Jun 44

TOP SECRET

STRATEGIC TERRAIN ANALYSIS

1. PURPOSE AND OTHER LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS:

This report is an extension of the Strategic Terrain Analysis - N.W. France previously prepared and included as Section I in Target Area Analysis No. 1, Headquarters Third U.S. Army, dated 23 April 1944. The additional area of France included in this study (see sketch No. 1) is bounded on the north by the LOIRE River from NANTES, 0456, to ORLEANS, 6047, and then by a line from ORLEANS, 6047, to PARIS, 4851. The southern boundary of the area is a line from LA ROCHELLE, 3194, to VICHY 6401, thence to CHALON SUR SAONE, 4504. The upper SEINE River south of PARIS, 4851, provides the eastern boundary for the area. (Principal sources of information: STRATEGIC ENGINEERING STUDY NO. 87 - FRANCE TERRAIN INTELLIGENCE by U.S. Geological Survey and STRATEGIC ENGINEERING STUDY NO. 71 - INLAND WATERWAYS OF FRANCE by Office, Corps of Engineers.)

2. GENERAL TOPOGRAPHY OF THE AREA:

a. Drainage System. (See Sketch No. 1)

Practically the entire area is drained by the LOIRE River and its southern tributaries. The only exception being the area just southeast of PARIS, which is drained by the SEINE River and its tributaries, and the narrow coastal strip on the west which is drained into the Atlantic Ocean by several small and relatively short rivers.

The major rivers in the area are the LOIRE and the SEINE; however, a number of the tributaries of both these rivers are considered important streams with a mean discharge of over 500 cubic feet per second (probably not fordable except in very dry seasons). Among these are the VIENNE, CHER and INDRE rivers, tributaries of the LOIRE River, and the YONNE and MARNE river, tributaries of the SEINE. All of the tributaries generally flow in north or northwest direction and several are canalized or bordered by canals. (See sketch No. 2.) The LOIRE is considered navigable for flat bottom 50 to 80 ton capacity, barges from NANTES, 0456, through ORLEANS, 6047, to BRIARE, 8041, and is then bordered by a navigable canal from BRIARE, 8041, to MARNY, 6048. The VIENNE River is navigable from its confluence with the LOIRE River to CHATELLERAULT, 0343, a distance of 14 miles. The LOIR River, a portion of which has been canalized, is navigable from VIENCUN Village, 7441, to its confluence with the LOIRE, a distance of 5 miles. The ALLIER River is navigable from PONTANEVAUX, 4041, to the LOIRE River, a distance of 17 miles. However, the navigation on this stream is relatively unimportant as the average depth is only 1.5 feet.

The SEINE River is navigable from its outlet at LA HAVRE to MERY SUR SEINE, 1647, a distance of 191 miles. The YONNE River, a tributary to the SEINE River, is navigable from MONTEREAU, 1918, on the SEINE River to AUXERRE, 4314. The YONNE River also forms a connection for the NIVERNAIS and BOURGOGNE canals with the SEINE River. The principal canal connecting the SEINE and LOIRE Rivers extends in a north-south direction from ST. MAMMES, 7648, on the SEINE River to BRIARE, 8041, on the LOIRE River, a distance of 65 miles. The CENTER Canal, extending from DIGOIN, 0766, to CHALON SUR SAONE, 4502, connects the lateral canal of the LOIRE with the navigable SAONE River which flows southward into the Mediterranean Sea. This canal crosses the divide between the SAONE and LOIRE Rivers and is 74 miles in length. The only other canal of importance in this area is the BURGUNDY canal which extends from LANDRECIES, 1241, on the YONNE River southeasterly through DIJON, 6461, to ST. JEAN DE LOSNE, 5408, on the SAONE River. This canal provides a navigable waterway through the middle of France from the English Channel to the Mediterranean Sea.

Most of the streams in the area flow in level, narrow bottom lands bordered by steep bluffs 4 to 20 feet high. The area south of ORLEANS, 6047, and the area west of CHATEAUROUX, 4041, are dotted with lakes and swamps which are partly drained by ditches.

b. Ridge System (See Sketch No. 3)

Within the area under consideration there is no distinct or predominant ridge line pattern. The terrain is generally comprised of broad plains and plateaus, interrupted in places by valleys and rough hilly areas. The low dissected plains of the LOIRE basin rise gradually in the south to merge with the central plateau. This plateau is bisected by the upper courses of the LOIRE tributaries to form rough flat-topped spurs and ridges trending toward the north and northwest. The streams have cut more deeply into the plains particularly POITIERS, 0734, forming steep sided valleys 50 to 100 feet in height. The relatively high plateau country merges into rough and hilly country in the vicinity of MONTBARD, 2447. Broken and hilly terrain also exists east of NEVERS, 6344, in the extreme southeast portion of this area.

c. General Nature of the Terrain

There is no rugged mountainous country within the area under consideration. The altitude increases from about 50 feet in the valley bottoms below TOURS, 7443, to about 800 feet in the extreme southeastern part. The terrain generally consists of low rolling hills similar to that in the LOIRE River Valley, southward approximately 50 miles where they merge into a high plateau area. In the transition zone, due to this general topographic pattern are the low swampy areas, south of ORLEANS, 6047, west of CHATEAUROUX, 4041, and along the river valleys south of POITIERS, 0734. The coastal strip on the west contains several long beaches but most of these are backed by a low swampy area and are generally forested. All the beaches are exposed to prevailing westerly winds, Atlantic swells and a tidal range of 12 feet. Principal ports are ST. NAZAIRE, 1734, at MANTES, 4756, both of which are situated on the estuary of the LOIRE River. In the LOIRE basin, which comprises the central portion of the area, the soil is fertile and is cultivated extensively in most parts. The swampy area south of ORLEANS, 6047, is most fully covered by forests and is used principally for agriculture lands. The dry chalk area southeast of TOURS, 7443, is practically barren except for scattered forests which are used principally as pasture lands. Principal cities are MANTES, 4756, with a population of 17,000; ORLEANS, 6047, with a population of 72,000; TOURS, 7443, with a population of 80,000; and POITIERS, 0734, with a population of 30,000. Tours, the largest city in France and the center of silk industry. All the above named cities are located either on the LOIRE or SEINE Rivers, the extreme north boundary of the area under consideration. There are several other relatively important cities in the southern portion of the area ranging in population from [illegible], Blois, POITIERS, [illegible], CHATEAUROUX, [illegible], TOURS, MONTARGIS, [illegible], Pithiviers, and MONTBARD, [illegible]. Each of these cities is a focal point for several of the principal highways.

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE TERRAIN:

There is a closely knit, intricate network of roads covering the entire area as shown in Sketch No. 4, attached. An efficient, wide hard surfaced highway connect principal towns, while numerous hard-surfaced secondary roads offer possible alternate routes. Towns are rarely by-passed and are serious obstacles to through traffic because of narrow, irregular streets and closely spaced buildings of stone and masonry. Road blocks are not very effective as there is generally adequate space for detours and many alternate routes. Tributary rivers and canals are easily bridged by portable and other types of temporary bridges. Tributary streams can be forded in many places during dry seasons, these are also easily bridged. LOIRE River is unfordable during high water, but can be forded in a number of places during dry seasons. Cross country movement of tracked equipment is generally unrestricted except south of ORLEANS, 6047, where many ground and extensive forest cover the movement is made in a few open areas. In the high plateau area along the southern boundary large forests afford ample concealment for armored vehicles. In addition to the excellent communication facilities afforded by the intricate network of hard roads as indicated on sketch No. 4, attached, there is also an extensive network of railroads throughout the area. Considerable partition to these lines is anticipated, however, prelimination of several of these lines may be anticipated due to permit their use in support of operations undertaken in this area.

4. CRITICAL TERRAIN FEATURES:

Principal terrain features are the marshy areas, the LOIRE River and its northern system of tributaries. Some of these tributaries flow through narrow but relatively high, bluffs from 10 to 40 feet high. The ridge and field cultivation pattern of the agricultural region, the scattered forests throughout the area and the numerous small towns with narrow streets are additional critical terrain features.

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Copies Nos. 1, 2, 3, and [illegible] to AC of S, G-2, TUSA.
Copy No. 4 to Engr, TUSA.

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

SKETCH NO 1 DRAINAGE SYSTEM
To Accompany
STRATEGIC TERRAIN ANALYSIS - FRANCE
AREA SOUTH OF LOIRE RIVER



SKETCH NO 2 - NAVIGABLE WATERWAYS
To Accompany
STRATEGIC TERRAIN ANALYSIS - FRANCE
AREA SOUTH OF LOIRE RIVER

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SKETCH No 3 - TERRAIN DIAGRAM
To Accompany
STRATEGIC TERRAIN ANALYSIS - FRANCE
AREA SOUTH OF LOIRE RIVER



SKETCH No 4 ROAD NETWORK
To Accompany
STRATEGIC TERRAIN ANALYSIS-FRANCE
AREA SOUTH OF LOIRE RIVER
Legend
Principal Highways
Road Secondary Roads

RESTRICTED

ANNEX NO. 2

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

24 June 1944

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM:

NUMBER 22:

ASSIGNMENT AND DETACHMENT OF SURVEY CONTROL BY ARMORED ELEMENT OF ARTILLERY AND ENGINEERS

1. REFERENCE

SHAEF Operations Memorandum Number 28, "Artillery and Engineer Survey", dated 25 April 1944.

2. AGENCIES INVOLVED

a. Topographic Section (Engineer Section, Hq. Third Army).

b. Army Survey Center (Survey Platoon, Engineer Topographic Battalion).

c. Survey Information Center (Field Artillery Observation Battalion and Corps Survey Platoon, when attached).

3. RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Topographic Section
(1) Will assemble, evaluate and distribute the trig lists for the Army operational areas.
(2) Will direct and supervise the activities of the Army Survey Center.
(3) Will file copies of all new, revised and captured trig lists and lists of coordinates as obtained or produced by army units within this plan.

b. Army Survey Center
(1) Will be responsible for the recovery and extension of points comprising the major net.
(2) Will furnish Corps with points with which to start lower order nets.
(3) Will establish azimuth and furnish to Corps the angles of declination between true azimuth and grid azimuth as required.
(4) Will act as a reserve to help Corps SIC when necessary
(5) Will tie in Corps nets where differences exist.
(6) Will supply control to Artillery units retained under Army control. This may or may not be accomplished together with a FA observation battalion.

c. Survey Information Center
(1) Will extend lower order survey, from the major net furnished by Army Survey Center, to Corps, Division and Battalion areas.
(2) The SIC will be in charge of the CO of the Field Artillery Observation Battalion. The Engineer Survey Platoon (Corps) will be attached to the SIC only as needed. It will be the responsibility of the Corps Engineer to see that its functions are performed in accordance with the general scheme of this plan. It will be the responsibility of the CO, Field Artillery Observation Battalion, that the talent of the Survey Platoon be utilized in the mission set forth in paragraph 3c(1), above, and not used as a check on work done by Artillery personnel.

4. TECHNIQUE

a. The methods used by the Army Survey Center will conform to standard practice for 1:500C accuracy or better.
(1) Azimuths should be based on star observations which will be made during daylight whenever possible.
(2) Computations by machine or logs will be made in the field with final check at headquarters.

b. Corps Survey Information Center
(1) Triangulation will be carried out by these units whenever possible and will be same order as major net.
(2) Transit traverse will probably be used in most circumstances.
The order of traverse should be to an accuracy of 1:5000. This can be accomplished by double reading of the angles, single chaining with stadia checks, and star observations for azimuth.
(3) With proper training, survey of this order can be obtained with a minimum of personnel.
(4) Points where accuracy is below 1:5000 should not be furnished to units of Division or higher. However, this will not be construed to mean that points of slightly less accuracy will be withheld from units when there is combat need for them.
(5) For work from Division to Battalions, control should be held to an accuracy of 1:3000 or better, and usually will consist of lines of transit traverse with either star or sun azimuths.
Computations should be sufficiently accurate to maintain instrument accuracy.
(6) In the event that time permits the establishing of lines from Battalions to gun positions, these can be run with a transit, with distances by stadia, or by graphic plane table methods.
The accuracy to be held to 1:750 or higher and computation made by logs or slide rule.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-3.

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"A" & "B"

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11

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ANNEX NO. 3

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

5 June 1944.

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM:

NUMBER 11:

DISTRIBUTION OF OPERATIONAL MAPS

1. MAP TABLES. "Initial Issue Tables for Operational Maps," inclosed herewith, lists the selection and quantities of operational maps and auxiliary material for initial issue in forthcoming operations. The quantities are based, in general, on map allowance tables in letter, Headquarters Third U.S. Army, 19 May 1944, file AG 061-CHMCR, subject: "Map Supply Policy". The inclosed table will be the basis for all future map requisitions required in operations to D plus 90, inclusive. Auxiliary mapping material listed in columns 14-17, inclusive, will be issued by the Army Engineer as soon as available direct to Corps Headquarters, Divisions, and Army and Corps separate units. All other maps and mapping material will be issued in accordance with instructions below.

2. DISTRIBUTION IN UK FOR BUILD-UP TROOPS. TUSA troops not landing in assault will be issued at a place and time after D-Day specified by the Army Commander all maps shown in columns 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 13 of inclosed tables, in addition to those maps listed in column 7 for Corps headquarters and divisions. These maps will be issued in the following manner:

a. Under supervision of the Army Engineer, personnel of the map storage and distribution platoon of the Army Topographic Battalion will draw bulk maps from an ETOUSA map depot for Army Headquarters and Army separate units, break down bulk stock to unit loads, and distribute "over the counter" to all Army separate units. To accomplish this, the Army Engineer will -

(1) Submit to ETOUSA requisitions covering above bulk order forwarding copy to the Army Topographic Battalion.

(2) Furnish the Army Topographic Battalion the necessary information for breaking down bulk stocks to unit loads.

(3) Notify all Army separate unit commanders when and where to draw their bulk maps.

b. Under supervision of the Corps Engineer, Corps map depot personnel will draw bulk maps from an ETOUSA map depot for Corps Headquarters and Corps separate units (to include Army separate units attached to XI and XII Corps for movement to continent), break down bulk stocks to unit loads and distribute "over the counter" to all Corps separate units. To accomplish this, the Army Engineer will -

(1) Submit to ETOUSA requisitions covering above bulk order forwarding copy to the Corps Engineer.

(2) Notify the Corps Engineer when and where to draw his bulk maps.

c. Under supervision of the Division Engineer, the Division map depot personnel will draw bulk maps from an ETOUSA map depot for Division Headquarters and Divisional units, break down bulk stocks to unit loads, and distribute "over the counter" to all divisional units. To accomplish this, the Army Engineer will -

(1) Submit to ETOUSA requisitions covering above bulk order forwarding copy through the Corps Engineer to the Division Engineer.

(2) Notify the Corps Engineer when and where the Division Engineer is to draw his bulk maps.

3. DISTRIBUTION IN UK FOR ASSAULT TROOPS. TUSA troops landing in assault will be issued at a place and time after D-Day as specified in the order moving the unit to the concentration area all maps shown in inclosed table necessary for the assault. This will normally include those maps listed in columns 2-10, inclusive, 12, 13, and any special maps that may be available.

a. Requisitions.

(1) The Engineer of the Corps assigned an assault mission will immediately furnish the Army Engineer a list tabulating all Divisions and Corps separate units in the assault and the sheet number of maps, scale 1/100,000 and larger, required by each tabulated unit for the assault.

b. Distribution. All maps and auxiliary mapping material will be drawn from ETOUSA map depots as follows:

(1) Officer representative of Army Engineer draws for Army Headquarters.

(2) Officer representative of Corps Engineer draws for Corps Headquarters.

(3) Officer representative of Division Engineer draws for the Division.

(4) Unit S-2 draws for Army or Corps separate units.

4. SECURITY. An officer drawing operational maps in the UK, either for build-up or assault troops, will be required to identify himself to the officer in charge of the ETOUSA map depot by showing his AG identification card and a copy of the unit's requisition. Lacking details from higher headquarters, the unit loads for Army and Corps separate units and Divisional units will be classified Top Secret-Bigot and handled as such. Security responsibility is charged to commanders responsible for the unit breakdowns. No unit bundle will be broken for organizational use until the unit is in an area under rigid security control through which these maps and the information they contain cannot leak. The Marshalling Area or a ship from which NO debarkation will take place except in a similarly controlled area are cited as examples. In addition to the security precaution outlined above, the map rolls will not be opened and rearranged until briefing is about to take place.

5. DISTRIBUTION OF MAPS IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE.

a. Army separate units will requisition direct to the Army map depot for "over the counter" delivery.

b. Corps separate units will requisition direct to the Corps map depot for "over the counter" delivery.

c. Division Engineer will submit consolidated requisitions to the Corps Engineer. These maps will be delivered in bulk by the Corps depot personnel to the Division depot.

d. Units mapped in the UK as build-up troops upon arrival on the continent will receive their initial issue of topographic maps, scale 1/100,000 and 1/50,000, without requisition, by "over the counter" delivery from their respective Army or Corps map depot. Army Engineer and Corps Engineer will inform their respective depots in advance sheet numbers of these maps required by newly arrived divisions and separate units for "over the counter" delivery.

e. Special issue maps, columns 9, 10, 11, and 12, will be issued to build-up troops upon arrival on the continent in accordance with procedure outlined in paragraphs 5a, b, and c.

f. Corps depot will be made operational on the continent upon arrival of the first organic Corps unit unless arriving in assault. Pending establishment of Army map depot, the Communications Zone advance map depot for Third U.S. Army will be functioning as an Army map depot.

6. LATE ARRIVAL ARMY UNITS. Army units arriving in the UK after Headquarters Third U.S. Army closes in the UK and opens in the continent, will be mapped in the UK in accordance with this Operations Memorandum by the Corps to which the unit is attached for movement to the continent.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

H. C. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-3.

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1 Incl
Initial Issue Table [illegible] (Not reproduced here. See revised tables inclosure to Third Army Circular No. 70 19 October 1944.)
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ANNEX NO. 4

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

17 April 1944

TRAINING MEMORANDUM:

NUMBER 2:

TRAINING OF ENGINEER UNITS

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this directive is to furnish a guide to Engineer units so that the maximum utilization of the remaining time will be made for training.

2. OBJECTIVE: The objective of the training in the UK is to bring the units up to the standards which will enable them to perform their primary missions in an efficient manner.

3. SCOPE: a. Engineer units have completed basic, unit, and in most cases combined training in the United States. Further training should perfect the unit performances of the company, battalion and group in the various engineer operations.

b. All engineer units will attain the proficiency requirements as indicated in Training Bulletin No. 12, Hq ETO OCE, 15 February 1944.

c. Priority of proficiency requirements of divisional or corps engineers will be prescribed by the appropriate commander.

d. Army combat battalions will attain highest proficiency in subjects in the following priority:

(1) Roads: Training in construction and maintenance of roads normal to missions of army engineer units will include: repair and maintenance of all types of existing hard surfaced roads, the construction of beach exit roads, by-passes, and the widening of roads. Training will stress maximum use of mechanical equipment and utilization of captured equipment and materials. Basis of training standards will be Chapter 1, FM 5-10.

(2) Military Bridges: Training will consist of actual construction of the various types of bridges in the following priority: (a) Fixed Bailey (b) Floating Bailey (c) Treadway (d) 25-ton Pontoon (e) Fixed Timber (f) M-3 Pneumatic Pontoon. All officers will be trained to estimate bridge capacities using the British Classification System. See ETOUSA Operations Memorandum No. 7, dated 5 March 1943, as amended by C1, 14 May 1943 and C2, 27 May 1943.

(3) Mine Warfare: Training will be in compliance with TM No. 9, Hq ETOUSA, 28 March 1944.

e. Army engineer units other than combat Battalions will become proficient [illegible]

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be scheduled so that the unit working parties will be attached whenever practicable to their units for operations applicable to their specialty. All units will be trained in the location and neutralization of enemy mines.

f. Engineer Reconnaissance: All officers and senior NCO's will be trained to conduct general engineer reconnaissance. Emphasis will be placed on road, bridge and material reconnaissance. (Reference Chapter 7, FM 5-6.

g. Training programs will be prepared so as to incorporate appropriate subjects to meet the standards of the following publications:

ETO-USA TRAINING MEMORANDA

TM - 1	23 February 1943	Lessons from North Africa
TM -18	29 June 1943	Training for Staff and Communications Personnel
TM -25	7 August 1943	Conduct of Field Exercises
TM -38	6 November 1943	Training
TM -40	11 November 1943	Defense Against Chemicals in Combat
TM -41	27 November 1943	Beach Reconnaissance
TM -44	27 November 1943	Aircraft Identification Training
TM - 7	28 March 1944	Mines, Minefields, Booby Traps and Demolitions

h. Training will be conducted where possible in the form of field exercises under tactical conditions. Map reading, concealment and camouflage training will be incorporated into all training as well as being treated as separate subjects. Camouflage discipline will be constantly stressed. Inclement weather will not alter training programs. A minimum of 10 percent of training time will be scheduled at night. At least two replacements will be trained as operators of technical equipment.

4. GROUP RESPONSIBILITY: a. The Group Commander is responsible for the training of all units of his group and will coordinate training activities as follows:

(1) Closely supervise all training within the group.

(2) Schedule combined training exercises between subordinate units.

(3) Coordinate the use of all special training aids and training sites available to the group.

(4) Approve monthly training programs for compliance with this memorandum and directives of higher headquarters.

(5) Allocate school quotas which will become available to the group.

(6) Conduct training inspections and tests.

b. The Group Commander will establish necessary facilities and/or schools for the training of all communication personnel of the group and subordinate units.

5. SCHOOLS: a. Schools will be used to the fullest extent to train instructors within units and to provide qualified personnel for key positions. Officers and men who have graduated as instructors will be used to conduct training within their own units so that the greatest advantage will be obtained from the instruction that has been given to them. Special effort will be made to provide alternate personnel capable of filling key positions.

b. Corps, divisions and separate army units down to include battalions will provide their own unit schools as far as possible when a need for such instruction exists. If there are no competent instructors available within units, this headquarters will be notified so that the necessary instructors may be trained at existing schools. If the need for a school is acute and no instructors are available within the unit concerned, this headquarters will endeavor to assign instructors necessary to conduct the school.

6. TRAINING TESTS AND INSPECTIONS: a. At the conclusion of various phases of training, tests will be conducted by the unit commander for the purpose of determining proficiency.

(1) Practical Work: A report will be rendered through engineer channels showing performance of the unit in the training as to type, quantity, rate, and quality.

(2) Written and oral tests will be given to determine individual qualifications.

b. Unit commanders will conduct training inspections a minimum of once weekly. These inspections will stress condition of individual equipment, vehicles, weapons and tools, as well as small unit efficiency.

c. Frequent inspections will be made by the Third Army Engineer and by the Group headquarters. These inspections will be coordinated with the training tests and will stress the following:

(1) Organization of training and/or work.
(2) Combined tactical and technical training.
(3) Officer and NCO leadership.
(4) Use of training aids.
(5) General condition of mess, barracks, latrines, and CP.
(6) Condition of individual equipment, vehicles, weapons and tools
(7) Interest and enthusiasm of personnel.

7. REPORTS: Formal regular training reports are not contemplated. All unit commanders must realize the importance of and develop the habit of immediately reporting all changes of status which affect their unit's operational ability.

8. PUBLICATIONS: Requests for engineer publications will be made in accordance with the policy set forth in Circular 10, Headquarters ETO, dated 16 March 1944. All units and echelons are cautioned to review carefully all requests for publications. The need must be genuine and limited to actual useful requirements. The raiding unit and maintenance of extensive libraries by engineer units is impractical and to be discouraged, particularly inasmuch as large quantities must be "jettisoned" prior to operations. Every effort will be made, however, to furnish pertinent information to interested units. It will be kept in mind that many of the publications which received widespread distribution in the United States are available only in limited quantities in this theater. When publications are pertinent only for infrequent references, the rule will be to borrow it from a higher echelon rather than place an unnecessary strain on critical shipping facilities applicable to publications sent from the United States, or an unwarranted burden on reproduction facilities in this theater.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

R. W. HARTMAN,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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ANNEX NO. 5

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

12 June 1944.

PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVE:

NUMBER 41

ACQUISITION OF REAL ESTATE

1. DEFINITION

The term "real estate" as used herein, includes land, buildings, piers, docks and wharves, office and storage space, rights-of-way, or easements, billets, and any interests which may be acquired or held therein, together with such personal property as is taken and used in connection with the real property on which personal property is located.

2. REFERENCES

This Procurement Directive is based upon ETO Procurement Regulations, Headquarters ETO, U.S. Army, AG 600.2 dated 1 April 1944, (ETO SCP No. 10) and ETO Procedure for Acquisition of Real Estate, Headquarters ETO, U.S. Army, AG 600 dated 1 May 1944, (ETO SCP No. 37).

3. BILLETING

a. If a permanent Town Major is stationed in a locality, the Commanding Officer of the troops to be billeted will apply to the Town Major for the location of billets to be occupied. The Town Major will designate billets and will keep the necessary records thereof and make payment therefor.

b. If there is no Town Major in the locality, the Commanding Officer of the troops to be billeted will designate an officer from his command as Acting Town Major. The Acting Town Major will:

(1) Apply to the Mayor for a list of available billets. When the Mayor of acting head of the local government does not supply information, the acting Town Major will take such other steps as may be necessary to obtain such lists.

(2) Assign billets as requested.

(3) Keep a record of billets and of the time occupied.

(4) Once a week, or earlier if the billets are surrendered, prepare a billeting distribution list in triplicate on forms prescribed for this purpose by the Chief Engineer, ETO. An initial supply of these forms will be furnished to units by Army. Additional supply may be obtained by requisition on Army Engineer through normal Engineer channels.

(5) Certify the correctness of the lists, and obtain the stamp or signature of the Mayor attesting their correctness.

(6) If a Purchasing and Contracting Officer is present, have him prepare and certify a local procurement voucher (FD 500 Series) and attach a copy of the billeting distribution list to the original and duplicate of the procurement voucher. The Mayor or local head of government should be paid for all billets. Payment should not be made directly to the inhabitants of a locality except when there is no recognized head of local government acting.

(7) Obtain payment of the local procurement voucher by any authorized disbursing officer in the vicinity, or forward to the Engineer, Third Army, if there is no disbursing officer in the vicinity.

(8) If a Purchasing and Contracting Officer is not present, send the certified billeting distribution lists, in triplicate, to the Engineer, Third Army.

(9) When made available, prescribed billeting rates will be incorporated in subsequent Procurement Directives published by this headquarters.

4. REAL ESTATE

a. Under the provisions of paragraph 4, ETO - SCP No. 37, it is the policy of this command to acquire the use of real estate by requisition or except in the case of real estate owned by an enemy state and real estate in the combat zone which has been vacated on account of existing or imminent combat, which will be seized without formality beyond actual seizure, occupation or use within the limitations prescribed by ETO Procurement Regulations and Procurement Directive No. 3, this headquarters.

b. Commanding Officers desiring the use of real estate will apply therefor to the Town Major or, if there is no Town Major, to the Division, Corps or Army Engineer having authority in the area.

c. Where immediate use of real estate is necessary and there is no Town Major or other engineer representative available, the Commanding Officer of the troops or service concerned may requisition its use, provided such action has first been approved by a General Officer in immediate command of such troops or service in the field or his authorized representative or by higher authority. Where possession is necessary and there is no opportunity for securing approval by a General Officer or his authorized representative, the Commanding Officer

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concerned may act on his own initiative. In such case he will make immediate report of his action and of the circumstances to the Division, Corps or Army Engineer having authority in the area, or where there is no such Engineer in the area to the Engineer, Third Army, through channels.

d. (1) Requisition receipt, GPA ETO Form No. 6 will be used for requisitioning.

(2) The original of the receipt will be sent to the Engineer, Third Army.

(3) The duplicate of the receipt will be given to the owner.

(4) The triplicate of the receipt will be retained by the requisitioning officer.

e. The requisitioning officer will cause a survey of the premises to be made upon entry thereon, and have the survey signed in duplicate by the owner or his representative, or by the Mayor or other public official, and by the officer making the survey. A copy of the survey will be given the owner or his representative and a copy will be forwarded to the Engineer, Third Army, with the original of the requisition receipt.

f. When the premises are surrendered, a similar inspection of premises will be made and forwarded to the Engineer, Third Army, unless the owner shall in writing acknowledge return of the premises without damage. Such acknowledge, if given, will be forwarded to the Engineer, Third Army.

5. PROCEDURE FOR PURCHASING AND CONTRACTING OFFICERS

It is desired that each headquarters appointing Purchasing and Contracting Officers consolidate reports and records called for in Section VII of SOP No. 37 and forward them to the Engineer, Third Army.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

R. W. HARTMAN,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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ANNEX NO. 6

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

24 June 1944.

PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 6

HIRING OF CIVILIAN LABOR

1. DEFINITION.

Civilian labor as used herein will mean any civilian residents of occupied or liberated countries employed by U.S. Forces.

2. POLICY.

a. Local civilian labor will be utilized to the greatest extent possible consistent with security for such tasks as will be appropriate.

b. In the combat zone, under the jurisdiction of Third U.S. Army, civilians will normally be employed on an emergency basis under authority granted in ETO-SOP No. 29 dated 26 May 1944.

3. AUTHORIZATION FOR EMPLOYMENT.

Corps and divisions and all separate units in the Army area are hereby authorized to employ such civilian labor as they require to accomplish their missions. Any questions regarding priority in the hiring of labor will be referred to the Division, Corps or Army Engineer in their respective areas.

4. EMPLOYMENTS--HOW MADE.

Civilians may be procured by any unit from any available source in the area under control of Third U.S. Army. Prospective employees will be offered work at the established rates of pay and told the hours they will be expected to work and other conditions of employment. Those who accept employment under these conditions will be put to work. Those who refuse employment will not be forced to work. No written employment agreement is required. However, should a local employment office be available in the area, all employments will be made through this office, if practicable. Labor will not be procured by contract with a civil agent or labor contractor, or on the basis of a sub-contract, unless specifically authorized by this headquarters. Wages will be paid directly to the individual laborer.

5. HOURS OF SERVICE AND RATES OF PAY.

a. Upon entry into France and until firm official wages are published by this headquarters, it is the responsibility of units procuring and using labor to ascertain from existing local indigenous authorities the local wage rates paid by French (not German) employers immediately prior to entry into the country, and this rate will be the rate paid to all civilian labor in that vicinity. In case it is impracticable to obtain the local wage rates paid by the French immediately prior to our entry into the country, the rates shown in Inclosure #1 will be used.

b. An eight-hour day shall constitute a full day's work and forty-eight hours a full week's work. All time over eight hours in a day or forty-eight hours in a seven-day week shall be considered overtime. Time allowed for meals and time required going to and returning from work shall not be counted as time worked. Recourse to overtime work should be avoided except where considered necessary.

c. Labor may be given one supplementary meal per working day at the place of employment. In establishing basic pay where this meal is given, deduction of 10 francs per meal is to be made. For example, if the wage rate is 8 francs per hour and one meal is furnished, the rate per hour will be reduced to 6.75 francs per hour, so that the worker will be paid 54 francs per eight-hour day, plus one meal.

6. ADMINISTRATION.

a. The officer or non-commissioned officer charged with the supervision of the civilian employees will enter each employee's name in a time book. Any kind of pocket note book may be used for that purpose. A book having columns for names, classifications, rates, dates and total earned is preferable. It is anticipated that each laborer will have his individual work book and identification with him. If so, his correct name will be taken from that record. In many cases the kind of work for which an employee is qualified can be determined from his work book. If requested by the employee, his services with the U.S. Forces should be entered in his work book. In doing this, names or numbers of military units should be omitted for security reasons. The date and hour an employee starts work should be entered on the time book. Employees on the job should be checked at least twice during each shift to see that all are present and working. At the end of each shift, the hours worked by each employee will be entered in the time book opposite the employee's name.

b. At the end of each pay period, which will not exceed two weeks, the hours worked by each employee will be totaled on the time book, multiplied by the rate per hour and the total amount earned entered on the time book. Time books should be retained by the unit or installation as permanent records. Payrolls will be made up from the time books, in quadruplicate, on Standard Form 1013. The hiring unit will retain one copy, one copy will be forwarded to the Army Engineer, and the original and one copy will be presented to the Agent Finance Officer who pays the labor (See par 6c). Except as covered in paragraph 6, below, these will be the only records kept. On the original copy of the payroll the signature of the individual employee will appear the payroll by his mark, which must be witnessed by a commissioned or warrant officer other than the Agent Finance Officer. No advance of pay will be made in any circumstances.

c. Unless other payment arrangements have been made with local Finance Officer, using units will designate an agent officer whose responsibility it will be to procure and disburse funds for the payment of civilian labor. Such agent officers will anticipate their periodic cash needs and draw funds from their parent disbursing officer. Where circumstances are such that the preparation of a payroll for emergency labor is impracticable, the voucher (Local Procurement Voucher FD ETO Form #1) evidencing payment of such emergency labor need not be supported by a payroll, but in lieu thereof the voucher itself will be countersigned and certified correct by an officer or warrant officer who witnessed the payment other than the paying officer. Agent officers will adopt proper means of identifying labor which has been employed under emergency conditions and will file, in support of the voucher, such evidence of employment whenever possible. In the absence of any identification slip bearing the signature of the individual, the officer will state on the voucher the means of identification adopted by him. Similarly, in the case of the payment of other labor, when conditions are such that the signature of all of the laborers cannot be obtained, an officer or warrant officer witnessing the payment, other than the paying officer, may sign the payroll as witness in place of the signature of the laborer. In lieu of the individual signatures on Standard Form 1013, there may be annexed to the payroll improvised receipts of any kind so long as they are signed by the payee or a witnessing officer. Isolated individual payments may be evidenced by individual Local Procurement Vouchers, in which case the agent officer will return to his parent disbursing officer the original and duplicate copies, signed by the employee in the two places marked "X".

7. INJURIES.

a. The word "injury" whenever used below shall mean the disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injuries sustained while in the performance of his duties, but no compensation shall be paid if the injury or death is caused by the wilful misconduct of the employee or by the employee's intention to bring about the injury or death of himself or another, or if intoxication of the injured employee is a proximate cause of the injury or death. Compensation claims will not be denied solely by reason of the fact that the injury or death resulted from enemy action.

b. "Injury Payroll". The term "injury payroll" means a special payroll to be made out in the same manner as the regular civilian employee payrolls on Standard Form 1013. It will only be used in the zone of the Army prior to the establishment of a rear boundary of the Army. Its purpose is to provide compensation for injuries prior to the time claim service is established. It will be plainly marked at the top in all capital letters with the words "INJURY PAYROLL" This injury payroll will be used exclusively for paying civilian employees during the period that they are incapacitated for work by reason of an injury. No individual on it will be paid more than a sum equal to $116.67 per month, nor for a period of beyond 180 days, unless special written instructions are received in the individual's case from Division or higher Headquarters. Compensation rates paid will generally be the rates of the country where the employee was hired, as determined from records of indigenous authorities. In general, the compensation rate should be about 50% of the wage rate.

c. ETO Compensation Form 124, "Report of Injury and Claim for Compensation," is a combination report of an injury claim, medical officer's report, and statement of facts. Requisitions for Form 124 will be sent to Engineer, Headquarters Third U.S. Army. It is to be employed for all injuries sustained by civilian employees. This form will be made out in triplicate and held pending the establishment of the rear boundary of the Army, at which time it will be turned over to the Advance Section or Base Section Claims Officer. Thenceforth, no injury payroll will be used; but all injuries will be reported at once to the Advance Section or Base Section Claims Office on Form 124.

d. In all cases of injuries to civilian employees requiring more than first aid treatment, medical care or hospitalization will be furnished by the commanding officer. Local doctors or hospitals will be utilized when available in preference to Army facilities.

e. Bills for doctors and hospital services incurred as a result of civilian employee's injuries will be forwarded, together with Form 124 covering the case, to the nearest U.S. Claims Service Office. If Form 124 has previously been forwarded, notation to that effect will be made on the bill. Authorization will be granted only to doctors of hospitals for treatment not extending beyond a period of ten days. In a case where treatment is required beyond a period of ten days, it will be necessary for the commanding officer who hired the civilian to give a new authorization for additional treatment. If the commanding officer originally authorizing treatment has moved from the locality where the injured man is being treated, this authorization may be secured from the commanding officer near the locality, to whom the responsibility of the case had been transferred. The employee's commander will continue to discharge his responsibility in regard to an injured employee regardless of his movements, either by carrying on such responsibilities at his new station or by accomplishing the transfer of

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the necessary record and responsibility to a successive commander near the employee. If Form 174 has been sent to a Base Section Claims Office, the successive commander of the employee receiving the injured employee's case will immediately notify the Base Section Claims Office of the transfer.

f. In all deaths of civilian employees, where the death occurs as a result of injuries on the job, the commanding officer may, when necessary, provide burial. This is applicable where necessity dictates and confers no right or benefit. From 174, Report of Injury, will be made out in all cases of death.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

R. W. HARTMAN,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

1 Incl
Guide to Wage Rates.

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GUIDE TO WAGE RATES

1. Rates of pay and grading system for male workers (Figures represent francs per hour)

Grade	Zone 1 min	Zone 1 max	Zone 2 min	Zone 2 max	Zone 3 min	Zone 3 max	Zone 4 min	Zone 4 max
1 very skilled	11	15	13	16	14	19	18	22
2 skilled	9	12	11	14	12	15	15	19
3 semi-skilled	8	10	10	12	11	13	13	15
4 unskilled	7	9	8	10	9	11	11	13

2. Rates of pay - grading system for female workers (75% of pay for male workers)

1 very skilled	8	11	10	12	11	14	13	17
2 skilled	7	9	8	11	9	11	11	14
3 semi-skilled	6	8	7	9	8	10	10	12
4 unskilled	5	7	6	8	7	9	8	10

Note: Explanatory notes on schedules:

Zone 1 - Communities of less than 20,000 persons.
Zone 2 - Towns and cities of more than 20,000 but less than 100,000 persons.
Zone 3 - All cities of 100,000 persons and over (except PARIS).
Zone 4 - Metropolitan PARIS area.

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ANNEX NO. 7

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

23 June 1944.

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM:

NUMBER 21:

FIRE DEFENSE

1. PURPOSE

This directive prescribes the operational fire defense policy within Third United States Army.

2. FIRE DEFENSE

Fire defense consists of the measures required to prevent the destruction by fire of installations, supplies, equipment and communications essential to the operation whether caused by accident, carelessness or enemy action.

3. RESPONSIBILITY

a. Each unit under direct control of Third United States Army will have a definite fire defense plan suitable for instant employment during active overseas operations and will be responsible for fire defense within their areas. Companies or similar units will provide fire watchers and fire guards.

(1) Fire watchers will be posted at convenient locations, so that they can see or hear bombs land. They will be equipped with a whistle and will report all incidents.

(2) Fire guards consisting of three men each, equipped with a stirrup pump (or pump can), two buckets, hand axe and wrecking bar will be provided as required.

b. Corps and Division commanders are responsible for fire defense in their areas.

c. When necessary, assistance to accomplish the mission will be requested from adjacent units, civil fire defense organizations (through Civil Affairs) and from higher echelons.

4. FIRE DEFENSE CONTROL

a. In case of fire, the senior officer or non-commissioned officer present will control all available fire defense measures until arrival of the company commander, fire marshal or fire officer concerned, who will then assume command.

b. Engineer fire fighting sections assigned to the Third United States Army will be under control of this Headquarters (Fire Officer, Engineer Section) and will be employed in fire defense of supply dumps, railheads and communication centers.

5. FIRE REPORTING

a. Any fire which has resulted or may result in affecting the operation will be reported immediately to higher echelons by the most rapid available means, giving unit area, location and brief description and extent of the fire.

b. Reports will be made to the following in order of priority shown:

(1) Engineer, Third United States Army.
(2) PAD Control Center, Third United States Army.

c. All other fires will be reported to the officers indicated in paragraph "b" above. Reports will include the cause of fire and damage in addition to information indicated in paragraph "a" above.

6. EQUIPMENT

Class IV fire fighting equipment will be available at Engineer supply dumps and depots.

7. FIRE REGULATIONS

Fire prevention measures contained in paragraph 11, Fire Regulations, Headquarters ETOUSA dated 15 December 1943, and inclosure No. 1 hereto will be observed.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

M. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-3

1 Incl:
Cy of Annex "A" to Planning
Guide, OCE Hq ETOUSA, 20 Apr 44.

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Inclosure [illegible] to Operations Memorandum No. 21, Hq Third U S Army, dated 23 June 1944.

Copy of Annex "A" to Planning Guide, OCE, Hq ETOUSA, 20 Apr 44

FIRE PREVENTION

EXPLOSION:

The issue of clear Fire Prevention Instructions and advice on the siting of camps, dumps and depots from the fire prevention aspect should be considered in all operational fire defense planning.

PETROL REGULATIONS:

1. Shipment of Packaged Petrol. Petrol should always be shipped in vessels designed or converted for the purpose. Where packaged petrol has to be shipped as part of a mixed cargo, the fire hazard is extremely high. Leakage is inevitable, and all possible precautions must be taken to prevent fires and explosions. The storage of petrol with supplies of a combustible nature, must be avoided.

2. Loading and Discharging Petrol. When loading or discharging petrol, fire fighting appliances should be ready for immediate action during the whole period of the operation. "No Smoking" or "Naked Light" regulations on ships and docks must be rigorously enforced.

3. Jettisoning Fuel. Should the jettisoning of fuel become imperative, no lights, fires or other means of ignition should be allowed within a quarter of a mile or more downstream or leeward and 200 to 300 yards to windward, when low flash fuels are jettisoned. Tidal streams and currents should also be taken into consideration. Jettisoning kerosene and diesel oil present no particular fire hazard, provided there is no admixture of vaporising oil.

4. Petrol Carried on Vehicles. Spare cans of petrol should be carried in carriers. Where cans have to be carried within the vehicle, they should be placed so that they can be easily removed should the vehicle or its load catch fire.

5. Filling and Decanting. Carelessness in handling cans when filling petrol tanks must be eliminated. Petrol will not be allowed to spill. Only one can should be opened at a time, the remainder being kept at a safe distance from the filling point. When decanting or draining tanks, each container should be removed to a safe distance from the filling point. When decanting or draining tanks, each container should be removed to a safe distance as soon as it is full.

SITING CAMPS, DUMPS AND DEPOTS.

1. The major problem confronting a Fire Defense Organization, is the supply of sufficient water for fire fighting. Those responsible for the reconnaissance of sites for camps, depots and dumps can ease this problem considerably if the water need is kept in mind.

2. Other conditions permitting, dumps and buildings of a combustible nature should be sited as near available water supply as possible.

3. The importance of dispersal, both of buildings and supply dumps, as a fire prevention measure must always be borne in mind when the selection of a site is being considered.

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ANNEX NO. 8

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

CIRCULAR)
NUMBER 70)

19 October 1944.

MAP SUPPLY POLICY

1. GENERAL. Letter, this Headquarters, dated 19 May 1944, file AG 061-CHMCR, subject, "Map Supply Policy", and Operations Memorandum Number 11, this Headquarters, dated 5 June 1944, are rescinded.

2. RESPONSIBILITY. The unit engineer of Army, Corps, and Division is charged with the distribution of military maps under the policy of the unit commander and the supervision of the unit G-2 except such confidential or secret maps that may require special distribution. He will obtain maps not reproduced by himself from the engineer of the next higher unit.

3. DISTRIBUTION.

a. Agencies of Distribution. A map depot for Army, one for each Corps, and one for each Division will accomplish distribution.

(1) Army Map Depot. Personnel of the map storage and distribution platoon of the Army Topographic Battalion, under the supervision of the Army Engineer, will operate the Army map depot. The duties of personnel of the Army map depot are as follows:

(a) Draw bulk stocks of maps from the Communications Zone advance map depot.

(b) Break down bulk stocks to Corps loads and deliver to Corps map depots.

(c) Operate map depot for "over the counter" delivery of maps to Army separate units.

(2) Corps Map Depot. Personnel of the Corps map storage and distribution detachment, attached to the Corps Topographic Company and supervised by the Corps Engineer, will operate the Corps map depot. The duties of personnel of the Corps map depot are as follows:

(a) Break down bulk stocks received from the Army map depot to Division loads and deliver to Division map depot.

(b) Operate map depot for "over the counter" delivery of maps to Corps separate units.

(3) Division Map Depot. The Division Engineer is responsible for operation of a Division map depot to provide for "over the counter" delivery of maps to divisional and attached units.

b. Basis of Distribution. "Initial Issue Tables for Operational Maps" inclosed herewith are based on tables in FM 30-20 and give the quantities of maps and auxiliary material considered adequate for initial issue.

(1) No issue in excess of these allowances is authorized without the approval of the Army Engineer.

(2) Actual maps issued will depend on their availability.

c. Mechanics of Distribution.

(1) Army separate units will requisition direct to the Army map depot for "over the counter" delivery.

(2) Corps separate units will requisition direct to the Corps map depot for "over the counter" delivery.

(3) The Division Engineer will submit consolidated requisition to the Corps Engineer for divisional and attached units. The attached units included will be listed on the requisition for editing purposes. The maps will be delivered in bulk by the Corps map depot to the Division map depot.

(4) The Corps Engineer will submit, in triplicate, consolidated requisition to the Army Engineer for replenishing Corps map depot stock. These maps will be delivered in bulk by the Army map depot to the Corps map depot. Consolidated divisional requisitions, as approved by the Corps Engineer, may be forwarded to the Army Engineer for processing. Maps will be stocked in Corps map depot primarily for "over the counter" issue to Corps separate units.

(5) Requisitions for "over the counter" delivery by Corps and Army map depots will be signed by an officer and submitted in duplicate direct to the issuing depot.

d. Automatic Issue. Maps will normally be issued automatically, without requisition, to the Corps map depot in staff planning or operational quantities, whichever may be applicable, for: -

(1) Distribution of new maps initially received by Army map depot.

(2) Initial issue covering new operational areas.

(3) Mapping a newly assigned Division which is not relieving another Division. (See paragraph 4c below).

4. USE AND DISPOSITION OF MAPS. The supply of materials required for map reproduction is critical and the reproduction facilities are at present overtaxed in the preparation of operational maps. Therefore, unit commanders are enjoined against viewing the problem of map supply complacently. It is their responsibility that maps issued to their units are used efficiently and that maps not immediately required are safely stored.

a. Maps issued to units in operational quantities will be limited to their immediate operational area.

b. When a unit has no further need for a certain series of maps, these maps will be sorted, packed, and returned with an itemized transmittal direct to the source of supply for that unit.

c. Any Division being replaced by another Division will transfer maps, no longer required, to the replacing unit, pursuant to instructions issued by the Corps Commander.

d. Maps worn beyond serviceability will be burned and the resulting ashes thoroughly pulverized.

5. CAPTURED AND LOCAL MAPS. Captured or local maps or reproduced copies of captured or local maps will not be issued to troops for operational use except in an emergency and then only with the approval of the Army Commander.

6. NEW MAPS AND MAP INFORMATION.

a. Whenever new maps or map substitutes are prepared by subordinate units, particularly a Corps or Army topographic unit, record copies will be required. These will include copies of all publications (including overprints) which can legitimately be classified as maps. Odd diagrams, tabulations, cards, etc. which may be reproduced lithographically, but which have no map significance, are not required. Distribution will be made as follows:

(1) Two (2) copies through engineer channels to Engineer, Third US Army, APO 403, US Army.

(2) Five (5) copies direct to Engineer, Twelfth Army Group, APO 655, US Army, copy of letter of transmittal to be forwarded to Engineer, Third US Army.

(3) Two (2) copies of each complete printing plus two (2) sets of color pulls direct to Chief, Map Reproduction and Distribution Section, Intelligence Division, OCE, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations United States Army, APO 887, US Army (Bigot material will be addressed directly to Colonel A. Hilwit, same address); copy of letter of transmittal to be forwarded to the Engineer, Third US Army.

(4) Two (2) copies of each complete printing plus two (2) sets of color pulls direct to Directorate of Military Survey, Survey 2(b), The War Office, Whitehall, SW1 (Bigot material will be addressed directly to Lieutenant Colonel WDC Wiggins, same address); copy of letter of transmittal to be forwarded to the Engineer, Third U S Army.

b. All corrective or supplementary map information will be forwarded through engineer channels to the Engineer, Third US Army.

c. Except for local sketches all map reproduction will be coordinated with the Engineer, Third US Army.

d. Communications involving change of map policy, procurement of aerial photography, or issue of non-standard map material for staff intelligence studies will be sent through G-2 channels to AC of S, G-2, Third US Army.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL

R. E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl:
Incl 1 - "Initial Issue Tables for Operational Maps".

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" & "C"

Information copies to:

CG, 12th A Gp (2)
CG, STO US Army (2)

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Inclosure to Third U.S. Army Circular No. 70, 19 October, 1944

INITIAL ISSUE TABLES FOR OPERATIONAL MAPS

UNIT	NO. OF UNITS	AIR MAPS		ROAD MAPS	SMALL SCALE	INTER. SCALE	MEDIUM SCALE		LARGE SCALE		MISCELLANEOUS								
		O. S. G. S. 4072 1/500,000	O. S. G. S. 3942 1/250,000	1/250,000 1/500,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/1,000,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/500,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/100,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/50,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/25,000	PHOTO MAPS 1/25,000	COMBAT ZONE O. S. G. S. 4114 1/250,000	TOWN PLANS	THRU WAY TOWN PLANS	GAZETTEERS 1/250,000	NOTES ON O. S. G. S. MAPS	TECH. DATA SHEETS	MAP INDICES		
(COLUMN NO.) →	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Army Hq. & Hqs. Co.		15	25	300	75	150	175	150	75	50	25	75	20	0	15	5	25		
Special Troops, (Army)		0	0	3	0	3	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		
Corps Hq. & Hqs. Co.		10	15	200	45	100	150	100	50	30	15	30	10	0	10	5	20		
DIVISIONS																			
Airborne		15	10	450	45	2000	3300	600	550	150	10	150	45	15	10	5	30		
Armored		20	10	2250	50	300	600	800	500	150	10	150	200	15	10	5	30		
Cavalry		20	5	1400	55	450	200	725	500	150	10	150	140	15	10	5	30		
Infantry		20	10	1500	55	150	150	900	800	150	10	150	145	15	10	5	40		
Infantry (L)		20	5	300	40	100	100	650	500	150	10	150	30	15	10	5	30		
L.Div. Pk. Transport		20	5	300	40	125	100	650	375	150	10	150	30	15	10	5	25		
L.Div. Trk. Transport		20	5	275	40	120	100	650	375	150	10	150	30	15	10	5	25		
ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY																			
Hq.&Hq. Btry., AAA Brigade		0	0	11	3	15	0	20	10	4	0	4	1	0	3	0	5		
Hq.&Hq.Btry., AAA Gp.		0	0	11	2	7	0	15	10	3	0	3	1	0	2	0	2		
AAA Auto Wpns. Bn., Mbl.		0	0	113	1	4	0	40	35	5	0	5	11	0	1	0	2		
AAA Auto Wpns. Bn., Sem.		0	0	37	1	4	0	40	35	5	0	5	3	0	1	0	2		
AAA Auto Wpns. Bn. SP.		0	0	123	1	4	0	40	35	5	0	5	12	0	1	0	2		
AAA Balloon B Bn. (VLA)		0	0	43	1	4	0	35	25	5	0	5	4	0	1	0	2		
AAA Gun Bn., Mbl.		0	0	120	1	4	0	35	27	5	0	5	12	0	1	0	2		
AAA Gun Bn., Sem.		0	0	42	1	4	0	35	25	5	0	5	6	0	1	0	2		
AAA Sl. Bn., Sem.		0	0	120	2	3	0	35	25	5	0	5	12	0	1	0	2		
AAA Operations Detachment		0	0	7	2	3	0	5	4	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	1		
ARMORED																			
Hq.&Hq. Det.,Tk. Gp. (M)		0	0	21	1	15	26	0	12	6	2	6	2	0	2	0	2		
Hq.&Hq. Co.,Armd. Gp.		0	0	21	1	15	26	0	12	6	2	6	2	0	2	0	2		
Tank Bn., (L)		0	0	127	0	25	51	0	27	10	0	10	12	1	0	0	2		
Tank Bn., (CDL)		0	0	160	0	35	50	0	30	10	0	10	16	1	0	0	2		
Tank Bn., (Sep).		0	0	167	0	37	55	0	32	10	0	10	16	1	0	0	2		
CAVALRY																			
Hq.&Hq. Tr.,Cav. Gp.		0	0	15	1	15	23	0	15	3	1	0	1	0	2	0	2		
Cavalry Brigade, Horse		0	0	400	4	170	266	0	160	15	0	0	40	0	8	0	2		
Cavalry Regt., Mecz.		0	0	471	1	75	111	0	75	10	0	0	47	0	3	0	2		
Cavalry Mecz. Ron. Sq.		0	0	243	0	40	150	0	45	5	0	0	24	0	1	0	2		
CHEMICAL WARFARE																			
Chemical Mtz. Bn. (Sep)		0	0	161	0	5	0	54	0	0	0	0	16	1	0	0	2		
Chemical Decon. Co.		0	0	22	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	1		
Chemical Depot Co.		0	0	12	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	1		
Chemical Lab. Co.		0	0	3	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1		
Chemical Maint. Co.		0	0	10	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	1		
Chemical Smoke Gen. Co.		0	0	37	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	1		

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Inclosure to Third U.S. Army Circular No. 70, 19 October, 1944

INITIAL ISSUE TABLES FOR OPERATIONAL MAPS

UNIT	NO. OF UNITS	AIR MAPS		ROAD MAPS	SMALL SCALE	INTER. SCALE	MEDIUM SCALE		LARGE SCALE		MISCELLANEOUS								
		G. S. G. S. 4072 1/500,000	G. S. G. S. 3942 1/250,000	1/250,000 1/500,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/1,000,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/500,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/100,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/50,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/25,000	PHOTO MAPS 1/25,000	COMBAT ZONE O. S. G. S. 4114 1/250,000	TOWN PLANS	THRU WAY TOWN PLANS	GAZETTEERS 1/250,000	NOTES ON O. S. G. S. MAPS	TECH. DATA SHEETS	MAP INDICES		
(COLUMN NO.) →	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
ENGINEER																			
Gen. Sv. Regt.		0	0	160	1	13	0	80	0	0	0	15	16	0	2	0	2		
Hq. & Hq.Co., Engr. C. Gp.		0	0	13	1	7	0	24	11	5	2	5	1	0	2	0	2		
Engr. Airborne Bn.		0	2	34	0	5	0	40	20	7	0	7	3	0	1	0	2		
Engr. C. Bn.		0	0	90	0	5	0	48	20	12	0	12	9	0	1	0	2		
Engr. Bn. (Sep.)		0	0	70	0	5	0	47	22	12	0	12	7	0	1	0	2		
Engr. Camouflage Bn.		0	0	55	0	5	0	45	20	10	0	10	5	0	1	0	2		
Engr. Hv. Pon. Bn.		0	0	118	0	5	0	33	15	6	0	6	11	0	1	0	2		
Engr. Top. Bn.(Army)		0	0	59	0	5	4	30	15	7	0	7	5	0	1	10	2		
Engr. C. Co. (Sep.)		0	0	21	0	0	0	6	4	1	0	1	2	1	0	0	1		
Engr. Depot Co.		0	0	17	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1		
Engr. Dp. Trk. Co.		0	0	51	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	5	1	0	0	1		
Engr. L. Equip. Co.		0	0	56	0	0	0	5	3	1	0	1	5	1	0	0	1		
Engr. L. Pon. Co.		0	0	76	0	0	0	7	5	1	0	1	5	1	0	0	1		
Engr. Maint. Co.		0	0	47	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	1		
Engr. Top. Co. (Corps)		0	0	17	0	0	1	5	4	1	0	1	1	0	1	10	1		
Engr. Treadway Bridge Co.		0	0	67	0	0	0	5	3	1	0	1	6	1	0	0	1		
Engr. Water Supply Co.		0	0	19	0	0	0	7	4	2	0	2	1	1	0	0	1		
Engr. Utility Det.		0	0	6	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1		
FIELD ARTILLERY																			
Hq.&Hq. Btry.,Corps Arty.(Mtz.)		0	5	22	3	15	0	39	15	8	0	8	2	0	3	2	5		
Hq. & Hq. Btry., F.A. Brigade		0	5	20	4	10	0	30	15	5	0	5	2	0	3	2	5		
Hq. & Hq. Btry.,F.A. Gp.(Mtz.)		0	5	19	1	7	0	26	12	6	0	6	2	0	2	2	2		
F.A. Obs. Bn.		0	0	98	0	5	0	39	21	5	0	5	9	0	1	20	2		
105 MM How. Bn. (S.P.)		0	4	106	0	5	0	48	29	5	0	10	10	0	1	2	2		
105 MM How. Bn. (Trk.)		0	4	86	0	5	0	47	28	5	0	10	8	0	1	2	2		
155 MM Gun Bn. (S.P.)		0	4	76	0	5	0	42	23	5	0	10	7	0	1	2	2		
155 MM Gun Bn. (Trac.)		0	4	76	0	5	0	42	23	5	0	10	7	0	1	2	2		
155 MM How. Bn. (Trac.)		0	4	85	0	5	0	45	26	5	0	10	8	0	1	2	2		
240 MM How. Bn. (Trac.)		0	4	79	0	5	0	42	23	5	0	10	7	0	1	2	2		
4.5" Gun Bn. (Trac.)		0	4	85	0	5	0	45	26	5	0	10	8	0	1	2	2		
8" Gun Bn. (Trac.)		0	4	79	0	5	0	42	23	5	0	10	7	0	1	2	2		
8" How. Bn. (Trac.)		0	4	79	0	5	0	42	23	5	0	10	7	0	1	2	2		
INFANTRY																			
Inf. Regt. (Sep.)		0	0	178	1	16	0	190	106	50	0	50	17	0	2	0	2		
Inf. Bn. (Sep.)		0	0	26	0	3	0	50	25	10	0	10	2	0	2	0	2		
MEDICAL																			
Hq.&Hq. Det., Med. Gp.		0	0	6	1	7	16	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2		
Aux. Surg. Gp.		0	0	9	1	7	64	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2		
Hq.&Hq. Det., Med. Bn.		0	0	9	1	5	16	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2		
Medical Lab. (Army)		0	0	9	1	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1		
Medical Gas Treatment Bn.		0	0	55	0	5	36	0	0	0	0	0	5	1	0	0	2		
Medical Amb. Co. Mtz. (Sep.)		0	0	36	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	1		
Medical Clearing Co.(Sep.)		0	0	11	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1		

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INITIAL ISSUE TABLES FOR OPERATIONAL MAPS

UNIT	NO OF UNITS	AIR MAPS		ROAD MAPS	SMALL SCALE MAPS	INTER SCALE MAPS	MEDIUM SCALE		LARGE SCALE		MISCELLANEOUS								
		C.S.G.S. 4072 (Mod)	G.S.G.S. 2962	1:1 000 000 1:1 583 000	1:1 000 000	1:250 000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1:100 000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1:250 000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1:100 000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1:50 000	PHOTO MAPS 1:25 000	COMBINATIONS C.S.G.S. 1318 (Mod)	TOWN PLANS	THRU WAY TOWN PLANS	GAZETTEERS 1:250 000	NOTES ON C.S.G.S. MAPS	TRNG. DATA SHEETS	MAP INDICES		
(COLUMN NO) →	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Medic Car Co (Sep)		0	0	17	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1		
Medical Depot Co		0	0	10	0	3	13	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1		
Medical Sanitary Co		0	0	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1		
Conv Hosp		0	0	18	0	3	12	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2		
Evac Hosp (150)		0	0	5	0	3	12	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2		
Evac Hosp Sem (400)		0	0	25	0	5	14	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	2		
Field Hosp		0	0	15	0	4	8	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2		
Vet Co (Sep)		0	0	10	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1		
Vet Conv Hosp		0	0	10	0	3	12	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2		
Vet Evac Hosp		0	0	5	0	3	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2		
Vet Gen Hosp		0	0	9	1	5	21	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2		
MILITARY POLICE																			
M P Bn		0*	0	250	0	5	0	50	0	0	0	2	8	1	0	0	2		
M P Bn (Army)		0	0	250	0	5	0	50	0	0	0	2	6	1	0	0	2		
M P Co		0	0	80	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1		
M P P W Proc Co		0	0	7	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1		
C I Squad		0	0	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	1		
M P Esc Gd Co		0	0	4	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1		
ORDNANCE																			
Hq & Hq Det Ord Gp		0	0	9	1	7	0	22	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	2		
Hq & Hq Det Ord Bn		0	0	15	1	4	0	17	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2		
Hq & Hq Det Ord Am Bn		0	0	10	1	5	0	14	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2		
Ord Maint Co A A		0	0	23	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	1		
Ord Am Co		0	0	1	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	1		
Ord Gas Co		0	0	35	0	1	0	7	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	1		
Ord Depot Co		0	0	25	0	1	0	7	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	1		
Ord Evac Co		0	0	55	0	1	0	7	0	0	0	0	16	1	0	0	1		
Ord M Auto Maint Co		0	0	28	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1		
Ord M Maint Co T A		0	0	30	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1		
Ord Hv Maint Co Tk		0	0	40	0	1	0	10	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1		
Ord Med M Maint Co		0	0	28	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1		
Ord Med M Ag Maint Co		0	0	24	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1		
Ord M V D Co		0	0	17	0	1	0	5	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1		
Ord Bomb Disp Sqd		0	0	5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1		
QUARTERMASTER																			
Trpt Reg Gp		0	0	38	1	7	0	54	0	0	0	0	4	0	2	0	2		
Hq & Hq Det Q M Gp		0	0	12	1	7	0	18	0	0	0	0	3	0	2	0	2		
Hq & Hq Det Q M Bn		0	0	2	1	5	0	15	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2		
Hq & Hq Det Q M Bn Mtl		0	0	5	1	5	0	15	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	2		
Q M Petroleum Products Lab		0	0	2	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1		
Q M Gas Supply Co		0	0	29	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	1		
Q M Refrigeration Co (Mtl)		0	0	40	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	1		
Q M Sales Co		0	0	18	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1		
Q M Bakery Co		0	0	3	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1		
Q M Car Co		0	0	92	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	9	1	0	0	1		
Q M Depot Co Supply		0	0	5	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1		
Q M Laundry Co		0	0	10	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1		
Q M Rhd Co		0	0	6	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1		
Q M Salvage Coll Co		0	0	21	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1		
Q M Salvage Repair Co		0	0	7	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1		
Q M Service Co		0	0	4	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1		
Q M Rec Squadron		0	0	48	0	5	0	41	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	1		

INITIAL ISSUE TABLES FOR OPERATIONAL MAPS

UNIT	NO OF UNITS	AIR MAPS		ROAD MAPS	SMALL SCALE MAPS	INTER SCALE MAPS	MEDIUM SCALE		LARGE SCALE		MISCELLANEOUS								
		C.S.G.S. 4072 (Mod)	G.S.G.S. 2962	1:1 000 000 1:1 583 000	1:1 000 000	1:250 000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1:100 000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1:250 000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1:100 000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1:50 000	PHOTO MAPS 1:25 000	COMBINATIONS C.S.G.S. 1318 (Mod)	TOWN PLANS	THRU WAY TOWN PLANS	GAZETTEERS 1:250 000	NOTES ON C.S.G.S. MAPS	TRNG. DATA SHEETS	MAP INDICES		
(COLUMN NO) →	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Q M Pack Troop		0	0	22	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1		
Q M Trk Co		0	0	55	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	5	1	0	0	1		
Q M Tr Trans Co		0	0	66	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	5	1	0	0	1		
Q M Gr Reg Co		0	0	18	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1		
Q M Frngt & Bath Co (Mtl)		0	0	9	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1		
Q M Base Pet Sup Co		0	0	13	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1		
SIGNAL																			
Signal Bn		0	0	203	0	5	0	35	10	6	0	0	20	0	1	0	2		
Signal Constr Bn		0	0	114	0	4	0	60	18	6	0	0	11	0	1	0	2		
Signal Opn Bn		0	0	112	0	8	0	30	21	10	0	10	11	0	1	0	2		
Signal Constr Co		0	0	57	0	1	0	25	4	2	0	2	5	1	0	0	1		
Signal Depot Co		0	0	26	0	1	0	10	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1		
Signal Mbl Broadcast Co		0	0	29	0	2	0	20	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1		
Signal Opn Co		0	0	50	0	4	0	11	7	3	0	3	5	1	0	0			
Signal Photo Co		0	0	39	0	1	0	20	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	1		
Signal Pigeon Co		0	0	48	0	4	0	10	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	1		
Signal Radio Intl Co		0	0	84	0	4	8	10	4	0	0	0	8	1	0	0	1		
Signal Repair Co		0	0	35	0	1	0	8	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	1		
Signal Service Co (R I)		0	0	22	0	2	0	9	2	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1		
Air Ln Squadron Det		40	0	4	36	0	0	18	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1		
Enemy Equip Ident Unit		0	0	3	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1		
Signal Crystal Grind Team		0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1		
TANK DESTROYER																			
Hq & Hq Co T D Brigade		0	0	13	3	20	28	0	8	4	2	4	1	0	3	0	5		
Hq & Hq Co T D Gp		0	0	17	1	13	23	0	10	5	1	5	1	0	2	0	2		
T D Bn (SP)		0	0	153	0	23	50	0	31	5	0	5	15	1	0	0	2		
T D Bn (Towed)		0	0	153	0	23	50	0	31	5	0	5	15	1	0	0	2		
MISCELLANEOUS																			
A P U		0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2		
Hq Civil Affairs Regt		0	0	27	1	17	0	0	0	2	8	4	1	0	1	0	2		
Civil Affairs Co		0	0	21	0	80	0	0	0	1	12	1	1	0	0	0	1		
Finance Disc Sect		0	0	2	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1		
Hq & Hq Co Repl Depot		0	0	11	0	0	32	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2		
M R U Type Y		0	0	3	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1		
M R U Type Z		0	0	4	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1		
Postal Regulation Sect		0	0	2	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1		
Repl Bn (Hq & Co)		0	0	10	0	0	38	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2		
Special Service Co		0	0	10	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	1		
M I Spec Unit		0	0	68	1	10	0	65	0	0	2	10	7	2	0	0	2		

* Notes: 1 When either one of the two maps is not available, the other will be issued on basis of the combined allowance of the two.

2 These maps are primarily for special use by the Artillery, Infantry and Engineer units and will be issued on request from a unit when a positive need for them exists.

3 Will be issued on above basis upon request from a unit when a positive need for this map exists.

4 Issued in these quantities only when a unit is operating on a special airborne mission. When operating on the ground, distribution for these maps will be the same as for the Infantry Division.

5 Hydrographic charts and defense overprints will be issued on request as made available for special missions.

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ANNEX NO. 9

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Engineer
APO 403

1618004A March 1945

ENGINEER OPERATIONAL
INSTRUCTION NO. 33

MAPS: Series 0955 4042, Scale 1:250,000, Sheets 8 & 9
Series 0929 4346, Scale 1:250,000, Sheets K49, K50 & K51

1. Engineer boundaries (see overlay).
2. No change.

- DISPOSITION OF TROOPS -

VIII CORPS
[illegible]d Engr C Gp
[illegible]7th Engr C Gp
[illegible]h Engr C Bn
[illegible]h Engr C Bn
[illegible]7th Engr C Bn
[illegible]th Engr C Bn
[illegible]d Engr C Bn
[illegible]2d Engr C Bn
[illegible]th Engr L Equip Co
[illegible]th Engr Maint Co
[illegible]t Engr Trdwy Br Co
[illegible]h Engr L Pon Co
[illegible]h Engr L Pon Co
[illegible]9th Engr Dp Trk Co
[illegible]h Engr Tmp Co
[illegible]d Engr TIT (C)

XII CORPS
[illegible]th Engr C Gp
[illegible]th Engr C Gp
[illegible] Engr C Bn
[illegible]h Engr C Bn
[illegible]h Engr C Bn
[illegible]h Engr C Bn
[illegible] Engr C Bn
[illegible]h Engr C Bn
[illegible]h Engr L Equip Co
[illegible]h Engr Maint Co
[illegible]h Engr Trdwy Br Co
[illegible]h Engr Trdwy Br Co
[illegible]h Engr Trdwy Br Co (-)

XII CORPS (Contd)
(1) LE Plat, 3.9th Engr L Pon Co
528th Engr L Pon Co
537th Engr L Pon Co
87th Engr Hv Pon Bn
673d Engr Tmp Co
4th Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn
2949th Engr TIT (-)

XI CORPS
1135th Engr C Gp
1152d Engr C Gp
135th Engr C Bn
160th Engr C Bn
178th Engr C Bn
179th Engr C Bn
206th Engr C Bn
245th Engr C Bn
281st Engr C Bn
1258th Engr C Bn
623d Engr L Equip Co
961st Engr Maint Co
2d Plat, 997th Engr Trdwy Br Co
993d Engr Trdwy Br Co
513th Engr L Pon Co
548th Engr L Pon Co
644th Engr Tmp Co
1st Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn
2898th Engr TIT (C)

ARMY
1123d Engr C Gp
1134th Engr C Gp
1301st Engr GS Regt
1303d Engr GS Regt
1306th Engr GS Regt
143th Engr C Bn
1834 Engr C Bn
188th Engr C Bn
249th Engr C Bn
2793d Engr C Bn (-)
809th Engr L Equip Co
676th Engr L Equip Co
976th Engr Maint Co
509th Engr L Pon Co (-)
3724 Engr Dp Trk Co
764th Engr Dp Trk Co
770th Engr Dp Trk Co
1356th Engr Dp Trk Co
1366th Engr Dp Trk Co
1367th Engr Dp Trk Co
88th Engr Hv Pon Bn
553d Engr Hv Pon Bn
652d Engr Tmp Bn
459th Engr Depot Co
2d Plat, 729th Engr Depot Co
Co A (-), 602d Engr Cam Bn
1511th Engr MS Co
1512th Engr MS Co
1239th Engr FP Plat
1240th Engr FP Plat
1681st Engr Surv Ln Team
1092d Engr Util Det
2890th Engr TIT (R)
Naval Unit N-2
Det B, 329th Harbor Craft Co
1407th Engr Mobile Sit Team
(1) Temporary attachment

For the purpose of showing an overlay, maps 1:500,000 are used in this Annex.

a. 1123d Engr C Gp: No change.
b. 1134th Engr C Gp:
Additional Attachments: 88th Engr Hv Pon Bn (less Co B, and 1367th Engr Dp Trk Co.
Detachment: 87th Engr Hv Pon Bn (less Co A).
Mission - No change.
c. 1301st Engr GS Regt: No change.
d. 1303d Engr GS Regt: No change.
e. 1306th Engr GS Regt: No change.
f. Separate Army Units: No change.
g. (1) Area assignments effective 170800A March 1945.
(2) No change.
(3) No change.
(4) No change.
h. AESP No. 10 - MONSCHAU on GC 58 (20434) Class IV and Bridging - XX Corps troops.
AESP No. 13 - BELVAL, 14 mi W EDGE (P7102) Class IV and Bridging - All troops.
AESP No. 14 - AELOS (P6122) Class II and IV Supplies - All troops.
AESP No. 18 - (L1049) MESSERICH - Class IV and Bridging - Closed 16 Mar 45.
AESP No. 19 - (L0685) PRUM - Class IV and Bridging - VIII Corps troops.
AESP No. 20 -(L7383) MUNSTERMAIFELD - Class IV and Bridging - XII Corps troops.
AESP No. 21 - (L7599) PLAIDT - Class IV and Bridging - VIII Corps troops.
Army Map Depot (P5704) LUXEMBOURG - All troops.
See Administrative Order No. 29 (not to accompany any FO) 112200A March 1945,Hq Third U S Army.
i. No change.
j. No change.

GOHKLIN

DISTRIBUTION:

Engr 6th Army Gp	2	Engr XI Corps	1	Co B, 293d Engr C Bn	1
Engr 12th Army Gp	3	1123d Engr C Gp	3	Co A(-), 602d Engr Cam Bn	1
Engr ASCF	2	1134th Engr C Gp	3	459th Engr Depot Co	1
Engr First US Army	1	1301st Engr GS Regt	3	G-3 TUSA	2
Engr Seventh US Army	1	1303d Engr GS Regt	3	G-4 TUSA	1
Engr VIII Corps	1	1306th Engr GS Regt	3	FN TUSA	1
Engr XII Corps	1	652d Engr Tmp Bn	1	Engr File TUSA	2



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Engineer Operational Instruction No. 33, shown on the preceding page, is an exact reproduction of the order as published with the exception of the overlay which has been superimposed on a 1:500,000 map. In order to provide coherence and present the complete instruction, the paragraphs headed "no change" are extracted from previous instructions and quoted below:

Paragraph 2. - The engineer mission is to support the operations through normal engineer functions.

Paragraph 3. a.- Perform all engineer work in zone (overlay) and support VIII Corps.

Paragraph 3. b.- Coordination of engineer depot haulage activities.

Paragraph 3. c.- Perform all engineer work in zone (overlay) and support XX Corps.

Paragraph 3. d.- Perform all engineer work in zone (overlay) and support XII Corps. Establish and report forward boundary.

Paragraph 3. e.- Perform all engineer work in zone (overlay) and support 1303d Engr GS Regt.

Paragraph 3. f.- Support operations through normal functions.

Paragraph 3. x. (2) (a) - Engineer boundaries between Corps and supporting Army units will be as mutually agreed upon by Corps Engineers and supportin; Army units. Such boundaries will be definitely delineated and will be reported promptly to the Army Engineer.

(b) - Engineer boundaries between mutually supporting Army units will be changed only upon approval of the Army Engineer.

Paragraph 3. x. (3) - Priority of routes for maintenance - see TRAFFIC Section of current Administrative Order and accompanying Traffic Circulation Diagram. Two way Class 70 routes parallel to the axis of movement will be of first priority. All other routes will be of second priority.

Paragraph 3. x. (4) (a) - Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, dated 7 November 1944, subject: "Protection of the Line of Communications." The following delineation of responsibility between Army Engineer and Corps troops will be followed:

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1. Army Engineer troops will be responsible, within their areas of responsibility, for the tactical guarding of such bridges in the Army area as may be designated by the Army Engineer.

2. Corps will be responsible for the tactical guarding of bridges forward of the Corps rear tactical boundary. Exceptions involving the use of Army Engineer troops will be made only on specific instruction of the Army Engineer.

Paragraph 4. b.- 976th Engr Maint Co (P-6023) 1 mi W of ARLON - Maintenance of engineer equipment.

Paragraph 5. - Changes in locations of headquarters charged with submission of Engineer Situation Reports (See Operations Memo No. 25, 27 June 1944, Hq Third U.S. Army) will be reported to the Army Engineer by the most expeditious means available.

ANNEX NO. 10





MONTHLY ISSUES FROM THIRD U S ARMY MAP DEPOT
(25th to 25th of each Month)
----- Quantity in Copies —— Weight in Tons
Weight is based on 12 Sheets per lb for 1/25,000 maps; 10 Sheets per lb for other maps



CUMULATIVE PROGRESS MAP REPRODUCTION
BY ALL AGENCIES THIRD U.S. ARMY

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

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Finance Officer
APO 403

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal.

TO : Commanding General,
Third United States Army.
APO 403, U. S. Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After Action Report of the Finance Section, Third U. S. Army, beginning with March, 1944, and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapter.

2. This report presents a review of the operations of the Finance Section since its arrival in the European Theater of Operations, and includes the planning period in the United Kingdom, the pre-operational period on the Continent, and the operational period of Third U. S. Army.

3. The Finance story is told without attempt to detail the various technical procedures which are more or less standardized by regulations of the War Department, the Treasury Department, and the Comptroller General. It is believed that this concise narrative of operations and problems in the field will serve to present a better general picture of events than a mass of technical data which tends to cloud significant issues.

Chas B Milliken
CHAS. B. MILLIKEN,
Colonel, F. D.,
Finance Officer.

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FINANCE SECTION

FINANCE SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart

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

DUTIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE - FISCAL SUBSECTION

Administrative and Fiscal Officer:
1. Supervises operation of Administrative and Fiscal Section.
2. Verifies Fiscal Reports.
3. Supervises suballotment of funds.
4. Supervises distribution of Finance information.
5. Supervises preparation and flow of correspondence.
6. Supervises consolidation of disbursing and personnel data.

Chief Clerk:
1. Effects flow of correspondence.
2. Supervises filing and reference system.
3. Checks all outgoing and incoming correspondence.

Principal Clerk:
1. Supervises sub-branches.
2. Audits Fiscal Reports.

Stenographic Branch:
1. Performs stenographic functions.
2. Handles all classified documents.
3. Maintains classified files.

Distribution Branch:
1. Maintains current rosters of Finance Officers.
2. Makes distribution of finance information.

Filing Branch:
1. Maintains unclassified files.
2. Posts all circulars and regulations.
3. Maintains office personnel records and rosters.

Fiscal and Report Branch:
1. Consolidates and forwards all administrative reports.
2. Maintains fiscal records.
3. Prepares necessary fiscal reports.
4. Effects proper suballotment of available funds.

MISSION

1. Advise Commanding General on fiscal and finance matters.
2. Supervise fiscal and finance activities within the Army.
3. Supervise payment of Army troops and commercial accounts.
4. Suballot funds to lower units.

DUTIES OF DISBURSING SUBSECTION

Disbursing Officer:
1. Supervises operation of Disbursing Subsection.
2. Verifies cashier and depository transactions.
3. Verifies accounting reports and records.
4. Inspects all vouchers paid.
5. Signs checks.

Deputy Disbursing Officer:
1. Acts as Deputy to Disbursing Officer.
2. Audits cashier's accounts daily.
3. Post-audits all vouchers.
4. Audits all accounting reports and records.

Principal Clerk:
1. Supervises branches.
2. Audits all vouchers before payments.
3. Informs personnel as to changes in regulations.

Cashier:
1. Assists in making cash collections.
2. Makes cash disbursements.
3. Exchanges funds.
4. Prepares daily Cashier's Report.

Accounting Branch:
1. Maintains accounting records.
2. Prepares accounting reports.
3. Prepares checks.

Pay and Allowances Branch:
1. Computes enlisted men's pay and allowances vouchers.
2. Computes officers' pay and allowances vouchers.
3. Prepares pay vouchers of headquarters officers.

Commercial Accounts Branch:
1. Computes commercial accounts vouchers.
2. Maintains Purchasing and Contracting Officers' ledger.

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CHAPTER I
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

Organization.-- The Finance Section of Headquarters Third U. S. Army was organized under the direction of Col. James E. Daly, FD, as an integral part of the staff and primarily as the head of the General Staff Section. The general duties of this section were the administrative and supervision of finance activities and services within the Army and the payment of troops and civilians employed by Army headquarters and assigned troops. To effectively perform this mission, the Finance Section was organized into an Administrative-Fiscal subsection and a Disbursing subsection.

Administration.-- Administrative activities entailed the following duties:

1. Distribution of technical finance information to finance officers, staff sections, divisions and corps finance offices.

2. Centralization of monthly reports of disbursements, personnel, etc., and monthly analyses of disbursements and collections for submission to higher headquarters.

3. Handling of technical questions.

4. Preparation of the finance plan for combat operations.

5. Inspection of finance offices under Army jurisdiction.

6. Preparations to effect purchasing and contracting in the event it proved necessary. Grant Officer Orders, instructing finance officers to purchase and contract with Contracting Officers, and issuing necessary DA forms.

Corps and divisions were provided with organic finance sections. Service units, however, had no organic finance units; consequently, the effective payment of Army and Corps troops in the Zone of the Interior was made the responsibility of Continental Communications Zone Finance Disbursing Sections, on a basis of one section per 15,000 troops. Sections were attached as follows:

7 Sections	to Army
1 Section	to VIII Corps
2 Sections	to III Corps
2 Sections	to XV Corps
2 Sections	to XX Corps

The finance plan for accounting and for continental operations was prepared and published in Third U. S. Army Administrative Orders. The complete plan is included as Annex No. 1.

In order to determine the operational efficiency and the adequacy of personnel and equipment, inspections were made of Corps, Division, and Finance Disbursing Sections prior to movement to the Continent. A certain amount of francs currency was distributed to each Disbursing Officer prior to his departure from the United Kingdom, and authority was granted him to keep $400,000.00 cash on hand.

For the cross-channel operation Finance Disbursing Sections were phased so that service could be maintained on the Continent according to troop strength. Since Finance Disbursing Sections had no organic transportation or messing facilities, it was necessary to phase the sections with other units to assure the availability of such facilities. Section equipment was shipped from home stations to the Continent by Communications Zone.

During their stay in the United Kingdom, Corps, Divisions and Finance Disbursing Sections performed regular finance functions. A summary report of operations for all Finance Offices of Third U. S. Army is presented as Annex No. 2.

Fiscal.-- Upon arrival in the United Kingdom, an unlimited allotment of Finance Department General Allotment Funds was issued to the Army Commander. Specific allotments of Contingencies of the Army Funds in amount of $1,540 for entertainment and $1,000 for military intelligence were received. The Army was designated a procurement agency with

ARMY FISCAL ORGANIZATION CHART



authority to suballot funds to Corps and Divisions. Corps and Divisions were appointed procurement agencies and suballotments were made on the following approximate basis:

	Contingencies of Army Funds Military Intelligence	Contingencies of Army Funds Entertainment	All other Funds FDGA 60-136
Each Corps	$750.00	$100.00	Unlimited
Each Division	$500.00	$ 50.00	Unlimited

Fiscal records were set up to record obligations of Army units and to consolidate the obligation reports submitted by Corps and Divisions. The monthly consolidated obligation reports were submitted to the Fiscal Director, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army. Funds obligated by Third U. S. Army Units are shown in Annex Number 3.

In view of continental operations an increase of $160,000 in Contingency of the Army funds for Military Intelligence purposes was requested and received. Corps Military Intelligence funds were increased to $10,000 and Divisions to $4,000.

Disbursing.-- The Disbursing subsection consisted of fourteen men. It was organized into Accounting, Pay and Allowances, and Commercial Accounts Branches.

Inasmuch as the section equipment was not available until several weeks after the arrival of the personnel in the United Kingdom, the Fiscal Officer, Western Base Section provided finance service for Headquarters, Third U. S. Army through a Class "B" Agent Office consisting of one warrant officer and two enlisted men from the 71st Finance Disbursing Section.

In order to obtain actual experience in problems and policies of European Theater of Operations, two officers and thirteen enlisted men were placed on temporary duty with Base Section Finance Disbursing Sections. In addition three enlisted men were sent for a short period to the Accounts Branch, Office of the Fiscal Director to learn its requirements regarding the preparation of vouchers, daily reports and capital papers.

Prior to the opening of the Army Disbursing Account, it was necessary to take care of certain technical matters pertaining to the account. These were as follows:

1. Obtained all necessary finance instructions pertaining to disbursing in the European Theater of Operations; these instructions were contained primarily in Finance Circular Letters issued by the Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army.

2. Reported total accountability to the Accounts Branch, Office of the Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army.

3. Forwarded signature cards of Disbursing Officer and Deputy Disbursing Officer to Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, for transmittal to the Guaranty Trust Company, of New York, London Branch, a general depository of the Treasurer of the United States, and to Barclays Bank, Ltd., local depository, to be used in verifying indorsements on deposits.

4. Reduced balance with the Treasurer of the United States to $1,000.

5. Forwarded surplus Treasury Checks to Accounts Branch, Office of the Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, for storage.

6. Secured the Appointment of Deputy Disbursing Officer as Sterling Deputy.

7. Obtained sufficient sterling funds for one month's disbursements from Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army.

8. Opened checking account with Barclays Bank, Ltd., and obtained supply of checks.

The Disbursing Account was opened in the European Theater of Oper-

ations on 6 April. The usual functions of disbursing were performed thereafter.

Prior to the departure of Headquarters for the Continent, one set of francs invasion currency was distributed to Disbursing Officers of Corps, Divisions and attached Finance sections as follows:

Boxes	Denomination	No. of Notes Per Set	Francs Set Value
2	2 francs	128,000	256,000
1	5	64,000	320,000
1	10	64,000	640,000
1	50	32,000	1,600,000
1	100	32,000	3,200,000
1	500	32,000	16,000,000
Total 7			22,016,000

Francs were distributed also to Purchasing and Contracting Officers appointed by Headquarters Third U. S. Army to be used for purchases on the Continent. These funds were distributed in sealed boxes, each box containing a total of 40,000 francs as follows:

Denomination	No. of Notes	Francs Value
5 francs	1,000	5,000
100 francs	350	35,000
	Total	40,000

To facilitate the computation of exchange on the Continent, conversion tables were compiled based on the rate of exchange set by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. These tables showed the conversion of Dollars and Sterling to Francs.

Inasmuch as Forward Echelon of Headquarters was scheduled to precede the Rear Echelon by two weeks, an Agent Finance Officer and three enlisted men from the Finance Section were designated to accompany the Forward Echelon. The mission of this group was to pay Headquarters personnel and convert personal funds to francs.

Before actual departure for the Continent American and British funds on hand were deposited, and the treasury balance and Barclay's balance were transferred to the Central Disbursing Officer in London. Surplus Treasury checks were forwarded to the Accounts Branch, Office of the Fiscal Director for safekeeping, and Barclay's checks were returned to the local depository.

Military personnel retained only a small portion of the pay and allowances they received while in the United Kingdom, most of it being returned to the United States in the form of allotments, personal transfer accounts or war bond purchases. The disposition of pay and allowances received by military personnel is shown in Annex No. 4.

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

As Finance Disbursing Sections arrived on the Continent, they were bivouaced according to troop density. A study was made of the tactical plan of operations in order that sections could follow up the main attack.

Upon receipt of final obligation reports for the fiscal year 1943-1944, 1944-45 funds were suballotted in amounts equal to the unobligated balances reported for 1943-44. Instructions were issued to Corps and Divisions to include obligations of Purchasing and Contracting Officers in future monthly obligation reports. Funds obligated during July, 1944 by units of Third U. S. Army are shown in Annex No. 5.

For the month of July approximately 1200 officers and 22,000 enlisted men were paid by the disbursing subsection assisted by the 11th Finance Disbursing Section. Of over $700,000 cash disbursements, more than $500,000 was returned in cash collections. A summary report of operations for July, 1944 of all Finance Offices of Third U. S. Army is presented in Annex No. 6; and the Disposition of Pay and Allowances of Third U. S. Army Military Personnel is shown in Annex No. 7.

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

After the Third U. S. Army became operational administrative duties became too voluminous to permit the Headquarters Finance Section to continue disbursing. Disbursing functions, consequently, were turned over to the 11th Finance Disbursing Section which was attached to Headquarters Special Troops; and later the 78th Finance Disbursing Section also was attached to assist in providing finance service to Army troops.

The Headquarters Finance Section was divided into two subsections, Administrative and Personnel. The personnel subsection prepared officers vouchers for the Headquarters and assigned troops and submitted them to the 11th Finance Disbursing Section for payment.

With the breakthrough of Third U. S. Army below Avranches, no trucks were available to move finance sections. In an effort to solve the transportation problem, Army Disbursing Sections were attached to other units with organic transportation as shown below:

Disbursing Section	Unit To Which Attached
11th Finance Disbursing Section -	Headquarters Third U S Army
56th Finance Disbursing Section -	121st Evacuation Hospital
71st Finance Disbursing Section -	48th Replacement Battalion
75th Finance Disbursing Section -	13th Evacuation Hospital
78th Finance Disbursing Section -	Headquarters Third U S Army
81st Finance Disbursing Section -	105rd Evacuation Hospital
98th Finance Disbursing Section -	136th Evacuation Hospital
94th Finance Disbursing Section -	55rd Replacement Battalion

Rapid movement over a large area made communications between this office and Finance sections, and between Finance sections and the units they were serving, extremely difficult. Keeping the units advised of the movement of Finance Disbursing Sections was solved by publishing locations in Administrative Orders. Maintaining service for corps troops was relatively simpler because Finance Disbursing Sections attached to Corps remained with, or near, the Corps Rear Echelons. Authority was obtained to issue one captured vehicle to each section in order to alleviate the transportation problem.

The amount of funds obligated by units of Third U. S. Army during August 1944 is shown in Annex No. 8; and a summary report of operations for the month for all Finance Offices of Third U. S. Army is given in Annex No. 9.

Third U. S. Army personnel retained only 11 per cent of their pay during the month of August, the balance being returned to the United States. Annex No. 10 shows the disposition of pay and allowances of military personnel.

CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

The number of Finance Disbursing Sections servicing Army and Corps troops was reduced to two sections for Army troops and two sections for each Corps. All other Disbursing Sections originally attached to Third U. S. Army reverted to the control of Advance Section, Communications Zone, but continued to assist in servicing Army and Corps troops. The locations of Finance Disbursing Sections were published periodically in Administrative Orders.

As a means of increasing mobility, each Corps Finance Disbursing Section was allocated one weapons carrier. Advance Section, Communications Zone Disbursing Sections operating in Army area were furnished two personnel carriers with trailers.

Allied Military Marks totalling 165,296,000 were distributed among Disbursing Officers. Each Disbursing Officer received one set of the following composition:

Boxes	Denomination	Number of Notes Per Set	Mark Value
1	100 marks	32,000	3,200,000
1	50 marks	32,000	1,600,000
1	20 marks	32,000	640,000
1	10 marks	32,000	320,000
1	5 marks	64,000	320,000
1	1 mark	64,000	64,000
1	½ mark	64,000	32,000
TOTAL 7			6,256,000

In addition, Belgium francs totalling 61,032,000 were distributed to those Disbursing Officers attached to Third U. S. Army and paying troops in Luxembourg. Rates of exchange between the Dollar, the German Mark and the Belgian Franc were set by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces as follows:

One Dollar equals 10 German Marks
One Dollar equals 43.7732 Belgium Francs

The finance plan for continental operations was revised and published in Third U. S. Army Administrative Orders. The revised plan is shown in Annex No. 11.

Original specific suballotments of Military Intelligence and Entertainment funds were issued to each new division and corps; they were designated also as a procurement agency to use all other overseas appropriations, Monthly Obligation Reports were received, consolidated, and forwarded to the Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations. Funds obligated by units of Third U. S. Army are shown in Annex No. 12.

The per cent of pay retained by Third U. S. Army personnel during the month of September was only 6.3 per cent, which partially accounts for the fact that the aggregate cash collections of all Finance Officers of Third U. S. Army exceeded the total amount disbursed. A summary report of operations of all Finance Officers of Third U. S. Army is included as Appendix No. 13; and the disposition of pay and allowances of military personnel is shown in Annex No. 14.

CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

A supply point was established in Third U. S. Army area for supplying currency and finance forms and for accepting sterling, dollars, negotiable instruments and surplus marks and francs. This supply point was located at [illegible] (NVL 1954.3) - Northwest Europe 1:250,000) and was operated by the 88th Finance Disbursing Section.

The 98nd Finance Disbursing Section was attached to Army and further attached to III Corps Headquarters. The Finance Officers of both units conferred with the Army Finance Officer regarding technical procedures and administration. Two weapons carriers were secured and issued to the 98rd Finance Disbursing Section for transportation unprovided in the Table of Organization for such a unit.

Instructions were issued to Finance Officers that until such time as German-issued "Reichsmarks" and "Rentenmarks" were placed in general circulation by Disbursing Officers, German-issued marks would not be accepted in denominations of 100 marks or greater; and German-issued marks that gave a date of issue prior to 1 September 1944 were not acceptable currency. No restrictions were placed on the use of Allied Military Authority Mark Notes.

Finance Officers serving Third U. S. Army troops in Luxembourg were advised of the program announced by Luxembourg authorities to withdraw German marks as legal tender and substitute therefor new Belgium francs and Luxembourg francs at the rate of one mark for 12.5 Belgium or Luxembourg francs. A special rate of exchange was provided for those military personnel who had received German marks as change in commercial transactions when the mark was legal tender and enjoyed a high rate of exchange. This special rate was one mark for 12.5 Belgian francs or Luxembourg francs; however, only a maximum of 50 marks per person could be exchanged at this rate.

In order to afford military personnel a means of safeguarding their funds during periods of duty in combat zone "Dreerhead Deposits" were made available. "Dreerhead Deposits" were temporary deposits made by military personnel with Finance Officers and repayable by any Finance Officer upon presentation of a proper voucher. These deposits were non-interest bearing.

During the month several reassigned corps and divisions reported Military Intelligence and entertainment funds for withdrawal and the balances were withdrawn and reissued to new units as necessary. Instructions were issued stating that upon reassignment of a corps or division cumulative totals of obligations and expenditures under general suballotments Finance Department General Allotment 60 funds would be reported to the new suballotting agency and a final report to this office was unnecessary.

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CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS



CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS



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CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

The 153rd Finance Disbursing Section opened at the 6th Convalescent Hospital at METZ (M9629) for the purpose of servicing Army troops in that area. As the 153rd Finance Disbursing Section had arrived recently on the Continent and was unfamiliar with Continental Disbursing, an officer and an enlisted man from the Headquarters Finance Section were attached for temporary duty with the section in order to assist it in the activation of its account.

The limitation against exchanging Continental currencies used by the Third U. S. Army for sterling and dollar currency by personnel leaving the Continent was removed. A revised directive on German money and exchange procedure was issued. The information contained in this directive is shown in Annex No. 27.

Old issue Belgium notes in denomination of 100 francs and above were found to be in the possession of some Finance Officers. These notes were no longer negotiable, as they had been withdrawn from circulation by the Belgium authorities in October, 1944; consequently, it was necessary to arrange a redemption procedure for these notes with the National Bank of Belgium.

Finance Officers were ordered to accept old issue Belgian notes in denomination of 100 francs and above only upon presentation of a certificate from the individual stating that the notes were acquired through the source of pay and allowances received on or before 30 September 1944. This precaution was necessary, because reports had been received that large quantities of old issue Belgian notes were in the possession of Germans captured during the recent German Offensive in Belgium and Luxembourg.

All Finance Officers were informed that counterfeit Belgian Five Franc coins were in circulation. Instructions as to the means of differentiating between the counterfeit and the real coins were issued.

The distribution of procurement directives and forms for requisition and purchase through civilian channels were turned over to the Third U. S. Army Adjutant General. Only the procurement forms involving cash payments were retained by the Third U. S. Army Finance Office for distribution to Purchasing and Contracting Officers requiring them.

Military Intelligence funds and ETO open allotment funds were suballotted to new divisions assigned to Third U. S. Army. Funds were withdrawn from divisions and corps relieved from assignment to Third U. S. Army.

Monthly Reports and Analysis of Disbursements and Collections were consolidated and forwarded to the Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army. Technical Finance information was distributed to all Finance Officers. Reports of Survey were processed, reviewed, or approved and proper disposition made in accordance with new Theater directives.

Annex No. 28 shows the amount of funds obligated by units of Third U. S. Army. A report of the operations of all Finance Officers is summarized in Annex No. 29. The disposition of pay and allowances of Third U. S. Army Military Personnel is given in Annex No. 30.

CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

Finance Officers of Third U. S. Army were informed of the program of the French Ministry of Finance to exchange all holdings of Reichsmarks in the Departments of Haut Rhin and Bas Rhin in eastern France at the rate of 15 French Francs for 1 Reichsmark. Finance Officers were authorized to exchange at this favorable rate Reichsmarks acquired by military personnel as change in these Departments; however, the amount that could be exchanged by military personnel was limited to 50 Reichsmarks per individual.

An estimate of the quantity and kind of Finance forms required by Third U. S. Army units was submitted to the Fiscal Director, Advance Section, Communications Zone, in order that an adequate supply of forms would be available at all times. The 46th Finance Disbursing Section located at LUXEMBOURG, Luxembourg (P8315) continued to be the supply point for Finance forms, as well as the funding office, for the Third U. S. Army Zone.

Third U. S. Army Finance Officers were ordered to pay troops serving in Germany in Allied Military Marks only and to exchange all currencies, other than marks, in the possession of troops in Germany for Allied Military Marks. This was done in order to prevent the illegal requisition and return through military and civilian channels of currencies illegally obtained and to prevent black market activities in currencies.

Descriptions of additional valid Netherlands Banknotes were issued. The exchange rate for the Swedish Krona was set at 4.1957; Swedish Kronors equal $1.00.

Change List Guides for pay rolls computed in German marks were prepared and issued to all Finance Officers for optional use. Technical finance information was distributed to all finance units.

Reports of funds obligated by units of Third U. S. Army were prepared and forwarded to the Fiscal Director. A summary report of funds obligated is given in Appendix No. 31.

Operations of all Finance Offices of Third U. S. Army for the month are summarized in Appendix No. 32. The disposition of pay and allowances of Third U. S. Army military personnel is presented in Annex No. 33.

CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

The advance of the Third U. S. Army through Germany was so rapid and so extensive that contact with the Funding Office of Advance Section, Communications Zone was impracticable. It became necessary, consequently, for the Headquarters Finance Section to take over the funding of all Finance Officers assigned to Third U. S. Army. It also was necessary to maintain an emergency supply of blank finance forms on hand for Finance Officers inasmuch as the usual Advance Section, Communications Zone supply point was inaccessible.

Conversion into Allied Military Marks of all approved currencies other than marks was made for military personnel in Germany. All accumulated surplus currencies of allied countries were returned to the Funding Officer for return to the various governments of liberated countries.

In order to provide Belgian civilians employed in Germany by the United States forces an opportunity to transmit to their families funds received as wages, an agreement was reached with the Belgian Government whereby the wages of the Belgian nationals could be credited to a personal account or remitted to their families by the Belgian Government. The part of their pay that was to be retained by the civilian employees was to be paid by the using service. Similar agreements were being negotiated with the French, Luxembourg, and Netherland Governments.

Five tons of Allied Military Austrian Shillings were requisitioned for the payment of the Third U. S. Army troops who had fought their way into Austria. The rate of exchange was set at ten Austrian Shillings for one U. S. Dollar.

A conference of Corps Finance Officers was held for the purpose of discussing the finance plan to be inaugurated in the Third U. S. Army Zone of Occupation in Germany.

Plans for the payment of repatriated United States and British Prisoners of War were formulated. Several tons of currency, personal effects, and records belonging to United States and Allied Prisoners of War were captured in overrun Prisoner of War Camps. The currency, records and personal effects were forwarded to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force for processing and return to their rightful owner.

An investigation was made of the pay status of enlisted personnel of the Third U. S. Army. This survey covered the extent of pay delinquency, the reasons therefor, and the possibilities of eliminating pay delinquency. The report is presented in Annex No. 34.

The 114th, 153rd, and 154th Finance Disbursing Sections were reorganized under Table of Organization and Equipment No. 14-500, dated 2 April 1944. The new Table of Organization provided for 2 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 17 enlisted men and resulted in a net loss of 2 enlisted men from each section. The surplus enlisted men were assigned to other Finance Disbursing Sections.

Finance instructions for Third U. S. Army troops were revised and published. These instructions are shown in Annex No. 35.

Action reports submitted by Purchasing and Contracting Officers revealed that procurement by each was practically non-existent since operations were almost entirely in Germany where all necessary unlicensed items were procured through requisition or seizure. Cash payments, however, were made to civilian employees for labor performed. Proper Finance procurement forms were distributed to Purchasing and Contracting Officers as needed. The list of Army Purchasing and Contracting Officers was brought up to date and the General Purchasing Agent, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, notified.

The shift of corps and divisions to and from Third Army command increased considerably the withdrawals and suballotments of funds during the month. In some cases divisions were reassigned before the funds could be used. This fluidity of units made the procedure requiring final obligation reports upon reassignment on open allotments of Finance Department General Allotment Funds impracticable in many instances. For maximum utilization of funds withdrawals were executed before final reports were received and proper adjustment made later upon receipt of the obligations incurred. A summary of the consolidated obligation report of April for the entire Army is shown as Annex No. 36.

Monthly Reports and Analysis of Disbursements and Collections for April were rendered to the Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations. A summary report of operations for all Finance Officers of Third U. S. Army is presented in Annex No. 37. The disposition of pay and allowances of Third U. S. Army military personnel is given in Annex No. 38.

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

A revised currency policy for Germany was formulated. This policy provided that troops in Germany would be paid in Allied Military Authority Marks only. All currencies other than Allied Military Marks held by troops stationed in Germany were to be exchanged for Allied Military Authority Marks not later than 25 May 1945. After the deadline date, Finance Officers were to exchange other currencies only upon presentation of official orders which legitimized possession of such currencies, or by a full explanation by a unit commander of field grade of the special circumstances which made the exchange necessary and proper.

A shipment of 16,320,000 Schillings of Allied Military Austrian Currency was received for funding the Finance Officer paying Third U. S. Army troops stationed in Austria. The Austrian Currency was distributed to Finance Officers in sets of eight boxes of the following composition:

Boxes	Denomination	No. of Notes Per Box	Schillings Value
1	100 Schillings	30,000	3,000,000
1	50 Schillings	40,000	2,000,000
1	20 Schillings	40,000	800,000
1	10 Schillings	90,000	900,000
1	5 Schillings	90,000	450,000
1	2 Schillings	60,000	120,000
1	1 Schilling	60,000	60,000
1	50 Groschen	60,000	30,000
Total 8			6,760,000

Fiscal procedures for Redeployment and Readjustment after the cessation of hostilities in the European Theater of Operations were formulated. A copy of the basic plan is included as Annex No. 40.

The stabilization of the Third U. S. Army Area made it necessary to reassign the Finance disbursing sections for better geographical troop coverage. The three sections situated at Third U. S. Army Rear Echelon and working as one unit opened their respective disbursing accounts and were attached to III Corps. They were located as follows:

78th Finance Disbursing Section at ERFURT (O-3627), Germany
114th Finance Disbursing Section at BAMBERG (O-2719), Germany
154th Finance Disbursing Section at WEISSENBURG (T-3653), Germany

In addition, the 153rd Finance Disbursing Section was relieved from attachment to the 6th Convalescent Hospital, attached to XII Corps, and located at AMBERG (O-9901), Germany. It was found advisable for security reasons to place these installations in bank buildings near other troops. The 78th Finance Disbursing Section dispensed with disbursing duties and acted solely as a funding agent for Finance Officers in the Third U. S. Army Zone. The Army Headquarters Finance Section ceased funding and resumed disbursing duties, paying headquarters personnel and units attached as special troops.

In order to facilitate Finance service, 1 truck, 3/4-ton (Weapons Carrier) was authorized the 114th, 153rd, and 154th Finance Disbursing Sections. The 78th Finance Disbursing Section because of its specialized funding activity was authorized two trucks, 3/4-ton (Weapons Carrier).

Due to the rapid reassignment of divisions a considerable number of suballotments and withdrawals of funds were effected.

An additional report of [illegible] Finance Department was submitted in compliance [illegible] survey of all outstanding [illegible] sealed no outstanding

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CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

1. The Finance Disbursing Sections assigned to the Third U. S. Army were organized under Table of Organization and Equipment No. 14-500. During field operations these organizations were found to have certain limitations which are listed below.

a. No cashiers are provided in the Table of Organization, although in combat all business is in cash and three or four cashiers are required at all times.

b. Finance Disbursing Sections are not self sufficient for mess and transportation; consequently it was necessary to attach the sections to other units with organic mess and transportation.

c. Table of Equipment provides only one ¼-ton truck. This was found insufficient to transport large volumes of cash to and from the Funding Office.

2. One Finance Disbursing Section is required in close support of each Army to act as a Funding Office (clearing house) for the Army, Corps and Division disbursing offices. Although this service was provided by Advance Section, Communications Zone, often times the Funding Office was so far to the rear that there was an unnecessary waste of time, transportation and gasoline. It would be more efficient to have a Funding Office assigned to each Army.

3. One Finance Disbursing Section should be attached to each Corps Headquarters for the purpose of rendering disbursing service to all Corps troops. The size of the section should be determined by the number of Corps troops to be served.

4. In order that Finance Disbursing Sections may be located easily by the units being served, they should be in the vicinity of rear echelons of Army and Corps Headquarters when the Army is operational. In a static situation, they should be located according to troop density.

5. In the invasion of Europe four different types of invasion currencies were used; namely, French, German, Austrian, and Italian Allied Military Notes. This required the conversion and reconversion of funds in the hands of troops each time that they entered or left an European country. Most of this exchange could have been eliminated if one type of invasion currency had been issued for use in all of the countries. The equivalent of the currency of the invaded countries would have to be stated on each invasion note; for example, there would be stated on a One Dollar ($1.00) Invasion Note that it was worth 50 French Francs, 10 German Marks, 10 Austrian Schillings or 100 Italian Lire. The Invasion Note would circulate at par with the currency of the country in which the troops were stationed.

6. The suballotment of funds to Corps and Divisions was a function of the Finance Section of Army Headquarters. As long as Corps and Divisions were static the system worked well, but the numerous interchanges of Corps and Divisions during combat made contact with suballottees and control of funds from Army level impracticable. There was a continual process of suballotting, withdrawing, and resuballotting to the same Corps and divisions as they were shifted back and forth between Armies. Considerable paper work and confusion would be eliminated if all funds were suballotted by one central office in the Theater of Operations.

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ANNEXES

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ANNEX NO. 1

FINANCE PLAN FOR MOUNTING AND CONTINENTAL OPERATIONS

1. General. French currency only will be used on the Continent. The rate of exchange is 49.5663 francs equals $1.00 or 200 francs equals one pound. Neither dollar nor sterling will be legal tender. All personnel are prohibited from accepting British or American currency. Personnel violating this order will be subject to courtsmartial. All foreign financial and foreign trade transactions, and all exports and imports of currency by any member of the armed forces, is prohibited except as permitted under regulations issued by authority of the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army. Initially all payments by Disbursing Officers will be in cash.

2. Mounting Operations.

a. Disposition of Surplus Funds.

(1) Unit commanders will be responsible that all sterling and dollar currency, except a sum not exceeding 10 shillings to cover purchases in the concentration and marshalling areas, is disposed of or exchanged by all members of their command. Facilities of static SOS Finance Units will be utilized insofar as possible.

(2) Military personnel may dispose of their excess funds by one of the following methods:

(a) Soldiers' Deposits (Enlisted personnel only)
(b) Purchase of War Bonds.
(c) Transmission of funds to the United States by FTA.

b. Partial Pay and Currency Exchange.

(1) Personnel officers will prepare partial payment payrolls (WD Form 366a) by organizations in sufficient copies to provide an original and two copies for each part of his organization called forward from the concentration area or home station. Such payrolls will include the names of all officers and enlisted men, attached and assigned, and one copy for each part of the organization will be properly signed before leaving the concentration area. The amount to be paid each man will be $1.05.

(2) One signed and two copies of payroll will be furnished the officer or non-commissioned officer in charge of each part of the organization which departs from the concentration area or home station or which will be detached from the organization prior to briefing. The names of all personnel not included in that part will be red-lined.

(3) On the triplicate, or retained copy, of the payroll, the amounts turned in for conversion will be entered opposite each name under the column general heading "Collections" or "Analysis of Collections" changed to read "Personal Funds". Separate columns will be used for pounds and shillings, and dollars (if any) and the last collection column will be left blank for use by the Finance Officer in entering therein the converted amounts.

(4) All 3 copies of the payroll, together with the personal funds collected for exchange will be entrusted to the officer or non-commissioned officer in charge of each detached party who will deliver payrolls and total cash to be exchanged to the Finance Officer assigned to his camp in the marshalling area, as soon as the camps are sealed. The Finance Officer will turn over to the unit or detachment commander, currency in proper denominations to cover the partial payments and a separate amount to cover the exchange of personal funds. The unit or detachment commander will complete the certificates as to payments on the original and duplicate copies of Form 366 at the time he obtains the funds. Triplicate copy, on which are shown the amounts to be exchanged for each man, will be retained by his and used for the purpose of paying the men the amounts due. The triplicate copy of the payroll will be turned over by the unit or detachment commander to his personnel officer at the earliest opportunity. Partial payments and exchange of currency will be made to troops immediately after briefing and prior to the further breakdown of units or detachments into unit parties (components of craft loads).

c. Unit and Hospital Funds.

(1) Custodians of Unit or Hospital Funds will turn over funds held in cash to their organizational or other Disbursing Officer who will issue a receipt (WD FD Form 38), or issue a Sterling Check for the amount of the funds.

(2) Repayment will be made by any Disbursing Officer upon surrendering the receipt (WD FD Form 38) or check.

(3) Funds deposited in registered bank accounts in the United Kingdom will not be withdrawn prior to embarkation. After the completion of the movement, the custodian of the funds will present a Sterling Check covering the balance of the registered bank account to his organizational or other Disbursing Officer who will effect payment in the appropriate currency.

3. Continental Operations.

a. Technical Finance Operating Procedure. Technical Finance Operating Procedure will be in accordance with "ETO-SOP No. 11 - Finance", Hq ETOUSA, dated 20 April 1944, as amended. Disbursing Officers should consult the SOP concerning their duties in regard to the following subparagraphs. Disbursing Officers should carry sufficient supplies to operate for sixty (60) days.

b. Currency Supply. Initial re-supply of currency for all troops on the Continent will be through the Fiscal Officer, Advance Section, Communications Zone. When Forward Echelon, Communications Zone becomes operational, supply of currency for all troops on the Continent will be through the Fiscal Director, Communications Zone.

c. Army Exchange Funds. Army Exchange Officers will deposit receipts from sales at Army Exchanges with Disbursing Officers.

d. Postal Funds. Postal Officers will turn in funds derived from sale of postal money orders and stamps to Disbursing Officers.

e. Special Service Funds. Stars and Stripes Routemen (enlisted men who are authorized to sell Stars and Stripes) and officers will turn in funds received from sale of Stars and Stripes and Yank, to Disbursing Officers.

f. Fiscal Procedure. See Annex No. 5 (Procurement Directive No. 1).

g. Procurement Procedure. See Annex No. 5 (Procurement Directive No. 1).

h. Enemy Funds. Any funds captured or received belonging to the enemy government or any of its departments or agencies which comes into the possession of military personnel will be promptly remitted without deduction to the nearest Disbursing Officer with full information as to the source from which the funds were received.

i. Funds of U S military personnel officially reported dead, killed in action, missing in action, missing, interned or captured by the enemy, and funds of deceased allied personnel will be turned in to the nearest Disbursing Officer with full information as to name, rank, serial number, status (KIA, MIA, etc.), organization and amount pertaining to each individual.

j. Repatriated Prisoners of War. Payment of repatriated Prisoners of War will be in conformity with directive to be issued by SHAEF.

k. Advances of Funds to Civil Affairs Officers. Civil Affairs Officers in need of funds during the early states of the operation and later in emergency situations, may secure such funds from Disbursing Officers.

l. Finance Service for duly accredited US War Correspondents and British War Correspondents attached to American units.

(1) Disbursing Officers are authorized to cash US Post Office Money Orders or Travelers' Checks for all duly accredited US War Correspondents.

(2) The privilege of Personal Transmission Accounts now afforded military personnel will be extended to duly accredited US War Correspondents.

(3) Accredited US Correspondents may have additional funds transmitted to them from the US by making arrangements with their home office in the US, who will be required to deposit in advance, such sums as they desire with the Central Disbursing Officer, APO 887.

(4) Disbursing Officers will make advances of pay to British War Correspondents on British advance of pay forms W-3241.

m. Vouchers covering travel and allowances to Allied personnel. Disbursing Officers will not make payment of vouchers covering allowances for travel, subsistence or quarters, presented by personnel of the Allied Forces. Such vouchers should be submitted through proper channels of the force concerned.

n. Troops departing from the Continent. No exchange of currency will be made for troops or civilian personnel when leaving the Continent. The exchange of currency for the appropriate currency of the country which troops or civilian personnel are to enter will be made on arrival at the port of debarkation.

ANNEX NO. 2

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
MARCH, 1944 TO JUNE, 1944

	March	April	May	June
Collections	$ 891,169	$ 925,982	$ 3,913,169	$5,599,371
Disbursements	$5,830,373	$4,455,352	$10,536,451	$7,080,899
Vouchers Processed	6,641	7,926	21,193	20,308
Personnel Paid	*	*	215,591	216,900
Finance Personnel on Duty	191	234	504	439
Officers	23	30	60	48
Warrant Officers	7	8	21	21
Enlisted Personnel	161	196	423	370

*Data not available

ANNEX NO. 3

FUNDS OBLIGATED
BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
MARCH, 1944 TO JUNE, 1944

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/40102	$2,851.15
Special Field Exercises, Army	212/40310	192.24
Supplies and Transportation, Army	212/40502	3,707.09
Signal Services of the Army	212/40605	110.51
Medical and Hospital Department, Army	212/40805	5.65
Engineer Services, Army	212/40905	354.11
Ordnance Service and Supplies, Army	212/41005	20.45
Total		$7,271.20

ANNEX NO. 4

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
MARCH, 1944 TO JUNE, 1944

	March	April	May	June
Total Pay & Allowances	$7,619,150	$9,011,986	$20,920,997	$18,787,103
Disposition (in percent)				
Family & Individual Allotments	37.2%	38.9%	39.3%	40.3%
Government Insurance	7.2	7.1	7.0	6.7
War Bonds	5.6	5.1	6.4	6.9
Soldiers' Deposits	.9	.7	1.3	1.2
Personal Transfers	8.1	7.3	14.5	14.7
Other Collections	1.8	1.8	2.5	2.3
Cash Payments	38.9	39.1	29.2	27.9
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

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ANNEX NO. 5

FUNDS OBLIGATED
BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
JULY, 194[illegible]

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	$ 45.00
Quartermaster Service, Army	212/[illegible]502	420.00
Signal Service of the Army	212/[illegible]605	17.00
Engineer Service, Army	212/[illegible]0905	433.00
Total		$1215.00

ANNEX NO. 6

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
JULY, 194[illegible]

Collections	$ 3,890,052
Disbursements	7,600,[illegible]30
Vouchers Processed	12,[illegible]47
Personnel Paid	169,300
Finance Personnel on Duty	[illegible]7
Officers	[illegible]3
Warrant Officers	14
Enlisted Personnel	319

ANNEX NO. 7

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
JULY, 194[illegible]

Total Pay and Allowances	$15,765,293
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	40.6%
Government Insurance	6.8
War Bonds	7.5
Soldiers' Deposits	1.[illegible]
Personal Transfers	19.5
Other Collections	2.9
Retained	21.[illegible]
Total	100.0%

ANNEX NO. 8

FUNDS OBLIGATED
BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
AUGUST, 194[illegible]

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	$2,21[illegible].00
Finance Service Army, Pay Civilian Employees Military Headquarters	212/50[illegible]25	56.00
Quartermaster Service, Army	212/[illegible]502	[illegible]4.00
Engineer Service, Army	212/50905	231.00
Total		$2,921.00

ANNEX NO. 9

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
AUGUST, 194[illegible]

Collections	$7,097,115
Disbursements	9,523,27[illegible]
Vouchers Processed	17,253
Personnel Paid	193,669
Finance Personnel on Duty	522
Officers	[illegible]8
Warrant Officers	21
Enlisted Personnel	[illegible]0

ANNEX NO. 10

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
AUGUST, 194[illegible]

Total Pay and Allowances	$21,527,000
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	[illegible]2.1[illegible]%
Government Insurance	7.2
War Bonds	6.8
Soldiers' Deposits	2.0
Personal Transfers	27.[illegible]
Other Collections	3.2
Retained	11.0
Total	100.0%

ANNEX NO. 11

THIRD U. S. ARMY
FINANCE PLAN FOR CONTINENTAL OPERATIONS

1. Rates of Exchange.

[illegible]0.5663 French francs equals	$1.00
[illegible]3.7732 Belgian francs equals	$1.00
1 pound Sterling equals	$[illegible].035
10 German marks equals	$1.00

2. Legal Tender.

a. Personnel are prohibited from having British or American currency in their possession on the Continent. All such currency will be exchanged for legal tender of the country in which serving.

b. Legal tender for continental countries is as follows:

France (including Alsace, Lorraine and Moselle)	French francs
Belgium	Belgian francs
Luxembourg	*Belgian francs
Germany	German marks

*Luxembourg may issue its own currency at a later date.

3. Financial Transactions. Except as permitted under regulations issued by authority of the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, foreign financial and foreign trade transactions, and exports and imports of currency by any member of the Armed Forces is prohibited.

4. Technical Finance Operating Procedure. Technical Finance Operating Procedure will be in accordance with "ETO-SOP No. 11 - Fiscal Procedures", Volume I, Headquarters ETO, dated 31 August 194[illegible].

5. Funding Service. The Disbursing Officer, Headquarters Third U. S. Army will act as funding officer for Corps, Divisions and separate Disbursing Officers. This service will include (1) supply of currency, (2) acceptance of sterling and dollar currency, (3) supply of blank forms, etc. Checks and postal money orders will be accepted for transmission to the Central Disbursing Officer, provided "Invoice of Funds Transferred" WD Form 326, is made out to Lt. Colonel C. C. Beely, FD, symbol number 210-930. Similar funding service is also maintained by the Fiscal Officer, Advance Section, Communications Zone, for those Disbursing Officers located closer to Advance Section, Communications Zone.

6. Army Exchange Funds. Army Exchange Officers will deposit receipts from sales at Army Exchanges with Disbursing Officers.

7. Postal Funds. Postal Officers will turn in funds derived from sale of postal money orders and stamps to Disbursing Officers.

8. Funds Captured or Seized from the Enemy. Funds captured or seized from the enemy (declared as State Funds by G-2) which come into the possession of United States or attached allied forces will be remitted promptly, without deduction, to the nearest finance officer with full information as to the source from which funds were received.

9. Personal Funds of Casualties. Funds of United States military personnel officially reported dead, killed in action, missing, interned or captured by the enemy, and funds of deceased allied personnel will be turned in to the nearest finance officer with full information as to name, rank, serial number, status (KIA, MIA, etc.), organization and amount pertaining to each individual.

10. Repatriated Prisoners of War. Payment of repatriated prisoners of war will be in conformity with a directive to be issued by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.

11. Troops Departing from Continent. No exchange of currency will be made for troops or civilian personnel leaving the continent. Exchange will be made upon arrival at port of debarkation.

ANNEX NO. 12

FUNDS OBLIGATED
BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
SEPTEMBER, 194[illegible]

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	$2,697.00
Special Field Exercises	212/50310	40.00
Finance Service Army, Pay Civilian Employees	212/50[illegible]25	146.00
Quartermaster Service, Army	212/[illegible]502	1,606.00
Engineer Service, Army	212/[illegible]905	914.00
Ordnance Service & Supplies, Army	212/51005	617.00
Total		$6,220.00

ANNEX NO. 13

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
SEPTEMBER, 194[illegible]

Collections	$7,791,1[illegible]4
Disbursements	7,795,[illegible]25
Vouchers Processed	7,802
Personnel Paid	173,059
Finance Personnel on Duty	303
Officers	[illegible]4
Warrant Officers	14
Enlisted Personnel	255

ANNEX NO. 14

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
SEPTEMBER, 194[illegible]

Total Pay and Allowances	$17,973,1[illegible]6
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	[illegible].1%
Government Insurance	7.3
War Bonds	6.2
Soldiers' Deposits	1.6
Personal Transfers	27.0
Other Collections	7.5
Retained	6.3
Total	100.0%

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ANNEX NO. 15

FUNDS OBLIGATED
BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
OCTOBER, 1944

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	$ 9,747.00
Special Field Exercises	212/50310	11.00
Finance Service Army, Pay Civilian Employees	212/50425	3,698.00
Quartermaster Service, Army	212/50502	1,668.00
Signal Service of the Army	212/50605	47.00
Engineer Service, Army	212/50905	32,719.00
Ordnance Service and Supplies, Army	212/51005	2,815.00
Total		$50,465.00

ANNEX NO. 16

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
OCTOBER, 1944

Collections	$ 8,079,936
Disbursements	10,153,943
Vouchers Processed	4,026
Personnel Paid	227,038
Finance Personnel on Duty	377
Officers	42
Warrant Officers	17
Enlisted Personnel	318

ANNEX NO. 17

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
OCTOBER, 1944

Total Pay and Allowances	$23,068,968
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	41.7%
Government Insurance	8.1
War Bonds	5.9
Soldiers' Deposits	1.7
Personal Transfers	26.7
Other Collections	5.9
Retained	10.0
Total	100.0%

ANNEX NO. 18

FUNDS OBLIGATED
BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
NOVEMBER, 1944

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	$5,237.00
Finance Service Army, Pay Civilian Employees	212/50425	1,160.00
Quartermaster Service, Army	212/50502	1,368.00
Signal Service of the Army	212/50605	49.00
Medical and Hospital Department, Army	212/50805	17.00
Engineer Service, Army	212/50905	995.00
Ordnance Service and Supplies, Army	212/51005	1,154.00
Total		$9,982.00

ANNEX NO. 19

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
NOVEMBER, 1944

Collections	$ 7,781,176
Disbursements	11,040,364
Vouchers Processed	40,145
Personnel Paid	250,578
Finance Personnel on Duty	381
Officers	42
Warrant Officers	17
Enlisted Personnel	322

ANNEX NO. 20

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
NOVEMBER, 1944

Total Pay and Allowances	$25,489,816
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	43.3%
Government Insurance	7.1
War Bonds	6.6
Soldiers' Deposits	1.6
Personal Transfers	24.8
Other Collections	5.8
Retained	10.8
Total	100.0%

ANNEX NO. 21

FUNDS OBLIGATED
BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
DECEMBER, 1944

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	$ 9,029.00
Finance Service Army, Pay Civilian Employees	212/50425	3,645.00
Quartermaster Service, Army	212/50502	2,132.00
Signal Service, Army	212/50605	1.00
Medical and Hospital Department, Army	212/50805	181.00
Engineer Service, Army	212/50905	499.00
Ordnance Service and Supplies, Army	212/51005	558.00
Total		$16,045.00

ANNEX NO. 22

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
DECEMBER, 1944

Collections	$ 9,659,522
Disbursements	11,672,272
Vouchers Processed	43,576
Personnel Paid	283,132
Finance Personnel on Duty	493
Officers	54
Warrant Officers	22
Enlisted Personnel	417

ANNEX NO. 23

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
DECEMBER, 1944

Total Pay and Allowances	$26,631,100.00
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	44.0%
Government Insurance	7.0
War Bonds	6.3
Soldiers' Deposits	2.1
Personal Transfers	22.5
Other Collections	7.3
Retained	10.8
Total	100.0%

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ANNEX NO. 24

FUNDS OBLIGATED
BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
JANUARY, 1945

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	$ 719.00
Finance Service Army, Pay Civilian Employees	212/50225	3,315.00
Quartermaster Service Army	212/50502	87..00
Medical and Hospital Department, Army	212/50805	195.00
Engineer Service, Army	212/50905	546.00
Ordnance Service and Supplies, Army	212/51305	764.00
Total		$6,418.00

ANNEX NO. 25

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
JANUARY, 1945

Collections	$ 9,556,887.00
Disbursements	12,598,373.00
Vouchers Processed	45,195
Personnel Paid	307,085
Finance Personnel on Duty	550
Officers	38
Warrant Officers	45
Enlisted Personnel	467

ANNEX NO. 26

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
JANUARY, 1945

Total Pay and Allowances	$29,905,087.00
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	44.8%
Government Insurance	7.0
War Bonds	6.7
Soldiers' Deposits	2.1
Personal Transfers	22.2
Other Collections	7.3
Retained	9.9
Total	100.0%

ANNEX NO. 27

GERMAN MONEY AND EXCHANGE PROCEDURE
FEBRUARY, 1945

1. Upon entry into Germany, or as soon thereafter as local commanders consider it advisable, dollar, franc and sterling (English) currency in the hands of troops will be exchanged for Allied Military Authority Marks at the following rates:

1 mark equals 4.95665 francs
1 mark equals 10 cents (US)
1 mark equals 8 pence (English)

2. Corps and division commanders will prescribe the exchange procedure for units under their command.

3. The exchange procedure for Third United States Army troops is as follows:

a. Each company and detachment will prepare a duplicate list of the names of each member of the organization. The amount collected from each individual will be shown opposite his name, leaving sufficient space for entry of the mark value of the money turned in. The funds collected and one copy of the list will be turned in to the Finance Officer normally paying the unit. The Finance Officer will furnish marks to the organization representative in the correct amount to pay each individual.

4. Allied Military Authority marks, in all respects equivalent to valid German-issue marks, are paper money printed in the following denominations:

½ mark (50 pfennig)
1 mark
5 marks
10 marks
20 marks
50 marks
100 marks
1000 marks

Allied Military Authority marks bear the words "Alliierte Militarbehorde" and "In Umlauf Gesetzt in Deutschland". The value is expressed in German words and figures.

5. Valid Reichsmarks are issued by the Reichsbank in denominations of 5, 10, 20, 50, 100 and 1000. They bear the word "Reichsbanknote" and the value in German words and figures.

6. Valid Rentenmarks are issued by the Rentenbank in denominations of 1, 2, and 5. They bear the word "Rentenbankschein" and the value in German words and figures.

7. The following bank notes are known to be invalid, and will not be accepted by finance and postal installations:

a. Mark notes bearing decree date prior to 30 August 1924, issued by either the Reichsbank or the private banks.

b. Reichsmark notes issued by the private banks.

c. Rentenbank notes of Rentenmark 10 and upwards.

d. Reichskreditkassenscheine and Verrechnungsscheine notes of all denominations.

e. German paper currency in denominations larger than 1000 marks.

f. Army auxiliary currency (Behrmachtbehelfsgeld).

8. The smallest denomination coins are the Reichspfennig and Rentenpfennig. One hundred pfennigs equal one mark. There are no coins of greater value than five marks.

9. Until further order, military personnel in Germany are not authorized to have in their possession German-issue notes in denominations of 100 marks or larger.

ANNEX NO. 28

FUNDS OBLIGATED
BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
FEBRUARY, 1945

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	$ 4,060.00
Finance Service Army, Pay Civilian Employees	212/50225	1,166.00
Quartermaster Service, Army	212/50502	3,533.00
Signal Service of the Army	212/50605	65.00
Medical and Hospital Department, Army	212/50805	96.00
Engineer Service, Army	212/50905	1,115.00
Ordnance Service and Supplies, Army	212/51305	1,495.00
Total		$11,621.00

ANNEX NO. 29

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
FEBRUARY, 1945

Collections	$ 8,065,532.00
Disbursements	11,912,225.00
Vouchers Processed	43,187
Personnel Paid	270,350
Finance Personnel on Duty	534
Officers	34
Warrant Officers	42
Enlisted Personnel	458

ANNEX NO. 30

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
FEBRUARY, 1945

Total Pay and Allowances	$28,753,895.00
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	45.0%
Government Insurance	7.1
War Bonds	6.5
Soldiers' Deposits	1.8
Personal Transfers	20.1
Other Collections	5.7
Retained	13.8
Total	100.0%

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ANNEX NO. 31

FUNDS OBLIGATED BY
UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
MARCH, 1945

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	$1,203.00
Finance Service Army, Pay Civilian Employees Military Headquarters	212/50425	2,170.00
Quartermaster Service, Army	212/50402	7,060.00
Engineer Service, Army	212/50905	326.00
Ordnance Service and Supplies, Army	212/51005	456.00
Transportation Service, Army	21520.09	20.00
Total		$5,235.00

ANNEX NO. 32

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
MARCH, 1945

Collections	$ 8,284,396.00
Disbursements	11,573,655.00
Vouchers Processed	21,472
Personnel Paid	264,116
Finance Personnel on Duty	474
Officers	49
Warrant Officers	20
Enlisted Personnel	405

ANNEX NO. 33

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
MARCH, 1945

Total Pay and Allowances	$31,798,679.00
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	40.5%
Government Insurance	7.2
War Bonds	6.6
Soldiers' Deposits	2.1
Personal Transfers	22.7
Other Collections	4.6
Retained	16.3
Total	100.0%

ANNEX NO. 34

PAY STATUS OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL
OF THE THIRD U. S. ARMY AS OF
28 FEBRUARY 1945

1. This report presents an analysis of the pay status of enlisted personnel in combat and service units of divisions, corps troops and Army troops assigned to the Third U. S. Army. It analyses the pay status as of 28 February 1945 of 269,470 enlisted men, approximately 95% of the total assigned enlisted strength of the Third U. S. Army. It discusses the reasons for delinquency in pay and submits suggestions for the elimination of pay delinquency. The information upon which this report is based was obtained from 413 organizations assigned to the Third U. S. Army.

2. Approximately 87 percent of all Third U. S. Army enlisted personnel were paid in full on the 28 February 1945. The enlisted men not paid at the end of February were practically all combat troops who could not be paid on the last day of the month because of the tactical situation; however, they did receive pay as soon as the tactical situation permitted. Among units who did not undergo front line conditions the percentage of troops not paid was less than 1 percent.

3. Of the personnel unpaid at the end of February, many were paid on supplementary pay rolls or received partial payments during the first half of March. In most cases of non-payment a complete settlement of the enlisted man's account was not feasible, because excessive indebtedness and courts-martial fines made settlement impossible; consequently, only a partial payment could be given. Many enlisted men in this category, however, refused ever partial payments because they preferred to settle their accounts completely as early as possible. The following are the reasons advanced by the various units included in this survey for nonpayment of enlisted men on the last day of the month:

Tactical situation
Insufficient funds to cover indebtedness
Hospitalization of enlisted man
Enlisted man transferred into unit after pay roll prepared
Enlisted man not present on pay day
Personnel records not received
Enlisted man in confinement or awaiting trial
Enlisted man reduced in grade after pay roll prepared
Enlisted man did not desire to sign pay roll
Service Record incomplete
Enlisted man's allotment in process of adjustment
Enlisted man AWOL
Clerical errors
Pay roll erroneously signed

4. The Finance Department was not held at fault for the non-payment of troops. In only two instances was the failure to pay enlisted men attributed to errors on the part of the Finance Department.

5. The personnel system was considered as one of the principal causes of non-payment of enlisted men. The haphazard way records of enlisted men were kept was severely condemned. There were many cases of poorly kept service records with incomplete and questionable entries which made the enlisted man's pay status questionable and which necessitated time and correspondence in clearing such accounts.

6. The personnel policy in effect at Reinforcement and Hospital Units was criticized, because these organizations were paying enlisted men partial payments in amounts larger than the enlisted men were entitled. The result was that when these men were given an assignment or were returned to duty, their organization found them overpaid; and their insolvency often lasted through two pay periods.

7. Various proposals were offered for the elimination of pay delinquency. The suggestions listed below are quoted remarks from Corps and Division reports and represent an adequate cross section of the proposals offered by all units.

a. "More cooperation from Reinforcement Depots in promptly furnishing Service Records of men transferred promptly.

"More complete financial data on Service Records or temporary service records of men transferred from Reinforcement Depots.

"Consideration should be given to having Service Records or temporary Service Records accompany men upon transfer or return from hospitalization."--XII Corps.

b. "A better system of obtaining records of Reinforcements who are assigned to organizations with only affidavits for service records. It often requires two or three months before said records are located.

"Partial payments should be kept to a minimum and should not be made without some information regarding pay status of individual."--90th Infantry Division.

c. "More emphasis on proper entries in Service Records of enlisted men at staging areas in the United States, and while in the replacement system would aid materially in effecting prompt payment of enlisted men after they arrive at new organizations.

"Personnel officers and disbursing officers of mobile units are overburdened at critical times because the equipment issued to such sections is not designed for mobile operation, with the result that such sections become inoperative for a considerable number of hours before each move, during each move, and after each move. These inoperative periods are usually the very periods during which their services are needed most because the administrative processes that must be accomplished in connection with movements and payments, or concurrently with movements, keep increasing. Frequently this results in accomplishment of only the most urgent processes, and payment of troops is generally not as urgent as some other matters. Delay in payment could be minimized by any of the following:

(1) "Creating a trend toward reducing administrative processes instead of increasing them.

(2) "Specifically designed and built boxes which house office records and equipment without wasting space, and which fit compactly in standard type vehicles.

(3) "Provision for 'rolling' offices in specially designed truck bodies or trailers, or both, for personnel sections and other offices.

(4) "Not recommended at this time, but recommended for consideration after termination of the present wars is a system providing for partial payments only to be made outside the United States upon signature of a cash receipt in the amount the individual desires to draw, with all other payments, including settlements of pay accounts in full when desired, to be made by a central pay office in the United States at which a pay card on each individual in the Army would be maintained."--6th Armored Division.

d. "A more efficient system of paying men while absent from their units and a more thorough check made on all records passing through each Port of Embarkation and Replacement Depot, as otherwise the Personnel Officer has to write for pertinent information required after the man has been assigned, causing delay in making prompt payment."--5th Infantry Division.

e. "Discontinuance by the Reinforcement Command of their compulsory partial payment policy. Most casuals have temporary records when returning to their parent unit and a true picture cannot be ascertained of their financial status. Cases have been reported of Enlisted Men being made to take partial payments at 3 or 4 Depots or Battalions as part of their processing before being allowed to continue further on their way back to the division."--4th Armored Division.

f. "Adequate supply and distribution of pay roll forms at all times to facilitate preparation of rolls and thus take advantage of short breaks in tactical operations.

"Prompt transmittal of permanent Service Records by hospitals and reinforcement Depots."--4th Infantry Division.

g. "To refrain from paying enlisted men at reinforcement depots unless soldiers original service record is available. If service record is not available, make a partial payment to the soldier.

"To require hospitals and reinforcement depots to adhere to TM 12-230 as pertains to financial status and entries in service record. (A common practice is to omit transferring to financial page record of courts-martial fines collected). Forwarding indorsements made too frequent reference to "see previous indorsements" which inveriably give little or no information. It is not uncommon to receive notice from two disbursing officers that an enlisted man has been paid by both officers for the same period or portion thereof. This necessitates inquiry as to exact periods covered and deductions made in each case. In these cases considerable difficulty is encountered when making inquiry in that APO number of disbursing officer is not indicated.

"Closer supervision of enlisted men when they make affidavits in lieu of service record. Date of last payment and amount of allotments carried are often incorrect.

"Closer supervision by reinforcement depots and hospitals as to total partial payments made in a given period. Many enlisted men receive so many partial payments that they are overpaid and not due for payment until this indebtedness is settled.

"Stress the importance of all allotment applications accompanying service record at all times so that financial status can be determined.

"Stress the importance of the original Service Record accompanying the enlisted man upon transfer, especially when through reinforcement channels."--80th Infantry Division.

h. "Reinforcement depots should secure permanent records from unit to which the enlisted man was last assigned or attached and forward them promptly.

"Reinforcement depots and hospitals should not give partial payments in excess of accrued pay. WD AGO Form innn should be checked for allotments before partial payment is made.

"Reinforcement depots should record accurate information as to pay status on the Service Record indorsement as required by paragraph 68h, TM 12-230, instead of using stock entry, "See Remarks Financial""--26th Infantry Division.

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1. "It is apparent that Personnel Officers are not making full use of temporary service records, as covered by paragraph 12 and 13, AR 345-155; also many Personnel Officers are not stating a man's account on the pay roll if his debits exceed his credits. This prevents the payment of a statutory partial payment. Also full use is not being made of supplemental pay rolls."--VIII Corps.

ANNEX NO. 35

THIRD U. S. ARMY FINANCE INSTRUCTIONS

1. Finance.

a. Rates of Exchange.

10 German marks equals	$1.00
49.6663 French francs equals	$1.00
43.7732 Belgian francs equals	$1.00
1 pound Sterling equals	$4.035

b. Legal Tender.

(1) Personnel are prohibited from having British or American currency in their possession on the continent. All such currency will be exchanged for legal tender of the country in which serving.

(2) Legal tender for military personnel in Continental Countries are as follows;

Germany - Allied Military Marks
France (including Alsace, Lorraine and Moselle) - French francs
Belgium - Belgian francs
Luxembourg - Luxembourg or Belgian francs

(3) As soon as practicable after entry into Germany, approved currencies, other than marks, possessed by personnel will be exchanged for Allied Military Marks.

c. Financial Transactions;

(1) Except as permitted under regulations issued by authority of the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, (in Germany by specific instructions from Supreme Headquarters) foreign financial and foreign trade transactions, and exports and imports of currency by any member of the Armed Forces is prohibited.

(2) Commanders of all echelons will take continuing and vigorous steps to prevent the securing of funds by military personnel from unlawful sources, including captured enemy currency, barter with prisoners of war, black market operations and similar methods.

d. Technical Finance Operating Procedure; Technical Finance Operating Procedure will be in accordance with "ETO-SOP No. 11 - Fiscal Procedures", Headquarters European Theater of Operations, dated 23 March 1945.

e. Army Exchange Funds; Army Exchange Officers will deposit receipts from sales at Army Exchanges with disbursing officers.

f. Postal Funds; Postal Officers will turn in funds derived from sale of postal money orders and stamps to disbursing officers.

g. Funds Captured or Seized from the Enemy;

(1) Currency captured or seized from the enemy which comes into the possession of United States or attached allied forces will be promptly remitted, without deduction, to the nearest Finance Officer, with full information as to the source from which such currency was received.

(2) The procedure for the handling of funds that are the personal property of prisoners of war is set forth in Par 3c (4) (d), ETO-SOP No. 16, "Evacuation, Processing and Handling of Prisoners of War", 3 December 1944.

h. Personal Funds of Casualties; Funds of United States military personnel officially reported dead, killed in action, missing in action, missing, interned or captured by the enemy, or evacuated to the hospital, and funds of deceased allied and enemy personnel will be turned into the nearest finance officer with full information as to name, rank, serial number, status (KIA, MIA, etc.), organization and amount pertaining to each individual.

i. Transmission of Funds;

(1) The transmission by military personnel of funds, other than amounts less than One Dollar ($1.00) for souvenir purposes, to any point outside the theater utilizing means other than those afforded by U. S. Army Finance Officers, Army War Bond Officers, or through the Army Postal Service, is prohibited.

(2) Any person (excluding officers of field grade and above) desiring to transmit funds by Personal Transfer account, postal money order, or by purchase of war bonds, will first submit application in appropriate form to the unit personnel (or comparable administrative) officer, for countersigning.

(3) The unit personnel officer is charged with maintaining a record in respect to each such individual in the unit, indicating the date, amount, and method of every transmittal of funds by such person.

(4) Unit commanders will examine the unit record of fund transmittals in conjunction with individual deposits entered on WD, FD Form No. 33 (Soldiers' Deposit Book) and individual records of currency exchanges at frequent intervals to detect disproportionately large sums of money in the possession of individuals. All such instances will be investigated, and if unlawful possession is indicated, appropriate action will be taken.

j. Upon presentation of proper travel orders, Finance Officers are authorized to convert currencies for military personnel upon change of station or leave to another country.

ANNEX NO. 36

FUNDS OBLIGATED
BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
APRIL, 1945

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	$ 878.00
Finance Service Army, Pay Civilian Employees	212/50425	3,712.00
Quartermaster Service Army	212/50602	2,576.00
Medical and Hospital Department, Army	212/50905	37,410.00
Ordnance Service and Supplies, Army	212/51005	3.00
Total		$44,579.00

ANNEX NO. 37

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
APRIL, 1945

Collections	$10,425,544.00
Disbursements	11,763,784.00
Vouchers Processed	25,563
Personnel Paid	344,399
Finance Personnel on Duty	587
Officers	59
Warrant Officers	24
Enlisted Personnel	504

ANNEX NO. 38

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
APRIL, 1945

Total Pay and Allowances	$35,391,798.00
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	44.8%
Government Insurance	7.2
War Bonds	6.5
Soldiers' Deposits	2.1
Personal Transfers	22.3
Other Collections	4.1
Retained	13.0
Total	100.0%

ANNEX NO. 39

THIRD U. S. ARMY
FISCAL PROCEDURE FOR REDEPLOYMENT AND READJUSTMENT

1. GENERAL.

a. Personnel. Finance administrative personnel, Finance disbursing sections and/or Finance teams will be located at assembly and staging areas to make payments, assist in reduction of funds in possession of troops, exchange currency, and otherwise provide finance service for troops embarking for the United States or for other theaters.

b. Application. All procedures required to be accomplished in the assembly area by the following paragraphs will be accomplished at the unit station if the organization proceeds directly to a staging area or port from the unit station.

2. PROCEDURES IN ASSEMBLY AREA.

a. Payment of Troops.

(1) The Soldier's Individual Pay Record, WD AGO Form 20, will be completed and in the hands of each enlisted individual prior to his departure from this theater. Enlisted personnel travelling separately from their units will be advised that they may draw partial payments through any personnel officer from any finance officer upon presentation of their individual pay record and upon proper identification.

(2) Officer's Pay Data Card (WD AGO Form 77) will likewise show complete and current information.

(3) All military personnel will be paid in full through the last day of the month preceding their departure from the assembly area. In the absence of the service or pay records, personnel officers will not omit enlisted personnel from payrolls, but will accept their affidavit for payment as prescribed in AR 345-155, 24 January 1945.

(4) All necessary partial payments will be made in the assembly area as no such payments will be made in the staging areas.

b. Reduction of Funds. All military personnel in the assembly area will be encouraged to dispose of all excess funds by the purchase of or investment in war bonds, soldiers' deposits, spear-head deposits, allotments, National Service Life Insurance, or personal transmission accounts. No such service will be available in staging areas, except for the purchase of war bonds through the static finance office.

c. Unit Funds (Non-appropriated funds). Unit funds will be disposed of in the assembly area in accordance with AR 210-50, 20 January 1945, and current theater directives. Units departing this theater may deposit their funds as spearhead deposits or exchange them for postal money orders for safekeeping during the movement. Money order fees may be deducted from unit funds as an authorized expenditure. Government bonds owned by and in the possession of departing units should be forwarded by registered mail and deposited with the U. S. Treasury Department for safekeeping. Where a unit is demobilized within the theater, a postal money order will be secured for the transmission of the unit funds to the ETOUSA Central Welfare Fund.

3. PROCEDURES IN STAGING AREAS.

a. Currency conversions. Currency conversions for troops will be accomplished in the staging areas from rosters prepared by unit and group commanders prior to departure from the assembly area. Each unit and reception station group commander will prepare a list in duplicate of the individuals under his control and will include the names of officers and enlisted men. Spaces should be allowed opposite each name for two columns headed respectively, "local currency collected" and "dollar equivalent". Such lists will be turned in with the local currency collected from individuals to the Finance officers at the staging areas for conversion, and the (blue or) yellow seal currency will be delivered to such commanding officers for payment to the persons concerned together with a copy of the roster on which the conversions are shown.

(1) Military personnel departing direct to another theater will be required to exchange all local currency in their possession for United States yellow seal currency. This will be accomplished in staging areas. Upon arrival at destination, yellow seal currency will be exchanged through disbursing officers for local currency of the country concerned.

(2) Military personnel departing to the United States will be required to exchange all local currency in their possession with disbursing officers for regular blue seal U. S. Currency. This will be accomplished in staging areas.

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(3) No limit will be placed on sums of money that individuals may carry so long as the amount requested for conversion does not exceed the amount that the individual could have received through normal pay and allowances. Where excessive amounts are presented for conversion, disbursing officers will require the execution of certificates establishing the source as pay and allowances and in the event that the certificate is not satisfactory, a request for an investigation should be made to the individual's commanding officer.

b. Bank accounts. Prior to departure all personnel are advised to close their bank accounts in the United Kingdom or on the Continent. This may be accomplished by:

(1) Cashing a personal check at the bank or requesting the bank to transfer the balance by cable or mail to a given address.

(2) Obtaining a cashier's check which should be cashed prior to departure from this theater and converted into blue or yellow seal U. S. Currency.

4. PROCEDURES EN ROUTE.

a. Partial payment. Partial payments necessary for military personnel due to lack of funds at time of departure for other theaters or the United States will be accomplished on board ship. Administrative instructions will direct each unit and reception station group commander to prepare and have signed, a partial payment payroll for his organization or group prior to its departure from the assembly area.

(1) The partial payment payroll will be prepared for every member of the organization in the amount of $10.00 for each individual.

(2) Where the journey exceeds 30 days, additional partial payments of $10.00 for individuals may be made.

(3) Such payrolls, properly completed and signed, will be turned in immediately after sailing to the Class "B" Agent Finance Officer on board who was previously appointed by order of the commanding officer at the staging area, as Agent to a Finance Disbursing Officer at the same location.

(4) Funds necessary for such payments will be secured by the officer appointed to act as Class "B" Agent on shipboard from his parent disbursing officer.

(5) The payrolls will be paid in yellow or blue seal United States currency, dependent upon the destination, by the Class "B" Agent. If the number of payrolls is large, unit or group commanders may be appointed Class "A" Agents to the Class "B" Agent Finance Officer by the senior US Army officer commanding the troops on board ship, for the purpose of paying their organizations or groups.

(6) The Class "B" Agent Officer will make his returns to the first available Finance Disbursing Officer after arrival at destination or, if an opportunity arises, to any Finance Disbursing Officer enroute.

b. Currency conversion. All necessary conversions of currency for local currency at stop-over ports of call enroute will be accomplished by a procedure corresponding to that outlined in paragraph 3a above.

5. FULL SETTLEMENT OF PAY AT DESTINATION.

a. Administrative instructions will direct each unit and reception station group commander to prepare and have signed, prior to arrival at final port of debarkation, payrolls for full settlement of pay to be submitted to Finance Officer at destination.

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ANNEX NO. 40

PICTORIAL ANALYSIS OF FINANCE FUNCTIONS



ADMINISTRATIVE-FISCAL: Preparation of Correspondence and Reports; Maintenance of Files and Fiscal Records; Suballotment of Funds.



ACCOUNTING: Processing of Paid Vouchers; Maintenance of Accounting Records.



PAY AND ALLOWANCES: Computation of Pay Vouchers and Commercial Accounts.



FUNDING: Shipment of Funds to Finance Officers.



CASHIER: Conversion, Collection, and Payment of Funds.



Preparation of Funds for Payment of Troops.

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ARMY PENALTY OFFICIALS: "Check Your Load, Sir!"



ADMINISTRATION: "Keep that Paper Moving!"



ACCOUNTING: "Checks and Balances"



PAY AND ALLOWANCES: "Get Your Pay!"

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MISCELLANEOUS

ALBANIAN LEK	INDO-CHINESE PIASTER
ALGERIAN FRANC	IRISH POUND
AUSTRIAN GROSCHEN	LATVIAN LAT
AUSTRALIAN POUND	LEBANESE LIVRE
BRITISH MILITARY AUTHORITY POUND	LITHUANIA LITAS
BRAZILIAN CRUZEIRO	MALTESE POUND
BULGARIAN LEV	MEXICAN PESCO
BRITISH EAST AFRICAN POUND	MOROCCAN FRANC
CANADIAN DOLLAR	NEW ZELAND POUND
CECHY A MORAVA KRONEN	NORWEGIAN KRONE
CELYON RUPEE	PALESTINE POUND
CHINESE YUAN	PERSIAN RIAL
CROATIAN KUNA	POLISH ZLOTY
CUBAN PESO	PORTUGAL ESCUDO
CZECHOSLOVAKIAN KORUNA	RUMANIAN LEU
DANZIG REICHSMARK	SCOTTISH POUND
DENMARK KRONE	SPANISH PESETA
EGYPTIAN POUND	SWEDISH KRONA
GREEK DRACHMA	SWISS FRANC
HONG KONG DOLLAR	TURKISH PIASTER
HUNGARIAN PENGO	UNION OF S AFRICA POUND
ICELAND KRONA	USSR CHERVONETZ
INDIAN RUPEE	YUGOSLAVIAN DINAR

1' 2' 3' 4

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD U. S. [illegible]
Office of the Chaplain
APO 403

SUBJECT: After-Action Report.

TO : Commanding General, Third United States Army, APO 403, U. S. Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Chaplain Section, Third United States Army Headquarters, beginning with 31 March 1944, and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapters.

2. Taken quickly from civil life and plunged deep into the [illegible] strom of battle chaplains of the Third United States Army have [illegible] demonstrated unflagging devotion both to God and to country. Death, wounds, and decorations for some testify to the self-sacrifice of all. It has been well worth the cost. For in the person of each soldier the chaplain has met something of his Lord; and in trying to give he has received far more than he had to offer. Therefore our chaplains complete this portion of their task as soldiers of God strengthened by the knowledge not only that men of faith make the best fighting men, but also that fighting men can be mighty warriors in the faith.

JAMES H. O'NEILL,
Chaplain (Colonel), U. S. Army,
Third U. S. Army Chaplain.

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CHAPLAIN SECTION

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Organizational and Functional Chart



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CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

The Chaplain Section was organized under Tables of Organization 200-1, War Department, 1 July 1942, and with its normal complement of officers and enlisted men arrived at the first overseas headquarters site, TAFT and FLAKER CAMPS, CHELTENHAM, England, 23 March 1942. Office space previously arranged by the advanced party was occupied and found to be adequate for the proper functioning of the Section.

Space limitations within the initial camp site did not allow the reservation of a specific building as a chapel for religious services. In preparation for the first Sunday schedule of religious services in the new location, announcements were prepared and circulated to every section and attached unit or team, announcing Catholic and Protestant Services in the enlisted men's mess halls, Forward and Rear Echelons, for 26 March. This schedule of services marked the beginning of the ministry of the Chaplain Section to the personnel of the Army Headquarters and attached units. Heretofore, the Headquarters had been so located in the United States that separate services specifically designed for the Headquarters personnel were not necessary nor desirable. The response to this initial service was satisfactory and promising.

On 27 March, the Chief of Section, with the Executive, made official calls to the residences of all clergymen whose parishes were adjacent to TAFT and FLAKER CAMPS. Clergymen of the Church of England, the Roman Catholic Church, and the various Protestant (Non-conformist) Groups were contacted, and the reception accorded American Chaplains had from the beginning and continued to be very warm and enthusiastic. These early contacts resulted in the offer, on the part of the Church of England, of two beautiful church buildings, complete with all equipment, for use by Protestant Chaplains in conducting a full religious program for the American troops. This offer was accepted, and these two churches, one in close proximity of each echelon of the Headquarters, were used with great effectiveness throughout the stay in the initial location. The schedule of services for American military personnel was arranged so as not to interfer with the normal parish schedule then in effect for the Churches. As the American religious program developed and as the attendance at all religious services increased, both the local clergy and the members of the parish Church were deeply impressed. They frequently commented enthusiastically upon the loyalty of the American soldier to his religious obligations.

In the assumption of the supervisory responsibilities belonging to this Section, it was necessary in this preliminary period to maintain a close liaison with the Troop Movement Sub-section of the G-3 Section to obtain as accurate and current list of units being assigned to this command whose tables of organization authorized an assigned or attached chaplain or chaplains. Immediately upon the assignment of such units, the necessary correspondence was prepared and forwarded to secure the name of and certain other desired information concerning the chaplain or chaplains assigned and present for duty. When replies to this initial correspondence indicated the absence of a chaplain in a T/O vacancy, necessary action was initiated to requisition the desired chaplain or chaplains.

Early in April, an official visit was made to the Base Chaplain, Western Base Section, Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, with reference to T/E and non-T/E equipment for chaplains. The visit afforded the opportunity of obtaining certain information necessary for proper orientation with reference to appropriate channels of supply in this Theater.

Upon the request of the Theater Chaplain, the Army Chaplain visited Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army, 4 and 5 April for the purpose of attending a conference on the policies of the Theater as they affected the work of chaplains.

During the period 25 March to 10 April, 149 chaplains came under the administrative supervision of this Section, and were, in general, assigned or attached as follows: forty-eight with five divisions, eighty-three with eleven non-divisional units, and eight assigned to corps headquarters. In a conference with the corps chaplains instructions were issued by the Army Chaplain to each corps chaplain to furnish this Section, monthly, a complete and accurate roster of all chaplains attached or assigned under corps jurisdiction. Individual Information Sheets were mailed to all Army units to obtain pertinent information on all chaplains on duty with Army troops. Appropriate instructions were given to units for whom chaplains were authorized and to which chaplains had not been assigned. Close liaison was maintained with the Personnel Sub-section, Adjutant General Section in the processing of all requisitions for chaplains. Initial rosters submitted by corps chaplains and individual Information Sheets prepared by Army Troop chaplains provided the necessary information for the beginning of a master card file. This card file was kept current at all times, and important changes occurring in the assignment of chaplains in the interim between the monthly roster were reported by corps chaplains as soon as they occurred. Monthly Rosters were prepared and submitted to the Theater Chaplain, who was kept informed on all changes occurring within the Third United States Army by means of an appropriate change in assignment form which was prepared and sent forward as soon as the change occurred.

A constant effort was made by this Section to insure full religious coverage for all religious groups within the Command. Detailed plans were made locally as well as throughout the entire Army for the appropriate observance by Jewish personnel of the Passover Holidays. Arrangements were made with local English synagogues and Jewish Communities to furnish appropriate religious ministrations to the Jewish personnel of this Headquarters. Transportation was provided and the attendance recorded represented a very high percentage of the total Jewish personnel present. Wide publicity was given to all Easter Services and the Religious Services throughout the entire Army were well attended on Easter Sunday. Many occasions arose for assistance and counsel by the Army Chaplain with unit chaplains who planned and conducted joint civilian and military services during the Easter Season. Holy Week Services were encouraged and many were conducted on a daily schedule with good results. The Pre-Easter Services within the Headquarters area were well attended.

In general the period 9-30 April is marked by three major emphases, namely, (1) the allocation of duties and responsibilities to each chaplain and enlisted man within the Chaplain Section; (2) the issuance of new instructions for accomplishing the Monthly Report of Chaplains, W.D., A.G.O., Form Number 5; (3) the systematic visitation of corps chaplains and chaplains assigned to Army troops. A detailed report of each visitation, enumerating observations made and corrections necessary, was submitted to the Chief of Staff.

Within the European Theater of Operations, an orientation school for chaplains was organized and conducted under the supervision of Headquarters Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations, United States Army. Third United States Army chaplains were detailed on a quota basis to attend this school. The duration of each class was two days, and classes were scheduled every two weeks. Quotas were received by the Army Chaplain and allocated to separate corps and Army troops. New chaplains arriving in the Theater were sent to this school as rapidly as the quota would allow.

All chaplains coming under the jurisdiction of this Army were instructed to requisition all chaplain's equipment authorized under the provisions of War Department Circular Number 81, dated 25 February 1942. A constant check of paragraph 6b of the Monthly Report of each chaplain was made to insure that all necessary equipment had been received and was being effectively and appropriately used. Deficiencies were noted and remedial measures taken immediately. All authorized equipment for this Section was requisitioned and received.

Attention is invited to the fact that the Chaplains of this Section, in addition to their other duties, performed the normal religious functions of unit chaplains for the personnel of this Headquarters. To the end that these functions might be effectively performed a small chapel and conference room was constructed adjacent to the office where daily services were conducted and religious instruction given as needed and desired.

At this stage in the training of unit chaplains, the need became apparent for some easily distinguishable feature of the chaplains uniform to provide for immediate recognition in the hour of combat when some outer garment such as a raincoat or trench coat might conceal the chaplain's insignia on the shirt collar. A recommendation was prepared by this Section, submitted to the Chief of Staff, was approved, and published in Section IV, Circular Number 4, this Headquarters, dated 17 April 1942.

Early in May the large number of units arriving in the United Kingdom made necessary an additional service on the part of the Chaplain Section, namely, a more careful supervision of the complete religious coverage for all units, especially separate battalions and companies not authorized tables of organization chaplains. To accomplish this task a new set of unit cards were prepared according to geographical location. The nearest chaplain was then notified to assume responsibility for all small units in his vicinity. The corps chaplains were instructed to set up the same plan for small units within corps troops. A map showing the location of chaplains assigned to army troops was set up in the Section and proved to be very valuable for unit commanders and chaplains. Visitation of chaplains and constant check on the status of equipment continued throughout this period.

In the period beginning 1 June, the number of Third United States Army chaplains had increased to 216, all of these chaplains had either received all authorized equipment or had requisitioned this equipment and were functioning effectively in the performance of their assigned duties with their respective units. With the increasing number of chaplains, a need was felt for some convenient instrument which might be effectively employed to disseminate information rapidly and concisely to each chaplain. It was not considered favorable under the restrictions governing travel to schedule a chaplain's conference of any kind. To meet this growing need for general instruction, the plan for the preparation of a Training Letter was originated and approved. This Letter was designed to be helpful to each individual chaplain and was to be prepared and issued by the Chaplain Section, not according to a fixed schedule but as the need seemed to warrant it. Training Letter Number 1 was prepared and forwarded to all chaplains of this Command, 1 June.

With the issuance of authorized transportation to chaplains, scattered reports began to reach this Section concerning certain misunderstandings that had developed between chaplains and unit commanders concerning the use of this transportation. In order to clarify the situation and to avert future difficulties of this kind, Section II, Circular Number 22, was prepared and issued by this Headquarters, 7 June 1942. This circular was the solution to what might have been a serious problem. After its issue, the number of complaints received were negligible and easily disposed of without excessive correspondence and command action.

As the organization of the Chaplain Section became complete, one chaplain from the Section was transferred to a combat unit to assist in meeting a great need for chaplains in the field. It was not necessary to secure a replacement.

In the period 15 to 25 June, units of this command were attached to First United States Army in numbers sufficient to reduce the chaplain strength of the Third United States Army to approximately 125. It was in this period that preparations were begun for the later movement with the Headquarters to the Marshalling Area and subsequently to the Continent.

A careful appraisal of this period revealed that satisfactory progress had been made in this preparatory period in equipping chaplains physically, mentally, and spiritually for the eventual hour of combat.

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

During the initial period there was a continuation of the procedures and policies formulated and practiced in the initial overseas period in the United Kingdom. The working out of the tactical planning of the invasion provided for the release of all divisional and many non-divisional units to the First United States Army. Those non-divisional units remaining with the Third United States Army upon arrival on the Continent were grouped in specific areas. The close proximity of units in these designated areas materially assisted the chaplain in providing complete religious coverage.

Through constant liaison with the Troop Movement Sub-section, G-3 Section, and the operations sub-sections of other sections of this Headquarters, current information was maintained in the Chaplain Section on the location of troop areas and of individual units within these areas. During this period of uniting, emphasis was placed on a complete and thorough religious program for all Third United States Army troops. Due to the small number of Catholic chaplains in certain areas, contacts were made with and the use of buildings secured from local ecclesiastical authorities for use in central Catholic Services for all adjacent military personnel. This procedure oftentimes proved to be very effective in enlarging the services of a limited number of Catholic Chaplains in a specific area.

The initial continental location increased the local religious ministry of the Chaplain Section. The Headquarters Commandant provided a large squad tent for religious services, and every phase of the religious program met with an enthusiastic response.

The location of this Headquarters in the pre-operational period was such that the Chaplain Section was easily accessible to all chaplains on duty with units assigned to the Third United States Army. The contacts of all unit chaplains with this section were frequent, thereby reducing the amount of visitation required of supervisory chaplains. Final sheets were made concerning equipment on hand and in use by unit chaplains.

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The first large continental problem confronting this Section was the needed authorization for a minimum amount of tonnage for each unit chaplain to provide protection for his expensive religious equipment as well as a place for counseling and the giving of religious instruction. A request for such authorization was forwarded to European Theater of Operations, United States Army, 5th July.

During this period it was determined that the entire Chaplain Section would become a part of the Forward Echelon of this Headquarters.

Every effort was made during this period of waiting to prepare all chaplains by personal contact, correspondence, and otherwise for actual combat experience in the field. The morale of the chaplains was high, and there was the general feeling, "We are ready".

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

On becoming operational 1 August, Headquarters Third United States Army began to receive Third United States Army units which had previously been attached to First United States Army. The rapid return of units made it difficult for the Chaplain Section to compile readily a new and accurate roster of Third United States Army chaplains. During the time which had elapsed between the arrival on the continent and the operational period many of the Third United States Army chaplains had come combat with the First United States Army. Casualties had resulted, and many physicians returned to Third United States Army with many changes in chaplain personnel; however, within a short time new rosters were received utilizing every means available to get them, and the master card file was brought up-to-date.

Several conferences were held with the Army Graves Registration Officer and under his direction all United States Military Cemeteries on the Continent were visited and studied with a view of arranging for the participation of Third United States Army chaplains in the regular interment services. Information regarding the location of cemeteries was made available to all chaplains and certain supervisory chaplains were designated to assume responsibility and provide appropriate interment services for the cemeteries. Frequently checks were made with corps chaplains responsible for cemeteries in the corps zone to insure that each soldier buried received the appropriate religious rites of his particular faith.

At the request of this Section, a visit was made to this Headquarters by the Senior Chaplain, Advance Section, Communications Zone, for a series of conferences with reference to non-T/E religious items essential for the work of chaplains in the field. From these conferences definite plans were formulated for the procurement and distribution to all chaplains of religious supplies to include, communion wine, altar candles, Catholic and Protestant Testaments, Jewish Scriptures, pamphlets, prayer books, missals, medals, rosaries, benediction sets, tracts, communion paper cups, and other miscellaneous supplies as needed. This plan was outlined in Training Letter Number 2 mailed to all Third United States Army chaplains, 19 August.

The Theater Chaplain and members of his staff visited this Headquarters for conferences on chaplain replacements and chaplain supplies, 18-19 August. This visit effected a closer liaison with the Theater Chaplain, the Communication Zone Chaplain, and the Army Chaplain, this Headquarters.

During the month of August, the master card file indicated that 289 chaplains were serving in the Third United States Army, of whom 199 were Protestant, eighty-six Catholic and four Jewish. Among the Protestant Chaplains seventeen denominations were represented. 143 chaplains were on duty with eleven divisions; 137 chaplains were assigned or attached to non-divisional miscellaneous units; and nine chaplains were on duty with four corps headquarters.

Many divisions returned from combat with the First United States Army with vacancies in their normal complement of chaplains. Replacements were expedited for these deficiencies by close liaison with the G-1 Section.

In combat, chaplains performed their duties in an excellent manner. For many chaplains of this command this first month of operations provided their first combat experience. The rapid movement of Third United States Army columns in the initial phases of the campaign of France presented problems which unit and supervisory chaplains had never confronted before. Scarcely was there a time throughout August when unit chaplains of forward units could gather together any appreciable part of their unit personnel for a formal religious service; however, the conclusion should not be drawn that this was a period of inactivity for chaplains with combat units. On the contrary, the chaplain with his motherized transportation was equal to the situation and was challenged by the difficulties under which he had to work. Following the instructions of the Commanding General and the Army Chaplain, the unit chaplain was always "forward" with his men. His presence was a source of inspiration to officers and men alike, and his indomitable spirit and the ability to endure proved him to be a good soldier. He was available to his men at every pause for a prayer, a period of Confession, and time permitting, a religious service. Men went into the fight with his blessings and carried with them his words of encouragement. At the battalion aid stations and the division clearing companies the chaplain met those who had been injured at the front. He administered the Sacraments of his Church and the appropriate ceremonies of his Faith to the wounded and the dying who needed and sought the eternal comforts of religion. But the saddest of his tasks was the responsibility of writing a letter of comfort and consolation to a mother or wife or sweetheart whose greatest hero had fallen on the battlefield.

At the front at least one of our chaplains was killed by rifle fire in an effort to reach one of his wounded men. On several occasions chaplains within front-line divisions crossed over to the enemy and arranged truces for the evacuation of the wounded and the dead. For such gallantry in action our chaplains have received many decorations but whether decorated or undecorated the same general spirit prevailed among the chaplains of the command.

Total decorations awarded to chaplains of this command from D-Day to and including 31 August were as follows: Purple Heart, five; Bronze Star, four; Silver Star, six.

The continuing emphasis of the Army Chaplain was complete coverage for all personnel. To this end, chaplains were placed on a detached service basis to insure complete coverage for all hospitals receiving combat patients. The problem of sufficient chaplains in all hospitals became acute at this period.

Transfers during this period were few, but necessary transfers were made speedily wherever and whenever necessary with the cooperative approval of G-1.

Chaplain casualties within Third United States Army units for total period since D-Day to 31 August were reported as follows: Killed in Action, three; Wounded in Action, seven; Missing in Action, one; evacuated for other causes, one.

Religious harmony, cooperation, and unity of purpose prevailed continuously, and Monthly Reports indicated that the Third United States Army chaplains gave outstanding service during this period.

CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

The first part of the second operational month for the Chaplain Section was given over to the initiation of a new plan of acquiring and delivering non-T/E religious items to unit chaplains of all echelons. Each individual chaplain within the Third United States Army was asked to indicate his need for such items as communion wine, communion wafers and hosts, new testaments, Catholic and Protestant, missals, medals, tracts, etc. These estimates were consolidated by each supervisory chaplain through which they passed. Corps chaplains under the supervision of the Army Chaplain procured all supplies for individual chaplains within the corps directly from the Senior Chaplain, Advance Section, Communication Zone. This Section prepared a consolidated requisition for all supplies needed for unit chaplains on duty with Third United States Army troops.

The distance between the echelons of Headquarters became so great at this period that it was necessary to assign two chaplains on a temporary duty status to the Rear Echelon for an adequate religious coverage of the military personnel of Headquarters. These chaplains were returned to their respective organizations as soon as conditions permitted.

On 5 September, the first shipment of religious supplies were received under the new plan from Advance Section, Communications Zone, and were delivered the same day to the Corps Chaplain, XX Corps, for further distribution to units within the corps.

Training Letter Number 3 was prepared, approved by Chief of Staff, and mailed 6 September, to all Third United States Army chaplains.

VIII Corps with ninety-nine chaplains attached or assigned passed from the control of the Third United States Army to the Ninth United States Army, 7 September.

The Religious Services during this period were well attended, due in some measure to the fact that both echelons were together for the first time since this Headquarters became operational.

Conferences with corps chaplains and assistants were held frequently to insure full and complete Catholic, Protestant and Jewish coverage for all personnel in the corps zone.

Archbishop Francis J. Spellman, Military Vicar of New York, arrived 13 September at the Third United States Army area, and offered Mass at 1700 hours for the military personnel of this Headquarters and adjoining units. During this period of his stay at the Army Command Post, he was escorted by the Army Chaplain on a tour of corps headquarters and front line combat units. Catholic chaplains were contacted and Masses offered by the Archbishop wherever the tactical situation would permit. At the conclusion of his visit in this zone the Army Chaplain accompanied the Archbishop on his visit to First United States Army and his return to the Twelfth United States Army Group.

As the period of the Jewish Holidays approached, this Section completed arrangements for Jewish Holiday Services in VERDUN (U 2865) and throughout the Third United States Army area. The Jewish personnel of this Headquarters were dispatched by motor convoy to VERDUN (U2865) for the New Year Religious Services. All Jewish Yom Kippur Services scheduled within the Third United States Army area were coordinated and announced. This Section arranged for three Jewish Services to be conducted at the theater of METZ (U 4770). Each of these services registered a very large attendance drawn from all Third United States Army units in that vicinity.

The events of this month necessitated a new study and a new appraisal was made concerning the religious coverage in evacuation and convalescent hospitals. The result of this study revealed an insufficient number of Catholic chaplains in or near hospital installations, to provide adequate Catholic chaplains in or near hospital installations to provide adequate Catholic coverage for the wounded and the dying. Recommendation was prepared and submitted to Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army, recommending that existing tables of organizations be changed to allow reassignment of one Catholic Chaplain and one Protestant Chaplain to each evacuation and convalescent hospital.

CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

Movement of the Headquarters into permanent buildings proved to be a definite asset to the religious program of this Headquarters and attached units. Heretofore, all religious services had been conducted in the field with a tent, small wall as protective covering for the altar only. Upon the movement of the Headquarters into the city of METZ (U 4770), an increasing attendance was noted from the personnel of neighboring small units not authorized an assigned or an attached chaplain. These circumstances called forth a special effort to make the religious program of this Headquarters serve as large an area as possible. To achieve a satisfactory measure of success in this "area plan" of services, it was necessary to give wide publicity to the schedule of religious services. The resulting success of this plan was even greater than was anticipated. One of the significant features contributing to the success of this "planned coverage" of many small units in one central program was the splendid interest and cooperation on the part of individual unit commanders. Unusually large attendances were recorded throughout this period at Catholic, Protestant and Jewish religious services. The responsibility for the Jewish religious program for this Headquarters and surrounding units was assumed by the Jewish Chaplain assigned to Headquarters XIX Tactical Air Command. The attendance figures increased, as they had always done through the campaign, on each Sunday that the Headquarters remained in the same loca-

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tion. The large number of men receiving the Sacraments, requesting New Testaments, Scriptures, Prayer Books, etc., and otherwise indicating a forward practice of their faith is indicative of the strength of religion among the men of the Third United States Army.

On 12 October, this Section moved with the Forward Echelon of this Headquarters from HOLTZ (U 4770) to METZ (U 8512). Upon arrival in the city of METZ (U 8512) a reconnaissance was made of all Churches, Protestant and Catholic, and Jewish Synagogues located within the city and its environs. The schedule of services in these Houses of Worship was made available to all personnel billeted within the city.

A careful study of the garrison area assigned for the billeting of this Headquarters, revealed a combination theater-chapel which was available for religious services as needed. It proved to be highly desirable to conduct a full religious program within the garrison area for Catholic and Protestant personnel.

A large synagogue was located in the city of METZ (U 8512) and steps were immediately taken through the Local Civil Affairs Detachment to clear the building of enemy medical supplies and to make it ready for "area" Jewish Religious Services. This Section cooperated with a French military officer, who was an acting chaplain in this area, in opening a French-American Service Center.

Arrangements were made with the Army Graves Registration Officer to furnish this Section with copies of burial forms for all personnel interred in Army Military Cemeteries. These reports were made available to chaplains conducting burial services in the cemeteries in an effort to help them accomplish correctly the Monthly Report of Chaplains.

The most significant accomplishment of the entire month of October was the agreement worked out by this Section and the Quartermaster Section of this Headquarters whereby one tent, small well complete with fly was made available to every chaplain the desired it within this command. But since the authorization for transportation of chaplains was there any item of equipment issued, which was issued for the chaplains work, which was more important than the tent, small wall. This barrage provided not only office space, privacy for counsel, study and religious instructions, but it also gave protective covering for altar, organ, and other expensive and essential equipment.

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

On 1 November 1944 the Army Chaplain and the Assistant Army Chaplain attended services at the Cemetery Du End and the Cathedral in METZ (U 8512) commemorating the death of civilians during the German occupation.

The Right Reverend Henry W. Hobson, Bishop of Southern Ohio Episcopal Church, representing both the General Commission on Army and Navy Chaplains and the Chief of Chaplains, arrived at this Headquarters from the United States. He conferred with the Army Chaplain on matters relating to Episcopalian and Protestant Chaplains. On 4 November, twenty-six of the chaplains of the Third United States Army participated in a conference with Bishop Henry W. Hobson at the Thiers Hotel, METZ. (U 8512).

During the month, routine items of administration touched upon tentage for chaplains, procurement of religious supplies, military cemeteries, funerals, Christmas plans, photo coverage of chaplain activities, distribution of Jewish Chaplains, technical questions on letters of condolence, a foreign language survey concerning chaplains, illegitimate pregnancy and marriages, casualty problems and a general survey to Leaders Commanding Officers who are requisitioning chaplain transportation without filling a requisition for a chaplain.

Armistice Day celebrations were held at the Cemetery Du End, the Cathedral in METZ (U 8512) in other Churches and cemeteries in the Third United States Army Area, and likewise in all Army cemeteries of World War I within the zone of the Third United States Army.

On 12 November 1944, the Assistant Third United States Army Chaplain, having served thirty months with this organization, was relieved. His successor reported for duty on 22 November 1944.

Action was taken for the restoration of sixty children and eleven governesses to their homes in METZ (U 8512). The group had been refugees in BOAS L'ETAPE (Q 4443) and word from Reverend Durand, the Pastor of the Temple Protestant, METZ (U 8512) informed the Army that they had been returned safely to METZ (U 8512). Arrangements were made to hold Jewish Services in a synagogue in METZ (U 8557) for men of the Jewish Faith stationed in the XX Corps Area.

The execution of two German Spies at the Prisoner of War Enclosure at TOUL (U 4410) brought commendation to the Chaplain of the 28th Field Hospital, for the moral and spiritual effort of his services. Religious Supplies were received from Advance Section, Communication Zone, as a result of pooled requisitions received from Army Chaplains during October and sent in together on 1 November. This procedure has resulted in a steady flow of religious supplies to chaplains in the field.

Through the cooperation of the chaplains in the combat area, a considerable quantity of ecclesiastical property including: Monstrances, Ciboria, Chalices, Missals, and Testaments, was returned to the Bishop of METZ (U 8512). Burial services were provided for 3,672 military personnel by the Chaplains of the Third United States Army.

Since the Third United States Army became operational, the following casualties had been suffered through November by its chaplains; Three Killed in Action; one Missing in Action; three Captured (two released); three Seriously Wounded in Action; ten Wounded in Action; eleven Slightly Wounded in Action; one Slightly Injured in Action; Total Casualties, thirty-two.

From 1 June 1944 to 1 December 1944, the number of chaplains under the administrative control of the Third United States Army varied from month to month. These totals read commencing 1 June, 216, 99, 289, 317, 308, 211, and 251 as of 1 December 1944.

On 1 December the 251 chaplains in the Third United States Army were serving as follows; Army Headquarters, two; on duty with three Corps Headquarters, six; on duty with nine divisions, 118, with twenty-six Antiaircraft Artillery Groups and Battalions, twenty-six; with three Armored Groups, four; with three Cavalry Groups, five; with nine Engineer Groups and Service Battalions, twelve; with eleven Field Artillery Groups, twenty-one; with three Medical Groups, three; with eight Evacuation Hospitals, fourteen; with one Convalescent Hospital, two; with four Field Hospitals, four; with seven Medical Clearing Companies, seven; with two Medical Gas Treatment Battalions, two; with sixteen Ordnance Groups and Battalions, seventeen; with two Quartermaster Groups, two; and with three Tank Destroyer Groups, six.

CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

Early in December the Twelfth U. S. Army Group Chaplain visited the Third United States Army Chaplain for a general discussion of pending problems.

Bad weather for operations in the field were characteristic of this period. The rains were continuous and immoderate. The Army Commander suggested to the Army Chaplain that a special prayer be prepared and circulated to every soldier in the Third United States Army, with an appeal to Almighty God for fair weather for battle. 250,000 copies of the following prayer were circulated in the Third United States Army; "Almighty and most merciful Father, we humbly beseech Thee of Thy great goodness, to restrain these immoderate rains with which we have had to contend. Grant us fair weather for battle. Graciously hearken to us as soldiers who call upon Thee that armed with Thy power, we may advance from victory to victory, and crush the oppression and wickedness of our enemies, and establish Thy justice among men and nations. Amen." The reverse side of the card contained the following Christmas Message from the Third United States Army Commander; "To each officer and soldier in the Third United States Army, I wish a Merry Christmas. I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty, and skill in battle. We march in our might to complete victory. May God's blessing rest upon each of you on this Christmas Day. /s/ G. S. Patton, jr., Lieutenant General, Commanding, Third United States Army. This office had general supervision of this Prayer Card distribution.

Following the same thought, Prayer was made the subject of Training Letter Number 5, which was circulated to Third United States Army Chaplains and unit commanders at this time. The letter is as follows; "Chaplains of the Third Army: At this stage of the operations I would call upon the chaplains and the men of the Third United States Army to focus their attention on the importance of prayer.

"Our victorious march from the Normandy Beach across France to where we stand, before and beyond the Siegfried Line, with the wreckage of the German Army behind us, should convince the most skeptical soldier that God has ridden with our banner. Pestilence and Famine have not touched us. We have continued in unity of purpose. We have had no quitters, and our leadership has been masterful. The Third Army has no roster of Retreats. None of Defeats. We have no memory of a lost battle to hand on to our children from this great campaign.

"But we are not stopping at the Siegfried Line. Tough days may be ahead of us before we eat our rations in the Chancellery of the Deutsches Reich.

"As chaplains it is our business to pray. To preach its importance. To urge its practice. But the time is now to intensify our faith in prayer, set alone with ourselves but with every believing man, Protestant, Catholic, Jew or Christian, in the ranks of the Third United States Army.

"Those who pray do more for the world than those who fight; and if the world goes from bad to worse, it is because there are more battles than prayers.' 'Blest is lifted up' said Emerson, 'much more battalions than hands that strike'. Gideon of Bible Fame was least in his father's house. He came from Israel's smallest tribe. But he was a mighty man of valor. His strength lay not in his military might, but in his recognition of God's proper claims upon his life. He reduced his army from thirty-two thousand to three hundred men lest the people of Israel would think that their valor had saved them. We have no intention to reduce our vast attacking force. But we must urge, instruct, and indoctrinate every fighting man to pray as well as fight. In Gideon's day, and in our own, spiritually alert minorities carry the burdens and bring the victories.

"Urge all of your men to pray, not alone in church, but everywhere. Pray when driving. Pray when fighting. Pray alone. Pray with others. Pray by night and pray by day. Pray for the cessation of immoderate rains, for good weather for battle. Pray for the defeat of our wicked enemy whose banner is injustice and whose god is oppression. Pray for Victory. Pray for our Army, and pray for peace.

"We must march together, all out for God. The soldier who 'crucks up' does not need sympathy or comfort so much as he needs strength. We are not trying to make the best of these days. It is our job to make the most of them.

"Now is not the time to follow God from 'afar off'. This Army needs the assurance and the faith that God is with us. With prayer we cannot fail.

"Be assured that this message on prayer has the approval, the encouragement, and the enthusiastic support of the Third United States Army Commander.

"With every good wish to each of you for a very Happy Christmas and my personal congratulations for your splendid and courageous work since landing on the beach, I am, etc."

Two chaplains assisted at the execution of German spies at the Prisoner of War Enclosure at TOUL (U 4410), one Catholic and one Protestant.

The 87th Infantry Division Chaplain visited this Headquarters on the occasion of the 87th Infantry Division coming under the control of the Third United States Army.

The following directive was issued by the Army Commander in regard to Church Property in the Army Area; "In situations where the local clergy abandon churches, soldiers are not forbidden to enter such churches, but extreme care should be exercised not to force entrance into locked rooms or compartments; to touch sacred vessels, vestments, or in any way to violate American church manners. Any act which reflects discredit on the United States Army or violates the American attitude of reverence and respect for a place of worship in France or Germany will be reported by unit commanders or chaplains to the nearest Military Police Headquarters. Commander of offenders will take necessary action under Articles of War 79-80, and Section I, Circular 41, this Headquarters, dated 4 August 1944. This directive will be brought to the attention of all personnel."

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The G-4 Section cooperated in forwarding a shipment of supplies very expeditiously from LONDON at this time.

Following the German break-through attempt, the VIII Corps Chaplains and chaplains serving other installations came under Third United States Army control.

The new procedure for the writing of Condolence Letters prepared by hospital personnel in the name of the Commanding Officer of the hospital for the signature of the appropriate chaplain, and addressed to the person whose name, relationship, and address supplied by the patient was inaugurated in the Third United States Army. This was a definite improvement in handling cases where wounded died in hospitals.

The military cemeteries at LIMEY (U 6429) and AMDILLY (U 6519) were closed toward the end of the month, and new cemeteries were opened at HAHN (P 8715) and GRAND FAILLY (U 9994). The total number of interment services conducted by chaplains under Third United States Army supervision were approximately 4,982, Allied and enemy dead.

With the assistance of documents issued by the Civil Affairs, general survey of religious affairs in Germany was made, it was discovered that in 1933, 32.5 per cent of the population of Germany were Catholic (Mostly concentrated in Bavaria and the Rhineland), 62.7 per cent Protestant, 0.8 per cent Jewish, and 4 per cent without religious preference. Austria, the Sudentenland, Alsace-Lorraine and the portions of Poland annexed in 1939 are all predominately Catholic. Consequently in the so-called "Greater Germany" the number of Protestants and Catholics are almost equal.

In addition to the Evangelical Church there were reported to be a number of small Protestant bodies which are called Free Churches. These include: certain Lutheran and Reformed sects, Methodists, Baptists, the Salvation Army, Mormons (Latter Day Saints), etc. The Christian Science Church and the group known as Jehovah's Witnesses existed in Germany before Hitler's rise to power but have since been banned. Before 1933 German Jews, like those of other countries, maintained Orthodox, Conservative and Reformed Synagogues.

It is the policy of the Supreme Commander to eliminate Nazi influence in official religious circles, to provide protection and fair treatment for all religious elements, and to permit freedom of religious worship for everyone in Germany.

Appropriate Religious Services for Christmas Day were conducted at midnight and in the morning for Headquarters troops. The War Department Theater which was used as a chapel, was appropriately decorated with Christmas trees, holly, and greens. The 61st Army Ground Forces Band supplied the music for the Protestant Service and the 28th Field Hospital choir participated in the Catholic Service.

On 26 December, the Forward Echelon moved to LUXEMBOURG (P 8422). The Rear Echelon remained at NANCY (U 8512). At this period, the Chaplain Section was a part of the Rear Echelon.

On the close of the month, the Third United States Army included the III, VIII, XII and XX Corps. The chaplains under the supervision of the Third United States Army totaled 262, and were serving as follows: Army Headquarters, two; on duty with four Corps Headquarters, eight; on duty with ten divisions, 138; with twenty-six Antiaircraft Artillery Groups and Battalions, twenty-six; with three Armored Groups, six; with three Cavalry Groups, four; with eight Engineer Groups and Service Battalions, thirteen; with eleven Field Artillery Groups, twenty-one; with three Medical Groups, three; with ten Evacuation Hospitals, eleven; with one Convalescent Hospital, one; with five Field Hospitals, five; with eight Medical Clearing Companies, eight; with two Medical Gas Treatment Battalions, two; with sixteen Ordnance Groups and Battalions, seventeen; with two Quartermaster Groups, two; and with three Tank Destroyer Groups, six.

CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

The opening of 1945 found the Chaplain Section of the Third United States Army located in NANCY (U 8512). Religious Services were conducted for Third United States Army personnel on New Year's Day in the local churches. The Ardennes Salient situation was in its closing phase, during which the Third United States Army had lost three Protestant and two Catholic Chaplains, missing in action.

A survey of the list of Military Dead revealed that there were many with religious preference classified as "unknown". The Third United States Army Chaplain secured lists of such unknown religious classifications and with the aid of the Corps, Division, and unit chaplains, determined the religious preference of a large percentage. This enabled the Graves Registration Service to erect proper grave markings; a Cross or a Star of David. An average of twenty such inquiries were received daily in the Third United States Army Chaplain Office. When the information was received, it was forwarded on to the Graves Registration Officer.

On 8 January, the Chaplain Section moved with the Rear Echelon, instead of the Forward, as formerly, from NANCY (U 8512) to the city of ESCH (P 7200). Four rooms were occupied on the second floor of a modern office building. The Section was ready for operations on the morning of 9 January.

The Third United States Army Chaplain and Assistant visited the city of LUXEMBOURG (P 8412) and made contacts and arrangements for complete religious coverage for the Forward Echelon's religious services.

At this period, difficulties arose concerning the flow of non-T/E religious supplies. For several months many units received only a small portion of needed rosaries, prayer books, missals, medals, and New Testaments for Catholic men. Protestant supplies also were very meager. Divisions that transferred from the administrative supervision of one corps to another were frequently without supplies on account of the failure of the previous corps to notify and make delivery to the new corps. Some units reported making trips to the nearest Communications Zone, Base Section, only to return without supplies requested. The Communications Zone Supply Officer stated that while some supplies were indeed insufficient, reservation had been made for shipping space at the New York Port of Embarkation, and it was expected that within two months the situation would improve. The Chief Quartermaster, European Theater of Operations, issued Circular #7, 15 January 1945, indicating improved organization of Chaplain Supply matters.

A satisfactory conference was held with the Oise Base Section, Communications Zone Chaplain and a standard procedure for non-T/E supplies was adopted. Chaplains of the Third United States Army were advised in Training Letter Number 6, under date of 22 January 1945, that original requests for non-T/E supplies would be filed in triplicate by individual chaplains on the twenty-fifth of each month. The European Theater of Operations Chaplain kept a card showing supplies furnished each chaplain; hence the importance of individual applications. Chaplains of Special Troops Third United States Army would file requests with the Third United States Army Chaplain before the twenty-fifth of each month. Chaplains whose units were attached to Corps would submit individual requests to the Corps Chaplain before the twenty-fifth of each month. Chaplains within Divisions would submit individual requests through the Division Chaplain to the Corps Chaplain. The Army and Corps Chaplains would forward two copies of the individual request to the Senior Chaplain, Headquarters Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, APO 887, and one copy to the Oise Base Section, Communications Zone Chaplain, APO 513, on the first of each month. The Oise Base Section, Communications Zone Chaplain, would deliver the supplies to the Army Chaplain and to the respective Corps Chaplains. Receipts accompanying supplies released to the Army Chaplain and to the Corps Chaplain were promised upon delivery. Distribution would then be made through the Army Chaplain for Army Troops, and through Corps Chaplains for Corps Troops and Divisions.

Chaplains were further advised in Training Letter Number 6 that the success or failure of the supply system depended on supplies reaching front-line chaplains and the men whom they served. Chaplains were advised not to omit until supplies were exhausted before filing a request. Negative requisitions, with explanation, were to be submitted by Division Chaplains to their respective Corps Chaplains when no supplies are desired for the following month. Supplies would be provided only on requisition, except in emergency. Standing order requisitions would not be honored. Desired supplies previously requisitioned but not received would be included in a requisition submitted the following month. Chaplains were advised that if they could not reach the proper Army or Corps distribution point to pick up supplies in person, they should contact any agency in their unit that may have transportation going to the assigned distribution point and arrange for collection of the supplies. Chaplains were admonished not to complain that they had failed to receive supplies unless they could prove that they had filed a request and were prepared to exhibit a copy thereof. When Corps Chaplains received supplies for Division Chaplains who had passed from their administrative control, these supplies would not be kept or returned. A notification that such supplies were waiting would be sent to the new Corps Chaplain, who would see that the undelivered supplies would reach the unit designated. While the Army Chaplain's Office was not a supply section, it was concerned that the flow of supplies for Chaplains of the Third United States Army be maintained at an efficient level.

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[illegible] effort [illegible] secure more accurate interment records made [illegible] Monthly Report of Chaplains. Directions were given in Training [illegible] 22 January 1945, to all Chaplains of the Third United [illegible] Forces this purpose. Despite the fact that the number of American, Allied and enemy interments for the month of December numbered some thousands, December Chaplain Reports list under paragraph 7c (W.D. Ch. Form No. 3) less than thirty-five. The question was raised as to whether this was in violation of the instruction for paragraph 7 in the Monthly Report, and of the letter from the Chief of Chaplains (File EPCHS 319.1 CMR, Subject: "Reports of Burials and Funerals") dated 29 August 1944, directing that chaplains conducting interment services report for each burial name, grade, organization, serial number, and the name of the cemetery. In Training Letter Number 4, dated 10 October 1944, from the Third United States Army Chaplain, chaplains were advised to conform to the directive of the Chief of Chaplains, especially since channels of official correspondence were becoming burdened by communications from the Office of the Chief of Chaplains directing that chaplains supply missing or incomplete records of interments.

Decision was made that administrative supervision of chaplains working in cemeteries rests with the Corps Chaplains. United States Military Cemetery No. 1 at HAHN (P 8715) was under the supervision of the XII Corps Chaplain. The United States Military Cemetery No. 1 at GRAND FAILLY (U 9994) was under the supervision of the III Corps Chaplain. Future installations would be announced by the Third United States Army Chaplain, and the appropriate Corps Chaplain advised to assume administrative responsibility. From time to time, each Corps Chaplain was to issue a duty roster covering a two week period to include names of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish Chaplains assigned to cemetery duty. Services would be held by a chaplain representative of each religious group at least three time a week. For example, the Protestant Chaplain who conducted services on the 7th of the month would be presumed to be conducting Protestant burial services for all Protestant interments since the visit of the last Protestant Chaplain to the cemetery. His Monthly Report should list interments for which services were conducted under the date that he was actually present. The same procedure was to be followed by Catholic and Jewish Chaplains. The name, grade, serial number, organization, and place of each interment would be reported in paragraph 7c, of each officiating Chaplain's monthly report.

The Army Chaplain received from the Army Graves Registration Officer consecutive lists of interments made in each cemetery. These lists were immediately dispatched to the responsible Corps Chaplains. For example, a Catholic Chaplain who conducted services on the 14th of the month might desire to know the names of the Catholic dead for whom he conducted services. If he could not secure the data before leaving the cemetery from the Graves Registration Officer, he could secure the information from the Corps Chaplain from the date that the last Catholic Chaplain officiated.

For purposes of future check it was regarded as advisable for the Corps Chaplain to submit to the Army Chaplain copies of the Duty Rosters as they were issued. If past Duty Rosters covering the period from the beginning of operations had not been forwarded, they too would be desired.

To prevent a volume of future official correspondence, chaplains were advised to be extremely conscientious in the fulfilment of the duty of recording interment services. The Army Chaplain explained to correspondents "the answer 'I don't know' will not be satisfactory when placed on an official communication as the '7th Indorsement' from a higher echelon of command. It will be the chaplain's responsibility to secure as accurate a record as possible of each interment to include name, grade, serial number, organization, and cemetery designation. The Chief of Chaplains has been advised as to the difficulty of obtaining this record, but in his letter dated 29 August 1944, indication was given as to the procedure to be followed. A blank entry under paragraph 7c does not constitute obedience to the directive of the Chief of Chaplains on 'Reports of Burials and Funerals'".

Toward the end of January a conference was held with Jewish Chaplains on the Jewish Passover Holidays. An announcement of the results of the conference appeared in Training Letter Number 6 reading as follows: "The annual Jewish Observance of the Feast of the Passover extends, this year, from 29 March through 5 April. The first two days (29-30 March) and the last two days (4-5 April) are of particular obligation. While tactical and geographical necessity may prevent many Jewish men from keeping the Passover as they desire, nevertheless, chaplains will take care to cooperate with Commanding Officers in providing such means of religious observance as may be available. During this period it is customary for Jews to abstain from ordinary bread and instead eat MATZOTH. During the Passover Holy Days approximately one pound per mattoth per Jewish observant is needed. Passover wine is also a desirable requisite. These supplies should be included in non-T/E requisitions submitted before 25 February 1945. They will be

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[redacted]

The total number of chaplains under the supervision of the Third United States Army Chaplain on 31 January 1945, was 354. These were distributed as follows: Army Headquarters, ten; on duty with four Corps Headquarters, nine; on duty with fifteen divisions, 197; with thirty-three Antiaircraft Artillery Groups and Battalions, thirty-three; with four Armored Groups, six; with three Cavalry Groups, four; with thirteen Engineer Groups and Service Battalions, twenty-two; with fourteen Field Artillery Groups, twenty-eight; with three Medical Groups, three; with twelve Evacuation Hospitals, thirteen; with one Convalescent Hospital, one; with six Field Hospitals, six; with ten Medical Clearing Companies, ten; with two Medical Gas Treatment Battalions, two; with seventeen Ordnance Groups and Battalions, eighteen; with two Quartermaster Groups, two; and with four Tank Destroyer Groups, eight.

CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

The Adjutant Section, Third United States Army, changed location on 1 February from [redacted], to the [redacted] on the [redacted].

On the 5th and 6th of February, the Army Chaplain was present at a [redacted] at the [redacted] of the Rhine-Main Center of Gravity as [redacted] Army, which was attended by the First, Third, Seventh, Ninth, Fifteenth Armies, and Sixth United States Air Force Chaplains. Discussion centered on questions of supplies, reinforcements, administration, exchange of personnel, and other profitable subjects.

[redacted] and in February, the Assistant Executive, [redacted] of the Army Air Force, spent ten days at the headquarters covering work of [redacted] and Special Service Sections. The Remagen Battle Field was visited.

[redacted] cases of trench sickness were reported during the month. [redacted] was held on the 28th for Antitoxin Administration.

The number of interments during the month was 4,260.

The roster of Third United States Army Chaplains during February numbered [redacted].

CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

A [redacted] Jewish Chaplain was held at the Third Army Headquarters [redacted] on March 8 [redacted] Army Chaplains.

The advance Headquarters Army was located [redacted] with the advance echelon of each subsidiary Headquarters [redacted] facilities available in the [redacted] area.

[redacted] provided by Military Government, transport was maintained and [redacted] Army [redacted] Army Corps, the [redacted] United States Army [redacted] Army [redacted] Army [redacted]

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

On the first day of May, Chaplains reported the over-running of German Prison Camp, at REGENSBURG (V 7878), MAUTHAUSEN (M 0284), and CHAM (D 9980). With these reports came stories of the finding of human bodies stacked in the past week, crematoria, of kennels where huge dogs were kept to torment prisoners, and of other German atrocities. This period found Chaplains advancing into Austria and Czechoslovakia, and services were held in SALZBURG (Q 4500) and other places famous in the Nazi regime.

At this time the wounded were carried to the rear areas almost entirely by air.

The Chief of Chaplains of the Wehrmacht, Major General Dormann, a Protestant Bishop, and with him, his staff, Colonel Wirmann, Catholic, and Colonel Muenchmeyer, Evangelical, retreating from BERLIN (Z 7) with the Commandant of the Wehrmacht headquarters, surrendered to the 20th Infantry Division. While under arrest at a Benedictine Monastery, they were interviewed by the 20th Division Chaplain and the 4th Armored Division Chaplain. It was reported that they were in great admiration of our Chaplains Corps. Commenting on our fifteen Chaplains in the Division, they asserted that they had great difficulty with the basis to have one Catholic and one Protestant assigned to each Division. Their senior rank was admitted to be a military Front and a sop to the religious-minded people of Germany. They admitted that the Nazi Party - with which they disclaimed membership - had to move cautiously toward the extermination of religion. The seeds were to die, for drastic action, but the slow death was in process. They appeared very familiar with the objectives and personnel of the United States Army Corps of Chaplains and could not praise it too highly.

Victory was celebrated in all units on 9 May, with services dedicated to the troops who destroyed the German Army, to the dead who lie near the roads from the Channel to the Elbe, and from the desert to the Alps. Victory meant the triumph of truth, the freedom and the dignity of the common man. The war ended with a common sentiment on the part of the chaplains that their belief in the rights of the common man was strengthened, and with the world's tragic losses before them, a better way would be found to settle human differences, and live their lives in peace, with reason, and with enduring good-will.

General Eisenhower issued an order of the day declaring that "full victory in Europe had been attained" and commending each member of the Allied Expeditionary Forces "for valiant performance of duty." Asserting that the "crusade in which we all embarked in the early summer of 1944, has reached a glorious conclusion," and the Supreme Commander asserted that "our accomplishments at sea, in the air, on the ground, and in the field of supply have astonished the world."

"Even before the final week of the conflict, you had put five million of the enemy out of the war. You have taken in stride military tasks so difficult as to be classed by many observers as impossible. You have confused the enemy on the road to victory, you have endured every discomfort and privation, and surmounted every obstacle ingenuity and desperation could throw in your path. Allied fighting men, General Eisenhower said, did not pause until "our front was firmly joined up with the great Red Army coming from the east and other allied forces coming from the south."

"But Allied troops, in achieving victory, have travelled through hundred of miles, marked by the graves of former comrades, for whose sacrifices, the Supreme Commander added, "the blood of many nations has been shed to gain the victory of the fallen."

The Chaplains of the Third United States Army participated in three campaigns on the continent; Normandy Campaign, 6 June 1944 to 24 July 1944; Northern France, 25 July 1944 to 14 September 1944, and the Germany Campaign, 15 September 1944 to an unannounced date.

In the line on 9 May were 17 Divisions with 225 Chaplains assigned. 120 Chaplains were attached to other supporting units. Third Army headquarters (Rear) was located at ERLANGEN (S 8417), III Corps at DEGGENDORF (Z 2773); V Corps at OBERNBURG (P 0131); XII Corps at GRAFENRAU (Q 1144) and XX Corps at ST. MARTIN (V 2242).

CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

ADMINISTRATION: Administrative representation in Army Groups and Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces would have been extremely advantageous. It is recommended that a chaplain of senior rank have a place on each of these staffs.

EQUIPMENT:

a. Tents, Wall, Small, Complete with Pins and Poles: In a large percentage of days in combat, tentage is a definite advantage to the chaplain for cover to protect vestments and alter equipment as provided in Section II (2) W.D. Circular 377 dated 18 September 1944.

b. Organ, Field Folding: Changing weather conditions effect the use of the Organ, Field, Folding. Metal should be substituted for the wooden pegs for organ stops. The use of plastic instead of fabric-covered wood would be an advantage to prevent warping.

INTERMENTS: During operations a Protestant and Catholic Chaplain should be assigned to Graves Registration Units. These chaplains would also have the responsibility of reporting burials to the Chief of Chaplains.

NON-T/E SUPPLIES: Throughout the campaign, supply installations were consistently too far behind the Army line for satisfactory supply service. Delivery of supplies to combat chaplains was not marked by a high standard of service. Supplies, in some items, were always inadequate. Chaplain Supply Agencies should have sufficient truckage on call to ease monthly deliveries of Non-T/E Supplies to Army and to Corps. Locked boxes, returnable at point of delivery, should be provided as basic equipment for the supply services, to eliminate possibility of theft.

PROMOTIONS: The chaplains promotion program was unsatisfactory. A critical bottleneck existed with reference to the promotion of chaplains from the rank of Captain to Major. Captains with three years in grade had little or no future opportunity for promotion. To overcome this situation the following suggestions are offered:

a. That Regimental, Group, and Senior Division Artillery chaplains be authorized in grade of Major.

b. That Infantry Divisions, comprising at present 15 chaplains, be allotted the following grades: One (1) Lieutenant Colonel, five (5) Majors, nine (9) Captains or First Lieutenants.

c. That Armored Divisions be allotted one (1) Lieutenant Colonel, four (4) Majors, (one (1) Assistant Division Chaplain, one (1) each Combat Command, one (1) Division Trains) and five (5) Captains.

TRANSFERS: More elasticity recommended for transfer of chaplains from combat to Communications Zone and vice versa. With this provision, problems of fatigue, age, denominational distribution, promotion and rank could be more efficiently handled.

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Chemical Officer
APO 403

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Chemical Section's Historical Report.

TO : Commanding General, Third U. S. Army, APO 403, U. S. Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Chemical Warfare Section, Third U. S. Army Headquarters, beginning with 23 March 1944, and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapters.

2. The Chemical Section had primary duties pertaining both to operation of troops and to supply, and accordingly was represented in both Echelons of Headquarters. Chemical Mortar Battalions participated in all major operations, employing both high explosive and smoke in the support of forward elements. The employment of smoke in river crossings, utilizing Chemical smoke generator companies, reached a new high in this campaign. Storage and issue of Chemical supplies, and maintenance and repair of Chemical equipment, often complicated by rapid movement and extent of front lines, were adequately handled by available Chemical Service units.

E. C. Wallington

E. C. WALLINGTON,
Colonel, C.W.S.,
Chemical Officer.

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CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



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CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

Section I. General. The Chemical Section, Third U. S. Army, arrived in the United Kingdom organized under its full authorized personnel. This consisted of six officers, one warrant officer, and nineteen enlisted men. Besides the Chemical Officer and the executive, the section was composed of operations, supply, intelligence, and administrative sub-sections. While in the United Kingdom, the Forward and Rear Echelons of the Chemical Section were located together. Prior to embarking for the Continent it was necessary, due to a reduction in personnel, to combine the operations and intelligence sub-sections.

Section II Operations. It was apparent upon arrival that the operations section was responsible for accomplishing the following:

1. Determining the number of Chemical service and combat troops required for the operations given Third U. S. Army, and recommending additional attachments if necessary.

2. Taking active steps to raise the standards of defense against chemical attack to the level of proficiency demanded in the event the enemy used gas

3. Establishing an operational policy for the Third U. S. Army for use prior to and during the initial phase of gas warfare.

4. Preparing Chemical service and combat troops for performance of their primary missions

5. Preparing Chemical annex to Operation OVERLORD plan.

Chemical Battalions

For operations given Third U. S. Army the Army was assigned four corps, with an initial allotment of one Chemical battalion, motorized, to support the operations. Because of the demand for Chemical battalions and in order to attach one Chemical battalion to each corps, an allotment of three additional battalions was requested. Although approved, the request could not be fulfilled because of the shortage of battalions in the theater

The one Chemical battalion assigned to Third U. S. Army, the 86th Chemical Battalion, Motorized, arrived in the United Kingdom 24 April 1944 and was billeted seven miles south of LIVERPOOL, at PORT SUNLIGHT. Upon arrival the unit was attached to VIII Corps as this was to be the initial corps of Third U. S Army to move to the Continent, and it was desired to give the corps the maximum fire power possible. The period from 26 April, when the battalion arrived, until 28 June, when it departed for the concentration area, was used by the battalion for securing its 75% equipment and giving all mortar squads additional firing practice. A total of 2296 rounds of 4" and 2016 rounds of 4" were expended during this firing. While it was desired to attach the battalion to a division for experience in rendering close support of infantry, this was impractical in England.

The battalion arrived at the staging area 28 June and left for the Continent as follows:

Battalion Headquarters	29 June
Headquarters Detachment	29 June
Medical Detachment	29 June
"A" Company	30 June
"B" Company	29 June
"C" Company	28 June
"D" Company	28 June

"B" Company, which embarked for the Continent 29 June, was forced to return to the United Kingdom on the same date when the original ship on which it boarded was damaged by enemy action. As a result of this accident the company had some casualties and lost all organic equipment, basic loads, and individual equipment except what the men had on their persons. It was therefore necessary to secure replacements and completely re-equip this company. Arrangements were made through the G-1 Section, Third U. S. Army, for replacements, and through the G-4 Section, Third U. S. Army for complete re-equipment of the company. By 16 July the company was again ready for embarkation and departed for the Continent where it was placed in section 19 July, the day following its debarkation. In the meantime the remainder of the battalion had arrived safely on the Continent and been committed by VIII Corps on 3 July.

Chemical Warfare Service Units

With the expectation of receiving three additional Chemical battalions later in the campaign, for a total of four, it was decided the Army would need a minimum of two Chemical depot companies and two Chemical maintenance companies. As the Army was assigned only one depot company and one maintenance company, the assignment of an additional company of each type was requested. With the assignment of these units it was planned that each maintenance-depot team would support two corps and two Chemical battalions. Chemical ammunition was to be supplied from Chemical ammunition supply points operated by detachments from the depot companies, and E/S items were to be drawn as needed on a replacement basis from the Chemical depot companies. All Chemical Warfare Service items requiring maintenance were to be evacuated from the depot company to the maintenance company for repair or reissue, salvage, or evacuation to the rear for disposition. Flame throwers were to be filled by the depot companies and drawn fully charged by units as needed. Empty flame throwers were to be returned immediately for refilling.

The first Chemical maintenance company assigned to Third U. S. Army was the 57th Chemical Maintenance Company which arrived in the United Kingdom 17 April and was billeted at CHURSTLETON miles north of WREXHAM. While in the United Kingdom the unit was equipped for operations on the Continent and performed third and fourth echelon maintenance of Chemical Warfare equipment brought to it by Third U. S. Army units. Arrangements were also made for the unit to continue its basic training and re-fire individual and organic weapons. The company was alerted for overseas shipment 5 July, departed for the concentration area 13 July, and left for the Continent 18 July.

On 1 June the 61st Chemical Depot Company was relieved of assignment to Western Base Section, Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, and assigned to the Third U. S. Army. At this time the unit was divided into three sections which were operating separate Chemical Warfare Service depots in Great Britain. The same day the unit was assigned to Third U. S. Army it was alerted for overseas movement and detachments were relieved from attachments to depots. By 8 June all detachments had rejoined company headquarters operating the Chemical section of General Depot Number 40 seven miles southwest of CARDIFF, at BARRY, WALES, and action was begun to prepare the unit for movement to the Continent. Preparations were completed 5 July, and the company moved to the concentration area at STROUD twelve miles southeast of GLOUCESTER. On 11 and 12 July the company moved to the marshalling area at PLYMOUTH, and departed for the Continent on 14 and 15 July.

As a result of the request for the assignment of an additional Chemical depot and maintenance company the 182d Chemical Depot Company was relieved from assignment to Southern Base Section, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, 15 July and assigned to Third U.S. Army. The unit was alerted for a short sea voyage 18 July, and as Army Headquarters was by this time on the Continent, the unit was attached to XX Corps 19 July, for administration and supply. By 1 August the unit was ready for overseas operations and departed from SHEPTON MALLET, five miles east of WELLS for the marshalling area. On 5 August the company left the marshalling area and proceeded by motor convoy to SOUTHAMPTON where it embarked for FRANCE on the same day.

On 9 June the 16th Chemical Maintenance Company, in NORTH IRELAND, was attached to Third U. S. Army in response to the Army's request for an additional maintenance company. The unit was further attached 14 July to XX Corps. Following this attachment, the 16th Chemical Maintenance Company continued operating the maintenance section of a Chemical depot at COLLYTOWN thirty-five miles south of LONDONDERRY, including the repair of Chemical Warfare equipment. During the month of June a total of 300 1½-quart decontaminating apparatuses and 32,891 gas masks, in addition to other items, were repaired. As the company was at that time located in North Ireland Base Section, Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations, it was alerted for short sea voyage 17 July, and was moved one month later, in order to facilitate preparations for Continental operations, to ARMATHOM, ENGLAND, fourteen miles north of CHELTENHAM. Upon arrival in ENGLAND, the company was attached to General Depot Number 26 at TEWKESBURY just north of CHELTENHAM, where it operated the Chemical Warfare section of the depot. The company left for the marshalling area 26 August and arrived at UTAH BEACH 29 August.

The 46th Chemical Laboratory Company, attached to VIII Corps, was assigned to Third U. S. Army upon the Army's arrival in ENGLAND. A Laboratory company on the Continent was not required by this Army prior to the initiation of gas warfare as it was planned to forward by air all samples of gas and gas equipment from the Continent to laboratories in the United Kingdom for analysis. For this reason action was begun at once to have the 46th Chemical Laboratory Company relieved from the Third U.S. Army and assigned to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army. This action resulted in the company's being assigned to Western Base Section, Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations, on 26 May.

Training

Various Army units were visited and their proficiency in defense against chemical attack tested. Based upon this inspection, Training Memorandum No. 14, Subject: Training in Chemical Warfare, (Annex a (Part Eleven, Chapter One)), was published 20 April to outline the standards of proficiency required by Third U. S. Army. Other actions taken were as follows:

1. Training films were made available through Western Base Section.

2. Ammunition and protective covers were made available for training.

3. Arrangements were made with Western Base Section for Third U.S. Army troops to send personnel to a Unit One Officer's and One NCO's course being conducted each week by Western Base Section.

4. All units were authorized to request assistance in their training program from division, corps, and Army Chemical sections.

The Chemical Warfare policy of this Army was established by Operations Memorandum Number 13, Subject: Chemical Warfare, which was published 8 June 1944 (Annex b (Part Eleven, Chapter One)).

Section III. Supply. The first week in the United Kingdom the supply section spent in devising a satisfactory supply system. It was necessary to contact Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations, to arrive at final decisions. A credit system was established for Third U. S. Army, and from stocks at various depots the supply officer issued Chemical Warfare equipment to the units. The usual procedure was for units to submit requisitions to Third U.S. Army for approval, after which the unit could either pick up the supplies, or request shipment. Of sections in this Headquarters having supply functions, the Chemical Section was the only one to make initial issue of supplies direct to units instead of having the initial issue made by the appropriate base section. This was done in order to conform with the supply policy previously established by the Chemical section of Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations, and in order that the Third U. S. Army Chemical Section would have accessible at all times information as to the amount of Chemical equipment each unit had on hand.

VIII Corps, which had arrived in the United Kingdom prior to Third U. S. Army, had been the supply agency for all units to be assigned to this Headquarters upon its arrival. The supply system VIII Corps employed was essentially the same as that followed by Third U.S. Army. This corps terminated its duties of supplying army units with submission of the Material Status Report for the month of March 1944. The Chemical Officer, Third U. S. Army, submitted on 20 April the first Chemical Warfare Material Status Report for the Army after arrival of this Headquarters in the United Kingdom. The purpose of this report was to provide a record that would indicate the extent of shortages of Chemical items by organizations. These figures were consolidated and submitted to Headquarters Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations.

Initially, some difficulties were experienced in providing authorized amounts of Chemical Warfare items for troops. Among these were flame thrower fuel, 4.2-inch Chemical mortar ammunition, and colored smoke grenades. However, as D-Day approached these items were provided in quantity set forth in the basic load requirements. The basic load established for the portable flame thrower was two fillings. This permitted transporting the apparatus filled with one loading, ready for use, with another filling in reserve. Basic load of 4.2-inch Chemical mortar ammunition was 2880 rounds for a battalion, in the ratio of 60% HE to 40% WP shells. It was necessary for this section to prepare its own basic load chart for Chemical Warfare ammunition.

Some items of British make were included in the Chemical equipment issued to U. S. Army units. These included the British gas alarm, British Anti-Lewisite (BAL) eye ointment, sleeve gas detector, eyeshields, a paint detector, and a substitute filling for the portable flame thrower.

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On 14 April, Administrative Order Number One was published setting forth the Chemical Warfare supply procedure, including initial allowances and basis of issue of Chemical Warfare items. These figures were based principally on logistic tables furnished by Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations. It became necessary to modify these figures slightly, due to changes in priority status of units, and in some part to availability of supplies. Units that were scheduled for early departure for the continent were relieved of their organizational protective equipment but retained individual protective equipment.

The Rear Echelon of Third U. S. Army moved to the staging area at NINE TREES, fifteen miles southwest of SALISBURY, 6 July. From here, on 11 July, the Chemical supply officer, in "S" Echelon--a group consisting chiefly of the supply sub-sections of the Headquarters--moved to CHELTENHAM to continue the job of providing all units under this Headquarters with initial and replacement equipment and supplies preparatory to their moving to the continent.

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

Section I. General. The Forward Echelon of the Chemical Section, Third U. S. Army, arrived on the Continent 7 July. This echelon was composed of the Chemical Officer, operations officer, warrant officer, and five enlisted men. The Rear Echelon, less the supply officer and one enlisted man, who had remained in "S" Echelon, arrived 19 July.

The Chemical Section, together with other supply services in this Headquarters, furnished a small cadre, known as the "S" Echelon, to remain in the United Kingdom. This echelon was attached to XII Corps. The purpose of the "S" Echelon was to complete the equipping of all Third U. S. Army units remaining in the United Kingdom subsequent to the Army's departure for the Continent.

Section II. Operations. The operations officer of the Chemical section made reconnaissances for bivouac areas for Chemical units scheduled to arrive on the Continent. The usual procedure was to meet the unit at the beach, and conduct it to the area selected.

Chemical Battalions

Prior to Third U.S. Army's arrival on the Continent, the 86th Chemical Battalion, Motorized, arrived 26 and 29 June in France. During the month of July, while assigned to VIII Corps, the battalion was in combat, when Third U. S. Army became operational 1 August, the 86th Chemical Battalion was the only combat Chemical unit under this command.

Chemical Warfare Service Units

Assigned to Third U. S. Army since 28 May, the 61st Chemical Depot Company arrived at UTAH BEACH 16 July, and proceeded to an area near STE. MERE-GLISE (T09), where it bivouaced over night. The next day the company moved to and occupied an area one mile east of ST. GERMAIN LE GAILLARD (000). The 87th Chemical Maintenance Company, arriving on the Continent 12 July, was met and conducted to a bivouac area in the vicinity of the 61st Chemical Depot Company. During the next week, all T/E shortages of both companies were filled, and the companies further prepared for performance of their primary missions. In order to be ready to serve Third U. S. Army troops when the Army became operational, both companies were attached to First U. S. Army. The 61st Chemical Depot Company was stocked with Class II, IV, and V supplies, and the 87th Chemical Maintenance Company was prepared to handle Chemical Warfare maintenance. This was accomplished by moving the two companies on 20 July to a point one mile south of PONT L' ABBE (T29) where a First U. S. Army Chemical depot was taken over. Their mission at this time was to furnish Chemical ammunition, operate supply dumps, and perform maintenance for VIII Corps.

When Third U. S. Army became operational, at 011500 August 1944, both the 87th Chemical Maintenance and the 61st Chemical Depot Companies reverted from attachment to First U. S. Army.

Section III. Supply. The principal type units remaining in the United Kingdom until the latter part of August, with which the Chemical Section in the "S" Echelon was concerned with supplying, were Field Artillery and Engineer Combat Battalions. In addition, there were two Chemical units which were subsequently to be assigned to Third U.S. Army --the 16th Chemical Maintenance Company and the 192d Chemical Depot Company.

During the five months the Chemical supply sub-section of Third U. S. Army was in the United Kingdom, 1853.8 tons of Chemical supplies, including all items, were issued to troops.

On 15 July, the 192d Chemical Depot Company, while still in England was assigned to Third U. S. Army. The 16th Chemical Maintenance Company, assigned to Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, but attached to Third U. S. Army, arrived at ASHCHURCH, England, near CHELTENHAM, from North Ireland on 17 August. It was necessary to complete the supply of these two units both with equipment and personnel before their departure for the Continent. This responsibility was primarily that of the "S" Echelon.

On the Continent, during the three weeks prior to becoming operational, the Rear Echelon of the Chemical Section was confronted mainly with devising a supply system that would be suitable for the Army upon becoming operational. Conferences were held with Chemical officers of Advance Section, Communications Zone, in order to gain any benefits that would simplify the system and improve its efficiency. Arrangements were made for Third U.S. Army units to draw Class II and IV Chemical supplies from First U. S. Army Chemical Warfare Service supply points. One of these supply points was operated by the 61st Chemical Depot Company, a unit temporarily attached to First U. S. Army, but designed to revert to Third U. S. Army upon the latter's becoming operational.

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

Section I. General. On 1 August, to reduce the size of the Forward Echelon of the Chemical Section, the warrant officer and one enlisted man were transferred from the Forward to the Rear Echelon. This left the Forward Echelon of the section with two officers--the Chemical Officer, and the operations officer--and four enlisted men.

Section II. Operations. Though requests had been made for additional Chemical battalions, maintenance and depot companies, there was only one each of these units under Third U.S. Army on 1 August--the 86th Chemical Battalion, attached to VIII Corps, and the 87th Chemical Maintenance and the 61st Chemical Depot Companies.

Chemical Battalion

The 86th Chemical Battalion remained attached to VIII Corps assigned to Third U. S. Army. Originally, this unit was organized so that each of its forty-eight 4.2-inch Chemical mortars, twelve of which were in each of the four combat companies, was operated by a six man squad. There were four squads to a platoon, three platoons to a company. During July while under VIII Corps, the battalion reorganized the four weapons companies into two platoons per company. Each platoon operated four mortars. The resulting excess personnel was rotated to the battalion headquarters detachment in the rear areas for rest whenever possible. The four extra mortars in each company were placed in the rear echelon of the units as reserve.

The first of August found the battalion headquarters, "A", and "B" Companies bivouaced in vicinity of MONTVILLE (T26), with "C" Company at ST. JEAN DE LA HAIZE (T01) supporting the 314th Infantry of the 79th Division, and "D" Company at PLOMB (T32). The following day the battalion headquarters moved to CHAMPSEY (T22). "B" Company was attached to the 8th Infantry Division. On 3 August, "A" Company was attached to the 83d Infantry Division.

On 5 August the battalion fired its first missions following its assignment to Third U.S. Army. "A" Company, in the ST. MALO Peninsula, fired two missions, one with 200 rounds of HE, the other with sixty-four rounds of WP. "C" Company expended ninety-one rounds of HE on an area target, and 100 rounds of WP, setting up a smoke screen. From 12 to 15 August, "B" Company was attached to 83d Infantry Division and fired several missions during the attack on ST. MALO (871).

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Members of the 86th Chemical Battalion firing the 4.2-inch mortar in operations near ST. MALO

After the fall of the Citadel at ST. MALO (871) on 17 August, "A", "B", and "C" Companies were released from their respective attachments, and reverted to battalion control. These companies moved to the battalion headquarters' area near TREMEDAN (A86), and were attached to the 8th Infantry Division. By 19 August the battalion was enroute to BREST (F99) where, for the next six weeks it participated in the attack on, and aided in reducing enemy resistance in the BREST Peninsula. During the month of August, the battalion fired 136 missions, expending 9156 rounds HE and 7702 rounds WP 4.2-inch Chemical mortar ammunition.

Chemical Warfare Service Units

It was planned to use one depot and one maintenance company as a team to operate in support of two corps. Chemical ammunition would be available at the ammunition supply points operated by the depot company, with T/E items drawn from the depot company on a replacement basis. The Chemical Warfare Service items requiring maintenance were to be evacuated from the depot company to the maintenance company for repair and reissue, salvage, or evacuation to the rear for disposition.

Upon reverting to Third U. S. Army on 1 August, the 61st Chemical Depot Company and the 87th Chemical Maintenance Company were bivouaced together near PONT L'ABBE (T29). The 61st Chemical Depot Company obtained a stock of Class II, IV, and V supplies at this location and both companies on the following day moved to a location four miles southeast of COUTANCES (T83). On 5 August the 61st Chemical Depot Company established Ammunition Supply Point No. 1 two miles east of PONTAUBAULT (T81). Three days later the remainder of the 61st Chemical Depot Company moved to a new location five miles northwest of FOUGERES (T36) to set up Ammunition Supply Point No. 2.

A second Chemical Depot company, the 192d, assigned to this command, arrived in France on 8 August. It moved the following day to an area near ST. GERMAIN LE GAILLARD (000). Since the Army's front had expanded over such a large area, it was decided to leave the 87th Chemical Maintenance and the 61st Chemical Depot Companies to operate in general support of VIII Corps to which the 86th Chemical Battalion remained attached. As their action centered westward, toward the BREST Peninsula, it [illegible] depot company was needed on the eastern end of [illegible] U.S. Army units exclusive [illegible] Company was moved from [illegible]ERS (T85) where on 12 [illegible] ished.

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At the beginning of September, the 1st Chemical Depot Company was operating three supply points: one at MONTSAUGE (T55), one at CLAYE (W11), and another at LAS GRANDS (Z69). All efforts were made to close out the supply point at MONTSAUGE (T55), which was too far to the rear, and transfer its stock to the most forward supply point at LAS GRANDS (Z69). However, before this could be done and in order to keep up with the rapidly advancing Third U. S. Army troops the 1st Chemical Depot Company had to establish still another supply point on 6 September at PIERREFITTE SUR AIRE (U25). On the same date the supply point at MONTSAUGE (T55) was closed, and operations were transferred to the newly established supply point at PIERREFITTE. Five days later the supply point at CLAYE (W11) was also closed, and operations were transferred to PIERREFITTE for the first time since leaving [illegible]. On 17 September a detachment was sent to Etival [illegible] later the entire depot from PIERREFITTE was moved to [illegible] remainder of the depot was sent to refurbish [illegible] the rear and receive, assemble and [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

During the 5th Infantry Division's advance eastward [illegible] the Moselle River in the vicinity of Arnaville [illegible] protect the bridging operation from observed artillery fire by use of smoke. The request to Twelfth U. S. Army Group for [illegible] generator company was approved with the result that [illegible] smoke generator company was assigned to [illegible] The [illegible] left its bivouac area at 0200, the same day, and arrived in the 5th Infantry Division area at 0815 [illegible] of the area to be screened was completed after arrival, and [illegible] tions were started at 0930. [illegible] every artillery fire [illegible] from the west bank of the Moselle River on 15 September, and by [illegible] tended it was possible to ferry four generators to the east bank. The river was [illegible] by smoke from both sides from 0930 to 2000 each day until the company was relieved by the 181st Chemical Smoke Generator Company, 29 September. Both 81 and 4.2 inch mortars were used [illegible] cent [illegible] water, after it became necessary because of shifts in wind direction, to move the mortars to [illegible] were employed during this operation.

[illegible]

An [illegible] of the [illegible] was [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] moved [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible]





[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

Section I. General. Located northeast of Metz (T47), the Chemical Section, together with the entire Rear Echelon of Third U. S. Army, departed 5 October for HARET (Z61) where the Headquarters was located for the remainder of October.

On 6 October, the Chemical Officer and the Operations Officer of this section witnessed a demonstration of a British Chemical mortar. This weapon was constructed similarly to the U S Army 4.2-inch Chemical mortar but on a much larger scale. The British weapon was a 9.75-inch mortar that fired a one hundred pound shell as far as 3700 yards. The projectile could be loaded with either fifty-six pounds of CK or sixty pounds of WP.

Again, on 26 October, a British flame thrower demonstration was witnessed by personnel of Third U. S. Army Headquarters. This flame thrower, mounted on a half track, carried 125 gallons of fuel, and fired up to a distance of 150 yards.

Section II. Operations.

Unit Activities

Remaining attached to XII Corps, the 86th Chemical Battalion went into action 1 October, two days after its arrival in the XII Corps area. The battalion headquarters detachment and "A" Company, the latter in corps reserve, remained at DOMMARIE (T90), ten miles east of NANCY. "B" Company took up a new position near GERBECOURT (Q04), while "C" Company operated near MORET (U03), and "D" Company remained in position near JUVRECOURT (Q11). By 8 October "A" Company was attached to the 6th Armored Division and moved out two days later to vicinity of ARNACOURT (T93). The other three companies continued firing small missions during the first week of October.



[illegible] Company of the 86th Chemical Battalion equipped [illegible] with an 81 mm mortar

[illegible]

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Personnel of the 81st Chemical Battalion in action in France

With the 81st Chemical Battalion still attached to XX Corps, "A" and "B" Companies were operating in support of the 83rd Infantry Division, and "C" and "D" Companies were further attached to the 5th Infantry Division to the 11th and 19th Field Artillery Battalions, respectively. The headquarters of the Chemical Battalion was billeted at MAINVILLE (7066). The first week of October "A" Company supported the 329th Infantry in its attack on MALZIEVILLE (7366). "B" Company operated with the 330th Infantry in the reduction of MARIMONTE (7975) and VEHEMIELLE (7975). and "C" Company was employed in the conquest of CHEMINOT (7163). Company "D" was used in support of infantry troops in their attack on FORT DRIANT (7979).

With the 5th Infantry Division the day before the scheduled attack on FORT DRIANT (7979), the enemy resistance was very stubborn and our forces were meeting with difficulties. Their artillery battalion was directed to the attack area for the purpose of destroying three railroad bridges which crossed the CHIERS River at [illegible]. Two of the bridges were destroyed, but the third bridge was not destroyed. It was necessary to create a diversion in order to get the infantry across the river. It was necessary to create a smoke screen on the south bank of the river. It was necessary to create a smoke screen on the north bank of

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

Section I. General. While Third U. S. Army Headquarters remained at NANCY (U81), the Chemical Section had attached to it a detachment of M2 smoke generator specialists. One of the individuals was the designer of the apparatus. During their approximately two weeks stay with the Headquarters, special schools in operation of the generator were conducted for the smoke generator companies. And instruction was given to the maintenance company in its repair and maintenance. As most of these generators were received without manuals of instructions, the specialists prepared directives on the proper operation and maintenance of this piece of equipment. This directive was distributed to all Chemical smoke generator and maintenance companies.

Some relief on the supply situation was obtained when the tonnage allocation of Chemical Warfare items brought forward daily for Third U. S. Army was increased from fifty tons to one hundred fifty tons per day.

Section II. Operations.

Chemical Battalions

Remaining attached to XX Corps, assigned to Third U. S. Army, the companies of the 81st Chemical Battalion at the beginning of November were attached two to the 90th Infantry Division, and two to the 95th Infantry Division. The battalion headquarters continued in its location near ST BENOIT (U84).

On the second day of November, Company "A", at HAGONDANGE (U87), and Company "B" at VERNEVILLE (U76), were relieved of front line combat when the 90th Infantry Division to which they were attached was sent to the rear for a rest period. Heretofore, when an organization which was supported by 4.2-inch Chemical mortar troops was relieved from combat for rest, the Chemical unit remained in operation and was attached to the organization which relieved the front line unit. This was the first time such relief had included the Chemical mortar companies. Companies "A" and "B", travelling approximately thirty miles to the rear of their old front line positions were set up in billets at JEUMAIN-LA-VILLE (U89) for rest, rehabilitation and training.

Company "C", in position near SILLEGNY (U84), was relieved on the first of November from attachment to the 95th Infantry Division and attached to the 46th Field Artillery Battalion of the 5th Infantry Division. The company continued its harassing fire on enemy troops in and around the villages of LA HAUTEMENIL (U84) and SILLEGNY (U84). Company "D" also was relieved from attachment to the 95th Infantry Division, and was attached to the 19th Field Artillery Battalion of the 5th Infantry Division. The company remained in its position near ANY (U74). The towns of VRIZE (U74), FEY (U84), and CORNY (U74) were still targets for the company, being subjected to harassing HE and WP fire.



A view of the smoke screen used to conceal bridging operations over the MOSELLE River, just south of METZ

After six days' rest and rehabilitation, "A" and "B" Companies on 8 November moved back into combat positions. These companies were brought back into action with the 90th Infantry Division in preparation for Third U. S. Army's offensive in the vicinity of METZ (U85). Companies "A" and "B" were located north of METZ (U85), while Companies "C" and "D" were south of the city. By 9 November, Company "A" in the vicinity of CAPENDEN (U99), was dropping HC and WP shells in the vicinity of HAUTE-RAN (U98), and BASSE-RAN (U98). In support of the 359th Infantry Regiment of the 90th Division, Company "B" by 9 November was located at GAVISSE (U99), where it remained two days awaiting completion of the bridge over the MOSELLE River.

Companies "C" and "D", located to the south of METZ (U85), continued in support of 5th Infantry Division field artillery battalions. However, on 8 November, "C" Company was relieved of its attachment and attached to the 10th Infantry Regiment, remaining near SILLEGNY (U84). Missions included harassing fire and smoke screens until 10 November, when the company was attached to the 83d Infantry Division. The following day, this attachment was terminated and the company attached to the 10th Armored Division. Company "D", meanwhile, on 8 November was relieved from its attachment to the 19th Field Artillery Battalion, and attached to the 2d Infantry Regiment of the 5th Division. Firing on the towns of FEY (U84) and CHEMINOT (U83) was continued.

On 15 November, battalion headquarters was moved from ST BENOIT (U84) to FONTOY (U79). Companies "A" and "B", remaining attached to the 90th Infantry Division continued in support of the drive north of METZ (U85). Company "A" moved up on 16 November to DISTROFF (U98), where firing was continued in the vicinity of KLINE (U98) and METTERVISEN (U98). "B" Company had moved by 14 November to HUNTING (U99), and two days later to NUTLING (U98), firing interdictory and harassing missions. On 18 November the company moved into FISLANGE (Q07).

"C" Company, by 16 November was located at KERSCHHAUSEN (Q06), supporting the 3d Tank Battalion of the 10th Armored Division. Moving at a rapid rate, reaching towns that the infantry had entered only one hour previously, personnel of the company were taking prisoners and evacuating them to the rear in return runs of the ammunition trucks. Two days later the company had reached RITZING (Q06). Company "D", continued to support the 5th Infantry Division in the drive against the METZ Fortress. Firing into the city of METZ (U85) on 18 November, this company hit an enemy ammunition dump which in turn completely knocked out enemy 150mm and 75mm guns.

For week of 19-25 November all companies of the battalion fired relatively small missions. Nevertheless, mortar part breakage continued at a high level, due, it was believed, to the muddy ground in which the mortars had to be emplaced. During the earlier part of the month a reclamation in the requests for mortar fire reduced the rate of mortar destruction as compared to that of the previous month. With only the one maintenance company to service the battalion's mortars, men from the battalion were put on detached service with the company to further expedite the replacement and repair of mortar parts. To lessen damage to baseplates and to help in maintaining fireable mortar positions, personnel of the battalion, working with the maintenance company, devised a square ring of metal to fit around the perimeter of the baseplate. The purpose of increasing the surface area was to reduce the rapid sinking of the mortar into soft earth by distributing the force of the recoil over a greater (by 70%) area, and to keep the front of the mortar from declining too rapidly, thereby eliminating frequent resetting of the weapon. Though somewhat successful, the experimental modification did not provide the desired improvements and only a few mortars were equipped with the attachment.

By 25 November, "A" Company which three days previously had been relieved of attachment to the 90th Infantry Division and had been attached to the 95th Infantry Division, was located in GOMELANGE (Q07), placing fire on the MAGINOT Line at (Q17). Four days later "A" Company crossed the German border to establish itself at ITTERSDORF (Q07). Moving from FISLANGE (Q07) on 19 November to KERANGE (Q06), and departing there three days later for ANTELING (Q07), "B" Company on 24 November was relieved from attachment to the 90th Infantry Division and attached to the 95th Infantry Division. On 28 November this company crossed into German territory, and by month's end was in position at DISINGEN (Q28).

Company "C", with the 10th Armored Division, entered Germany 19 November at LAUENTROFF (Q18). One week later the company was relieved from attachment to the 10th Armored Division and attached to the 90th Infantry Division while located near KERALING (Q09). The following day, the unit moved to ONNERSCH (Q18), and by end of the month was set up at GRELFANGE (Q13).

Company "D", at NAGNY (U98), on 19 November fired a smoke mission to deny observation to the enemy at FORT DE QUELEU (U85) while our troops advanced. The smoke mission was continued while part of an infantry battalion that had advanced in this zone the previous night could regroup. Relieved from its attachment to the 5th Infantry Division, the company on 20 November was attached to the 95th Infantry Division. On the same day the company entered the city of METZ (U85). Leaving METZ two days later, the command post of the company was set up at SERVIGNY-LES-HAVILLE (Q05), and by 30 November was at DALEM (Q17).

Chemical Warfare Service Units

Chemical Depot Companies

The 61st and 192d Chemical Depot Companies continued to operate Chemical depots for all Third U. S. Army troops. At the beginning of November, the 61st maintained Depot No. 9 at FLAVIGNY (U89) in support of XII Corps. This supply point handled Class II, IV, and V supplies. On 19 November the company opened Depot No. 11, stocking all classes of Chemical Warfare supplies, at FRESNES (Q02). Depot No. 11 was operated in support of XII and III Corps. The 192d Chemical Depot Company operated Depot No. 7 at FLIREY (U63) until 5 November when Depot No.10, handling Class V supplies was opened at AUDUN (U68) in support of XX Corps. Later, on 25 November, Depot No. 12 was set up at HOMBOURG (U97) stocking Class II, IV, and V supplies. This depot served XII and XX Corps.



Stacks of 4.2-inch Chemical shells handled by the depot companies.



Chemical Maintenance Company

The 16th Chemical Maintenance Company was, during November, the only unit of this type under Third U. S. Army. Located at PONT-A-MOUSSON (U79), the company was responsible for maintaining repair and serviceability of all Chemical Warfare equipment of Third U. S. Army troops. In addition to the 4.2-inch Chemical mortar maintenance for the 81st Chemical Battalion, the unit repaired 10,270 gas masks, 64 smoke generators, and 46 portable flame throwers. As the M2 portable smoke generator was being substituted for the M1 generator, there was need for a method of transporting this two hundred pound apparatus for short distances. The 16th Chemical Maintenance Company altered the two wheeled mortar cart to satisfactorily serve this purpose. In addition to transporting the M2 smoke generator, the cart can be used for transporting the fifty-five gallon, 450 pound, drums of fog oil.

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Infantry (left) advances while concealed by a Chemical Battalion smoke screen.



Anti-tank gun of the 90th Division which has just crossed the SAAR River and is moving up to support the infantry. The 1st Chemical Battalion is continuing to maintain a screen of smoke.

CHAPTER I
OPERATIONS

Section I: General.

Section II: Operations

Preliminary Planning

The first [illegible] of the Headquarters Detachment of the 91st Chemical Battalion to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

The amount of damage to mortar parts continued to decrease during the month as improving weather conditions permitted the selection of better mortar emplacements, shorter ranges were requested on most missions, and the reinforced baseplates displayed some advantages. A rest camp was established at FONTOY (U78), to which personnel of the companies were rotated for three day periods. The companies, remaining in the above-mentioned positions, fired principally harassing missions until the end of December.

The 91st Chemical Battalion, arriving on the Continent 22 October, was assigned two days later to Third U. S. Army. Difficulties involved in completely outfitting the organization with its authorized equipment resulted in the battalion remaining bivouaced near VALOGNES (O30) until 3 December. On this date the 91st Chemical Battalion assumed the responsibility of security of the petroleum pipe-line system from CHERBOURG (O12) to COUTRAIN (N29), a distance of approximately 128 miles. One week later, having received all its equipment, the battalion was relieved of this duty and was alerted for movement to Third U. S. Army's area. The battalion arrived in the vicinity of NANCY (U81) 18 December and continued on to PONTPIERRE (Q24) where billets were secured. The same day this unit was attached to XII Corps.

The first round fired in combat by the 91st was on 19 December when "D" Company, attached to the 35th Infantry Division, had as its target BLEINGRUNDEN (Q26). "C" Company was attached to the 87th Infantry Division while the remainder of the battalion was attached to the 80th Infantry Division. On 21 December "C" Company reverted to battalion control. The next day the battalion, less "D" Company, departed its location at PONTPIERRE (Q24) and moved to GONDRANGE (P92) where orders were received relieving the companies of their previous attachments and attaching them as follows: "A" and "B" Companies to the 4th Infantry Division, "C" and "D" Companies to the 5th Infantry Division. These attachments were made necessary when the XII Corps was given the mission of securing the south and west bank of the SAUER River which had been seized by the enemy in their new offensive in BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG. Battalion headquarters attached to the 4th Infantry Division, remained in position at GONDRANGE (P92).



A mortar squad of the 91st Chemical Battalion fires a round of HE from their position in Belgium.

All companies except "A" were committed on 23 December. Company "B", in support of the 22d Infantry Regiment was employed in clearing the enemy from the vicinity of the west bank of the SAUER River, and seizing the bank of the river. In its advance, the company was requested to fire on a small town located in a valley and provided with good defilade. Artillery could not reach RODENBOURG (P92) but the mortar could. The command "Fire for Effect" resulted in the leveling of the town. "C" and "D" Companies supported the attack of the 5th Infantry Division, the former reducing the village of WALDHILLIG (P93) in its advance from HAFFINGEN (P93) to the north of BEAUFORT (P90). By the end of the month the company was firing on the German village of WALLENDORF (P94). "D" Company, on the left flank of the division it was supporting was employed in the attack on ERPELDORF (P93). firing harassing and interdictory missions. Company "A", committed on 27 December, operated in support of the 8th Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division. By month's end the barrages this company had put down on the high ground overlooking the SAUER River from WASSERBILLIG (L12) to MORSDORF (L12) resulted in our infantry taking and holding the ridge with relative ease.

On 24 December a third Chemical battalion was attached to Third U.S. Army. Assigned to Sixth U. S. Army Group, the 2d Chemical Battalion was further attached by this Headquarters to III Corps. On 1830 on Christmas Day the battalion had reached its assembly area at AUTELHAUT, BELGIUM (P61), and the companies were attached as follows: "A" Company to the 26th Infantry Division; "B" Company to the 6th Cavalry Group; "C" Company to the 4th Infantry Division; "D" Company to the 6th Cavalry Squadron. Battalion headquarters was established at AUTELHAUT (P61) where it was located for the remainder of the month. The following day the companies, taking up positions across III Corps' front, gave support to the drive on the south flank of the German ARDENNES Salient between BASTOGNE (P55) and STEINBRUCK (P63). The 3d Chemical Battalion had as its mission, in addition to stemming the enemy's salient, the close support of two infantry divisions, an Armored division, and a cavalry group in liberating the 101st Airborne Division along with elements of the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions which were encircled at BASTOGNE (P56).

In the course of the attack against the enemy's salient, "D" Company on 27 December was relieved from attachment to the 6th Cavalry Squadron, and was placed in support of the 35th Infantry Division. By 30 December, "C" Company was relieved of its attachment and was also attached to the 35th Infantry Division, while "B" Company, relieved from the 6th Cavalry Group, was placed in support of the 26th Infantry Division.

Chemical Warfare Service Units

Chemical Depot Companies

The 61st Chemical Depot Company at the beginning of December was operating Depot No. 11 at FUSSEN (Q08). This depot stocked Class II, IV and V supplies, and operated in support of III and XII Corps. On 11 December Depot No. 13 was opened at SANKTALNE (Q44) in order to service XII Corps units more efficiently. Only Class V Chemical Warfare supplies were stocked. This depot was closed when the ammunition was moved to REUTELLE (U09), where Depot No. 14, handling Class II, IV, and V items was opened 24 December. Troops of three corps were serviced by this installation—III, VIII, and XII. Five days after this depot was opened, Depot No. 11 was closed. The 192d Chemical Depot Company on 2 December closed Depot No. 10, and continued during December to operate Depot No. 12 at HOMBOURG (U97). This latter depot, servicing III and XX Corps, stocked Class II, IV, and V Chemical Warfare items.

When a railhead was established at PIENNEPONT (U89) there was a substantial increase in the amount of supplies received by rail. Both depot companies unloaded cars and shuttled supplies by truck from the railheads to the various depot installations.

Chemical Maintenance Company

The 16th Chemical Maintenance Company continued to perform maintenance work on Chemical Warfare items for Third U. S. Army troops. Improving weather conditions indirectly resulted in less destruction of mortar parts, with baseplates still the most frequently damaged item. The company remained in operation at PONT-A-MOUSSON (T72) until 24 December. It moved at this time to NILVANGE (U78), where repair and servicing of Chemical Warfare equipment of Third U. S. Army troops was continued.

With the acquisition of two additional Chemical battalions, it was necessary that at least one additional Chemical maintenance company be obtained. Thus, on 23 December the 13th Chemical Maintenance Company, assigned to Advance Section, Communications Zone, was attached through Twelfth U. S. Army Group to Third U. S. Army. At this time the company was located in BONNY (U98) where, in addition to repairing 4.2-inch Chemical mortars, the company was experimenting with methods designed to lengthen the lifetime of mortar parts. A device which increased the area of the mortar baseplate by seventy percent was being improved by personnel of the company in cooperation with members of the 91st Chemical Battalion. On 29 December a detachment from the unit was sent to KLEINBETTINGEN (P61) to set up a mortar repair shop nearer the newly acquired 3d and 91st Chemical Battalions of Third U. S. Army.

Chemical Decontamination Company

For the first time since becoming operational, Third U. S. Army received a Chemical decontamination company. On 23 December the 33d Chemical Decontamination Company, assigned to Sixth U. S. Army Group, was attached to Third U. S. Army. The unit moved to and joined the 192d Chemical Depot Company at HOMBOURG (U97) on 26 December. As the absence of gas warfare exempted this unit from functioning in its primary role, its personnel and transportation facilities were equally divided to assist the two depot companies. The problem of unloading supplies at the railhead and transporting them to the various Chemical Warfare depots was being further solved.

Chemical Smoke Generator Companies

Located at HAGONDT (Q12) personnel of the 81st Chemical Smoke Generator Company continued to receive instructions in the operation and servicing of the M2 mechanical smoke generator. On 7 December the unit moved to FUTCLAEUE (Q45). Two days later its first mission with the M2 generator was performed. Under heavy mortar, artillery, and small arms fire a four hour screen was maintained in order to conceal construction by engineers of a bridge over the SAAR River in the vicinity of ZEMMELFING (Q26). Remaining in position until 11 December, the company moved that date to BILCHINGEN (Q45), and again, on 23 December to ELLANGE (P90). The 1634 Chemical Smoke Generator Company remained attached to Third U. S. Army.

On 2 December, the 84th Chemical Smoke Generator Company, after accomplishing its mission of providing a smoke screen over the MOSELLE River bridge at METZ (U80), moved to BERTLINGEN (Q18). A three day mission was begun on 4 December when the company furnished three sections to provide concealing smoke screens for the assault crossing of the SAAR River by troops of the 90th Infantry Division. The three sections were all established in the vicinity of SAARLAUTERN (Q27), one at WALLERFANGEN (Q26), another at WADGASSEN (Q37), and a third between these two sites. As operations progressed, changes in the plans of adjacent units necessitated the removal of the section from WADGASSEN (Q37), and its subsequent emplacement at LISDORF (Q27). The smoke drew heavy enemy artillery fire, with the sections of the company suffering casualties, and damage to vehicles and smoke generators. The operations at WALLERFANGEN (Q26) were suspended 5 December and the remainder of the sections were concentrated at LISDORF (Q27). Smoke operations were continued at this location until 17 December. Meanwhile, the company moved on 7 December from GERSTLINGEN (Q18) to BEHRENDORF (Q27). From here, on 19 December, a section was sent to assist the 161st Chemical Smoke Generator Company in its operations. This detachment returned two days later. By 23 December the company had moved to METTERNICH (U98) where it was located at month's end.



Three soldiers of the 161st Chemical Smoke Generator Company switch fuel line of an M2 smoke generator to a full drum of fog oil. This screen covered the SAAR River near WALLERFANGEN.

Two of the four sections of the 161st Chemical Smoke Generator Company, located at METTERNICH (U98), were attached on 3 December to the 10th Armored Division. The sections moved into position at HILBRINGEN (P19) on the SAAR River where a diversion screen was established to draw enemy fire. An active screen was maintained for two days, when operations were suspended. On 5 December the entire company was attached to the 90th Infantry Division and the following day moved to WALLERFANGEN (Q26) to screen operations over the SAAR River. Heavy enemy artillery and machine gun fire caused casualties and damages to be sustained by the company.

Smoke operations were continued daily from 0700 until 1700 hours, with from fifteen to twenty M2 smoke generators in operation at all times. This mission was completed 21 December, and the company returned the following day to METTERNICH (U98).

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JANUARY [illegible]

Section I [illegible]

Before any of the Chemical units were again committed, the Fifth Army [illegible] December, with a view to [illegible] for use by the Army Service Forces.

Severe winter weather [illegible] Fifth U. S. Army [illegible] to set in, and the Chemical Section, [illegible] Headquarters, Fifth Army, was [illegible] for the use by front line troops. Many [illegible] were issued to troops as a [illegible] Army Service Forces. Additional [illegible] were not available. The Headquarters was able to secure fifty percent of the materials used in [illegible] positions. Chemical [illegible] Line

Section II [illegible]

[illegible] Defensive

The 91st Chemical Battalion [illegible] Headquarters [illegible] Company [illegible] Company [illegible] Infantry Division, [illegible] Company [illegible] Platoon [illegible] Company [illegible] Platoon [illegible] Company [illegible] Platoon

Company "A", in position near MECHER-DUNKROUT (P64) fired on communication centers and enemy personnel in preparation for an attack by the 101st Infantry. On 4 January this company was employed in repelling a local German counterattack. Company "B" was in position at ST PIERRE (P64) while Company "C" was at SALVACOURT (P66). Located near LIVARCHAMPS (P64) "D" Company fired missions similar to those of "A" Company. Both HE and WP missions were carried out, although the battalion on the whole fired fewer missions than did similar units. Targets consisted of enemy assembly areas, routes of communication, personnel, roads, and towns.

On 6 January "B" Company, after attachment to the 6th Armored Division, moved to PERLE (P65). The following day the unit proceeded to a location near BASTOGNE (P65) where several enemy counterattacks near BASTOGNE (P65) and MAGERET (P65) were broken up. This company fired a smoke mission on 11 January to screen our troops in their advance on WARDIN (P65). On 8 January, "C" Company was relieved of attachment to the 35th Infantry Division, and was placed in support of the 90th Infantry Division. Five days later "B" Company was similarly attached. By middle of the month, the latter company was firing on enemy personnel in LONGVILLY (P66). Meanwhile, "C" Company on 17 January was relieved of attachment to the 90th Infantry Division, and reverted to battalion control. The company then moved to LONGWY (P50) for rest and rehabilitation. Company "A" likewise reverted to battalion control on 27 January, and moved to LIVARCHAMPS (P64), where the unit was afforded rest, and an opportunity to recondition equipment. On the same day the battalion headquarters moved from AUTELHAUT (P61) to HONVILLE (P54).

Replacing Company "C" in its rest camp at LONGWY (P50), Company "B" on 25 January was relieved from attachment to the 6th Armored Division, with Company "C" in turn attached to that organization. The latter company then moved up to BINSFELD (P77). The only other change in attachments during the month was that of "D" Company. On 27 January that unit was relieved from the 26th Infantry Division and was attached to the 17th Airborne Division. The company took up positions at HONVANGE (P76) where smoke missions were fired in the vicinity of HOSINGEN (P85).

Chemical Warfare Service Units

Chemical Depot Companies

The 192d Chemical Depot Company continued during January to operate Depot No. 12. Located at HOMECOURT (U97) until 14 January, when it moved to FERANGE (Q07), this depot provided Chemical supplies for XII and XX Corps troops. The only change in Chemical depot installations of Third U. S. Army in January was the establishing of Depot No. 15 on 3 January at BONNERT (P62). This depot was opened by the 61st Chemical Depot Company in addition to Depot No. 14 which the company was operating at PIERREPONT (U89). Both depots functioned in support of III and VIII Corps.

Chemical Maintenance Companies

The repair of mortar parts and the maintenance of all Chemical Warfare items of Third U. S. Army troops was carried out by the 13th and 16th Chemical Maintenance Companies. No move was made by the 16th Chemical Maintenance Company, the unit remaining at HILVARDE (U78). Approximately 8,000 gas masks were repaired during January. Baseplates continued to be the part of the 4.2-inch Chemical mortar requiring the most maintenance, with this item slackening off during the latter half of the month. A total of 70 M-2 smoke generators were overhauled during the period.

The 13th Chemical Maintenance Company moved from its location at HONNY (U85) on 4 January, to KOERICH (P72). The same day the unit's mortar repair detachment which had been operating at KLEINBETTINGEN (P61) in support of the 3d and 91st Chemical Battalions, moved to and joined the company at KOERICH (P72). On 16 January this company modified the WP hand grenade for use as a rifle grenade. This was done by swedging an adapter on the bottom of the grenade body. In addition, the unit by month's end produced 520 white camouflage snow suits for Third U.S. Army Engineer camouflage battalions. After setting up an assembly line, thirty of these suits were turned out each day.

Chemical Decontamination Company

The four platoons of the 33d Chemical Decontamination Company remained in operation with the two depot companies. Two of these platoons assisted the 192d Chemical Depot Company in bringing supplies forward from the railhead at FERANGE (Q07). The other two platoons operated with the 61st Chemical Depot Company in transferring supplies from the railhead at PIERREPONT (U89) to the Chemical supply depots. On 27 January, the 33d Chemical Decontamination Company, with headquarters at PIERREPONT (U89), was relieved from assignment to Seventh U.S. Army and was assigned to Third U. S. Army.

Chemical Smoke Generator Companies

Four Chemical smoke generator companies were part of Third U. S. Army's troops. These were the 162d, assigned to this Headquarters 15 November, and the 81st, 84th, and 161st Chemical Smoke Generator Companies. The latter three were relieved from assignment to Advance Section, Communications Zone and attachment to Third U. S. Army, and were assigned on 22 January to this Command. The 81st Company, at HOMECOURT (P63), was attached 18 January to the 91st Chemical Battalion to coordinate smoke operations that the battalion might be called upon to perform. This was in connection with the attack launched by XII Corps' 4th and 80th Infantry Divisions. Smoke was to be provided for screening construction of bridges by the Engineers. One mission was carried out at INGELDORF (P64), over the SAUER River, another at SCHIEREN (P83) over the ALZETTE River, and a third at HURDEN (P84).

The 84th Smoke Generator Company, located at METZERVISSE (U98), carried out no smoke missions during the month of January, but was engaged in trucking Chemical supplies between the railheads and Chemical supply points. On 11 January the unit moved to VALMESTROFF (Q08), where it remained until the end of the month. The 161st Chemical Smoke Generator Company, also located at METZERVISSE (U98) aided Third U. S. Army Chemical depot companies in transporting Chemical supplies. This company moved 11 January to BASSE HAM (Q08) where it was located for the remainder of the month.

CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

Section I. General. The Rear Echelon of Third U. S. Army, operating in ESCH/ALZETTE (P70) at the beginning of February, moved after the first week of the month to join the Forward Echelon at LUXEMBOURG City (P81). Sections of the echelons of the Headquarters, while in the same immediate vicinity, continued to operate in separate installations.



A mortar squad of the 3d Chemical Mortar Battalion fires a 4.2-inch mortar emplaced near BASTOGNE

Shortages of ammunition for the 4.2-inch Chemical mortar became more acute during February than at any time since Third U. S. Army became operational. Mortar accidents attributable to faulty rounds of ammunition had resulted in the impounding of large quantities of the shell. To relieve this shortage, the Chemical Officer obtained permission to authorize firing of the impounded rounds with the use of the lanyard. The shortage of ammunition, which had necessitated rationing of shells and resulted in a reduction of the fire power of the battalions during the first two weeks of February, was thus somewhat relieved and the units resumed their regular pace.

Both the 81st and 91st Chemical Battalions, Motorized, were reorganized and redesignated the 81st and 91st Chemical Mortar Battalions by 20 February. Both battalions reorganized with a minimum of confusion and difficulty while engaged in front line activities. The new Table of Organization and Equipment, 3-26, dated 29 September 1944, provided three weapons companies and a headquarters company in each battalion, while under the old organization the battalion consisted of four weapons companies and a headquarters detachment. Another major difference in the two setups was the increase under the new organization of the overall strength of the battalion by fifty enlisted men.

The two Chemical maintenance companies were reorganized during the month to conform to Table of Organization and Equipment 3-47, dated 22 November 1944. Total personnel of the company was three officers and ninety enlisted men; one officer and twenty-five enlisted men less than formerly comprised the company.

On 22 February a Chemical Officer from Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, a specialist in the installation of the mechanized flame thrower, was attached to the Chemical Section of Third U. S. Army. Approximately twenty-two such flame throwers were issued and installed in armored units under this Headquarters.

The Supply Officer and the supply sergeant of the Chemical Section, Rear Echelon, were awarded the Bronze Star Medal by the Commanding General for meritorious service rendered from August 1944 to February 1945.

Section II. Operations.

Chemical Battalions

Three Chemical battalions were operating under Third U. S. Army at the beginning of February--the 81st, 91st, and 3d Battalions. Assigned to Sixth U. S. Army Group, attached to Third U. S. Army, and further attached to III Corps, the 3d Chemical Battalion, in position at HONVILLE (P54), was relieved on 3 February from attachment to this Headquarters and was attached to Ninth U. S. Army. The battalion departed for its new station on 6 February.

The headquarters of the 81st Chemical Battalion remained during the month of February at ERKELVILLEN (Q07). Company "A", on 1 February continued operations from SCHOENBUCK (Q28) while attached to the 182d Field Artillery Battalion of the 26th Infantry Division. Its targets were the towns of SAARLAUTERN ROHEN (Q28) and KNEIDORF (Q37), and pillboxes in the surrounding area. "B" Company, located at KERICH (L06), and attached to the 301st Regiment of the 94th Infantry Division, provided smoke screens for the attack of our infantry on pillboxes in the Siegfried Line. Also attached to the 94th Division, "C" Company, supporting the 302d Infantry, was located at ETT (Q09). This company placed fire on OBER-LEUKEN (L00), and enemy mortar positions and roads in the surrounding area. "D" Company, in position near ITTRACH (Q28) remained attached to the 101st Field Artillery Battalion of the 26th Infantry Division. From this location the mortars of the company placed fire on HECKINGEN (Q26), DILLINGEN (Q28), and PACHTEN (Q26).

For the first week of the month all companies of the battalion fired routine and relatively minor missions. Ammunition expenditures were smaller than for any like period of time in over two months. The light firing resulted in an almost negligible amount of equipment failure. The above conditions were the results no doubt of the critical ammunition supply situation. The outcome of several accidents caused by faulty ammunition was that almost all of the stock of HE 4.2-inch Chemical mortar shells were impounded. Functioning on a reduced basis the battalions consumed their maximum allotments of shells, and would have undoubtedly expended more had they been available. However, the situation was somewhat relieved as soon as permission was received authorizing the firing of impounded HE shells by use of the lanyard.

As the increased mortar ammunition supply permitted the battalion to resume its normal pace, breakage of mortar parts began to increase. The warming weather and melting snow left the ground muddier, softer, and less supporting to the mortar baseplates than previously. Damaged parts of the mortar were principally the baseplates and standards, with relatively few barrels requiring repair or maintenance.

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...equarters of the battalion in the [illegible] were involved missions during the month. [illegible] was requested on [illegible] of the night [illegible] there was unusual activity [illegible] of the town of [illegible] and engineers from enemy observation as they [illegible] bridge across the Siegfried Line. [illegible] On 7 February the enemy was pushing an [illegible] on 128 [illegible] antitank ditch [illegible] just east of the town. This permitted our tanks [illegible] of the town and [illegible] to continue enemy [illegible] fleeing in the vicinity. [illegible] On [illegible] February [illegible] one day before from [illegible] to [illegible]. During this mission the artillery fired [illegible] ammunition [illegible] use of [illegible] shells, which for the same purpose of screening [illegible] very satisfactorily. This was the first time WP was used in the Continent by any Third U. S. Army Chemical battalion and reports were that this agent compared favorably with WP in its screening power. It did not, however, possess the smoke reducing and [illegible] properties of WP, for which [illegible] was more and more to be used in the Siegfried. Another [illegible] mission was at 2345 hours on 8 February when "C" Company, supporting Task Force "A" of the 26th Infantry Division, expended 18 rounds of WP ammunition in an area across the SAAR River near PACHTEN (4928). This fire was requested by the division in order that an area where enemy activity was suspected might be illuminated and our infantry be permitted to act accordingly. The operation was successful.

On 13 February, Company "A" moved from its position at SCHERVOCK (4928) to SAARLAUTERN (4927) where its fire power was still [illegible] on the [illegible] and SAARLAUTERN (4927) areas. "F" Company on 15 February [illegible] into diversionary fire to cover an attack by the Infantry of the 26th Division on a position [illegible] east of [illegible] (4926). Meanwhile, the WP smoke screens surrounded combat patrols and two tank platoons that were advancing toward the [illegible] and SAARLAUTERN (4926). Mortars of the company expended 2400 rounds of WP and 252 rounds of HE in their support of this mission. A small counterattack initiated by the enemy at this time was [illegible], and "F" Company moved up three days later to [illegible] (4927).

Company "C" departing from [illegible] (4926) on 11 February took up a position at [illegible] (4926). Two days later the company moved to [illegible] (4926). On 15 February a smoke screen near [illegible] northwest of [illegible] was provided to enable troops of the 26th Infantry Division to capture [illegible] in the immediate vicinity. FP was used in this mission which was purely for [illegible] operations and harassing. Approximately [illegible] rounds of smoke screen were maintained for thirty minutes with 248 rounds of WP and FP. Two enemy pillboxes were reduced and thirty-two prisoners were taken.

Moving from [illegible] on 19 February, "F" Company arrived at [illegible]. A two [illegible] smoke screen was maintained [illegible] on the west side of the SAAR River at [illegible]. The purpose of the screen was to conceal [illegible] crossing while the infantry [illegible] to get [illegible] across. Part of the infantry [illegible] river. [illegible] of thirty men [illegible] this mission [illegible] artillery fire, and the smoke screens [illegible] by "F" Company. However, by 16 February all members of the patrol had been located in [illegible] the river and returning to our area.

To help regulate an enemy counterattack in the vicinity of the railroads [illegible] SAARLAUTERN [illegible] artillery of "A" company on 21 February placed in over [illegible] rounds of WP. The counterattack was successfully regulated. By 24 February the company [illegible] as its targets WALLERN [illegible], HELLENDORF [illegible] and FRAUENKIRCH [illegible]. Company "A" on 16 February moved from SAARLAUTERN [illegible], to [illegible]. This company participated in the first phase of the attack launched by the 26th Division the following day to clear the enemy from the SAAR-MOSELLE triangle. The principal part played by "A" Company was providing smoke screens. The company moved to FELS [illegible] 20 February from which place the second phase of the attack was begun. By evening FELSENBERG (4910) had fallen to our troops and the company headquarters was established at that place the following day. Steadily moving forward, two companies of the supported unit had, by 22 February, crossed the SAAR River and successfully established a bridgehead. "F" Company moved to the west bank of the river at FELSENBERG (4910), provided a six-hour [illegible] screen that entirely enveloped the bridgehead. By 24 February the company had moved to ZAPPEN (4911) from which location several screens were maintained while the bridgehead was developed.

On 18 February "C" Company moved to KERPEN (4910) while still operating in support of the 26th Infantry Division. On 21 February, the company was relieved from attachment to this organization and was further attached to the 10th Armored Division. The company moved 22 February to KERPEN (4911) and two days later to ATL (4911) where it gave support to units employed in the SAAR River bridgehead operations. "F" Company, on 18 February, was relieved of its attachment to the 101st Field Artillery Battalion of the 26th Infantry Division, and reverted to Battalion control. The company remained in place at ITZBACH (4908) and prepared for the discontinuance of the company relative to the reorganizing of the battalion under a new Table of Organization and Equipment



Members of the 13th Chemical Maintenance Company repair gas masks.



...onvert WP hand grenades to rifle grenades. ...



...ware white camouflage snow suits.

At the beginning of February the 91st Chemical Battalion still operated in support of XII Corps units. Company "A", at KRAUTHEIM (P93) operated in support of the 90th Infantry Division, while "F" Company concluded its four day rest period at MERSCH (P82). "C" Company, with the 5th Infantry Division, was in place at WEILER (L06) preparing to go to the rest area upon being relieved by "B" Company. This change was made the following day. In position near VIANDEN (P94) "D" Company supported troops of the 5th Infantry Division.

After assuming its position at WEILER (L06) "B" Company immediately went into action on 2 February, giving direct support at the main line of resistance. The same day "D" Company, relieved from attachment to the 5th Infantry Division, was attached to the 76th Infantry Division, moving to HERSCHDORF (L03) the following day. All companies fired interdictory and harassing missions though hindered somewhat by the scarcity of mortar ammunition. In preparation for XII Corps' offensive to be launched 7 February to breach the Siegfried Line, all the companies of the battalion were dispersed and in support of attacking organizations. Company "A", attached to the 90th Infantry Division was on the north end of the line; Companies "B" and "C", with the 5th Infantry Division, were located in the center; "D" Company was in support of the 76th Infantry Division on the south.

That the resistance of the enemy was strong was evidenced by the fact that all companies were still giving supporting fire from their original positions four days after the attack was begun. "A" Company was in position at HOSDORF (P94), and "B" Company was just north of HERSCHDORF (L03). The latter company was employed principally in maintaining smoke screens while the infantry was engaged in operations over the SAUER River in the 5th Division's zone. On 9 February over 2800 rounds of WP mortar ammunition were expended in maintaining a nine-hour screen. In three days time the company expended in excess of 6000 rounds. Company "C" remained in position south of HERSCHDORF (L03) supporting the crossing with WP and HE shells. "D" Company operated from a position near ROSPORDEN (L03).

The attack on the Siegfried Line continued with improving success. By 13 February Company "B" moved entirely into German territory, and was established near HOLLENDORF (L04). Company "C" was edging its way into the enemy's country, while Company "D" gave support by establishing smoke screens. Those permitted personnel to deepen the bridgeheads across the SAUER River while at the same time rendering as much protection as possible. Company "A" by 14 February was on German soil and went into position east of WOLLENDORF (P94). As the attack progressed, the bridgehead became more firmly established, and, except for one, all platoons of the 91st Chemical Battalion's companies were inside Germany by 15 February.

A forceful enemy counterattack on the following day was repulsed by troops of the 5th Infantry Division, while the mortars of "D" Company gave heavy support. Fire from the artillery and the mortar company repulsed the counterattack. When the position of the units across the SAUER and OUR Rivers was considered sufficiently secure, XII Corps regrouped its forces to continue the attack to the northeast. In this shuffle, Company "C" was relieved from attachment to the 5th Infantry Division and was attached to the 76th Infantry Division. Company "A", with the 314th Field Artillery Battalion moved into position just west of BETTENDORF (P94), while "B" Company maintained its position at SCHANKWEILER (L04), supporting troops of the 5th Infantry Division. Company "D", on 22 February, was redesignated as Company "A". Under the reorganizing of the battalion, while Company "A" was broken up, forming mainly the Headquarters Company. Some personnel of the former Company "A" were assigned to the three weapons companies.

The troops were engaged actively again them. on 24 February XII Corps renewed its eastward attack to clear the enemy from the area bounded by the SAUER - MOSELLE - SYLL Rivers. Lighter enemy resistance than had heretofore been encountered permitted the troops to make favorable advances with a minimum of casualties.

Chemical Warfare Service Units

Chemical Depot Companies

The Chemical Warfare depots were operated during the month by the 192d and 61st Chemical Depot Companies. The 192d Chemical Depot Company continued operating Depot No. 12 at FERANGE (Q07), handling all classes of Chemical Warfare supplies. At the beginning of the month this company sent out a detachment to establish Depot No. 14 at PILTZERDORF (P89) and Depot No. 15, at BONNERT (P82). As increasing amounts of supplies were moved forward to Depot No. 15, a detachment of officers and enlisted men from the 61st Chemical Depot Company were attached to the LORENTZWEILER (P82) installation. When the 61st Closed out Depot No. 15 on 10 February, and Depot No. 14 on 20 February, the entire company took over Depot No. 15. Personnel of the 192d Chemical Depot Company at the end of February were operating Depot No. 12, at FERANGE (Q07).

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Chemical Decontamination Companies

The 334 Chemical Decontamination Company remained attached to the two depot companies. The company's headquarters and two platoons were attached to the 51st Chemical Depot Company at PIRMASENS (U89). The other two platoons of the company were attached to the 1924 Chemical Depot Company, alternately operating at [illegible]-WEILER (F52) and PERL[illegible] (Q87). Employment of the decontamination company continued principally to assisting the depot companies in moving incoming chemical supplies from railheads to the depot installations.

Chemical Maintenance Companies

Located at HILTZHAUS (C78) during February the 11th Chemical Maintenance Company continued its repair of gas masks and the main source of the 4.5-inch Chemical mortars, M2 smoke generators and flame throwers, A, proximately 800 ammunition units were turned in by the company during the month. The 12th Chemical Maintenance Company, assigned to the division at [illegible] (K3[illegible]), in addition to the repair and maintenance of Chemical Warfare items, this company was responsible for the [illegible] of the [illegible] Platoon personnel of this company were also [illegible] Chemical Warfare [illegible] Platoon personnel [illegible] Chemical Warfare [illegible] Platoon personnel [illegible] Chemical Warfare [illegible] Platoon personnel

Tactical attachments of the companies changed frequently during the month. "A" Company on 7 March was attached to the 668th Field Artillery Battalion of the 65th Division. Company "B", after a forty-eight hour attachment to the 26th Infantry Division, was attached on 9 March to the 301st Infantry of the 94th Division. On this change of attachment the company moved to a new position at PFALZGRAFENROTH (LL0). The same day "C" Company was attached to the 328th Infantry of the 26th Division. On 10 March the unit moved up to [illegible] (LL7). Continuing in support of artillery units, Company "A" on [illegible] March was attached to the 313th Field Artillery Battalion of the [illegible] Division. The company moved 16 March to a new position near [illegible] (LL3) firing harassing and interdictory fire in support of the artillery. Company "B" on 13 March established a thirteen hour smoke screen for the infantry of the 94th Division. The screen denied observation to the enemy located on high ground east of the RHINE River (LM81A), while the 376th Infantry attacked. Moving up the next day to LORSCHWEIG (LM2) the company established a 3600 yard long smoke screen to conceal a bridge over the ROER River and to aid in the advance of the 301st Infantry. An effective screen was maintained for over nine hours with 1888 rounds of WP. Supporting the 26th Division, Company "C" moved up to a position at [illegible] (LL7) followed the same day by a move to HEPPLAER (LL9) and then to [illegible] (LM9).

As the front began to move more and more rapidly the companies were on the road at times twenty-four hours a day. Very little firing was done during the week 18-24 March, only "B" Company expending 612 rounds of ammunition. On 20 March, "A" Company sustained a serious loss when its position at HERRESHEIM (LM9) was attacked by enemy aircraft. Anti-personnel bombs were dropped on the area by evidently experienced pilots just after daylight. The company suffered thirty-seven battle casualties in the raid. A relief from the strain of battle was given the companies when on 24 March [illegible] companies were relieved of their attachment and proceeded to [illegible] (LM9), to revert to battalion control. This was the first time the companies had been in their battalion assembly area since the arrival of the 81st in Third U. S. Army's area in September 1944.

From its assembly area at [illegible] (LM9) the battalion on 29 March began its move east. Although an advance of 185 miles was made by the organization during the last week of the month not one round of 4.2-inch mortar ammunition was fired - the first time this had occurred since 6 June 1944. By month's end the 81st was located at [illegible] (MC6), with its companies attached as follows: "A" and "B" Companies to Field Artillery battalions of the 65th Infantry Division, and "C" Company to the 26th Infantry which at the time was operating with the 6th Armored Division.

Firing done by the 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion was light early in March. Engaged in moving a great deal of the time, there were few opportunities or necessities for going into action. Company "A" in position at HERRESHEIM (LL9), was attached to Field Artillery units of the 65th Infantry Division. Company "B" at [illegible] (LL8) gave support to the 11th Infantry of the 5th Division. Clearing the enemy from the division's zone, and firing on [illegible] (LL8), and BACHEM (LL8), the company gave strong support in the advance to and the establishing of a bridgehead over the ERFT River on 3 March. "C" Company, attached to the 76th Division also gave support in the crossing of the ERFT River by the 304th Infantry. That the companies were moving frequently is attested to by the fact that until 10 March no rounds were fired by Company "A", and relatively few by the other companies. "C" Company in ten days occupied eighteen new mortar positions.

In XII Corps' breakthrough to the RHINE River in the zone between ANDERNACH (FF0) and KOBLENZ (LM9), the 81st Battalion's companies were employed by the attacking divisions. "C" Company remained attached to the 76th Infantry Division which was on the Corps' south flank. On the north, the 4th Armored Division led, followed by the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions to which "B" and "A" Companies, respectively, were attached. The bridgehead established over the ERFT River by the 5th Division on 3 March was passed through by the 4th Armored Division leaving the 5th and 90th Divisions to mop up enemy resistance and clear the enemy in the zone to the RHINE River. In the 76th Division's zone, "C" Company did extensive firing as heavier resistance was met in this area. On 6 March, just as the first platoon was engaged in "march order", the enemy launched a counterattack, and the second platoon was immediately called on for harassing and interdictory fire. In the hasty set up, it was necessary for a short while to transmit fire data from the fire direction center to the gun position by a line of men who relayed the information by voice. Results of the mission were destruction of one enemy vehicle, silencing of four enemy mortars, and blasting of the town of SCHLEIDWEILER (LL6).





Unloading Class V Chemical supplies at a railhead, personnel of the depot companies haul drums of fog oil to Chemical depots, where they are handled by the company's swinging boom.



On 10 March "A" Company passed to control of the 89th Infantry Division and began preparations for moving forward to the front line. "B" Company moved up with the 5th Division toward the RHINE River and occupied a position at KOLLIG (L68). Moving into NIEDERLITTDORF (L36) on the same date, "C" Company with the 76th Infantry Division took up positions farther eastward in the vicinity of WITTLICH (L56). On 11 March the battalion headquarters moved from METTERICH (L15) to DAUN (L37). By middle of the month Company "A" had moved to BRUNEN (L77) and Company "B" was at RAIRUEN (L67). "C" Company on 14 March was attached to the 90th Infantry Division and moved up seventy-five miles to occupy positions near MOSELKRUMPH (L78). At this location a smoke screen was provided on 15 March while the 357th and 359th Infantries crossed the MOSELLE River. The same day "B" Company fired 350 rounds of HE into the town of LUKE (L76) and on road junctions south of the town. By 16 March, "C" Company had reached the RHINE River where it was attached by the 90th Division to the 3d Cavalry Group. The company went into action the same day, dropping mortar fire on ZILLEN (L88), across the RHINE River.

The attack across the RHINE River by XII Corps on 22 March met with light and disorganized resistance, evidently completely surprising the enemy. By noon of the same day "B" Company, with the 5th Infantry Division was across the river, and "C" Company with the 90th Infantry Division crossed on the night after the attack was begun. By the 25th, "A" Company was across the RHINE River, attached to the 358th Infantry. The following day the company fired its first important mission in over twenty-five days. From its position at KRIV ACHEIM (M86) rounds of WP and HE were fired on a rail yard and an oil warehouse located about 3000 yards from the mortar positions. A total of fifty prisoners were flushed from this target.

Almost continually on the go, by months end "C" Company with the 90th Infantry Division had taken up positions at HINRAGH (M84), while "A" Company, with the 26th Infantry Division, was located at WITTGENBORN (M98). Company "B" after supporting the 5th Infantry Division's attack on FRANKFURT (M56), reverted to battalion control, and on 31 March was set up with the headquarters at OFFENBACH (M76), on the MAIN River.

Chemical Warfare Service Units

Chemical Depot Companies

At the beginning of the month only two depots were in operation by Chemical units. Depot No. 12, at HOMBURG (U97), remained opened the entire month. This depot, handling Class II, IV, and V Chemical Warfare supplies, was operated by the 193d Chemical Depot Company. The other supply point in operation was Depot No. 18 located at LORENTZWEILER (P43). Operated by the 61st Chemical Depot Company, the depot furnished Class II, IV, and V Chemical Warfare items to units of VIII and XII Corps. In an effort to keep supplies available as near the front as practicable, the depot companies sent out detachments to establish forward supply points. On 6 March the 61st Chemical Depot Company opened Depot No. 17 at KRUCHTEN (P98), and the following day the 193d Chemical Depot Company opened Depot No. 18 at OBERDORF (L01). The company operating Depot No. 17 closed the installation after one week, and opened Depot No. 19 on 14 March at DAUN (L37). This depot operated approximately one week, and was closed 23 March, one day after the 61st Chemical Depot Company opened Depot No. 20, on 22 March, at ARGENSCHWANG (L04). As the 193d had closed out Depot No. 18 on 26 March, the only depots in operation at the end of the month was No. 20.

Chemical Decontamination Company

The 93d Chemical Decontamination Company remained attached to the two depot companies. The company headquarters, second and third platoons were attached to the 61st Chemical Depot Company, while the first and fourth platoons operated with the 193d Chemical Depot Company. Moving farther into Germany had necessitated additional security precautions around the depot installations. To this end personnel of the decontamination company were employed as guards in addition to their duties of helping the depot companies unload supplies at railheads and truck stocks to the supply installations.

Chemical Maintenance Companies

The 16th Chemical Maintenance Company moved from HILVARDE (U78) on 9 March to ZAMBEN (L12) Germany. Repairs of Chemical Warfare items were made for Third U. S. Army units. In addition to the maintenance of 4.2-inch Chemical mortars and M2 smoke generators. Large quantities of gas masks and duet respirators were repaired and salvaged by the company. The unit departed ZAMBEN (L12) and arrived at MEISENHEIM (L83) on 23 March, moving the following day to BOCKENAU (L83). During the month, twenty-four smoke generator mounts were made by each maintenance company for installation in assault boats. This order was requested by engineers who planned to use the M2 portable smoke generator in assault boats for making initial river crossings.

From KERSCH, Luxemburg (P72) the 13th Chemical Maintenance Company moved on 8 March to ALSDORF, Germany (L04). In addition to performing its primary mission, the company sent out a detachment of men to VIII Corps units to install mechanical flame throwers. Another detachment was put on temporary duty with the 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion to help relieve urgent maintenance needs of the battalion. A third detachment of maintenance men was sent to the 103d Chemical Smoke Generator Company. On 16 March the company moved from ALSDORF (L04) to NIEDERSTAUFFELD (L97) where the job of making twenty-four smoke generator mounts was completed. The company moved again on 22 March, and established itself at KRAUSCHEILER (M04). The 13th Chemical Maintenance Company was given the mission of supporting the 93d Chemical Mortar Battalion when that organization became operational under Third U. S. Army on 29 March.

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On 27 March the company was attached to the 90th Infantry Division to carry out smoking operations on the RHINE River at MAINZ (M36). Two sections of the company were set up in MAINZ (M35), while the other two sections operated from KASTEL (M35) on the opposite bank of the river. Smoke screens were provided from MAINZ (M35) 29 March while engineers were engaged in bridging the river. Since it was unnecessary to use the KASTEL (M35) installations, the two sections on the west bank of the river returned to MAINZ (M35) and on 30 March were operating with the two sections previously installed on the west bank. Smoke missions by all four sections were continued from MAINZ (M35) for the remainder of the month.

Two smoke operations were performed by the 84th Chemical Smoke Generator Company in Germany. Attached for one operation to the 5th Infantry Division, two sections of the company were employed 2 March to provide smoke screens at METTERICH, Germany (L26) while troops of the division attached across the KYLL River. The second operation of the company was also on 2 March when the other two sections of the company, attached to the 5th Infantry Division, were set up at HUTTINGEN, Germany (L25). For two days intermittent screens were maintained at this position to deny observation to the enemy of the exposed supply route of the supported unit. Only light artillery and mortar fire were experienced, and it is believed the anti-observation screens helped prevent destruction of material and personnel in an otherwise vulnerable spot.

On 3 March one section of the 161st Chemical Smoke Generator Company was attached to the 6th Armored Division. Moving up to LUXEMBACH (L07), the section's generators were emplaced but no screening was required. The following day the company moved to PRONSFELD, Germany (L09) where it was attached on 5 March to the 90th Infantry Division. For the ensuing week, men and trucks were employed by the division to haul troops. The company moved 16 March to PLAID (L79) where it resumed its primary mission. Attached to the 87th Infantry Division, one section provided a smoke screen over the MOSELLE River at KAIMIS (L69), while infantry men crossed the river. Relieved of this attachment, the company moved up 20 March to WALDRACHS (L88), and two days later to FILSEN (L88). At this latter location the unit was again attached to the 90th Infantry Division and small smoke screens were provided 23 March at HUSSENICH (M30), HAIDENPANZT (M29), and FRIL-WINDRIN (M29). Other missions were carried out by the company at NIERSTEIN (M44) on the RHINE River on 28 March, at GROSSANKEIM (M46) and MULHEIM (M46) on 27 and 28 March, and at MULHEIM (M46) and HUPPENHEIM (M45) from 28-31 March.

The 162d Chemical Smoke Generator Company, operating in the VIII Corps sector in direct support of the 358d and 345th Infantry Regiments, expended 9900 gallons of fog oil from 24 to 28 March. For the operations the company was divided into five sections, employed as follows: section one at DREHKOSEL (L96); section two At ST. GOAR (L97); section three at WELLMICH (L97), section four at BOPPARD (L86); and section five at BOPPARD (L86). Encountering enemy small arms and artillery fire, the sections provided smoke screens that denied direct observation to the enemy while our infantry troops crossed the RHINE River with a minimum of casualties. The BOPPARD (L86) mission in addition to the screening protection for the infantry crossing, also screened construction of a RHINE River bridge by the 1105d Engineer Group. Operations by the 162d Chemical Smoke Generator Company at all five sites were suspended 28 March.

Chemical Smoke Generator Companies

Continuing in operation under Third U.S. Army, the 81st, 84th, 161st and 162d Chemical Smoke Generator Companies carried out smoking missions for various organizations during March. The 81st Company, with headquarters at REMICH, Luxemburg (P90) had sections one and two in position at CASTEL, Germany (L10), and sections three and four at TRIER (L23) until 9 March. No missions were required and the company moved to a rest and rehabilitation center at METZ, France (U98). At times during the two weeks rest period part of the personnel and trucks were employed by XX Corps for trucking operations.

[illegible]

[illegible] Section I General [illegible] Chemical [illegible] FRANKFURT [illegible] on 6 April, [illegible] FRANKFURT (M46), to [illegible] on 26 April were made by the [illegible] division.

Several sample gas shells from a German toxic gas dump, captured near HUNSTADT (M89) the latter part of March, were forwarded to Twelfth U. S. Army Group for analysis. The single-blue-ring marked shells were examined by the 40th Chemical Laboratory Company and were reported to contain the harassing and irritant agent DM (Adamsite). According to the report the net weight of the shell was 46.5 kilograms, the body weighing 27.7 kilograms. Encased were 2.5 kilograms of HE and 1.4 kilograms of DM (Adamsite). From the heavy steel casing, and the comparatively large charge of HE, it was believed the shell would be valuable tactically for causing casualties by fragmentation. As a chemical harassing agent the missile would cause sneezing, vomiting and some systemic effects, but presence of the agent would be concealed initially by the HE blasting effect.

Two additional German poison gas dumps were uncovered during April in Third U. S. Army's eastward advance, in addition to several bridges laden with toxic filled bombs discovered on the DANUBE River. On 23 April one of the enemy's large ammunition dumps was uncovered in the vicinity of GRAFENWOHR (P0038). This dump contained at first estimate between two and four million rounds of German chemical ammunition. In addition to Nebelwerfer (rocket smoke projector) shells, and land mines an undetermined amount of French and possibly Hungarian filled gas shells were found. Most of the German filled shells were marked either with white (for lacrimatory and irritant), green (for non-persistent choking irritant), blue (for lung irritant, sternutator), or yellow (for persistent vesicant, blister) bands. The second dump was captured on 29 April at WINDEA LEITERSDORF (U8033). The stock of this enemy dump consisted almost entirely of approximately 80,000 aerial bombs, marked either with one yellow band, two yellow bands, two blue bands, two white bands, two green bands, or three green bands. The area was placed under guard of personnel from the 33d Chemical Decontamination Company, and the capture of the dump was reported to higher headquarters for disposition.

The contents of these two dumps, however, did not produce the tactical interest equal to that which arose from the report of gas laden barges on the DANUBE River near KOWNRACH (U8347) and REINERSTOFF (U8746). With fuses marked "1945", and having been filled as recently as March of the same year, the 500 pound bombs had been brought by rail from NURNBERG (040) and put on the river barges, evidently in an effort to build up a poison gas reserve in the Redoubt area. The three green painted bands indicated the bombs were filled with a mixture of AC (Hydrocyanic Acid) and HN (Nitrogen Mustard) gas. The five barges captured 28 April held a total of approximately 2800 bombs.

Further investigation of the barges revealed that when capture of the barges became imminent, the enemy left a German officer (Captain) in the area to ensure that the bombs were not detonated by either side, thereby creating an unintentional gas attack. On 28 April a conference was held by officers of Third U. S. Army with two Colonels from the German Army, together with an SS Lieutenant. The purpose of the meeting was to establish a neutral zone around the area of the DANUBE River where the barges were located. This was done so that both enemy and friendly forces could be warned not to bomb, strafe, or fire artillery into the area.

A shell is dropped down the barrel of a 4.2-inch mortar in Germany



The end of April found more Chemical mortar battalions assigned to Third U. S. Army than had been assigned at any other one time. The 93d Chemical Mortar Battalion, acquired during the latter part of March, was relieved from assignment to Third U. S. Army on 22 April when VIII Corps, with its attached units, passed from control of this Headquarters. However, four battalions were acquired during the month--the 90th, 94th, 98th, and 97th Chemical Mortar Battalions. With the assignment of III Corps to this Command on 18 April, the 90th Chemical Mortar Battalion was assigned to Headquarters, Third U. S. Army. On 8 April, the 97th Chemical Mortar Battalion was assigned to Third U. S. Army, and later in the month, 21 April, the 94th and 98th were acquired from Ninth U. S. Army. Thus, a total of six Chemical mortar battalions operated under this Headquarters at the end of April.

Section II. Operations.

Chemical Battalions

At the beginning of the month the 81st, 91st and 93d Chemical Mortar Battalions continued operating assigned to Third U.S. Army. The 81st was attached to the XX Corps throughout the month, the 91st to XII Corps, and the 93d to VIII Corps. When this latter Corps, with attached units, was transferred on 22 April, the 93d Chemical Mortar Battalion was lost from control of this Headquarters. However, with the assignment of III Corps to Third U. S. Army on 18 April, the 90th Chemical Mortar Battalion was acquired. Three other battalions received during the month were the 97th, assigned to this Command 8 April, and the 94th and 98th battalions, assigned 21 April to Third U. S. Army from Ninth U. S. Army. For operations the six Chemical mortar battalions were attached as follows: 90th and 98th to III Corps; 91st and 97th to XII Corps; and the 81st and 94th to XX Corps.

Headquarters of the 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion was located early in the month at RIPA (R14), with "A" Company in position at BRUTH (R18), attached to Artillery of the 90th Infantry Division. Company "B" was also in support of the 90th Infantry Division, and was located at SCHLAGEN (M29). "C" Company, attached to the 65th Division operated from a position near HAMSFELD (M26). On 4 April this company was relieved from the attachment and was attached to the 76th Infantry Division. The first week of April all elements of the battalion were continually on the move, doing little firing in their support of Third U. S. Army units in the advance toward SOTHA (J06) and ERFURT (J36). The front lines were advancing so rapidly, that at times the battalion was over one hundred miles in front of the corps headquarters.

Company "B" did the majority of firing for the battalion the first week of April. A total of 662 rounds were fired by the company to support the advance of the 319th Infantry towards EHRENSTEIN (W66), on 5 April. While firing W76 to provide a screen, the company fired HE to assist in keeping down enemy fire as our infantry advanced. By 10 April the mortars of the company were firing on targets of opportunity in the vicinity of EHOTA (J36). A group of the enemy walking along a ridge northeast of SCHMIRA (J36) was sighted and fired upon. The same day the company was employed in repulsing an enemy counterattack comprised of a force of three tanks and sixty infantry. Credit for checking the counterattack was given by the supported 318th Infantry to the mortars of Company "B". The towns of ARNSTEDEN (J26) and WITTERDA (J27) were fired on by "C" Company on 10 April in an effort to soften the targets for troops of the 328th Infantry. Company "A" supported the 317th Infantry 10 April by firing on road junctions, buildings and other targets in the vicinity of KINDERSLEBEN (J36). Even with the increased number of missions, mortar breakage continued at a minimum.

[illegible] On 24 April "B" Company was [illegible] mortars. Friendly [illegible] Army [illegible] the same [illegible] Artillery Battalion [illegible] attached to the [illegible] Division. [illegible] Artillery Battalion [illegible] Infantry [illegible] Army was attached to the [illegible] Infantry [illegible] was relieved from attachment [illegible] Company "B" [illegible] Division. Two [illegible] Division [illegible] Division [illegible] Division



Attached to III Corps, the companies of the 91st Chemical Mortar Battalion were operating in support of the 26th, 71st and 97th Infantry Divisions. Company "A", attached to the 104th Infantry of the 26th Division, occupied positions near DIEUZE (F92). The mission of the regiment was to protect the right flank of the Corps. Company "B" in position at FOLKLING (K3), was in reserve of the 71st Division. Company "C", at DRAKE HM (F74), operated in the vicinity of the SIERCK River. Headquarters Company at FENETRANGE (F76) made preparations on 1 April to move to MERLEN (F84). But unexpected events began to take place. The advance party of the company reached its new location without difficulty, but the main body of the company proceeded to serve up several pockets of enemy troops caught along the Corps' main supply route. As the company encountered road blocks created by enemy action, guns and small arms, orders were given to built up later elements of the company that had not imported the III Chemical Post. The following day enemy resistance had been overcome and the battalion headquarters proceeded on its move. Two personnel of two vehicles was captured but was recovered unharmed on 8 April.

Company "A" fired missions 4 April on the towns of OPPERTZ (H30) and and BRINCK (H30). Enemy in the woods north of these two towns were routed out with a few rounds of VT harassing fire. The same day "C" Company fired one mission in the attack on RAHLINGEN (H84) and by 7 April had moved to ETTENDORF (H68).

In preparation for an attack by III Corps on 10 April, "A" Company was attached to the entire 26th Division for general support. The company moved up to DIEDENHOFEN (J22), and two days later to KUPPELSTOCK (J4), firing only a few small harassing missions. By 13 April the company was relieved from the 26th Division, and was attached along with "B" Company to the 71st Infantry Division. With companies were placed in division reserve. On 10 April "B" Company moved from MARIENTHAL (H42) to TUNTAN (J01), and the following day to SCHLOSS (K20). No missions were fired. "C" Company from positions at STUTZANGEN (J23), gave on call registers of the 90th Infantry Division. Beginning 10 April, the platoons of the company leap-frogged throughout the next three days in order to keep within effective range of the infantry. Some harassing and interdictory missions were fired in support of the troops. By 13 April the company was situated in LEMBERG (J61).

On 14 April the 91st Chemical Mortar Battalion was relieved from its attachment to the 71st and 90th Infantry Divisions and moved to an assembly area at BACHEMDORF (J30). The entire battalion was attached to the 9th Tank Destroyer Group with the mission of furnishing Military Government Guard for the III Corps area. "A" Company on 16 April moved to BINSFELD (J20) and began patrolling the assigned area. The next day, "B" Company moved to the vicinity of ARZFELDEN (J40) and "C" Company, with "A" Battery of the 275th Field Artillery Battalion, began patrolling the area surrounding LORENTZEN (J71) and HEMMERICH (J67). By 19 April, changes in division boundaries had displaced headquarters Company, companies "A" and "B" to new areas in the vicinity of PRUM (J56) and BONNERSDORF (J19), while "C" Company patrolled in the vicinity of WILSECKERANGE (J07).

The 91st Chemical Mortar Battalion, after mobilization, went to Third U. S. Army, arriving 11 April in an assembly area at TAILLY (H8). Four days later the battalion was attached to the 12th Armored Group, Corps Area in case of need. The following day operations of the battalion moved to front line combat areas and established security guards on supplies, communication zones, factories and bridges. On 21 April, fired 48 rounds of HE into the woods in the vicinity of DIEULOUARD to clear enemy from the area. No other rounds were fired by the battalion and the Head, Artillery was located by 22 April at LAENGENICH (J54).

Attached to III Corps upon its arrival in Third U. S. Army's area 24 April, the 90th Chemical Mortar Battalion assembled in the area of LEDEBURG (J61). Two companies were attached to the 80th Infantry Division for overall support. The battalion headquarters moved from MARIENTHAL (J42) on 25 April to ALTRANSTEDT (J44) and three days later to LANGENSTEIN (J72).

These pictures illustrate the use of the M2 smoke generator in river crossings. Mounts made by the 13th and 16th Chemical Maintenance companies permit installation of the generator in an assault boat (upper left) and in a ferry boat (center left). Large (55 gal) drum containing fog oil. Generator in action and boat in use to distribute smoke across river (center right and lower right).



One platoon of "A" Company of the 90th Battalion fired a smoke mission 28 April near FRANKENAU (C64). The rest of the month the troops encountered such light resistance that no additional missions were requested. By 30 April the unit was located at LAUTERBACH (C58). The latter three days of the month "B" Company fired on railroad junctions, buildings and other enemy built installations in the vicinity of ALSFELD (C42). The following day the company gave support at WINDECKEN (C72) to cover infantry crossing the LAHN RIver. Two days later the company received positions at FAULBACH (C41). "C" Company fired two missions 27 April from its position near HESS (F2). Four missions were fired on RAUSCHENBACH (C60), the following day. By month's end the company had reached AMPERTSHAUSEN (C89).

Chemical Warfare Service Units

Chemical Depot Companies

Depot No. 20, stocking Class II, IV and V Chemical supplies remained in operation during the month by the 61st Chemical Depot Company. This supply point served III Corps units and was located at ABLEICHSWANN (C44). Depot No. 21 was opened at BATTALSTADT (C84) by the 1926 Chemical Depot Company on 12 April. Class IV and V items were handled at this location until 21 April when the depot was closed. The following day the company opened Depot No. 23, at ALTENFETN (C7) stocking the Class IV and V supplies. Meanwhile, the 61st Chemical Depot Company on 20 April had established Depot No. 22 at OBERSS-LAUDENBACH (B43) servicing III, XII, and XX Corps units.

The biggest problem for the depot companies during April was transportation. To keep Chemical supplies available for Third U.S. Army's fast moving tempo it was necessary for the depot companies to keep stocks of all classes of supplies constantly moving up. At times the Chemical depot companies were borrowed in addition to the 331 Chemical Decontamination Company to assist in transporting supplies to the more forward depot points. Fortunately, the amount of supplies consumed was not great and no serious shortages were experienced, even though at times there were six battalions operating under Third U. S. Army.

On 1 April, both the 61st and 1926d Chemical Depot Companies, complying with orders issued by Third U. S. Army 31 March, were reorganized and equipped under Table of Organization and Equipment 8-67, dated 6 January 1945. The new reorganization reduced the number of enlisted personnel by 27 men, leaving each company with five officers and one hundred fifty enlisted men.

Chemical Decontamination Company

Continuing to operate with the Chemical depot companies, the headquarters section and third platoon of the 331st Chemical Decontamination Company were attached to the 61st Chemical Depot Company. The first and fourth platoons assisted the 1926 in carrying out depot functions. Personnel of the decontamination company were also employed in guarding captured enemy chemical dumps. The third platoon was stationed at the captured toxic gas dump at HEMMERICH (M56) from 8 to 16 April. At this time the platoon moved to OSNABRUCK (L70). The second platoon on 22 April established a guard at the captured dump at BAUMHOLZ (G84) while the third platoon moved the same day to WILDFLECKEN (H6w).

Chemical Maintenance Company

Located at NEU ISENBURG (M6w), the 16th Chemical Maintenance Company continued to perform its primary service for Third U. S. Army troops. Maintenance was performed on 1F2 Chemical smoke generators (M2) and repairs made to sixteen 4.2-inch Chemical mortars, including barrels, baseplates and standards. On 11 April the unit departed NEU ISENBURG (M6w), and set up at VAINA (M45). From this location the company moved to KITZINGEN (M72) on 17 April, followed by still another move one week later to EICHSTADT (P7w).

The 13th Chemical Maintenance Company, at MARKTBREITEN (M04), moved 1 April to ALSFELD (M38) and six days later to HERSFELD (M38). Work was performed on twenty-five smoke generators and the company furnished a detail of men to the depot companies for reworking defective fuses of 4.2 inch Chemical ammunition. The company moved again on 9 April to WASTENSAND JD (M16) where it continued routine operations. A school was held at VAINA (M45) for personnel of both maintenance companies from 12 to 16 April. Instructions were given in the installation, operation and maintenance of flame throwers mounted in tanks. On 22 April the company moved to KITZINGEN AIR JD (J01). The relatively few missions performed in April by the smoke generator companies and Chemical Battalions resulted in a minimum of work being received by the two Chemical maintenance companies.



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DECLA

Chemical Smoke Generator Companies

On 1 April the 91st Chemical Smoke Generator Company at HAIBT (5447 [illegible] was to enter on the ZUGSPITZE Project. This operation was termed [illegible] The 91st Chemical Smoke Generator Company moved by motor convoy to [illegible] and established [illegible] On 10 April a Platoon [illegible] of Germany was followed by the detachment's remaining [illegible] The 91st Chemical Smoke Generator Company remained in [illegible] Army on 30 April.

The lack of enemy air activity permitted the [illegible] to operate [illegible] were used in more conventional [illegible] the 91st Chemical Smoke Generator Company [illegible] Army on 30 April.

The 92nd Chemical Smoke Generator Company was [illegible] Army on 1 April. The 92nd Chemical Smoke Generator Company [illegible] Army on 30 April.

The 93rd Chemical Smoke Generator Company was [illegible] Army on 1 April. The 93rd Chemical Smoke Generator Company [illegible] Army on 30 April.



Stocks of German filled 105mm gas shells found in dump near OBERMENZING

[illegible]
MA[illegible]

Section I. General. Combat operations ceased 7 May with the Chemical [illegible] Army [illegible] The Platoon Leader's Course [illegible] May for 20 [illegible] The Chief Chemical Officer, [illegible] U. S. Army remained at [illegible]

The Theater Chemical Warfare Officer, together with [illegible] officers from the Office of the Chief, Chemical Warfare Service, [illegible] Army, arrived the latter part of April. On 1 May these officers accompanied the Chief, [illegible] Headquarters, visiting the rest camps for the purpose of holding conferences with the Commanding Officers of the Chemical Mortar Battalions assigned to this Command. These conferences dealt primarily with matters pertaining to redeployment of the Chemical Battalions following the cessation of hostilities.

A second Chemical Warfare Service Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service [illegible] was attached to the Headquarters, [illegible] May. This unit, [illegible], was in addition to the [illegible] Army's Chemical Section at its headquarters. The [illegible] was one of German [illegible] gas tanks, [illegible] ammunition, rockets, and [illegible] of chemical equipment over run by the [illegible] Army. Details of [illegible] assisted in the assessment of this [illegible] were [illegible] with investigating and examining [illegible] and anti-aircraft German Chemical Warfare equipment [illegible] Third U. S. Army's zone.

[illegible]

We [illegible] the rest of the company itself, every effort [illegible] Company [illegible] primary [illegible] Battalion [illegible] Battalion [illegible] Company [illegible] Army [illegible] 3 May [illegible] Company [illegible] Army [illegible] Company [illegible] Army [illegible] Company [illegible] Army

CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

1. During operations of Third U. S. Army, the greatest handicap to adequate supply of Chemical items was the lack of organic transportation. At times depot companies were unable to move stocks of the supply points from one location to another, and it was necessary to obtain additional transportation from Army sources. In many instances, because other agencies had higher priority, transportation was not available promptly, and during the advance across France and again across Germany, portions of one depot company were as far as two hundred miles behind the troops supported. Until the middle of March, the Chemical smoke generator companies, with their twenty-nine (29) two and one-half ton trucks were utilized, in addition to performing their primary duties, in transferring the Chemical depot stocks nearer the front. The reorganization and equipping of the companies in March 1945 under T/O and E 3-267, dated 4 May 1944, reduced the number of two and one-half ton trucks in each company to five (5). This imposed further hardships in the transportation situation.

2. Consideration should be given to the formation of a service unit similar to a Quartermaster truck company for addition to each Chemical depot company, or provisions made thereby it would be standard procedure to attach a Quartermaster truck company to each Chemical depot company in operation. In this connection, it will be noted that the Ordnance Department, the Quartermaster Corps, the Corps of Engineers, and other services, all have service units with surplus organic transportation in their organizations or are able to use such units for the transportation of depot supplies in emergencies. This action was possible in the Chemical Warfare Service in those instances where smoke generator companies (prior to reorganization in March 1945) could be used to provide transportation when not performing their primary mission.

3. From the experience Third U. S. Army gained in its nine-month operational period, the following information relative to the function and employment of Chemical Warfare units in combat is submitted:

a. Chemical Mortar Battalions

(1) In the phase of planning for operations, prior to 9 May, it was recommended that one Chemical mortar battalion be attached to each infantry division. However, the number of battalions available was limited. Upon becoming operational 1 August 1944, only one Chemical mortar battalion was assigned to Third U. S. Army.

(2) During the operational period Third U. S. Army constituted of from two to four corps, with as many as eighteen divisions under Army control at a single time. The maximum number of Chemical mortar battalions assigned to Third U. S. Army at one time was seven. Other times the Army operated with only one, but generally with three such units, one attached to each corps. In this capacity the three companies of the battalion supported at times three different divisions. Employed over such large areas, the control, administration, and supply by the battalion headquarters was very difficult.

(3) Chemical mortar battalions were frequently attached during combat to Field Artillery units. Such attachments were not favored, principally because of the tendency of the artillery to request firing on targets outside the authorized range of the 4.2-inch Chemical mortar. This weapon should not be expected to fire over 4400 yards, especially at any sustained rate of fire. Artillery liaison officers and liaison planes were used at times to direct the fire of the 4.2-inch mortars.

(4) Chemical mortar troops should not be attached to armored units. Designed to be employed directly in front line operations, Armored divisions are equipped accordingly, with maximum protection afforded the individual. Chemical mortar battalions do not possess the mechanized mobility or protection commensurate with operating in areas in which armored troops are employed.

(5) During certain periods the breakage of mortars and accessory equipment was extremely high. Because of the dispersion of the battalions over a large area, and the rapidly moving front, the Chemical maintenance companies supporting the battalions were often a great distance from the companies of the battalions. Under these conditions, and considering the time consumed in returning the equipment to the maintenance companies for repair, an excessive number of mortars and accessories were necessary to maintain the mortar-position-to-maintenance-company cycle.

(6) In view of the demands combat by larger organizations for 4.2-inch Chemical mortar support, the basis of troop unit requirements should be one Chemical mortar battalion per infantry division.

(7) Consideration should be given to providing a mortar repair detachment as an organic part of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Chemical mortar battalion. This type detachment could perform such non-specialized maintenance as welding, base-plate straightening, and other repairs which are normally but not necessarily performed by the maintenance company.

b. Chemical Depot Companies

(1) The number of Chemical depot companies needed by an Army in operation depends on the method employed by Army in issuing Class V Chemical supplies, the extent of use of Chemical Warfare material, and the speed with which the Army moves. The latter two conditions are too unstable to justify using them as a basis for making definite calculations.

(2) It was the policy within the area of Third U. S. Army to handle all Class V Chemical supplies, in addition to Classes II and IV Chemical items, at the Chemical depot points. This was done in preference to sending out small detachments from the Chemical depot companies to Ordnance ammunition supply points to handle Chemical ammunition at Ordnance installations.

(3) According to plan, all portable flame throwers were filled, stocked, and issued ready for operation, to using units. This proved to be an advantage since the limited availability of flame thrower filling kits would not permit the issue of the kits to the using troops in the amount authorized. Flame throwers were returned empty to the depot companies.

(4) If it is the intention of the Chemical Warfare Service within an Army to maintain Chemical depots through which Class V Chemical items are issued, two Chemical depot companies should be assigned to each Army.

c. Chemical Decontamination Company

(1) The Chemical decontamination company assigned to Third U. S. Army was not called on for performance of its primary mission. However, it was employed to a great extent in other operations. Useful in such jobs as fire-fighting, hauling water, washing vehicles, providing bathing facilities, the equipment and personnel of the company more than justified their attachment to Third U. S. Army, despite the fact they were not engaged in their primary mission.

(2) Although gas warfare was not initiated, the safety factor of having a Chemical decontamination company, in addition to the capabilities noted above, warrants recommending assignment of such a company to an Army. Additional companies should be retained in rear echelons, available for use in emergencies.

d. Chemical Maintenance Companies

(1) The maintenance of mortars comprised the majority of work, and received priority over other items to be repaired in the company. In this Army it was found that one maintenance company could support two Chemical mortar battalions. At the same time, maintenance facilities for all other Chemical Warfare Service equipment were ample. However, the assignment of additional battalions severely taxed the capacity of the maintenance companies.

(2) Generally, two maintenance companies proved to be sufficient in performing the maintenance of all Chemical equipment within Third U. S. Army. The employment by one Army of more than four battalions in sustained combat would require the services of more than two maintenance companies.

(3) It is estimated also that when mechanized flame throwers (M4-6) are supplied in considerable quantity, and these maintenance companies are responsible for maintenance of these weapons, additional maintenance facilities would be required.

(4) Except for the conditions indicated above, one maintenance company should be assigned to each field Army, with additional companies assigned in the ratio of one (1) maintenance company per two (2) Chemical mortar battalions.

(5) Because the majority of the work of the maintenance companies was concentrated in the mortar repair section, such a section or detachment should be included in Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Chemical mortar battalion.

e. Chemical Smoke Generator Company

(1) For the majority of the time, four Chemical smoke generator companies were assigned to Third U. S. Army. It was the practice in this Army to attach single companies to corps for any particular operation. In some cases corps have attached these companies to divisions or to particular engineer or antiaircraft artillery units. In fact, some engineer units requested that smoke generator companies be in action prior to their initiating bridging operations. In the majority of cases smoke generator companies were employed primarily to cover bridges and bridge sites.

(2) Upon reorganizing under Table of Organization and Equipment 3-267 (dated 4 May 1944) the Chemical smoke generator companies lost twenty-four (24) two and one-half ton trucks. Having previously been employed intermittently in transporting stocks of Chemical depots from rear areas to forward installations, the smoke generator companies after reorganizing had insufficient organic transportation within the unit. The supplying of heavy items such as drums of fog oil, smoke pots, and other materials required by these companies in action was seriously hampered. To assist in overcoming this difficulty, permission was obtained to permit each company to retain ten (10) two and one-half ton trucks in addition to the authorized five (5).

(3) Only in a very few instances were smoke generator companies requested to maintain a screen at a site unfavorable to operations because of terrain. Even though the M2 is a portable smoke generator as compared to the M1, when a site is selected and a position secured, the smoke generator cannot be moved by personnel. Therefore, some defilade or other protective cover is necessary. In situations lacking such protection the 4.2-inch Chemical mortar is more practicable for maintaining a smoke screen.

(4) One serious disadvantage of the M2 Chemical smoke generator is the noise made by the generator in operation. In assault type operations it was difficult to maintain the element of surprise. Operating personnel experienced difficulty in hearing incoming enemy artillery and mortar shells, which frequently were placed on the smoke generator positions.

(5) With reference to a Headquarters, and Headquarters Detachment, Chemical smoke generator battalion, as far as operating under Army control is concerned, there is no need for such a detachment. Since the smoke generator companies were attached by Army to corps for any particular operation, the Chemical smoke generator battalion could not be efficiently utilized. When the smoke generator companies were attached as indicated, the corps assumed responsibility for administration and control. The supervising of a smoke generator battalion headquarters over companies widely separated (no more than two companies were ever attached to or ever used by more than one corps) was not practicable and served no useful purpose.

(6) Sufficient Chemical smoke generator companies should be assigned to an Army to be available for attachment on the basis of one company per corps.

f. Chemical General Service Company

At no time during operations was any Chemical general service company attached or assigned to Third U. S. Army. It is not believed that this type of unit is economical for operation with field Armies or corps under normal situations. Certain sections of this company would only be employed under special situations, and the units discussed above will normally be sufficient.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX NO. 1

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

30 April 1944

TRAINING MEMORANDUM:

NUMBER 14 :

TRAINING IN CHEMICAL WARFARE

1. Attention is invited to Training Memorandum Number 48, Headquarters ETOUSA, 23 December 1943, and Training Memorandum Number 4, Headquarters ETOUSA, 27 January 1944.

2. All commanders will immediately make a survey of the training of their troops to see that they meet the "Standard of Proficiency" in defense against chemical attack as outlined in paragraph 4, Section I, Chapter I, FM 21-40.

3. The purpose of all training in defense against chemical attack will be to assure the unit's being able to complete its mission with a minimum of casualties, even though gas or smoke is used against them. With this in mind the limitations as well as capabilities of chemical warfare will be taught so that an individual will have an unwarranted fear of gas. All instructions on the effects of gases will emphasize the available protection the individual has against this type of attack, and that the degree of protection depends on the individual's knowledge and ability to use his protective equipment.

4. The following additional provisions will be complied with:

a. Unit commanders will ascertain that all members of their command have the complete authorized protective uniform in serviceable condition, and by observation of the men in the uniform will assure themselves that each man knows how to wear the uniform and that it fits him correctly. Upon completion of the visual inspection the protective uniform will be held in unit storage.

b. The protective cover, carried in the gas mask carrier, will not be removed from the container unless gas attack is obviously imminent or unless directed by higher headquarters.

c. The ½-quart decontaminating apparatus will be mounted on vehicles as directed by Section XI, Maintenance and Operation of Motor Vehicles, Headquarters ETOUSA, 24 January 1944. The apparatus will be kept filled with decontaminating agent non-corrosive (DANC) in accordance with Section II, Training Memorandum Number 23, Headquarters ETOUSA, 31 July 1943.

d. The following items will be issued to individuals and carried in the gas masks as directed in Training Memorandum Number 4, Headquarters ETOUSA, 27 January 1944, Section I, subject: "Method of Carrying Individual Gas Protection Equipment."

(1) Two (2) eyeshields
(2) One (1) tube protective ointment
(3) One (1) pocket reference card
(4) One (1) protective cover (QM issue)
(5) Two (2) sleeve gas detectors
(6) One (1) tube BAL eye ointment (Medical issue)

e. The following items will be drawn and placed in unit storage until directed otherwise:

(1) One (1) protective cover (QM issue)
(2) Two (2) eyeshields
(3) Protective clothing (QM issue)
(4) One (1) can shoe impregnite

5. Unit gas personnel will be trained and appointed as indicated below, and all units will maintain an up-to-date list of personnel so appointed.

a. A minimum of one unit gas officer and one gas noncommissioned officer of each brigade, regiment, and battalion, and a minimum of two gas noncommissioned officers for each company.

b. Decontamination squads on the basis of one man for each twenty (20) men or fraction thereof. As each unit will be required to perform its own decontamination, members of the squad will be trained to decontaminate clothing, shoes, web equipment, gas masks, weapons, vehicles, areas, food, and any special equipment which the unit is authorized. Each individual in the unit will be able to perform personal decontamination, decontamination of weapon with which armed, and, if a member of a crew-served weapon, decontamination required to keep that weapon in operation. Drivers will be able to perform first echelon decontamination of vehicles with the ½-quart apparatus.

6. A gas defense plan will be prepared by each unit, based upon what the unit should do if subjected to a gas attack while in its present location. The plan should be simple and explained to all personnel of the unit, after which it will be tested by trial alarms. The alert plans will contain the following minimum:

a. Plan for movement of unit to alternate position in the event of vesicant gas attack.

b. Use of decontamination squads for decontamination of vital areas, buildings, and equipment.

c. Procedure for reporting the use of gas by the enemy.

d. Location of gas alarms and responsibility for sounding the alarm.

e. Use of protective equipment in the gas mask carrier.

f. Drawing gas protective equipment and clothing from unit storage.

g. Protection of vehicles and supplies.

7. a. Gas masks will be carried under the following conditions:

(1) When participating in actual or simulated field operations except when specifically directed otherwise by the commander of troops. Unit commanders will use their own judgment as to when it is obviously inappropriate for masks to be worn and will then direct that gas masks not be carried.

(2) By both interior and local security detachments while on duty. The mask may be kept at posts of duty, instead of being worn, except that during air raids or gas alerts the mask will be carried on the person.

(3) While on leave, furlough, or traveling on official business, if separation from the post is to exceed 24 hours. The mask need not be carried on the person but must be available for use.

b. Gas masks will be worn for a minimum of one-half hour per week, except that in higher headquarters (divisions and above) this requirement may be reduced to 15 minutes per day, twice each month.

c. Individuals who have not tested their gas masks in the presence of tear gas or who have had repairs made to their masks since the last test, will be taken through the gas chamber at present station. This will be done at the earliest practicable date.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ R. W. HARTMAN
/s/ R. W. HARTMAN,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" & "C"

ANNEX NO. 2

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

8 June 1944

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM:

NUMBER 13:

CHEMICAL WARFARE

1. REFERENCE.

a. Operation Memorandum Number 15, SHAEF, dated 26 March 1944, (Secret) subject: "Chemical Warfare."

b. Operations Memorandum, Headquarters ETOUSA, dated 2 May 1944, (Secret) subject: "Chemical Warfare."

c. Operations Memorandum Number 14, Headquarters ETOUSA, dated 28 December 1943, subject: "Reciprocs." (Section I); "Reporting Enemy Gas Attacks in the United Kingdom." (Section II); and "Reporting Enemy Gas Attacks Other Than in the United Kingdom" (Section III).

d. Operations Memorandum No. 1, Headquarters ETOUSA, dated 16 May 1943, subject: "Reporting Enemy Gas Attacks in the United Kingdom."

2. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this memorandum is to establish the Chemical Warfare policy within Third United States Army.

3. GENERAL.

The enemy is capable of employing gas on a large scale at any time. He is fully trained in defensive measures and has an adequate supply of suitable equipment and material for extensive defensive use of gas. Other than his capabilities, however, there is no positive intelligence that the enemy plans to use gas against troops invading the continent.

4. OFFENSIVE POLICY.

a. Full scale of gas offensive equipment will be provided and held in the United Kingdom until gas warfare begins.

b. Toxic gas will not be employed until so directed, and offensive gas ammunition will not be moved overseas, into or through ports or port areas until so directed by the Supreme Commander.

c. If and when chemical warfare is resorted to, commanders responsible for ordering the employment of toxic agents will be responsible for warning all Allied units operating in the vicinity.

5. DEFENSIVE POLICY.

a. Provisions are being made in the United Kingdom for full-scale anti-gas equipment for all troops to be engaged in operations. Location, method of carrying, and use of protective supplies, equipment, and reserves will be in conformity with instructions from this headquarters. The guiding principle is:

(1) One layer of protective clothing (outer) to be worn by all troops entering the Continent during the assault phase. Troops under this category will be so notified in sufficient time to don the protective uniform in the Marshalling Area.

(2) The user will not be separated from his personal anti-gas protective equipment except for a definite period of operation for which the risk can be accepted.

(3) Reserves of anti-gas protective clothing and equipment will be carried in forward areas only as considered necessary by gas intelligence. Main reserves will be located in such a way that they are readily available when required.

b. Inspections of anti-gas protective clothing, equipment, and supplies will be made with sufficient frequency to insure that these items are always serviceable. Current directives for inspection of protective ointment and clothing will be complied with.

6. USE OF SMOKE.

a. During land operations authority is delegated to corps and divisions to make full large scale use of smoke and smoke-making materials within their sectors. This authority may be redelegated to subordinate units provided proper coordination is maintained between adjacent units. Wherever smoke from one sector may drift into or interfere in the defense of another sector, the use of smoke will be coordinated between commanders of the respective sectors.

b. All units are authorized to use colored smoke grenades in accordance with appropriate SOI's, and individual HC, WP, or Frangible Grenades for purposes of escape, blinding pill boxes, etc.

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c. During amphibious operations the use of gas will be coordinated with the necessary Naval commanders after establishment of a beach head and until troops are far enough inland to be under the protection of land artillery fire. Units will be ready while afloat for combat use in Naval amphibious operations.

7. SAFETY PRECAUTIONS.

The storage and shipment of lethal and toxic gas and chemical ammunition and gas will be closely controlled under the supervision of the Chemical Warfare Service Troops. These services will be supplied with information and instructions regarding safety precautions for storage and shipment. Individuals will be adequately trained in the safety precautions and hazards pertaining to handling and employment and that all personnel will be familiar with these hazards and will observe them as nearly as possible. Gas masks will be carried by all troops when it is necessary to initiate the use of gas. Carriers will be notified in advance and will be instructed to provide safety precautions. Manifests will describe the shipment in detail and will specify the necessary counteracting chemical of decontaminating agent. Shipments will be routed through sparsely populated areas wherever possible.

8. GAS ATTACKS.

a. Enemy use of gas not particularly initial employment, must be reported to Army Headquarters and to adjacent units by the most expeditious means available. All messages concerning the first use of or subsequent use of gas by the enemy will be secret and will be given PRIORITY priority.

b. Any information in the army's interiors in connection with gas warfare must reach Army Headquarters in the shortest possible time. Negative, as well as positive information of the enemy's intentions is required.

c. When the fact that the enemy is using gas is substantiated, the type of attack report to be made will be specified.

9. WARNINGS.

a. Units of this command will give local warnings to civilians in the United Kingdom only if ordered to save civilian lives. A general warning will be given only by British authorities while in the United Kingdom. Units are responsible for their own local warning system, using the British type gas rattle.

b. During overseas operations a general warning of the presence of gas will be issued whenever warranted. A general warning will be issued in the United Kingdom after the issue of the general warning by His Majesty's Government.

10. DECONTAMINATION.

a. All units are responsible for performing their own decontamination. Where the need for decontamination of areas or equipment exceeds the capacity of the unit, Chemical Warfare Service Troops may be requested from Army Headquarters through command channels.

b. Unit commanders will insure that adequate preparations are made for decontamination of vital communication centers, headquarters, static camps and supply and maintenance installations. Authorized amounts of decontaminating materials and equipment will be maintained.

c. Within the United Kingdom and prior to the use of gas the provision of gas-sealing shelters for personnel and the gas-proofing of rooms and vehicles is not considered necessary. Vital installations, such as operation rooms and telephone exchanges can be gas-proofed when necessary.

d. Unit commanders will render such assistance to the civilian population of re-occupied territories in clearing, etc., as is compatible with the attainment of their major object which is the furtherance of the military effort. Local resources, personnel, and raw materials will be exploited to the fullest extent possible before imported military resources are diverted from their primary functions.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON

HUGH J. DAFFEY
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

ANNEX NO 3

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

10 May 1945

Change No. 1 to Administrative Instructions Number 3

* * * * *

III. Chemical Warfare Service Instructions

1. Class II & IV

a. Method of issue: Requisitions in duplicate to the nearest CWS depot

b. Maintenance:

(1) First and second echelon: By unit concerned.

(2) Beyond second echelon: By Chemical maintenance companies. Direct exchange of serviceable for unserviceable items will be made at CWS depot and/or maintenance companies

c. Special Class IV Instructions:

(1) Portable flame throwers and accessories - Issued fully charged and serviced for use from CWS ASPs. Empty flame throwers must be returned to nearest CWS installation. Division Engineer combat battalions only are authorized to retain flame throwers, kits, and filling equipment.

(2) Containers - Cylinders for storage and shipment of hydrogen and nitrogen and containers (jerricans, drums, etc.) used for CWS POL products will be returned to nearest CWS ASP or depot without delay.

4. Individual and Organizational CWS Equipment, Clothing, and Supplies:

(1) The following items of individual protective equipment will be retained by the individual or held in regimental or smaller unit storage at the discretion of the unit commander concerned:

1 ea Mask, Gas (service or diaphragm as authorized)
1 ea Tube, Ointment, Protective) Kit, Ointment,
1 ea Tube, Bal Eye Ointment) Protective, M5, contains these items in single package.
4 ea Eyeshields
2 ea Detector, Sleeve

(2) The following items of collective protective equipment will be held in regimental or smaller unit storage:

Alarm, gas
Disinfectant, gas mask
Kit, repair, gas mask, M1 (Company)
Kit, repair, gas mask, Universal, M8
Kit, Chemical agent detector, M9 or substitute
Apparatus, decon 1½ qt. (retain mounted, but empty on vehicles)
Apparatus, decon., power driven

(3) All other CWS equipment except respirator, dust, will be turned in to nearest CWS supply point. Dust respirators may be retained at the option of unit commander concerned.

These instructions do not apply to Chemical depot, maintenance, and decontamination companies.

(4) Cover, protective (M item) - disposition as directed in letter, this Headquarters, subject: "Covers, Protective, Individual", file AG 420 3SMCG-4.

LIST OF CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS ASSIGNED TO THIRD U. S. ARMY

UNIT	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY
Chemical Mortar Battalions										
86	•	•	•							•
81		•	Hold 26							Asgd 6
91		Asgd 18	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
3			Asgd 24	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
83				•	•	•	•	•	•	
97					Asgd 24		Hold 3			
90								Asgd 25	Hold 22	
94									Asgd 6	•
98									Asgd 18	•
Chemical Depot Companies									Asgd 21	•
61	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	Asgd 21	•
192	Asgd 6	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Chemical Maintenance Companies										
67	•	•								
16		Hold 19	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
13		Asgd 10			•	•	•	•	•	•
Chemical Decontamination Company					Asgd 23	•	•	•	•	•
33					Asgd 23	•	•	•	•	•
Chemical Smoke Generator Company										
161	Atchd 1	•	•	•	•	Asgd 22	•	•	•	•
84		Atchd 6	•	•	•	Asgd 22	•	•	•	•
162				•	•	•	•	•	•	•
81				Asgd 18	•	Asgd 22	•	•	•	•
				Atchd 18						

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

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[redacted]
Third [redacted] Army
Office of the Headquarters Commandant
APO [redacted]

Subject: After Action Report, Headquarters Commandant's Section.

To : Commanding General, Third U. S. Army, APO 403, U. S. Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After Action Report of the Headquarters Commandant's Section, Third U. S. Army, beginning with the date of alert for overseas service on 1 January, 1944 and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapters.

2. It has been written with two objectives:

a. To report the operations of the section.

b. To be as helpful as possible to future commandants of a large headquarters in campaign: during summer, autumn, winter and spring; in fast moving tactical situations over great distances, and during periods of relative stability of the front; under canvas in the field, or utilizing covered accomodations in communities both large and small; in combat, and perhaps (the future will tell) during the occupation of enemy territory after hostilities have ceased.

3. The Commandant's task is not easy, and little source material is available to assist him to visualize his work and to prepare to get it done. It is hoped that this report may fill a portion of this void.

Fred H. Kelley

FRED H. KELLEY,
Colonel, Infantry,
Headquarters Commandant.

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HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart

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

TROOP ATTACHMENTS

HEADQUARTERS, SPECIAL TROOPS, THIRD U.S. ARMY

- HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
- HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
- 1092 ENGR UTILITY DET
- MED DET 9P TRS
- MED DET 511 MP BN
- 502 QM CAR CO
- 3597 QM TRK CO
- 3805 QM TRK CO
- 39 MRU
- 11 FDS
- 78 FDS
- 3457 ORD MAM CO
- 61 AGF BAND
- 572 APU
- 166 SIG PHOTO CO
- ZY DET WEA SQ
- ZY DET MBL COM SQ

DEA. 21

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FOREWORD

FROM THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

On 1 January, 1944, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, stationed at FORT SAM HOUSTON, Texas under the command of Lieutenant General [illegible] was alerted for movement through the NEW YORK Port of Embarkation to the European Theater of Operations.

An advance party consisting of thirteen officers and twenty-six enlisted men left FORT SAM HOUSTON on 10 January. Upon arriving near STAMFORD, CONNECTICUT, it was met aboard ship by the newly designated Army Commander, Lieutenant General [illegible] and entrained immediately for FROGHALL AREA, about three miles from [illegible], Cheshire, England, fifteen miles south of WIGAN and eight miles distant, for the reception of the main body. During the next few weeks a number of staff officers, most of whom had served with the Seventh U. S. Army, joined the Headquarters.

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Headquarters Special Troops, Headquarters Company, and Medical Detachment, Special Troops, Third U. S. Army (less the advance party), after having relieved of command responsibilities by Headquarters Fourth U. S. Army, entrained at FORT SAM HOUSTON, Texas on 17 February and arrived at CAMP KILMER, New York, 19 February. On 10 March the Headquarters boarded the [illegible] at a Manhattan pier and sailed without escort the following day. The vessel anchored in the FIRTH OF CLYDE opposite the port of GREENOCK, Scotland on 1 March. The [illegible] debarked 20 March, entrained immediately, and reached the FROGHALL area on 20 and 21 March.

ORGANIZATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS FOR COMBAT

When the Headquarters arrived in the United Kingdom, it was at the exact strength prescribed in Tables of Organization [illegible], and 20-1. Additional attachments were made by higher Headquarters commencing the early part of April and continuing for many weeks. This, and the nature of the forthcoming operations, necessitated the enlargement of Headquarters Special Troops, Headquarters Company and many of the General and Special Staff Sections.

The dual function of the Headquarters Commandant and Provost Marshal set forth in T/O 200-1 was eliminated by appointing an Army Provost Marshal in the grade of colonel and creating for him a special staff section.

- The G-5 Section was constituted (Civil Affairs).
- The G-6 Section was constituted (Publicity and Psychological Warfare).

An Army Exchange Officer was appointed to operate under the Special Service Section.

An American Red Cross Field Director joined the Headquarters to operate in conjunction with the Special Service Section.

Within the G-3 Section, the Accomodations Sub-section was constituted. Its mission was to receive and billet in Army Army troops, working in conjunction with the British authorities and with the Western Base Section, United States Army. It became the G-3 Liaison Sub-section when its former mission ceased upon arrival on the Continent.

Within the G-4 Section, the Transportation Sub-section was constituted. Its mission was to coordinate and control transportation and motor routings within the Army area.

By 1 July the following teams and units, by attachment, had become an integral part of the Headquarters:

G-2 Attachments:

G-2 Air Sub-section
Special Liaison Unit
Counter Intelligence Detachments
Military Intelligence Interrogation Teams
Photo Interpreter Detachments
Order of Battle Unit
Interrogators of Prisoners of War Teams
Escape and Evasion Unit
SIS (Secret Intelligence) Team
SCI (Secret Counter Intelligence) Team
Field Interrogation Detachment
Enemy Documents Section
Advance Documents Section

G-3 Attachments:

G-3 Air Sub-section
G-3 Air Liaison Sub-section
Third Army Historical Team
Special Operations Detachment and Signal Section (redesignated HQ, U. S. Strategic Air Force, Signal Section)
- 11th Liaison Squadron (Army Air Forces)

G-6 Attachments:

- 3rd Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (Note: Transferred to Headquarters 12th Army Group 6 August 1944)
- Detachment, 82nd Publicity Service Battalion (This unit established with the Press Camp and provided complete housing, messing and transportation facilities for a group of approximately fifty war correspondents)

Adjutant General Attachments:

- 44th Machine Records Unit
  572nd Army Postal Unit

Engineer Attachments:

  106lst Engineer Liaison Detachment
  Detachment, 496th Engineer Topographical Battalion
  496th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team

Finance Attachments:

  71st Finance Disbursing Section (Note: Relieved by 11th Finance Disbursing Section 7 August 1944)

Provost Marshal Attachments:

  Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 511th Military Police Battalion (Note: 14th Military Police Criminal Investigating Section attached 17 August 1944)

Signal Attachments:

- IX Detachment, 21st Weather Squadron, and IX Detachment, 1295th Mobile Communications Squadron
- 166th Signal Photo Company
  (Note: Enemy Equipment Identification Service Team No. 8 attached during late July)

Medical Detachment, Special Troops Attachments:

  Medical Detachment, 511th Military Police Battalion

ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL TROOPS FOR COMBAT UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

Table of Organization 100-2 (Headquarters Company, Army) proved to be inadequate for service in the field. The need for utility engineers, carpenters, masons, plumbers, sign painters and electricians was met by attaching to Headquarters Company, Third U. S. Army, the 1294th Engineer Utility Detachment. The number of generators assigned was insufficient for CP-tour operations in the field, and a considerable number of additional generators was obtained.

To insure mobility to the Headquarters, two Quartermaster Truck Companies (175th and 176th) were attached to Headquarters Special Troops, as was the 526th Quartermaster Car Company. In addition, Headquarters Company was provided with three additional 3/4-ton CARGO and Reconnaissance Trucks and fifty additional 1/4-ton 4 x 4 Trucks. Fifteen of the latter were needed for the G-3 Air Liaison Sub-section alone. Three 1/4-ton 6 x 6 Cargo Type Trucks were secured and fitted out as quarters for the General Officers, and an M-20 Armored Car was obtained for the use of the Army Commander. It was found advisable to provide trailers, either 1/4-ton or 1-ton, for practically all vehicles.

To service this motor transportation, the 545/7th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company was attached to Headquarters Special Troops.

The 6th Cavalry Band (later redesignated 61st Army Ground Forces Band) was attached to Headquarters Special Troops to serve as the Headquarters Band.

ARMY AIR FORCE

Headquarters, XIX Tactical Air Command was designated by higher Headquarters to support the Army. Subsequently in combat it physically joined the Forward Echelon at some of its Command Posts, but did not displace forward with each move made.

OTHER TROOPS

The following Troops habitually served the Headquarters:

- 501st Signal Operations Battalion
- 33rd Signal Construction Battalion
- 34th Signal Construction Battalion
- 503rd Military Police Battalion

(Note: After arrival on the continent, the following Troops were added to the above):

- 56th Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion (Mobile)
- 293rd Engineer Combat Battalion (less two companies)
- Headquarters, 6th Cavalry Group (with varying detachments from 6th Cavalry Squadron and 43rd Cavalry Squadron to provide security in the field)

- Unit had its own Mess.

DISPOSITION OF THE HEADQUARTERS

Early in April a Third U. S. Army Liaison Office was established in Bryanston Square, LONDON. It consisted of the Deputy Chief of Staff and a group of approximately eleven officers and eight enlisted men. Its mission was to maintain contact with Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army, and Headquarters First Army Group. The Liaison Office rejoined the Headquarters in the SOUTHAMPTON area.

On 1 May the Headquarters Commandant was directed to plan for the establishment of the Headquarters in three echelons as follows:

a. An advance command group, consisting of representatives of those sections of the general and special staff which would be indispensable in combat operations, together with the necessary troops to provide for their security and housekeeping. This group, known as "Forward Echelon, Group A," would be entirely mobile, and be capable of proceeding ahead of the regular forward echelon to conduct operations.

b. "Forward Echelon, Group B," that portion of the forward echelon remaining after the departure of "Forward Echelon, Group A."

c. The Rear Echelon.

It was planned to move the Headquarters to the continent over the beaches, in the event no major port was available. Therefore loading lists for all three echelons were published on 23 and 31 May to facilitate loading the Headquarters on landing craft.

On 22 May the BUCO (Build Up Control Organization) Section of the Headquarters, consisting of four officers, four enlisted men and two vehicles, departed for [illegible], where it operated under BUCO West, supervising the priorities and loading of Third U. S. Army units moving to the Continent. (Note: This section rejoined the Headquarters in early August in the SOUTHAMPTON (T-23) area).

Shortly after D Day, two liaison groups left to take station as follows:

a. With Headquarters VIII Corps: Representatives from G-2, G-3, Provost Marshal, Quartermaster and Signal Sections -- eight officers, nine enlisted men and five vehicles.

b. With Headquarters Advance Section, Communications Zone: Representatives from G-1, G-4, G-5, G-6, Engineer, Medical and Quartermaster Sections -- eight officers, four enlisted men and three vehicles.

The Forward Echelon was phased in to be lifted to the continent on D plus 2½ days; the Rear Echelon, on about D plus 14 days. On 10 June (D plus 14 days) it became apparent that there was a possibility the Forward Echelon might become operational while the Rear Echelon was still in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, on D plus 20 the great bulk of the troops assigned to the Army would still be stationed in the United Kingdom -- indeed, many were still to arrive from the United States. Their equipping and preparation for combat was a task of considerable magnitude. Accordingly, the following decisions were made:

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a. The Commanding General, XII Corps, was designated as Deputy Army Commander, to assume command of Third U. S. Army troops in the United Kingdom upon the departure of the Army Commander for the continent.

b. The normal Forward Echelon of the Headquarters to be provided with operational groups from the following sections normally in the Rear Echelon: G-3, Adjutant General, Chaplain, Finance, Inspector General, Judge Advocate, Medical, Ordnance and Quartermaster.

This new grouping of the staff was known as Forward Echelon, Group "X".

c. The Rear Echelon of the Headquarters to be provided with operational groups from the following sections normally in the Forward Echelon: G-1, attached G-2 teams, G-4, Artillery, and attached Engineer teams. This grouping was known as Rear Echelon, Group "Y".

d. To reinforce the staff of the XII Corps so it could perform the Army mission given it, in addition to its own responsibilities, another group of personnel, designated as Group "Z", was formed consisting of twenty-four officers and twenty-nine enlisted men, with three vehicles and a number of impressed British civilian sedans. Sections represented were: G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5, G-6, Adjutant General, Artillery, Chemical Warfare Service, Engineer, Inspector General, Medical, Ordnance, Quartermaster and Signal Sections. It was planned to have Group "Z" rejoin the Headquarters when the XII Corps arrived on the continent. Actually, while most of them did so, a few of the officers and men remained in the United Kingdom dealing with problems of personnel and supply long after the XII Corps had been committed to action.

Loading Lists for Groups "X" and "Y" were published on 19 and 20 June, 1944.

On 5 July the Headquarters was organized for combat operations, and was disposed as follows:

Forward Echelon, Group "X" in the SOUTHAMPTON area.
Rear Echelon, Group "Y" and Group "Z" in the KNUTSFORD (MACCLESFIELD) area.
The HUCO Section at PORTSMOUTH.
Liaison group with Headquarters, Advance Section, Communications Zone, on the continent.
Liaison group with Headquarters, VIII Corps, on the continent.

CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

On 25 March all officers and enlisted men of the Headquarters were massed on the grounds of PEOVER HALL, the Army Commander's residence, and addressed by him. The Headquarters became operational a few days later, and was established as follows: At PEOVER HALL and PEOVER CAMP, the Army Commander, the Command Group, and the Forward Echelon; at TOFT CAMP, the Rear Echelon.

Both PEOVER and TOFT camps were British camps containing semi-permanent and temporary buildings. Officers of field grade were billeted in KNUTSFORD and vicinity. Even with the erection of a great many additional buildings for staff section offices, officers quarters, messes, latrines and bath houses, it was necessary to quarter the majority of the enlisted men under canvas. Some units were billeted in KNUTSFORD; the G-5 Section was housed at THE HERMITAGE, a large manor house several miles distant; the truck companies and Utilities Detachment camped on the heath in KNUTSFORD.

Messes for the Headquarters proper were established as follows: At PEOVER HALL and PEOVER CAMP, the Army Commander's Mess, a colonels' mess, an officers' mess and an enlisted mess. At TOFT CAMP, an officers' mess and an enlisted mess.

The War Room and Top Secret Control Office were established in PEOVER HALL. As a security measure, the office buildings of the Forward Echelon were surrounded by a high barbed wire fence and guarded day and night. Special passes were required to secure admittance to these areas.

This was a period of intense activity. Organization of the Army, planning its part in the coming invasion, receiving advance parties of all Army troops arriving in the United Kingdom, visits of distinguished visitors, schools for officers, conferences, and visits to higher headquarters consumed much time. A few ceremonies were held for the purpose of awarding decorations, and, on Flag Day, 14 June, for the blessing of the Army Colors by the Chaplain.

With the advent of D Day on 6 June, all activities were intensified. On 19 May the Headquarters Commandant had been directed to reconnoiter south of the line LONDON-BRISTOL for suitable accommodations for the Headquarters in order to be nearer the designated embarkation area and to the bulk of the troops assigned to the Army. Several trips were made and the area within a 10-mile radius of BRAMSHOTT HALL (VU 53), Hampshire (west of SOUTHAMPTON) was finally selected.



PEOVER HALL

On 14 and 15 June advance detachments proceeded to BRAMSHOTT HALL to prepare for the reception of Forward Echelon, Group "X". On 21 June the Chief of Staff directed Group "X" to move by motor to the new area and designated the Army Provost Marshal as the Commander of the columns. The march was made on 29 June; distance traveled was 218 miles.

On 2 July, Forward Echelon "X" was ordered to be prepared to embark at SOUTHAMPTON on 5 July; destination, UTAH BEACH, NORMANDY, France. All vehicles were to be prepared to land in four feet of water, and the waterproofing of the vehicles was rushed day and night.

On 031200 July, loading lists and Ship Sheets were received indicating that two military transports (Liberty Ships) and six LST's were to be used to transport the Headquarters. The Chief of Staff arranged with the Commanding General, Southern Base Section, to have the 301st Signal Operations Battalion and one company of the Military Police Battalion with the Headquarters on LST's.

On 4 July Forward Echelon, Group "X", the 301st Signal Operations Battalion, the 33rd Signal Construction Battalion and the 503rd Military Police Battalion closed messes at 1300, entrucked starting 1800, and moved to SOUTHAMPTON, a distance of twenty miles, during 4 and 5 July. Embarkation was accomplished during the 5 and 6 July.

Meanwhile, the advance detachment of Rear Echelon, Group "Y" arrived at BRAMSHOTT HALL 041500 July. On 7 July Rear Echelon "Y" moved by motor to NINE YEWS (BRAMSHOTT area). PEOVER and TOFT CAMPS were turned over to Western Base Section by 9 July. Group "Y" began to move to SOUTHAMPTON on 14 July. By this time, the waterproofing of vehicles had been discontinued. The Group was loaded on three military transports and one LST.

Group "Z" moved to the BRAMSHOTT area with Group "Y" and joined Headquarters, XII Corps, which moved into BRAMSHOTT HALL as soon as Forward Echelon "Y" cleared the area on 4 July.

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

During the period 5-7 July, Forward Echelon, Group "X" sailed from SOUTHAMPTON for UTAH BEACH, covering a distance of approximately 150 miles in convoy; average time for transit was fourteen hours. The military transports were anchored offshore and their loads transferred to small landing craft and amphibious trucks for unloading on the beach. The LST's were beached at high tide; left dry when the tide ebbed, debarkation was carried out and all vehicles moved inland about eight miles to a transient area, where vehicles were initially de-waterproofed (after coming ashore on dry land) and each convoy proceeded a distance of twenty-eight miles to the Headquarters Bivouac Area near NEHOU (G 19) fifteen miles south of CHERBOURG and eight miles from the front lines of the VIII Corps. The Commanding General and Chief of Staff flew to France and joined the Headquarters, which was set up entirely under canvas in the orchards and fields of Normandy, lined by the now famous hedgerows. Two officers' messes and two enlisted messes, in addition to the Army Commander's mess, were established, and the first hot meal was served the evening of 7 July. Overnight visitors were accommodated in pyramidal tents supplied with cots and blankets.

Canvas immediately became a critical item of supply; tables of Basic Allowances proved to be entirely inadequate, and the Headquarters Supply Officer exerted every effort during the next six weeks to procure a sufficient stock of heavy tentage. Passenger vehicles, notably 1/4 ton 4 x 4 Trucks were also insufficient in number and more were procured.

The Army was not yet operational, but on 10 July it established two control points, one on UTAH BEACH and the other on OMAHA BEACH to receive and direct to assembly areas all arriving troops assigned to Third U. S. Army. This proved to be a task of considerable magnitude during the remainder of the month.

By 19 July, Rear Echelon "Y" closed with the Forward Echelon "X" in the NEHOU area.

During the remainder of July, the Headquarters continued receiving and organizing Army troops and preparing for the forthcoming operations.

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

Headquarters Third U. S. Army became operational for combat for the first time at noon on 1 August 1944, under the Twelfth U. S. Army Group.

The subsequent displacements forward of the Forward and Rear Echelons are covered below. In general, the Forward Echelon moved forward by bounds of from thirty to seventy miles; the Rear Echelon moved less frequently, locating in the vicinity of the Forward Echelon about every second move the latter made. The rapidity of the Army's advance necessitated frequent and long displacements.

At 0030 on 7 August the Headquarters, then in the BEAUCHAMPS area, was bombed and strafed. One stick of bombs fell into a Headquarters Company area but caused neither casualties nor damage.



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CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

Continued bad weather impelled many units of the Army to seek shelter in towns. To meet this situation the Accommodations Sub-section of the G-3 Section was reactivated to control the assignment of all covered accommodations.

Meanwhile, preparations for the move to NANCY were being rushed. In this connection, the report of Headquarters, 1137th Engineer Combat Group, indicating the magnitude of the task of rehabilitating the three casernes selected as the site of the Command Post, is quoted herewith as a matter of interest:

"1. Work accomplished by this headquarters in clean-up and repairs to buildings for occupancy by Third Army consisted of principal tasks summarized as follows:

a. Electrical Repairs: Wiring, new fixtures, switches, fuse-ox, boxes, etc., were replaced or repaired and tie-in with city current completed. Work consisted of installing 6,000 feet of various types of wire; 1,250 fuses; 2,000 sockets; 1,500 light bulbs; 2,500 switches; etc.

b. Roof Repair: This work accomplished by civilian and military personnel. Materials were on the site.

c. Plumbing: Repairs to plumbing in place and installation of two toilet rooms complete; 14 toilet seats; 38 faucets; 1,0[illegible] feet of galvanized pipe; and miscellaneous items, as [illegible], etc., was completed by military personnel assisted by two civilian French plumbers.

d. Blackout curtains: Approximately 750 windows provided with blackout shades, requiring acquisition of materials, framing of several sizes, covering and hanging by troop labor.

e. Window Panes: 31[illegible] thousand window panes requiring acquisition of materials, clean-up old frames, glass-cutting and installation completed almost entirely by troops.

f. Building clean-up: Before plumbers, carpenters, or electricians could start work all buildings, thoroughly scattered by Germans upon evacuation, were cleared of debris and furniture, toilets, latrines and plumbing fixtures cleared of obstructions; and damaged furnishings and rubble removed from premises.

g. Clearing grounds: Wrecked German vehicles, radar equipment, bedding, [illegible] removed by troop labor, bulldozers and wreckers.

h. Map removal: Approximately 450 tons or 120 truck loads of German maps removed from premises.

2. Manpower of personnel required executed to approximately [illegible] civilian plumbers, [illegible] civilian electrician; [illegible] civilian carpenter, and [illegible] interior decorator and painters."

On 4 October the Rear Echelon moved from [illegible] to NANCY ([illegible]), a distance of seventy miles, occupying office and barracks space in CASERNE [illegible]. The [illegible] of the Forward Echelon moved from [illegible] to CASERNE [illegible] on 5 October, followed by the [illegible] troops, as well as by the Forward Echelon of the XIX Tactical Air Command, on the following day.

It is interesting to note that on 10 October, the Forward Echelon had been operational for seventy-three days. It had traveled from the [illegible] FRANCE, [illegible] to NANCY, forty miles from the German frontier, covering a distance of [illegible] miles, and had occupied thirteen different sites. The Rear Echelon had occupied eight different sites in the same length of time over the same distance.

The many problems incident to locating the Headquarters in a city, instead of in the field, can best be appreciated when it is realized that the Headquarters Commandant, on the last day of October, had taken over under leases from the respective owners and was operating the following establishments:

Three large casernes.
Five hotels quartering 321 officers, and providing accommodations for sixty overnight visitors.
Five apartment houses quartering 122 officers.
Twelve other billets quartering thirty officers.
A tailoring and dry-cleaning establishment for all personnel.
Seven garages.
Fourteen other buildings.

The following messes were in operation:

The Army Commander's Mess.
Grand Hotel Mess for seventy-six officers of all grades.
Hotel Thiers Mess for 155 officers of field grade.
Cafe de Deux Hemispheres Mess for 276 officers of company grade.
An enlisted mess for 1,450 men.

In addition, a bus line was chartered and operated to provide transportation for officers between the Headquarters, their messes and their billets.

Finally, approximately 300 French civilians were employed as chefs, waiters, and interpreters on the staffs of the hotels, and as janitors and charwomen for the apartment houses.



Forward [illegible] in city of [illegible]

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

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On 31 October, the Chief of Staff directed the Headquarters Commandant to reconnoiter the front for possible locations for the Forward Echelon, as the Third's attack which started on 8 November was making steady progress northeastward. Among the sites reconnoitered during the balance of November were CHARLEVILLE (Q 12), MONTHOIS (Q 93), FAULQUEMONT (Q 15), and ST AVOLD (Q 25), all of which lie from fifteen to thirty-five miles northeast of NANCY.

On 26 November announcement was made of a revised division of Staff Sections into Forward and Rear Echelons. Relative strength (exclusive of Headquarters Commandant's Section, Headquarters Special Troops, Headquarters Company, the Aid Stations and all attached troops) was as follows:

	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	VEHICLES
Forward Echelon	235	506	325
Rear Echelon	190	500	248
Other Areas	110	211	202

On 6 November the Chief of Staff directed the Headquarters Commandant to be prepared to move and quarter a Mobile Command Group consisting of thirty-five officers, 187 enlisted men and fifty-four vehicles from these sections:

Command Section
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Artillery
Engineer
Signal

together with small detachments of signal troops, military police, Civil Affairs Engineers, the Aid Stations, and Headquarters [illegible]. One mess was to feed all personnel.

CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

Early in December the Chief of Staff directed the Headquarters Commandant to prepare [illegible] for occupancy by the Forward Echelon.

On 11 December, the advance party of the Headquarters Commandant's Section, with a [illegible] signal, engineer and service troops proceeded to erect and [illegible] repairs on all installations. However, following the German attack in the ARDENNES [illegible] December, the Chief of Staff directed, on 16 December, that this move cease and all troops return to NANCY. [illegible] the Chief of Staff Group (see Chapter 6) proceeded to the [illegible] on 17 December. During the next week many officers and men of the Forward Echelon proceeded to [illegible], and on 24 December the remainder of this echelon closed. Distance traveled was ninety miles.

The Headquarters was comfortably located in one large modern building having all staff sections.

Messes were established as follows:

The Army Commander's Mess.
Two Officers' Messes (225 members).
One Enlisted Mess (750 members).

Remnants of the shift north, reconnaissances for a location for the Rear Echelon were made, starting 21 December, in the towns of METZ (U 96), THIONVILLE (U 96), LUXEMBOURG (P 50), and EPCH sur ALZETTE (P 70). The latter place was selected by the Chief of Staff on 29 December, and the advance party proceeded thereto immediately. The actual move of the Rear Echelon [illegible] 9 January, 1945.

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CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

[illegible]

The Mess Attendant was [illegible] duties.

[illegible]

CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

[illegible]

The Army Commander's Mess.

Four Officers' messes, each in a separate hotel.

Two Enlisted Messes.

[illegible]

By 15 February the Purchasing and Contracting Officer [illegible] the hunt for [illegible] and requisitioned furniture in [illegible] our Airbase.

At the end of the month, there were [illegible] the headquarters [illegible] personnel, principally [illegible] Mess Officer, Messing Stewards, and [illegible].

CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

[illegible]



[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

On 1 April the Rear Echelon working party left for FRANKFURT am MAIN (M66). On 3 April, the Forward Echelon moved to FRANKFURT am MAIN (M66), a distance of eighty-five miles, and located with all installations inside of the ADMINISTRATION 6ird KASERNE and the BLAUBACH KASERNE. Officers were quartered in barracks buildings.

The next day the Headquarters Commandant reconnoitered ALSFELD (M84) and, on 5 April, LAUTERBACH (M74), BAD SALZSCHLIRF (M82) (which was entirely occupied by wounded soldiers of the German Wehrmacht) and HERSFELD (M35). The latter place was designated and the Forward Echelon working party, reinforced by one Engineer Combat Battalion and 600 prisoners of war moved out on 6 April.

On the same day the Rear Echelon closed in the FRIEDBERGER WARTE KASERNE in FRANKFURT am MAIN, traveling a distance of 135 miles. Just north of this area was located the Forward Echelon of the XIX Tactical Air Command.

The Forward Echelon moved to HERSFELD (M35), a distance of eighty-five miles, on 11 April, occupying the KRAFTFAHRER KASERNE east of the city. Officers were quartered in the apartments and dwellings formerly occupied by German officers and non-commissioned officers. The Forward Echelon of XIX Tactical Air Command moved into buildings inside the city itself.

On 12 April the cities of OHRDRUF (J15) and GOTHA (J06) were reconnoitered and, the following day, WEIMAR (J57). The Chief of Staff designated the latter place and on 14 April the working party, with a battalion plus a company of combat engineers and 600 prisoners of war left for the site and commenced work. On the same day the rear echelon selected an adjoining kaserne area in WEIMAR (J57).

However, because of a major change of direction in its zone of advance which was given to Third Army, all work at WEIMAR (J57) was cancelled the afternoon of the 16th, and the working party returned to HERSFELD (M35).

The Chief of Staff directed the Headquarters Commandant to reconnoiter the area WURTZBURG (N53) - NURNBERG (Q40) - BAMBERG (Q24), which was done by air on 18 April. ERLANGEN (O35) was designated and on 19 April the working party, with a battalion plus two companies of combat engineers and XX prisoners of war proceeded thereto. Two days later the working party of the Rear Echelon arrived in the same city to prepare the RHEINLAND and ST. MIHIEL kasernes for occupancy.

The Forward Echelon moved to the new location on 22 April, occupying the VILLERS BRETONNEAUX KASERNE, a former German Panzer establishment, plus various private residences and the former quarters of German officers and non-commissioned officers. This move was the longest one the Forward Echelon ever made under combat conditions - 150 miles.

The Rear Echelon started to displace to ERLANGEN (O35) on 21 April, closing thereat two days later.

The Forward Echelon of the XIX Tactical Air Command also moved to ERLANGEN (O35), occupying office and factory buildings in the city itself.

On 28 April the Headquarters Commandant reconnoitered REGENSBURG (U15) by air, and the next day inspected several kaserne areas. The city and kaserne had been badly damaged by heavy air strikes and a very large amount of rehabilitation was necessary in any area selected. The Chief of Staff ordered the working party to proceed to REGENSBURG (U15) on 30 April. It was reinforced by a battalion plus a company of combat engineers and 800 prisoners of war.

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

What was destined to be the last displacement of the Forward Echelon in combat in Europe commenced on 2 May, from ERLANGEN (O35) to REGENSBURG (U15), a distance of 87 miles, and was concluded on the next day. In this move the Headquarters crossed to the south bank of the Danube River.

The Army Headquarters proper, at the end of the war, was disposed as follows:

At REGENSBURG, GERMANY (U15)

a. Forward Echelon of Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Headquarters Company, Headquarters Special Troops, Medical Detachment Special Troops, and 1092nd Engineer Utilities Detachment.

b. 502d Quartermaster Car Company (less 1½ platoons).

c. 1st Platoon, 3467th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company.

d. Attachments of various sections.

At ERLANGEN, GERMANY (O35)

a. Rear Echelon of Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Headquarters Company, Headquarters Special Troops, Medical Detachment Special Troops, and 1092d Engineer Utilities Detachment.

b. 1½ Platoons, 502d Quartermaster Car Company.

c. 3467th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company, less 1st Platoon.

d. 61st Army Ground Forces Band.

e. 572d Army Postal Unit.

f. 99th Machine Records Unit.

g. Attachments of various sections.

CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

1. The Headquarters must be able to displace and set-up ready for operation on very short notice - as little as a day - in any season of the year, regardless of weather or existing facilities.

2. The primary minimum needs of the Headquarters from this Staff Section are food, shelter and light.

3. Personnel and equipment must be organized to enable the Forward and Rear Echelons to function either separately, or together, and so that either or both Echelons can be temporarily split for short periods.

4. Next to mess personnel, the utilities personnel (electricians, plumbers, carpenters, masons, mechanics, sign painters) is one of the most important groups for which to provide.

5. Canvas must be kept on hand ready for instant use where covered accommodations are not available.

6. A control of both the officers and enlisted messes, designed to exclude the large number of unauthorized personnel "stopping-in", is imperative. The solution at this headquarters in October 1944, was the issue of mess cards to all personnel, and the issue of guest cards by the interested sections to all authorized visitors.

7. The personnel assigned was adequate to perform its missions. On 8 May it consisted of the following:

	Off	WO	EM
Hq Sp Trs	7	1	22
Hq Co (less Postal Section)	10	2	368
1092d Engr Utilities Det	2	0	38

8. The following materials should be carried on hand in ample stocks:

a. Electric Supplies: Lamps, wire, fuses, plugs, switches, etc.

b. Pipe, tees, els, and other fittings.

c. Blackout materials.

d. Hardware - nails, screws, bolts, angles, etc.

e. Lumber - All types of medium and light thicknesses.

f. Paint - all colors for signs, touch-up, etc.

9. This section must be augmented for any special tasks, such as preparing new covered accommodations in minimum time. Engineer troops and prisoners of war proved the best solution to this problem.

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
CHERBOURG
FWD 5-31 JUL
RR 17 JUL-2 AUG
NEHOU
XXXX
THIRD
FWD 1 AUG
LANDED UTAH BEACH
DIEPPE
LE HAVRE
ST LO
CAEN
ROUEN
FWD 2-7 AUG
RR 3-10 AUG
AVARANCHES
FALAISE
ST JAMES
FWD 8-11 AUG
RR 11-17 AUG
RENNES
FWD 12-14 AUG
LAVAL
FWD 15-19 AUG
RR 18-26 AUG
LE MANS
FWD 20-24 AUG
BROU
PARIS
VERSAILLES
PITHIVIERS
FWD 25-29 AUG
RR 27 AUG-5 SEPT
SENS
FWD 30 AUG-3 SEPT
TROYES
REIMS
CHALONS
FWD 4-14 SEPT
RR 6-17 SEPT
VERDUN
MONS
NAMUR
CAMBRAI
BELGI
SEINE R.
MARNE R.
MEUSE R.
ORNAIN R.
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

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ANNEXÉS

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ANNEXES

ANNEX NO. 1

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

19 June 1944

LOADING LIST

(Supersedes Loading List, Groups "A" and "F", dated 25 May 1944, as revised).

1 Item Number	2 List Index Number	3 Section	4 Personnel	5 Vehicles	6 Number & Type of Vehicle	7 Source of Vehicle
		Forward Echelon, Headquarters Third United States Army Group "A"				
1.	2060 B5 a.	Commanding General	13	8	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 1 Trk, 2½ ton 2 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, 2½ ton, van K-60 1 Car, armored Util, M-20	Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co
2.	2060 B5 b.	Chief of Staff	7	5	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 1 Trk, 2½ ton, van K-60 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co
3.	2060 B5 c.	Deputy Chief of Staff	5	5	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 1 Trk, 2½ ton, van K-60 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co
4.	2060 B5 d.	Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations)	2	1	1 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R	502 QM Car Co
5.	2060 B5 e.	Secy, General Staff and Top Secret Control Sec	19	7	2 Trk, ¼ ton 2 Trlr, ¼ ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co Hq Co Hq Co
6.	2060 B5 f.	A C of S, G-1	22	8	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton 2 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 2 Trk, 2½ ton 2 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co Hq Co 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
7.	2060 B5 g.	A C of S, G-2	46	24	7 Trk, ¼ ton 7 Trlr, ¼ ton 5 Trk, 2½ ton 5 Trlr, 1 ton	5-502 QM Car Co; 2-Hq Co 5-502 QM Car Co; 2-Hq Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
8.	2060 B5 h.	G-2 Air Sub-sec	3	2	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton	Organic Organic
9.	2060 B5 i.	Special Liaison Unit	14	4	3 Trk, 1½ ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, amb	Organic Organic
10.	2060 B5 j.	Counter Intelligence Det	52	30	16 Trk, ¼ ton 14 Trlr, ¼ ton	Organic Organic
11.	2060 B5 k.	Military Intelligence Interpreters	6	3	2 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton	Organic Organic
12.	2060 B5 l.	Photo Interpreters	3	2	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton	Organic Organic
13.	2060 B5 m.	Order of Battle Unit	3	2	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton	Organic Organic
14.	2060 B5 n.	Interrogators Prisoners of War	12	6	4 Trk, ¼ ton 2 Trlr, ¼ ton	Organic Organic
15.	2060 B5 o.	Escape and Evasion Unit	6	3	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R	Organic Organic Organic
16.	2060 B5 p.	OSS (Secret Intelligence)	8	6	2 Trk, ¼ ton 2 Trlr, ¼ ton 1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic Organic Organic Organic
17.	2060 B5 q.	OSS (Special Counter-Intelligence)	5	3	2 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton	Organic Organic

Hq, TUSA, Loading List 19 June 1944 (cont'd)

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1 Item Number	2 List Index Number	3 Section	4 Personnel	5 Vehicles	6 Number & Type of Vehicle	7 Source of Vehicle
		Forward Echelon, Hq, TUSA Group "A" (cont'd)				
18.	2060 B5 r.	Field Interrogation Det	4	4	2 Trk, ¼ ton 2 Trlr, ¼ ton	Organic Organic
19.	2060 B5 s.	Enemy Document Sec	5	3	2 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton	Organic Organic
20.	2060 B5 t.	A C of S G-3	97	25	6 Trk, ¼ ton 6 Trlr, ¼ ton 3 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 5 Trk, 2½ ton 5 Trlr, 1 ton	3-502 QM Car Co; 3-Hq Co 3-502 QM Car Co; 3-Hq Co 3-502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
21.	2060 B5 u.	Third Army Historical Team	2	1	1 Trk, ¼ ton	Hq Co
22.	2060 B5 v.	Special Opns Det & Signal Sec	62	24	10 Trk, ¼ ton 2 Trlr, ¼ ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 2 Trk, 2½ ton 4 Trlr, 1 ton 5 Trk, 1½ ton, FC (2 - Skeyle) (1 - Skeyl)	Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic Hq Co
23.	2060 B5 w.	A C of S, G-4	40	18	5 Trk, ¼ ton 5 Trlr, ¼ ton 2 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 3 Trk, 2½ ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton	3-502 QM Car Co; 2-Hq Co 3-502 QM Car Co; 2-Hq Co 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
24.	2060 B5 x.	A C of S, G-5	10	3	2 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trk, 1½ ton	Hq Co Hq Co
25.	2060 B5 y.	A C of S, G-6	15	----		
26.	2060 B5 z.	72 Publicity Service Bn	141	62	21 Trk, ¼ ton 21 Trlr, ¼ ton 2 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 10 Trk, 2½ ton 7 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, 2½ ton, wrecker	Organic Organic Organic 7-Organic; 3-3597 QM Trk Co 5-Organic; 2-3597 QM Trk Co Organic
27.	2060 B5 aa.	3rd Mbl Radio Broadcasting Co	24	6	3 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic Organic Organic Organic
28.	2060 B5 bb.	P & PW Det, TUSAG	35	----		
29.	2060 B5 cc.	Adjutant General	26	9	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 3 Trk, 2½ ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co Hq Co 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
30.	2060 B5 dd.	Anti-Aircraft	57	10	1 Trk, ¼ ton 2 Trlr, ¼ ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 3 Trk, 2½ ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co 1-502 QM Car Co; 1-Hq Co 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
31.	2060 B5 ee.	Artillery	92	19	4 Trk, ¼ ton 2 Trlr, ¼ ton 2 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 1 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 5 Trk, 2½ ton 5 Trlr, 1 ton	2-502 QM Car Co; 2-Hq Co 502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
32.	2060 B5 ff.	Chaplain	7	8	3 Trk, ¼ ton 3 Trlr, ¼ ton 1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co Hq Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
33.	2060 B5 gg.	Chemical Warfare Service	10	1	1 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 2 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co

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1 Item Number	2 List Index Number	3 Section	4 Personnel	5 Vehicles	6 Number & Type of Vehicle	7 Source of Vehicle
			Forward Echelon, Hq, TUSA Group "X" (cont'd)			
34.	P060 95 hh.	Engineer	64	18	3 Trk, ¼ ton 2 Trlr, ¼ ton 2 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 1 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 5 Trk, 2½ ton 5 Trlr, 1 ton	2-502 QM Car Co; 1-Hq Co 1-502 QM Car Co; 1-Hq Co 502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
35.	P060 95 ii.	1681 Engr Survey Liaison Det	15	6	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 2 Trk, 2½ ton 2 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
36.	P060 95 jj	Det, 692 Engr Topo Bn	12	6	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, 4 ton 1 Trk, 5-6 ton, tractor 1 Trk, 10 ton, semi-trlr	Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic
37.	P060 95 kk.	Finance	7	3	1 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
38.	P060 95 ll.	Inspector General	10	4	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
39.	P060 95 mm.	Judge Advocate	6	3	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
40.	P060 95 nn.	Medical	82	6	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton 2 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co Hq Co 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
41.	P060 95 oo.	Ordnance	54	16	4 Trk, ¼ ton 5 Trlr, ¼ ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 3 Trk 2½ ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton	1-502 QM Car Co; 3-Hq Co 3-502 QM Car Co; 2-Hq Co 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
42.	P060 95 pp.	Provost Marshal	6	---		
43.	P060 95 qq.	Hq/Hq Det 511 MP Bn	41	18	10 Trk, ¼ ton 3 Trlr, ¼ ton 3 Trk, 2½ ton 2 Trlr, 1 ton (5 - Wheyle)	Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic
44.	P060 95 rr.	CID Sqd	11	3	2 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trk, 2½ ton	Organic Organic
45.	P060 95 ss.	Quartermaster	37	10	2 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 1 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 3 Trk 2½ ton 4 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 3805 QM Trk Co 3805 QM Trk Co
46.	P060 95 tt.	Signal	72	21	3 Trk, ¼ ton 2 Trlr, ¼ ton 2 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 7 Trk, 2½ ton 7 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 3805 QM Trk Co 3805 QM Trk Co
47.	P060 95 uu.	14 Liaison Sqd	114	47	14 Trk, ¼ ton 9 Trlr, ¼ ton 5 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 7 Trk, 2½ ton 7 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, amb 2 Trk, Fuel, P-3 2 Trlr, Fuel, A-3	Organic Organic Organic 6-3805 QM Trk Co; 1-Organic 6-3805 QM Trk Co; 1-Organic Organic Organic Organic

1 Item Number	2 List Index Number	3 Section	4 Personnel	5 Vehicles	6 Number & Type of Vehicles	7 Source of Vehicle
			Forward Echelon, Hq, TUSA Group "X" (cont'd)			
48.	P060 95 vv.	"B" Det 21 Mine Sqd, "B" Det 40 Bbl Comm Sqd	27	9	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 3 Trlr, 1 ton 2 Trk, 1½ ton 1 Trk, 2½ ton, K-53	Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic
49.	P060 95 ww.	Fwd Esh, Hq Sp Trs Third Army	18	9	3 Trk, ¼ ton 3 Trlr, ¼ ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co 3805 QM Trk Co 3805 QM Trk Co
50.	P060 95 xx.	Fwd Esh, Hq Co Third Army	179	51	3 Trk, ¼ ton 2 Trlr, ¼ ton 4 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 20 Trk, 2½ ton 21 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk 2½ ton, wrecker	1-3805 QM Trk Co; 2-Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co 3805 QM Trk Co 20-3805 QM Trk Co; 1-Hq Co Hq Co
51.	P060 95 yy.	Fwd Esh, Med Det Sp Trs Third Army	6	3	1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, amb	3805 QM Trk Co 3805 QM Trk Co Hq Co
52.	P060 95 zz.	Med Det 511 MP Bn	8	2	1 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 1 Trk, ¾ ton, amb	Organic Organic
53.	P060 95 aaa.	1st Plat, 3457 Ord MAM Co	41	10	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 4 Trk, 2½ ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, 4 ton, wrecker	Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic
54.	P060 95 bbb.	572 Army Postal Unit	15	7	1 Trk, ¼ ton 3 Trk, 2½ ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic 3805 QM Trk Co 3805 QM Trk Co
55.	P060 95 ccc.	Fwd Esh, 1092 Engr Utility Det	52	12	1 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 4 Trk, 2½ ton 6 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, 2½ ton, dump	Organic 1-Organic; 3-3805 QM Trk Co 3-3805 QM Trk Co; 3-Hq Co Organic
56.	P060 95 ddd.	502 QM Car Co (-)	97	10	3 Trk, ¼ ton 3 Trlr, ¼ ton 2 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic
57.	P060 95 eee.	3597 QM Trk Co	97	15	4 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 5 Trk, 2½ ton 5 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic Organic Organic Organic
58.	P060 95 fff.	3805 QM Trk Co	60	14	3 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 6 Trk, 2½ ton 4 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic Organic Organic Organic
59.	P060 95 ggg.	Special Service	3	2	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co
60.	P060 95 hhh.	39 Wheisme Record Unit	2	---		
61.		TOTAL, Personnel	1729			
62.		TOTAL, Vehicles		619		

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FORWARD ECHELON "X", THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Recapitulation, Personnel and Vehicles

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Item No.	List Index No.	Unit Serial No.	Unit	O	WO	EM	Total Personnel	Trk ¼ T	Trlr ¼ T	Trk ¾ T C&S	Trk ¾ T WC	Trk 2½ T Cgo	Trlr 1 T	Trk 1½ T Cgo or PC	Trk ¾ T amb	Trk Misc	Total veh	Remarks
1.	2060 H1	48622	Fwd Echn, Hq/Hq Det Third Army	178	14	355	547											a. Trk, 2½ ton, 6 x 6, wrecker.
2.		48622	G-2 Air Sub-section	2		1	3	1	1								2	b. Reproduction Eqpt, semi, 4 ton, 6 x 6, standard trk chassis w/van body.
3.	2062 H7	48622	Special Liaison Unit	4		10	14							3	1		4	
4.	2062 H5	49616/7	Counter Intelligence Det	4		28	32	16	14								30	c. Reproduction Eqpt, semi-trlr, mounted, 10 ton, w/van type body
5.	2062 H3	48622	Mil Intel Interpreter Team No. 405	2		4	6	2	1								3	d. Trk, 5-6 ton, 4 x 4, tractor.
6.	2062 H11	48622	Photo Interpretar Det No. 37	1		2	3	1	1								2	
7.	2062 H2	48622	Order of Battle Unit No. 1	1		2	3	1	1								2	e. Trk, 2½ ton, 6 x 6, fuel servicing, 750 gal, P-3.
8.	2062 H1	48622	Interrogators of P & W Teams Nos 2&7	4		8	12	4	2								6	f. Trlr, fuel, 4-wheel, A-3.
9.	2060 H7	48622	Escape and Evasion Unit	4		2	6	1	1	1							3	g. Trk, van, 2½ ton, 6 x 6, K-53.
10.	2060 H9	48622	OSS (Secret Intelligence)	4		4	8	2	2			1	1				6	h. Trk, van, 2½ ton, 6 x 6, K-60.
11.	2060 H9	48622	OSS (SCI) Team No. 54 (-)	2		3	5	2	1								3	i. Car, armored, utility, M-20.
12.	2060 H5	48622	Field Interrogation Det	2		2	4	2	2								4	j. Trk, 4-ton, 6 x 6, wrecker.
13.	2060 H6	48622	Enemy Documents Section	1		4	5	2	1								3	k. Trk, 2½ ton, 6 x 6, dump.
14.		48622	Third Army Historical Team	1		1	2											
15.	2062 H9/10	48622	Special Opns Det & Signal Sec	15		47	62	10	2	1		2	4	5			24	2 - motorcycles
16.	2062 H8	47752	72 Publicity Service Hq	52*		85	137*	21	21		2	7	5			e 1	57	
17.		49583	3rd Mbl Radio Broadcasting Co	9		15	24	3			1	1	1				6	
18.	2060 H12		P & PW Det FUSAG	23		12	35											
19.	2070 H1	48730	1681 Engr Survey Liaison Det	5		8	13	1									1	
20.	2070 H2	47192-A	Det, 652 Engr Topo Hq	2		10	12	1				1	1			b 1 c 1 d 1	6	
21.	2076 H	47164/5	Hq/Hq Det, 511 MP Bn	6	1	34	41	10	30			3	2				18	5 - motorcycles
22.	2068 H	48622	Criminal Investigating Sqd	1		10	11	2				1					3	
23.	2063 H	52972	14 Liaison Sqd (Ground Echelon)	8		98	106	14	9		5	1	1		1	e 2 f 2	35	
24.	2062 H4 2062 H5	50159 50224	"ET" Det, 21 Weather Sqd "ET" Det, 40 Mbl Comm Sqd	3		24	27	1	1		1		3	2		g 1	9	
25.	2060 H4	48624	Fwd Echn, Hq Sp Trs Third Army	5	1	11	17									a 1		
26.	2060 H2	48623	Fwd Echn, Hq Co Third Army	2	1	168	171	33	25	4	4	2	9	1	1	h 3 i 1	84	1 - motorcycle
27.	2060 H4	48625	Fwd Echn, Mnd Det Sp Trs Third Army	1		4	5											
28.	2076 H	47169	Mnd Det, 511 Military Police Bn	1		7	8				1				1		2	
29.	2076 H5	47296	1st Plat, 3457 Ordnance HAM Co	1		40	41	1			1	4	3			j 1	10	
30.	2061 H	48677	Fwd Echn, 1092 Engr Utilities Det	1		28	29				1	1				k 1	3	
31.	2072 H	31573	572 Army Postal Unit	1		11	12	1									1	
32.		38900	39 Khakims Records Unit	1		1	2											
33.	2058 H	45886	502 QM Car Co (-)	3		91	94	25	26	26	5	1	1				84	
34.	2065 H	47901	3597 QM Trk Co	5		110	115	4			1	50	49				104	
35.	2057 H	46022	3805 QM Trk Co	5		110	115	4			1	50	49				104	
36.			TOTAL	360*	17	1350	1727*	165	114	32	23	125	129	11	4	16	619	* Includes 50 war correspondents

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ANNEX NO. 2

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

20 June 1945

LOADING LIST

(Supersedes Loading List, Rear Echelon, dated 31 May 1945.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Item Number	List Index Number	Section	Personnel	Vehicles	Number & Type of Vehicle	Source of Vehicle
		Rear Echelon, Headquarters Third United States Army Group "T"				
1.	2789 A a.	A C of S, G-1	8	4	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton 1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co
2.	2789 B b.	Advance Documents Sec	3	2	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton	Organic Organic
3.	2789 B c.	OSS (Secret Intelligence)	14	6	2 Trk, ¼ ton 2 Trlr, ¼ ton 1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic Organic Organic Organic
4.	2789 B d.	OSS (SCI) Team No. 54 (-)	5	2	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton	Organic Organic
5.	2789 B e.	MII Teams Nos. 403 & 486	12	6	4 Trk, ¼ ton 2 Trlr, ¼ ton	Organic Organic
6.	2789 B f.	Interrogators P of W Teams Nos. 62 &	12	6	4 Trk, ¼ ton 2 Trlr, ¼ ton	Organic Organic
7.	2789 B g.	Escape & Evasion Unit	5	2	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton	Organic Organic
8.	2789 B h.	Counter Intelligence Corps	32	24	16 Trk, ¼ ton 8 Trlr, ¼ ton	Organic Organic
9.	2789 A i.	A C of S, G-4	15	9	2 Trk, ¼ ton 2 Trlr, ¼ ton 2 Trk, 2½ ton 2 Trlr, 1 ton	*502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co
10.	2789 B j.	A C of S, G-5	67	15	8 Trk, ¼ ton 2 Trk ¾ ton, WC 2 Trk, 2½ ton 2 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, 1½ ton, PC	Hq Co Hq Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co Hq Co
11.	2789 B k.	3rd Mbl Rad Broadcasting Co	142	70	3 Trk, ¼ ton 4 Trlr, ¼ ton 10 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 4 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 24 Trk, 2½ ton 14 Trlr, 1 ton 3 Trk, 1½ ton, PC 4 Trk, ¾ ton, amb	Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic
12.	2789 B l.	P & PW Det, FUSAG	19	----		
13.	2789 B m.	Adjutant General	66	20	2 Trk, ¼ ton 2 Trlr, ¼ ton 8 Trk, 2½ ton 8 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co
14.	2789 B n.	Artillery	5	1	1 Trk, 2½ ton	44-5 QM Tr T Co
15.	2789 B o.	Chemical Warfare Service	13	4	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton 1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	532 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co
16.	2789 B p.	Engr Intelligence Team (Research)	9	4	2 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton 1 Trk, 2½ ton	Organic Organic Organic
17.	2789 B q.	Engr Intelligence Team (Combat)	4	3	2 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton	Organic Organic

Hq Comdt
IV

Hq TUSA, Loading List 20 June 1945 (cont'd)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Item Number	List Index Number	Section	Personnel	Vehicles	Number & Type of Vehicle	Source of Vehicle
		Rear Echelon, Hq, TUSA Group "T" (cont'd)				
18.	2789 B r.	Finance	23	8	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton 4 Trk, 2½ ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co
19.	2789 B s.	71 Finance Disbursing Sec	22	4	2 Trk, 2½ ton 2 Trlr, 1 ton	44-5 QM Tr T Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co
20.	2789 B t.	Inspector General	8	2	1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	44-5 QM Tr T Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co
21.	2789 B u.	Judge Advocate	7	3	1 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co
22.	2789 B v.	Medical	43	14	2 Trk, ¼ ton 2 Trlr, ¼ ton 2 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 4 Trk, 2½ ton 4 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co
23.	2789 B w.	Ordnance	22	11	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton 2 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 3 Trk, 2½ ton 4 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co
24.	2789 B x.	Provost Marshal	1	----		
25.	2789 B y.	Hq/Hq Det, 511 MP Bn	8	4	2 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic 44-5 QM Tr T Co 44-5 QM Tr T Co
26.	2789 B z.	Quartermaster	28	9	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 3 Trk, 2½ ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 3345 QM Trk Co 3345 QM Trk Co
27.	2789 B aa.	Signal	5	3	1 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 3345 QM Trk Co 3345 QM Trk Co
28.	2789 B bb.	Det, Ground Echelon, 14 Liaison Sq	7	6	3 Trk, 2½ ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton	3345 QM Trk Co 3345 QM Trk Co
29.	2789 B cc.	Special Service Office	8	4	1 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 1 Trk, 2½ ton 2 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 3345 QM Trk Co 3345 QM Trk Co
30.	2789 B dd.	American Red Cross	1	2	1 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trlr, ¼ ton	Organic Organic
31.	2789 B ee.	Rear Echelon, Hq Sp Trs, Third Army	8	3	1 Trk, ¾ ton, C & R 1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co 3345 QM Trk Co 3345 QM Trk Co
32.	2789 B ff.	Rear Echelon, Hq Co Third Army (Less Postal Sec)	138	45	2 Trk, ¼ ton 1 Trk, 1¼ ton, C & R 6 Trk, ¾ ton, WC 19 Trk, 2½ ton 18 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic Organic Organic 6-Orgs 12-3345 QM Trk Co 6-Orgs 12-3345 QM Trk Co
33.	2789 B gg.	Postal Sec, Hq Third Army	19	6	3 Trk, 2½ ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton	3345 QM Trk Co 3345 QM Trk Co
34.	2789 B hh.	Rear Echelon, 1092 Engr Utility Det	24	8	3 Trk, 2½ ton 4 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, 1½ ton, No. 525, Pumper 1 Grader, Road, WRad, CFD	3345 QM Trk Co 3345 QM Trk Co Organic Organic
35.	2789 B ii.	Rear Echelon, Med Det Sp Trs Third Army	11	3	1 Trk, 2½ ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, ¾ ton, amb	3345 QM Trk Co 3345 QM Trk Co Hq Co

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Item Number	List Index Number	Section	Personnel	Vehicles	Number & Type of Vehicle	Source of Vehicle
			Rear Echelon, Hq, TUSA Group "Y" (cont'd)			
36.	2789 B jj.	99 Machine Records Unit	67	20	1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & H	Organic
					1 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC	Organic
					3 Trk, 2½ ton	3345 QM Trk Co
					5 Trlr, 1 ton	3-Organic; 2-3345 QM Trk Co
					1 Semi-trlr, 10 ton, Van Mbl	Organic
					5 Trk, 4-5 ton, tractor	Organic
					4 Semi-trlr, 10 ton, 2 W Mbl	Organic
37.	2789 B kk.	3457 Ordnance M&M Co (Less 1st Plat)	79	26	1 Trk, ¼ ton	Organic
					1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & H	Organic
					10 Trk, 2½ ton	Organic
					11 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic
					1 Trk, 4 ton, wrecker	Organic
					2 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC	Organic
38.	2789 B ll.	61 AGF Band	29	3	2 Trk, 2½ ton	Organic
					1 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic
39.	2789 B mm.	3rd & 4th Plats, 502 QM Car Co (-)	28	6	2 Trk, ¼ ton	Organic
					2 Trlr, ¼ ton	Organic
					2 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC	Organic
40.	2789 B nn.	445 QM Tr T Co	81	44	4 Trk, ¼ ton	Organic
					1 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC	Organic
					20 Trk, 2½ ton	Organic
					19 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic
41.	2789 B oo.	3345 QM Trk Co	80	42	4 Trk, ¼ ton	Organic
					1 Trk, 3/4 ton WC	Organic
					19 Trk, 2½ ton	Organic
					18 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic
42.		TOTAL, Personnel	1178			
43.		TOTAL, Vehicles		453		

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WAR ECHELON, THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Recapitulation, Personnel and Vehicles

Hq, TUSA, Landing Plat 20 June 45e. (cont'd)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Item No.	Plat Index No.	Unit Serial No.	Unit	O	WO	EM	Total Personnel	Trk ½ T	Trlr ½ T	Trk ¾, 1 T Cab	Trk ¾ T WC	Trk 2½ T Cgo	Trlr 1 T	Trk 10 T Cgo & WC	Trk ¾, 1 T Amb	Misc	Total Veh	Remarks
1.	2747 B	1,9622	Rear Ech, Hq/Hq Det Third Army	69	8	193	270											a. Trk, 1½ ton, 4 x 4 @105, pumper.
2.		1,9622	Advance Documents Section	1		2	3	1	1								2	b. Grader, Road, mtzd, DPD, 12' mold board.
3.		1,9622	CIS (Secret Intelligence)	5		9	14	2	2			1	1				6	c. Trk, 4-5 ton, 4 x 4, tractor.
4.		1,9622	CIS (Fwd) Team No. 94 (-)	1		4	5	1	1								2	d. Semi-trlr, 10-ton, van, mbl.
5.	2748 B	1,9622	CIC Team Nos. 403 & 446	1		8	12	4	2								6	e. Semi-trlr, 10-ton, 2M mbl recond.
6.		1,9622	Interrogators P of W Teams Nos 462 & 4	1		9	12	4	2								6	f. Trk, 4-ton, 6 x 6, wrecker
7.		1,9622	Escape & Evasion Unit	5			5	1	1								2	
8.	2745 B	1,9615/7	Counter Intelligence Det	4		28	32	16	8								24	
9.		1,8622	Attachment to G-5 Sec	5			5											
10.		1,9683	3rd Mbl Rad Broadcasting Co	13		129	142	9	4	10	3	24	13	3	4		70	
11.			P & PW Det FUSAG	19+			19+											
12.			Engr Intelligence Team (Research)	3		6	9	2	1			1					4	
13.			Engr Intelligence Team (Combat)	1		3	4	2	1								3	
14.	2749 B	53,895	71 Finance Disbursing Sec	2	1	17	20											
15.		1,7144/5	Det, Hq/Hq Det, 511 MP Bn	1		6	7	2									2	
16.		52972	Det, Ground Echelon, 14 Liaison Sq	1		3	4											
17.			American Red Cross	1			1	1	1								2	
18.	2749 B	1,9624	Rr Ech, Hq Sp Trs Third Army	2		5	7											
19.	2748 B	1,9624	Rr Ech, Hq Co Third Army	6	1	130	137	13		2	8	6	6	1	1		34	
20.		1,9677	Rr Ech, 1749 Engr Utilities Det			21	21									a - 1 b - 1	2	
21.		1,9624	Rr Ech, Mbl Det Sp Trs Third Army	2		8	10											
22.	2803 B	52300	93 Machine Records Unit	3		61	64			1	1		3			a - 5 d - 1 e - 4	15	
23.	2746 B	47215	3,457 Ord M&W Co (Less 1st Plat)	3		76	79	1		1	2	10	11			f - 1	26	
24.		90506	61 Army Ground Forces Band		1	28	29					2	1				3	
25.	2791/2 B	1,5886	3rd & 4th Plat, 530 QM Car Co (-)	2		35	37	13	13		10						36	
26.	2086 B	49666	445 QM Trk Co	5		113	118	4			1	50	49				104	
27.	2954 B	51577	3545 QM Trk Co	5		110	115	4			1	50	49				104	
28.			TOTAL	167+	11	1300	1478+	77	57	44	26	144	135	4	5	13	453	+ Includes Civilians

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

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

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Inspector General
APO 403

Subject: Section Reports in Volume II, War Report.

To : Commanding General, Third U. S. Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Inspector General's Section, Third U. S. Army Headquarters, beginning with August, 1944, and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapters.

2. Throughout the entire campaign, the Inspector General's Section assisted the Army Commander and the general and special staff sections in processing and effecting the following:

a. Numerous and sundry investigations.

b. Inspections of units and organizations throughout the Army.

c. Recommendations on proposed Army policies and drafts of appropriate action.

3. In all of the above the underlying principle of the Inspector General's Section was the promoting of the efficient administration of the command.

C. C. PARK,
Colonel, IGD,
Inspector General.

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INSPECTOR GENERAL SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

The Inspector General's Section arrived in England 23 March with the main body, Headquarters Third U.S. Army, and was quartered at KNUTSFORD until 17 July.

During this period the Section made "Alert Inspections" and "Contact Visits." "Contact Visits" were made to insure that Army units were receiving publications issued by Headquarters European Theater of Operations, and complying with Theater policies. Special attention was given to the matter of "indoctrination" of troops. "Alert Inspections" were conducted in compliance with "Preparation for Overseas Movement," Short and Long Sea Voyage. This Section worked closely with other sections in the Headquarters to determine supply shortages existing in the units alerted for continental operations. Based on Priority Schedules published by the G-4 Section, units were contacted and checked for Tables of Organization and Equipment shortages. Reports were submitted to the Chief of Staff and appropriate action taken.

On 5 July the Chief of Section left SOUTHAMPTON, England, and embarked for the Continent. He was accompanied by two officers, one warrant officer, and four enlisted men. On 17 July the second contingent, consisting of three officers and four enlisted men, left SOUTHAMPTON, England, and embarked for the Continent. Effective the same day (17 July) one officer and two enlisted men were attached to XII Corps and remained in England to assist in processing Army units to the Continent.

This concluded the first phase of operations.

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

On 18 July the Section was reunited and complete, except for those who had remained in England attached to XII Corps. The Section was bivouacked at MEHOU, France (019).

While in bivouac (awaiting arrival of units) the Section made inspections of Third U.S. Army Supply Distributing Points which were then set up and functioning.

During this period a study was made of the problem of self-inflicted wound cases and neuropsychiatric casualties. This problem had caused considerable apprehension in some echelons. Visits were made by senior assistants to the Army Inspector General to Headquarters First U.S. Army and hospitals, in connection with this study. It was concluded after preliminary investigation and study that this problem could be solved under existing regulations.

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

Visits were made by the Army Inspector General to the Headquarters of each Corps to discuss personnel and procedure in preparation for active operations.

The Section was stationed in its entirety in the Army Rear Echelon from which visits were made to the Forward Echelon and other Army installations, and [illegible] the Army area, as necessary.

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The principal functions performed were the following:

1. Investigations directed by the Army Commander or higher authority.

2. Inspections of units with respect to compliance with directives on Soldier Voting.

3. Inspections (with Medical Corps Sanitary Inspections) of areas as vacated by the various parts of the Headquarters and supporting units.

4. Numerous pretrial investigations preparatory to further action on Court-Martial charges.

5. Required periodic inspections of disbursing accounts of Finance Sections.

6. Check inspections of Army service establishments.

7. Studied and advised with respect to administrative problems presented by subordinate units and sections of the Army Headquarters.

8. Investigation of accidents and claims pertaining to the Headquarters.

9. Provided personnel for six different Court-Martial boards of the Army Headquarters.

10. Instructed hospitals and units as to application of existing regulations and instructions to neuropsychiatric cases and self-inflicted wounds.

11. Visited Headquarters of VIII and XV Corps in regard to voting matters.

The widespread operations and rapid movements of units made it necessary to obtain a total of four motor vehicles for the Section to accomplish its tasks.

The extent of the administrative matters referred to the Section for recommendation is indicated by the following statistical summary:

	In	Out
Action papers	501	517

CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

On 2 September one officer and two enlisted men rejoined the Section at FITHIVIERS, France.

During the month the Section performed regularly assigned duties as directed by the Army Commander. Special emphasis was given to Soldier Voting, and, in all, 136 Army units (companies) were contacted and checked on Soldier Voting.

During this period Special Inspections were made as follows:

1. Three required periodic inspections of disbursing accounts of Army Finance Sections.

2. Five inspections of areas vacated by Army Headquarters upon change of bivouac locations.

3. One Special Inspection directed by the Army Commander.

Investigations completed during this period were as follows:

1. Four Formal Investigations.

2. Four Pretrial Investigations.

3. One Informal Investigation.

This Section provided personnel for six different Court-Martial boards of the Army Headquarters.

During the period covered by this report the Section administratively handled [illegible] action cases referred for recommendation.

CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

During the month the Section performed regularly assigned duties as directed by the Army Commander.

During this period Special Inspections were made as follows:

1. Six inspections of Army Postal Units and Army Post Offices.

2. One inspection of area vacated by Army Headquarters upon change of bivouac locations.

3. Two Special Inspections directed by the Army Commander.

Investigations completed during this period were as follows:

1. Seven Formal Investigations.

2. One Informal Investigation.

3. One Pretrial Investigation.

Continual emphasis was placed on Soldier Voting. Seventy-four Army Units were contacted and checked on Soldier Voting.

Fifty-five Army Units were contacted and checked on Conservation of Supplies and on Maintenance of Personnel Records (Section II, Circular 99, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1944).

This Section provided three officers for three different Courts-Martial of the Army Headquarters.

During the period covered by this report, the Section administratively handled 155 action papers referred for recommendation.

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

During the month of November the Section performed regularly assigned duties as directed by the Army Commander.

On 22 November three additional officers were assigned to the Section by Headquarters European Theater of Operations for special training in the Inspector General Department, with a view to filling existing vacancies in subordinate commands.

During this period the Section prepared Administrative Check-Lists to be used in connection with inspection of administrative records of subordinate units.

Inspections made during this period were as follows:

1. One Special Inspection directed by the Army Commander.

2. Ten Special Inspections on Maintenance of Personnel Records (Section II, Circular 99, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1944) and Conservation of Supplies.

3. Six Inspections of Army Postal Units and Army Post Offices.

Investigations completed during this period were as follows:

1. Seven Formal Investigations.

2. Twenty-eight Formal Investigations were conducted on Unauthorized Federal Ballots directed by the Theater Commander.

3. Three Informal Investigations.

This Section provided three officers for three different Courts-Martial of the Army Headquarters.

During the period covered by this report, the Section administratively handled the following number action papers, referred for recommendation: In - 266, Out - 317.

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CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

The Section performed regularly assigned duties as directed by the Army Commander during the month of December.

One Captain from this headquarters was assigned to fill the existing vacancy as Assistant Inspector General in the 26th Infantry Division.

Inspections made during this period were as follows:

1. One Special Inspection directed by the Army Commander.

2. Twenty-one Inspections on Maintenance of Personnel Records (Section I, Circular 111, ETO US Army, 1944) and Conservation of Supplies.

3. Five Army hospitals were inspected as directed by the Chief of Staff relative to the preparation, serving, quality, and quantity of food.

4. Inspection of office quarters and billets vacated by Forward Echelon, Army Headquarters, and three subordinate units upon change of location.

Investigations completed during this period were as follows:

1. Seven Formal Investigations.

2. One Informal Investigation.

3. Five Pretrial Investigations.

This Section provided three officers for three different Courts-Martial of the Army Headquarters.

Chief of Section was appointed President of Board of Officers for the purpose of making recommendations to the Army Commander for Awards and Decorations.

Two officers were appointed on two separate Boards of Officers for conducting investigations as required by AR 420-5.

During the period covered by this report the Section administratively processed the following number action papers referred for recommendation: In - 146, Out - 163.



CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

The Section performed regularly assigned duties as directed by the Army Commander during the month of January.

On 11 January three additional officers were assigned to the Section by Headquarters European Theater of Operations for special training in the Inspector General Department, with a view to filling existing vacancies in subordinate commands.

One Lieutenant Colonel assigned this headquarters was placed on Detached Service as Acting Inspector General of the 5th Infantry Division.

Two Captains, IGD, assigned to this headquarters from subordinate units were placed on Detached Service with European Theater of Operations for assignment to position vacancies of the next higher grade in the Communications Zone.

Four Captains from this headquarters were assigned to fill existing vacancies as Assistant Inspectors General in subordinate units, namely, 35th Infantry Division, 4th Armored Division, 80th Infantry Division, and 87th Infantry Division.

Inspections made during this period were as follows:

1. Four Special Inspections directed by the Army Commander.

2. Messes of three Army Hospitals were inspected as directed by the Chief of Staff with particular attention to the preparation, serving, quality, and quantity of food.

3. Inspections of accommodations vacated by Rear Echelon, Army Headquarters, and seven subordinate units upon change of location.

Investigations completed during this period were as follows:

1. Six Formal Investigations.

2. Five Informal Investigations.

3. Three Pretrial Investigations.

One officer from this Section served as a member of a General Court-Martial appointed by this headquarters.

One officer and one enlisted man were provided to take inventory of accommodations occupied by the Forward Echelon, this headquarters, in the City of LUXEMBOURG (YU 8513).

The Chief of Section served as President of Board of Officers for the purpose of making recommendations to the Army Commander for Awards and Decorations.

During the period covered by this report the Section administratively processed the following number action papers referred for recommendation: In - 200, Out - 204.

CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

The Section performed regularly assigned duties as directed by the Army Commander during the month of February.

On 14 February three additional officers were assigned to the Section by Headquarters European Theater of Operations for special training in the Inspector General's Department, with a view to filling existing vacancies in subordinate commands.

Two Captains from this headquarters were assigned to fill existing vacancies as Assistant Inspectors General in subordinate units, namely, 4th Infantry Division and 26th Infantry Division.

Inspections made during this period were as follows:

1. Two Special Inspections as directed by the Army Commander.

2. Messes of four Army Hospitals were inspected as directed by the Chief of Staff with particular attention to the preparation, serving, quality, and quantity of food.

3. Inspections of accommodations vacated by Rear Echelon, Army Headquarters, and five subordinate units upon change of location from [illegible] to LUXEMBOURG (P-71).

The 702d Railway Grand Division and one of its battalions, the 714th Railway Operating Battalion, were visited and inspected.

Investigations completed during this period were as follows:

1. Three Formal Investigations.

2. Three Pretrial Investigations.

One officer from this Section served as a member of a General Court-Martial appointed by this headquarters.

One officer was provided to take inventory of accommodations occupied by this headquarters in the city of LUXEMBOURG (P-71).

The Chief of Section served as President of Board of Officers for the purpose of making recommendations to the Army Commander for Awards and Decorations during the entire month of February.

During the period covered by this report the Section administratively processed the following number of action papers referred for recommendation: In - 143; Out - 148.



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CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

The Section performed regularly assigned duties as directed by the Army Commander during the month of March 1945.

The following personnel changes were effected during the month:

1. One officer and one enlisted man returned to United States on temporary duty.

2. One Lieutenant Colonel was assigned as Inspector General of 6th Armored Division.

3. One Lieutenant Colonel on detached service as Acting Inspector General of the 5th Infantry Division returned to this headquarters.

4. Two Captains from this headquarters were assigned to fill existing vacancies as Assistant Inspectors General in subordinate units, namely, XX Corps and 28th Infantry Division.

5. Two Captains were assigned to this headquarters from subordinate units to fill existing vacancies in this command.

Inspections of accommodations vacated by the Forward and Rear Echelons, Army Headquarters, and 9 subordinate units upon change of location from LUXEMBOURG (P81).

Investigations completed during this period were as follows:

1. Four Formal Investigations.

2. One Informal Investigation.

3. Three Pretrial Investigations.

One officer of this Section served as President of a General Courts Martial Board appointed by this headquarters.

During the period covered by this report this Section administratively processed the following number of action papers referred for recommendation: In - 121; Out - 126.

CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

The Section performed regularly assigned duties as directed by the Army Commander during the month of April 1945.

Inspections made during this period were as follows:

1. Inspections of accommodations vacated by the Forward Echelon, Army Headquarters, upon changes of locations from [illegible] (W71), FULDA (W69), and HERSFELD (W85), GERMANY.

2. Inspections of accommodations vacated by the Rear Echelon, Army Headquarters, upon changes of locations from METZ (Y41), and [illegible] (W69), GERMANY.

3. Inspections of accommodations vacated by thirteen subordinate units.

4. Three inspections on maintenance of personnel records (FTC Circ 111 and 30, 1944, and 1945, respectively) and conservation of supplies.

Investigations completed during this period were as follows:

1. Two Formal Investigations.

2. Two Informal Investigations.

One officer visited the Displaced Persons Camp, Allied Prisoner of War Camp, and Prisoner of War Camp, located at METZ (Y41), GERMANY.

The Buchenwald Concentration Camp near WEIMAR (U51), GERMANY, was visited and report of observations rendered.

One officer from this Section served as a member of a General Court-Martial appointed by this headquarters.

During the period covered by this report the Section administratively processed the following number of action papers referred for recommendation: In - 121; Out - 124.

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

The Section performed regularly assigned duties as directed by the Army Commander during this period.

Inspections made during this period were as follows:

1. Inspections of accommodations vacated by Forward Echelon, Army Headquarters, upon change of location from ERLANGEN (W36), GERMANY, and thirteen subordinate units.

2. Three Special Inspections.

3. Administrative records of Headquarters Third U.S. Army and the 474th Infantry Regiment (Sep) were inspected in compliance with Staff Memorandum Number 12, this headquarters.

Investigations completed during this period were as follows:

1. Two Formal Investigations.

2. One Pre-Trial Investigation.

One officer from this Section served as a member of a General Court-Martial appointed by this headquarters.

During the period covered by this report the Section administratively processed the following number of action papers referred for recommendation: In - 36; Out - 34.

LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

Lessons Learned: No material changes in method or procedure were found necessary or desirable.

Conclusions: That currently prescribed methods and procedures of the Third Army generally are sound.

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PART 16



JUDGE ADVOCATE

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Judge Advocate

SUBJECT: After-Action Report.

TO : Commanding General, Third US Army, APO 403, US Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Judge Advocate Section, Third U. S. Army Headquarters, beginning with March 1944 and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapters.

2. Included in this report are the various problems faced by the Section during the Third U. S. Army's campaign, and statements of how these problems were met. Difficulties of an inadequate Table of Organization and the procurement of skilled personnel on temporary duty assignments to supplement the regular T/O were among the primary problems, and the report indicates how the Section reacted to the unforeseeable events as they developed. The types of cases handled, and the volume and nature of the work performed, are herein described, in order to indicate all the aspects of an Army Judge Advocate Office in time of war.

Charles E. Rhetts

CHARLES E. RHETTS,
Colonel, J. A. G. D.,
Staff Judge Advocate.

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JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart

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

CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

Prior to leaving the United States the enlisted personnel of the Judge Advocate Section had been selected with a view to their competence as court reporters as well as other matters. While this Headquarters was stationed in the United Kingdom the training in court reporting, previously begun by the enlisted personnel, was continued.

During the time the Headquarters was in the United Kingdom, an effort was made to increase the officer strength of the Section, as experience of other armies had shown the inadequacies of the officer strength (three) prescribed by the Table of Organization. As a result of the endeavors made, two officers of the Judge Advocate General's Department were placed on detached service with this Section shortly before the rear echelon left the United Kingdom.

In anticipation of such problems arising during operations, this Section began in the United States an intensive study of the laws of warfare and military government, which was continued in the United Kingdom.

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

7 July - 18 July: Advice was given on various legal problems and charges were prepared in a number of cases.

19 July - 1 August: From the time the rear element of the Section joined the forward element, 19 July until 1 August, ten general court-martial cases were tried at the Headquarters. Since the regular heavy duties of the other officers of the Headquarters and army units prevented the expeditious handling of the charges, officers of this Section were detailed as Trial Judge Advocate and Defense Counsel. This policy also promoted the fair, professional presentation of the serious charges referred to the general courts-martial. In all cases the proceedings were reported by enlisted men of this Section.

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

1 August - 10 August: Five general court-martial trials involving eight accused were tried at the Headquarters during this period. All proceedings were reported by enlisted men of this Section and in all but one case both the Prosecution and the Defense were presented by officers of the Section.

Two enlisted men were attached and another vehicle was secured in order to facilitate the task of finding and assembling witnesses from the various, rapidly-moving units and to give the regularly assigned enlisted men more time for reporting and transcribing court proceedings and for other stenographic duties. The smaller units ordinarily having no telephone, personal visits were found to be the most practical and expeditious means of interviewing witnesses and accused during this period when the area held by units of the Third U. S. Army was small.

10 August - 17 August: Seven general court-martial trials were [illegible] Headquarters during this period, all being reported by enlisted men of this Section. [illegible] Section represented the

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Prosecution in all cases and presented the Defense in all but two cases. Since the officers appointed as Assistant Trial Judge Advocate and Assistant Defense Counsel were ordinarily unable, in addition to their regular duties, to assemble the witnesses and produce the accused for trial with sufficient expedition, these tasks were performed by the Trial Judge Advocate and Defense Counsel. Also, in the interests of technical accuracy of procedure and to insure the quick punishment of those committing crimes of violence, such as rape, murder, and aggravated assaults, against French civilians, this Section, in this and later periods, prepared the charges and arranged for the formal pre-trial investigation in such cases. As an example of the expedition achieved, two soldiers were on 15 August tried and convicted of a serious offense committed on 9 August.

Since the then existing officer strength of the Section (five officers and one warrant officer) was insufficient to handle the extraordinary volume and variety of work, another officer was placed on temporary duty with the Section. Additional vantage was requested, but pending receipt thereof the courts sat, during the good weather prevailing in this and the next period, in the open air in the bivouac area of this Section.

17 August - 27 August: Ten general court-martial cases were held at this Headquarters. Personnel of this Section participated in all these trials, the officers acting as Trial Judge Advocate, Defense Counsel and Law Member and the enlisted men serving as court reporters. Of the ten trials, three involved aggravated assaults or other offenses against civilians by five soldiers. In order to relieve the Trial Judge Advocate and Defense Counsel, so far as possible, of the burden of assembling witnesses and producing the accused, now that units of the Third U. S. Army were operating over such large areas of France, radio messages were sent to the accused's unit requesting the commanding officer thereof to produce the accused and necessary military witnesses for trial at earliest practicable date. The attendance of civilian witnesses and interpreters continued to be secured by personal contact. Completion of trial preparations were made upon arrival of the accused and the witnesses and the cases were then tried.

In the interests of expedition and in accordance with the Theater policy that crimes against civilians should be tried near the scene of the offense and the residence of the witnesses, three other sets of serious charges relating to six accused and three cases involving aggravated assaults upon French civilians were processed during this period and sent to the appropriate general court-martial authority of the Communications Zone for trial.

During this period, also, a letter was prepared for the signature of the Commanding General informing all troops under his command of the extreme punishment which had been and would be imposed upon those committing crimes of violence against French civilians.

Another officer and another enlisted man, previously requested reported for duty with this Section during this period.

27 August - 31 August: During this four day period, the personnel of this Section arranged for and otherwise participated in six general court-martial trials. Another officer reported for duty with the Section.

1 August - 31 August: In addition to serving as Trial Judge Advocate, Defense Counsel, and reporter in nearly all the general court-martial cases tried at this Headquarters during the month of August, as law member of the court in many cases and as investigating officer in some, personnel of this Section wrote reviews of fifteen general court-martial proceedings. The regular flow of work relating to military affairs, laws of warfare, legal assistance to military personnel, review of proceedings of inferior courts, and similar matters was also handled.

CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

1 - 6 September: Six cases were tried at the Headquarters by general court-martial. Officers of this Section participated in the Prosecution and Defense of all six cases, and an officer of this Section sat as Law Member in three of the cases. The enlisted men of this Section acted as court reporter in three of the six proceedings.

Two new officers, captains of infantry, reported for detached service with this Section during this period.

6 - 18 September: Sixteen general court-martial cases were tried at the Headquarters. Officers of this Section represented the Prosecution in all cases and participated in the Defense of all but two. In a number of instances the Law Member of the court was furnished by this Section; and in a majority of the cases the proceedings were reported by the enlisted men of the Section.

The military justice activities of the Section during this period also included the preparation of a procedural guide for the summary court officers appointed by the Headquarters Commandant for the trial of traffic, uniform and other minor offenses occurring within the operational area of the Third U. S. Army. These summary courts tried 535 cases from 10-30 September.

During this period two additional officers, first lieutenants of infantry, reported for temporary duty with this Section. An increase in the enlisted strength of the Section to ten was also authorized during this period. Two enlisted men reported for temporary duty with the Section at this time, both of whom were subsequently assigned to the Section.

18 - 30 September: Thirteen general court-martial cases were tried at the Headquarters before the end of the month. One of the cases involved a common trial of twenty-three soldiers accused of rioting. One case concerned civilians residing in or near PARIS, and in accordance with Theater policy, their testimony was given before a court sitting in PARIS, the military witnesses being heard before the court sitting at the Headquarters. Officers of the Section participated in the prosecution and defense of all the cases and in some instances the Section furnished the Law Member for the court. Enlisted men of the Section acted as court reporter in the riot case and most of the more difficult cases tried during this period.

One officer, lieutenant colonel, infantry, reported for duty with this Section during this period while one officer, a major in the Judge Advocate General's Department, left to assume his new duties as Assistant Judge Advocate of XX Corps.

1 - 30 September: In addition to the military justice activities above set forth, personnel of this Section wrote reviews of twenty-one general court-martial proceedings, reviewed the proceedings of many inferior courts-martial, formally investigated numerous charges, and made recommendations with respect to the trial of many charges. Concurrently with these matters of military justice, the Section dealt with various questions of military affairs, rules of land warfare, military government, and legal assistance to military personnel. Personal liaison and contact was established with the officers of the Communication Zone with respect to matters of military justice, military affairs and allied matters.

Of the total cases tried by general court during the month of September, only one, charges of robbery and larceny, involved an offense against civilians.

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CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

Thirty-two general court-martial cases were tried at this Headquarters. Officers of the Section participated in the Prosecution and Defense of all of them and as Law Member in thirty. They also served as additional members of the court in a substantial number of the trials. Twenty-six of the cases were reported by enlisted men of the Section.

The first trial of spies in the Third U. S. Army was held this month before a Military Commission at this Headquarters. The trial judge advocate, one member of the commission, and the reporter were furnished by this Section. Both Defense Counsel were attorneys and in addition the two accused were aided throughout every stage of the proceedings by individual interpreters. The two accused were convicted of acting as spies and sentenced to be shot to death with musketry.

Of the Thirty-two general court-martial cases tried in October, nine were of officers and one of a warrant officer as compared with thirty-five cases tried in September, seven of which were of officers and one of a warrant officer. Only two of the cases in October and one in September involved offenses against civilians, while during August, seven were for crimes of violence against civilians. The death penalty was imposed upon four accused, including the spies, during October.

During this month two general courts-martial were in session at the same time on several occasions. In a number of cases interpreters of French, German or Polish were used.

Numerous questions were submitted to the Section for advice to the summary court officers appointed for the trial of traffic and uniform violations within the territorial limits of Third U. S. Army by the Headquarters Commandant and for which this Section had previously prepared a procedural guide. Eight hundred sixty-seven cases were tried by these courts during October.

In addition to the activities recounted above, personnel of the Section performed the following work:

1. Wrote twenty-three general court-martial and one military commission reviews.
2. Reviewed several hundred special and summary court-martial records.
3. Wrote eighteen reprimands and admonitions.
4. Conducted eleven pretrial investigations.
5. Referred fifty-one charges for trial by general court-martial.
6. Made many recommendations with respect to trial of charges by inferior courts.
7. Processed numerous claims and reclassification matters.
8. Rendered opinions of various questions concerning military justice, military affairs, rules of land warfare, and military government.
9. Furnished legal assistance to military personnel in approximately seventy-five instances.

The Section continued to operate on a seven day work week, and in addition inaugurated the policy of maintaining an officer on duty each night to handle such matters of an emergency nature as might arise. After moving into permanent billets, the night guard previously necessary was discontinued.

Three enlisted men who were stenographers reported for temporary duty with the Section during the month. During this period the staff judge advocate of the III Corps spent ten days in the Section observing its functioning and holding conferences with the judge advocate and the chiefs of the sub-sections in order to familiarize himself with the Third U. S. Army policy.

The Section moved into buildings previously used by the German Army, occupying thirteen rooms, four of which were used as courts-martial and witness rooms. In addition, all its enlisted personnel were quartered in the same building. This improvement in the physical setup made a division of work feasible, resulting in the establishment in addition to the executive sub-section of separate sub-sections for military justice, military affairs, international law and rules of land warfare and miscellaneous matters. It also permitted increased efficiency in the operation of the chief clerk's office by the assembling of the enlisted personnel and all records in one large room.

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

Thirty-two general court-martial cases were tried at this Headquarters. Officers of the Section participated in the prosecution and defense of all but one of them and contributed the court's law member in all but three of the cases. In several instances, an additional member of the court was furnished by this Section. All but one of the proceedings were reported by enlisted men of the Section.

The second trial of spies in the Third U. S. Army was held before a military commission at this Headquarters. The trial judge advocate, one member of the commission and the reporters were furnished by this Section. Both defense counsel were attorneys and the accused were aided throughout every stage of the proceedings by individual interpreters of their own choice. In addition, there were the official German and French interpreters for the commission. The two accused were convicted of acting as spies and sentenced to be shot to death with musketry. The accused were members of the 1st and 3rd Companies, 73rd Regiment, 19th Division, German Army.

The two German soldiers convicted of spying during the month of October were executed this month. Moreover, four U. S. Army soldiers, convicted of rape during the month of August and sentenced to death by hanging, were executed this month, following due approval and confirmation of their sentences. These six executions were the first carried into effect pursuant to sentences imposed by courts and commissions of the Third U. S. Army.

The thirty-two general court-martial cases tried in November involved five officers and thirty-four enlisted men. Nine officers and one warrant officer were involved in the same number of cases in the preceding month. One trial of two officers and one noncommissioned officer for several offenses including the sale by the accused of French champagne at prices in excess of those established pursuant to French law, was held in the court room in the local Palais de Justice in the presence of many civilian spectators. The officers were sentenced to dismissal, total forfeitures and confinement at hard labor for five years and the noncommissioned officer to dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures and confinement at hard labor for three years, the results of the trial being published in the French press. The publicity given the trial served as a dramatic demonstration of American cooperation with the French in the protection of the French economy against inflation.

An examination of eighty general court-martial orders and fourteen actions under Article of War 48 covering general courts-martial on which action had been taken by the Commanding General between 1 August 1944 and 18 November 1944, disclosed that the following personnel were concerned:

White 61

Colored 60

Those proportions are to be interpreted in light of the following figures respecting the total number of colored and white troops under direct control of this Headquarters as shown below:

	Colored EM & Officers	White EM & Officers
31 August 1944 . . .	10,991	63,758
30 September 1944. .	9,965	68,766
31 October 1944. . .	12,663	54,752
18 November 1944 . .	12,641	55,992
Total .	46,260	243,268

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Numerous questions were submitted to the Section for advice to the Summary Court Officers appointed for the trial of traffic, uniform, and other minor offenses within the territorial limits of the Third U. S. Army by the Headquarters Commandant and for which this Section had previously prepared a Procedural Guide. 866 cases were tried by these courts during November.

In addition to the activities mentioned above, personnel of this Section performed the following work:

1. Wrote nine reprimands and admonitions.

2. Referred thirty-one sets of charges for trial by general court-martial.

3. Referred twenty-nine sets of charges for trial by inferior courts.

4. Reviewed 700 records of trial by summary court-martial and 135 records of trial by special court-martial.

5. Prepared 54 reviews of trials by general court-martial, and one review of a trial by a military commission, the most reviews prepared by this Section in any single month.

6. Handled the correspondence necessary to effectuate the release or evacuation of all general prisoners in the hands of the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army.

7. Prepared a circular letter respecting the place of non-commissioned officers in the enforcement of military discipline. A copy of the circular is attached as Annex 2.

8. Caused the distribution for divisional and special troops of the Third U. S. Army of Soldier's Handbook of The Rules of Land Warfare, prepared by the Chief of this Section. A copy of the pamphlet mentioned is attached as Annex 4.

9. Investigated the report of a number of related violations of the Geneva Convention and processed various other reports of violations.

10. Reviewed for legal accuracy a guide prepared for military government legal officers operating under the jurisdiction of the Third U. S. Army, its Corps and Divisions.

11. Reviewed for legal sufficiency memoranda prepared in other sections pertaining to the exchange of currencies, the processing of enemy soldiers captured in civilian clothing and other administrative matters involving questions of international law.

12. Rendered legal advice in a number of cases pertaining to looting and pillaging.

13. Processed numerous claims.

14. Caused the distribution of a circular letter previously prepared in this Section covering the investigation of automobile accidents, a copy of which is attached as Annex 1.

15. Furnished legal assistance to military personnel in approximately 75 cases.

16. A field officer of the Section served as a member of the War Decoration Board.

A memorandum of the Branch Office of The Judge Advocate General, European Theater of Operations, reporting on general court-martial records received by the Branch Office during the month of November 1944 gave the following figures respecting the military justice operations of three of the United States Armies operating in the theater:

	No. Accused Tried	No. Cases Tried
First U. S. Army	14	13
Third U. S. Army	63	38
Seventh U. S. Army	9	9

The authorized personnel of the Section was augmented by the allotment of the following officers and enlisted men for use in connection with investigations of violations of the Geneva Convention: 1 Colonel, 2 Majors, 2 Captains, and 5 Privates.

CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

Thirty-two general court-martial cases were tried at this Headquarters. Officers of this Section represented the prosecution and the defense in all but seven of the general court-martial cases and contributed the court's law member in all but one of the cases. In several instances an additional member of the court was furnished by this Section. All these proceedings were reported by enlisted men from this Section, and an enlisted man from this Section acted as interpreter in two of the cases.

Of the 32 general court-martial cases tried in December only two involved crimes against French civilians. The attendance of civilian witnesses was secured by personal contact, and transportation was supplied by this Section.

Four murder cases, none of which involved civilians, were tried during this period, whereas none was tried during the previous month and only three since the start of the year. In one of the cases, the offender was sentenced to be hanged and in two others the offenders were sentenced to life imprisonment. The fourth case resulted in an acquittal. Four officers were tried, three of them being sentenced to dismissal and confinement and one to dismissal only.

For the first time since arrival on the Continent several cases involving long absences without leave were tried. Previous cases under the 61st Article of War had consisted of absences of brief duration tried in conjunction with other more serious offenses.

Two German soldiers convicted of spying during November were shot to death with musketry after the sentences were confirmed by the Commanding General of the Twelfth U. S. Army Group. There were no trials by Military Commission during the month of December, but study of war crimes was intensified and the ground work has been laid for the eventual trial of war criminals and violators of the Geneva Convention.

Eleven officers from the 2nd European Civil Affairs Regiment, who were awaiting assignment in Germany, were appointed members of a general court-martial. This court was so constituted in order to reduce to a minimum the disruption inherent in calling officers away from important duties in other sections of the Headquarters and in subordinate units while at the same time giving court-martial experience to officers of the 2nd European Civil Affairs Regiment at a time when their regular duties were light. One enlisted lawyer, a Technician Fifth Grade, was newly assigned to the Section.

In addition to the activities mentioned above, personnel of this Section performed the following work:

1. Wrote five reprimands and admonitions.

2. Referred nine pre-trial investigations, three of which were referred to officers from this Section.

3. Referred forty-five sets of charges for trial by general court-martial.

4. Referred nineteen sets of charges for trial by inferior courts.

5. Wrote sixteen letters directing redrafting or withdrawal of charges.

6. Reviewed 534 records of trial by summary courts-martial, and 123 records of trial by special courts-martial, taking necessary corrective action.

7. Handled the correspondence necessary to effectuate the release or evacuation of all general prisoners in the hands of the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army.

8. A circular letter, previously prepared by this Section respecting relations with the German people, was signed and distributed. A copy of this letter is attached as Annex 3.

9. Processed numerous matters concerning accidents and claims.

10. Prepared thirty reviews of trials by general court-martial.

11. Numerous miscellaneous legal opinions were given to other sections in the Headquarters.

12. Furnished legal assistance to military personnel in approximately 70 cases.

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CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

Fifty-five general court-martial cases were tried at this Headquarters. Officers of this Section represented the prosecution in 48 of the cases and the defense in the vast majority. This Section contributed the court's law member in 51 of these cases, and in several instances an additional member of the court was also furnished. All these proceedings were reported by enlisted men of this Section, in courts held contemporaneously at both NANCY (U8512) France, and ESCH (P7301) Luxembourg. An enlisted man from this Section acted as French interpreter in four of the cases.

The number of cases tried this month exceeded by more than 60 per cent the number tried by this Headquarters during any previous month, and placed a considerable strain on all the personnel of the Section. Of the 55 general court-martial cases tried, only six involved commissioned officers, two of which resulted in an acquittal, whereas one officer was sentenced to dismissal and confinement for 10 years for selling captured liquor for his personal gain, and another officer was sentenced to dismissal and confinement for five years for being drunk in public and absent without leave for a total of 30 hours. Of all the cases tried, there were only six acquittals. The one case of rape brought a sentence of life imprisonment, while two soldiers convicted of assault with intent to rape were sentenced to 20 years. There were two murder cases tried during the month, one of which resulted in life imprisonment and the other in imprisonment for 25 years. There were severe sentences imposed in several cases which involved black-market operations. In all cases, where required, the attendance of witnesses was secured by personal contact, and transportation was supplied by this Section.

Although no trials of war criminals were held in this Headquarters, a circular, previously prepared, was distributed to Interrogation of Prisoners of War and Counter Intelligence Teams, advising them of the procedure to be followed at prisoners of war enclosures to detect war criminals and to bring them to justice.

A memorandum on discipline was prepared, listing the results of significant courts-martial cases tried in the European Theater of Operations during the month, and distributed for publicity throughout the command for its deterrent effect.

A member of this Section who had done outstanding work, was given a direct commission as a second lieutenant in the Army of the United States to fill an existing vacancy in the Section. A candidate for the Judge Advocate Officer Candidate School was attached to this Section for about two weeks so that his qualifications could be determined.

When the Headquarters moved to its new position at ESCH (P7301), Luxembourg, this Section occupied 10 rooms on two floors of a large office building. In addition, there were two large court-rooms with adjoining witness rooms. This improvement in the physical set-up permitted increased efficiency in handling the mounting volume of cases.

In addition to the activities mentioned above, personnel of this Section performed the following work:

1. Received, reviewed, and passed on 33 general courts-martial cases.

2. Received, reviewed, and passed on 485 cases tried by summary courts-martial.

3. Received, reviewed, and passed on 147 cases tried by special courts-martial.

4. Referred 23 charges to jurisdictions not under the Third United States Army.

5. Referred 25 sets of charges to trial by general courts-martial.

6. Referred 16 sets of charges to inferior courts.

7. Wrote 24 letters regarding irregularities in trials by special and summary courts-martial.

8. Handled the correspondence necessary to effectuate the release or evacuation of all general prisoners in the hands of the Provost Marshal, Third United States Army.

9. Wrote 85 letters requesting confinement and transfer of prisoners.

10. Wrote 8 reprimands and administrative restrictions.

11. 53 letters were written regarding accidents and claims.

12. 17 letters were written on various matters concerning violations of the Geneva Convention.

13. 21 miscellaneous legal opinions were given to other sections in the Headquarters.

14. Legal assistance was furnished to military personnel in approximately 85 cases.

15. In addition, 256 miscellaneous letters, indorsements, and buck slips were prepared.

CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

Throughout February the bulk of general courts-martial appointed at this Headquarters was made up of officer personnel from nearby civil affairs detachments who were awaiting assignment to active operations in Germany. This policy was begun in December, 1944, for the use of these officers had the advantages of permitting staff officers at this Headquarters to devote a maximum amount of their time to matters of an operational nature, and also gave the civil affairs officers practical training in disciplinary problems which would be encountered in their work in Germany.

Forty-four general court-martial cases were tried at this Headquarters, and officers of this Section represented the prosecution in 33 of the cases and the defense in 13 of them. A member of this Section sat as Law Member in 32 of the cases, and all but five of the cases were reported by enlisted men of this Section.

The three murder cases tried during the month resulted in two death sentences and one sentence to life imprisonment. One mutiny case, involving 7 accused, resulted in acquittal of two of the accused and a sentence of 15 years for each of the other five. Two enlisted men were sentenced to imprisonment for 30 years for sleeping on post and leaving post before being properly relieved, respectively, and a lieutenant colonel was fined a total of one thousand dollars for violating censorship regulations. Forty-seven enlisted men and three officers were tried during the month.

The nucleus of a War Crimes Branch was enlarged within the Section and investigation of reported war crimes continued. The object in each case was to obtain sufficient evidence, as soon after the violation as practicable, to establish a prima facie case against the malefactors. Persons, regardless of nationality, who had personal knowledge of violations of the Geneva Convention and the Laws and Usages of War were interviewed, in their native tongue, by officers through enlisted interpreters, from the Section, and their sworn statements were taken. Among the cases investigated during February were the torturous murder of a wounded American aviator by enraged German women, the inhuman treatment of civilians by Gestapo and SS troops, and the murder of French children by a retreating Panzer Division. Though crimes against all allied nationals were examined, the main emphasis was placed upon offenses committed against U. S. troops and U. S. nationals, and a growing portion of the work of the office was concerned with crimes committed by the

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Two officers were transferred from the Section to assume responsible assignments in other Sections of this Headquarters where their training heretofore acquired was utilized, and a chief warrant officer, who was a lawyer in civilian life, was brought into the Judge Advocate Section from a combat unit where he had rendered outstanding service for the past several years, for seasoning and training in Judge Advocate work. In addition, three enlisted men, two lawyers and a court reporter were attached to the Section on temporary duty for training, giving the Section 6 officers, 1 warrant officer, 10 enlisted men and 5 attached enlisted men, as compared to the 5 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 5 enlisted men who comprised the Section when it arrived on the continent.

The following work was also performed by personnel of this Section:

1. Received, reviewed and passed on 30 general court-martial cases.

2. Received, reviewed and passed on 126 special court-martial cases.

3. Received, reviewed, and passed on 90h cases tried by summary court-martial.

4. Referred 56 charges to jurisdictions not under Third U. S. Army.

5. Referred 34 sets of charges to inferior courts.

6. Wrote 29 letters regarding irregularities in records of trial by summary and special court-martial.

7. Handled the correspondence to effect release or evacuation of all prisoners in the hands of the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army.

8. Wrote 90 letters requesting release from confinement or transfer of general prisoners.

9. Wrote 6 reprimands or punishment under the 104th Article of War.

10. 57 letters were written regarding accidents or claims.

11. Several investigations were made by officers of this Section regarding violations of the Geneva Convention and reports thereon were submitted to higher headquarters. 25 letters were written regarding such violations.

12. A circular letter requiring court-martial action against all military personnel who sustain self-inflicted wounds was prepared for distribution through the command.

13. Numerous legal opinions were given to other sections of the Headquarters.

14. Legal assistance was furnished to military personnel in approximately 80 cases.

15. In addition, 175 miscellaneous letters, indorsements, and buck slips were prepared.

CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

Throughout March the military justice work of the office was stabilized and an increasing emphasis was placed upon crimes committed by the enemy in violation of the Geneva Convention and the Laws and Usages of War. There were 47 general court-martial cases tried by this Headquarters during this period, and all but 2 of them resulted in a conviction. Forty-four enlisted men and three officers were tried. The one murder case resulted in a sentence to life imprisonment and the one rape case brought the death penalty. Seven soldiers were tried for looting and severe penalties were imposed.

The War Crimes Branch was faced with reports of 42 violations of the Geneva Convention. An immediate problem was the procurement of trained personnel who were capable of coping with the language difficulties that would be involved in a thorough investigation of these cases. Two interpreters of the Dutch Army were assigned to this Headquarters on temporary duty. One enlisted man who had a knowledge of French, German and Russian was assigned to this Section. Teams consisting of an officer, an interpreter and a driver were dispatched from this Headquarters to the scene of the various crimes and a thorough investigation was made. Many of the offenses involved the murder of Allied pilots. Wherever possible, the bodies were disinterred, and after being identified, were removed to an American cemetery for proper burial. Evidence was taken of crimes committed against any Allied nationals, and reports were prepared which would establish the prima facie case against the malefactors. Sworn statements, in the witnesses' own handwriting, were taken and all the details were included. One of the problems of the office was liaison with other sections of the Headquarters. G-2 and G-3 were very helpful in providing information to identify the German units which were present at a particular place where a war crime occurred. The Signal Section furnished photographers to take pictures wherever they were necessary as evidence. Graves Registration helped in the identification of unknown victims and disinterred the bodies. CIC, Psychological Warfare and Military Intelligence sent in many clues to show a violation of the Laws of War, and the Provost Marshal took custody of all the German civilian prisoners apprehended. Most of the crimes investigated during this period took place in Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the western part of Germany. The offenses covered mistreatment of Allied prisoners of war and the murder of individual Allied soldiers by members of the SS and Gestapo. It was expected that with the advance of Allied armies into Germany a greater variety and number of cases would be encountered and plans were being made for a further extension of the War Crimes Branch.

The following work was also performed by personnel of this Section:

1. Received, reviewed and passed on 35 general courts-martial.

2. Received, reviewed and passed on 803 cases tried by summary courts-martial.

3. Received, reviewed and passed on 156 cases tried by special courts-martial.

4. Reviewed 26 charges , jurisdiction not under the Third United States Army.

5. Referred 62 sets of charges to inferior courts.

6. Wrote 27 letters regarding irregularities in records of trial by special and summary courts-martial.

7. Wrote 91 letters requesting release, confinement or transfer of prisoners.

8. Wrote many reprimands and notifications of punishment under Article of War 104.

9. Fifty-five letters were written regarding accidents and claims.

10. Seventy letters were written expediting final disposition of cases being held for investigation as self-inflicted wounds.

11. Numerous legal opinions were given to other sections of this Headquarters and legal assistance was rendered in about 100 cases.

12. A circular letter, regarding looting, pilfering and pillaging was prepared for distribution throughout the command (Annex 1).

13. In addition, about 300 miscellaneous letters, indorsements and buck slips were prepared.

CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

The Military Justice work of the Judge Advocate Section continued to set new records in the volume handled, while the War Crimes Branch reached its peak in intensity and volume of investigations. There were 38 general court-martial cases tried by this Headquarters during April and all but 2 resulted in convictions. In addition, there was a total of 890 records of trial by special and summary court which were reviewed for legal sufficiency. The War Crimes Branch has to this date investigated or are in process of investigating a total of 129 cases involving violations of the Geneva Convention and/or Rules of Land Warfare by Enemy Forces and/or Enemy Nationals. Many large prisoner enclosures in which American and other Allied Prisoners of War were maintained and a

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number of concentration and extermination camps for allied nationals required intensive investigations by War Crimes teams which were composed and sent out from this office. Included in these camps were those of Buchenwald (Weimar) Germany, Arnstadt Concentration Camp, Ohrdruf Concentration Camp, and the extermination camp at Mauthausen, Austria. The investigating teams were composed of varying members of officers, interpreters, typists and photographers needed to cover the particular assignment in question. Moving pictures and still pictures were taken in order that the conditions at each establishment might be recorded as they were left by the enemy. Almost every type and form of cruel and inhuman treatment was discovered to have been committed upon the prisoners. Often bodies were disinterred in order that photographs and autopsies might be made to determine cause of death and to show the evidence of mistreatment. A number of arrests were made of war criminals following these investigations to insure their presence in court at the proper time.

The following work was also performed by personnel of this Section:

1. Received, reviewed and passed on 38 general court-martial cases.

2. Received, reviewed and passed on 740 cases tried by summary courts-martial.

3. Received, reviewed and passed on 150 cases tried by special courts-martial.

4. Referred 51 charges to jurisdictions not under the Third United States Army.

5. Referred 62 sets of charges to trial by general court-martial.

6. Referred 28 sets of charges to inferior courts.

7. Wrote 44 letters regarding irregularities in trials by special and summary courts-martial.

8. Handled the correspondence necessary to effectuate the release or evacuation of all general prisoners in the hands of the Provost Marshal, Third United States Army.

9. Wrote 138 letters regarding confinement and transfer of prisoners.

10. Wrote 15 reprimands and administrative restrictions.

11. Sixty letters were written regarding accidents and claims.

12. Twenty-three letters were written on various matters concerning violations of the Geneva Convention.

13. Seventeen miscellaneous legal opinions were given to other sections in the Headquarters.

14. Legal assistance was furnished to military personnel in approximately 85 cases.

15. In addition, approximately 300 miscellaneous letters, indorsements, and back slips were prepared.

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

Ten general court-martial cases were tried at this Headquarters. This Section furnished the Trial Judge Advocate and Defense Counsel in five of them while the Law Member and court reporters were furnished by the Section in all of the cases. The formal pre-trial investigation was conducted in several of the cases by officers of this Section and all interpreters were furnished for the investigations and the trials where there were any civilian witnesses involved.

Of the ten general court-martial cases tried during this period, all resulted in convictions. Two of these cases involved commissioned officers as the accused, while the remaining eight pertained to enlisted men as accused. One officer was sentenced to dismissal from the service and the other officer case resulted in a sentence by the court to forfeit from his pay $50.00 per month for six months. In all the cases, the civilian witnesses were secured by personal contact and transportation was furnished by the Section.

The War Crimes continued to require much administrative and investigative attention. Fifteen new cases of War Crimes were reported during the period, and at the cessation of hostilities, this Section had six investigating teams operating in the field. These cases involved the investigation of mass atrocities and murders committed at liberated concentration and extermination camps, as well as cases involving mistreatment and murder of individual Allied Prisoners of War and Allied Nationals. One of the cases investigated during this period involved an offense against the Geneva Convention in the illegal use by the enemy of the red-cross emblem by displaying it on barges in which were stored poisonous gas materials.

Fourteen officers and twenty-nine enlisted men are engaged in the War Crimes Branch of the Judge Advocate Section in the capacities of investigating officers, interpreters of German, French, Russian, Polish, Italian, Dutch and Czechoslovakian languages, stenographers, typists, photographers, and drivers. In addition eleven officers and eighteen enlisted men devote their full time to the Military Justice Branch of the Judge Advocate Section. This total of twenty-five officers and forty seven enlisted men represents a substantial growth in the Section as it was constituted, when embarking overseas on 13 March 1944. At that time, the Section was composed of three officers, one warrant officer and five enlisted men.

In addition to the activities recounted above, personnel of this Section performed the following work during the period:

1. Received, reviewed and passed on 14 general court-martial cases.

2. Received, reviewed and passed on 289 cases tried by summary court-martial.

3. Received, reviewed and passed on 65 cases tried by special court-martial.

4. Referred with a view to trial 18 charges to jurisdictions not under Third U. S. Army.

5. Referred 15 sets of charges to trial by general court-martial.

6. Referred 15 sets of charges to inferior courts.

7. Wrote 25 letters regarding irregularities in trials by special and summary court-martial.

8. Handled the correspondence necessary to effectuate release or evacuation of all general prisoners in the hands of the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army.

9. Wrote 25 letters requesting confinement or transfer of prisoners.

10. Prepared 21 letters regarding accidents and claims.

11. Prepared 18 letters of various violations of the Geneva Convention and Rules of Land Warfare.

12. Rendered six written legal opinions to other Sections in the Headquarters.

13. Furnished legal assistance to military personnel in approximately 25 cases.

14. Prepared 95 miscellaneous letters, indorsements and bank slips.

CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

1. Court reporters are almost as essential in the trial of general court-martial cases as the court itself. Experienced court reporters are rarely available in the Army. Court reporters are consequently developed and trained from the most alert and efficient stenographers.

2. In an active campaign, the front-line soldier should know the more important Rules of Land Warfare and the main points covered by the Geneva Convention. The Judge Advocate Section prepared a booklet on this subject and approximately 35,000 copies were distributed to units of the Third Army during the campaign.

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3. Skilled interpreters are often needed in court-martial cases, particularly where there are civilian witnesses appearing before the court. This Section has learned during the European campaign the importance of having immediately at hand interpreters among enlisted men of the Section.

4. The necessity of the Judge Advocate Section working closely with Sections of the forward echelon of the Headquarters and supporting troops and services caused considerable loss of efficiency during those periods when the forward and rear echelons of the Headquarters have been separated by great distances. At times the rear echelon was so far behind the units that unit commanders and other personnel were required to make long trips to the rear in connection with Judge Advocate activities.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Court reporters are essential to the Judge Advocate Section during an active campaign and the tables of organization of the Army Headquarters should be increased so as to provide eight court reporters. The present enlisted strength authorized makes no provision for court reporters.

2. All soldiers in the field during an active campaign should know the principal Rules of Land Warfare and the main points covered by the Geneva Convention for their protection and guidance.

3. Skilled interpreters should be procured and included among the enlisted personnel of the Judge Advocate Section prior to an active campaign in a foreign country.

4. The Judge Advocate Section should be included in the forward echelon of the Headquarters.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX NO. 1

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Commanding General

APO 403
31 October 1944

AG 537.5
GNMCJ

SUBJECT: Automobile Accidents.

TO : See Distribution.

The number of motor vehicle accidents in this command indicates the existence of negligence and the failure to obey directives of this and higher headquarters. Consequently, the following procedure will be effective immediately:

a. Every accident involving vehicles of this command driven by military personnel will be immediately investigated. Charges will be preferred against both the driver of the vehicle and the senior officer or noncommissioned officer riding therein when the investigation reveals negligence, disobedience of directives, or any misconduct.

b. In aggravated cases, the charges will be referred for the formal investigation required by paragraph 35a, Manual for Courts-Martial, with a view to trial by general court-martial.

c. Any military driver involved in a vehicle accident resulting in his conviction by court-martial will have his driver's permit suspended for not less than three months or revoked, depending on the circumstances.

d. Action as outlined above will in no way change or modify standing operating procedure as to the processing of claims.

e. The commanding officer of each unit is charged with the responsibility of compliance with the foregoing.

f. Commanders will maintain a careful record of all accidents occurring within the units and organizations of their respective commands. This record will be carefully considered when preparing the Efficiency Reports of the unit and organization commanders concerned.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ L. L. Manly
L. L. MANLY,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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ANNEX NO. 2

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Commanding General

APO 403
16 November 1944

AG 250 - GNMCJ

SUBJECT: Noncommissioned Officers.

TO : See Distribution.

1. It has been clearly demonstrated in this war, as in past wars, that noncommissioned officers are the backbone of the Army. All unit commanders must give their personal attention to improving the quality and prestige of noncommissioned officers, especially those who exercise command responsibility. Attention is directed to the means for attaining this desired result suggested in Circular #0, War Department, 16 February 1944, particularly the necessity for delegating to noncommissioned officers all authority that is rightfully theirs, and the necessity for creating increased opportunity for noncommissioned officers to exercise command and initiative.

2. In general, officers must deal with enlisted men through the appropriate noncommissioned officers. The proper utilization of noncommissioned officers will result not only in the development of their initiative and leadership, but will result also in a corresponding improvement in overall discipline and efficiency. The innumerable situations in which noncommissioned officers may be used to advantage range from the handling of a disorderly soldier to the execution of a combat mission. The success and effectiveness of every commander is due largely to the degree he develops and maintains a thoroughly competent corps of noncommissioned officers.

3. The great number of court-martial cases in which private soldiers are charged with offenses against noncommissioned officers committed while under the influence of liquor, including disobedience of orders or disrespect, indicates that the proper use of noncommissioned officers is not being made.

4. Each unit commander is charged with the responsibility of carrying into effect the views herein expressed.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ L. L. Manly
L. L. MANLY,
Lt. Col., A. G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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ANNEX NO. 3

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Commanding General
APO 403

12 December 1944

AG 091

SUBJECT: Relations With the German People.

TO : See Distribution.

1. The friendship and cooperation of the French people will be replaced in Germany by universal hostility, which will require that we regard all Germans, soldiers and civilians, men, women, and even children, as active enemies. It is expected that we shall encounter sniping, guerilla warfare, sabotage, and treachery. Everyone must be warned of these probabilities and prepared to take all possible protective measures. Particular care must be taken to insure the proper performance of guard duty.

2. Fraternizing or friendly association with any German is absolutely forbidden and will be punished. Any pretense of friendship must be viewed with the utmost suspicion. Individuals claiming to have escaped from German prisoner of war camps or to be non-German members of the German Army or forced laborers will be considered as enemies until cleared by careful investigation.

3. German inhabitants who behave peacefully and refrain from hostile acts will not be molested and their lives, persons and property will be respected. All German inhabitants will be required to fulfill requisitions duly made upon them for military purposes, but anyone within this command who takes food, occupies billets or makes any demands for property, public or private, without proper authority, who engages in looting, or who commits any other offense against the persons or property of German inhabitants will be punished. Immediate action, appropriate to the circumstances, will be taken against German civilians who wrongfully commit hostile acts against us. Those who are taken prisoner will be tried by military courts.

4. Each unit commander at a special formation held as soon as practicable after the receipt of this communication will personally impress upon all members of his command this information. Should military circumstances make a formation of an entire unit at one time impracticable, a number of formations of smaller groups may be utilized, provided all members of the unit are included in one such formation.

/s/ G. S. Patton, Jr.
G. S. PATTON, JR.,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

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ANNEX NO. 4

SOLDIER'S HANDBOOK ON THE RULES OF LAND WARFARE

By

CHARLES E. CHEEVER

Colonel, Judge Advocate General's Department, United States Army

THE combat soldier very often knows little, if anything, of the rules which even in war not only control what may be done against an enemy, but also set up certain rights which the enemy must respect. This pamphlet does not contain an extensive treatment of these rules. It is intended to provide a general knowledge of the most important ones, without attempting to decide the great number of specific or doubtful questions which will come up in the field and be decided on the basis of orders and interpretations of superior authority.

BASIS OF RULES

The rules for carrying on war on land are called the Rules of Land Warfare. These rules are found both in agreements between nations and in so called unwritten rules which are so established by custom although perhaps not included in a written agreement that they are generally followed. The rules which are considered as binding upon United States forces in the field have been published in War Department Field Manual 27-10, dated 1 October 1940.

The rules of land warfare are based on the principles of military necessity, humanity, and chivalry. Generally, it may be said that it is proper to use any amount and kind of force to compel the complete surrender of the enemy at the smallest possible cost of time, life, and money, provided that violence not actually necessary is not used and dishonorable means or conduct are not involved.

Some rules are binding only on the nations which have signed the agreements in which they are included. However, in general, the enemy's soldiers and people are expected to live up to the same rules as the Allied soldiers and population. If they do not, the severe penalties which the laws of war permit may be imposed upon them.

DIVISIONS OF ENEMY POPULATION

The laws of warfare divide the population of a country at war into its armed forces and its civil or peaceful population. Ordinarily soldiers do not attack civilians unless the civilians have attacked them. However, it is not necessary to avoid firing at enemy troops only because civilians will be unavoidably injured by such fire. In turn, enemy civilians are not permitted to attack soldiers except in very limited cases. If a soldier violates this rule, he would not have the right to be treated as a prisoner of war by the enemy in the event he were captured and he might also give the enemy grounds for not complying with the rules of war. Naturally, he would also provide ammunition for propaganda to counteract the enemy's own violations. The enemy civilian who improperly attacks a member of the armed forces can of course be counter attacked and, if captured, may be tried as a war criminal and perhaps put to death. He also might provide grounds for action against the enemy population in reprisal which otherwise would not have been proper.

Some members of the armed forces, particularly medical personnel and chaplains, are entitled to special protection and are not subject to attack as long as they are doing their special jobs and do not actively fight. However, if an attack on combat soldiers incidentally kills or wounds medical soldiers or a chaplain it is not an offense against the rules of war.

TYPES OF WEAPONS

There is no unwritten rule definitely forbidding the use of poisonous gas. The United States is not a party to any agreement now in force which forbids its use. The possibility of the use of gas by the enemy must always be kept in mind since the failure to use it during the present war is not because there is a rule against it. The use of all types of mines is common and ordinarily not illegal. Poisoning of a water supply or of abandoned food is considered as a violation of the rules of war. Water supplies can be made unfit for use, however, by means which can be seen, such as placing dead animals in the water.

AERIAL BOMBARDMENT

The rules with respect to bombing from the air had not been fully developed before the present war. Probably the heavy bombings of this war are making new rules as well as history. Civilians, of course, are not proper targets for bombs. However, the presence of civilians will not protect a proper military objective. Nor is there a ground for complaint because civilians are killed or injured unavoidably as the result of an attack upon military objectives. The same is true as to civilian property. The enemy, as well as the Allied forces, have regarded such privately owned property as shipyards and plants producing war materials as proper military objectives.

ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT

Shelling of undefended towns, villages, or dwellings is forbidden. A city protected by combat troops, by forts, or similar means, is not undefended. Very often the question of whether a town or city is defended or undefended is doubtful. These cases are decided by the proper officer or commander, or even by the commander in chief, depending on the circumstances involved and after considering all the facts and obtaining legal advice if necessary.

Private as well as public property may be destroyed in the shelling of a defended place. Churches, museums, libraries, hospitals, and historic monuments should not be fired upon deliberately, assuming, of course, they are not being used for military purposes by the enemy. Damage to such buildings, accidentally or because they are near proper targets, is not a violation of the rules of war. It is the policy of the Allied forces to take all measures consistent with military necessity to avoid damage to all structures, objects, or documents of religious, cultural, architectural, archaeological, or historical value. President Roosevelt himself said some time ago, speaking of the war in Italy, that: "We have tried scrupulously, often at considerable sacrifice, to spare religious and cultural monuments, and we shall continue to do so."

TREACHERY AND QUARTER

All is not fair even in war. It is unfair and illegal for a soldier who throws down his rifle and holds up his hands in surrender to pick up his weapon and shoot the soldier who has just spared his life. A soldier, however, cannot rely on the law to protect him against a trick. Even though it is forbidden to play dead or wounded in order to surprise a careless enemy, some soldiers who seem to be dead or wounded may not be. The rules of war are not always followed by everyone. They do not do away with the combat lessons which soldiers have been taught. Soldiers cannot take chances on the basis that the enemy will always do what the rules of war say he should. A soldier must be practical and obey the orders which will be given on the basis of the situation at the time. A soldier must not shoot an enemy who has laid down his arms and surrendered, but he can keep a very close watch on him. It is forbidden to kill an enemy soldier who is disabled or wounded and has stopped fighting or to mutilate a body by gunfire or in any other way. This does not forbid, however, making certain that the enemy soldier who seems to be dead or wounded is not playing a trick.

When a soldier or a group of soldiers offers to surrender and stop fighting, which is sometimes called asking for quarter, the offer should ordinarily be accepted. Sometimes it is impracticable, however, to give quarter when some of the enemy continue to fight and then it is proper to deny quarter. Refusal of quarter may be authorized if the enemy has previously refused to give quarter.

RUSES AND STRATAGEMS

A battle is a contest of wits as well as of force and violence, but tricks which involve treachery or bad faith are forbidden. The following quotation from paragraph 40 of United States War Department Field Manual 27-10 shows in general the means which can be used to fool the enemy:

> "Among legitimate ruses may be counted surprises, ambushes, feigning attacks, retreats, or flights, simulating quiet and inactivity, giving large outposts or a strong advance guard to a small force, constructing works, bridges, etc., which it is not intended to use, transmitting false or misleading signals and telegraph messages, and sending false dispatches and newspapers with a view to their being intercepted by the enemy, lighting campfires where there are no troops, making use of the enemy's signals, bugle and trumpet calls, watch words, and words of command, pretending to communicate with troops or reinforcements which have no existence, moving landmarks, putting up dummy guns or laying dummy mines, removing badges from uniforms, clothing the men of a single unit in the uniform of several different units so that prisoners and dead may give the idea of a large force."

The use of the enemy's flag, insignia, and uniforms is permitted under some circumstances. They are not to be used during actual fighting, and if used in order to approach the enemy without drawing fire should be thrown away or removed as soon as fighting begins. It is definitely a war crime to use a flag of truce or the Red Cross emblem improperly.

Spies, that is, persons who disguise themselves for the purpose of obtaining information, may be sentenced to death if captured. However, a soldier acting as a spy is not a war criminal. He may be put to death not because he has violated a rule of law but in order to discourage the enemy's use of spies.

ENEMY PROPERTY

The rules of land warfare forbid pillage, that is, taking property both private and public from the field of battle or occupied areas. Taking property such as watches and money from the enemy sick or dead, or articles for personal use from enemy civilians, or from civilians of a free country temporarily held by the enemy, is forbidden.

Military equipment left on the battlefield may not be taken for the personal use of individual soldiers. Such property ordinarily goes to the soldier's government. The United States Articles of War in Article 79 declare that all public property taken from the enemy is the property of the United States and shall be secured for the service of the United States, and directs punishment of persons subject to military law who wrongfully take such property. The right to seize or destroy private property on enemy territory depends on the military needs of the Army. Destruction simply for the sake of destruction is forbidden, but buildings may be used for shelter, or wood cut for fuel or to clear a field of fire. The proper military authorities will decide what may be done.

COMMUNICATION WITH THE ENEMY

There are times when communication with the enemy is necessary. For example, the enemy may wish to arrange a surrender or to ask for a truce in order to bury the dead. Such communication is permitted under certain conditions. A white flag may show merely a wish to arrange for a surrender or for a meeting. It does not necessarily mean a surrender. The force which sends a messenger with a white flag should stop firing. If it does not stop firing it is not safe to believe that the enemy commander has authorized the use of the white flag and the messenger may be simply an individual soldier trying to surrender. If the enemy stops firing as the white flag advances and there are no suspicious circumstances, a group of not more than four people approaching in daylight with the white flag should not be shot at. Ordinarily communication in this way at night should not be permitted. It is entirely proper to insist that a messenger approach in such a way that any surprise or trick can be prevented.

SICK, WOUNDED AND DEAD

After a battle the force in possession of the field is required to make a search for the sick and wounded and to take care of the sick and wounded of the enemy as well as they take care of their own men. Sick and wounded soldiers in the enemy's hands, aside from their right to care and protection, are generally subject to the same treatment as other prisoners. When sick and woun-

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ded must be left behind, medical soldiers should be left with them if at all possible.

MEDICAL UNITS AND CHAPLAINS

It has already been mentioned that medical soldiers and chaplains must not be attacked if they are not taking part in actual fighting. They also have the right to be returned to their own forces as soon as practicable, if they are captured, instead of being held as prisoners of war. While waiting to be returned, medical soldiers may be used to take care of the sick and wounded with preference being given to members of their own forces. The proper military authorities decide when the return of medical soldiers or chaplains can be permitted without danger of their taking back valuable information. The authorities will also decide when the military situation makes such a return possible.

The equipment of a mobile hospital unit such as its ambulances, litters, surgical instruments and hospital equipment, if captured, will be returned at the same time as those who belong to the unit. The building and material of a more or less permanent hospital may under some circumstances be used for other purposes if captured, but only after arrangements have been made to take care of the sick and wounded being treated in that kind of hospital.

PRISONERS OF WAR

Prisoners of war had no rights until fairly recently in the history of war. They could be killed and were often made slaves. The rights of prisoners of war in the present war are found principally in the Geneva Convention of 1929, an agreement which is binding upon most of the nations in the war.

An Allied soldier who is captured is entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war unless he has lost the right to be so treated by violating one of the rules of war. This means, among other things, that he has the right to be treated decently and protected against violence, insults and public curiosity. He must not be confined as a criminal except in punishment for a crime. He cannot be forced to give information other than his true names and rank, or else his serial number, and it is unlawful for the enemy to use force, refusal of privileges, or any other means to make a prisoner of war give any other information. Of course, a prisoner of war can be questioned about anything, but he cannot be made to answer. He may keep personal things, such as his gas mask, uniform, toilet articles, and jewelry such as a watch. His money may be taken from him if a receipt is given. All weapons, ammunition and military equipment and papers, personal or not, may be taken from him.

The names of captured soldiers are exchanged through neutral nations, such as Switzerland. Generally, prisoners of war are removed from combat zones as soon as possible. They are not confined in jails or cells like common criminals, but are usually placed in enclosed and guarded areas. They are entitled to adequate and healthy camps, proper heat, ventilation and bedding, and air space and food equal to that of troops at base camps of the nation which holds the prisoners. Prisoners of war are entitled to freedom of religion and to send and receive mail and parcels. Of course, mail is limited and censored. Sick and wounded prisoners must be cared for in the same way as troops of the army which has captured them.

Prisoners of war, with the exception of officers and persons entitled to be treated as officers, such as war correspondents, may be required to do some work. The management, cleaning, and upkeep of camps and farm labor are included in the type of work permitted. Work which is degrading, unhealthy or dangerous or directly related to war operations is improper. A prisoner of war cannot be legally required to do work for which he is not physically fit. Noncommissioned officers can be required to do only supervisory work.

Prisoners of war are not paid for work in connection with the maintenance, administration, and management of the camps. They usually receive for other work the same pay as is received for similar work by soldiers in the army of the government by which they are held, or if there is no such rate of pay they are paid according to the work they do. Where work is done for a private employer, such as a farmer, the government may keep amounts which the private employer pays over the amount which it would pay the prisoner for similar work. A prisoner is not entitled to receive all of the money he earns as he earns it. Some of it can be held back to be given to the prisoner when he is released.

Officers usually are held in separate camps or at least separate quarters. They cannot be forced to work, but are entitled, unless there are other agreements, to be paid an amount equal to an officer of similar rank in the army by which they were captured, but not above the amount they are paid by their own country.

Certain neutral nations have been appointed as "protecting powers" to enforce the rights of prisoners of war. Their agents are entitled to visit and inspect camps and prisoners and to receive complaints and requests. Prisoners of war may also complain to the nation holding them, individually, or through an officer or agent whom they have selected, if such selection is permitted by the authorities in charge of the prisoners. A prisoner of war cannot be punished for making a complaint even if there is no basis for it. If improper treatment of prisoners of war is found, protests are made, as has been done in the case of American prisoners held by the Japanese, and everything possible is done to obtain the treatment to which prisoners of war are entitled.

Prisoners of war are subject to the same laws and regulations as the soldiers in the army of the country by which they are held. They are subject to the same punishment for crimes, except that bodily punishment and cruel treatment are forbidden. The military rank of a prisoner of war cannot be taken away or a number of men punished for the action of one man. Prisoners of war must salute officers of the army by which they are held. Officer prisoners must salute enemy officers of a higher rank. Punishment for minor offenses by prisoners of war may not be for a period of more than 30 days. Such punishment is like company punishment and as to prisoners held by the United States would usually be given under Article of War 104. Serious offenses are tried by military courts. A number of things have been done to make sure that a prisoner of war receives a fair trial in such cases, including a notice of the trial to the nation which is acting as the "protecting power". Death sentences can be imposed.

A prisoner of war who attempts to escape is guilty only of violating disciplinary regulations and his punishment cannot be for a period of more than 30 days. However, a prisoner of war who committed another offense while attempting to escape, such as killing a guard, would be subject to trial and punishment for that offense. A prisoner may be confined temporarily to prevent his escape.

The armistice or treaty ending a war usually controls the release of persons of both sides held as prisoners of war. The rule in general is that prisoners of war will be returned to their own countries. However, the return of prisoners of war does not always begin as soon as combat has ended. For example, many French soldiers are still being held as prisoners by the Germans, and Italian prisoners of war were not released as soon as the armistice between the Allied forces and the Badoglio government was made in Italy. Prisoners of war serving sentences for violations of the laws of war, for ordinary crimes, such as murder, or awaiting trial for ordinary crimes, are not always returned. The release and return of prisoners of war in the present war will no doubt be fully provided for in the armistices and final treaties of peace.

Prisoners of war may be released under some circumstances even before the war has ended. Return of sick and wounded prisoners who are not likely to be able to take part in further fighting has already taken place. The types of wounded or sick prisoners who are entitled to be returned are set out in detail in the Geneva Convention. Of course, nations at war may make special agreements for the exchange of prisoners at any time.

PAROLE

A parole is a promise made by a prisoner of war in return for his release. As a rule, the prisoner will be required to agree not to take part for a certain time, or not at all, in further fighting against the enemy. Soldiers in the United States Army are generally not permitted to give parole and cannot be forced to do so by the enemy. The giving of a parole for limited purposes only, such as medical treatment, is permitted in the United States forces. Enlisted men will, if possible, give their parole through an officer and an officer will not give his parole without the permission of a military superior if one is present. A soldier or officer who without authority promises not to take part in further fighting against the enemy in exchange for his release may be sent back to combat. If he is captured by the enemy, he may be punished for breaking his promise, since it is no excuse to the enemy that his promise is not recognized by his own army.

ARMISTICES

An armistice suspends the fighting for a particular time and at a particular place. It may be general, such as the armistice which ended the fighting in World War I, or it may be local, affecting only some of the forces engaged in the war. The kind most often used in the field is that known as a suspension of arms, which is a truce entered into for local military purposes, such as the bringing in of the wounded and burying of the dead. All troops concerned will be notified of the terms of the armistice. Violation of these terms must be avoided because the soldier who commits the violation will be subject to punishment by the enemy if he is captured and the violation may also give the enemy an excuse to break the armistice.

MILITARY OCCUPATION

The military occupation of enemy territory or friendly territory regained from the enemy is a complicated matter which will be handled by the special forces assigned to that task. Generally, the lives, religious convictions and practices, family honor and private property of the inhabitants will be respected. The relationship of the armed forces to the people of occupied territory and the requirements which will be made of these people will no doubt be fully set out by the proper authorities.

PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OF WAR

Penalties for violations of the laws of war are severe. They may affect not only the person guilty of the violation, but many others as well. The nation against which the violation was committed may punish the individual if he is captured, protest to the enemy, and demand the punishment of the individual offender, publish the facts to influence public opinion or make reprisals. The penalty of death is provided for many violations. It should also be remembered that offenses against laws of war by a soldier may also result in a trial under the articles of war provided for United States forces or similar articles in other forces.

As has already been indicated, the orders of superior officers are to be obeyed at all times in combat with the enemy. It is declared to be the rule in paragraph 347, Field Manual 27-10, provided for the armed forces of the United States, that individual members of the armed forces guilty of a violation of the rules of land warfare will not be punished for these offenses in case they are committed under the orders or sanction of their government or commanders. Those ordering the act have the responsibility and will be subject to punishment if it is illegal.

Reprisals are the most serious results of violations of the rules of land warfare. They are actions taken against the enemy to prevent him from gaining an advantage from his offenses and to cause him to stop his wrongdoings. Reprisals include acts such as taking hostages and burning towns or houses under some circumstances, which except as a reprisal would not be permitted.

Reprisals are not a matter for the individual soldier. In general the highest available military authority must be consulted before a reprisal is made. Revenge is not the reason for reprisals and they must not be out of proportion to the acts of the enemy, although they need not be the same as the act of the enemy.

COURTS AND TRIBUNALS

All persons accused of violations of the rules of land warfare are entitled to trial. Executions without trial are not permitted. Usually these trials are before courts-martial, military commissions, provost courts or similar courts. In the Army of the United States, courts-martial are most often used for the trial of soldiers and other persons subject to the military law of the United States, while others are tried by military commissions, provost courts or specially established courts of similar jurisdiction.

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ANNEX NO. 5

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 250.1
GNGCJ

14 March 1945

SUBJECT: Looting, Pilfering and Pillaging.

TO : All Corps, Divisional and Separate Unit Commanders.

1. I am much displeased with the numerous reports which have reached this Headquarters of acts of looting, pilfering and pillaging by American soldiers in France, Luxembourg, Belgium and Germany. Even if committed in enemy countries, looting and pilfering are reprehensible crimes, indicative of a relaxation of necessary standards of discipline on the part of our troops. Condonation of such violations, wherever committed, will tend to destroy the discipline and morale of our soldiers as well as the good reputation of the American Army.

2. All commanders will immediately institute and maintain the most forceful measures to stop these dereliction and breaches of discipline. Particular attention will be paid to the guarding of areas and buildings, in which there is a likelihood that looting may occur, as well as to the censoring of outgoing packages.

3. All military personnel will be warned that offenses of this character will not be tolerated and will be strictly dealt with and that failure on the part of any officer, regardless of rank, to take the strongest measures necessary to prevent these crimes will result in his trial by courts-martial.

/s/ G. S. Patton, Jr.
G. S. PATTON, JR.,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

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PART 17

MEDICAL



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Headquarters Third U. S. Army
Office of the Surgeon
APO 403

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Medical Section, Headquarters Third U.S. Army.

TO : Commanding General, Third U. S. Army, APO 403, U. S. Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After Action Report of the Medical Section, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, beginning with 24 March 1944, and continuing at properly designated intervals by chapters.

2. Essentially, the major effort of the Third U. S. Army Medical Service has been to save lives, to conserve military strength and to insure the earliest possible return to duty of all casualties. This, in turn, has called for the provision of prompt medical attention and surgery in forward areas, coincident with expeditious and efficient evacuation to army hospital units, where more adequate facilities are available. Operating under all types of weather conditions, terrain, and tactical situations, the Medical Service of this army has been able to achieve a mortality rate in its installations of consistently less than two percent each month from all causes. This has constituted one of the lowest mortality rates achieved by the Medical Service of any Army in military history.

Thomas L. Hartford
THOMAS L. HARTFORD,
Colonel, Medical Corps,
Surgeon.

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MEDICAL SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



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325th R/C US ARMY

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CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

Upon its arrival in the United Kingdom, the Medical Section was composed of the following number of officers, by branch:

4 - Medical Corps Officers
2 - Dental Corps Officers
2 - Veterinary Corps Officers
1 - Sanitary Corps Officer
6 - Medical Administrative Corps Officers

In addition, the section included one warrant officer and thirty-five enlisted men.

Headed by the Army Surgeon and the Executive Officer, the Medical Section is broken down into seven sub-sections. To these sub-sections were delegated specific duties involved in discharging the responsibilities of the Army Surgeon. A description of the functions of each sub-section will be found in the accompanying organizational and functional chart. The Liaison Sub-Section, shown in the chart, was added on the Continent, but for purposes of completeness is included here.

As the result of efforts to reduce the number of personnel in all staff sections to an absolute minimum in April, the Medical Section was reduced to an allotment of thirty-four enlisted men instead of the thirty-five called for under Table of Organization 20A-1. This enlisted man was taken from the Personnel and Administrative Sub-Section and is not accounted for in the personnel shown in the chart as assigned to that sub-section.

A further change in the organizational setup of the Medical Section occurred during the latter part of May when the Medical Consultant assumed duties as Assistant Executive Officer of the Medical Section. This change was due to pressure of work throughout the Medical Section in the consummation of plans for operations on the Continent and was due also to the comparative scarcity of purely medical problems, as distinct from surgical, which were being encountered. The Medical Consultant, however, was held available at all times in his advisory capacity should major medical problems arise within the command.

Top Secret Control Procedure

Due to a necessity for the maximum amount of secrecy concerning planned operations a "Top Secret" room was set aside in one of the buildings occupied by the Medical Section, to which room entrance was denied to all except classified officers and enlisted men. In this room all "Top Secret" papers were kept in a locked safe, and access to this safe was possible to classified officers only after clearance with the Executive Officer of the Section. Suitable furnishings were available in this room to allow study of all "Top Secret" documents within the room itself. No "Top Secret" documents or extracts from same were allowed to be carried from this room.

Nine officers of the Medical Section were "Complete Knowledge" officers, and seven additional officers had "Limited Knowledge" of the impending Operation "OVERLORD". The warrant officer of the section, as well as six enlisted men, were classified as "Top Secret Security Clerks" in order to assist with preparation of details concerning the operation itself.

Though the above entailed considerable lack of knowledge on the part of the remaining officers and enlisted men of the Medical Section during the planning phase, it was felt that the secrecy required justified such a procedure.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

During the entire period spent in the United Kingdom no Army medical units actually functioned as such with the exception of a few which were placed in operation under Southern Base Section shortly prior to and after D-Day. This period was therefore devoted primarily to inspection of medical units, to the training of same and to the preparation of plans for operation of these units on the Continent.

As of 23 March there were forty-one medical units assigned to Third U. S. Army which had just previously been under the control of Headquarters VIII Corps prior to the arrival of this Headquarters in the United Kingdom. Numbers of units by types assigned at this time and totals to be assigned were as follows:

	Units assigned	Total to be assigned
Medical Collecting Company	9	16
Ambulance Company, MAr	7	21
Clearing Company	6	10
Hq & Hq Detachment, Med Bn	7	17
Hq & Hq Detachment, Med Gp	3	5
Medical Gas Treatment Bn	1	3
Evac Hosp (750 bed)	1	1
Evac Hosp (CM) (400 bed)	5	14
Field Hospital	0	8
Convalescent Hospital	2	3
Medical Depot Company	0	3
Medical Laboratory	0	1
Medical Auxiliary Surg Gp	0	1
	41	105

Appraisal of all units was necessary. This was done immediately in the case of those medical units already in the United Kingdom, and the process was continued with regard to all other medical units as they arrived. The inspections were conducted by one or more officers primarily with a view to an ascertaining the training status of these units, but in addition, each inspection included appraisal of related matters such as personnel, supply, mess, motor maintenance and administration.

After several inspections it was noted that certain deficiencies in training were common to the majority of units. The most prevalent of these were lack of training in mine disposal, mine detection and airplane identification. To correct these deficiencies and to include in one document all Theater training directives a brief training memorandum No 17, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, Subject: "Training in Medical Units," dated 10 April 1944, attached hereto as annex [illegible] Master training directives submitted to this Headquarters by all army medical units were an additional means of maintaining close supervision of the training of the various units. When a unit was rated unsatisfactory, it was reinspected within ten days. At all times high standards were required.

Training inspections of Army medical units, including division medical service, was a continuous process during the stay in England. These, combined with many personal visits by the Surgeon, kept the Surgeon constantly informed of the efficiency and capabilities of medical units.

All training of hospitals in the United States, including Third U. S. Army maneuvers, had stressed wide dispersion of tents and camouflage. All reports indicated that the German army observed the provisions of the Geneva Convention with respect to medical units. This necessitated a change in the physical setup of hospitals. After consultation with Third U. S. Army hospital commanders and with commanders of hospitals which had been in combat on the Mediterranean Theater, a basic hospital setup was devised. The 11th Evacuation Hospital (CM) demonstrated this to all hospital commanders and their staffs. Tents were placed in relatively compact units on their own several yard tents laced together for greatest functional value. At a later date, a demonstration setup for convalescent and field hospitals was conducted for commanders concerned.

Medical battalions and medical companies were attached to medical groups on the basis of former command attachments in the United States, where possible, and on geographical location in England. This did not make the medical group a tactical unit. It was realized that this would have to wait until arrival on the Continent. Medical groups and medical battalions were active in supervising the functions and training of their sometimes widely dispersed companies.

Six weeks after arrival in England the Medical Section sent a liaison officer to [illegible] to work closely with First U. S. Army Group in planning the Continental operations. Constant interchange of information was maintained in all phases of the planning. Medical units were placed with [illegible] to train with the troops to which they were to be attached. Many changes occurred before the Troop List, that was published in final, unalterable form. The Medical Plan [illegible] No. 10 to Third U. S. Army Plan for operation "OVERLORD", was published 11 May.

At the request of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, certain medical units were selected for use in the Southern Base Section before D-Day. These units included headquarters & headquarters detachments of medical battalions, medical collecting companies, ambulance companies, clearing companies, one assorted evacuation hospital and the 750-bed evacuation hospitals. These units obtained valuable experience in the operation of actual hospital facilities as they were made from the Southern Base Section. The two evacuation hospitals handled a total of [illegible] casualties during the eighteen days they were in operation under Southern Base Section. Examination of patients returning from the Continent demonstrated that even during the first few days of the invasion, the medical care had been excellent.

Twelve general surgical teams, less nurses, were loaned to First U. S. Army to secure experience relative to the handling of battle casualties, as well as to provide additional surgical service for that Army's operations subsequent to D-Day. To augment naval medical personnel on Landing Ships, Tank, forty-five general surgeons and ninety surgical technicians from Third U. S. Army medical units were loaned to European Theater of Operations before D-Day for use until approximately D plus 20. The majority of the general surgeons was furnished by hospital units, as were the surgical technicians. This also constituted important training for the personnel involved. Four of this number became casualties.

A number of courses were offered at the American School Center at SHRIVENHAM, England, which were calculated to enhance the value of field services rendered by officers of the Medical Department. Approximately one hundred Medical Corps officers attended Medical Field Service School at this location, as well as a more specialized course in the treatment of gas casualties.

The Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, likewise provided facilities for field training for Army Nurses at the 14th Medical Center, CIRENCESTER, England. Approximately 250 nurses attended this course, commencing in the latter part of May. Due to the advent of D-Day and the alerting of many hospital units, this course did not run the entire thirty days originally planned for it.

To supplement courses available in this particular field at the American School Center and in order to provide intensified instruction to as many personnel as possible, a two-day course in the treatment of gas casualties was organized to be conducted by members of a company of the 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion. Practical demonstrations were given to practically all Medical Department personnel as well as to line units on the principles and techniques involved in the handling of gas casualties. Every effort was made in this connection to drive home the need for early treatment of all such cases, thereby eliminating the necessity for mass evacuation of such casualties. All divisions received this training.

After liaison had been established with medical personnel of the Ninth U. S. Air Force, special attention was given to the training of personnel in the medical groups in the technique of loading patients on airplanes for evacuation by this means. Fine cooperation on the part of the Air Force made possible the actual use of airplanes for demonstration and application of this important phase of training.

2. Evacuation

This problem was not faced from an actual operational standpoint during the planning phase in the United Kingdom. Those medical units which were loaned to Southern Base Section for use in operations immediately subsequent to D-Day performed under the control of Southern Base Section. However, preparation of plans for evacuation on the Continent consumed a considerable portion of time. A brief description of these plans follows.

It was planned that medical groups would be assigned to certain definite sectors from front to rear in the Army area. In the particular sector assigned the medical group commander would be in charge of all evacuation. In addition to furnishing evacuation facilities for division and corps clearing stations by Army, the groups would also be concerned with furnishing medical service to Army troops in the Army area.

Specifically, it was planned that Army medical groups, in so far as practicable, be reconstituted with "normal" medical battalions to consist of two medical collecting companies, one ambulance company and one clearing company as the units arrived on the far shore. Medical groups, after being assigned to sectors from front to rear, would be responsible for their respective sectors for:

a. Evacuation of division and corps clearing stations and field hospital platoons to evacuation hospitals.

b. Evacuation from evacuation hospitals or field hospitals to air fields, entraining points or beaches.

c. Providing reinforcements for corps and division medical service requested by the Army Surgeon.

d. Providing holding units at air fields.

e. Augmenting litter bearers at evacuation hospitals, air fields, and train loading points, when required.

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f. Furnishing prophylactic teams, when required.

g. Providing the Army Surgeon with operational information.

h. Providing courier service for transmission of periodic reports on request of the Army Surgeon.

i. Providing medical service for Army prisoner of war enclosures.

j. Providing clearing stations and dispensary service, where needed, for Army troops.

k. Delivering reports of status of division and corps clearing stations to the Army Surgeon by phone or courier, daily, as of 2400, indicating:

(1) Number of patients in clearing stations.
(2) Number of patients capable of being evacuated.
(3) Number of patients in active field hospital platoons.
(4) Number of patients transportable in field hospital platoons.
(5) Potential bottlenecks in any installation serviced.

l. Reporting ambulance losses - number destroyed; number deadlined and approximate time when reavailable.

Since it was felt that the Communications Zone would have only a limited amount of transportation at its disposal, it was considered likely that Third U. S. Army would have to furnish its own evacuation transportation, possibly directly back to the ports or beaches. It was stressed throughout this planning that constant contact and liaison between Army Headquarters all the way to divisions, as established and maintained by medical groups, was the keynote to the solution of all evacuation problems that might arise.

It was planned that the entire evacuation system should be made as flexible as possible. It was contemplated that collecting companies, for instance, might be attached to evacuation hospitals, thereby making available evacuation by ambulance, as well as the physical presence of personnel of the litter bearer platoons for intra-station and inter-station transportation. Possible use of clearing platoons or of an entire clearing company as holding units at air evacuation strips was also foreseen, as well as the need for at least one ambulance section at each such holding unit.

Flexibility was the guiding principle in all planning concerning evacuation of casualties on the Continent. The medical groups setup was relatively untried in military history, and it was for this reason that their function and use was stressed during the all too brief period of training allotted in the United Kingdom.

3. Hospitalization

The 400-bed Evacuation Hospital and 750-bed Evacuation Hospital loaned to Southern Base Section for use in the Southern Base Section before and after D-Day were not under Third U. S. Army control at the time. No other hospital units were in operation prior to their embarkation for the Continent.

4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

Upon its arrival in England, each new unit of Third U. S. Army was informed of the location of the nearest station hospital; it was also provided with dispensary service from a nearby unit, if none existed within its command.

Medical service, in some instances, was furnished to units not provided organically with such service by Tables of Organization and Equipment. This was particularly true of such separate companies as Signal Radio Intelligence Companies, the nature of whose duties involved some degree of isolation from other units in the United Kingdom. In such cases "medical detachments", consisting of one or more medical officers together with enlisted technicians and necessary equipment, were placed on temporary duty with these units.

Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

During the planning stage the professional staffs of the evacuation, field and convalescent hospitals assigned to this Headquarters were thoroughly investigated. The experience of the unit as a whole, as well as the professional abilities of its individual members, were evaluated.

To evaluate the professional staff of each of the units, questionnaires were sent to all officers and record made in this Headquarters of their experience and professional qualifications. Through these questionnaires and through personal interviews it was determined that in some staffs there was a shortage in particular specialties, and that in other staffs there were duplications of personnel qualified in similar specialties. Through transfers among Third U. S. Army medical units it was possible to balance many of the hospital staffs. When this source of qualified talent was exhausted, help from the European Theater Medical Staff was requested. Help was particularly needed from the Theater in the specialties of x-ray, anesthesia and neurosurgery.

In addition to constant effort toward rearrangement of the professional staffs of the various hospital units assigned to this Army, an effort was made to train hospital units to establish compact practical physical setups in the field in contrast to the dispersion and camouflage which had been practiced by these units on maneuvers in the United States. Demonstrations were arranged, put on by units with combat experience, for the benefit of Third U. S. Army hospital units in this connection.

In order to provide a maximum amount of background to personnel performing duties in the surgical and medical specialties of Army hospitals, a seven-day conference was held at KNUTSFORD, England, to which were invited Medical Corps, Dental Corps, and Army Nurse Corps personnel of the various hospital units assigned to this Army. At these conferences the Chief Consultant of the European Theater of Operations in each specialty (i.e.: surgery, medicine, neuropsychiatry and the like), as well as other professional speakers with combat experience, addressed the medical commissioned personnel interested in the particular subjects discussed on a given day. It was felt that much benefit accrued as a result of these conferences, and that a proper background was provided on which medical commissioned personnel could base further study of the difficulties which they were about to face in operations on the Continent.

During this planning phase, also, a comprehensive directive covering Medical Policies for Planned Tactical Operations was prepared and distributed to all Third U. S. Army medical units. This directive constituted a downgraded extract of pertinent material which may be found in Annex 16 (Medical Annex) to Operation "OVERLORD".

During the planning phase there was opportunity to train a large number of medical officers and nurses in a variety of professional subjects. All existing facilities in the Army, as well as in European Theater of Operations installations were used for this purpose. Among those offered were courses in anesthesia, neuropsychiatry, orthopedic surgery, laboratory technique (especially darkfield interpretation), x-ray, treatment of gas casualties, and combat exhaustion.

The course attended by the largest number of medical officers was the instruction offered at the 312th Station Hospital by European Theater of Operations in the early recognition and management of combat exhaustion. This course was attended by approximately 275 medical officers of hospital and line units assigned to Third U. S. Army.

A course for the Army Nurse Corps, designed specifically for the training of Chief Nurses and other key nurses, was conducted at the American School Center, SHRIVENHAM, England. Instruction in shock and transfusion at the British Blood Supply Depot, BRISTOL, was also available for a small number of medical officers.

By arrangement with the Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations a four-day course in anesthesia for medical officers and nurses and a one-day course in plaster technique was conducted at the 10th Station Hospital, in the MANCHESTER area. These courses were designed to precede a thirty-day period of temporary duty in those specialties in station and general hospitals.

Many difficulties were encountered as the date for Continental operations approached. However, it was possible during a three months' period to train approximately 1,000 officers and 300 nurses in a number of professional and military subjects.

2. Surgery

For details of surgical procedures planned for use in operations, see Annex 16 (Medical Annex) to Operation "OVERLORD".

3. Neuropsychiatry

The field of neuropsychiatry is relatively new and untried in military experience and will, therefore, bear some discussion in the body of this chapter.

The policy of this Headquarters in regard to the handling, treatment and disposition of neuropsychiatric casualties was based on the concept that the essential functions of medical officers are to preserve the health of the command, to conserve manpower and to keep as many men at the fighting front as possible. Emphasis was therefore placed on preventive neuropsychiatry. Since virtually all preventive measures are command functions, the division neuropsychiatrists, by virtue of their assignments, were in a position to disseminate pertinent information to officers of the line. Especial importance was placed on the necessity for differentiation between cases of physical fatigue and neuropsychiatric casualties. Provision was made to handle these in unit rest areas at the regiment or battalion level to prevent their being placed in medical evacuation channels. The Army policy included the statement "no such case will be evacuated unless he has unmistakable symptoms which are neither mild nor transient. The decision (to evacuate) is essentially one of command unless the medical aspects are clear and pronounced." Levels of therapy were to be placed, in echelon, at:

a. The line.
b. The unit rest area.
c. The battalion aid station.
d. The clearing company, from which point the division psychiatrist was to work.
e. The evacuation hospital.
f. The convalescent hospital.

The avoidance of indiscriminate evacuation and the proper selection for treatment on the spot were considered to be imperative. Formal neuropsychiatric diagnosis leaves in the mind of the soldier the firm conviction that he will never again perform combat service. It was directed, therefore, that no diagnosis other than "exhaustion" would be placed on the Emergency Medical Tag except in the case of the obviously psychotic.

Each evacuation hospital and each division had its assigned neuropsychiatrist. This group of men had an average of five years' formal training and experience in neuropsychiatry. All were sent to the Theater course in combat neuroses. Division medical officers were systematically sent to this highly practical course at the rate of twenty per week. Each evacuation hospital neuropsychiatrist chose and trained two nurses and six enlisted men as narcotherapy teams.

Because of the tactical necessity for relatively short periods of therapy in the evacuation hospitals (due to their expected admission rates and probable rapid moves) it was anticipated that many neuropsychiatric casualties who might otherwise be returned to full combat duty would be lost to the Army. The convalescent hospital was equipped with a clinical section and a comprehensive, intensive and graded rehabilitation program. It seemed ideally adapted for handling this particular group of casualties. Therefore, each convalescent hospital was assigned one neuropsychiatrist and six enlisted medical technicians who had been trained as a narcotherapy team.

4. Dental

On 21 April a dental directive was published which, among other matters, ordered that upon arrival of troops in the United Kingdom an immediate dental survey should be made and that routine dental work be accomplished as soon as possible.

Plans were also formulated during this period for adequate dental service to be furnished on the Continent, including emergency dental work, routine treatment wherever possible, repair and replacement of dentures which might be lost or broken in combat and the proper treatment of maxillo-facial injuries prior to evacuation of such casualties to the Communications Zone.

In many instances separate companies were too far removed from a unit having assigned dental personnel to make practical their treatment by dental personnel of such a unit. Dental service was furnished by placing a dental officer and an enlisted assistant from either a medical battalion or field hospital on temporary duty for a period of from fourteen to twenty-one days with the separate company requiring dental service.

Dental laboratory trucks for the 4th Auxiliary Surgical Group prosthetic teams did not arrive until 1 June. During the interim permission was obtained from the Dental Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, to place the nine technicians comprising a part of these prosthetic teams on temporary duty with Central Dental Laboratory Number 1 in LONDON for duty and training in that laboratory. During the first week of June three dental laboratory trucks arrived and the prosthetic teams to operate them were assigned to the XII, XV and XX Corps to be placed at the disposal of the corps surgeons in furnishing prosthetic treatment, where necessary, to the respective corps units.

Two more dental laboratory trucks were shortly thereafter made available for an indefinite length of time to Third U. S. Army; the personnel to operate these two trucks to be furnished by this Army.

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The fourth truck with its dental prosthetic team was dispatched to VIII Corps on 15 June to remain with them until they left for the Continent. The fifth dental laboratory truck was assigned on activity to duties at PA[illegible] CAMP (northeast of [illegible], England) at which there was a considerable concentration of units assigned to this Army.

A consolidated report of dental service furnished to Third U. S. Army during the period March 1944 to June 1944 is shown below:

	Mar.	Apr.	May	June
Strength (Reported)	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Admissions Routine	1041	1103	1211	[illegible]
Admissions Emergency	456	2167	1761	[illegible]
Sittings	6444	17056	21912	17944
Officer Personnel	117	247	256	236
Enlisted Personnel	115	239	261	258
Restorations	2447	11407	13611	10770
Dentures	124	347	420	[illegible]
Gingivitis	119	948	1357	1087
Gingivitis Treatment	684	1703	3034	2404
Stomatitis, Vincent's	111	448	485	521
Stomatitis, Vincent's Treatment	315	1434	1595	1330

5. Veterinary

With the establishment of four messes in Headquarters Third U. S. Army the Headquarters Commandant requested the veterinary services of the Medical Section to supervise their sanitation and cleanliness. They were inspected daily until departure from the United Kingdom of this Headquarters.

On 24 March inspection of Class I distributing points was inaugurated. These inspections were largely confined to the supply points located at [illegible] and [illegible] Detachment of [illegible]. Even though these supply points were under Western Base Section control, the veterinary service of this Headquarters was authorized by the Depot Quartermaster to point out deficiencies when noted, and to offer constructive advice to railhead personnel. Most common deficiencies noted were:

1. The failure to issue individual pieces of meat and cheese with protective covering.
2. Insanitary dividing of meat and cheese.
3. Issue of bread without any protective covering.

Lack of an adequate number of bread sacks was common throughout the entire period of stay in the United Kingdom.

From 5 April until departure from the United Kingdom, over 200 Third U. S. Army troop messes were inspected. Many of these were joint-messes and therefore represented many more troops than would have been the case if each mess had been operated separately. The mess problem was largely of a sanitary and mechanical nature.

Personnel of many messes were not properly informed regarding the use of lemon crystals. This matter was discussed at each mess inspection and instructional material was published as a Third U. S. Army directive.

6. Personnel

As new medical units arrived in the United Kingdom from the Zone of the Interior, they were not completely at Table of Organization strength. This was true particularly in regard to Medical Corps officers. A shortage of Medical Corps officers, therefore, principally developed, and as of the end of June the following shortages existed throughout the Third U. S. Army:

Medical Corps	- 25
Medical Administrative Corps	- 18
Dental Corps	- 7
Army Nurse Corps	- 5

By means of continuous shifting of medical personnel, all units had embarked for the Continent prior to the end of June with full Table of Organization strength. The above shortages were only partly filled in medical units phased in later, prior to their departure for the Continent.

Shortages of commissioned officers qualified in the specialties, particularly x-ray, neurosurgery, and anesthesia, existed throughout this period. Through constant survey of the professional qualifications of all medical personnel, together with resulting transfers, the shortages in these specialties were minimized to some extent.

Section 4 - Medical Supply

During this phase problems involving medical supply resolved themselves into three major and distinct efforts.

1. Procurement of initial T/E and T/BA equipment for medical units.
2. Implementation of substitutes for T/E and T/BA medical equipment not readily in sufficient quantities in this theater for distribution to all units.
3. Preparation of a medical supply plan for operations on the Continent.

The provision of T/E and T/BA equipment for medical units was a continuous process from the time this Headquarters reached the United Kingdom until approximately the end of August, two and a half months after D-Day, when the Army medical units were so equipped prior to their evacuation for the Continent. In addition, T/E and T/BA medical equipment was procured for line units, including major commands, such as divisions.

Three general depots, under the control of Western Base Section, were primarily utilized as sources for Third U. S. Army medical equipment. These depots were located in the general area between [illegible] and [illegible]. The modus operandi included close coordination with the [illegible] Section of this Headquarters, AC of S [illegible] of First U. S. Army Group, AC of S [illegible] of Headquarters European Theater of Operations, the Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, and the various general depots concerned.

To increase the facility with which medical items could be handled and distributed to Third U. S. Army medical units, provision was made, in the middle of April, for the use of Army medical depots as distributing points for equipping and supplying these units. The two depot companies set up distributing points in the LIVERPOOL area. At approximately the same time, the Army Medical Supply Officer was appointed Purchasing and Contracting Officer for all types of medical supplies for Third U. S. Army.

Requisitions for pre-scheduled medical supply requirements were submitted to Headquarters European Theater of Operations for approximately 300 tons. Pre-scheduled medical supply requirements for Civil Affairs units for Third U. S. Army were also computed and submitted, at this time.

Among items which proved difficult to procure for medical units were tentage of all types and pioneer tool sets for vehicles. The shortages in tentage alone resulted in a requisition, on 3 May, for 1,534 pyramidal tents and 477 hospital ward tents. Essential expendable medical supplies such as aspirin, ammonia chloride troches, terpin hydrate and other drugs used in the treatment of upper respiratory diseases, were comparatively non-available.

Particular difficulty was experienced in equipping the 8th Convalescent Hospital and the 79th Infantry Division. As of the end of April, the 8th Convalescent Hospital had still received none of its equipment. It was learned that no equipment for a convalescent hospital was, at that time, in the United Kingdom. It was therefore necessary that a radiogram be sent to the United States to have complete equipment for this unit placed on the next available transport. The equipment arrived just prior to the scheduled departure of that unit for the Continent.

Due to a sudden change in the priority of the 79th Infantry Division early in June, it became necessary to equip this unit immediately. The major shortage of this division was lack of assault medical pack equipment in accordance with recent changes in Tables of Equipment. The only source in the United Kingdom for this equipment proved to be in the 29th Infantry Division. Trucks from one of the Army medical depot companies were dispatched immediately to the 29th Infantry Division to pick up this equipment and transport it to the docks where it was turned over to the 79th Infantry Division just prior to its departure. Shortly thereafter the priorities of the 5th and 8th Infantry Divisions were also raised and it was necessary to institute considerable transfer of medical supplies between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland for the purpose of completely equipping these units in time.

It was learned early in June that the Office of the Chief Quartermaster, European Theater of Operations, had not been able to furnish Red Cross ground markers for Third U. S. Army medical units, and also that sufficient flies, for marking them properly, would not be available as substitutes. It was thus necessary to secure 60,000 square yards of canvas, and contract was initiated with a local firm in LIVERPOOL to sew 548 fly-type markers and forty-eight, fifty-foot-square ground markers on which to paint the Red Cross.

Since certain medical units were phased in under VIII Corps, which was attached to First U. S. Army in its assault wave on the Continent, it was necessary that certain medical units be provided with means of amphibious packing of medical supplies. In this connection, AOC 65-mm shell cases were secured from an ordnance ammunition company and one of the Army medical depot companies was given the assignment of changing the markings of these cases, and packing and sealing them so as to be watertight. In addition, 5,000 British-made packing boxes were secured for use by hospital units in packing equipment for movement to the Continent.

In addition to procurement of T/E and T/BA equipment for medical units assigned to Third U. S. Army, FROCO (Project for Continental Operations) units were secured for use by the 4th Auxiliary Surgical Group under FROCO Project No. 1 and FROCO Project No. 2.

Under FROCO Project No. 1, one FROCO unit consisted of three 1½ ton 6x6 trucks, cargo, complete with special surgical equipment and one, 250-gallon water trailer. Ten such units were procured for the 4th Auxiliary Surgical Group.

Under FROCO Project No. 2, one FROCO unit consisted of one 2½ ton truck, specially fitted with x-ray equipment. Three of these units were ultimately received by the 4th Auxiliary Surgical Group.

A Blood Bank Detachment consisting of eight 2½ ton trucks, for use in transporting blood was also secured and attached to one of the Army medical depot companies.

In connection with the procurement of complete unit assemblies for hospital units, adequate storage facilities were not always available at locations occupied by the various units. In instances such as these, efforts were made to obtain tentage, or in the event that that failed, recommendations were made to move the unit to a new location or to obtain local storage facilities.

Preparation of a medical supply plan for operations on the Continent was submitted to Headquarters First U. S. Army Group, early in April, and was subsequently approved. Details of this plan will be found in Annex 16 to Operation "OVERLORD."

Under Operation "OVERLORD", an advance platoon of the 93d Medical Depot Company was attached to First U. S. Army for operation on the OMAHA BEACH. Advance Section No. 2, of the 93d Medical Depot Company was attached to VIII Corps for initial operation on the UTAH BEACH. Initial planning in regard to Third U. S. Army operations included the furnishing of the two medical depot companies at an early stage.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

Upon arrival of Headquarters Third U. S. Army in the United Kingdom, it was evident that five major problems were to be considered from the standpoint of Preventive Medicine.

a. Venereal disease control.
b. Communicable diseases.
c. Medical reports and records.
d. Non-battle injuries.
e. Sanitation.

As a basis for all plans in this particular field, considerable data was assembled and studied from experiences of troops on maneuvers in the United States, other troops based in Iceland and in the United Kingdom, results accruing from the North African, Sicilian and Italian campaigns, and information secured from United States Army Air Force operations in the European Theater of Operations. It became obvious, early in the planning phase, that much of the above data would not apply in the case of proposed Continental operations. During the planning period, constant coordination was in effect with observers from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, North African Theater of Operations, First U. S. Army Group, and First U. S. Army. As a result of this constant study and coordination, repeated changes were made in policies and procedures as the planning period progressed. All available medical intelligence reports from the above mentioned headquarters were carefully studied and evaluated in the light of their applicability to the needs of this Army.

The details of all plans and policies promulgated in the field of Preventive Medicine will be found in Annex 16 (Medical Annex) to Operation "OVERLORD." Pertinent extracts from this Plan were downgraded and published in the form of directives, for use in the medical service of this Army.

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2. Venereal Disease Control

Available intelligence reports indicated that there was a great increase in venereal disease incidence among the civilian population in Nazi occupied countries; therefore, it was anticipated that the control of venereal disease amongst Third U. S. Army troops during Continental operations would be a definite military problem. With this in mind, a Venereal Disease Control Officer was designated as such, on a full time basis, on 1 May.

A comprehensive venereal disease program was instituted while troops were still located in the United Kingdom, this program becoming a basis for similar control on the Continent.

During this period also, preparations were made for the operation of venereal prophylactic stations in towns and cities on the Continent by institution of training whereby medical collecting and clearing companies would become qualified to operate such stations.

The control of venereal diseases during the stay of Third U. S. Army troops in the United Kingdom, at no time constituted a serious problem. The various base sections had established venereal disease prophylactic stations in all large cities in the United Kingdom. Most venereal disease cases occurring among Third U. S. Army troops originated from contacts in LONDON, BIRMINGHAM, MANCHESTER, and LIVERPOOL. A summary of the statistics shown in Annex II to the Medical Section report, for the period 24 March to 7 July, reveals that for an average strength of 138,364 officers and men, a weekly average of sixty-eight new cases were reported, this being a rate of 16.49 per 1,000 per annum. A complete breakdown by weekly periods will be found in the above referred to Annex.

3. Communicable Diseases

In general, communicable diseases presented no problem to Third U. S. Army troops during their stay in the United Kingdom; upper respiratory diseases were widespread, but mild in nature. Predisposing to this type of infection was the cold, damp, foggy English weather, as well as heating and housing facilities to which United States troops were unaccustomed.

Figures shown in Annex II to the Medical Section report, reveal that during the period 24 March to 7 July, on an average total strength of 138,364 officers and men, 1,023 cases of communicable diseases occurred weekly, or an average weekly rate of 384 per 1,000 per annum. Weekly breakdown of figures on which this summary is based will be found in Annex II.

Common respiratory diseases revealed high seasonal rates during April and May and a few cases of pneumonia were reported.

Diarrheal diseases were few and sporadic, with the exception of a small outbreak during the weeks of 7 April and 16 June.

The incidence of influenza was low throughout the entire period.

Both measles and mumps were fairly prevalent during the first eight weeks of the period. Scarlet fever cases were extremely low, one small outbreak occurring in a medical unit on 30 May. The total personnel affected in this outbreak consisted of ten cases.

Sporadic cases of recurrent malaria, epidemic hepatitis and meningococcic meningitis, were seen.

The daily non-effective rate gradually decreased from 18.04 per 1,000 per annum, at the beginning of the period, to 6.68 per 1,000 per annum at the conclusion of this phase.

4. Medical Reports and Records

The projection of medical policies and plans and the attainment of results in the field of preventive medicine, are largely dependent upon the assembly and analysis of an enormous number of statistical reports. Therefore, interwoven with every aspect of the Medical Section's activities during the planning phase in the United Kingdom, was the necessity for the setting up of a system of accurate medical reports and records, whereby conclusions could be properly drawn and plans promulgated and effected. The details of the system evolved will be found in Annex 16 (Medical Annex) to Operation "OVERLORD", and amendments thereto.

5. Non-Battle Injuries

During the period 24 March to 7 July, inclusive, an average of 216 cases per week of non-battle injuries occurred among an average strength of 138,364 officers and men. This constituted an average weekly rate of seventy-five cases per 1,000 per annum, as will be seen by reference to Annex II of the Medical Section report. The highest rates were experienced from the fifth through the thirteenth weeks of this period. The high rate of non-battle injuries was at least partially due to heavy traffic on narrow winding roads, foggy days and nights which reduced driving visibility, and the necessity for driving on the left hand side of the road.

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

The 7th Medical Laboratory arrived in the United Kingdom on 16 May. It was the only medical laboratory assigned to Third U. S. Army. No actual laboratory work was performed during the period of its stay in the United Kingdom. Professional training of the personnel of the unit, together with orientation courses calculated to better its performance of its mission on the Continent, procurement of necessary equipment, and study of the operations of other Army medical laboratories in the North African Theater of Operations, and in the Pacific Theater, occupied the unit during this entire phase.

7. Sanitation

U. S. Army troops were housed in the United Kingdom under a wide variety of conditions, varying in degree from field bivouac areas to shelter in requisitioned buildings. In many respects, standards of sanitation were quite different from those to which our troops had been accustomed in the United States. This called for the use of some temporary expedients, compromises, and in some instances, changes in standards, to meet local conditions.

Water supplies for troops in the United Kingdom were obtained largely from municipal sources, practically all of which provided some degree of artificial treatment, including chlorination. The capacity for which English water systems were designed, was approximately one quarter that of American practice for a comparable number of people. In addition, the presence of a large number of Allied troops throughout the entire United Kingdom necessitated conservation measures in order to prevent the overtaxing of local systems and the occurrence of serious shortages.

Due to the overcrowded conditions throughout the United Kingdom, it was frequently expedient to utilize halls and large buildings on estates, for the housing of various troops. These estates were provided with a private water supply in most instances and a policy was followed of artificial chlorination of such water.

The disposal of sewage and human wastes varied from fairly satisfactory flush-toilet installations, almost invariably connected to sewer systems having sewage facilities, to the less satisfactory "bucket-latrine" method commonly used in many British camps.

Disposal of garbage and other waste materials presented few problems. Local collection and use of garbage for stock feeding was reasonably satisfactory, depending on the capability and care exercised by the individual collector.

Insect control was greatly facilitated by climatic conditions. Cool weather precluded any appreciable or serious development of flies or mosquitoes. Routine local control measures were effective in most instances.

A review of reports and authoritative accounts of experiences in other theaters of operations, indicated that sanitation could become a major military problem unless commands were thoroughly instructed in the difficulties which might be encountered and methods of handling them. Expected conditions on the Continent, as made available through medical intelligence and related channels, were taken into account in the preparation of directives relating to sanitation. The principles involved in these directives will be found in Annex 16 (Medical Annex) to Operation "OVERLORD."

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

The following officers of the Medical Section accompanied the movement of the Forward Echelon of this Headquarters to the Continent, preceding the main body of the Medical Section:

Surgical Consultant
Medical Consultant
Neuropsychiatric Consultant
Operations and Training Sub-section:
Chief of Sub-section
Hospitalisation Officer
Air Evacuation Officer
Administrative Assistant
Venereal Disease Control Officer
Chief of Finance and Supply Sub-section
Assistant, Veterinarian
Assistant, Personnel & Administrative Sub-section

Nine enlisted men also accompanied this movement.

Upon arrival of the main body of this Headquarters on the Continent, the organization of the Medical Section remained essentially unchanged. However, two officers and two enlisted men of the Medical Section remained behind in the United Kingdom as representatives of this section, with Headquarters III Corps, Medical Section. Of this personnel, one officer was from the Finance and Supply Sub-section, one officer was from the Operations and Training Sub-section, and one enlisted man each, was from those respective sub-sections.

An additional 1st Lieutenant, Medical Administrative Corps, was placed on temporary duty with Headquarters III Corps, to aid the representative of the Finance and Supply Sub-section, Medical Section, this Headquarters, in equipping medical units still in the United Kingdom.

A 1st Lieutenant, Medical Administrative Corps, was also placed on temporary duty with the Finance and Supply Sub-section, on the Continent, due to the necessity for locating equipment of various medical units as they arrived on the Continent, which often arrived separately from the personnel of the units.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

As of 6 July, all Third U. S. Army medical units already on the Continent were attached to Headquarters VIII Corps, which was in operation under the control of First U. S. Army. These units were:

Hq & Hq Det, 167th Medical Battalion
Hq & Hq Det, 106th Medical Battalion
429th Medical Collecting Company
465th Medical Collecting Company
635th Clearing Company
16th Field Hospital
44th Evacuation Hospital (2M)
31st Evacuation Hospital (2M)
33d Medical Depot Company

In addition, the Advance Depot Platoon of the 32d Medical Depot Company was in operation for First U. S. Army on the OMAHA BEACH.

Due to the fact that Third U. S. Army did not become operational for some time and it was found that hospitalization facilities would be required by First U. S. Army in excess of that possessed by hospitals already in operation under that Army, Twelfth U. S. Army Group directed that all evacuation hospitals upon their arrival on the Continent would be attached to First U. S. Army. These hospitals were to be moved and operated by that Army as the need arose, until Third U. S. Army became operational. A total of eleven evacuation hospitals assigned to Third U. S. Army operated for varying lengths of time under First U. S. Army during the period 6 July to 31 July. At the end of this period all evacuation hospitals except the 106th Evacuation Hospital and the 109th Evacuation Hospital were returned to Third U. S. Army control, the latter two being relieved of their attachment at a later date.

One field hospital was used during this period by First U. S. Army. On 16 July the 54th Field Hospital moved to the vicinity of LA HAYE DU PUITS (T-18) to support the 9th and 79th Infantry Divisions. The units of this hospital remained in this vicinity during the period 16 to 31 July.

In addition to the above-mentioned medical units, occasional need arose for operation of other units by First U. S. Army. For example, the 436th Medical Collecting Company was utilized to augment the 44th Evacuation Hospital which was receiving a large volume of casualties in the CARENTAN (T-28) area. There was especially a need for the litter bearer platoon and less urgent necessity for the station platoon. The ambulance platoon was used to supplement evacuation of the hospital. A need for another unit arose when the 83d Infantry Division arrived in France with only one platoon of its clearing company. The other pla-

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tion had become separated in the marshalling area in England and did not rejoin the unit until three weeks after the division reached the Continent. The 46th Clearing Company was attached to the 4th Infantry Division to supplement the one platoon. It operated with the division until about 25 July.

The majority of Army medical units, as they arrived in sporadic groups, were concentrated in bivouac in an area several miles north of [illegible] (T-09). From one to seven units would arrive in a day's time. As the units arrived on the beach, they were directed to a transit area and from there guided to [illegible] (T-10) or to ST [illegible] (T-17) by a Military Police escort. The CO of G-4, of that Headquarters, was notified in advance of the units scheduled to debark on the beach and in turn notified the Medical Section. An officer guide from the Medical Section was then dispatched to the designated transit to meet the unit and guide it to the concentration area. As more units arrived, officers were designated from units in the concentration area to lead in the new arrivals. Difficulties were encountered. Most of the units arrived in more than one serial, some in four or five. At times only one vehicle of a unit would arrive. Moreover, because of the large volume of units arriving on the beach and the relatively limited communication facilities, the notification of a unit's arrival often came after the unit had already reached the rendezvous point. Nevertheless, with reasonable facility eighty-six of 104 medical units assigned to Third U. S. Army arrived on the Continent during the pre-operational period 7-31 July. The principal units which had not arrived were:

12th Evacuation Hospital
108th Evacuation Hospital (SM)
110th Evacuation Hospital (SM)
56th Field Hospital
7th Convalescent Hospital
8th Convalescent Hospital
92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion
94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion
95th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion

2. Evacuation

During the pre-operational period of Third U. S. Army on the Continent, definite plans were made for the tactical employment of medical units. In brief, they were as follows:

a. Each corps was assigned a corps battalion consisting of one battalion headquarters, one clearing company, two collecting companies and one ambulance company. The corps battalion was to be under the control of the corps surgeon with the mission of providing corps medical service.

b. Each medical group was to evacuate a corps zone from division clearing stations to an Army installation. Groups were organized to consist of two medical battalions similar in so far as possible, to the corps medical battalion. In advance section Communications Zone was to evacuate as many evacuation hospitals as possible.

c. From the division clearing stations, where triage of patients was performed, non-transportable patients were to be sent to an adjacent platoon of a field hospital. The transportable patients requiring further evacuation were to be sent to an evacuation hospital.

3. Hospitalization

Hospitalization facilities were needed for the care of Third U. S. Army troops during the pre-operational phase on the Continent. The 101st Evacuation Hospital was therefore opened on 13 July at a location two miles northwest of ST [illegible] LE VIC (T-10), and authority was obtained for Third U. S. Army to retain control of this hospital during the entire pre-operational period.

The following plans were made covering the use of hospital units when Third U. S. Army became operational:

a. Evacuation Hospitals: Evacuation hospitals were to be used in the accepted orthodox manner.

b. Field Hospitals: By attaching field hospitals to the various corps, the corps surgeon was further enabled to attach one hospitalization unit (one section of a field hospital) to each division clearing station. Platoons of field hospitals were to be used, in addition, as holding units at air strips, augmented by one or more clearing companies of a medical gas treatment battalion.

c. Convalescent Hospitals: Convalescent hospitals were to be used for those patients not requiring more than a fifteen-day convalescent period.

d. Army Clearing Companies: Army clearing companies were not to be employed in the orthodox manner. The clearing companies (or platoons of same) were to be attached to the evacuation hospitals to provide medical service for the less seriously wounded, and also to act as holding units for non-transportable patients when evacuation hospitals displaced forward.

e. Army Collecting Companies: It was also planned to attach one Army collecting company to each evacuation hospital with the exception of the ambulance platoons of those companies. It was felt that such an attachment to an evacuation hospital would aid in the transporting of patients within the hospital area and free the personnel of the evacuation hospital for more intensive medical care of the patients.

4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

A few Signal and Ordnance companies, as well as a number of Quartermaster companies, located in the vicinity of ST MARTIN (T-05), were without medical service. An Army collecting company was therefore given the responsibility of establishing and maintaining a roving dispensary and ambulance service for these companies from the middle to the end of July.

Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

The pre-operational phase of Headquarters Third U. S. Army on the Continent, in so far as the professional services of the Medical Section were concerned, was one primarily of orientation and study of results already obtained in First U. S. Army.

2. Surgery

In the field of surgery, through constant contact with First U. S. Army, it was noted that frequent transfers of auxiliary surgical teams from one hospital unit to another were the rule rather than the exception; such transfers depending almost exclusively upon the tactical situation and the surgical backlog of the hospitals concerned. This problem was watched very closely in as much as it was felt that Third U. S. Army hospitals would be faced with fundamentally the same circumstances upon becoming operational. Several surgical teams from the 4th Auxiliary Surgical Group (a Third U. S. Army unit), attached to First U. S. Army hospital units to supplement their surgical services, benefited considerably from their experience.

3. Neuropsychiatry

A high percentage of the neuropsychiatrists in Third U. S. Army units had intensive experience in the combat zone during a month or more prior to Third U. S. Army becoming operational, through work with First U. S. Army.

The Third U. S. Army divisions attached to First U. S. Army experienced a variable rate of neuropsychiatric casualties. From the standpoint of predictability concerning such casualties when Third U. S. Army became operational, a consideration of the factors involved led to the conclusions that:

a. A high percentage of replacements would have already taken place in officers and men in these divisions. A higher incidence of neuropsychiatric casualties might be expected in this group of replacements than had occurred in the various divisions' original assigned strength.

b. The remaining troops (including replacements) would be seasoned, but tired.

c. Many seasoned troops would enter combat under officers who had little or no battle experience.

d. To offset the above considerations remained the fact, that men who should never have originally been sent to foreign service, would, to a great extent, already have been weeded out in actual combat.

4. Dental

During the month of July, of the five dental laboratory trucks available to Third U. S. Army, two were attached to First U. S. Army for duty with the 4th Convalescent Hospital, and two were attached to the 101st Evacuation Hospital, which was the only evacuation hospital servicing Third U. S. Army troops during the pre-operational period. The remaining dental laboratory truck was attached to Headquarters Third U. S. Army to perform necessary prosthetic work among personnel of the Headquarters.

Due to the experience of First U. S. Army, it was decided to attach the dental prosthetic teams (dental laboratory trucks) of the 4th Auxiliary Surgical Group to evacuation hospitals when Third U. S. Army became operational, rather than to corps or division headquarters. It was also decided to enlarge the dental services of the 6th Convalescent Hospital in order to provide routine treatment for all patients admitted to that hospital and to treat those who had lost or broken their dentures, the latter to be held in this hospital until treatment was completed. Necessary equipment was requested to be ready for issue at such time as the 6th Convalescent Hospital became functional.

A consolidated report of dental service rendered to Third U. S. Army troops during the month of July is shown below:

	July 13 Days
Strength (Reported)	132598
Admissions Routine	5650
Admissions Emergency	994
Sittings	15756
Officer Personnel	226
Enlisted Personnel	224
Restorations	6681
Dentures	295
Gingivitis	726
Gingivitis Treatment	1409
Stomatitis, Vincent's	520
Stomatitis, Vincent's Treatment	935

5. Veterinary

It was the function of the veterinary service to advise concerning possible purchases of local excess foodstuffs to augment Army rations and to inspect Class I supply points.

During this early period on the Continent it was felt that the purchase of local foods should be prohibited, particularly butter, because of:

a. Failure of the local products to meet sanitary requirements of the Army.

b. The impracticability involved in attempts by a fast moving force to procure and inspect large quantities of foodstuffs and to distribute same to the troops.

This position was later compromised by agreement that certain foodstuffs could be purchased locally and served to the troops, provided that a germicidal rinse had been used to wash same prior to consumption.

Between 16 July and 1 August, a total of three Class I supply points were placed in operation for Third U. S. Army units. These were inspected regularly, particular attention being paid to the handling of perishable rations and the avoidance of waste. It was directed that all ration trucks be made spotlessly clean before rations were loaded. The initial supply of "C" and Ten-in-One rations were continually inspected, this being in addition to the inspection of "B" rations and perishable substitutes.

Each of the three bakeries of these supply points were also inspected during this period. Bread prepared by quartermaster mobile bakeries, in general, was handled in a satisfactory manner. Bread sacks were usually available and it was found that care was necessary in stacking the bread at the supply points to avoid crushing.

6. Personnel

Shortages in Medical Department commissioned personnel continued to exist throughout the month of July. As of the end of that month, the following deficiencies existed:

Medical Corps	35
Medical Administrative Corps	20
Dental Corps	5

Shortages were due partially to casualties which had occurred in Third U. S. Army units while attached to First U. S. Army, and partially to the inability of replacements to report physically to our units. The previous shortage of nurses, mentioned in Chapter 1, had been adjusted by the end of July.

Shortage of qualified personnel in the specialties, particularly that of anesthesia, continued to exist, both in regard to Medical Corps officers and Army Nurse Corps. Constant survey of qualifications possessed by commissioned personnel in all medical units were made, in an attempt to reduce the extent of this deficiency.

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Section 4 - Medical Supply

Medical supply problems experienced in July involved three major efforts:

1. Completion of equipping medical units still in the United Kingdom, prior to their departure for the Continent.

2. Coordination of the arrival of medical units in a bivouac area with the arrival of their equipment, which in many instances had been shipped separately from the United Kingdom.

3. Deployment of the two medical depot companies in the most advantageous manner for actual use in impending operations by Third U. S. Army.

Medical units still in the United Kingdom were equipped through the efforts of a Medical Administrative Corps officer and an enlisted man left on temporary duty with Headquarters XII Corps, by the Medical Section of this Headquarters.

Upon departure of the 33d and 33d Medical Depot Companies, for the Continent, Company "C" of the 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion was set up to operate a supply point for Army medical units at ASHFORD, England. This company functioned as such until the completion of the equipping of all medical units of Third U. S. Army.

When this Headquarters arrived on the Continent, the advance platoon of the 33d Medical Depot Company, attached to First U. S. Army, was in operation with the 1st Medical Depot Company on the OMAHA BEACH. The advance section, 33d Medical Depot Company (attached to VIII Corps) was operating with the advance platoon, 1st Medical Depot Company, on the UTAH BEACH.

Problems were encountered in finding organizational equipment of units which arrived on the Continent separately from the personnel. A plan was set up with the Medical Supply Officer, Advance Section, Communications Zone, to have an officer assigned to the specific job of checking each ship as it arrived at either beach, to determine whether or not the equipment was unloaded, and when it would be ready to pick up.

On 18 July, Third U. S. Army was notified by the Advance Section, Communications Zone, that medical depot companies assigned to the latter, had not yet arrived on the Continent; that they did not have the necessary personnel to operate a depot at CHEF DU PONT (T-14), which was to relieve the UTAH BEACH medical dump. It was agreed that the 33d Medical Depot Company (assigned to Third U. S. Army) should well be attached for this purpose. Over 900 tons of medical supplies were handled and processed swiftly and efficiently.

On 18 July, the 33d Medical Depot Company was moved into MONTEBOURG (T-10), immediately upon its arrival, in order to supply Third U. S. Army medical units, which were then arriving on the Continent in increasing numbers and going into operation for First U. S. Army.

As the VIII Corps started its drive toward COUTANCES (T-26), the advance section of the 33d Medical Depot Company moved in to directly support the troops at LA HAYE DU PUITS (T-18). The depot was established two and one half miles from the front line.

Due to imminent operations by the Third U. S. Army, the 33d Medical Depot Company was moved by shuttle to BRICQUEVILLE (T-10), having been relieved of its assignment at CHEF DU PONT (T-14) by the arrival of an Advance Section, Communications Zone medical depot company. BRICQUEVILLE was selected as being the southernmost point within the Army boundary that could support the Army when it became operational.

In view of the fact that the Advance Section, Communications Zone, had been unable to fill the requisitions to stock Third U. S. Army medical depots, it was agreed by the Third U. S. Army and the Advance Section, Communications Zone, to place ten medical maintenance units in the 33d Medical Depot Company at BRICQUEVILLE. This provided medical supplies for 200,000 men for fifteen days.

The experience of First U. S. Army, and known planned operations of Third U. S. Army, made it apparent that the minimum of supplies in a medical maintenance unit would not meet the demands of Third U. S. Army hospitals. Therefore, Advance Section, Communications Zone, was requested to release immediately all supplies arriving on the Continent bearing markings for Third U. S. Army units. Advance Section, Communications Zone, agreed to this, thereby providing a ten percent reserve of T/E and T/A non-expendable items.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

After the establishment of this Headquarters in France, all the various phases of Preventive Medicine were again gone over in detail with unit medical officers in all Third U. S. Army units. Many of the anticipated problems did not materialize and liaison was constantly maintained with various corps and division surgeons, Civil Affairs, and with the First U. S. Army, as many of our troops were fighting under its command.

2. Venereal Disease Control

The problem of venereal disease control was at its minimum. Troops were being moved from the United Kingdom to the Continent, and the venereal disease rates among troops still in the United Kingdom remained low.

On the Continent the incidence of venereal disease among troops was also quite low. This was primarily due to the fact that all towns, cities and homes were placed "off limits", and these restrictions were rigidly enforced. In addition, most troops were committed to action under First U. S. Army, soon after arrival.

3. Communicable Diseases

No real problems or epidemics were encountered during this period despite intimate contact with French civilians in the NORMANDY sector. One small outbreak of gastro-enteritis occurred during the week ending 21 July. All other cases of communicable disease were small in number and sporadic in nature. (See Annex III to the Medical Section report).

4. Medical Records and Reports

These continued to be an administrative problem due to the rapid movement of all units over the beach from the United Kingdom and due to the frequent changes of assignment and attachment of these units. Repeated conferences were held with unit and medical officers, with a view to attaining accuracy and efficiency in the handling of these reports.

5. Non-Battle Injuries

Such injuries were reduced by fifty per cent, with the establishment of various unit headquarters in France and with the reduction of movement over the beaches by large convoys and large numbers of troops. (See Annex III to the Medical Section report).

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

The 7th Medical Laboratory, with partial equipment, reached France on 16 July and went into bivouac. The rest of the period was devoted to unpacking equipment and setting up the necessary supplies and equipment for an operational mobile section. The bulk of the essential equipment failed to arrive in France before Third U. S. Army became operational, but this one small section had sufficient equipment and supplies to go into immediate operation.

7. Sanitation

Experience on the Continent during this phase showed that, although some of the anticipated and possible sanitary problems did not materialize, previous planning was justified. Only in relation to water supply control was any modification deemed desirable. In as much as water from Engineer water supply points would be the only water a proved generally, for the use of troops, greater reliance was placed on chlorine residual tests to determine potability at the point of consumption.

Greater emphasis was found necessary on mess and field sanitation, with a view primarily to putting into routine practice standard procedures set forth in current operational directives.

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

Early in August the Medical Section was split into a Forward and a Rear Echelon. Originally the Forward Echelon consisted of five officers including the Army Surgeon, and nine enlisted men. However, due to the speed of advancement of Third U. S. Army, it was found necessary to move the Executive Officer and the entire Operations and Training Sub-section to the Forward Echelon. Approximately one week later, the Finance and Supply Sub-section was also moved to the Forward Echelon. This left the following sub-sections in the Rear Echelon:

Personnel and Administrative Sub-section
Consultant Sub-section (less Surgical Consultant)
Preventive Medicine Sub-section
Dental Sub-section
Veterinary Sub-section

The Medical Consultant was appointed Surgeon of the Rear Echelon. The Surgical Consultant was the only consultant in the Forward Echelon.

Due to the rapidity with which events moved, it was found necessary to bring in a 1st Lieutenant, Medical Administrative Corps, on temporary duty with the Operations and Training Sub-section to perform statistical duties connected with the bed status of various hospital units and the placement of hospital surgical teams with these units.

It was also found advantageous to place a major, Medical Corps, on temporary duty with this Section, as Liaison Officer with the Twelfth U. S. Army Group. This was a full time job and it was not considered possible to spare an officer already assigned to the Section for this duty.

During this period, also, the Chief of the Operations and Training Sub-section, Medical Section, Headquarters Ninth U. S. Army, was on temporary duty with the Forward Echelon of the Medical Section, this Headquarters, for purposes of orientation.

Late in the month the Army Veterinarian was transferred to the Communications Zone, at the request of that headquarters. From that time and during the ensuing month the Medical Section had only one Veterinary Corps officer assigned.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

Practical application of months of training now ensued. As in other departments of the Army, this type of training is the most beneficial in its results.

2. Evacuation

Soon after the Third U. S. Army became operational it became evident that evacuation was to become the most serious problem faced by the Medical Service during the month of August. Prior to the onset of operations, attachment of subordinate units to Medical Groups had been accomplished and Corps Zone responsibilities had been assigned in accordance with projected plans made in the United Kingdom and during the pre-operational phase on the Continent previously discussed in this history in Chapters 1 and 2.

The Corps Zone responsibilities were assigned as follows:

64th Medical Group to support the VIII Corps
65th Medical Group to support the V Corps
66th Medical Group to support the XX Corps
67th Medical Group to support the XII Corps

The group commanders were given the responsibility of preparing medical plans of evacuation. For this purpose fifteen ambulance companies and eighteen collecting company ambulance platoons were available.

The 69th Medical Group was given the mission of evacuating all Army evacuation hospitals, until such time as Advance Section, Communications Zone, could take over this function.

Constant leapfrogging of the evacuation hospitals during the first ten days was inadequate to keep hospital units close to the front lines. Long ambulance hauls were therefore necessary. Excellent care in the forward area was very effective in counteracting possible deleterious effect of these hauls.

Daily contact was maintained with the commanding officers of the medical GP Army, and a situation map showing the location of all Army medical units was published as of 0600 daily. Wide distribution of this publication through medical channels eliminated undue delay which might otherwise have been caused through rapid changes in location of evacuation hospitals and consequent inability of ambulance drivers to locate them.

The success of the evacuation system during this period was due in

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A Staff Nurse of a Field Hospital Platoon Makes Out the Daily Report on Patients.

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Unit	Location	Days of Supply	Tonnage
10d (-) Med Dep Co	LE MANS (C-43)	4	400 tons
33d Med Dep Co	ORLEANS (F-62)	5	200 tons
Adv Sec, 10d Med Dep Co	DREUX (E-18-1)	3	120 tons
Adv Sec, 33d Med Dep Co	RAMBOUILLET (H-77)	7	100 tons (for VIII Corps only)

The above figures represent maximum requirements. It was considered that at the then present rate of casualties and demands for medical supplies, there was sufficient stock within Third U. S. Army supply installations to make the Army self-sufficient for twenty to thirty days.

Further disposition of medical depots during August, resulted in establishment of depots at FONTAINEBLEAU (H-29) and CHARTRES (F-27) with plans completed for the movement of one of the depots to VERDUN (U-26).

Transportation of medical supplies, as well as of depot companies themselves, constituted a major problem during the entire month of August. Considerable ingenuity was required in many instances in order to get critical items to their point of consumption. During the second week of August it was found that Army medical supply depots were constantly running short of certain Class III items of medical supply. These items consisted mostly of sutures, needles, intravenous solutions and sheet wadding. Since a shortage of such items was considered critical, arrangements were made with the Chief of the Supply Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, whereby the items were made available at an airport in the United Kingdom. A pilot of the Ninth U. S. Air Force made a special trip to the United Kingdom, upon the recommendation of the Air Liaison Evacuation Officer attached to Third U. S. Army. While this procedure by-passed all channels of supply, the action enabled Third U. S. Army to meet all demands of hospitals for these items.

When Twelfth U. S. Army Group became operational, it functioned to allocate critical items on a priority basis. Status reports on all critical items were submitted to Twelfth U. S. Army Group, as well as a daily report on the amount of whole blood received, on hand, and required.

During the third week of August, 200 tons of medical supplies were actually backlogged in Communications Zone medical depots. In order to supplement the efforts of the Communications Zone in this regard, fifty trucks were made available from Third U. S. Army hospitals to haul these supplies from Communications Zone depots at CHEF DU POINT (T-36) and near LONGUEVILLE (T-68), involving a roundtrip of several hundred miles. The situation was further alleviated by the simultaneous arrival of cargo trucks, weapons carriers, and ambulances from Communications Zone depots, as well as twenty ambulance loads of medical supplies loaded in the United Kingdom and shipped direct to Army medical depots.

A notable achievement in the history of air transportation occurred on 26 August when C-47 planes landed at the HEFTY (H-41) air strip with cargoes including eighty tons of medical supplies such as blankets, litters, plasma, and surgical supplies. These planes were unloaded in less than ten hours.

Use of trucks from Army medical gas treatment battalions for movement of medical depot companies was frequent. Due to higher priorities exercised by Quartermaster truck companies that might otherwise have been available, the latter source for movement was not advantageous in view of time elements involved in the entire operations.

During the month of August, a large quantity of German medical supplies and equipment was captured. Wherever possible, these supplies were turned over to Army medical depot companies and reissued for use by this Army. However, in certain instances, it was impossible to carry all of the equipment captured, and in such instances, medical units were notified of the location of the captured supplies and instructed to help themselves. Following is a list of captured medical equipment and supplies:

6 August 44 - location REMMES (T-05); estimated amount, valued at $1,000,000.
10 August 44 - location ST MALO (S-71); estimated amount, 10 tons.
12 August 44 - location LAVAL (T-64); estimated amount, 4 tons.
15 August 44 - location ALENCON (L-39); estimated amount, 10 tons.
22 August 44 - location ORLEANS (F-62); estimated amount, 15 tons.
25 August 44 - location MELUN (S-33); estimated amount, 15 tons.
25 August 44 - location FONTAINEBLEAU (H-29), estimated amount, 20 tons.
26 August 44 - location SENS (K-66); estimated amount, 15 tons.
26 August 44 - location ETAMPES (H-89); estimated amount, 20 tons.
28 August 44 - location east of SENS (K-76); estimated amount, 12 tons.
31 August 44 - location SOMMESSOUS (T-42); estimated amount, 10 tons.

In instances where captured equipment was of no particular value to Army hospital units, such supplies were released to Civil Affairs personnel for distribution to French hospitals, since Civil Affairs reported an urgent need for all medical items in this category.

A sketch will be found in Annex VII of the Medical Section report of the various locations of Third U. S. Army medical depots during the month of August.

Section 3 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

Due to the speed with which operations of the Third U. S. Army progressed during the month of August, Preventive Medicine measures became secondary to the more important phases of medical care for wounded troops.

2. Venereal Disease Control

Incidence of venereal disease during the month of August is shown in Annex VIII to the Medical Section report. An analysis of these figures reveals that with an average mean strength of 248,196 officers and men, an average of twenty-four cases per week occurred, being an average weekly rate of 5.09 per 1,000 per annum.

During this month, almost all towns and cities remained "off limits". Due to the large and rapidly expanding area occupied by Third U. S. Army troops, it was difficult to enforce these off limits restrictions. The low venereal disease rate, therefore, was largely due to the fact that most troops were in direct contact with the enemy during this month.

3. Communicable Disease

All communicable diseases (including venereal disease) and daily non-effective rates for the month of August revealed an unprecedented low for Third U. S. Army. (Figures supporting this statement will be found in Annex VIII to the Medical Section report). These figures reveal that for an average mean strength of 248,196 officers and men, a daily non-effective rate from all diseases of 1.15 per 1,000 per annum occurred.

4. Medical Reports and Records

The speed of advance and the tempo of the warfare carried on during the month of August, posed very serious problems and barriers to the ability to keep medical reports and records current. Due to the fact that channels of communication were strained to the limit, and forward combat elements and rear administrative elements were continuously changing locations, many instances occurred in which it was almost impossible to prepare the required reports. Continuous front-line liaison by representatives of the Medical Section was necessary to provide such information. Due to constantly changing attachments and assignment of units, there was a considerable tendency towards confusion, inadequacy and unreliability of all medical reports. Every effort was made by all medical officers of all levels (Division, Corps, and Army) to remedy this situation, and during the last week of August, it became somewhat less confused. As an indication of the volume attained by the medical reports and records referred to, following is a brief summary of the reports handled during this month:

MD Form 51	303
MD Form 52 series	16,131
MD Form 8048	507
RTC U.S. Army, MD Form 310	310
RTC U.S. Army, MD Form 329	937
Monthly Venereal Disease Reports	59
Monthly Sanitary Reports	200
Miscellaneous	1,400
Total	20,147

5. Non-battle Injuries

Concurrent with the lightning-like advance of this Army, and the mass movement of armor and all types of supply and liaison vehicles, there was a marked increase in all non-battle injuries incurred during this month. The average rate per 1,000 per annum was 110 (details can be found in Annex VIII to this report). The increase in non-battle casualties was undoubtedly due to the presence of heavy traffic on the roads, together with long hours of driving and maximum efforts to keep essential supplies flowing forward to the fighting troops.

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

An advance section of the 7th Medical Laboratory set up in VITRY (T-15) on 9 August. Complete equipment for this laboratory did not arrive until two days following, so that the base section did not begin operation until 12 August. One mobile section was dispatched to investigate an outbreak of diarrhea in the Rear Echelon of VIII Corps, on 14 August, returning to the organization two weeks later. Minor sanitary deficiencies were corrected and the outbreak controlled.

A venereal disease diagnostic section was established at the 6th Convalescent Hospital on 16 August, consisting of one Medical officer and two enlisted men. The section was established for diagnosis of primary syphilis and treatment of primary syphilis, chancroid, and complicated gonorrhea. The section also acted as a collecting point for laboratory specimens. From the commencement of its operation to the end of the month, this section performed twenty dark field examinations, eighteen urethral smears, and consulted in fifteen cases of venereal disease.

The highly mobile nature of the tactical operations made it necessary to divide the base laboratory into two sections performing similar functions, except where duplicate equipment or trained personnel were not available (e.g. pathology and complement fixation). Requisitions were submitted to obtain the necessary additional equipment to provide for this inadequacy.

Observations showed that the use of copper sulfate kits or solutions which had been distributed to evacuation and field hospitals was not completely understood by these units. An officer from the 7th Medical Laboratory was therefore assigned to cooperate with the surgical staff of one of the evacuation hospitals in evaluating this method as a guide to diagnosis and treatment of shock hemorrhage.

A breakdown of laboratory tests completed by the 7th Medical Laboratory during the month of August, is given below, the breakdown being by the section of the laboratory performing these tests.

SECTION	NO. OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Serology	477	67.6
Bacteriology (Including water analysis)	145	20.6
Pathology (Including Dark Fields)	50	7.1
Chemistry	25	3.6
Parasitology	6	0.8
Hematology	2	0.3
	705	100.0

It must be pointed out that procedures in bacteriology and pathology consume a great deal more time and material than in serology and can not be evaluated on test-unit basis. Moreover, the chemistry section in addition to its technical work was charged with the function of supplying solutions and reagents to other sections of this laboratory and to all field units.

A breakdown of the same tests, by type of unit requesting same, is shown below:

TYPE OF UNIT	NO. OF UNITS	NO. OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF ALL TESTS
Evacuation Hospitals	13	442	62.7
Convalescent Hospitals	1	93	13.2
Engineer Units (Water Points)	15	62	8.8
Other Medical Installations	5	14	2.0
Tactical Organizations	22	94	13.3
	56	705	100.0

7. Sanitation

With the frequent and sometimes daily movement of water points, further revision of water supply control was found necessary. It became impractical to attempt submission of samples for bacteriological examination from each water point in accordance with principles set forth in Annex 16 to operation "OVERLORD." Accordingly, a directive was issued requiring inspection and submission of samples from each engineer water point at least monthly and whenever, in the judgment of Army, corps, and division surgeons such samples were deemed necessary to insure a proper supply of potable water.

As a result of bacteriological analyses of eighty-five water samples performed by the Army medical laboratory during the month of August, it was found that twenty-six of these samples were raw, untreated water, and therefore non-potable. Of the forty-nine remaining samples examined (treated), sixteen (thirty-three percent) were found to be non-potable due to fecal contamination; eight (sixteen percent) were found to be questionable; and twenty-five (fifty-one percent) were found to be potable. Though no serious outbreak of disease had occurred due to consumption of non-potable water, it was felt that the above analyses were indicative of a situation which might develop at some time to serious proportions.

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Insect control required no more than minimum attention. A large number of hornets were constantly present at all messes throughout the Third U. S. Army area, but this constituted a nuisance problem rather than one of health. Absence of flies was noted in the presence of hornets and bees.

Other sanitary problems, such as sewage and waste disposal, were negligible, inasmuch as prior static conditions of the troops were now changed to rapid advance on all fronts.

CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

[redacted]

[redacted]

By the end of the first week in September the gasoline situation had become so acute that it was necessary to assign first priority on gasoline to units of the Army medical services. This priority was necessary particularly in regard to the medical supply evacuating Army hospitals to air strips in view of the distances involved. Evacuation of divisions was comparatively unaffected by the gasoline shortage inasmuch as Third U. S. Army hospitals were [redacted] part of the divisions.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]





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

The First Hospital Train Leaves YOKOHA with its Load of Patients (19 Sep 1964)

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[illegible] Preparation of Wire in the Field Laboratory" by the [illegible] Hospital

[illegible] 6 September a drive was made to cross the MEUSE River. The enemy had had an opportunity to reorganize and dig in to resist this assault. As a result there was a very marked increase in all types of casualties admitted to division clearing stations. The highest casualty rates occurred in the 329th, 11th, and 3d Infantry Regiments of the 9th Infantry Division. On 10 September the clearing company of this division admitted 558 casualties of all types and the following day admitted 466. Due to the difference in type of warfare, the types of objectives, strong enemy opposition, the beginning of cold weather and the onset of heavy rains, there was also a proportionate increase in neuropsychiatric casualties in all divisions. Those divisions which had made every effort toward handling physical exhaustion and combat exhaustion cases in battalion and regimental areas, such as the 35th Infantry Division, 79th Infantry Division and 90th Infantry Division, continued to have a relatively low incidence of neuropsychiatric casualties. The 9th Infantry Division which had little or no provision for treatment of neuropsychiatric casualties at aid station level, and the 80th Infantry Division which had emphasized treatment of these cases at clearing station level showed a marked increase in neuropsychiatric casualties during this phase. In the 80th Infantry Division, neuropsychiatric casualties represented fifteen and eight-tenths percent of total admissions to the clearing station, and in the 9th Infantry Division twenty-four and four-tenths percent of all clearing station admissions for the month of September. The 90th Infantry Division created a convalescent station at clearing station level to prevent this influx of patients, including the slightly wounded, from leaving the division area so that they would not be lost to the division. In the 5th Infantry Division the division evacuation system and the clearing station were swamped with patients, which resulted in large numbers of patients being evacuated to evacuation hospital level. This resulted in overloading the Army evacuation

[illegible] dation of the evacuation hospital according [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

patient's own unit. Those broken or lost, however, required more skilled care and equipment than was feasible organically in forward units. At the end of September an additional dental clinic was established at the 32d Medical Depot Company for the purpose of providing prosthetic treatment in a location more accessible to a large number of troops than that normally afforded by the 6th Convalescent Hospital. It was possible to send these troops to the medical depot on trucks proceeding there for medical supplies.

On 8 September an additional dental prosthetic team reported to this Headquarters and was immediately placed on temporary duty with the 4th Armored Division, which was badly in need of assistance in repairing and replacing the dentures which had been broken and lost since that division arrived on the Continent.

Also during this month one of the three remaining dental prosthetic teams was transferred from its location at an evacuation hospital and attached to the 6th Armored Division.

The consolidated monthly report for September, shown below, indicated a considerable increase in September in the treatments rendered over the previous month:

	Sept
Strength (Reported)	213747
Admissions Routine	9709
Admissions Emergency	2979
Sittings	16610
Officer Personnel	306
Enlisted Personnel	301
Restorations	10582
Dentures	982
Gingivitis	911
Gingivitis Treatment	1443
Stomatitis, Vincent's	451
Stomatitis, Vincent's Treatment	1770

Of the reports received, approximately five and four-tenths percent of battle casualties admitted to Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month of September were maxillo-facial injuries. The death rate was approximately eight-tenths of one percent of those admitted with maxillo-facial injuries.

5. Veterinary

During the month of September thirty-five inspections were made of a total of fourteen Class I Supply Points, which were operated for varying periods of time during the month. The most common deficiency found was the failure to thoroughly police the areas of ration dumps. This was complicated by the arrival and departure of convoys at all hours of the day or night and by frequent rains. Government owned foodstuffs continued to arrive in a highly satisfactory condition. Only in the case of oranges and shell eggs was it necessary to recommend an increased basis of issue to avoid loss through spoilage.

Early in the month, approximately 1,200 metric tons (2,600,000 pounds) of German frozen carcass beef and 17,000 cans of roast beef (each weighing 850 grams), were found at a large, modern refrigeration and meat packing plant at MONTMEDY (U-72). Through contact with the owner of the plant, it was established that this food had been shipped from Germany to escape bomb damage and that the beef had been processed in the plant for the German Army. There was no evidence of sabotage.

During the month of September, in excess of 1,400,000 pounds of this captured beef was approved by the Army Surgeon and made available for issue to Third U. S. Army personnel. Large quantities of this meat were consumed by combat troops and provision was also made for distribution of generous quantities to medical installations handling patients. Distribution of the remainder of this meat was made to U. S. Army troops during the following month.

6. Personnel

During September the substitution of Medical Administrative Corps officers as assistant battalion surgeons, under the provisions of War Department Circular No. 99, 1944, was completed. Although it had been contemplated that substitution would result in the existence of a surplus of Medical Corps officers, such a surplus did not in fact result. After transfers of Medical Corps officers from units under Third U. S. Army with surpluses to units with shortages, it was found that the entire Third U. S. Army was almost exactly at an even Table of Organization strength with regard to Medical Corps officers. This was due to the absorption of the originally contemplated surplus by battle and non-battle casualties among Medical Corps officers.

Preliminary reports from division surgeons, concerning the efficiency and usefulness of the Medical Administrative Corps officers furnished as assistant battalion surgeons, were highly favorable. Only in isolated instances was it found that these officers were unequipped for the duties assigned to them.

Preliminary plans were made toward a rotation of Medical Corps officers. The plans were designed to effect permanent transfers of Medical officers with combat units to hospital units and vice versa. Due to the nature of the contemplated operations of Third U. S. Army, the rotation was planned to affect only the most deserving cases.

Section 4 - Medical Supply

Coincident with the decrease in forward movement of the combat elements of Third U. S. Army during the month of September was a lack of necessity for frequent movements of the two medical depot companies assigned to this Army. As of the end of August the 32d Medical Depot Company was located at FONTAINEBLEAU (U-24) and the 33d Medical Depot Company at JOINVILLE (T-27). During the first week of September an advance section of the 32d Medical Depot Company moved forward to VERDUN (U-26) to support corps and Army troops in that area. Immediately subsequent to this movement, steps were taken to move the entire depot consisting of approximately 35% long tons of medical supplies into this location. The entire depot opened in VERDUN at 081800 September.

At 201500 September, the 33d Medical Depot opened at TOUL (U-61), the movement having been accomplished by rail transportation consisting of thirty-five boxcars supplemented by two passenger cars.

The two depot companies remained at the above locations during the remainder of the month of September.

With the locations of the depots comparatively static a major effort was devoted to the actual procurement and distribution of medical supplies of all types. The Communications Zone had allocated a specific tonnage of supplies of all types which were to be transported to this Army by Communications Zone vehicles. As part of this total tonnage, approval was secured for the allocation of eighteen long tons daily of medical supplies. This allocation did not include supplies transported by Army transportation or supplies delivered by air. The railhead for Army medical supplies was designated by Communications Zone as SEZANNE (T-05). The modus operandi for reception of medical supplies was as follows:

Army requisitions were accepted by the Regulating Group who in turn forwarded them to Advance Section, Communications Zone. Requisitions reaching Advance Section, Communications Zone were sent out on daily telegram to the Communications Zone. Requisitions were filled by Communications Zone and forwarded to the Army railhead by Red Ball Express. The following tonnages were received from the Communications Zone by this method on the dates indicated:

13 September 1944	-	15 tons
14 September 1944	-	10 tons

By the middle of the month it became evident that the daily requisition for eighteen long tons of medical supplies for Army was not working out satisfactorily. Arrangements were therefore made to discontinue this procedure and requisition a ninety long ton maximum each ten days.

Delivery of medical supplies to the Army railhead, now located at SOMMEVOIRE (T-42) improved considerably during this period. Medical supplies in the amount of 128 tons were received on 16 September, ten tons on 18 September and 361 tons on 19 September.

Among items on which particular effort was necessary for procurement during this month were blankets and litters. These had become critical, largely due to losses sustained regarding such items in the process of air evacuation of patients. After it became apparent that emergency requisitions for these two items were becoming far too frequent, steps were taken to set a definite figure on the number of each item to be kept in reserve at each air strip. The figures arrived at were 4,000 blankets and 1,500 litters. All litters and blankets above these amounts were to be stocked in Army medical depots. A policy was also established with the Chief of the Supply Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, whereby blankets and litters used in air evacuation would be replaced daily on the basis of the number of patients evacuated and the number of blankets and litters needed to replace those lost. The Army Surgeon was to report this information each day by telephone, to Communications Zone, and Communications Zone, in turn, was to make arrangements to have replacements flown to the Army air strips.

In order to prepare the medical service for proper operation in winter, requirements were estimated and requested involving 26,400 blankets, 10,150 woolen pajamas and 800 stoves, tent.

Due to the fact that hospital messes, in general, were expanded to sizes not contemplated by Tables of Organization and Tables of Equipment, it was necessary that additional immersion water heaters be furnished for proper handling of the messes. Information was secured that these items were not available in this theater in quantities sufficient to warrant issues in excess of Tables of Equipment allowances. It was further stated, however, that efforts were being made to procure them and that hospital units would receive first priority when sufficient stocks were received.

During the latter part of the month it was also learned that practically all biologicals were now stocked on the Continent. A list was therefore procured of depots where stocks were maintained, and it was estimated that the movement of these biologicals to the points of consumption would now be greatly facilitated.

Lack of spare parts also became a major supply problem during this period. Maintenance sections of Army medical depots were unable to make some repairs on certain items due to this shortage. The difficulty was solved through agreement with the Communications Zone whereby a representative from Communications Zone medical depots, well qualified in maintenance and repair of medical equipment, was sent to the Army medical depots with a stock of maintenance equipment and spare parts. This aided materially in the program of repair and conservation of items of medical equipment.

Captured German medical supplies were found in the following locations:

Location	Type of Material and Equipment	Disposition
MONTREAU (U-48)	1 Ton of miscellaneous medical supplies	Stocked in 32d Medical Depot Company.
VERDUN (U-26)	20,000 pairs of pajama trousers	Stocked in 32d Medical Depot Company for reissue to hospital units.
COMTERCY (U-22) and vicinity	20 Tons miscellaneous Medical supplies	1-1/2 tons stocked in 33d Medical Depot Company, remainder to Communications Zone.
NANCY (U-81)	4 Tons miscellaneous Medical supplies	Stocked in 33d Medical Depot Company.

In addition to the above, twenty-two 15-KVA generators captured at TOUL (U-61) were taken over by the 32d Medical Depot Company for reissue to hospital units. Also, approximately 150 tons of coal captured at TROYES (T-37) and 8.77T (T-54), and fifteen tons of coal captured at NANCY were made available to hospital units.

The locations of Third U. S. Army medical depots during the month of September will be found in Annex VII to the Medical Section report.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

Due to the fact that the month of September was characterised by a slowing down of tactical operations, preventive medicine problems approached equal importance with those posed by the care of actual battle casualties.

2. Venereal Disease Control

"Off Limits" restrictions on troops entering towns and cities were lifted on 1 September. The presence of brothels, street walkers, and casual "pickups" in these towns and cities, therefore, resulted in an increase in the number of venereal disease contacts made by troops. A rise in the venereal disease rate was therefore to be expected. The rate rose from 8.82 per 1,000 per annum in the first week of the month to 32.56 per 1,000 per annum during the last week of the month.

During September, Army prophylactic stations were established at ORLEANS (N-44), CHATEAUDUN (N-45), FITHIVIERS (N-21), FONTAINEBLEAU (U-24), ST. DIZIER (U-12), BAR LE DUC (U-13), VERDUN (U-26) and COMERCY (U-22). Approximately 5,000 prophylactic treatments were given in these stations during this month. In addition, prophylactic stations were established by corps surgeons in the [illegible] towns in their respective areas.

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(Above) Litter Carry Over Helicopter Door at LZ, Pronto

(Below) Application of Shoulder Splint in an Aid Station Hospital



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CHAPTER X

[illegible] OPERATIONS

The most [illegible] of Third U. S. Army's [illegible] was the [illegible] of a large number of battle casualties since the summer [illegible] of operations. The fact that there was a [illegible] of improvements in Army hospitals was a further [illegible] of a cooperative will.

A month such as this was of [illegible] to benefit to the medical service. [illegible] medical services was [illegible] some instances, every all [illegible] it was [illegible] to all [illegible] of a careful study of the [illegible] of the previous [illegible] months of action. [illegible] are detailed [illegible] from evaluation [illegible] [illegible] and surgery [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

hospitals were attached by corps to divisions. Most of the platoons made few or no moves and the problem of their employment became relatively simple. In addition, the 16th Field Hospital (less the first platoon) and the 59th Field Hospital (less the third platoon) augmented the air evacuation holding unit at TORI (U-61) for a time. Later in the month, all but one platoon were relieved of this mission. The second platoon of the 59th Field Hospital augmented the 12th Evacuation Hospital at BAINY (U-81) during the latter part of the month. At the close of the month XX Corps had two complete field hospitals, the 16th and 60th, while XI Corps had attached to it the 30th Field Hospital and the 59th Field Hospital (less the first platoon).

With the arrival of III Corps, it was planned to attach the 164th Field Hospital to this corps when it became operational. This was to depend, however, on where and when this corps went into action. The 65th Field Hospital was assigned to this Army but did not arrive in the Army area before the end of October.

Third U. S. Army commenced the month with one 750-bed and ten 400-bed evacuation hospitals. These consisted of the following:

12th Evacuation Hospital (750-bed)
32d Evacuation Hospital (HE)
34th Evacuation Hospital (HE)
35th Evacuation Hospital (HE)
59th Evacuation Hospital (HE)
101st Evacuation Hospital (HE)
103d Evacuation Hospital (HE)
106th Evacuation Hospital (HE)
108th Evacuation Hospital (HE)
109th Evacuation Hospital (HE)
110th Evacuation Hospital (HE)

The 110th Evacuation Hospital was relieved of assignment to this Army on 22 October and assigned to First U. S. Army.

The relative inactivity of combat troops during October was reflected in the comparatively slight changes in location of Army hospitals. Movement of hospitals, only four in number, was easily accomplished with available pooled transportation of medical units, as necessary. The decreased number of casualties likewise permitted two evacuation hospitals to remain closed for almost the entire month, thus providing a well-earned rest for those units. At the end of the month five 400-bed evacuation hospitals were in reserve, prepared to open in the same location or move, as the tactical situation required.

The locations of all evacuation hospitals and the convalescent hospital during the month of October will be found in Annex XIII to the Medical Section report.

During this month buildings were utilized to great advantage for housing of evacuation hospitals. The 12th Evacuation Hospital and the 34th Evacuation Hospital operated for the entire month in buildings. The 35th, 59th, 101st, and 106th Evacuation Hospitals made similar use of buildings during the greater part of the month. Toward the latter part of the month the 103d Evacuation Hospital had a portion of its station in buildings at BRIEY (U-67) and the remainder under tents in the adjacent grounds. The 106th Evacuation Hospital was in reserve most of the month and remained under tentage. The 32d Evacuation Hospital was in reserve and for part of the month occupied buildings in METZ (U-47) where it operated a small (25-bed) hospital. Only the 109th Evacuation Hospital remained in operation under tentage during the entire month, except during a short movement from DONCOURT-AUX-TEMPLIERS (U-55) to THIAUCOURT (U-44).

There were 3,000 beds available in hospital buildings in the vicinity of NANCY (U-81) and TOUL (U-61) supporting III Corps. Toward the end of the month, when the 35th and 59th Evacuation Hospitals closed in those respective locations, there still remained 2,000 beds available which could be readily increased by expansion of existing facilities. Similarly, there were 1,600 beds available in the XX Corps zone. Considering the number of casualties, the bed space available in both corps was more than ample.

The 6th Convalescent Hospital remained in the vicinity of ST MIHIEL (U-44) and on 30 October began to move to higher ground about two miles away. As there were less than 800 convalescent patients in the hospital it was expected that the move could be accomplished without difficulty.

A detailed analysis of battle casualties hospitalized during the month of October is shown below:

a. Number of wounded admitted "direct" (i.e., not by transfer):

Designation	Number
(1) U. S. Army Troops	9984
(2) British Army Troops	[illegible]
(3) French Army Troops	
(4) U. S. Navy and Marine Corps	
(5) British and French Navy	
(6) Enemy Forces Personnel	
(7) Civilians	
(8) Others - specify (b)(3)	

Note: All of the following in b through f pertains to U. S. Army troops only.

b. General Classification of Wounds:

(1) Serious	917
(2) Slight	207

c. Anatomical Classification of Wounds:
(Patients with multiple wounds are classified according to most extensive wounds).

	Admissions	Deaths
(1) Wounds other than burn:		
(a) Abdominal	181	24
(b) Thoracic	292	28
(c) Maxillo-facial	74	4
(d) Neurologic		
Head	282	27
Spine	38	2
Nerve	7	0
(e) Extremities		
Upper	88	1
Lower	1267	19
(f) Buttocks	213	7
(g) Other	38	3
Sub-total	2500	111
(2) Burns - all locations	60	6
Total	9984	117

d. Number of patients with multiple wounds: 1054 — 26

e. Classification of wounds by causative agents:

(1) Gunshot wounds (rifle, pistol, or machine gun)	1085	27
(2) Shell wounds (HE, flak, mortar, or cannon)	5941	71
(3) Bomb wounds (aerial, grenade, booby-trap, or mine)	237	8
(4) Blast injuries (bomb, shell, or mine)	161	1
(5) Wounds from secondary missiles	7	0
(6) Burns (petrol, flash, flame-thrower, phosphorus, etc.)	61	6
(7) Others (NEC and unclassified missiles)	176	4
Total	9984	117

f. Number of deaths by primary and secondary causes:

Perf W abdomen	Shock & Hemorrhage	5
Perf W thorax	Pulmonary Edema	2
Perf W Chest	Pulmonary	2
SMW LE Left Flank		1
GSW Buttocks, PCC Iliac Crest lac wall sigmoid colon	Respiratory Failure	1
PCC Tibia and Fibula		2
Perf W Shell Thigh and PCC Femur		1
Perf W Thigh and Hip	Shock	1
GSW Both Legs and Chest and traumatic amputation left leg and GSW Abdomen and chest		1
Perf W Both Legs	Shock	5
Perf b Chest, Pleura, Diaphragm Liver, Kidney		1
Perf b Chest PCC Clavicle		1
GSW Back and Forearm		1
PCC HE Skull		5
GSW Head		6
PC Skull, Herniation Brain		2
PC Shoulder with Head injuries		2
GSW Head	Secondary Shock	1
Perf W Pelvis, Femur, Ilium	Traumatic Shock	1
Perf W Chest, Lung and Spinal Cord	Traumatic Shock	1
Perf & Buttocks, [illegible] Abdomen	Traumatic Shock	1
Pen & Legs and Arms	Circulatory Failure	1
Pen & Head with Brain Laceration	Traumatic Shock	3
Pen & Chest, PCC Tibia & Fibula	Hemothorax	1
HE Both Legs	Irreversible Shock	1
PF Humerus and Chest	Traumatic Shock	1
PC Both Legs	Traumatic Shock	1
Ab. Wound, Chest	Hemorrhage	1
MW KIA Chest		1
EE (Electric Mine) KIA		4
Pen W HE Buttocks	Hemorrhage	1
Pen W HE Foot PC Maxilla	Hemorrhage	1
Pen & [illegible] Abdomen	Shock	1
PC (Mortar) Skull	Hemorrhage & Shock	3
PC HE Mandible		1
GSW Abdomen	Bronchial Pneumonia	1
Pen W HE Head	Pulmonary Edema	1
Pen W HE Thorax	Secondary Shock	1
Pen W HE Spine	Secondary Shock	1
Pen & HE Thorax	Pulmonary Edema	1
Pen W HE Liver, Stomach and Colon		1
GSW Chest	Pulmonary Edema	2
Perf W HE Chest	Hemorrhage and Shock	3
Perf b HE Abdomen	Hemorrhage and Shock	1
Perf F HE Head	Hemorrhage and Shock	4
Perf b HE Buttocks	Hemorrhage and Shock	2
Pen & Chest	Hemorrhage and Shock	3
Pen W HE Buttocks	Hemorrhage and Shock	1
SMW Abdomen	Nephritis	1
PCC Skull		9
GSW Lower Lumbar	Renal Insufficiency and Shock	1
Pen W HE Skull Lac of Brain		3
PCC (Teller Mine) Skull	Shock	1
Pen W HE Chest	Shock	3
Pen W Head	Shock	1
Perf W (Booby Trap) Thigh	Embolism, Thrombus, Pulmonary	1
PC HE Foot	Shock	1
Pen W HE Leg	Anemia, Hemolytic due to Transfusion reaction	1
Pen & Abdomen	Fat Necrosis due to pancreatitis lac of Pancreas and Liver	1
Pen W Abdomen and PCC Vertebrae	Hemorrhage, Paralysis and Shock	1
Burn, Thermal third Degree Generalized		2
Perf W Abdomen and Colon	Hemorrhage	1
PCC HE Tibia, Fibula and Ankles	Anuria Due to Blood Transfusion reaction	1
SMA HC Shell HE Abdomen		2
Pen W Chest	Atelectasis right Lung	1
Pen W Shoulder and Neck	Shock and Hemorrhage	2
Pen B Chest and Thoracic Wall	Hypertension Complicated by Anuria and Uremia	1
Pen W Chest	Cardiac Decompensation	1
HE Abdomen, Extrusion of Bowel HE lac of Lung	Surgical Shock	1
HE Lac of Liver, Diaphram and Kidney		1

Note: Items g, h, and i pertain to all military and civilian patients in hospital.

g. Number of Transfusions of:

(1) Fresh Whole Blood	488
(2) Stored Blood	1502
(3) Dry Plasma	1880
(4) Other Blood Substitutes (do not include crystalloids) Normal Saline	0
Total	3870

h. Number of Units of Penicillin Administered 1,545,664,000

i. Number of Amputations:

(1) Upper Extremity	36
(2) Lower Extremity	46
Total	82

j. Number of Cases Showing Clinical Evidence of the

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5. Veterinary

A total of twenty-seven inspections were made of Class I supply points during the month. Food stuffs continued to arrive at the distributing points in excellent condition. The most important problem was the prevention of damage and waste occasioned by inclement weather. This was largely prevented through adequate use of dunnage.

The inspection and issue of the captured German beef in storage at HERBECOURT (U-72), FRANCE, was completed during the month. A total of 22,150 pounds was condemned.

6. Personnel

Early in the month a directive was issued by this headquarters to commanders of evacuation hospitals, the convalescent hospital, and the two medical depot companies, clarifying the uses to which prisoners of war labor were to be put. Their attention was called to the fact that they must be maintained under strict military discipline, that routine inspections of prisoners of war and their quarters were to be conducted and that all like matters involving military discipline should be rigidly enforced. Conversations between American or Allied military personnel and prisoners were forbidden except in line of official duty. Separate messing hours, separate details and all similar countermeasures were to be taken, in order to avoid fraternization of any sort whatsoever.

The numbers of prisoners of war present in hospitals remained approximately the same as during the month of September. However, during October the medical depot companies were authorized to utilize fifty prisoners of war each, for labor details.

During August and September, considerable difficulty had been experienced in the filling of requisitions by this Army for nurses. Since the tables of organization of evacuation and field hospitals had cut the number of nurses allotted to a minimum, it was vital that when a nurse was lost to a unit, she be replaced immediately. On 17 October, therefore, ten nurses were assigned by Headquarters European Theater of Operations to Third U. S. Army for use as a pool, to fill present and future requisitions. These ten nurses were assigned for duty by this headquarters to various evacuation and field hospitals. In the event that requisitions for nurses were received, the requisitions would be filled rapidly from this pool. Under the plan, as the available pool of nurses diminished, they were to be reinforced by the further assignment of sufficient nurses to maintain the pool at a constant number of ten nurses.

It was tentatively planned that Third U. S. Army would make available five medical officers weekly for permanent transfer to Communications Zone general hospitals under a rotation policy being projected by the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army. Under the plan, preference would be given by this Army to medical officers over forty years of age who have had the longest service in line units under combat conditions. The Communications Zone would furnish replacements under thirty-five years of age, of company grade and fit for general service.

Shortages which occured during this month due to battle and non-battle casualties among Medical Department commissioned personnel were as follows:

Medical Corps	11
Medical Administrative Corps	19

Commissioned reinforcements of both categories continued to be difficult to obtain.

In order to aid in the ability to select proper assignments for patients of the Army medical installations being returned to duty, a directive was issued on 1 October, placing in effect the following classifications of duty status of patients being released from hospitals to reinforcement installations:

Class I - Full duty
Class II - Limited duty, but meeting the minimum requirements of MR 1-6, as amended.
Class III - Limited duty, but below the minimum standards as prescribed by MR 1-6, as amended.

Section 4 - Medical Supply

Due to the relative inactivity of combat troops during October, it was not necessary to move either of the two medical depot companies. The 324 Medical Depot Company remained at VIRTON (U-26) and the 334 Medical Depot Company remained at TOUL (U-81). The 334 Medical Depot Company continued to be minus its Advance Section which had been attached to Ninth U. S. Army in September.

A system was set up whereby one unit of torniere allocation regulations was furnished by [illegible] to the Army Surgeon, Chief Surgeon's Office, European Theater of Operations, where immediate action could be initiated. It was felt that such a procedure would alleviate occasional slowness in processing requirements through normal supply channels.

During the month the following deliveries of supplies were received from the Communications Zone:

2 October	20½ Long Tons
4 October	5 Long Tons
8 October (by air)	5 Long Tons
8 October	10 Long Tons
9 October (by air)	4 Long Tons
10 October	5¼ Long Tons
11 October	23 Long Tons
12 October	14½ Long Tons
14 October	57½ Long Tons
15 October	45½ Long Tons
16 October	5½ Long Tons
17 October	8 Long Tons
18 October	7½ Long Tons
19 October	14½ Long Tons
22 October	8½ Long Tons
23 October	6 Long Tons
25 October	11 Long Tons
26 October	5 Long Tons
27 October	14½ Long Tons
30 October	3 Long Tons
Total	295½ Long Tons

In order that complete knowledge of the status of medical supplies would be available, Army medical depot companies were directed to submit semi-monthly physical inventories to the Army Surgeon. These inventories were to show maximum and minimum levels of supply.

During this month, a requisition was placed on the Communications Zone for 100,000 ccs of typhoid vaccine, in order to meet requirements of current directives in the Theater, that all personnel receive booster shots.

Of the scarce items which had existed during the months of August and September, it was learned that brassards, Benzedrine inhalators, and terpin hydrate would be made available in the near future, the latter being an important ingredient of a cough mixture made up by Army pharmacists in connection with the treatment of upper respiratory diseases.

Major efforts were directed toward provision of Army medical units with supplies necessary for winterization. All hospital units were authorized to increase the number of blankets per bed, to five; the requisition covering this increase was to be based on total bed capacity. This authorization was ultimately extended to all medical units throughout the Army. In addition, 10,000 winter pajamas were requisitioned from the Communications Zone. Stoves and extra tentage were also authorized for use by the few hospitals still remaining under canvas and by other medical units. It was necessary to provide 125 additional ward tents in view of the approach of winter.

The 12Oth and 1O9th Evacuation Hospitals, still under canvas, were given lumber for experimental purposes to floor one ward tent each. Due to the problem of transporting the flooring, complete equipping of these hospitals was considered impractical at this time.

During October a pharmacy was established at each Army medical depot company for the preparation of pharmaceutical items to be issued to units not authorized the personnel or equipment to prepare these types of medicinal products.

Also during this month, transfusion sets, direct, were made available to Army hospitals on the basis of forty per evacuation hospital and thirty-six per field hospital.

Captured medical supplies during the month included approximately thirty tons captured at [illegible]NAG CITY (U-81) and NANCY (U-81). Equipment deemed of value to the Army was removed and placed in depot stock and the remainder, approximately fifteen tons, was released to the Communications Zone for further use and study.

Due to difficulties which had constantly occurred in medical units, in respect to generators, it was decided during October that procurement, storage, issue, maintenance, and repair of this item would henceforth be accomplished by engineer units rather than by the repair and maintenance sections of the two Army medical depots.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

The month of October was characterized by a moderate amount of rest and rehabilitation of combat units. During this period local contact with the enemy was maintained, but comparatively little hard fighting or sustained progress was made. As a result, battle casualties decreased and preventive medicine problems increased.

The month was characterized by heavy and frequent rains, and unseasonal cold, including snow and sleet. The rains were the heaviest in many years, causing the MOSELLE River and its tributaries to flood the lowlands. This increase in rain and cold made preventive medicine standards difficult to maintain. The subject will be discussed in more detail in paragraph 7, below.

2. Venereal Disease Control

During October, many line troops were given rest periods and the opportunity to visit some of the larger towns. This fact and the fact that many service troops were billeted in or near towns, were important factors in the rise of the venereal disease rate.

Army prophylactic stations were established in ST MIHIEL (U-41), NANCY (U-81), TOUL (U-81), and THIONVILLE (U-27). Stations set up during September in TOUL (U-81) and METZ-NANCY (U-47) continued in operation throughout October. During this month, 6,755 prophylactic treatments were given.

The supply of mechanical prophylactics was adequate. Two units reported an inadequate supply of individual chemical prophylactic units. An investigation revealed that there were no individual chemical prophylactic kits on hand for issue during the last week of October.

Individual venereal disease contact reports were received in 162 instances during the month. Only in rare cases was the information on these reports inadequate for the specific location of female contacts. Those reports having the necessary information were turned over to the Civil Affairs Public Health Officer for necessary action with the local authorities. The reports indicated a very low incidence of venereal disease among troops having station prophylactics.

As during previous months, letters were sent to all units with venereal disease rate above 100 per 1,000 per annum, calling the attention of the unit commanders to the fact that the control of venereal disease is a command responsibility.

During the four-week period ending 27 October, the average venereal disease rate was 91.05 per 1,000 per annum, based on an average mean strength of 241,000 officers and men.

The incidence of venereal disease during the month of October will be found in Annex #3 to the Medical Section report.

3. Communicable Diseases

Communicable diseases continued to be relatively few in number with the exception of upper respiratory diseases, which showed a slight increase, and venereal diseases which rose sharply.

During the third and fourth week of the period, approximately fifty percent of Third U. S. Army troops of all echelons had a mild form of bacillary dysentery and/or gastro-enteritis, which was apparently due to consumption of non-potable water. This outbreak was not serious, very few cases requiring hospitalization, and all responded quickly to proper sanitary measures and the use of sulfadiazine therapeutically. The extent of the outbreak and number of cases involved are not accurately reflected in Annex #1 to the Medical Section report, inasmuch as over ninety-five percent of the cases were treated on a duty status. The division (the 80th Infantry Division) suffered the most cases of bacillary dysentery, and Third U. S. Army Headquarters was the hardest hit with gastro-enteritis.

There were 568 cases of bacillary dysentery found in the 80th Infantry Division during the period 1 October to 14 October, exclusive. Since the observation was somewhat limited, this does not reflect the total number of cases. The organisms recovered in nineteen percent of the cases inspected recovery, fifteen to twenty-five percent) were of the Shigella paradysentery group. Water consumed by the troops was non-potable upon analysis and showed evidence of fecal contamination.

The outbreak of gastro-enteritis in Headquarters Third U. S. Army represented a percentage incidence of forty-seven and five-tenths percent of the personnel. Investigation of this outbreak by the 7th Medical Laboratory resulted in the conclusion that it was also water borne.

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For a detailed breakdown of statistics on communicable diseases during October, see Annex IV to the Medical Section report.

c. Medical records

A total of [illegible] Medical Department reports were processed during the month, representing a substantial increase over the two previous months. As the result of continued efforts along these lines, the quality of these reports and the promptness of their rendition continued to improve.

5. Non-battle Injuries

A slight reduction in the incidence of non-battle injuries occurred during this month, the rate being [illegible] per 1,000 per annum, based on a mostly average strength of [illegible] officers and men.

Detailed statistics regarding non-battle injuries may be found in Annex XV to the Medical Section report.

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

The base laboratory continued to be divided into two sections for operational purposes. Section I remained at NANCY [illegible] and Section II remained at NANCY [illegible] during the entire month. There were 8,560 tests performed during this month compared to the [illegible] during the previous month, an increase of approximately two hundred and sixty-three percent. Since the capacity of an Army medical laboratory is estimated at [illegible] tests per month, this represented an operational load of forty-two percent over its estimated capacity.

The total work is broken down for comparision with the previous month, as follows:

BASE LABORATORY	SEPTEMBER No. of Tests	SEPTEMBER % of Total	OCTOBER No. of Tests	OCTOBER % of Total
Serology	1525	[illegible]	[illegible]	61.2
Bacteriology	447	14.8	1340	15.6
Chemistry	41	2.5	83	1.0
Pathology	87	2.9	174	2.0
Parasitology	18	0.6	45	0.5
Parasitology	7	.2	70	.8
Subtotal	2125	70.4	7275	85.1
[illegible]				
General Hospital Section (6th Convalescent Hosp	402	16.5	1283	12.0
Shock Section				
94th Evac Hosp	170	5.6	208	2.7
Subtotal	926	29.6	1251	14.9
GRAND TOTAL	3038	100.0	8526	100.0

The significant changes are shown in the Venereal Disease Section where the volume of work doubled and in the Serology Section where the work practically tripled over that of the previous month. The increase in work in other sections reflected the relatively static phase of the Third U. S. Army, with consequent demand for more detailed medical services. The three-fold increase in bacteriology, however, was the result of water-borne dysentery, which is seasonal in character due to heavy pollution of streams. It is noteworthy that [illegible] in the Army area for the month of October was thirty percent above the average.

A breakdown of the above tests by type of unit requesting them during the month of October is shown below:

Type of Unit	No. of Units	Tests	No. of Units	Tests	Percentage of Total Tests
Evacuation Hospitals	13	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	46.2
Convalescent Hospital	1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	15.0
Other Medical Installations	24	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	7.5
Tactical Organizations	114	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	31.3
Total	152	8526	[illegible]	[illegible]	100.0

7. Sanitation

The comparatively static tactical situation during the month, together with unseasonal weather, a scarcity of billets in an [illegible] and environment factors among the troops, rain and cold weather, with occasional snow and sleet proved varied, revolving threats of [illegible] problems affecting the health and well-being of the command. Rain fell in the Army area on twenty-eight of the thirty-one days of the month.

During the month many of the troops moved into buildings. The Army Headquarters itself moved into buildings in the city of NANCY [illegible]. Occasional bedbug infestation of buildings formerly occupied by German personnel were successfully combatted by proper housekeeping and the use of DDT powder, as well as a complete DDT spray.

Insects other than bedbugs did not constitute a problem. Flies, restricted in a few instances during the first part of the month, practically disappeared with the advent of colder weather.

The disposal of wastes, including garbage and refuse, became a difficult problem in some instances due to the limited number of sites available for this use. It became necessary to establish a few additional new disposal sites, with constant regulation and maintenance by military personnel, in the vicinity of troop concentrations. Instructions were issued by Administrative Orders of this Headquarters forbidding the establishment of dumps within the Army area without the approval of the Army Surgeon.

A continued shortage of overshoes increased the health hazards to the troops from water and mud throughout the area. Efforts of the Army Quartermaster were continued unremittingly and toward the end of the month receipts of this item were increasing, and the shortage was alleviated.

The outbreaks of diarrhea, gastro-enteritis, and/or bacillary dysentery, discussed in a previous section of this report, were considered to be, to a large extent, water-borne. In this connection, work had been in progress for sometime to change the standard military method of treatment of water because of conditions pre-out in water sources throughout this Theater. Water on the Continent had been found to be more turbid and more contaminated with organic matter than that found in any similar condition in the United States. Efforts were being made to provide a method of water treatment which would include a one-hour period for coagulation, settling and preschlorination, followed by filtration at reduced rates in order to insure the availability of water more closely approaching medical standards. The change in procedure recommended was calculated to give greater assurance of the removal of the cysts of endamoeba histolytica where the water source was so contaminated. The results obtained by the new method of treatment led eventually to adoption of this method throughout the entire Theater.

It was felt that the increasing incidence of diarrheal diseases was by no means entirely due to heretofore imperfect methods of water treatment. In view of this fact, a directive was also issued toward the end of October emphasizing again the constant need for water discipline among the troops, to the end that water for drinking and culinary purposes would be obtained only from an engineer water point or distributing point and from no other source, unless adequately treated and approved by competent medical authorities. Disinfection and sterilization of all water containers was also directed.

A summary of analyses of water collected from engineer water points during October indicates a marked improvement in the qualities of the water processed and only [illegible] samples dropped from twenty-one percent in September to twelve percent in October. With adoption of the recommended new method of operating the engineer water units, further improvement was confidently expected.



Evacuation hospital occupying a French Military Hospital in NANCY [illegible].

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

November was a welcome month for Third U. S. Army, and the Medical Department was no exception in this regard. The attitude of this Army has been characterized by restlessness since its first commitment in action, and progress in some direction is its only cure. On 8 November, amid some of the most violent storms and floods that had raged for over three decades in the sector assigned to Third U. S. Army, it began the arduous push from the MOSEL R iver to the SAAR and the German Border.

The encirclement of METZ (U-05) by XX Corps on the northern flank and progression by the III Corps toward the SAAR on the southern flank necessitated river crossings of the MOSELLE and smaller rivers, under flood conditions of an unprecedented nature. Under such conditions troops were often exposed to water, snow and sleet for days at a time. All precautions possible from a tactical standpoint were taken, but in spite of these, Third U. S. Army had its first cases of trench foot in significant numbers. Extraordinary measures taken will be described elsewhere in this report.

The enemy had had time to dig in, and the results are reflected in the fact that battle casualties quadrupled over those of the previous and relatively static month.

The locations of Army medical units, particularly of hospitals, had been established so far forward by the end of October that only five additional zones of evacuation hospitals were required during November to support our advance.

November was a welcome month, but a hard one.

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

Although the Medical Section continued to operate with a Forward and Rear Echelon in the same manner as during the three previous months, in November these echelons were located within approximately a city block of each other.

On 9 November a new Army Veterinarian joined the Medical Section, having been transferred from Headquarters Ninth U. S. Army. This officer replaced the previous Army Veterinarian who was transferred in August to Headquarters European Theater of Operations.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

Impetus was given to extensive training in means and methods of prevention of trench foot. This was definitely considered to be a command function, and secretaries and primary effort was directed toward proper education of personnel with command responsibilities.

An officer from the Medical Section attended the course on "Information and Education" offered by Headquarters European Theater of Operations.

2. Evacuation

There was no change in the general plan for evacuation. The 66th and 67th Medical Groups continued to evacuate the divisions of XX and III Corps respectively. Plans were made for evacuation of III Corps by the 66th Medical Group. However, this corps did not commence operations during the month of November. The 66th Medical Group was therefore held in reserve and many of its units reattached to other medical groups during the month. On 30 November the 67th Medical Group was relieved of assignment to Third U. S. Army and its mission was given at that time to the 66th Medical Group.

The 67th Medical Group continued to evacuate the majority of Army hospitals. Advance Section, Communications Zone ambulance companies did not evacuate more than three Army hospitals at any one time during November. They did, however, provide ambulance service at the Army air rail medical evacuation holding unit at TOUL (U-01) as well as at air and rail medical evacuation holding units operated by Advance Section, Communications Zone in support of the Army area.

Many new medical units, including six medical collecting companies and two clearing companies, had been assigned to Third U. S. Army during the previous month. Two of the collecting companies arrived in the Army area by the end of November.

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The use of facilities for evacuation by road from Army hospitals increased markedly. More than two-thirds of a total of 18,587 patients were evacuated by road, with 5,413 being evacuated by rail and only 5ch by air. The change in these statistics was largely a technicality. During November general hospitals were opened in much closer support of the Army, and by the end of the month all medical holding units for purposes of evacuation from Army areas were being operated by Advance Section, Communications Zone units. Since statistics on evacuation from Army are based on the type of conveyance used from the Army installation to the supporting "service" installation, it was only natural that with general hospitals in such close support the majority of the evacuation from the Army area should be by road. As a matter of general information, it must be pointed out that many of the patients included in the total for road evacuation were further transported by rail or air from the Advance Section, Communications Zone medical holding unit in the Army area.

At the beginning of the month of November, the air/rail medical evacuation holding unit operated by the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion remained adjacent to the air field at TOUL (U-61). Air evacuation was actually available at this field on only four days during the month. Repeated efforts were made to increase air evacuation from this field, but the use of the field by tactical fighter units, coupled with many days of poor weather, hampered all such attempts. It was impossible on most days for planes based in the United Kingdom to make a round trip in the few hours of good flying weather. The policy of higher headquarters prohibited the use of Continental based planes and also the evacuation of patients to the PARIS (S-CL) area by air. Evacuation of patients to PARIS (S-CL) by air was also not feasible because of the fact that the unloading personnel and capacity of the medical holding units there were not adequate to handle incoming traffic in addition to the large volume of patients being evacuated by air from the general hospitals in the PARIS (S-CL) area.

On 21 November, the air/rail medical evacuation holding unit at TOUL (U-61) closed. During the remainder of the month, Advance Section, Communications Zone operated the three medical holding units at NANCY (U-81), TOUL (U-61), and ETAIN (U-47). At the latter location both air and rail evacuation were available throughout November. At NANCY (U-81) and at TOUL (U-61) the medical holding units operated by Advance Section, Communications Zone were purely for purposes of rail evacuation.

Minor alterations in evacuation policy were made as needs arose, especially following the offensive begun by Third U. S. Army on 8 November. During the week 8 to 14 November, facilities were seriously taxed. A peak was reached of more than 2,100 patients evacuated from division clearing stations to evacuation hospitals in one day.

Slightly wounded casualties were burdening the hospitals, and arrangements were made to send these patients directly from the ambulance regulating post operated in NANCY (U-81) by the 67th Medical Group to the air/rail medical evacuation holding unit at TOUL (U-61) still operated at that time by the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion. More than 800 slightly wounded patients were admitted directly to this holding unit without being treated or processed at an evacuation hospital. Wounded prisoners of war casualties were evacuated in the same manner, and in addition, many prisoner of war casualties who had been treated at Army evacuation hospitals were sent from these units direct to the 50th General Hospital (an Advance Section, Communications Zone unit) at COMMERCY (U-42), by-passing the holding unit at TOUL (U-61). Daily quotas were given to each Army hospital for evacuation back to the Communications Zone and to the 6th Convalescent Hospital. This was necessary to regulate the flow from the Army area and to prevent flooding of rear installations.

The locations of evacuation facilities in the Third U. S. Army during the entire month will be found in Annex XVI to the Medical Section report.

3. Hospitalization

The use of field hospitals remained much the same as in the past but was given greater flexibility through greater use of auxiliary units.

Each corps had available a field hospital platoon for each of its divisions and an additional platoon for corps reserve. The XII Corps employed the 10th and 60th Field Hospitals and the XX Corps employed the 30th and 59th Field Hospitals (less the first platoon). The First Platoon, 59th Field Hospital remained attached to the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion, augmenting the medical holding unit operated by that battalion at TOUL (U-61). The facilities of field hospital platoons in support of divisions were augmented by several means. Both corps used some type of holding unit to take over the non-transportable patients from the field hospital platoon when it displaced forward. This prevented undue immobilization of the platoons due to the presence of post-operative patients requiring several days' care before they would become transportable. The holding units were formed in XII Corps from the two medical collecting companies of the corps medical battalion. The XX Corps personnel were obtained from the two clearing platoons attached to the corps. In each instance the field hospital platoon augmented the holding unit with surgical and nursing personnel according to the number of patients left behind when it moved forward.

In addition to the use of holding units, it was possible for XII Corps to leapfrog field hospital platoons. The fact that an armored division and an infantry division were frequently operating in the same center made it possible to permit only one field hospital platoon in support of both divisions, holding the remaining platoon in readiness for movement.

Transportation for movement of field hospital platoons was furnished in many instances by Army medical units. In other cases, it was obtained from corps medical units. A few divisions, however, were able to utilize division transportation to effect the movement of the field hospital platoon attached to them. In every case the source of transportation depended on other operational considerations. Most movements were planned at least twenty-four hours in advance, and transportation from some source could then be more easily arranged.

As of 1 November, Third U. S. Army had assigned to it the same evacuation hospitals as on 1 October with the exception that the 110th Evacuation Hospital had been relieved of assignment and transferred to First U. S. Army.

All evacuation hospitals operated in buildings during this month with the exception of the 109th Evacuation Hospital which remained under tents throughout the month. The use of buildings by hospitals was considered essential for the welfare of the patients, and hospitals were given priority in the choice and selection of available buildings, wherever possible.

It was found that the operation of a hospital in buildings was less economical in the use of personnel than when functioning in the field. As previously, the hospitals were augmented by collecting and/or clearing company personnel. The usual attachment to an evacuation hospital consisted of a litter bearer platoon of a medical collecting company and one platoon, where possible, of a clearing company. Quartermaster service troops were attached to serve at the hospitals and civilian help was likewise employed where necessary. Prisoner of war labor was used only in those hospitals which remained located more than twelve miles from organized enemy resistance.

During the period immediately following 8 November surgical backlogs as high as 200 were encountered in some hospitals. A total of four surgical and eight shock teams were obtained on temporary duty from the 50th General Hospital in COMMERCY (U-42) and the 90th, 95th, and 100th General Hospitals in BAR-LE-DUC (U-12), through arrangement with the Surgeon, Advance Section, Communications Zone. Likewise, thirty-four additional nurses from Communications Zone hospitals were attached to Army hospitals for a short period of temporary duty. When their parent hospitals opened later in the month these teams and nurses were returned and a group of four surgical and four shock teams and thirty-five nurses was obtained from the 50th General Hospital in COMMERCY (U-42) which was not yet operational.

The peak hospital census was reached on 18 November when all Third U. S. Army hospitals, including the 6th Convalescent Hospital, had a total of 9,752 patients. At that time the hospitals had an expanded capacity of 8,921, although their normal capacity without additional personnel would have been 7,350. One evacuation hospital expanded on 17 November to 857, more than twice its normal capacity.

There was no difficulty encountered in the movement of hospitals since the ten evacuation hospitals occupied only fifteen locations during the month. However, the location of suitable new sites presented some difficulty. In accordance with the policy of using covered accommodations, reconnaissance for new sites was done with a view to finding suitable buildings. In XX Corps zone of advance such buildings were scarce. In XII Corps zone there were a number of towns with barracks which could be converted to accommodate evacuation hospitals. Although hospitals were given priority over other service units, the availability of some buildings was delayed due to occupation by tactical units. On other occasions, a change in plans was necessitated. Where buildings were not immediately available, consideration was given to moving a hospital to the field in order to maintain close support. However, representatives of the Engineer Section who accompanied reconnaissance parties strongly advised against this because of the poor terrain which would require considerable road construction and maintenance. Fortunately, with few delays, buildings were found in all new locations.

Transportation for movement of evacuation hospitals was obtained exclusively from Army medical units. The gradual accumulation of more personnel and more equipment by all hospitals continually raised the transportation requirements. For example, the 36th Evacuation Hospital which moved from [illegible] (Z-34) to METZ (U-95) transported ninety two-and-one-half-ton trucks and eighty one-ton trailer loads of equipment and personnel. Besides this, some personnel were moved by ambulance. In all, the hospital hauled about four and one-half times the amount that could be carried on its organic vehicles.

The 6th Convalescent Hospital remained in operation in the vicinity of ST MIHIEL (U-44) until 27 November. Reconnaissance was made for a new site and a large group of barracks was found at [illegible] (Q-15). Movement to the new site was not made during the month. Essentially, though officially closed, the convalescent hospital continued to receive patients with venereal diseases.

Locations of hospitals during November are shown in Annex XVII to the Medical Section report.

An analysis of wounded personnel by types hospitalized during the month of November is shown below:

a. Number of wounded admitted "direct" (i.e., not by transfer):

Designation	Number
(1) U. S. Army Troops	13,406
(2) British Army Troops	[illegible]
(3) French Army Troops	[illegible]
(4) U. S. Navy and Marine Corps	[illegible]
(5) British and French Navy	[illegible]
(6) Enemy Forces Personnel	[illegible]
(7) Civilians	[illegible]
(8) Others - (Russians 3, PW 5)	[illegible]

Note: All of the following in b through f pertains to U. S. Army troops only.

b. General Classification of Wounds:

(1) Serious	2928
(2) Slight	10,478

c. Anatomical Classification of Wounds:
(Patients with multiple wounds are classified according to most extensive wounds).

	Admissions	Deaths
(1) Wounds other than burns:		
(a) Abdominal	664	98
(b) Thoracic	1111	[illegible]
(c) Maxillo-facial	712	[illegible]
(d) Neurologic		
Head	737	60
Spine	[illegible]	[illegible]
Nerve	[illegible]	[illegible]
(e) Extremities		
Upper	[illegible]	[illegible]
Lower	[illegible]	[illegible]
(f) Bostons	[illegible]	[illegible]
(g) Others	[illegible]	[illegible]
Sub-total	13,373	[illegible]
(2) Burns - all locations	83	1
Total	13,406	357

d. Number of patients with multiple wounds: 1,069 — 77

e. Classification of wounds by causative agents:

(1) Gunshot wounds (rifle, pistol, or machine gun)	3702	102
(2) Shell wounds (HE, flak, mortar, or cannon)	7779	190
(3) Bomb wounds (aerial, grenade, booby trap, or mine)	511	16
(4) Blast injuries (bomb, shell, or mine)	[illegible]	[illegible]
(5) Wounds from secondary missiles	[illegible]	[illegible]
(6) Burns (petrol, flash, flame-thrower, phosphorus, etc.)	[illegible]	[illegible]
(7) Others	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total	13,406	357

f. Number of deaths by primary and secondary causes:

Loc 2 (HE) Lung and liver	2

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Pen W and FC frontal bone		1
Lac W (EE) blast, jejunum		1
Wounded (EE) cerebral		1
Lac W (EE) ileum and mesentery		1
GSW abdomen	Peritonitis	1
GSW transection of liver		2
GSW lung and abdomen		4
W (bomb) traumatic amp lower leg		1
FCC skull		21
Pen W chest and abdomen	Shock	6
Pen W neck and spinal cord		1
Pen W shoulder and arm		1
Perf W chest	Shock	4
Pen W thigh	Gas gangrene	1
FC radius, ulna, femur, and fibula	Gas gangrene	1
FCC femur	Shock	1
FCC mandible	Shock	1
Traumatic amp both feet		2
GSW groin, traumatic amp leg	Gas gangrene	1
Perf W forearm, contusion of medial nerves		1
Perf W abdomen		4
Perf W buttocks Hematoma		1
Pen W chest	Hemothorax and respiratory insufficiency	2
Pen W groin FC femur	Shock	1
Pen W abdomen and legs	Shock	1
Shell W	Shock	3
Shell W	Surgical shock	4
GSW	Surgical shock	5
Shell W	Avulsion of brain	4
Shell W	Air embolus in heart	1
Shell W	Intracranial hemorrhage	1
Pen W GSW chest	Pulmonary edema	4
Pen W (EE) chest	Hemorrhage and shock	9
Perf W (EE) abdomen	Hemorrhage and shock	12
Perf W (EE) hand	Hemorrhage and shock	1
Perf W (EE) buttocks	Hemorrhage and shock	4
Pen GSW abdomen	Hepatitis, acute	1
Pen GSW abdomen	Shock	6
Perf GSW chest	Pulmonary edema	4
Pen W (mortar) chest		5
Perf W (EE) thigh, rupture of bladder		1
DOA electrical shock		1
GSW chest	Hemorrhage and shock	2
Pen W both thighs	Dilation of heart and Hydrothorax	1
Pen W (EE) thigh traumatic amp hand		1
Pen W GSW leg	Gas gangrene	1
Pen W (EE) arm and face	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W (EE) abdomen	Hemorrhage and shock	2
Pen W (EE) buttocks	Bronchopneumonia	2
Traumatic amp (mine) both feet	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W (EE) buttocks	Pulmonary edema and hydrothorax	1
Pen W GSW abdomen	Atelectasis of lungs	3
Pen W (EE) chest and buttocks	Shock	1
FCC GSW left radius	Shock	1
Pen W (shell) skull	Pulmonary edema	3
GSW skull		2
FCC (shell) left tibia	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W (shell) sternum	Shock	1
Pen W (shell) skull	Shock	2
Pen W GSW thigh	Shock	1
Pen W (shell) chest		3
Pen W (shell) chest	Pulmonary edema	2
Pen W (shell) left leg	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W (shell) leg	Shock	3
FCC (shell) skull	Pulmonary edema	3
GSW neck	Thrombosis left common carotid	1
Lac W (shell) neck		1
Pen GSW left thigh	Peritonitis	1
FCC cervical spine		1
Perf GSW skull		1
DOA		10
Traumatic amp leg	Pulmonary embolism	1
FCC tibia and fibula	Shock	2
Pen W right chest	Intracranial pressure	1
Perf W shoulder, arm, WB chest	Shock	1
FCC forearm and thigh	Shock	1
EE (shell) traumatic amp left leg and left arm at wrist	Exsanguination, shock severe	1
EE (mine) amp traum foot, left		

Pen W wrist and arm left	Pulmonary edema	1
EE (art) Pen W epigastrium with viscous damage, severe	Shock - severe	1
GSW (rifle) Pen W abdomen, sv	Shock - severe	1
EE (mortar) WB back with FC vertebrae and abdomen Pen		1
EE (Type ?) FC Tibia, left and scapula	Biliary peritonitis from large perf of liver	1
GSW (MG) Pen W chest rt severe		1
GSW (Type ?) Pen W chest, sv		1
EE (Mortar) WBs face & Pen W arm, rt, FC skull, Pen W brain, thorax	Pulmonary edema	1
EE (shell frag) Pen W left flank involving spinal cord at level T4	Shock and hemorrhage	1
EE (Mortar) Perf W chest with fracture ribs rt side, fracture sternum	Respiratory failure	1
EE (Mortar) Pen W abdomen sv Pen W thigh, left - sv LBs thigh left and right	Generalized peritonitis	1
Burns (enemy mine) hands, face, arms and legs	Respiratory failure	1
GSW (Rifle) Perf W rt thigh with perf femoral, artery	Massive hemorrhage	1
GSW (MG) perf W chest, lt, sv Perf W kidney, lwr lobe left lung & diaphram	Pneumothorax	1
EE (Mortar) Pen W left thorax, posterior		1
GSW (rifle) FC skull- severe	Shock - severe	1
EIA (Type ?) Pen W left hip w/entire peritoneal Perf rectum and bladder	Diffuse peritonitis	1
EE (Type ?) cerebral cone. sv LE chin, Pen W chest, rt	Shock - severe	1
EE SFW FCC Skull - severe		1
EE (Shrap) Pene W abdomen - sv left arm EIA		1
EE (SFW) Pen W right chest and abdomen		1
GSW Perf left costal margin	Hemorrhage	1
Perf W shell head	Shock	1
Pen W shell head	Pulmonary edema	2
Pen W shell right arm, FCC	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W shell, chest	Pulmonary edema	3
GSW, Pen right leg, FCC	Irreversible shock	1
Pen W, shell, both thighs	Secondary shock	1
Pen W, shell, left thigh and ischium, FS both	Post-operative atelectasis	1
Pen W, shell abdomen	Irreversible shock	2
Pen W, shell buttocks	Irreversible shock	2
GSW, Pen right leg, FC	Secondary shock	1
GSW, Pen chest	Secondary shock	1
Pen W, shell, chest	Hemothorax	1
Pen W, shell, left thigh	Irreversible shock	1
GSW, Pen, head	Irreversible shock	1
Pen W, shell, head	Respiratory failure	3
Pen W, shell, left leg	Secondary shock	1
GSW, Pen abdomen	Aspiration pneumonia	1
Pen W, shell, right thigh	Renal failure	1
Pen W, shell, both legs, FCC	Renal failure	1
Pen W, shell, right arm, FCC	Irreversible shock	1
Pen W, shell, right thigh, FCC	Pulmonary edema	1
FC, base of skull	Intracranial hemorrhage	1
Traumatic amputation, foot right	Shock, hemorrhage, pulmonary edema	2
FCC, skull	DOA	1
FCC, skull	Severe brain injury	1
FCC, depressed walls of right sinus	Shock, hemorrhage	1
Traumatic amp, right & left foot	Shock, tetanus	1
Traumatic amp, left foot and right hand	Shock	1
Electric shock	DOA	1
FCC, skull	Shock	1
Perf W, chest	Shock, internal hemorrhage	1
Pen W, abdominal	Generalized peritonitis	1
Perf W, buttock, left and right	Shock	1
Pen W fronto-parietal area	Shock	1
Pen W parieto-occipital region	Shock	1
FCC skull with brain evisceration	Shock	2
Perf W FCC right thigh	Shock	1
Pen W lumbar region	Shock	1

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[illegible]	Shock	1
[illegible]	Shock	1
[illegible]	Shock	1
[illegible]	Shock	8
[illegible]	Shock	1
Pen GSW head	Shock	3
Pen W (EE) chest	Shock	7
Pen GSW abdomen	Shock	6
Perf W (EE) abdomen	Pneumonia	1
Pen W (EE) abdomen	Shock	1
Traumatic amp left arm	Shock	1
Perf W lungs	Respiratory failure	1
Pen GSW Chest	Shock	3
MW (EE) head	Pulmonary embolus	1
Pen W (EE) spine	Hemorrhage	1
Pen W (EE) pelvis	Pulmonary embolism	1

g. Number of transfusions of:

(1) Fresh whole blood	[illegible]
(2) Stored blood	[illegible]
(3) Dry plasma	[illegible]
(4) Other blood substitutes - Saline 5%7	[illegible]
(Do not include crystalloids) Dextrose 5%	[illegible]

h. Number of units of penicillin administered: 4,535,480,000

i. Number of amputations:

(1) Upper extremity	[illegible]
(2) Lower extremity	[illegible]

j. Number of cases showing clinical evidence of gas gangrene:

(1) U. S. Army	46
(2) Other	17

k. Number of wounded evacuated to other hospitals:

(1) U. S. Army	11206
(2) Other	1085

4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

The 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion, less certain elements, continued to be held in reserve for use in the event of the employment of chemical warfare by the enemy.

Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

With the resumption of the offensive beginning on 8 November there was an expected increase in total battle casualties. The number increased from 3,581 in October to 13,406 in November. However, in addition to this total for November, which involves actual wounds and/or burns, there were during the month 4,587 cases of trench foot, almost all of them were evacuated to the Communications Zone.

The percent of deaths to total dispositions from all causes in Third U. S. Army medical installations during this month was one per-cent, representing a very slight increase over the previous month.

2. Surgery

Of the 13,406 battle casualties admitted during the month the number of serious injuries totalled 2,928 and slightly injured 10,478 men.

The addition of 4,587 cases of trench foot to the total number of battle casualties did not reflect an accurate total of all battle casualties inasmuch as many cases with battle wounds developed this complication because of the cold and rain and the fact that because of these conditions it was at times difficult to evacuate casualties early from the battlefield. With a campaign to stress the command responsibility in the proper care of the feet and the prevention of trench foot, the number of casualties from this source was reduced. It was found in regard to trench foot that surgical measures were not of any great value and paravertebral block was found to be of little use in those cases where the condition was well established.

In some sections of the front, large mine fields were encountered and this fact was reflected in an increase in injuries to the lower extremities, with a higher number of amputations being necessary than in any previous like period. There were 160 amputations of the lower extremities required as against forty-six during the previous month.

A higher incidence of gas gangrene also occurred, there being six-

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tion cases in October and forty-eight in November. The majority of such cases were present in wounds of the extremities, and the increase was undoubtedly a result of the combination of factors involving unfavorable weather and consequent slower evacuation.

5. Neuropsychiatry

The incidence of neuropsychiatric casualties in Third U. S. Army during the month of November was influenced by several factors. This Army, which has swept across France and emerged in prolonged and static warfare along the MOSELLE River and before METZ (U-84), now bores the slow and arduous push from the MOSELLE river to the SAAR and the German border. The weather had become extremely cold with sleet, snow, and ice. Water crossings were necessary, and the Third U. S. Army had been unable to obtain enough overshoes to equip it completely. Many divisions had been in combat since D-Day; others since the Third U. S. Army became operational on 1 August 1944. Each division had instituted rest areas at the battalion division areas, regimental train areas, or the division rear, to which tired men were sent for one to three days to rest and resupply themselves. A Third U. S. Army rest center in NANCY (U-41) was functioning in a more than adequate manner for units of the III Corps. Aesters of the line, divisional officers, and nurses were being sent for three-day rest periods in PARIS (S-OL) at the rate of 500 per month from the Army. Every effort was being made from the standpoint of command to combat cold and fatigue. The combat soldier was supplied with one hot meal or some hot elements with one meal daily wherever humanly possible, which resulted in hot foods being brought to his position after dark. The 10th Armored Division was placed in the line ready for its first combat. The entire 90th and all or a part of the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions were placed in reserve between 1 November and 9 November.

On 8 November and 9 November, Third U. S. Army attached on a front extending from SIERCK (Q-09) to a point half-way between NANCY (U-81) and CHARMES (Z-97). Enemy opposition was fierce along the entire line, and particularly in the never-conquered city of METZ (U-85). Casualty rates pyramided as of 8 November, and by the end of the month of November, the total non-fatal casualties (including diseases) amounted to 30,492, which was an all-time monthly high for this Army.

The incidence of neuropsychiatric casualties compared to the total non-fatal casualties have been for four months as follows:

August	7.4 Percent
September	10.5 "
October	10.5 "
November	9.1 "

The influx of more than 30,000 patients in a period of thirty days resulted in shorter periods of care at aid stations, clearing stations, evacuation hospitals, and the convalescent hospital. Of the 4,338 neuropsychiatric casualties, 911 were returned to duty at division clearing station level, this being somewhat fewer than were returned from the same level in previous months. This was due to the fact that clearing companies were highly mobile, frequently moved, and fewer patients could be held at that level. Evacuation hospitals each received from 1,100 to 5,000 patients, and the convalescent hospital was, in many instances, filled to capacity. As a result, only 2,220, or sixty-six and five-tenths percent of the neuropsychiatric casualties were returned to duty. The divisions sustained from 2,000 to 4,800 non-fatal casualties; however, the neuropsychiatric rate was lower than it had been since August.

4. Dental

The three prosthetic dental teams assigned to the 4th Auxiliary Surgical Group, as well as an additional prosthetic team loaned to this Army by the Communications Zone in October, were used throughout November in division areas. During this month it was also demonstrated that the mobility of these teams was of a high order and that little working time was lost due to movements of division units.

The English bus-type dental laboratory truck placed on detached service in October with this Army continued to work at the location of the 12th Evacuation Hospital in NANCY (U-81).

The dental clinic previously established at the 6th Convalescent Hospital consisted of a total of seven dental officers, together with appropriate enlisted assistants. Although the clinic was closed for an entire week, it processed 156 prosthetic cases, and 401 restorations were inserted during the month of November, in addition to routine examinations and other treatments.

During the first week of the month an investigation was made into a new anti-concussion device being made for personnel in a 155-mm field artillery gun battalion by a dental officer of that unit. Approximately thirty of these devices had been made and were being tried under actual firing conditions. Praise for them was unanimous by all individuals who used them. The devices were being made of dental-type acrylic, and through a process of successive molds with a dental material were constructed to fit the individual ear.

Facilities were provided in the 3rd Medical Depot Company to complete these devices for the entire field artillery battalion in order that a more comprehensive survey could be made concerning the results that accrued. In order to economize on the time of the men assigned to the field artillery battalion the impressions of the ears were made in the battalion area, were processed in the medical depot company laboratory, and the devices were then brought back to the battalion where they were individually fitted. It was found that when the men were made readily available in the battalion area it was possible for the dental officer and his two assistants to take impressions of the ears of approximately 100 men in one day. Laboratory work necessary for processing that many devices required approximately five days. Thus it was possible to complete anti-concussion devices for 100 men in six to seven days, or approximately two weeks for a battalion.

Dental clinics at the two medical depot companies operated for approximately three weeks during the month. One clinic treated ninety-five prosthetic cases, and the other clinic 107 prosthetic cases, completing the laboratory work on sixty-two additional cases.

Approximately five and three-tenths percent of battle casualty admissions to hospitals during the month were maxillo-facial injuries, there being a total of 721 such cases. Among these cases there were seven deaths, or ninety-eight one-hundredths of one percent of the maxillo-facial cases admitted.

Following is a chart showing the number of dental treatments accomplished throughout the Army during the month of November:

Strength Reported	236117
Admissions Acutae	11,498
Admissions Emergency	2902
Sittings	20,941
Officer Personnel	502
Enlisted Personnel	321
Restorations	1,502
Fixtures	1427
Gingivitis	805
Gingivitis Treatment	1,043
Stomatitis, Vincent's	374
Stomatitis, Vincent's Treatment	716

5. Veterinary

Inspections were made of forty-four Class I supply points, five division ration breakdown areas, five messes and two quartermaster bakeries during November. It was again noted that food usually arrived at the railhead in good condition and that major efforts must be toward the prevention of waste and deterioration after arrival. Inclement weather and the sanitary conditions which result, continued to be the major problem. Dunnage and pallets were the chief means employed to avoid damage.

Subsequent to the fall of METZ (U-85), approximately 100 tons of carcass fresh beef and twenty tons of carcass fresh pork were discovered frozen in the city abattoir which belonged to the civilians. German garrison stores consisted of canned beef, canned corned beef, cheese and sardines. This supply was issued to Third U. S. Army troops after being carefully inspected. In addition to meat, there was flour, canned plums and dehydrated vegetables.

6. Personnel

In response to a letter from the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, recommendations were made to the Chief of Staff, through the AC of S, G-1, this headquarters, regarding a proposed policy for rotation of Medical Department officers between Communications Zone installations and Army installations. It was recommended that five Medical Department officers weekly be recommended for permanent rotation from this Army based on the age of the officer, his length of time in his present unit, length of service in combat, professional and military qualifications. These officers were to be replaced by the Communications Zone with officers under thirty-five years of age and fit for general military service. Emphasis was to be placed on the permanent rotation of medical officers from combat units such as divisions. It was further recommended that two medical officers from each 400-bed evacuation hospital, three from the 750-bed evacuation hospital, and six from the Auxiliary Surgical Group be made available for temporary rotation to Communications Zone hospitals for a sixty-day period only, these officers to be replaced temporarily by medical officers of like professional qualifications during each sixty-day period. The above recommendations were incorporated later in the month in an improvement to the letter from the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army.

Due to a high rate of casualties in this Army as a result of its offensive commenced on 8 November, it was necessary to secure the additional surgical and shock teams as well as nurses on temporary duty from general hospitals, mentioned previously in this report.

Shortages in Medical Corps officers increased from eleven during the previous month to seventeen by the end of November. Shortages also continued to exist in Medical administrative Corps officers, in which there was a shortage of twenty-one at the conclusion of the month. Also the establishment of a pool of ten nurses assigned to this Army in October, to be kept at a constant level, tables of organization shortages did not exist in the Army Nurse Corps. However, as will be noted from the above, tables of organization no longer provide adequate nursing personnel during a period of extended military operations.

During this month a directive was issued to the effect that all medical units would turn back all prisoners of war being used as labor to advance Section, Communications Zone prisoner of war inclosures prior to entering Germany. Several hospitals had already turned in prisoners of war due to the fact that they were operating close to the front lines and to the German border. Two quartermaster service companies were placed at the disposal of the Army Surgeon in lieu of prisoner of war labor and their use in hospitals was projected during this month.

Section 4 - Medical Supply

Movements of the Army medical depot companies were again at a minimum. On 7 November Advance Section Number 1 of the 92d Medical Depot Company opened in METZ (U-79) to support more closely the troops of XX Corps. No other movements of medical depots occurred.

Delivery of medical supplies by Communications Zone had fallen off shortly after the middle of October. On 14 November, a survey was made and it was discovered that of 130 tons requisitioned since 15 October only twenty-two and one-half tons had been received. This was resulting in a critically short supply of many back-ordered items. During the month a total of 438 long tons of medical supplies was actually delivered to Army medical depots. However, the majority of these supplies was secured by sending Army transportation to the Communications Zone depots which involved long trips by forward transportation.

In the middle of the month, 250,000 ccs of typhus vaccine were secured from Communications Zone medical depots to be used in typhus inoculations throughout Third U. S. Army.

Among other unusual items which were procured were 215 sets of litter brackets to be used in making litter attachments on jeeps within Third U. S. Army divisions. These brackets were distributed to medical detachments of forward elements of divisions, to engineer battalions, and to other similar units. The Army Engineer were available 500 rolls of captured "Hessian" matting and these were placed in stock at the 93d Medical Depot Company for issue to hospitals and air/rail medical evacuation holding units for use as flooring. Action was also initiated during this month to increase the allowance of pajama suits, winter, to 1,000 per evacuation hospital. Also, 44,000 copper sulfate pads were made available to each division. These were issued to individual soldiers for their protection against white phosphorous burns.

Disproportionate exchanges of blankets were being effected at air evacuation holding units. Steps were taken during the last week of November to remedy this situation and a proper method of exchange was finally accommodated early in the following month through the timely cooperation of the Supply Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army.

During the month a new plan for delivery of blood to hospitals was instituted. Under this plan, two blood trucks serviced each corps area daily, one of these carrying blood for evacuation hospitals only, and one for field hospital platoons only. The trucks destined for field hospital platoons would report to the corps medical battalion, a representative of which would accompany and guide the truck to its destination. In addition, each corps medical battalion was to keep on hand thirty or forty pints of blood and several hundred units of penicillin. Necessary refrigerators for this purpose were authorized to the corps medical battalions.

A small quantity of captured medical supplies was found in two military hospitals and the police hospital in METZ (U-85) toward the close of the month. A small percentage of this was placed in stock in Army medical depots and the rest released to Civil Affairs and Advance Section, Communications Zone. A representative of the Medical Intelli-













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gence Branch, Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations visited this office to investigate new items of captured medical material. Most important of the items studied were a new type gas casualty kit, several types of trench and insecticide powder, and some anti-frostbite ointment. Samples of these items were shipped to the Medical Equipment Laboratory, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, for further investigation.

Section 3 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

During this month there was heavy fighting throughout the Third U. S. Army area, characterized by difficult river crossings over the MOSELLE and SAAR Rivers and the assault of METZ (U-25). Heavy and frequent rains continued, with temperatures ranging from the low thirties to the low forties. The tactical situation and frequent troop movements throughout the period made preventive medicine standards difficult to maintain.

2. Venereal Disease Control

The venereal disease rate remained high for the first two weeks of November. However, with the onset of heavy fighting beginning on 8 November a moderate decrease in the incidence of venereal disease was noticeable. During the period the weekly rates varied between 31.61 and 18.64 per 1,000 per annum. The average for the period was 21.47 per 1,000 per annum, based on an average mean strength of 240,288 officers and men.

Prophylactic stations were established in TOUL (U-61), ST NICHOLAS (U-90), and ESCH (P-70). During the month 15,834 prophylactic treatments were given in Army operated prophylactic stations. The supply of mechanical and individual chemical prophylactic units was adequate.

Venereal disease contact reports were received on 512 individuals. The reports showed an increase in the number of cases of syphilis. Those reports which contained the necessary information for identification of the contact were turned over to Civil Affairs and the Provost Marshal for necessary action.

The practice of sending letters to commanders of units with rates above 100 per 1,000 per annum was continued.

For a weekly breakdown of figures showing the incidence of venereal disease during the month of November see Annex XVIII to the Medical Section report.

3. Communicable Diseases

Communicable diseases continued to constitute a minor problem. Upper respiratory infections showed a sharp seasonal increase.

Diarrheal diseases rose moderately during the fourth and fifth weeks of the period. No single factor was responsible and there was no clinical or bacteriological evidence of a new disease entity such as "virus diarrhea" as was reported by the First and Ninth U. S. Armies. Investigations (chemical and laboratory) revealed that most of the cases were of bacillary origin or due to food poisoning. It was felt that lowered sanitation standards under difficult conditions of active combat and consumption of unauthorized food, drink and water were responsible for the increase. No specific outbreaks occurred, the cases being uniformly spread throughout Third U. S. Army.

A detailed breakdown of statistics on communicable diseases in November will be found in Annex XVIII of the Medical Section report.

4. Medical Records

The total number of records and reports processed during the month reached a new high of 14,450. Their quality and promptness of rendition continued to improve.

5. Non-battle Injuries

The rate in this category increased to 14.5 per 1,000 per annum, based on a weekly average of 240,288 officers and men. Exclusive of the above figures, however, there also occurred a tremendous increase in the number of trench foot cases. From 8 November to the end of the month trench foot constituted a serious and major problem to this Army. Due to the necessity for constant exposure of the men's feet to water and cold, a sharp increase in this type of casualty occurred.

In this connection it was estimated that sixty-five percent of all men developing trench foot would probably be of no further value for combat during, at least, the winter months. However, the experience of this Army with trench foot was not extensive enough to be absolutely certain on this point.

A policy was established of evacuating patients with trench foot to the Communications Zone for further treatment and evaluation.

All possible efforts were made toward prevention of trench foot inasmuch as specific treatment has not yet been developed for this condition. All echelons of command were made fully cognizant of their responsibilities in this respect.

Daily statistics showing the incidence of trench foot as revealed by total admissions to division clearing stations is shown below:

DATE	CASES
8 November	11
9 November	21
10 November	129
11 November	387
12 November	501
13 November	432
14 November	424
15 November	433
16 November	431
17 November	126
18 November	193
19 November	104
20 November	78
21 November	92
22 November	98
23 November	199
24 November	225
25 November	81
26 November	150
27 November	152
28 November	70
29 November	76
30 November	165
Total	3987

The downward trend of these statistics after the peak had been reached reflects the beneficial results of instruction and education toward prevention and superhuman efforts of all concerned to keep the men supplied with dry socks and overshoes.

Differences between the figures given above and those shown in Annex XVIII to the Medical Section report are due to the fact that the latter are based on reports from the respective organizations in which the cases occurred. Later changes in diagnoses accounts for the fact that the above figures reflect a greater number of cases, being based on reports from evacuation agencies.

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

The 7th Medical Laboratory continued to operate throughout the month in two sections as follows:

Section I - SAMPIGNY (U-32)
Section II - NANCY (U-81)

There were 8,177 tests performed during the month, or 349 less than the tests performed in October. This represented only a five percent drop from the peak load and was surprisingly small considering the mobile state of the tactical situation. The total remained well over the estimated capacity of an Army Medical Laboratory of 6,000 tests per month.

The above total of tests, by section performing them is broken down below:

BASE LABORATORY SECTIONS	NO. OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Serology	5272	64.4
Bacteriology	1110	13.6
Chemistry	467	5.7
Pathology	169	2.1
Hematology	53	0.7
Parasitology	105	1.3
Sub-total	7176	87.8
MOBILE SECTIONS:		
Venereal Disease Section (6th Convalescent Hosp)	746	9.1
Shoes Section (60th Field Hosp)	255	3.1
Sub-total	1001	12.2
GRAND TOTAL	8177	100.0

The drop largely occurred in the mobile venereal disease section due to the temporary closing of the 6th Convalescent Hospital. Also the elimination in the laboratory itself of unnecessary water examinations. There was also a drop in the number of stool samples submitted.

A breakdown of the above tests by type of unit requesting them during the month of November is shown below:

TYPE OF UNIT	NO. OF UNITS	NO. OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF ALL TESTS
Evacuation Hospitals	11	2259	27.6
Convalescent Hospital	1	2519	30.8
Other Medical Installations	23	790	9.7
Tactical Organizations	172	2609	31.9
TOTAL	207	8177	100.0

7. Sanitation

The cumulative effect of continuous rains during the month, with abnormal precipitation during the latter phase of this period, resulted in aggravated mud conditions and record floods in practically all of the streams. These conditions of the terrain, coupled with heavy type fighting and low temperatures throughout the Army area, contributed to the high incidence of upper respiratory infections and trench foot discussed above.

Problems from insects and rodents were at a minimum during the month. Only a few instances of bedbug infestation were encountered and prompt correction was effected through the use of DDT preparations.

Garbage and refuse disposal presented few problems. Authorized military dumps were established in areas having a concentration of troops.

A shortage of overshoes which was acute during the month of October was corrected during November to a great extent.

During the month there were sporadic cases of diarrhea, but a definite total reduction over the previous month. In no instance could the cases be proven attributable to a specific cause. In two instances frozen food was suspected, and in one instance discrepancies in water discipline and mess sanitation were indicated. Steps were taken in every instance to reemphasize sanitation in all its phases. The summary of analyses of water samples from engineer water points showed further gratifying improvement in the potability of the water produced. Non-potable samples dropped from twelve percent in October to six percent of those examined in November. General application of the modified method of operating water purification units projected in October was in actual effect in Army, Corps and Division engineer units during November.

Representatives of the Office of the Chief Surgeon and the Office of the Chief Engineer, European Theater of Operations, visited the area to investigate the modified water treatment policy in effect throughout Third U. S. Army. The methods employed were favorably considered for adoption throughout the European Theater of Operations.

CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

The progression of the Third U. S. Army in an easterly direction up to and across the German Border and constant preparation for a major attack on the SIEGFRIED LINE led to a consequent disposition of medical units to support these operations. Relentless efforts in regard to the problem of cold injuries (trench foot and frostbite) on the part of the respective commands produced definite results and decreases in this type of injury.

In December, for the first time, Third U. S. Army overran German enclosures which contained a mixture of Allied prisoners of war and Allied displaced personnel. The medical care of these abandoned personnel who were sick or wounded became the responsibility of the Medical Department. Since there was a high percentage of morbidity among them, the Medical Department assumed responsibility for a large proportion.

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Late in the month, the movement of medical units to the north, in order to support the attack of the Third U. S. Army on the southern flank of the ARDENNES bulge, was achieved with a speed as incredible as the shift of the combat elements involved.

The details of all of the above circumstances will be found below in this chapter.

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

There was no change in the physical organizational setup of the Medical Section during this month.

Shortly after the breakthrough of the Germans in the ARDENNES area, an officer from this section was placed on temporary duty with Headquarters III Corps, and one with Headquarters VIII Corps for liaison purposes. This action was necessitated by the fact that operations were somewhat nebulous during the first few days, and were also initially being carried on at a considerable distance from the location of this headquarters.

Four enlisted men from the Medical Section were furnished for training as riflemen. These men were not replaced in the section.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

One officer, each, from the 65th and 66th Medical Groups attended the course on "Information and Education" offered by Headquarters European Theater of Operations at Cite Universitaire, PARIS (T-24). Requests were also submitted during the month to the AC of S, G-1 for allotment to medical units of a proportionate share of future quotas for attendance at other courses to be held at the Army Information-Education Staff School.

Officers and nurses of the 65th Field Hospital were placed on temporary duty with various hospitals for orientation purposes. The 65th Medical Group was given the responsibility of training this unit.

2. Evacuation

When the III Corps became operational on 6 December with the mission of mopping up in METZ (U-85), the 66th Medical Group assumed the responsibility for medical evacuation of this corps, in addition to its responsibility for evacuation of XII Corps. This was possible due to the fact that the latter corps was assigned a front on the SAAR River, stretching roughly from SAARBURG (L-11) to SAARBRUCKEN (Q-47), although the former had not yet been approached closely. The sector surrounding METZ (U-85) covered by III Corps was geographically in the rear of this area; and the 66th Medical Group, which was located in METZ (U-85), was in an admirable position to combine evacuation of both corps. By 15 December, the evacuation of all isolated forts at METZ (U-85) had been completed, and III Corps was assigned a sector on the SAAR River front to the south of XX Corps, and responsibility for its evacuation was at that time taken over by the 65th Medical Group, located at MORHANGE (Q-23). A corps medical battalion had been attached to III Corps prior to its commencement of operations, consisting of Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 152d Medical Battalion, 411th Medical Collecting Company, and the 608th Clearing Company. This battalion was later augmented by the attachment of the 667th Medical Collecting Company. On 22 December, the 608th Clearing Company was relieved by the 624th Clearing Company.

Exciting days prevailed for this Army beginning 20 December, when it was given the mission of bringing pressure on the southern flank of the German bulge in the ARDENNES area to crush the German counter-offensive. The III Corps moved north to the vicinity of ARLON (P-62), and became operational in the area north of that point on 20 December. XII Corps followed two days later, moving to the vicinity of LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81). The 65th Medical Group continued to support both of these corps during the movement of the corps and their units, establishing its own headquarters at ESCH (P-70).

VIII Corps was established west of III Corps, and was being evacuated by the 64th Medical Group. This corps was assigned to Third U. S. Army, effective 21 December. The 64th Medical Group was not actually assigned by order until 26 December, but continued to evacuate this corps, except that it was relieved of the responsibility of evacuating the evacuation hospitals in its area. The latter function was assumed by the 69th Medical Group, which moved north to ESCH (P-70). Close cooperation between the 64th and 65th Medical Groups during this period resulted in smooth evacuation in situations where the division of responsibility was not always clear.

Units attached to the 64th Medical Group, in support of VIII Corps, included the following:

Sq A Hq Det, 170th Med Bn	595th Amb Co, Mtr
Sq A Hq Det, 240th Med Bn	6234 Clearing Company
580th Amb Co, Mtr	42d Field Hospital
581st Amb Co, Mtr	107th Evac Hosp (Mtr)
590th Amb Co, Mtr	110th Evac Hosp (Mtr)

An unusual problem developed as a result of the isolation at BASTOGNE (P-55) of the 101st Airborne Division and elements of the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions. Evacuation of casualties from these forces was not possible for a period of about six days; and, as a result of the capture of the medical company of the 101st Airborne Division, the units isolated were supported essentially by first echelon medical personnel, only. Intensive liaison activity by representatives of the Army Surgeon and of the III and VIII Corps Surgeons, under particularly difficult conditions, early established the fact that approximately 1,000 casualties were present in BASTOGNE (P-55), who would require third echelon medical care when the breakthrough to that town was completed. As an initial step, medical supplies were dropped to the besieged forces on 23, 24, and 25 December. Meanwhile, alternate plans were developed for the provision of third echelon medical care, as well as evacuation in the event that the breakthrough by the 4th Armored Division and the 80th Infantry Division occurred on any given day. The former aspect will be discussed below under the heading, "Surgery". The breakthrough actually occurred on 26 December, and on the following day, 652 of the 1,150 casualties in the town were evacuated by units of the 64th Medical Group.

To support the 101st Airborne Division and its attached units, a provisional medical battalion was formed. It included the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 439th Medical Battalion, the 695th Medical Collecting Company, and Company "A", 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion. These units were gathered from their various and distant locations and dispatched to the vicinity of BASTOGNE (P-55) on 27 December. The first two units mentioned were relieved of this attachment on 31 December, and Company "A" of the 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion continued its mission of operating a clearing company for the relieved forces until transfer of that division, early in January, to the Seventh U. S. Army.

To regulate casualty flow to hospitals supporting VIII, III, and XII Corps, the 64th Medical Group established an ambulance regulating post at VIRTON (P-41), and the 65th Medical Group established similar posts at ARLON (P-61) and at LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81).

The 69th Medical Group, assisted by ambulance companies of the Advance Section, Communications Zone, continued its mission of evacuating Army hospitals. Advance Section, Communications Zone, gradually assumed responsibility for evacuation of a total of five evacuation hospitals, as well as the provisional hospital operated by the 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion at THIONVILLE (U-88). In addition, Advance Section, Communications Zone, furnished ambulance service to all medical holding units supporting this Army.

The movement of Army medical troops to the southern flank of the bulge constituted a transportation achievement comparable to that of the mass movement of armor and infantry units to the same point. Movement was accomplished by infiltration, and generous credit is due to the respective Sections of G-3 and G-4 of this headquarters, without whose cooperation the achievement would not have been attained.

Four new medical collecting companies (the 413th, 660th, 667th, and 687th) and two new clearing companies (the 606th and 624th) arrived in the Army area during the month. At the end of this period, there were still four medical collecting companies and one clearing company assigned by order to Third U. S. Army which had not yet arrived.

On 26 December, the 606th Clearing Company was attached to the 64th Medical Group, which had its headquarters at VERDUN (P-25). The platoons of this clearing company were subsequently employed to operate two Army clearing stations west of the MEUSE River in support of tactical units, which included the 17th Airborne Division then protecting that river. This constituted the first orthodox use of an Army clearing company since Third U. S. Army became operational. Patients from these clearing platoons were evacuated directly to the 170th General Hospital (a Communications Zone unit) located at REIMS (V-05). Prior to the assignment of this mission to the 606th Clearing Company, the evacuation of the 17th Airborne Division and the 11th Armored Division in this area had been provided by two provisional clearing companies formed from a Communications Zone hospital located in REIMS (V-05).

The Army air/rail medical evacuation holding unit, operated by the 64th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion, was located throughout the month at THIONVILLE (U-88). The unit opened at this location on 6 December, and two days later railroad facilities, as well as air evacuation, became available at that point. During the month, 1,741 patients were evacuated from this unit by air. This represented a minority of those evacuated, but was a considerable increase over the month of November. It was also accomplished during a period marked by snow and murky weather. When the axis of the Army turned north, the air/rail medical evacuation holding unit was still in an excellent position to support the hospitals.

Advance Section, Communications Zone continued to operate an air/rail evacuation holding unit at STAIN (U-47) and HARCY (U-81). The latter unit, however, had only rail evacuation facilities available. An additional field hospital of Advance Section, Communications Zone moved to HARCY (U-81) early in December, and operated an auxiliary rail evacuation holding unit until the end of the month when it was closed and prepared for movement to the north.

A total of 24,092 patients were evacuated from Third U. S. Army during the month. In addition to the 1,741 evacuated by air, 12,886 were evacuated by road to Advance Section, Communications Zone medical holding units, or to general hospitals, and 9,465 were evacuated by rail.

The locations of evacuation facilities throughout the month are shown in Annex XIA to the Medical Section report.

3. Hospitalization

The attachment of field hospitals and their platoons remained rather stable until after 16 December. The 65th Field Hospital arrived in the Army area early in the month, and was attached to the 65th Medical Group for orientation purposes.

The mass movement of divisions which occurred after the third week of the month resulted in considerable changes in the attachment of field hospital platoons. Some of the platoons accompanied the divisions to which they were attached on all movements, but others remained behind to support new divisions. One platoon, the 3d Platoon of the 60th Field Hospital, completed the following odyssey of attachments during December: XII Corps, III Corps, XX Corps, XII Corps and III Corps. At the end of the month, the following attachments of field hospitals were in effect:

III Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
16th Fld Hosp	1st Plat, 30th Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 30th Fld Hosp
2d Plat, 59th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 30th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 59th Fld Hosp
3d Plat, 60th Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 42d Fld Hosp	
	2d Plat, 60th Fld Hosp	

64th Medical Group	65th Medical Group	69th Medical Group
1st Plat, 42d Fld Hosp	65th Fld Hosp	1st Plat, 59th Fld Hosp
3d Plat, 42d Fld Hosp		
1st Plat, 60th Fld Hosp		

The 42d Field Hospital was assigned to Third U. S. Army concurrently with the assignment of VIII Corps, and its various units. It had been attached to the 64th Medical Group, and was supporting the divisions of VIII Corps at the time of the German counteroffensive. The first platoon was in support of the 28th Infantry Division at WILTZ (P-75) with twenty-two non-transportable patients on hand. On 18 December, trucks were obtained and the bulk of the equipment and personnel of this platoon was removed to BASTOGNE (P-55). However, two officers, including the platoon commander, and sixteen enlisted men of the platoon, plus one general surgical team (minus nurses) from the 3d Auxiliary Surgical Group remained with the non-transportable patients. All of these personnel were captured. On the following day, the remaining personnel were removed from BASTOGNE (P-55), but it was necessary to leave the equipment behind. The third platoon of this hospital was in support of the 106th Infantry Division at ST VITH (P-88). On 17 December, the majority of the personnel withdrew, and on the following day all patients and remaining personnel, except two enlisted men, left to guard the equipment, withdrew from ST VITH (P-88). The equipment and two enlisted men were also presumed to have been captured.

In general, field hospital platoons were employed in accordance with past procedure. Through the use of holding units, consisting of a headquarters and station platoon of a medical collecting company, it was possible to free these platoons for earlier movement in support of division clearing stations when the latter displaced forward.

An innovation in the use of a field hospital in Third U. S. Army was the employment in the latter part of the month of the 65th Field Hospital as a single unit. This hospital actually opened on 31 Decem-

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ber at ARLON (P-62) with a capacity of approximately 200 beds. The capacity was limited by the size of the building available to this unit. The attachment of the 65th Field Hospital to the 65th Medical Group continued in its new operation.

During the first two weeks of December, movements of evacuation hospitals were deemed necessary to support an impending attack westward by PATTON'S U. S. Army through the ARLON-BASTOGNE LINE. The 95th and 107th Evacuation Hospitals had moved east to VITRY (Q-25) and BAYLAY-MONTOIR (Q-06) respectively. The 105th Evacuation Hospital was closed at METZ (U-67) and prepared to move east to CHATTENAID (Q-26). The 10Lth Evacuation Hospital began a move to MERIBEUX (Q-42), a move which was never completed due to subsequent radical changes in plans.

Following the German counteroffensive, the great majority of the evacuation hospitals and other medical units had to be moved north to support the Army effort in that direction. The 105th, 95th, 113th, 109th, and 101st Evacuation Hospitals moved in that order to respective new locations at LUNEVILLE (P-49), VITRY (P-41), LUXEMBOURG CITY (U-81), MONTMEDY (P-25) and ARLON (P-62). The 16th Evacuation Hospital remained open at NANCY (U-81), and was the only Third U. S. Army hospital south of METZ (U-65) at the end of the month. Meanwhile, arrangements were being made for a new site for the 12th Evacuation Hospital in LUXEMBOURG CITY (U-81).

Two additional evacuation hospitals became Third U. S. Army units during the month. The 107th Evacuation Hospital, located in the vicinity of CLERVAUX (P-48) on 16 December was closed and prepared to move. The 110th Evacuation Hospital was open at ESCH (P-70) and remained there throughout the month. The 107th Evacuation Hospital was required in a period of seven days to make three retrograde movements and was located during this period at LIBIN (P-25), CARLSBOURG (P-02) and at SEDAN (P-05). This hospital, in an eighty-two-hour period at LIBIN (P-25) admitted 781 patients and performed 326 surgical operations. There were 400 patients in the hospital when the next move became necessary. In a space of three hours, 500 patients were loaded in ambulances for evacuation to the 130th General Hospital at CHEST (P-19). Several times during this period the hospital was directly in the line of advance of the enemy forces and hasty departures were in order. On the move from LIBIN (P-25) it was necessary to leave a volunteer detachment of five officers and fifty enlisted men with the remaining patients and equipment. However, all the personnel and the greater part of the equipment were recovered later.

The 6th Convalescent Hospital was reopened early in December at ST MIHIEL (U-44) with a capacity of 1,500 beds. It opened in ZEMMING (Q-15) on 15 December. Due to subsequent changes in the tactical situation after 16 December, the location at ZEMMING (Q-15) became far from ideal, and a new site was selected at MONTIGNY-LES-METZ (U-45) in the vicinity of METZ (U-65). By the end of the month, the unit completed its movement to the new location, but had not yet opened.

An analysis of wounded hospitalized in the month of December is shown below:

a. Number of wounded admitted "direct" (i.e., not by transfer):

(1)	U. S. Army Troops	11405
(2)	British Army Troops	0
(3)	French Army Troops	25
(4)	U. S. Navy and Marine Corps	1
(5)	British and French Navy	0
(6)	Enemy Forces Personnel	167
(7)	Civilians	277
(8)	Others	29

Note: All of the following in b through f pertains to U. S. Army troops only.

b. General classification of wounds:

(1)	Serious	5326
(2)	Slight	6118

c. Anatomical classification of wounds:
(Patients with multiple wounds are classified according to most extensive wounds).

		Admissions	Deaths
(1)	Wounds other than burns:		
	(a) Abdominal	596	88
	(b) Thoracic	1136	176
	(c) Maxillo-facial	803	3
	(d) Neurologic:		
	Head	347	177
	Spine	219	15
	Nerve	10	0
	(e) Extremities:		
	Upper	2236	10
	Lower	3798	40
	(f) Buttocks	761	11
	(g) Others	891	12
	Sub-total	11358	343
(2)	Burns - all locations	137	1
	Total	11495	344

d. Number patients with multiple wounds 3183

e. Classification of wounds by causative agents:

		Admissions	Deaths
(1)	Gunshot wounds (rifle, pistol, or machine gun)	2937	83
(2)	Shell wounds (HE, Flak, mortar, or cannon)	6081	204
(3)	Bomb wounds (aerial, grenade, booby trap, or mine)	447	7
(4)	Blast injuries (bomb, shell, or mine)	388	8
(5)	Wounds from secondary missiles	61	1
(6)	Burns (petrol, flash, flame-thrower, phosphorus, etc.)	178	2
(7)	Others	583	9
	Total	11495	344

f. Number of deaths by primary and secondary causes:

Pen W (HE) Abdomen	Shock	7
Pen W (HE) Abdomen	Uremia	1
Perf W (HE) Chest and Abdomen	Shock	6
Pen W Abdomen, PCC Lumbar Vertebrae	Autolytic Peritonitis	1
Pen W Head, Buttocks and Chest		1
GSW Pen W Abdomen	Shock	5
Shell (HE) Head	Shock	8
Shell (HE) Arm	Shock	1
GSW Buttocks	Pneumonia	1
FCC (Shell) Skull		3
FCC (Shell) Skull	Shock	1
Pen W (Shell) Left Arm	Shock	1
Pen W (Shell) Chest	Pulmonary Edema	1
Concussion (HE) Cerebral	Hemothorax	1
FCC Skull	Internal Injuries	3
FCC Right Ilium	Internal Injuries	1
Pen W Neck	Shock	1
Pen W Chest through Diaphragm	Shock	1
Pen W Buttocks	Hemorrhage	3
Pen W Lower Abdomen	Shock	2
Pen W Abdomen	Peritonitis	1
GSW FCC Skull	Pneumonia	1
Perf W Abdomen	Pulmonary Edema	1
Perf GSW Abdomen	Shock and Hemorrhage	3
Pen W (HE) Abdomen	Shock and Hemorrhage	1
Pen W GSW Abdomen	Shock and Hemorrhage	2
Pen W (HE) Thigh	Shock and Hemorrhage	2
Perf GSW Chest	Empyema Thoracis	1
Perf GSW Chest	Shock, Paralysis, Nerve of Spinal Cord	1
Lac W (mine) Buttocks	Shock and Hemorrhage	1
Burns 1st & 2d Degree Generalized	Shock	1
Lac W Abdomen and Liver	Shock and Hemorrhage	1
Perf GSW Left Thigh	Shock and Hemorrhage	3
FCC Right Femur	Shock	1
Pen W Abdomen and Both Legs	Pneumonia	1
Pen W Abdomen, Perf or Jejunum, Colon and Bladder	Shock	1
Perf Chest	Shock and Hemorrhage	2
Pen W Skull	Respiratory Failure and Shock	1
Pen W Buttocks	Shock	1
Pen W Groin	Shock	1
Pen W Brain	Cerebral Edema and Hemorrhage	8
FCC Maxilla	Hemorrhage and Shock	1
FCC repair with Lac of Artery	Hemorrhage and Shock	1
Pen W Buttocks	Hemorrhage and Shock	5
Pen W Lumbar, Kidney and Liver	Hemorrhage and Shock	1
Perf W Abdomen	Hemorrhage and Shock	1
Transection of Spinal Cord	Respiratory Failure	1
Blast injury to Brain and Lungs	Shock	2
Blast Injury to Brain and Lungs	Pulmonary & Cerebral Edema Shock	2
Pen W Thigh	Blood Transfer Reaction	1
Transection of Spinal Cord	Shock	1
Pen W Brain	Cerebral Edema and Shock	1
Blast Injury Chest	Respiratory Failure	3
Concussion Blast (HE) of Brain	Hemothorax	1
FCC Femur	Shock	1
Perf W FCC Skull	Cerebral Hemiplegia	1
Pen W FC Tibia and Fibula	Pulmonary Embolism	1
Pen W (Shell) Hips	Pneumonitis	1
Pen W Thigh, Perf W Shoulder	Shock	1
Pen W Abdomen, FC Knee and Foot with Traumatic Amp of Right Foot		1
Lac W Malar Region, FCC Zygoma		1
Pen GSW Skull		1
Pen W Head, FCC Skull		1
Pen W Jaw and Forehead	Shock	2
Perf W Right Buttocks FC Sacrum	Shock	1
Perf W Arm and Head, FCC Skull	Shock	2
Traumatic Amp Left Leg	Hemorrhage and Shock	1
Pen W (HE) Lower Extremities	Hemorrhage and Shock	5
FCC GSW Skull	Shock	1
FCC (HE) Mandible	Atelectasis of Lungs	1
Pen W (HE) Neck and Shoulder	Hemorrhage	1
Pen W (HE) Arm and Thigh	Dilation of Right Ventricle of Heart	1
Pen W (HE) Lower Extremity	Pulmonary Edema	4
Perf & GSW Abdomen	Hepatic Hemorrhage	1
FCC GSW (HE) Skull		1
FCC Crushing (Vehicle) Skull		1
Perf & Pen W (HE) Lower Extremities, Chest and Face	Pulmonary Edema	1
Pen and Perf W (& Blast) Lower Extremities	Hemorrhage and Shock	1
Pen W GSW, Abdomen, Lac Kidney	Uremia	1
Pen W (HE) Upper and Lower Extremities	Pulmonary Edema	1
Pen W FCC Skull		15
Perf & Abdomen, Colon, and Kidney	Shock	1
Pen W Buttocks, Avulsive Type	Shock	1
Perf W Forearm, FCC Radius and Ulna	Shock and Hemorrhage	1
Traumatic Amp Head, FCC Humerus	Pulmonary Embolism	1
Pen W GSW Chest (Lung)	Shock and Hemorrhage	4
Pen & GSW Extremities with FCC Femur	Shock and Hemorrhage	9
Perf W Loin through Abdomen and Kidney	Progressive Anuria and Shock	1
Pen W Chest Lac Spinal Cord and FCC Dorsal Spine	Paraplegia	1
Pen W Chest, Spinal Injury, Complete Paralysis and Anesthesia	Shock and Hemorrhage	1
Perf W Neck with Cord Lesion	Myelitis	1
Perf W Neck with Transection Spinal Cord		1
Asphyxia, due to Aspiration of Vomitus		1
Pen & (HE) Chest	Hemorrhage and Shock	1
Pen W (HE) Abdomen, Lac of Spleen Diaphragm	Peritonitis and Shock	1
Pen W Lower Lumbar	Sub-hepatic Abcess, Pneumonia	1
Perf W Arm, Pen W Chest		2
FCC occipl, Occipital Region		1
Pen W, Chest and Back	Shock	4
Pen W, Abdomen, Contused W Foot	Anuria and Uremia	1
Perf W Upper Arm, Pen W Thigh and Abdomen	Anuria and Uremia	1
Perf W Stomach and Back	Anuria and Uremia	1
Pen W Chest	Shock	1
Perf W Abdomen	Gas Gangrene	1
Pen W Lumbar Region	Surgical Shock	1
Pen W Knee, Pleura, Left Hand, Arm and Leg		1
Pen W Abdomen	Peritonitis	1
Pen GSW Abdomen	Shock	6
Pen GSW Chest	Anoxia	7
Pen W (HE) Chest	Anoxia	4
Perf GSW, Knee		2
Pen W (HE) Abdomen	Shock	7
Perf GSW Abdomen	Shock	8
Pen GSW Chest	Pulmonary Edema	4
Pen W (HE) Chest	Shock	4
Pen W (HE) Buttocks	Shock	5
Blast, Cerebral	Shock	2

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Pen W (Shell) Traumatic Amp Right Leg	Shock	1
MW (Shell) Lower Extremities	Hemorrhage and Shock	6
MW (Shell) Chest	Pneumonia and Peritonitis	1
Pen W (Shell) Head	Shock	7
Perf W (Shell) Thigh	Acute Dilation of Heart	1
Perf W (Shell) Lower Extremities	Pulmonary Embolism	1
Perf W GSW Chest	Meningitis, Pneumococcic	1
Traumatic Amp (Shell) Left Leg	Pulmonary Edema	1
Perf GSW Chest	Pulmonary Edema	3
Pen W (Shell) Head	Cerebral Edema	1
Traumatic Amp (Shell) Right Leg	Shock	1
MW (Shell) Upper and Lower Extremities	Shock	2
Extensive W (Shell) Left Thigh	Shock	1
Pen W (Shell) Head	Pneumonia	1
Pen W (Shell) Chest	Pulmonary Edema	1
Pen W (Shell) Lower Extremities	Pulmonary Embolism	3
MW GSW Lumbar Spine	Meningitis Acute Generalized	1
Perf GSW Chest	Pulmonary Edema	1
GSW Lower Leg	Gas Gangrene	1
Pen W (shell) Abdomen	Pulmonary	2
Pen W (Shell) Traumatic Amp of Both Legs		1
Pen GSW Abdomen	Pulmonary Infarct	1
Pen W (Shell) FC Skull	Cardiac Failure	1
MW Pen (Bomb) Chest		1
Pen W Chest and Abdomen	Hemothorax	4
FCC Upper Femur, Pen W Abdomen	Shock and Uremia	1
Perf W Right Epigastrium, Lac Liver and Spleen		1
Pen W Abdomen, Large Perf of Ascending Colon	Hemorrhage and Peritonitis	5
Perf W Head, FCC Skull		6
FCC, Skull, Herniation of Brain		3
Pen W Chest	Massive Pulmonary Hemorrhage	6
MW Pen Abdomen, Intraperitoneal W	Shock	5
Pen W Chest (Sucking)	Respiratory Failure	2
Pen W Neck, Lac of Carotid Artery	Hemorrhage	1

g. Number of transfusions of:

(1) Fresh Whole Blood	629
(2) Stored Blood	5,500
(3) Dry Plasma	7,811
(4) Other Blood Substitutes	1,611

h. Number of units of Penicillin Administered: 3,986,221,000

i. Number of Amputations:

(1) Upper Extremity	115
(2) Lower Extremity	151

j. Number of cases showing clinical evidence of Gas Gangrene:

(1) U. S. Army	58
(2) Others	16

k. Number of wounded evacuated to other hospitals:

(1) U. S. Army	8605
(2) Others	1148

Locations of hospitals during December will be found in Annex XX to the Medical Section report.

4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

The 60th Medical Group provided medical care and evacuation for three groups of Allied military prisoners recovered during the month at DIEDING (Q-16), CREUTZWALD (Q-26) and SARREGUEMINES (Q-55). On 13 December, the Commanding Officer, 69th Medical Group assumed command of the camp at DIEDING (Q-16). There were approximately 800 Russian and Italian prisoners at CREUTZWALD (Q-26), about 110 being bedridden, eighty-five percent of these with nutritional deficiencies. At SARREGUEMINES (Q-55) there were 100 prisoner patients who required immediate evacuation because the prisoner of war enclosure was under enemy artillery fire. Arrangements were made to evacuate these patients to the 36th Evacuation Hospital at METZ (U-86), and the 64th Medical Treatment Battalion at THIONVILLE (C-84). The bedridden patients at CREUTZWALD (Q-26) were transferred to the camp at DIEDING (Q-16) which was being operated as a medical installation. Arrangements were completed with Advance Section, Communications Zone for evacuation of about 500 patients from DIEDING (Q-16) and for eventual operation of the camp there by Advance Section, Communications Zone. Conforming with this plan, 300 patients were evacuated to the air/rail medical evacuation holding unit at THIONVILLE (C-84) to await rail evacuation to the Communications Zone. On 19 December, these patients were still at THIONVILLE (C-84). Because of an expected flood of battle casualties, these 300 patients were, therefore, returned to DIEDING (Q-16) to give the air/rail medical evacuation holding unit necessary bed space for battle casualties.

Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

Total battle casualties during the month of December, involving actual wounds and/or burns amounted to 11,095. In addition to this total, there were 2,852 cases of trench foot and twenty-one cases of frostbite admitted to all division, corps, and Army clearing stations during this month. Approximately 600 cases were returned to duty at clearing station level, and an additional estimated 300 cases returned to duty from hospitals.

Based on total dispositions from all causes in Third U. S. Army medical installations, there was a mortality rate of one percent during this month.

2. Surgery

As will be seen from the above figures, the surgical services of Army hospital units were extremely busy in December. The fact that only 314 deaths occurred among the total battle casualties mentioned above reflects a high degree of experience and skill attained by the entire Army Medical Service.

A study of the detailed statistics presented in the paragraph devoted to "Hospitalization" in Section 2 of this report reveals an interesting breakdown of these figures according to regions of the body effected. The largest group comprises wounds of the extremities and involves 5,625 cases, or approximately sixty percent of the total battle casualties. Of these cases, only fifty died, and the great majority of the remaining cases will eventually return to duty. It is in this salvage role that the Army evacuation hospital is doing its greatest service in the present war. However, the low mortality rate in the entire Army is a great accomplishment, and is a result of a combination of the efforts of all medical personnel, from the battalion aid station on back to the rearmost hospital.

Mortality rates were as low as any in military history. The figures which support this conclusion are shown below:

TYPE OF WOUND	NUMBER	NUMBER OF DEATHS	MORTALITY RATE
Wounds of the Abdomen	559	82	14%
Chest Injuries	1149	70	6%
Head Injuries	787	77	10%
Buckshot Wounds of the Spine	213	6	2.8%
Wounds of the Buttocks	561	11	2%
Burns	137	1	0.7%

One of the epics of this war was the magnificent stand of the 101st Airborne Division, together with one combat command each of the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions, at BASTOGNE (P-55), where they were cut off for approximately ten days until the 4th Armored Division and the 80th Infantry Division broke into the pocket to relieve them. When these divisions were cut off, they were completely without surgical personnel. The only medical personnel available to them were in the various medical detachments of the divisions concerned. These medical officers were equipped neither with experience nor instruments for major surgical procedures.

Outside of the pocket a field hospital platoon, with surgical team attached, was held in readiness to rush into the besieged town as soon as a corridor was established. In addition, another field hospital platoon with its surgical team was set up just outside the encircling ring to care for those casualties which could be transported out after relief of the forces. Other measures taken are described in Section 2 of the Medical Section report, under the sub-section devoted to "Evacuation".

With the relief of the forces not yet established, a general surgeon flew into BASTOGNE (P-55) by liaison plane on 25 December. On the following day three more general surgeons, an orthopedic surgeon, an anesthetist, and four enlisted technicians were flown in by glider. In both cases, enemy fire was encountered, but all personnel and their equipment arrived safely.

The make-shift hospital consisted of a large garage with one very large room and a small adjoining room. Approximately 150 seriously wounded men were in the large room on litters and straw pallets. Four battalion aid station surgeons, who had treated all casualties until the arrival of this medical relief, were completely exhausted. The general surgeon who had flown in by liaison plane had set up an operating room in the small adjoining room. All casualties other than the most seriously wounded were scattered throughout the town in cellars, basements, and other buildings. In the garage there was no heat, and there was only one light in the larger room.

The supply of blood was very low, as most of the containers had been broken when dropped by parachute on the previous day. However, the supply of plasma was plentiful. The garage had apparently been the site of a field hospital that had hastily withdrawn prior to encirclement. Part of the hospital equipment had been left behind. An operating lamp and an autoclave were available. The surgical teams which had flown in had on hand all the surgical instruments necessary to go into immediate operation.

Within one and one-half hours, all the patients in the garage were carefully triaged by the surgical teams. Those cases that required immediate surgery were selected, and priority for surgery was thereby established. Four operating tables were set up in the small room by placing litters on tables. Two anesthetists, one of whom had accompanied the surgical teams, and the other of whom was a battalion aid station surgeon with the 10th Armored Division, alternated between the operating tables. The medical officers from the 101st Airborne Division medical detachments provided medical care for those patients in the large room. Operations were begun by 261830, and continued throughout the night until the following noon.

Concurrent with the arrival of relief on 27 December, which included twenty-three ambulances of the 64th Medical Group, a truckload of blood also arrived early in the afternoon. After a few hours' rest, the surgeons were back at work. With the evacuation of part of the casualties, the situation was greatly alleviated. The hospital was then organized into a pre-operative and post-operative section with a consequent improvement in the post-operative care. The surgeons again operated throughout the entire night until the following afternoon (28 December), when all patients were evacuated and a field hospital platoon (1st Platoon, 60th Field Hospital) went into operation in the area. In all, fifty major operations were performed, with only three post-operative deaths occurring.

During this period, bombing and shelling of the hospital area was intermittent. On the night of 27 December, a bomb landed near the hospital and blew in the door of the hospital room, and considerable plaster fell from the ceiling. For a time, operations had to be continued by flash light.

The services of three Belgian women were secured to assist in the care of the wounded. No drapes or gowns were available, and sterile towels were used about the wounds. The wounds of the patients were from two to eight days old, with the average case about three days old.

Mortality rates were gratifyingly low in spite of the handicaps encountered. It is noteworthy that casualties in the BASTOGNE (P-55) area are included in the figures quoted in the beginning of this section.

3. Neuropsychiatry

During the first week of December, slow but steady advances were continued until Third U. S. Army was disposed along the SAAR River and within the boundries of Germany along that river on a front of sixty miles. SAARLAUTERN (Q-28) and SARREGUEMINES (Q-55) were taken.

Enemy resistance was, at all times, stiff, and our casualties high. It had been the experience of this Army that a tactical situation which included severe artillery fire from the enemy, resulting in more or less placing down our own troops, usually resulted in a higher neuropsychiatric rate. A slight increase during the first two weeks of December was therefore to be expected. By the end of the second week the situation again became somewhat static, and at the end of the third week, Third U. S. Army divisions were drawn from their positions and moved rapidly northward. The number of neuropsychiatric cases, therefore, evened itself off and resulted, for the entire month, in a percentage less than that which occurred during the previous month.

The figures for the month of December revealed that there were 33,222 non-fatal casualties, which was a reduction over those suffered in November. Of these, 1,587 were neuropsychiatric cases, or seven and seven-tenths percent of the total non-battle casualties. Seventy-five percent of these were returned to duty from either division clearing station or hospital level.

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THE FLIGHT





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TO BASTOGNE





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A survey revealed that from 1 August to 31 October, there had been 1[illegible] admissions from all installations from all causes, sick and injured. Of these, [illegible] were admitted for neuropsychiatric reasons. A total of [illegible] were admitted for neuropsychiatric incidents as low over a 3-month period. Of the [illegible] cases, [illegible] were returned to duty, either from a forward psychiatric unit, or from [illegible]. Of the [illegible] cases which were not returned to duty, but were evacuated from the Army area, [illegible], [illegible] constitutional psychopathic states, mental deficiencies, and through progressive neurological diseases characterized the primary causes.

4. Dental

The dental service for the month of November followed much the same course as it did in October. In spite of difficulties attending the movement of troops as they attempted to [illegible] during the first ten days, and the [illegible] for protection of units participating in the southern flank of the [illegible] during the latter part of the month, more dental treatments were accomplished than during the month of November. A chart showing the breakdown of these treatments follows:

Strength (Reported)----------	2[illegible]70
Aid Station, Routine----------	1[illegible]4
Aid Station, Emergency--------	[illegible]
Division Dives----------	27[illegible]
Officer Personnel----------	[illegible]
Enlisted Personnel----------	[illegible]
Prosthetics----------	16[illegible]
Dentures----------	17[illegible]
Gingivitis----------	1[illegible]
Gingivitis Treatments----------	1[illegible]
Stomatitis----------	[illegible]
Stomatitis Treatments--------	[illegible]

The processing of acrylic anti-concussion devices had been further refined so that they were more comfortable and more effective than before. Previously, the thickness and size of these devices had resulted in their bumping against the helmet during strenuous exertion by the wearer. Another chance in the device consisted of shortening the part which fits in the cavity of the ear. This improvement allowed a greater volume of air between the device and the eardrum, and afforded greater protection against the shock waves produced by the blast effect of heavy artillery, which normally caused damage to the inner ear. With improvements also made in the design of flasks and presses used in the processing of the devices, together with the production of a smaller size, it was possible to speed up the processing to the point where the production could be completed for the first personnel of an entire battalion, consisting of approximately 17% officers and enlisted men, within ten days.

The percentage of maxillo-facial injuries to the total casualties admitted to hospitals during the month was six and nine-tenths percent, there being a total of [illegible] such cases. Three deaths occurred as the result of maxillo-facial injuries, constituting thirty-seven one-hundredths of one percent of all maxillo-facial cases admitted during December.

5. Veterinary

Inspections were made of twenty-one Class I supply points, four division ration breaks or dumps, two messes, and one quartermaster bakery. Some improvement was noted in the proper utilization of dumps. Sanitary conditions were also better, due to the arrest of freezer weather, with a consequent diminishing in the mud. The problem of fresh supplies freezing, however, arose during December and caused some difficulty.

On 10 December [illegible] pounds of fresh beef was inspected, which had been captured by liberating troops. This beef was found to be in good condition, and was turned over to Civil Affairs representatives.

6. Personnel

The names of five Medical Corps officers were submitted to the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, for permanent rotation to general hospitals in the Communications Zone. All of these officers have been in combat units for over two years, and had served in actual combat with these units since D-Day.

The names of twenty-seven Medical Corps specialists from evacuation hospitals, the intermediate hospital, and the auxiliary surgical group were also submitted to the Chief Surgeon for temporary rotation of sixty days to Communications Zone hospitals for educational purposes.

Due to the battle casualties in this Army, as well as to shortages sustained by the assignment of VIII Corps and its units to Third U. S. Army on 1 December, which units had suffered losses in the Hurtgen-Roer offensive, a total shortage of medical Corps officers existed as of that date of approximately fifty. This shortage was a serious one, but was alleviated somewhat by the arrival of fifteen Medical Corps officers furnished by the Communications Zone. Immediately their arrival in the Army area, Headquarters European Theater of Operations directed several Medical Corps officers, including these officers on temporary duty for a period of seven days with Headquarters Third U. S. Army. Upon their arrival, further orders were immediately issued by this headquarters placing them on temporary duty with the divisions in which the most serious shortages existed. Transportation was furnished largely by the Medical Section of this headquarters down to the corps level, where corps either furnished supply and transportation, or had division transportation call for them at that point. Reassignment orders by Headquarters European Theater of Operations assigned these officers to this headquarters, and additional orders were then cut assigning them to the Division in which they had previously been placed on temporary duty. Approximately fifteen additional Medical Corps officers were placed on temporary duty with Medical Corps officers from Army medical units, pending the arrival of further reinforcements.

Simultaneously, there also existed a shortage of twenty-five Medical Administrative Corps officers. Approximately sixty applications for appointment as Second Lieutenant, Medical Administrative Corps, had been forwarded from this Army to Headquarters European Theater of Operations.

Due to a high rate of casualties in Third U. S. Army, which had begun in November and continued during the first two weeks of December, the nursing service of the Army was extremely hard pressed. Fifty nurses were secured on temporary duty from a few unit[illegible] some general hospital, and were distributed among Third U. S. Army hospitals to the best advantage, thereby augmenting our 28% organic nurses. These nurses replaced thirty-five nurses returned previously in a similar manner who were returned to their parent unit on the same date.

On 8 December, 311 Medical Department enlisted reinforcements arrived at the reinforcement depot supporting this Army. This was the first group of Medical Department enlisted reinforcements received by Third U. S. Army since the beginning of the offensive on 8 November, though constant efforts had been made to secure them.

Also during this month two additional shock teams were borrowed from Advance Section, Communications Zone medical units. These teams were of inestimable value in handling the large flow of casualties which was being received in Army hospitals, and properly preparing these casualties for surgery.

Section 4 - Medical Supply

There were more movements of the depot companies during the month of December than there had been since the month of September. During the first week, Advance Section Number one of the 43d Medical Depot Company moved from A METZ [illegible] to METZ [illegible] to join its parent unit. After several days of reconsolidation, on 17 December the 43d Medical Depot Company moved from [illegible] and became operational in CHATEAU-SALINS (Q-42), prepared to support Third U. S. Army's expected push to the East.

Due to the German breakthrough in the ARDENNES area, and the subsequent absorption by Third U. S. Army of VIII Corps, provision was made for the return to this Army of the Advance Section, 43d Medical Depot Company, which had been transferred to Third U. S. Army in September. This separate section became operational at LONGUYON ([illegible]) on 20 December. The remainder of the 43d Medical Depot Company moved from CHATEAU-SALINS (Q-42) to LONGUYON ([illegible]) and became operational there on [illegible].

With the 3d Medical Depot Company located throughout the month at METZ [illegible], the two depot companies were disposed toward the close of the month in the most advantageous positions to support both flanks, as well as the center, of this Army.

A sketch, showing the disposition of the medical depot companies throughout the months of October, November, and December, will be found in Annex XXI of the medical section report.

Difficulties continued to exist in the way of actual reception of medical supplies at the Army medical depot companies. During the first two weeks of December, approximately [illegible] trips were necessary on the part of Army transportation to Communications Zone depots to obtain items that were in great demand. There were fifty or sixty of these items in critical shortage. The majority were Class I and Class III items. This condition was to some extent alleviated by the end of the month. In cases where transportation was sent to Communications Zone depots from Army, coordination was effected between the Surgeon's Office and AC of S, G-4 of this headquarters.

During this month, the allowance of anesthesia apparatus, portable, was increased from two to three per evacuation hospital, and field hospitals were authorized an additional three apparatus, suction, foot pump, vacuum type, Item 8a8-3.

The 95th Field Hospital arrived in the Army area short a considerable percentage of its T/E equipment. Items that were not available at Army medical depot companies were extracted to the Chief Surgeon's office, Communications Zone by telephone for purposes of expediency.

Losses among VIII Corps units incident to the German counter-offensive shortly after the middle of the month included the following:

42d Field Hospital----------	All equipment of 1st and 3d Platoons was lost.
101st Airborne Division----------	All equipment of the medical company was lost.
28th Infantry Division----------	All equipment of one platoon of the clearing company was lost; in addition, all medical equipment for one complete infantry regiment and one artillery battalion was lost.
107th Evacuation Hospital---------	Miscellaneous Class I, III, and IV items were lost, but no major items of medical equipment were lost. The majority of the teentage and quartermaster equipment, however, was lost.

Replacement of a majority of the above equipment was attained in an expeditious manner largely through arrangements by this Army to proceed to Communications Zone medical depots for purposes of picking up the equipment and speeding up delivery of same. In the case of medical equipment for the 101st Airborne Division medical company, it was flown into the Army area by air, and transported to the 3d Medical Depot Company where it was picked up by division transportation.

Arrangements were also made with the 66th Medical Group and the 107th Evacuation Hospital, while operating in the VIII Corps Zone, to set up a provisional medical depot for VIII Corps units, to fill emergency requisitions from those units. Eight truckloads of such supplies were dispatched from the 3d Medical Depot Company to the 107th evacuation hospital for further distribution.

The displaced filled personnel found in concentration camps, and referred to under section 2, Sub-section L of the Medical Section report for December, required considerable amounts of supplies for their care. Blankets, sheets, pots, and stoves were issued to the 66th Medical Group, which was in charge of these personnel who needed treatment. Arrangements were also made with the Army Quartermaster for additional mess equipment and fire units. German medical supplies in the Army medical depot companies were set aside and issued to the 66th Medical Group for this purpose. Difficulty was experienced in securing DDT Powder for delousing purposes, but within forty-eight hours, [illegible] tons were located in a Communications Zone depot and shipped to the 3d Medical Depot Company for immediate issue to the 66th Medical Group. Two days later, a release was obtained for 1,000 pounds of DDT Powder for the same purpose.

Though discussion is made elsewhere in this report of events incident to the relief of the battered forces in BASTOGNE ([illegible]) on 26 December, it is pertinent to mention here that supplies were in fact furnished by air on [illegible], and 27 December. These supplies included whole blood, blood plasma, Carlisle dressings, and morphine syrettes, among other items.

Also toward the close of the month, it was arranged in conjunction with Advance Section, Communications Zone, that VIII Corps units might use their medical supplies from either Depot Number [illegible] (Communications Zone), at LONGUYON ([illegible]) from the 43d Medical Depot Company at LONGUYON ([illegible]), from the Advance Section, 3d Medical Depot Company, at METZ ([illegible]), or, for those for which it might be closer, from First U. S. Army depots.

Captured enemy medical supplies during the month were inspected at METZ ([illegible]). These amounted to[illegible] tons of miscellaneous supplies, about half of which were deemed of value to this Army and placed in depot stock. The remainder was turned over to Communications Zone

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deputes.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

Variations in the tactical situation, which ranged from the establishment of a bridgehead in the [illegible] (Q-25) and [illegible] (Q-26) areas to the dash northward to the southern apex of the [illegible] Bulge, had little effect on preventive medicine problems, compared to those of the previous month. Some problems associated with the [illegible] tion of potable water did arise, and these are discussed in toi. in part under the paragraph dealing with "[illegible]". Temperatures ranged from near zero to the low thirties throughout this period.

c. General Disease Control

The fact that the latter half of November was characterized by a mass movement of many [illegible] in the [illegible] of [illegible] relatively [illegible] was the [illegible] factor in the [illegible] disease rate for the month.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

h. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

i. Malaria Control

[illegible]

j. Rabies Control

[illegible]

k. Venereal Disease Control

[illegible]

l. Malaria Control Measures

[illegible]

m. Entomological Service

[illegible]

[illegible]

Section [illegible]-----------SANITY [illegible]

There were [illegible] tests [illegible] this month, necessitating a slight increase over the number performed during the previous month. The five [illegible] were caused, in part, by the harvesting of the [illegible] and in part by a drop in [illegible] requests.

The [illegible] for the month of November in [illegible] zone as follows:

			PERCENTAGE
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

CHAPTER 8

AN ARMY MEDICAL ACTIVITY

The month of January was characterized by rapid and far-reaching changes in the employment of medical units. The gradual retraction of the ridge in the Ardennes area caused a significant improvement by Third U.S. Army, giving a wide front, stretching generally from [illegible] in the north to the vicinity of Saint-Vith in the south. Changes in medical evacuation and hospital units were made to support the new situation.

Freezing weather, snow and ice, and extremely bitter fighting prevailed throughout the month. The combination of these factors resulted in the largest number of casualties ever suffered in this area since the beginning of the operations. The large casualty figure, however, was also frequently due to the fact that the Third U.S. Army was employing a larger number of divisions than during any previous month.

The problem of trench foot and frostbite, with which the Army had been so much concerned since early November, were further alleviated by a continuous distribution, by the use of a [illegible] specialist in the Army area, of the latest type of equipment to all front line units, and by closer [illegible] of the individual soldier. The overall effect was a marked decrease in trench foot, an overall increase in cold injuries as an accompaniment thereto.

Because of the cold and inclement weather, ice road surfaces and short hauls to the [illegible] were difficult for all evacuation [illegible] ambulance, as well as for all other Army and Service [illegible]. Despite these hazards, the mortality rate among [illegible] was the lowest of any [illegible] campaign.

Section II - Operations

1. Training

The training program for Information-Education officers of medical units was continued. Four officers from Army Medical Units attended the Information School at the Staff [illegible] in Paris, and one officer attended the Allied Civil Affairs School, and one officer attended the course in Instructor Training offered at that school.

2. Evacuation

January was marked by a gradual, steady evacuation of the enemy salient in which Army [illegible] were engaged. There were a number of [illegible] operations in the [illegible] area, and hospitalization facilities of every [illegible] were increased, a number of [illegible] units were withdrawn from Third U.S. Army with a consequent reduction in the number of evacuation agencies available. The 14th Medical Battalion, and [illegible] were withdrawn from the Medical Battalion, and [illegible] were assigned to Third U.S. Army. The 4th Medical Battalion was attached to the 7th Medical Group, and was stationed in the area [illegible] on 1 January. The 4th Medical Battalion was still [illegible] during January, and on 1 January was attached to the 56th Army Group of the [illegible] Army and was effected

[illegible]

Some of the units previously assigned or attached to Third U.S. Army by order of higher headquarters had not arrived by 1 January. By that date the 56th Medical Group, the 14th Medical Battalion, the 4th Medical Battalion, and the 91st Medical Battalion were assigned to Third U.S. Army. [illegible] during the month which had not yet arrived, was relieved if its attachment to Third U.S. Army.

Following [illegible] battalions, there were assigned and in operation with Third U.S. Army, seven [illegible] companies, two [illegible] companies, a clearing [illegible] and the 94th Medical Depot. The motor [illegible] companies performed a number of vital functions, including litter-bearer platoons for evacuation hospitals, providing [illegible] units for field hospitals, platoons and squads for ambulance facilities. Platoons of the clearing companies were augmenting evacuation by [illegible] as in June, July and [illegible], and the [illegible] companies [illegible] in the [illegible] manner with some exceptions. The 1st Airborne Division and 18th Airborne Division had inadequate facilities organically for evacuation, and Army ambulance platoons were attached for purposes of ground evacuation in these divisions, during the latters' deployment as infantry divisions.

The 14th Medical Group supported the VIII Corps until 10 January. The 56th Medical Group supported VIII and XII Corps until 10 January, and thereafter supported VIII and III Corps. The 16th Medical Group supported XX Corps until 10 January and the VII and IX Corps thereafter.



Improvised Litter-Sled in Folded Position



Litter-Sled in Use



Simplicity of Runner Mounting on Litter



Demonstrating Method of using Litter-Sled

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At the beginning of the month, the 69th Medical Group was evacuating seven evacuation hospitals and the 66th Field Hospital. Advance section, Communications Zone units were evacuating five evacuation hospitals and the provisional hospital being operated by the 92d Medical Treatment Battalion. During the month, Advance Section, Communications Zone units gradually took over the evacuation of all but three evacuation hospitals. Third U. S. Army was responsible for supply and evacuation of a maximum of eighteen divisions during January.

The air/rail medical evacuation holding unit operated by the 46th Medical Air Treatment Battalion and attached units remained at [illegible] during the entire month. The limitation imposed on air operations by poor weather, restricted the number of patients evacuated by this medium during the month to 2,441, which, however, constituted an increase over the previous month. During hospital trains, rail evacuation evacuated 10,[illegible] patients. Ambulance evacuation, including the utilization of Advance Section, Communications Zone ambulances, was responsible for 7,[illegible] patients being moved to the rear of the Army area. The total number evacuated by air the month of January thus totalled 20,[illegible] patients. An air rail medical evacuation holding unit was also operated by the 5th Field Hospital Advance Section, Communications Zone) at [illegible] in support of Third U. S. Army.

Representation of a sketch showing the locations of evacuation facilities in Third U. S. Army during the month of January will be found in Annex XIII to the Medical Section report.

1. Hospitalization

The use of field hospitals continued along lines previously established in the [illegible] Army with some effort having been made to [illegible] platoons of a field hospital in one corps or, failing that, with units that were geographically adjacent. Some platoons were still [illegible] separated from their parent organization. This was permitted in order to preserve the normal arrangement between a field hospital and the division which it supported. The use of the field hospital was generally in accordance with previously established Third U. S. Army policy. Occasionally, exception was made in order to meet the emergency of some special requirement.

The 55th Field Hospital, reinforced with a surgical team, continued to function as an evacuation hospital in [illegible], providing 200 beds during a period when they were urgently needed for support of units eradicating the bulge.

The first and third platoons of the 3d Field Hospital were refitted while attached to the 11th Medical Depot. Two trucks were used to transport equipment of this unit from [illegible] (P-55), where it had been abandoned due to lack of vehicles when the unit made a retrograde movement to avoid capture during the counteroffensive. The remainder of necessary equipment was requisitioned and supplied through normal supply channels.

At the end of the month, the attachments of field hospitals were as follows:

III Corps	VIII Corps
2d Plat, 18th Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 42d Fld Hosp
3d Plat, 14th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 42d Fld Hosp
	1st Plat, 45th Fld Hosp
	2d Plat, 59th Fld Hosp
	3d Plat, 60th Fld Hosp

XII Corps	XV Corps
1st Plat, 16th Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 30th Fld Hosp
1st Plat, 45th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 42d Fld Hosp
1st Plat, 94th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 59th Fld Hosp
2d Plat, 66th Fld Hosp	

66th Med Gp

1st Plat, 42d Fld Hosp
66th Fld Hosp

The month of January saw the efforts of Third U. S. Army directed toward the reduction of the bulge and restoration of the lines in effect before the German counteroffensive. At the start of the month, all Third U. S. Army evacuation was in a southerly direction. The 12th Evacuation Hospital closed at its site in [illegible] and moved to the [illegible] Luxembourg, [illegible] With the arrival of this unit, three evacuation hospitals were located in [illegible] City [illegible] the 66th, 12th, and 45th in the depiction of the bulge progressed, the drive of the Combat troops was in a northeasterly direction. It was apparent that the previously favorable positions of the evacuation hospitals in the southern flank were rapidly lengthening ambulance hauls over roads that became almost impassable due to the damage by armored vehicles, snow and ice. With only a mild, several of the hospitals were moved to new sites. The 107th Evacuation Hospital moved from [illegible] to Marche (X-53).

In January the First U. S. Army reverted to the command of Twelfth Army Group. Under this was a communications zone extending between the First and Third Armies and also responsible for [illegible] The 21st Corps was on the northern flank of First Army [illegible] In order to minimize the problem of [illegible] it was necessary to move the evacuation hospitals to [illegible] the units of the corps. The [illegible] and operated in the [illegible] at [illegible]

An evacuation hospital was re-established in the Army area for temporary assignment to the [illegible] The 11th Evacuation Hospital [illegible] and was [illegible] for transportation to this purpose.

During January the enemy air raided in force [illegible] the city of Liege [illegible] These attacks caused very little damage to the hospitals, but, during the height of the [illegible] was erratic and the service was severely [illegible] The 21st Evacuation Hospital was the object of [illegible] on the night of [illegible] and fired fragments [illegible] Three were [illegible] the hospital nurses, but several members of the quartermaster laundry platoon attached to the hospital sustained injuries from the flying fragments and one soldier was killed to an extent requiring amputation of his right arm. The 21st Evacuation Hospital also suffered some damage, but no [illegible]

The 8th Convalescent Hospital, opened at its new site in [illegible] remained there during the entire month. Despite the fact that a maximum capacity of 4,000 beds was utilized, there still were more patients ready for evacuation to the Communications Zone [illegible] than could be accommodated. This necessitated a revival of the daily [illegible] system for each evacuation hospital, which had been used previously and had proved satisfactory. The allocation of [illegible] to various Third U. S. Army hospitals was made by telephone by the Operations and Training Subsection of the Medical Section.

For locations of hospitals during the month of January, see Annex XIIV to the Medical Section report.

An analysis of wounded hospitalized in Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month of January is shown below:

a. Number of wounded admitted "direct" (i.e., not by transfer).

	Designation	Number
(1)	U. S. Army Troops	[illegible]
(2)	British Army Troops	[illegible]
(3)	French Army Troops	[illegible]
(4)	U. S. Navy and Marine Corps	[illegible]
(5)	British and French Navy	[illegible]
(6)	Enemy forces personnel	[illegible]
(7)	U. S. Civilians	[illegible]
(8)	Others - specify	[illegible]

Note: All of the following in b through f pertains to U. S. Army troops only.

b. General classification of wounds:

(1)	Serious	[illegible]
(2)	Slight	[illegible]

c. Anatomical classification of wounds:
(Patients with multiple wounds are classified according to most extensive wounds.)

	(1) Wounds other than burns	Admissions	Deaths
(a)	Abdominal	[illegible]	[illegible]
(b)	Thoracic	[illegible]	[illegible]
(c)	Maxillo-facial	[illegible]	[illegible]
(d)	Neuromuscular		
	Head	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Spine	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Nerve	[illegible]	[illegible]
(e)	Extremities		
	Upper	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Lower	[illegible]	[illegible]
(f)	Buttocks	[illegible]	[illegible]
(g)	Others	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Sub-total	[illegible]	[illegible]
(2)	Burns - all locations	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Total	[illegible]	[illegible]

d. Number of patients with multiple wounds: [illegible] [illegible]

e. Classification of wounds by causative agents:

(1)	Gunshot Wounds (rifle, pistol or machine gun	[illegible]	[illegible]
(2)	Shell, B. and M. (HE, Flak, Mortar or Cannon)	[illegible]	[illegible]
(3)	Bomb, Missile (aerial, grenade, booby trap or cannon)	[illegible]	[illegible]
(4)	Blast (by enemy A. and M., or mine)	[illegible]	[illegible]
(5)	Missile (Rotary Missiles)	[illegible]	[illegible]
(6)	Flame (jet-propelled, flash, flame thrower, [illegible], etc.)	[illegible]	[illegible]
(7)	Other (specify)	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Total	[illegible]	[illegible]



An attempt of [illegible] Line 1 Marine January Recovering from

Abdominal Wounds

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f. Number of deaths by primary and secondary causes:

Perf W (Shell) lower extremities	Embolism, pulmonary	6
Burn, 3d degree, generalized	Shock	1
Pen W (Shell) head	Shock	5
Pen W GSW lower extremities	Shock	7
Perf W Avulsed, spine		1
Pen W (Shell) spine	Hemorrhage	3
Pen W SFW chest	Hemorrhage & shock	12
Pen W (Shell) spine	Paralysis respiratory center	1
Pen and Perf W (Shell) thighs	Shock	4
Pen W MW (Shell) spine		1
Perf W (Shell) chest	Hemorrhage	4
Pen W (Shell) head	Cerebral edema	12
Pen W (Shell) spine	Pulmonary edema	1
Perf W GSW head	Cerebral edema	5
Pen W (Mine) chest	Shock	1
Pen W (Shell) chest	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W PCC (Shell) skull		1
Pen W GSW chest	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W (Shell) skull	Shock	2
Pen W (Shell) neck	Shock	2
Pen W (Shell) left arm	Shock	1
MW (Shell) left leg	Shock & gas gangrene	1
Pen W (Shell) skull		5
Pen W (Shell) neck	Hemorrhage	1
Pen W (Shell) right thigh		1
Pen W (Shell) right thigh	Shock	2
Pen W (Shell) right hand		1
DOA		4
Lac W PCC (Shell) right thigh	Shock	1
Pen W (HE) neck	Respiratory failure	1
GSW PC femur and tibia	Gas gangrene	1
GSW PCC humerus	Shock	1
Pen W lower right leg (HE)	Shock	1
GSW PCC spine	Respiratory failure	1
GSW Pen W chest	Respiratory failure	1
Pen W Buttocks & lumbar		8
Lac W (HE) arm, Pen W thigh	Shock	1
Traumatic amp, leg, arm	Uremia	1
Perf W chest, PCC spine	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W neck, PCC spine	Pulmonary atelectasis	1
Lac W occiput and PCC skull	Aspiration of liquid (gavage) feeding	1
Perf W (Sucking) chest		1
Pen W right arm, both buttocks, lower extremities and scrotum		1
Perf W left arm, PCC radius & ulna		1
Perf W abdomen, thigh, and back	Uremia, nephrosis	1
Traumatic amp (Shell) left leg	Shock	1
Traumatic amp (Shell) both legs	Shock	1
Blast injury	Shock	1
Pen W (Shell) chest	Shock	10
Perf W (Shell) chest	Shock	4
GSW Pen W chest	Shock	2
Pen W (Shell) abdomen	Shock	8
GSW Perf W abdomen	Shock	4
Perf W avulsion, right calf	Shock	1
Pen W chest	Shock	6
PCC skull	Petechial hemorrhage	1
PCC skull	Evisceration of brain	3
PCC skull	Herniation of brain	5
Alcohol poisoning		4
LW (HE) PC skull	Hemorrhage	4
Pen W (HE) skull		5
Pen W (Shell) PCC right thigh	Shock	1
Pen W (Shell) chest	Circulatory collapse	2
Pen W (Shell) MW face and eyes	Meningitis	1
Pen W (Shell) PCC lumbar vertebra		1
Pen W (Shell) MW chest	Shock	1
Pen W (Shell) skull	Respiratory failure	3
Pen W (Shell) abdomen	Shock	5
GSW traumatic amp both legs		1
GSW Pen W, both legs		3
Pen W (Shell) right thigh	Embolus	1
GSW Pen, skull	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W (Shell) skull	Shock	2
Pen W (Shell) right thigh PCC		1
GSW chest		10
Pen W (Shell) skull and PC left arm		1
Pen W (Shell) buttocks	Pulmonary edema	4
PS spine and left humerus		1
Burn 90% body surface	Shock	1
GSW left thigh		1
GSW chest	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W (Shell) abdomen	Paralytic ileus	1
Internal injuries and head (bomb)	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W (Bomb) both legs		1
Pen W (Bomb) chest		1
Pen W (Shell) face and ear		1
GSW Pen W head		1
Pen W (Shell) head	Renal insufficiency	1
Pen W (Shell) head	Myocardial insufficiency	2
PCC spinal column	Meningitis, cerebro-spinal	3
Pen W (HE) PCC skull	Cerebral edema	6
Transection spinal cord		1
Pen W brain	Cerebral edema	4
Perf W brain	Cerebral edema	1
Pen W chest and heart	Pericarditis	1
Traumatic amp leg and arm	Shock	1
Pen W buttocks, urethra, thigh	Transfusion reaction and anuria	1
PCC scapula, clavicle, tibia, fibula	Hemorrhage & shock	1
Pen W chest, lung, back, kidneys	Shock	2
Pen W thigh	Hemorrhage	1
Perf W buttocks, rectum, bladder	Anuria and uremia	1
Perf W buttocks, rectum, neural canal	Meningitis, cerebro-spinal	1
PCC spinal column, transection cord	Shock	1
Pen W (Shell) spine	Pulmonary edema	4
Perf W GSW chest	Hemothorax	3
Pen W MW (Shell) chest	Hemothorax	2
Pen W MW (Shell) buttocks	Shock	3
Pen W GSW chest	Pneumonia	1
Pen W (Shell) chest	Hemorrhage	5
Perf W head	Cerebral edema	4
Perf W GSW chest	Shock	1
Pen W (Shell) lower extremities	Shock	1
Pen and Perf W M Fractures	Shock	1
Lac W and Fractures, vertebrae	Transfusion reaction, shock	1
Internal injuries, Fracture pelvis	Hemorrhage & shock	1
Pen W (HE) extremities	Shock	1
Pen W (HE) lower extremities	Pulmonary hematoma, shock	3
PCC (HE) skull	Shock	2
PC skull	Shock	2
Hemoperitoneum, crushing injury	Atelectasis of lung	1
Pen W (HE) chest and abdomen	Pulmonary edema, nephrosis	1
Pen W (Grenade) chest & abdomen	Hemothorax	1
PC arms, legs and ribs	Shock	1
Pen W chest	Cardiac failure	1
Pen W chest	Pulmonary edema	4
MW skull, testicles & extremities	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W abdomen	Toxemia acute	1
PC (HE) skull	Shock	7
GSW Thoraco-abdominal	Respiratory failure	5
Pen W abdominal (HE)	Respiratory failure	1
Pen W (HE) extremities & pubic	Chemical peritonitis	1
Pen W (HE) upper and lower extremities	Pulmonary edema and uremia	1
GSW PC skull	Hemorrhage	3
Perf W GSW buttocks and back	Shock	2
Perf W (HE) Thoraco-abdominal	Shock & hemorrhage	1
Perf W (Bomb) abdomen	Shock & hemorrhage	1
Perf W (Mine) upper & lower extremities	Shock & hemorrhage	1
GSW Thoraco-abdominal	Shock	1
GSW Chest	Shock & hemorrhage	3
Perf W (HE) maxillo-facial	Embolus of right internal carotid artery extending into middle	1
Perf W (HE) maxillo-facial	Obstruction of respiratory tract	1
Perf W (Mine) lower extremity	Asphyxia (vomitus)	1
Lac W (HE) upper & lower extremities	Shock & circulatory failure	1
PCC skull	Abscess brain	1
PCC skull	Shock	3
Perf W abdomen	Peritonitis acute	1
PCC both legs	Shock	2
PCC skull with depressed fragments	Shock	8
DOA LF head PCC skull	Hemorrhage & shock	2
DOA Pen W lower abdomen	Hemorrhage & shock	1
Pen W abdomen, LF jejunum & ileum	Shock	4
Pen W MF both thighs	Broncho-pneumonia	1
Pen W chest GW kidney, PCC ileum	Broncho-pneumonia	1
Pen W chest and abdomen	Shock	1
Perf W neck, chest & abdomen	Circulatory failure	1
Pen W chest, lower precordium	Shock	1
Pen W MF both thighs & abdomen	Gas gangrene	1
Perf W pelvis, PCC sacrum, LF bladder	Shock & pneumonia	1
DOA Pen W hip, frostbite, hands and feet	Shock & exposure	1
Pen W back and shoulder	Uremia	1
Amp both legs at knees	Anuria & pulmonary edema	1
Pen and Perf W both thighs	Shock & pneumonia	1
DOA Pen W left leg, Perf W upper arm	Shock	2
DOA snow blindness with exposure	Physical exhaustion	1
Burn, 2d and 3d degree	Shock	1
Pen W pelvis	Shock	1
MF (Shell) thighs	Shock	1
Pen W (Shell) skull	Hemorrhage	1
Pen W (HE) chest	Hemorrhage and shock	2
Pen W (HE) chest & abdomen	Bronchial spasm, cardiac failure	1
Pen W (HE) abdomen, PCC femur	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W (HE) abdomen, Lac of stomach	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen GSW abdomen, Lac of kidney and spleen	Shock	1
Pen W (HE) abdomen, Lac of stomach	Hemorrhage & shock	1
Perf W (HE) lung, diaphragm, liver	Pulmonary edema	1
MF both legs and arms	Shock	1
Lac W head, Pen W abdomen	Pulmonary atelectasis	1
Perf W abdomen with evisceration	Peritonitis	1
Perf W right leg, PC femur	Shock	1
GSW Pen W right side	Hemorrhage	1
Pen W (Sucking) chest		1
Lac W right Arm		1
Perf W GSW buttocks	Pulmonary emboli	1
DOA Pen W (HE) head		1
Pen W GSW spine	Shock	1
Perf GSW chest	Shock	6
Pen GSW chest	Shock	3
Perf W (HE) chest (DOA)		1
DOA Pen W (HE) abdomen		1
Perf W (Shell) abdomen	Shock	3
Perf W (HE) abdomen	Pneumonia, lobar	2
Perf W (HE) chest	Shock	3
Pen W (HE) chest	Hemorrhage	2
GSW abdomen	Hemorrhage & shock	2
GSW chest	Hemorrhage & shock	3
Perf W abdomen	Hemorrhage & shock	13
Perf W chest	Hemorrhage & shock	6
Perf W buttocks	Hemorrhage & shock	1
Perf W legs and feet	Hemorrhage & shock	2
PCC skull	Shock	1
MW Pen W (Sucking) chest	Hemorrhage & shock	1
Traumatic amp left leg	Uremia	1
Pen W back, Lac of stomach, spleen	Hemorrhage & shock	1
Pen and Perf W abdomen	Hemorrhage & shock	1
GSW Pen W abdomen	Hemorrhage & shock	1
GSW Pen W chest	Shock	1
GSW MF 5th vertebra	Hemorrhage & neuro-logical damage	1

g. Number of transfusions of:

(1) Fresh whole blood	45
(2) Stored blood	720
(3) Dry plasma	508
(4) Other blood substitutes (specify) (do not include crystalloids)	0

h. Number of units of penicillin administered: 2,367,446,000

i. Number of amputations:

(1) Upper extremity	165
(2) Lower extremity	377

j. Number of cases showing clinical evidence of gas gangrene:

U. S. Army 40 Other 15

k. Number of wounded evacuated to other hospitals:

U. S. Army 13133 Other 1050

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4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

In an attempt to salvage some of the valuable trained personnel of the Army who were afflicted with trench foot, the 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion established a provisional hospital for the treatment of this condition in THIONVILLE (U 88). This hospital, which previously had been established to care for minor medical and surgical cases, now devoted its entire facilities to caring for cases of trench foot. The policy was to treat them for fifteen days. Those who could return to duty at the expiration of an additional fifteen days were sent to the 6th Convalescent Hospital. The remainder were evacuated to the Communications Zone. The original capacity of 200 was found to be inadequate and was increased to 440 patients.

Company "A", 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion, remained attached to the 101st Airborne Division to replace the medical company of that unit which was captured by the enemy when the Pernal Eagle Division was encircled at BASTOGNE (P 55). It was relieved from this attachment when the 101st Airborne Division was relieved from Third U. S. Army on 19 January, and the company reverted to its battalion at that time.

Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

A combination of bitter fighting, very rough terrain, and subfreezing temperatures, which kept snow on the ground throughout the period, produced the highest number of battle casualties in a single month since the commencement of operations of Third U. S. Army.

There were 16,035 battle casualties (wounds and/or burns) treated in Third U. S. Army hospitals in January. Of these patients, 436 died.

Based on total dispositions from all causes in Third U. S. Army medical installations, there was a mortality rate of one percent among U. S. Army personnel.

2. Surgery

It is interesting to note that 332 of the 436 deaths among battle casualties, were due to high explosive shelling, and only eighty-eight were caused by small arms fire. It is obvious from these figures that close-in fighting was not the rule, as the majority of deaths from long range fire constituted a ratio of almost four to one.

Cold injuries caused much concern, and it was necessary for all medical installations to be on the alert for combinations such as frostbitten feet or hands occurring in patients brought in for battle wounds. When the wounded could not, for tactical reasons, be almost immediately evacuated from the battlefield, frostbitten feet or hands were likely combinations.

There were eight deaths during January from anuria. These patients had responded well after surgery, but the kidney complications caused death in three to five days. All of these cases had serious wounds which were multiple in type, and were associated with rather severe shock. They all received multiple blood transfusions. Alkalinization was attempted in all instances to no avail. A team from the Army medical laboratory was given the problem of investigating the possible causes of such complications, and initiated rather extensive studies in this connection, including laboratory work and post-mortem on all deaths in which anuria was associated.

3. Neuropsychiatry

The previous five months of varying types of combat had demonstrated that good leadership is a prime factor in the prevention of neuropsychiatric casualties. The incidence of such casualties is also influenced by such factors as operational conditions, including the type of operation, terrain, climatic conditions, and the ability from a tactical standpoint to rotate combat troops. Morale is particularly important. The type of leadership and type of operation have a great bearing on morale.

During the month of January, the bulge produced by the German breakthrough in the ARDENNES area was reduced to the German border. This battle resulted in the greatest number of total non-fatal casualties yet sustained by Third U. S. Army. During this period, there were 47,409 admissions to hospitals of Third U. S. Army from all causes. Five and five-tenths percent of these were neuropsychiatric casualties. There were 3,672 actual neuropsychiatric cases admitted to division clearing stations and/or hospitals in January. Of these, 2,936 or seventy-seven percent were returned to duty, 929 being effected at clearing station level and the remainder at hospital level.

Although Third U. S. Army had consistently had the lowest incidence of neuropsychiatric casualties of any Allied Army, the incidence in January was the lowest of any of its six months of combat. Outstanding leadership, plus the fact that Third U. S. Army was again "on the move", and the awareness of every soldier that Germans were losing this battle and being forced back into Germany contributed to the exceptionally high level of morale throughout the Army.

4. Dental

The amount of dental work accomplished continued to increase over that of previous months. Following is a chart showing the breakdown of dental treatments for the month of January:

Strength (reported)	298280
Admissions (routine)	20772
Admissions (emergency)	4564
Sittings	35569
Officer Personnel	417
Enlisted Personnel	433
Restorations	25461
Dentures	2342
Gingivitis	1436
Gingivitis Treatment	2413
Stomatitis, Vincent's	548
Stomatitis, Vincent's (Treatment)	1138

By this time, it had been proved that the anti-concussion devices being constructed from dental acrylic had definite merit, and the Artillery Section of this headquarters was anxious to obtain devices for the gun crews of all field artillery battalions using the 155 millimeter gun. Through slight revision in methods and provision of additional equipment, it was possible to process 200 pairs of these devices in approximately a week.

The dental clinic established at the 6th Convalescent Hospital now included six assigned officers and ten dental technicians. In addition, two dental officers and four enlisted technicians were on detached service with the clinic during the month of January. Each patient of the hospital was examined by a dental officer upon his transfer from the clinical section of the hospital to a convalescent company. During the month of January, 6,740 patients were examined, of which 702 received dental treatment. All patients were placed in dental Class IV before they were discharged from a convalescent company to duty. During the month, 427 restorations were accomplished, together with 122 new prosthetic cases and eighty-one dentures repaired.

During the same period, the 32d Medical Depot Company dental clinic processed 180 denture cases. Of these, seventy were new cases, and the others were repairs, rebases, and reconstructions. In the same dental laboratory, the processing of 145 pairs of acrylic anti-concussion devices was completed. This laboratory was instrumental in caring for the prosthetic cases of one division which was in a rest area near the depot company location. In addition to this work, the clinic furnished dental treatment necessary for the smaller units in the same area.

The number of maxillo-facial cases reported for the month decreased slightly from those admitted during the previous month. Third U. S. Army medical installations had 763 admissions with maxillo-facial injuries, with eight deaths resulting from these wounds. The percentage of admissions with maxillo-facial injuries was four and seventy-five one-hundredths percent of the total battle casualties admitted during January. Of these, one and four-tenths percent died.

5. Veterinary

Nineteen inspections of Class I supply points were made during the month. Owing to the prevailing freezing weather, many problems usually encountered were eliminated. The need for dunnage was not acute, and the danger of spoilage in fresh meat products by defrosting was at a minimum. The greatest difficulty encountered was the freezing of vegetables. The problem was finally solved by erecting squad tents where buildings were not available, and by covering the products with straw. In some instances, stoves were used. In spite of all precautions, considerable loss through freezing of these products occurred.

Eight bakeries were inspected during the month, which provided bread for the supply points mentioned above. Six civilian establishments processing food, such as bakeries and ice cream manufacturing plants, were also inspected.

6. Personnel

The names of nineteen additional Medical Corps officers were submitted to the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, for permanent rotation to general hospitals in the Communications Zone. During January, permanent rotation was actually effected on four Medical Corps officers to Communications Zone units. This was the first permanent rotation effected between Army and Communications Zone.

During the month, thirty-five Medical Corps officers were received as reinforcements. It helped to absorb an original shortage of fifty Medical Corps officers existing on 31 December 1944. Additional casualties and the arrival in Third U. S. Army area of new divisions which were short Medical Corps officers, resulted in a continuing shortage of approximately twenty-five Medical Corps officers.

The shortage of twenty-five Medical Administrative Corps officers was not rectified during January. Twelve of these officers were received from the Reinforcement System during the month, but only six second lieutenants, Medical Administrative Corps, were appointed out of approximately sixty applications sent to the Office of the Chief Surgeon with recommendations for their appointment. Every effort was made to have these appointments made immediately, in order to absorb the serious shortage in Medical Administrative Corps officers in Third U. S. Army.

Approximately 1,000 Medical Department enlisted men were received from the Reinforcement System during the month. The shortage at the conclusion of the month, however, remained well over 500, and constant efforts were made to expedite the reception of additional Medical Department enlisted men through the Reinforcement System.

Approximately fifty nurses were on detached service with Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month, on loan from general hospitals which were not in operation. Similarly, a number of surgical and shock teams were also on detached service with Army hospitals during the month. These teams rendered invaluable assistance in handling the high flow of casualties which took place during the month.

Section 4 - Medical Supply

At the beginning of the month, the 32d Medical Depot Company (minus one advance section) continued in its location at METZ (U 85). The Advance Section, 32d Medical Depot Company was at ARNETZ (U 79). The 33d Medical Depot Company was also continuing in its location at LONGUYON (U 49).

No movement of the medical depots occurred during the month, with the exception of the setting up on 29 January of an advance section of the 33d Medical Depot Company at BASTOGNE (P 55).

At the beginning of the new year, the overall medical supply situation was satisfactory. Medical depot stocks were balanced, and approximately a sixteen-day supply of medical supplies was on hand. During the first two weeks, the supply picture continued to improve, and shipments were received regularly. A constant and vigorous follow-up policy was maintained on items which were on requisition and not yet received. The reequipping of units whose equipment had been lost due to enemy action during the ARDENNES breakthrough in December was completely completed by the middle of the month.

Where shipments of medical supplies were received by rail, considerable difficulty had previously been experienced in identifying particular shipments in subsequent dealings with Communications Zone which might pertain to them. During this month, therefore, the Medical Section initiated a report to be submitted to this section by the Army medical depot companies subsequent to the receipt of each shipment. This report contained the following information:

1. Rail car or truck number.
2. Consignor.
3. Waybill number.
4. Requisition number, against which it was shipped.
5. Time and date received.
6. Date unloaded.
7. Tonnage.
8. Discrepancies in markings and documentation.

These reports proved invaluable in proper identification in the case of any contingency which might arise with reference to a particular shipment.

Approximately 635 long tons of medical supplies were received from the Communications Zone in Third U. S. Army medical depots during this month. Shipments were being received in a more satisfactory manner than at any time during the previous months. In an effort to expedite the shipment of medical supplies, a new system was initiated in the middle of the month. Under this plan, carload shipments were to be attached to hospital trains at PARIS (S 04) and destined for THIONVILLE (U 88) for the 32d Medical Depot Company, and PETANGE (P 60) for the 33d Medical Depot Company. Less than carload shipments were to be placed in hospital train litter cars and delivered to the above places.

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Initially, during the month, whiskey was authorized for medicinal purposes on the following basis:

Divisions	24 quarts per week
Medical Detachments	4 quarts per week
Army and Corps Clr Coy (non-divisional)	4 quarts per week

Later in the month, and after a survey had been made among the divisions, it was decided that the above allowance of twenty-four quarts per week was not sufficient. The allowance was therefore increased to a maximum of forty-eight quarts per week.

The Medical Section was notified by the Office of the Chief Surgeon European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, that stocks of Medical Department blankets and litters were becoming exceptionally low and were rapidly disappearing from continental reserves. Conservatory measures were therefore undertaken by this Army, and the fact that these items were in critical shortage was emphasized to all medical units under this command. A letter was prepared directing that all Medical Department blankets and litters not actually required be returned to the nearest Army medical depot, and that necessary action be taken to prevent loss and wastage of these items.

A total of 2,000 vials of diphtheria antitoxin and 1,000 vials of smallpox vaccine, on which the expiration date had passed, were turned over to Civil Affairs personnel for their use.

In the middle of the month, the problem of deadlined ambulances first arose. It was found that, as of 16 January, thirty-seven ambulances were in Ordnance for repair, and eleven others had been captured or destroyed and required replacement. The Ordnance Section of this Headquarters was contacted, and arrangements were made to give first priority to ambulances in the shop for repair. In addition, information was received that approximately forty ambulances could be expected by the end of the month, or shortly thereafter.

Approximately 16,000 packets, first aid, parachute, modified by the addition of one tube of boric acid ointment, were received from the Communications Zone during this month. These packets were issued to all armored divisions on a basis of 2,000 per division. This item had been issued to troops of armored units prior to D-Day, and had been used successfully in early invasion days. The tubes of boric acid ointment were included in place of tourniquets.

Around the middle of the month two maintenance teams were formed, each consisting of one Medical Administrative Corps officer and two enlisted men, for the purpose of checking the maintenance of equipment and status of medical supply in Army medical laboratories, in Army hospital units, and Army medical gas treatment battalions. One of these teams was attached to each of the two medical depot companies, and operated from those locations. These teams, in addition to inspecting equipment, were responsible for making repairs of a minor nature and instructing unit maintenance men in proper methods of maintenance and repair. Reports on each unit inspected were submitted to the Medical Section of this Headquarters.

Toward the close of the month, the Army Quartermaster informed the Army Surgeon that stoves, tent, M-1941 were now available, and that a limited quantity of burner, oil, stove, tent, M-1941 would be available in the near future. All Army medical units were therefore requested to submit a report to the Medical Section, showing the amounts authorized, on hand, and required of these items.

As of 31 January, it was determined by a survey that there were approximately 160,200 Medical Department blankets and 20,300 litters on hand in units and medical depots of Third U. S. Army. This information was forwarded to Headquarters European Theater of Operations.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

Preventive Medicine problems consisted of the production of potable water, the prevention of cold type injuries to the feet and an increase in upper respiratory diseases.

2. Venereal Disease Control

Army prophylactic stations were established in LUNEVILLE (P 50), FRANCE, VITRY LE (P 41) REIMS (P 40), and EPERNAY (P 70) and LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81), LUXEMBOURG. Army prophylactic stations gave 11,072 prophylactic treatments during the month.

Individual venereal disease contact reports were received in 374 instances. Of these, thirty-six and eight-tenths percent were contacts made outside the Army area.

The supply of individual chemical and mechanical prophylactics remained adequate throughout the month.

The fact that most divisions were in the line, favorably affected the venereal disease rate for the month of January. Weekly statistics on venereal disease during this month may be found in Annex XIV to the Medical Section report.

3. Communicable Diseases

These diseases showed a slight increase over the previous monthly period. A marked increase was experienced in upper respiratory disease, with the rate of diarrheal diseases remaining approximately the same as during the previous month.

The incidence of epidemic hepatitis increased from approximately four cases per week during December to sixteen cases per week in January.

No outbreaks of significant proportions were encountered.

A detailed breakdown of statistics on communicable diseases occurring during the month of January will be found in Annex XIV to the Medical Section report.

4. Medical Records

A new high for these reports was reached in January. A total of 55,149 were processed, representing an increase of approximately 10,000 over those processed in December. The quality continued to be good.

5. Non-Battle Injuries

The rate of these injuries increased from 165 to 194 per thousand per annum. The increase was mainly attributable to the icy, dangerous condition of roads, and poor visibility throughout the Army area.

Non-battle injuries represented fifteen percent of the total direct admissions as compared with twelve percent for December.

Cold type injuries, especially of the feet, increased from 128 to 264 per thousand per annum. A number of factors contributed to this tremendous increase, especially of frostbite (128 per thousand per annum). These factors included constant exposure to bitter cold, heavy snow, the emergency of the tactical situation, and the fact that practically all combat troops were committed continuously during the period.

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

In January, the two base sections of the 7th Medical Laboratory operated throughout the month in the following locations:

Section I - METZ (U 85)
Section II - LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81)

The combined sections performed 9,535 tests, an increase of approximately 2,000 tests over those performed during December. This was the heaviest month of operations, in so far as the 7th Medical Laboratory was concerned.

The total work for the month of January is broken down as follows:

BASE LABORATORY SECTIONS	NO OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Serology	5678	59.5
Bacteriology	1542	16.1
Chemistry	485	5.1
Pathology	246	2.6
Hematology	87	0.9
Parasitology	96	1.0
Sub-total	8124	85.2
MOBILE LABORATORY SECTIONS		
Venereal Disease Section (66th Conv Hosp)	1411	14.8
Sub-total	1411	14.8
GRAND TOTAL	9535	100.0

A breakdown of the above tests by type of unit requesting them during January is shown below:

TYPE OF UNIT	NO OF UNITS	NO OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF ALL TESTS
Evacuation Hospitals	12	2907	30.5
Convalescent Hospital	1	3165	33.2
Field Hospitals	9	334	3.5
Misc Medical Installations		443	4.6
Misc Tactical Installations		2686	28.2
Totals	22	9535	100.0

The increase in total work is reflected primarily in an increase of requests from the 6th Convalescent Hospital (plus 1,100), the evacuation hospitals (plus 454), and the Venereal Disease Section (plus 588). Roughly, one-third of the work continued to come from the tactical units, which used the laboratory consultations and diagnoses of the 7th Medical Laboratory.

7. Sanitation

With continued cold and a snow-covered terrain throughout the month, environmental sanitary conditions remained satisfactory. The health of the command was generally satisfactory during the month.

Sanitary problems due to insects, rodents, garbage and refuse disposal were practically non-existent during the period.

Difficulties in operation of water units continued during the extreme cold weather. As indicated in the December report, many improvisations were necessary to combat freezing of the tanks, filters, pumps, valves and hose lines. Treatment results were, however, better than in any previous month.

Requests for approval of modified and simplified operating procedure for water treatment units because of the cold weather conditions were approved in only three instances after determination that the water supply was being obtained from protected ground water sources.

The summary of the results of 144 bacteriological analyses of treated water from engineer water points showed an all time high for potable water samples. Less than two percent (1.8%) of the samples were non-potable as compared with forty-nine percent questionable or unsafe for human consumption during August, 1944.

Following is the summary of improvement during the past six-month period, expressed in percentage of samples:

	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan
Potable	51%	72%	85%	89%	95%	98%
Non-potable	49%	28%	15%	11%	5%	2%

Change to the recommended new method of operation of water treatment units was effected during the latter part of October and the month of November throughout the Third U. S. Army.

During the month a new directive was issued from the Office of the Chief Engineer, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, embodying the Third U. S. Army method of water treatment for adoption throughout the Theater.

CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

Highlights of the month included the presence of roads which, as a result of spring-like thaws, became almost impassable. Medical evacuation was difficult under such circumstances. Heavy snow in the early part of the month posed similar difficulties. Unorthodox methods of evacuation, plus the fact that a lower number of casualties was being experienced, eased the situation to some extent.

Difficulty was encountered in the location of suitable covered accommodations for hospitals. Changes in Army boundaries had left Third U. S. Army with an area containing fewer suitable sites.

An innovation in February was the setting up of a provisional hospital to care exclusively for patients with self-inflicted wounds.

Unusual procedures in the field of internal medicine were instituted and are covered in a new sub-section to Section 3 of this report.

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The last week of the month saw the 4th Armored Division push to the vicinity of BITBURG (L-14), and the fall of TRIER (L-12) with a period of rapid movement of all units soon to be in the offing.

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

One captain, Medical Corps, from the Operations and Training Subsection, and one captain, Veterinary Corps, departed from the Medical Section to their new assignments with medical units of Third U. S. Army. This was in conformity with Staff Memorandum Number 71, this Headquarters, dated 16 December 1944.

The Medical Section now consisted of a total of twenty-four officers (including one Army Nurse Corps, one warrant officer, and twenty-eight enlisted men.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

The training program for Information-Education officers was continued. Two officers from Army medical units attended the Information-Education Course at the Staff College in PARIS (Group 3). In addition, two officers attended the Education Advisement Course, and two officers attended the course in Instructor Training at the Staff College.

2. Evacuation

By 1 February, the concentrated efforts of the Allied armies had reduced the "German Bulge" to its former proportions, and they were ready for an offensive of their own. The First and Ninth U. S. Armies and the Armies of the British Twenty-First Army Group were to furnish the impetus for the proposed push. Third U. S. Army was designated to continue its activities, at least in a defensive role, in the Saar-Moselle triangle. By the middle of the month, however, with the U. S. Third Army's clear of the enemy, the 4th Armored Division was ordered to the front in a hurry, over muddy roads that were rendered almost impassable. Roads in the area were in such poor condition that the heavy traffic which was brought about by the German breakthrough in the Ardennes offensive, and particularly the melting snow which left the roadbeds a mass of mud and slush.

With roads in such a deplorable state, and military traffic at an accelerated pace, evacuation of casualties became one of the main problems of the offensive. Movement of ambulances was extremely slow, and the majority of the evacuation hospitals were located too far to the rear to permit expeditious delivery of patients by road. On 14 February the 115th Evacuation Hospital was moved at [illegible] to substantially alleviate the situation. However, due to the condition of the roads, it was necessary to use a combination of evacuating patients by transferring them from ambulances to [illegible] and by carrying litter patients. The 33rd Medical Battalion, [illegible] and the Medical Section of that section from the [illegible] were pressed into service. Faster transportation of patients developed, and it frequently occurred that four hours after arrival, or one half of the time which it had taken to move these patients by road. This [illegible] for three days (13-15 February), and a total of [illegible] casualties were evacuated by such means. Of these, [illegible] were ambulatory patients, and seventy-eight litter patients. On 15 February the 56th Evacuation Hospital received a more suitable road net leading out from its location and [illegible] from 115th Evacuation Hospital was discontinued at this date.

During February several units were transferred from Third U. S. Army. The 45th Field Hospital and 4 Ambulances were assigned to Ninth U. S. Army, the 147th Medical Group and the 94th Medical Collecting Company were assigned to Sixth Army Group, and the 160th Medical Collecting Company was ordered to the Seventh U. S. Army, to which it was assigned to First U. S. Army. The 147th Medical Collecting Company was relieved from its temporary attachment to Sixth Army Group and returned to Third U. S. Army. They were assigned to and operating with Third U. S. Army eleven ambulance companies.

When III Corps was assigned to First U. S. Army on 24 February, the units of the corps medical battalion, consisting of one battalion headquarters, two medical collecting companies, and one clearing company, remained with Third U. S. Army. Fourteen of units attached to the medical battalions, thus bringing the total number of clearing companies to thirteen and the clearing companies to six. Ambulance and collecting companies were employed as in the past, except in the case of ten ambulances of the 147th Medical Collecting Company. These remained attached to the 12th Armored Division for the remainder of medical service until 10 February, at which time that division was relieved of attachment to Third U. S. Army and returned to the First Allied Airborne Army.



"Weasel" Carrying Two Litter and Three Ambulat[illegible] Patients

During January, [illegible] litter bearer platoons of collecting companies and clearing companies were employed to augment the staffs of the evacuation hospitals. [illegible] were also organized from headquarters and station platoons of collecting companies to care for nonambulatory and post-operative patients when field hospital platoons moved forward.

Until the end [illegible] of III Corps to First U. S. Army, the 94th Medical Group was supporting it and the VIII Corps, the 147th Medical Group supported XIX and XX Corps, and the 94th Medical Group evaluated the 16th, 26th, and 104th Evacuation Hospitals. Advance sections [illegible] were responsible for the evacuation of the remaining hospitals.

The 56th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion continued to operate the air [illegible] evacuation which is [illegible] for the entire month. [illegible] were forced to operate under weather conditions [illegible] Patients [illegible] air evacuation. The number of casualties evacuated by air was limited to 2,[illegible] as compared to a total of 7,[illegible] evacuated by rail.

It was during this month that the first hospital train to see [illegible] U. S. War Department, [illegible] from Third U. S. [illegible] the Front), 238 litter and [illegible] patients were evacuated from the 16th, 26th, 104th, and 115th Evacuation Hospitals at [illegible] and [illegible] Hospital at [illegible] Center at [illegible]. An operation proceeded, however, the use



"Weasel" Carrying Three Litter Patients

of this station for the evacuation of patients was discontinued because of the [illegible] number of patients did not justify its operation [illegible] Likewise, the small number of casualties requiring evacuation prompted the closing on 23 February of the 56th Field Hospital which had been operating as a holding unit for Third U. S. Army at PETANGE (P-61). It was the original plan to employ the 7th Field Hospital (also an Advance Section, Communications Zone unit) as a holding unit for Third U. S. Army at BASTOGNE (P-55), but this plan was thwarted when fire destroyed the buildings which the unit was to occupy and by certain rail traffic difficulties.

The seriousness of the problems which confronted the Army Medical Service with respect to the evacuation of patients is amply reflected by the fact that, because of heavy snow and practically impassable roads, extreme measures were initiated to continue the normal flow of casualties within the division areas. Regardless of the comparatively small number of casualties during February, the fact remained that satisfactory evacuation was extremely difficult. To illustrate the urgency of a suitable means of carrying out proper evacuation of patients in the division areas, it is only necessary to review some of the methods employed in an attempt to overcome the obstacles brought about by the elements. After a trial with litters on sleds and track-laying cargo carriers (weasels), it was decided that the use of dog teams would prove more desirable in the evacuation of casualties within the division echelons. Hence, it was determined to order thirteen dog teams of the Air Rescue Service from Labrador. The final contingent of a total of [illegible] dogs, fourteen enlisted men, and thirteen officers arrived at the [illegible] on 11 February. During the ensuing period between the request and the delivery, however, the snow had melted, and the teams were never employed.

Total evacuations for the month follow:

Air [illegible]	2,671
Ambulance [illegible]	3,021
Road [illegible]	10,105
Total	15,639

For locations of evacuation facilities during the month, see Medical Annex [illegible].

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BOX CAR EVACUATION FROM DIVISION AREA

FEBRUARY

1945





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3. Hospitalization

With the exceptions of using the 69th Field Hospital as a provisional evacuation hospital and attaching the first platoon of the 43d Field Hospital to the 34th Medical Battalion, the field hospitals were utilized in the same manner as Third U. S. Army had previously employed them. At the end of the month, the attachments of the field hospitals were as follows:

VIII Corps	XII Corps
3d Plat, 16th Fld Hosp	1st Plat, 16th Fld Hosp
2d Plat, 43d Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 16th Fld Hosp
3d Plat, 43d Fld Hosp	1st Plat, 30th Fld Hosp
1st Plat, 59th Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 60th Fld Hosp
2d Plat, 59th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 60th Fld Hosp

XX Corps

2d Plat, 30th Fld Hosp
3d Plat, 30th Fld Hosp
3d Plat, 59th Fld Hosp

With the complete reduction of the bulge, resulting from the German counteroffensive, Third U. S. Army continued the attack. In the early stages of the attack, VIII Corps on the northern flank was making the principal effort. There was considerable difficulty in locating covered accommodations for evacuation hospitals in this sector because the fierce fighting had reduced the majority of the buildings to rubble and ventilated them to an extent that was considered extreme. The 101st Evacuation Hospital was established in the GRAND DUCHESS OF LUXEMBOURG's Summer Palace in BERG (P-83), and on 8 February patients were received at that installation. Six days later, the 110th Evacuation Hospital was moved from ESCH (P-70) to CIERF (P-76) to augment the 101st Evacuation Hospital. With the former unit only four miles from the front, and the 101st Evacuation Hospital relatively close to enemy activity, the critical situation which had existed for several days began to assume a more normal aspect. With these two hospitals established in the north and central area of the front, immediate plans were made and executed to bring others nearer to the zone of activity. The 69th Field Hospital, still functioning as an evacuation hospital, moved from ARLON (P-62) to ETTELBRUCK (P-95), and the 34th Evacuation Hospital moved from METZ (U-85) to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81). A total of four evacuation hospitals were now located in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81); namely, the 12th, 34th, 35th, and 104th.

Advantage of this ample support was taken to close the 35th and 104th Evacuation Hospitals at different times, in order to rest the personnel, who had been furnishing medical support from the beginning of the reduction of the bulge.

The 109d Evacuation Hospital, which had been temporarily attached to Sixth Army Group, was assigned to First U. S. Army on 26 February.

During the month of February, extensive use was made of civilian labor for the essential duties of housekeeping in Army hospitals. As in previous months, this aid was secured through civilian agencies on a reverse lend-lease basis.

The 6th Convalescent Hospital remained at its location in MOULINS-LES-METZ (U-85) during the entire month. The large number of upper respiratory infections, brought on during the month by exposure to freezing temperatures, placed a tremendous strain on the convalescent hospital. The daily quota system continued to be employed. In order to relieve the burden on the 6th Convalescent Hospital, a provisional hospital was formed by the 436th Medical Battalion and put in operation at MONDORF-LES-BAINS (P-90) to care for convalescent medical cases which would otherwise go to the 6th Convalescent Hospital.

At MONDORF-LES-BAINS (P-90) seven hotels in the famous Spa provided a 900-bed capacity for the hospital proper. Four more hotels, and several boarding houses and villas, were used as accommodations for organic and attached hospital personnel. The beautiful parks and surrounding environs provided an ideal locale for convalescent patients. The baths of MONDORF-LES-BAINS (P-90) perfected the setup.

The location of Third U. S. Army hospitals during February will be found in Medical Annex XXVII.

An analysis of wounded hospitalized in Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month of February is shown below:

a. Number of wounded admitted "direct" (i.e. not by transfer).

Designation	Number
(1) U. S. Army Troops	10631
(2) British Army Troops	3
(3) French Army Troops	12
(4) U. S. Navy and Marine Corps	0
(5) British and French Navy	0
(6) Enemy Forces Personnel	1095
(7) Civilians	135
(8) Others	29

Note: All of the following in b through f pertains to U. S. Army troops only.

b. General classification of wounds:

(1) Serious	2927
(2) Slight	7674

c. Anatomical classification of wounds:
(Patients with multiple wounds are classified according to most extensive wounds).

	Admissions	Deaths
(1) Wounds other than burns		
(a) Abdominal	500	67
(b) Thoracic	378	67
(c) Maxillo-facial	719	4
(d) Neurologic		
Head	687	43
Spine	241	9
Nerve	3	1
(e) Extremities		
Upper	2624	9
Lower	3854	41
(f) Buttocks	443	9
(g) Others	506	3
Sub-total	10439	253
(2) Burns - all locations	72	2
Total	10631	255

d. Number of patients with multiple wounds: 3500 46

e. Classification of wounds by causative agents:

(1) Gunshot Wounds (rifle, pistol or machine gun)	2440	61
(2) Shell Wounds (HE, flak, mortar or cannon)	6302	157
(3) Bomb Wounds (aerial, grenade, booby trap or cannon)	721	22
(4) Blast Injuries (bomb, shell or mine)	455	6
(5) Wounds from secondary missiles	81	2
(6) Burns (petrol, flash, flame thrower, phosphorus, etc.)	81	1
(7) Others	551	6
Total	10631	255

f. Number of deaths by primary and secondary causes:

Pen W abdomen	Hemorrhage	2
Perf W chest	Hemorrhage	2
Perf W chest	Lac W liver and ascending colon	1
Pen W abdomen	Mult lac of ascending colon	1
Pen W abdomen	Mult lac stomach & colon	1
Pen W chest	Hemorrhage cerebral concussion	1
Pen W scalp	Intracranial & abdominal injuries	1
Perf W abdomen	Mult lac of ileum & sigmoid colon	1
Pen W chest	Mult lac of lung, diaphragm spleen, & colon	1
Pen W chest	Mult lac of small intestine & bladder	1
Pen W chest	Hemothorax-severance of spinal cord at D-6	1
Pen W chest	FCC thigh right	1
Pen W chest	Lac of liver and superior pole kidney right	1
Pen W abdomen	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W chest	Perf W abdomen with ileum, FCC femur	1
Pen W chest	Pen W abdomen with lac of splenic artery	1
Pen W shell (HE) head	Cerebral injury & shock	2
Pen W shell (HE) abdomen with multiple lac of small intestine, transection of small	Mesentertic thrombosis & gangrene of entire small intestine	1
intestine & descending colon		
Pen W shell (HE) abdomen with lac spleening colon	Right pneumothorax, pneumonia left base, shock of wound disruption & secondary operation	1
Pen W shell (HE) lower extremities traumatic amputation left leg, Frac C mult right leg at ankle tibia, fibula, femur, FCC right humerus	Hemorrhage & shock	1
Pen W shell (HE) abdomen with mult lac small intestine & transection descending colon & retroperitioneal hematoma	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W shell (HE) spine with complete diplegia of lower extremities	Hemorrhage, shock & pulmonary edema	1
Pen W shell (HE) abdomen with transection duodenum, lac right kidney & transection left ureter	Continued hemorrhage & shock	1
Pen W shell (HE) abdomen with lac cecum intestinal evisceration, mult intestinal perforation	Shock & pulmonary edema	1
Pen W (HE) abdomen	Anuria & icterus	4
Pen W GSW abdomen	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	1
Perf W, SPW (HE) abdomen	Pulmonary edema	2
Pen W GSW abdomen	Pulmonary edema	2
Pen W, SPW abdomen	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	1
Pen W (mine) abdomen	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	1
Amputation, traumatic, incomplete, ankle right	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	2
Amputation, traumatic, complete, thigh right	Shock severe, trauma	1
Perf W, SPW (HE) head	Shock severe, trauma	1
Pen W, SPW (HE) chest left	Pulmonary edema	1
Perf W GSW chest left	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	1
Pen W, SPW (HE) chest right	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	1
GSW Pen severe, right chest W with extensive lac of right lung involving large bronchus & branch of pulmonary artery	Hemorrhage, aspiration	1
GSW Pen right chest, lac pulmonary artery	Hemorrhage, severe	1
SPW, severe, chest left with lac of diaphragm	Shock & hemorrhage	1
SPW, Perf left chest, FCC skull	Irreversible shock	1
SPW, Perf severe neck	Shock	1
SPW, mult Pen severe neck mediastinum, abdomen	Shock	1
SPW, Pen left chest with lac of left lung, lower lobe	Shock and hemorrhage	1
SPW, severe lac left shoulder & chest	Acute pulmonary edema	1
SPW, Pen right thorax with Perf right lung	Shock & hemorrhage	2
SPW, Pen right chest	Pulmonary edema & shock	1
GSW, Pen right sublingual region to upper right abdomen	Shock & hemorrhage	1
GSW left flank, Pen	Irreversible shock	1
SPW, Pen chest	Exsanguination	1
GSW, Pen W of left chest	Shock & hemorrhage	1
SPW, Pen upper third left forearm with FCC radius, SPW, Pen severe upper third of left thigh	Irreversible shock & exposure	1
SPW, Pen right chest with lac of upper lobe, right lung	Broncho-pneumonia, right upper & middle lobes, Pulmonary edema	1
SPW, chest	Shock & hemorrhage	4
SPW, abdomen	Shock & hemorrhage	12
GSW chest	Shock & hemorrhage	4
GSW abdomen	Shock & hemorrhage	1
SPW lower extremities	Shock & hemorrhage	1
Burns	Shock	1
Pen GSW abdomen	Hemorrhage, shock	1
Pen (mine frag) W left thigh	Shock, traumatic	1
Pen GSW buttocks	Shock, DOA	1
Pen GSW chest	Shock	4
Pen shell frag W left buttock	Atalectasis, lobar	1
Pen shell frag W abdomen	Anuria, complete	1

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Perf GSW left buttock	Oliguria severe	1
Pen shell, frag W chest	Shock	1
Pen shell, frag W chest	Pulmonary edema	1
Skull frac	Exsanguination	1
Terminal anuria & edema, lungs	Mult wounds	1
Perf W abdomen LIQ	Irreversible shock	1
Blast injury, cerebral & pulmonary mult W	Circulatory failure	1
Pen W abrup W abdomen	Shock	3
Pen W abrup W chest	Shock	2
Perf GSW chest	Shock	2
Perf W GSW abdomen	Shock	1
Pen W neck	Hemorrhage	1
Pen W neck	Shock	1
Cerebral concussion	Shock	2
Perf W abdomen	Shock	1
Perf W abdomen	Peritonitis	1
FCC skull	Herniation of brain	3
FCC sacul	Meningitis	1
Perf W elbow joint left	Hemorrhage	1
Coronary occlusion		1
Perf W shell (ME) abdomen, head, thoracic	Hemorrhage	12
Frac compound (bomb, mortar, mine)		1
Traumatic amputation SW (ME) left leg	Shock	1
Pen W, SW (ME) skull, extrusion of brain	Shock	2
Perf and Pen W, GSW right upper arm, right chest	Hemorrhage, hemothorax & shock	1
Pen W, FCC, SW (mortar) right arm & right humerus	Dilation right ventricle of heart partial atelectasis & congestion of lungs	1
Blast injury burns third degree SW (ME) thighs	Contusion of lungs, hemothorax LH, spleen kidneys	1
Pen W, GSW, left thigh FCC, left femur severe left femoral artery	Hemorrhage & shock	1
Pen W, SW (ME) left elbow, buttocks, abdomen	General peritonitis, atelectasis of lungs, Empyema left, toxic myocarditis shock	1
Pen W, SW, (rocket) skull, extrusion of brain	Shock	1
Perf W, SW (ME) left knee	Hemorrhage, shock, hydrothorax	1
Traumatic amp, SW (ME) right foot, severe lac left forearm	Hemorrhage & shock	1
FCC, unknown force, skull with intracerebral hemorrhage	Shock	1
Pen W, SW (ME) chest, left forearm & pericardiac effusion	Shock	1
Traumatic amp SW (ME) right lower thigh	Hemorrhage, shock	1
Pen W, SW (ME) abdomen	Peritonitis	1
Pen W shell, thigh	Shock	1
Pen W shell left buttocks		1
MW shell left shoulder	Shock	1
Pen W shell skull	Shock	1
Pen W shell skull	Shock	2
MW, shell left leg	Shock	1
MW shell left leg	Shock	1
Pen W shell skull	Pulmonary edema	1
MW shell right hip	Shock	1
Pen W shell skull	Pulmonary edema	1
MW shell right hip	Shock	1
Pen W shell abdomen	Shock	1
Perf W chest, LW right forearm Perf W left arm	Traumatic shock & pneumonia	1
DOA frac skull, left shoulder & arm	Skull injury	1
Pen W lower lumbar region over 1st sacral body	Cardio-respiratory failure	1
Pen W back with FCC spine & lamina of thoracic 3d & 4th incomplete cord lesion thoracic 2d & hemothorax right	Traumatic shock with pneumonia	1
Pen W both legs, FCC right femur, Pen W right forearm with FCC radius	Traumatic shock with progressive circulatory collapse	1
Traumatic amp left upper thigh with gas gangrene & traumatic amputation left forearm, FCC right femur & avulsion W right thigh	Irreversible shock	1
FCC right femur & pelvis, avulsion of right buttock & rectum femur muscle of right thigh	Traumatic shock & hemorrhage	1
Pen W left buttock, Perf W sigmoid & jejunum	General peritonitis with small bowel obstruction	1
Contor W buttock, deep to sacrum with FCC sacrum & coccyx	Traumatic shock	1
Pen W, GSW, left thigh	Shock	1
Pen W shell left cheek	Cerebral anemia	1
Pen W shell left & right thighs	Pneumonia, broncho	1
Traumatic amp, shell left leg	Pneumonia, lobar	1
Perf W shell upper extremity	Pneumonia, broncho	1
Perf W shell chest	Pneumonothorax, hemothorax, atelectasis	1
Pen W head GSW	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W shell chest	Pulmonary edema	1
Perf W shell right thigh	Blast injury with pneumonia, broncho	1
Pen W shell head	Cerebral edema	1
Mult Pen W shell upper extremities	Uremia	1
Pen W, GSW, head	Massive subdural hemorrhage	1
Perf W, GSW, chest	Pneumonia, broncho, extensive	1
Perf W shell right thigh	Shock	1
Pen W shell head	Cerebral edema	1
Pen W shell spine	Uremia	1
Pen W shell face & neck	Shock	1
Traumatic amp (mine) right leg	Pulmonary embolism	1
Perf W shell chest	Shock	1
GSW Pen spine	Shock irreversible	1
Pen W shell chest	Shock irreversible	1
GSW, MW, Pen right shoulder		1
Concussion cerebral	Respiratory failure	1
Extensive avulsion mandible & maxille	Respiratory failure	1
Pen W shell head	Respiratory failure	3
Pen W, MW, right leg	Irreversible shock	1
Pen W, MW, shell, FC left leg	Irreversible shock	1
Pen W, MW, shell, abdomen	Respiratory failure	2
Pen W shell left buttock	Acute liver insufficiency	1
Pen W, MW, shell face	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W shell traumatic amputation left leg		1
Pen W shell head	Respiratory paralysis	1
Traumatic amputation, left leg	Shock, pulmonary edema	1
FCC skull	Shock, extreme	2
Pen W chest	Shock, extreme	1
Extensive W base of skull (bomb) booby trap	Shock & hemorrhage	1
Multiple Pen & Perf W right lower extremity (bomb) land mine	Massive pulmonary edema congestion generalised capillary engorgement of all vicera due to shock from severe blast effect	1
Extensive W of head with brain damage shell (ME)	Shock	2
Extensive W of lower extremities (bomb) land mine	Shock, severe	1
Extensive W of lower extremities shell (ME)	Uremia & pulmonary edema	1
Pen W skull with herniation of brain tissue & FCC skull, Pen W right arm, Pen W left leg		1
Pen W abdomen, Pen W left parietal region skull with FC parietal bone		1
Pen W neck through trachea & apex of right lung	Pneumonia, broncho, bilateral, pneumothorax & atelectasis, right, mediastinitis	1
Perf W abdomen with transection of je_unum, FCC L-5 with spinal cord involvement		1
FCC skull Pen W neck Perf W right arm	Pen W (sucking) right axilla DOA CRO	1
Pen W left chest, FCC right arm & forearm, MW right arm & right thigh, intracranial injury (no external head wound)		1
Pen W skull, left parietal region with FCC skull with appearance of cerebral tissue, Pen W left neck, DOA CRO		1
Gas gangrene right leg, FCC left knee joint, MW Pen W legs & thighs, multiple, LH hands, FC middle phalanx, left 2d finger & proximal phalanx left 5th finger	Shock, irreversible, nephrosis tubular, edema, pulmonary	1
Perf W extensive, left arm, FCC left humerus, lower third, Pen W bone left thumb, LW left index finger, DOA CRO	Shock	1
Pen W right chest, pneum & hemothorax; pneumoperitoneum secondary to perforation of diaphragm; loc of right kidney with hematuria; FCC laciniae & transverse processes of 2,3,4 lumbar vertebrae; impact fracture left ilium, foreign body traumatic imbedded in left ilias bone		1
Pen W face, right side	FC skull with herniation of brain tissue	1
Pen W shell (ME) brain	Cerebral edema & respiratory paralysis	1
Perf W shell (ME) brain	Cerebral edema & respiratory paralysis	1
Pen W (bomb) mine, chest & abdomen	Blast concussion of lung	1
Perf GSW chest & abdomen	Shock, traumatic	1
Burns, 2d degree & 3d degree of face, neck & extremities	Mult frac & blast concussion of brain & lungs	1
Frac, simple (bomb) left femur	Blast concussion of brain & lungs	1
Perf GSW neck	Shock, traumatic	1
Pen W shell (ME) left buttock & anus	Shock & cardiac failure	1
Pen W shell (mortar) right buttock with Perf of rectum	Shock, traumatic	1
Perf W (bomb) W head	Cerebral concussion	1
Shell wound	Blast injury to lungs	1
Bomb wounds (mine)	Asphyxia, caused by aspiration	1
GSW	Respiratory paralysis, due to cervical cord injury	1
Shell wound	Uremia	1
Bomb wound	Irreversible shock	1
Shell wound	Irreversible shock	1
Skull frac		1
GSW	Pulmonary edema	1
GSW	Shock	1
GSW	Aspiration with respiratory collapse	1
GSW	Massive hemothorax	1
Mult W both legs, mult W chest, abdomen	Shock, profound, sustained irreversible	1
GSW through abdomen, left	Shock, irreversible, circulatory	1
Pen W abdomen	Shock, irreversible, circulatory	1
Mult W chest, extremities, Pen W of penis with urinary extravasation, hemothorax bilateral, pneumothorax, lt serve	Shock, profound, irreversible	1
Partial traumatic amp of right ankle & foot	Pulmonary embolism, severe	1
Mult Pen W abdomen (mine)	Shock	1
Pen W abdomen GSW	Peritonitis; bronchial pneumonia	1

g. Number of transfusions of:

(1) Fresh whole blood	946
(2) Stored blood	1,906
(3) Dry plasma	1,960
(4) Other blood substitutes (Do not include crystalloids)	0

h. Number of units of penicillin administered 4,975,650,000

i. Number of amputations:

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(1) Upper extremity 92
(2) Lower extremity 215

3. Number of cases showing clinical evidence of gas gangrene:

U. S. Army 7% Other 14

4. Number of wounded evacuated to other hospitals.

U. S. Army 79% Other 6%

4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

The 52d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion continued to operate its provisional hospital at [illegible] LEAP for acid in jury trench foot and frostbite cases, on a fifteen-day basis.

In accordance with the policy of the Army Commander, all patients with self-inflicted wounds were held in Army evacuation hospitals, pending investigation and/or trial by courts-martial. Investigations of many of these cases were not completed for as long as four to six weeks. In order to relieve the burden on evacuative hospitals of caring for such patients during their extended hospitalization, and to release these beds for normal use, it was decided to form a provisional hospital to be specifically charged with the care of patients with self-inflicted wounds. On 14 February, the 54th Medical Battalion opened a provisional hospital at the former site of the 11 th Evacuation Hospital in Pich [illegible] Calang "A" of the 3d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion, the first platoon, 52d Field Hospital, and the 52d Clearing Company were attached to the 54th Medical Battalion as augmentation for this purpose. On the first day of operation, ninety-five cases of self-inflicted were admitted by transfer from Third U. S. Army hospitals.

Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

During the month of February, [illegible] battle casualties were treated in Third U. S. Army medical installations. Of this number, [illegible] died.

Based on total disposition from all causes in Third U. S. Army personnel, once again the mortality rate was only one percent.

2. Surgery

February, 1945 marked the end of six months of operation in Third U. S. Army. Throughout this period, the activity of the troops was clearly reflected in the battle casualties and in the variety and the intensity of the offensive undertaken. The intensity of the offensive is specifically stated, as not only was the troop activity of the before us. With our lines always moving forward, it was impossible to maintain very close medical support during the early part of the month. Battle casualties were admitted to our medical installations.

Of these casualties, [illegible] percent were caused by small arms fire, i.e. rifle, machine gun, [illegible] the remaining seventy-three percent were caused by artillery fragments, [illegible] grenades, mortars, mines, or bombs. [illegible] casualties. It is interesting to note that [illegible] wounds received from small arms fire, [illegible] thirty percent of all battle casualties had multiple wounds.

The evaluation of the results obtained in the treatment of the casualties gives us a true picture of the surgery that was accomplished during the six months. There were [illegible] types of treatment, namely the [illegible] and the evacuation hospitals, and the [illegible] were dead on arrival. This gives a mortality rate of [illegible] for the entire [illegible] and, [illegible] the mortality rate for [illegible] six months period of [illegible] and seven-tenths percent.

A further study of the battle casualties [illegible] is clearly revealed that [illegible] were treated by [illegible] the wound [illegible]. Most of these cases were treated [illegible] hospitals, [illegible] for [illegible] and [illegible] early [illegible] for [illegible] the [illegible] at the evacuation hospitals [illegible] mortality rate of [illegible] of these cases was [illegible] percent.

Most casualties in these [illegible] hospitals and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

3. Neuropsychiatry

With the ARDENNES bulge eliminated during the month of January, the Third U. S. Army confined its efforts in February to what might be called an aggressive defensive. The enemy's counteroffensive, extending into January, which resulted in a record number of casualties within Third U. S. Army for any one month, was replaced by a type of warfare somewhat similar to that employed by this Army; that is, primarily a holding operation. The result was that Third U. S. Army's total non-fatal casualty admissions for the month of February dropped to approximately 15,000 less than those for the previous month. Five and seven-tenths percent of the total of 32,189 non-fatal casualties admitted during February were neuropsychiatric, and seventy-three percent of the 1,847 cases of this type were returned to duty as compared to seventy-seven percent returned to duty during the previous month. The percentage of neuropsychiatric casualties to the total admissions showed a two-tenths percent increase over the five and five-tenths recorded during January. A comparison of the two months' percentages and ratios shows no marked variation with relation to neuropsychiatric casualties.

The fact that proper rotation of troops to division rest areas is a command function was stressed as heretofore, and continuous emphasis was placed upon the fact that this rotation is very definitely a contributing factor to the reduction of neuropsychiatric conditions.

4. Dental

During February, five prosthetic dental detachments were activated by Headquarters Third U. S. Army upon authority received from Headquarters European Theater of Operations. These detachments, based upon the T/O and E in column BH, 8-500, consisted of one captain, Dental Corps, and three enlisted dental technicians. The organization provided for each detachment to operate from a dental prosthetic truck. Since only three trucks would ultimately be available, one detachment each was attached to the two Army Medical Depot Companies. The Surgeons of each of the three corps requested that a detachment be assigned to them for operation with the clearing company attached to the corps headquarters. These assignments were made since the prosthetic treatment available to Army troops would thus be distributed where the greatest numbers of troops could best be served.

It was believed that the addition of the five prosthetic detachments would supplement the already excellent denture service available in Third U. S. Army to the point where all echelons could receive attention with a minimum of time lost from duty.

Officer and enlisted personnel were drawn from experienced, well qualified groups so little time would be lost in establishing a well-rounded and smoothly-functioning detachment. The headquarters of the 44th Auxiliary Surgical Group was chosen to administer the five detachments and serve as their headquarters.

The Army Dental Surgeon's inspections of dental installations revealed that evacuation hospitals were receiving many maxillo-facial cases which were being well-handled prior to evacuation. All clinics were devoting much of their time to the treatment of routine operative cases who were being placed in Class IV without delay. The latter cases were receiving the necessary prosthetic attention upon completion of the required operative and surgical procedures.

Although there were a fewer admissions for routine dental treatment during the month of February, a greater number of restorations were completed than during any month since October, 1944. The incidence of Vincent's infection was lower than it had been since March, 1944.

A chart is shown below giving the breakdown of dental treatments for the month of February:

Strength (Reported)	374493
Admissions Routine	22103
Admissions Emergency	4065
Sittings	32698
Officer Personnel	343
Enlisted Personnel	369
Restorations	21626
Dentures	2128
Gingivitis	1364
Gingivitis Treatment	2070
Stomatitis Vincent's Treatment	469

5. Veterinary

Seventeen inspections were made of Class I supply points. Thawing weather and rain, together with rapid movement of the Army, made it difficult to find proper sites for supply points. Constant check was necessary to prevent loss from moisture.

Five bakeries supplying the above points were inspected and found to be satisfactory.

6. Personnel

Names of Medical Department officers and enlisted men were submitted to the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, for permanent rotation to general hospitals in the Communications Zone, in the following numbers:

Medical Corps officers	6
Dental Corps officers	4
Medical Administrative Corps officers	2
Enlisted men	24

Permanent rotation was actually effected in February of eleven Medical Corps officers. In addition, rotation was offered within Army on a much larger scale than heretofore, in an attempt to salvage the services of Medical Department personnel, particularly in division areas. Nine Medical Corps officers were so rotated. Division Surgeons were apprised of the fact that rotation was available to Army units of Medical Department officers, on forty-eight hours' notice.

During the month, ten Medical Corps officers were received as reinforcements. Shortages among Medical Department commissioned personnel, as of the end of the month, were as follows:

Medical Corps	32
Dental Corps	9
Medical Administrative Corps	40

Consistent efforts were continued to obtain proper reinforcements from the Communications Zone. However, Theater shortages, particularly in regard to Medical Corps officers, continued to exist and made difficult the obtainment by Third U. S. Army of sufficient reinforcements in this category to bring it up to T/O strength. There were still sufficient applications for appointments as second lieutenants, Medical Administrative Corps, which had been approved by this Headquarters and forwarded to Headquarters European Theater of Operations during January, to make up the deficit existing within Third U. S. Army in that branch. Appointments, however, were slow in coming through.

Shortages in enlisted men continued to approximate a consistent total of more than 500. Constant efforts were made to secure such a number in a block from Communications Zone general hospitals, with the thought in mind that this would even out the shortage curve to a point closely approaching zero. Reinforcements of Medical Department enlisted men were being sent to Third U. S. Army in sufficient numbers to counteract current casualties and losses.

Approximately fifty nurses remained on detached service with Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month. These nurses were on loan from general hospitals which were not in operation. As the general hospitals to which the particular nurses were assigned went into operation, exchange was effected for a similar number of nurses from other general hospitals, not yet in operation.

A number of surgical and shock teams were also on detached service with Army hospitals during the month, on loan from general hospitals.

Section 4 - Medical Supply

Few changes occurred in the locations of the medical depot companies during February. The 32d Medical Depot Company (minus one advance section) continued in its locations at METZ (U-84). The advance section of this company remained at AMNEVILLE (U-79) throughout the month. The 33d Medical Depot Company also continued in its location at LONGUYON (U-49). At the close of the month, however, the 33d Medical Depot Company closed at that location in preparation for a movement to ETTELBRUCK (P-84). An advance section of the 33d Medical Depot Company remained at BASTOGNE (P-55) until 26 February. It became operational on 27 February at ETTELBRUCK (P-84).

There was little change in the overall medical supply situation. Through extraordinary shipments of medical supplies from Communications Zone in January, an adequate stock of medical supplies had been accumulated. During February, shipments were received regularly, and a total of 880 long tons of medical supplies were actually received from Communications Zone during this month. The major difficulty encountered was the continued inability of hospital trains to make an even property exchange on blankets. This problem had been a bothersome one for several months, and further corrective action was initiated.

Due to the poor condition of roads to the rear in the vicinity of REIMS (T-37), caused by February thaws, restrictions were placed by appropriate authorities in the Communications Zone, barring these roads from travel by two and one-half ton trucks, or heavier vehicles. As a result, an excessive amount of salvage material accumulated at both Army medical depots. On 10 February, two highways to REIMS (T-37) were opened, and twelve trucks were obtained from the 24th Regulating Station (an Advance Section, Communications Zone unit) to carry salvage material from the Army medical depots to Depot M-408 at REIMS (T-37).

Also during the early part of the month, Twelfth Army Group requested the Army Surgeon to prepare a list of medical items to be used for an emergency air drop, in the quantity required to support 15,000 men for one day. This list consisted of fourteen items, and weighed approximately 18,377 pounds, occupying a space of approximately 10,798 cubic feet.

In the middle of the month, information was received that the air field T-33 at THIONVILLE (U-88) was closed for cargo and that all shipments of supplies by air would be sent to A-82-C at ETAIN (U-47) until further notice.

Approximately 200 cases of captured liquors were released by AC of S, G-4, for issue to Army medical units for medicinal purposes. Distribution was made to the units on a strength basis from one of the Army medical depot companies.

Among unusual items received during the month were 20,000 bags, patients, efforts. Basis of issue from the Army level included one for every two beds in units other than divisions and for divisions, not to exceed an estimated seven days' consumption. Sufficient quantities of tray, food, six compartment, were received from the Communications Zone to allow each evacuation hospital 300 of this item. Limited quantities of markers, Red Cross, nine feet, six inches by twenty-one feet, six inches, and burners, oil, stove, tent, were available. Distribution was made on the oil burners on the following basis:

50 per Evacuation Hospital and Medical Gas Treatment Battalion
60 per Field Hospital
100 per Convalescent Hospital

Four additional stoves, two-burner, gasoline, were authorized each division for use in battalion aid stations.

Due to previous difficulties involving the use of Army transportation to pick up emergency supplies from Communications Zone depots, as well as to deliver salvage material to those depots, corrective measures were instituted. Arrangements were made with the 24th Regulating Station (Advance Section, Communications Zone unit) whereby that station would furnish trucks to the Army medical depot companies for the purposes outlined.

During the last week of the month, an extract of Medical Department Supply Catalogue - 1944, listing only items stocked in Army medical depot companies was sent to all divisions and to separate battalions of corps, as well as to Army medical units. The extract was reproduced and printed through the efforts of the Army Surgeon's Office.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

February was marked by continued hard fighting, with the additional problem of successfully executing several river crossings in prevailing temperatures which, though somewhat elevated in comparison with those of the previous month, were contributing factors toward the continuing prevalence of cold type injuries (trench foot and frostbite) and upper respiratory diseases. At the same time, temperatures rose to a sufficient level to permit the ice and snow to melt, thereby creating sanitary problems resulting in an increase in diarrheal diseases and infectious hepatitis. Water pollution again demanded serious attention.

2. Venereal Disease Control

There was a slight increase in the venereal disease rate over the month of January, despite the fact that heavy fighting continued. Ordinarily, this increase would not be expected; however, the policy of issuing passes to cities outside the Army area was credited with the venereal disease increase. Nine Army prophylactic stations were established in ARLON (P-52), BELGIUM, CHEPPAMS (U-66), FRANCE, and ESCH (P-70), LUXEMBOURG. There were 4,734 prophylactic treatments given by Army prophylactic stations during the month.

The supply of new type individual chemical and mechanical prophylactic units was adequate.

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During this period, 350 individual venereal disease contact reports were received, of which approximately one-half represented contacts made outside the Army area--ninety-two of them originating in PARIS (S-Ok). Statistics, by months, on venereal disease during February may be found in Annex XXIX to the Medical Section report.

3. Communicable Diseases

Infectious hepatitis showed the sharpest increase of any malady in the communicable disease category with a weekly incidence of thirty-one cases, as compared to sixteen per week during January. There was a slight increase over the previous month in upper respiratory infections, and the diarrheal rate was almost doubled. The majority of the infectious hepatitis cases originated in the 26th Infantry Division. Annex XXIX to the Medical Section report shows a detailed breakdown on the communicable diseases occurring during the month of February.

4. Medical Records

A total of 48,072 reports were processed during the month, a decrease over the previous month. This decrease was expected in view of the fact that in February a number of units were transferred from the Third U. S. Army.

5. Non-battle Injuries

The melting of the ice and snow which resulted in less slippery roads was responsible for a decrease in non-battle injuries during the month. During the first week, the rate was 228 per 1,000 per annum, with a subsequent progressive decrease to 137 for the last week of the month. Non-battle injuries represent fifteen percent of the total direct admissions for the month. Although there was a slight increase in the trench foot rate, due to the mud following the thaw, the frostbite rate dropped so sharply that the total cold injury rate per 1,000 per annum decreased to approximately fifty percent of that for the month of January.

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

During the month of February the 7th Medical Laboratory continued to operate in two sections as follows:

Section I - METZ (R-85)
Section II - LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81)

The combined sections performed 9,829 tests during the period, which represented a slight increase over the 9,535 tests performed during January, and established an all-time high for any one month since the commencement of operations.

The total work for the month of February is broken down as follows:

BASE LABORATORY SECTIONS	NO OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Serology	6113	62.3
Bacteriology	1508	15.4
Chemistry	434	4.4
Pathology	218	2.2
Hematology	122	1.2
Parasitology	129	1.3
Sub-total	8544	87.0
MOBILE LABORATORY SECTIONS		
Venereal Disease Section (4th Conv Hospital)	1120	11.3
Shock Section (30th Field Hosp, 1st Plat)	165	1.7
Grand Total	9829	100.0

A breakdown of the above tests by type of unit requesting them during February is shown below:

TYPE OF UNIT	NO OF UNITS	NO OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF ALL TESTS
Evacuation Hospitals	12	2821	28.7
Convalescent Hospital	1	2918	29.7
Field Hospitals	10	620	6.3
Misc Medical Installations		625	6.3
Misc Tactical Installations		2845	29.0
Total	23	9829	100.0

There was no appreciable variation in the distribution of work between this and the preceding month.

7. Sanitation

Weather conditions were the influencing factor which brought about an increase in the problems of sanitation, including water supplies, camp sanitation, and personal hygiene.

There were scattered instances of louse infestation, but these were effectively dealt with by the use of DDT Powder. There was a definite absence of bedbug, rodent, garbage, or refuse disposal problems. A continuation of the policy of establishing military dump sites in troop centers brought favorable results.

Pollution of the soil from animal and human wastes was extensive in the occupied villages. There were twelve reported instances of a high diarrheal rate, and undoubtedly there were many which escaped reporting due to the comparatively mild and short-lived nature of the outbreaks. Sporadic cases continued generally throughout the month with diminishing frequency. The source or cause of the diarrhea was not determined, although investigations were carried out in several instances.

The operation of water treatment units when treating grossly polluted sources by the new method of treatment received a thorough test. Out of a record of 201 samples of treated water analyses, only three were found polluted during the month, which is considered exceptionally low in view of the stream conditions at that time.

A new directive on water supply was received from the European Theater of Operations (Section II, Circular No 17, dated 10 February 1945) incorporating Third U. S. Army's policy on water treatment and sampling.

CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

The Assistant to the Army Dental Surgeon, a captain, Dental Corps, who had been with Headquarters Third U. S. Army since before its embarkation for ENGLAND, was transferred to an evacuation hospital. A replacement reported to the Medical Section.

No other changes occurred during the month in the organization of the Medical Section.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

Two officers from Army medical units attended the Information-Education Course, and one officer attended the Instructor Training Course at the Army Information-Education Staff School in PARIS (S-Ok).

2. Evacuation

The problems of evacuation in March provided a repetition, more or less, of the difficulties faced in the sweep across FRANCE in August, 1944. Following its breakthrough on the SIEGFRIED LINE east of the GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG, Third U. S. Army's rapid advance was broken only for short periods by the natural obstacles offered by terrain and rivers. The Army faced the tactical problem of establishing bridgeheads across three rivers - the MOSELLE, the RHINE, and the MAIN. However, except for the retarding effect of these river assaults, the advances were sweeping. The speed with which the advances were executed, for the most part, placed a heavy burden upon evacuation facilities, since patients had to be hauled longer distances than normal speeds of advance would require. Fortunately, however, more favorable weather conditions had resulted in improved roads which permitted more successful evacuation by road.

There were only two changes in Army evacuating units for the period. The 580th Ambulance Company, Motor, was attached to Sixth Army Group about the middle of the month; and, subsequently, the 583d Ambulance Company, Motor, was relieved from First U. S. Army and assigned this Army.

The 65th Medical Group supported the VIII and XII Corps, and the 66th Medical Group supported the XX Corps. The 69th Medical Group, with the additional aid of ambulances from Advance Section, Communications Zone, provided evacuation for Third U. S. Army hospitals.

A grand total of 23,192 patients were evacuated from the Army area during March. Of this number, seventy-five percent were evacuated by road, due to the fact that Third U. S. Army was not operating an air medical evacuation holding unit after 13 March. Nevertheless, 5,698 patients were evacuated by air, and 2,081 were evacuated by rail from the Third U. S. Army medical holding unit during the month.

The 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion operated the Third U. S. Army air/rail medical evacuation holding unit at THIONVILLE (U-88) during the first half of the month. That unit was then alerted to prepare itself for the role of furnishing medical support in the event of chemical attack by the enemy. Both rail and air facilities were utilized during its operational period. The 28th Field Hospital (an Advance Section, Communications Zone unit) replaced the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion at THIONVILLE (U-88) when the latter unit closed on 13 March. The 28th Field Hospital was then closed on 23 March, and one of its platoons was moved to ST WENDEL (Q-99) to care for Allied prisoners of war recovered from the camp at BAUMHOLDER (L-71).

The 7th and 58th Field Hospitals (both Advance Section, Communications Zone units) also operated air/rail medical evacuation holding units in support of Third U. S. Army. The 7th Field Hospital moved to Airfield Y-62 at NIEDERMENDIG (L-69) on 14 March. However, the field could not be used for air medical evacuation until 27 March because of the fact that the field was under observation of the enemy, who was deployed on the east bank of the RHINE River prior to that time. The 58th Field Hospital opened a rail medical evacuation holding unit at PITTELANGE (P-84) on 12 March, where it remained for five days. The unit then moved to TRIER (L-12) to operate an air/rail medical evacuation holding unit for the remainder of the month.

Locations of evacuation agencies of Third U. S. Army during March will be found in Annex XXX to the Medical Section report.

3. Hospitalization

The field hospitals continued to operate in the support of division clearing stations as they had in the past. The 65th Field Hospital was the only exception; this unit functioned as an evacuation hospital. At the end of the month, the attachments of the field hospitals were as follows:

VIII Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
3d Plat, 42d Fld Hosp	1st Plat, 16th Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 30th Fld Hosp
2d Plat, 59th Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 16th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 59th Fld Hosp
1st Plat, 60th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 16th Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 60th Fld Hosp
	1st Plat, 30th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 60th Fld Hosp
	3d Plat, 30th Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 42d Fld Hosp
	1st Plat, 59th Fld Hosp	

Third U. S. Army completed its penetration of the SIEGFRIED LINE; and by the middle of the month had advanced to the RHINE River in that part of its sector north of the MOSELLE River. This rapid advance left the hospitals a considerable distance to the rear of front line operations. To correct this undesirable situation, the 101st and 107th Evacuation Hospitals were established in the vicinity of MAYEN (L-69), where they could give excellent support to both the VIII Corps, operating in the vicinity of KOBLENZ (L-89) and XII Corps, which was changing direction to cross the MOSELLE River for a drive south. At the same time, the 104th and 109th Evacuation Hospitals had moved to TRIER (L-12) to support XX Corps, which was launching an attack toward the East in the sector south of the MOSELLE River. The 69th Field Hospital, functioning as an evacuation hospital, was brought up to SIMMERN (L-85) to support the southward drive of XII Corps; and, subsequently, the 110th, 39th, and 121st Evacuation Hospitals were moved to BAD KREUZNACH (M-03) in rapid succession. This marked the initial operational opening of the 121st Evacuation Hospital, which had become a unit of this Army on 9 March. Meanwhile, the 106th Evacuation Hospital followed up the advance of XX Corps, and moved to ST WENDEL (Q-99). Shortly thereafter, the 32d Evacuation Hospital moved to ALZEY (M-22).

Hospitals were limited to buildings in their choices of new sites until after Third U. S. Army crossed the RHINE River. The assault of the RHINE River by Third U. S. Army was carried out without serious op-

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MEDICAL
AIR EVACUATION
HOLDING UNIT
AT THIONVILLE, FRANCE





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position, and was adequately supported by the hospitals at BAD KREUZNACH (M-09) and at ALZEY (M-22). Immediately following the establishment of a secure bridgehead east of the RHINE, the 109th and 35th Evacuation Hospitals made reconnaissance to the East. The 109th Evacuation Hospital had the distinction, by setting up in the vicinity of HEPPENHEIM (M-55) on 28 March, of being the first Third U. S. Army evacuation hospital to open east of the RHINE River, and it was also the first to go under canvas since the commencement of winter. The 35th Evacuation Hospital opened the next day at Paul Lander Krankenhaus in DARMSTADT (M-64).

The 6th Convalescent Hospital remained at HOMBURG-LES-METZ (B-05) throughout the month. This unit, however, closed on 22 March, pending a move forward. The non-availability of transportation during this time immobilized the hospital, except for the Venereal Disease Section which moved to the site of the 39th Evacuation Hospital in BAD KREUZNACH (M-09), where it opened on 31 March.

For several weeks prior to the first of March, the 6th Convalescent Hospital had been operating at capacity. To alleviate this situation, and prevent patients from leaving the Army area, due to capacity having been reached at the 6th Convalescent Hospital, a provisional convalescent hospital was organized. The Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 436th Medical Battalion, was charged with the operation of the provisional convalescent hospital. Attached to it were: Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 182d Medical Battalion; 2d Platoon, 423d Clearing Company; and the 424th Clearing Company. The hospital was set up at HOMBORF-LES-BAINS (P-90) and opened on 3 March to care for ambulatory convalescent medical cases less neuropsychiatric cases. This unit operated for nineteen days and was closed on 22 March.

For one week during the last half of the month, there were no convalescent hospital facilities available, and convalescent patients were evacuated to Communications Zone. Though this was disadvantageous, it was deemed necessary to empty the 6th Convalescent Hospital and the 436th Medical Battalion (provisional convalescent hospital) which were falling far behind, due to rapid advances of the Army. The latter was able to move and was established at OBERSHEIM (M-35) on 29 March.

The 24th Medical Battalion (provisional hospital) continued to operate at ERCH (P-70), providing care for self-inflicted wound cases who were being retained in the Army area awaiting investigation and/or court-martial. This unit closed on 28 March in preparation for a move eastward.

Locations of Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month of March will be found in Annex XXXI to the Medical Section report.

An analysis of wounded hospitalized in March is given below:

a. Number of wounded admitted to medical installations:

(1) U. S. Army Troops	11072
(2) British Army Troops	22
(3) French Army Troops	37
(4) U. S. Navy and Marine Corps	1
(5) British and French Navy	0
(6) Enemy Forces Personnel	171
(7) Civilians	53
(8) Others	28

Note: All of the following in b through f pertains to U. S. Army troops only.

b. General classification of wounds:

(1) Serious	2891	
(2) Slight	8181	

c. Anatomical classification of wounds:
(Patients with multiple wounds are classified according to most extensive wounds).

	Admissions	Deaths
(1) Wounds other than burns:		
(a) Abdominal	418	85
(b) Thoracic	311	52
(c) Maxillo-facial	443	4
(d) Neurologic		
Head	813	66
Spine	176	7
Nerve	15	0
(e) Extremities		
Upper	2165	4
Lower	3658	70
(f) Buttocks	1053	11
(g) Other	1241	1
Sub-total	10044	277
(2) Burns - all locations	104	4
Total	11072	281
d. Number of patients with multiple wounds	3307	50

e. Classification of wounds by causative agents:

(1) Gunshot wounds (rifle, pistol or machine gun)	2805	80
(2) Shell wounds (MK, flak, mortar or cannon)	6389	171
(3) Bomb wounds (aerial, grenade, booby trap or cannon)	540	18
(4) Blast injuries (bomb, shell or mine)	130	1
(5) Wounds from secondary missiles	113	1
(6) Burns (petrol, flak, flamethrower, phosphorus, etc.)	96	3
(7) Others	707	7
Total	11072	281

f. Number of deaths by primary and secondary causes:

Perf W lt, eye	Hernia of the brain	1
Pen W back	Shock	1
FCC Skull	Herniation of brain	5
Pen W neck	Hemorrhage	1
FCC lt L-S	Hemorrhage	1
FCC lt radius and ulna	Shock	1
Pen W brain	Edema pulmonary	5
IW popliteal artery and vein	Pulmonary embolism	1
Multi flak wounds	DOA	5
Pen W, SFW (MK) abdomen	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	4
Pen W, SFW (MK) abdomen	Perforation of ventral & caval hemorrhage	2
Pen W, SFW (MK) buttocks	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	2
Pen W, SFW (MK) chest	Shock severe, sucking wound, hemorrhage	6
Pen W, SFW (Mine) abdomen	Evisceration; small intestine, hemorrhage	2
Pen W, CSW abdomen	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	14
Pen W, SFW (MK) chest	Shock severe, hemorrhage	6
Crushing W, chest (crushed by truck)	Shock severe, contusion severe	1
Pen W, buttock with entrance into abdomen, lac W's at jejunum and ileum, severe	Shock profound, irreversible	3
Perf W lt anterior chest	Shock severe, irreversible	10
Perf W, abdomen severe	Shock profound, irreversible	5
Lac W, mid buttock, herniation of rectum	Shock severe, irreversible	1
Pen W, sucking, back rt side	Shock severe, irreversible	1
Perf W, lt thorax	Shock severe, irreversible	2
Pen W, left upper abdomen	Shock severe, irreversible	1
Pen W, lt chest, sucking	Pulmonary collapse, consolidation, toxicity dem to liver damage	4
Pen W, rt upper abdomen	Shock severe, irreversible	17
Perf W, abdominal wall, severe	Shock severe, irreversible	1
Perf W, thorax rt severe	Shock severe, irreversible	1
Multi puncture W's of the thighs, perineum & anal region	Shock severe, irreversible	2
Pen W, buttock with abdominal penetration	Shock severe, irreversible	2
Ruptured spleen, severe, lac W of rectum dem to fall	Shock profound, irreversible	1
Extensive Perf W's rt shoulder blast injury, lungs, bilateral severe	Shock severe, irreversible	1
FCC rt humerus, hemathorax, rt side & paralysis spine complete at D2	Shock severe	1
FCC vault of skull, occipital region, severe	Shock	4
Perf W neck through lt arm upper third perf spinal cord at level of about D2 & 3	Shock & hemorrhage	1
FCC skull, orbital & occipital	Shock & hemorrhage	6
[illegible] head with [illegible] injuries	[illegible]	1
Burns, [illegible] face, neck, [illegible] arm, lt hand, rt leg, thigh, lt thigh & perineal region	Shock	1
SFW, left chest	Cerebral anoxemia due to shock, Pulmonary edema	9
IW & FC secondary missile, skull	Intracranial hemorrhage	1
Pen W, CSW lt lumbar region & through abdominal cavity	Perf of liver, diaphragm & intestines	1
Pen W, SW (mortar) abdomen, traumatic amputation of lt arm	Generalized peritonitis	1
Pen W, SW (MK) thighs, legs	Pulmonary congestion & edema. Dilation of rt ventricle of heart	2
Pen W, skull	Shock	7
Pen W, neck	Shock	1
Lac W (Shell) spine	Shock	1
Perf W (Shell) rt arm	Shock	1
Pen W (Shell) both legs	Shock	1
Burns (at shell) face	Shock	2
Perf W, chest with sucking W rt chest, lac lower lobe, rt lung, rt diaphragm	Circulatory collapse	1
Pen W, lt thigh, FCC femur, Pen W lt leg	Shock	2
Pen W, upper lt abdomen & lower lt chest	Shock, hemorrhage & traumatic secondary to injuries	10
Pen W, abdomen, division complete jejunum, lac & contusion sigmoid colon	Circulatory collapse secondary to shock, hemorrhage	6
DOA Pen W, lt leg, FCC lt tibia & fibula, Pen W chest	Shock	1
DOA Perf W xyphoid process of sternum	Shock, hemorrhagic	1
IW jejunal complete with generalized peritonitis		1
Evisceration abdomen	Shock	1
Pen W of back	Congestive heart failure	1
3d degree white phosphorus burns face, chest, hands & arms DOA	Hemorrhage & shock	1
Pen W (MK) abdomen with lac colon	Hemorrhage & shock	1
FCC rt lower leg with impairment blood supply		1
Multi Pen W shell (MK) head, chest, upper and lower extremities	Shock & cerebral edema	3
CSW Pen W lt abdomen	Surgical shock	1
SF Pen W rt abdomen	Peritonitis	1
FCC rt tibia, CSW lt upper abdomen & thorax		1
CSW Pen W lt upper abdomen & kidney lac	Surgical shock	1
Perf W (CSW) abdomen	Lobar pneumonia	1
CSW Pen W abdomen	Shock	1
Shrap W Pen W chest	Shock	2
Shrap W Pen W abdomen	Shock	5
Shrap W Perf W abdomen	Shock	1
Shrap W Perf W chest	Shock	1
Shrap W Perf W flank	Pulmonary embolism	1
Shrap W Perf W abdomen	Uremia	4
Shrap W FCC tibia, fibula	Shock	1
Pen W shell, head	Cerebral edema	5
Perf W shell head	Subdural hemorrhage	2
Traumatic amputation, mine, both legs	Secondary shock severe	2
Pen W (shell) spine	Bronchopneumonia	1
Pen W (shell) chin	Shock, severe DOA	1
Pen W CSW rt chest	Hemothorax, rt	1
[illegible] amputation, mine, [illegible]	Acute dilation of heart	5
[illegible] FCC both legs	Cardiac failure	1
[illegible] FCC [illegible] MK	Irreversible shock	1
[illegible]	Severe asphyxia	5
CSW [illegible]	[illegible]	1
Pen W shell, [illegible]	[illegible] shock	2
Pen W shell, head FC	[illegible] failure	6
Pen W shell rt leg, FC	[illegible]	1
Pen W shell, spine MK	[illegible] secondary	1
Amputation, traumatic thigh	Gangrene, [illegible]	1

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Perf R hip and buttock	Division complete, artery	1
Perf R abdomen	Peritonitis	2
Extensive R s of spine region shoul (WE)	Myelitis	1
Extensive head W/s with brain damage	Cerebral hemorrhage	3
Extensive head W/s with brain damage	Respiratory failure	1
Extensive head W/s with brain damage	Trauma	4
Extensive head W/s	Extensive subdural hemorrhage. Ruptured middle temporal artery	1
Extensive abdominal W/s	Internal hemorrhage	1
Extensive soft tissue facial & chest injuries (plane crash,	Hemothorax, bronchial pleural fistula with subcutaneous emphysema	1
Extensive W/s upper and lower extremities (mine)	Atelectasis (massive left lung), quest effect	1
WE Perf R upper, middle third, perf chest, PC penetrating, soft tissues	Gas gangrene R leg, shock & dysentery	1
WE both feet, ankle joint left ankle, area [illegible] with perforations	Rifle shrapnel wounds	1
Perforating W/s soft tissues	Shock	1
Perf 2/3 upper	Shock	1
Penetrating WE R leg, lt area	Shock	1
P[illegible] middle third tibia & fibula	Shock	1
Perf WE brain	Respiratory paralysis cerebral edema	2
Pen W skull (WE) brain	Blast concussion of brain & lungs shock	1
Chest & Pen W chest & abdomen	Shock	1
P[illegible] (WE) jaw	Shock	1
WE Perf R lt shoulder, severed axillary artery	Gross examination	1
WE Pen W lt hip	Blast injury, lungs	1
WE Perf W rt thigh	Amputation & shock	1

g. Number of transfusions of:

(1) Fresh whole blood	304
(2) Stored blood	1,214
(3) Dry plasma	434
(4) Other blood substitutes (does not include crystalloids)	
Serum albumin	2
Saline	110
Dextrose 5%	153

h. Number of units of penicillin administered: 6,429,912,000

i. Number of amputations:

(1) Upper extremity	115
(2) Lower extremity	144

j. Number of cases showing clinical evidence of gas gangrene:

(1) U. S. Army	18
(2) Other	48

k. Number of wounded evacuated to other hospitals:

(1) U. S. Army	2262
(2) Other	4911

4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

During the early part of the month, there were reports of the possible use of chemical agents by the enemy. To be adequately prepared, the 82d and 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalions were alerted for support of the Army in the event of such attack. The 82d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion closed its provisional hospital for gas injury cases at THIONVILLE (U-668) and the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion ceased its function as an air and rail evacuation holding unit.

For the remainder of March, these battalions were mobilized to close support of the divisions and conducted refresher training for all personnel, as well as checking all equipment for serviceability. Radio equipment was furnished each battalion and the 55th and 94th Medical Groups to facilitate communication. Fortunately, these battalions were not required to perform their primary mission during this period.

As the Army progressed through Germany, more and more German hospitals came under Third U. S. Army control. During the latter part of March, the medical group supporting the particular sector in which a hospital was uncovered assumed control and became responsible for supervision and supply of the installation. It soon became apparent that many more such installations were to be found, and it was deemed advisable to place the responsibility for supervising all German military hospitals on a single medical group. Plans to that end were being made as the month ended.



A Nurse Prepares a Laparotomy Pack with Forceps, Retractors, Scalpels and Hemostats, for the Steriliser

Section I - Professional Services

1. General

There were 11,072 battle casualties during March. Based on total dispositions from all causes among Third U. S. Army personnel, there was a mortality rate of one and two-tenths percent.

2. Surgery

Surgical units were kept close up behind the rapid advance of the Third U. S. Army columns during the month. The problem was made more difficult by a number of major river crossings. However, through the use of surgical trucks and PROCO units attached to the field hospitals, the armored columns were well supported. The distances to evacuation hospitals were greater than had been the rule, but no harm was done, as the non-transportable cases were cared for well forward. Through the proper use of PROCO units, it was felt that the problem of handling the casualties of armored divisions was solved. The armor of the Third U. S. Army moved fast and over great distances, and the commanders of the divisions were well satisfied with the surgical support they were given. The method by which these results were accomplished is as follows:

A field hospital platoon was attached to the armored division. The organic personnel of this platoon was reinforced with two general surgical teams and two shock teams. These surgical teams were furnished with two two-and-one-half-ton trucks with sufficient tentage, instruments, and supplies to function in conjunction with the clearing company of the division. The trucks also carried the surgical personnel; and, as the division moved forward, they went with it. They set up with the clearing station and did the non-transportable cases encountered. The field hospital platoon later moved up and established itself at the same level and took over the job of nursing and caring for these casualties. The PROCO unit was then free to move forward again. The field hospital platoon, in turn, was relieved by a holding unit made up from collecting company personnel. The hospital platoon could move up very quickly to again join the surgical teams. Such moves were possible every few days, and great distances were covered, thus shortening the ambulance haul and lowering the mortality.

In addition to the 11,072 battle casualties from our own troops, there were eight-ten allied wounded and 5,424 of the enemy who received surgical care in Third U. S. Army medical units. In spite of this relatively high number of casualties and the distances involved, the surgical standards of the Army were maintained at their usual high level.

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Dental Clinic with Normal Field Equipment

Operates at an Army Medical

Depot





A Dental Clinic at an Army Medical Depot

uses "Acquired" Equipment

A manuscript, "Dental Supply Shipments," was written by a dental officer of the Base Section, for the Army Surgeon's consideration and remarks. The device, method of construction, and utilized materials contained in Chest Number 60 made possible the proportioning of every ingredient required for every cavity, and large fillings, thus effecting a saving of filling material. The manuscript was forwarded to the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, with a recommendation from Headquarters, Army Dental Surgeon that its publication be considered.

A decreased number of admissions, readmissions, and treatments resulted from the rapid movement of the Army. In that dental officers and their potential patients were following the advance across FRANCE, with no opportunity to give corrective treatments other than those of an emergency nature.

A chart is shown below giving the breakdown of dental treatments for the month of March

Strength Reported	24,[illegible]
Admissions, Routine	[illegible]
Admissions, Emergency	[illegible]
Fillings	2[illegible]
Officers Performing	[illegible]
Enlisted Personnel	[illegible]
Prosthetics	2[illegible]
Dentures	[illegible]
Gingivitis	[illegible]
Alveolitis Treatments	[illegible]
Stomatitis, Vincent's	[illegible]
Stomatitis, Vincent's Treatments	[illegible]

*. Veterinary

Due to lengthening supply lines and shortage of transportation during the month of March, inspections of Class I supplies continued to be relatively low in number. However, no difficulties were encountered with respect to sanitary conditions. The remaining 40 per cent of the various Class I supplies were instructed to receive close attention, and especially was this policy stressed in the case of canned beef.

Thirteen messes and one quartermaster issue were visited during March, and corrective action recommended where indicated.

Two divisions were visited for the purpose of investigating the method of food handling in the division Class I dumps.

6. Personnel

Shortages continued to exist in the appropriate numbers of previous months in Medical Corps, Dental Corps, and Medical Administrative Corps officers. Though constant efforts were made to obtain adequate reinforcements to bring Third U. S. Army units up to full strength, Theater shortages continued to prevent attainment of this end. Approximately fifteen Medical Administrative Corps officers were appointed from the ranks in March. These appointments were effected as the result of applications for transfer to Headquarters Third U. S. Army in January. Further efforts were maintained, and are still in force, to obtain a sufficient number of these applications to effect appointments of second lieutenants, Medical Administrative Corps, of the proper calibre to relieve the entire shortages of Third U. S. Army in this category.

Approximately fifty nurses and a number of surgical and shock teams continued on detached service with the Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month, on loan from general hospitals.

Section 2 - Medical Supply

Despite the fact that March ushered in one of the most active periods from a tactical standpoint, a period in which the problem of long supply lines was developed, definite progress was made toward a better medical supply situation within Third U. S. Army. Improved road conditions, more favorable flying weather, and the increasing mobility of train vehicles all contributed to the receipt of many more tons of medical supplies during the month. Especially was there a marked improvement in the delivery of supplies by air from the Communications Zone. There were approximately 641 long tons of medical supplies received from Communications Zone depots during March, whereas, during the previous month, only 381 long tons were delivered. At this meeting, the Chief of Air Medical Supply from the Chief Surgeon's office visited this headquarters during the month and checked on shipments of medical supplies by air. He left with the Army Surgeon that all future shipments of medical supplies required for

[illegible] Army hospitals from depots in the SOS, Third Army would be utilized [illegible] at Depot [illegible].

The Army Surgeon, Chief of the [illegible] and the Medical Supply Officer attended a conference [illegible] with representatives of the Chief Surgeon's office and Quartermaster. The meeting was called in the interest of [illegible] with regard to the [illegible] of the present depot [illegible] and the [illegible] of the Army. [illegible] was made to [illegible] the [illegible] of the Army [illegible] fewer [illegible] and [illegible] the [illegible] of the Army was [illegible] the [illegible] of the Army [illegible] the [illegible] of the Army [illegible] the [illegible] of the Army

Releases were obtained from the Communications Zone on two dental laboratory trucks, four dental operating trucks, and four surgical operating trucks. Also notification was received from the Chief Surgeon's Office that release had been secured on six M-7 Generator Trailers which would come to Third U. S. Army through Ordnance channels.

One additional anesthesia apparatus, portable, was authorized each evacuation hospital, bringing the total on hand to four in each hospital.

The problem of handling the increasingly large stores of enemy medical supplies uncovered by Third U. S. Army's rapid-moving forces was becoming one of great import.

To deal effectively with the situation, a captured enemy material team was organized, which consisted of one officer and ten enlisted men whose duty it would be to investigate, inventory, and guard all captured German medical supplies. The team was placed on detached service with the captured enemy material platoon, operated by Quartermaster Field Service. As the Army moved deeper into [illegible], a number of large medical supply depots were captured, resulting in the immediate functioning of this valuable addition to the Army Medical Service.

Reproduction of a sketch showing the locations occupied by medical depot companies during January, February and March will be found in Annex XXXII to the Medical Section report.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

With the exception of an increase in the incidence of infectious hepatitis, preventive medicine problems of every category were reduced during the month of March. Rising temperatures, accompanied by a number of sunny days, was one of the factors which contributed in large measure to the decrease in non-effective rates within Third U. S. Army. By the end of the month, however, the incidence of infectious hepatitis, which showed a monthly increase over February of almost three hundred percent, was causing some concern.

2. Venereal Disease Control

As a result of the advance of large numbers of combat troops into GERMANY, where the rules of non-fraternization [illegible], the rate of venereal disease continued [illegible] bringing about an overall reduction in the [illegible] despite the continuing abundance of [illegible] areas outside the army [illegible] of all individual venereal disease reports received, [illegible] one-half of the total [illegible] areas outside the Army area at the [illegible] a subject of venereal disease, or activities [illegible] for March prevailed a relative decrease in the incidence of [illegible] ca. breakdown by weeks of venereal disease is shown in Annex [illegible] to the Medical Section report.

3. Communicable Diseases

Exclusive of the increase in infectious hepatitis, there was a decrease in all communicable diseases. [illegible] disease rates declined from February's rate of thirty-eight per thousand per annum to seventeen, and upper respiratory diseases to [illegible] thirty-two per thousand per annum, as compared to February's 46 cases.

4. Medical Records

There were [illegible] of reports processed during the month. Upon comparing this figure with the [illegible] reports processed during the previous month, it is obvious that there was a considerable [illegible] reduction in admissions of all types.

5. Non-battle Injuries

Cold type trench foot and frostbite injuries, which had previously taken their [illegible], were practically [illegible] during the month of March, as the few cases weather conditions [illegible] necessity of keeping the troops [illegible] freezing temperatures. The [illegible] non-battle injury rate [illegible] per thousand per annum [illegible] for March to maintain a figure which represented thirteen percent of the total direct admissions [illegible] Improved [illegible] conditions, as the result of less rainfall, was a factor in the monthly reduction in non-battle injuries.

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

The 7th Medical Laboratory continued its policy of operating in two sections which were located as follows:

Section I - 1 to 30 March - METZ (U-95);
30 to 31 March - BAD KREUZNACH (M-03)
Section II - LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81)

The combined sections performed 9,168 tests during March as compared with 9,829 for the previous month.

The total work for the month of March is broken down as follows:

BASE LABORATORY SECTIONS	NO. OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Serology	5209	56.8
Bacteriology	1801	19.6
Chemistry	906	9.9
Pathology	208	2.3
Parasitology	195	2.1
Hematology	66	0.7
Sub-total	8483	89.6
MOBILE LABORATORY SECTIONS		
Venereal Disease Section (6th Convalescent Hospital)	1185	13.0
Grand Total	9168	100.0

A breakdown of the above tests by type of unit requesting them during the month of March is shown below:

TYPE OF UNIT	NO. OF UNITS	NO. OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TESTS
Evacuation Hospitals	4	2230	24.3
Convalescent Hospital	1	2626	28.8
Field Hospitals	2	364	3.9
Misc Medical Installations		416	4.5
Misc Tactical Installations		2332	25.5
TOTAL	26	9168	100.0

The total figure of 9,168 marks a decrease of several hundred over, compared with the totals for the two previous months.

7. Sanitation

Improved environmental conditions [illegible] by favorable weather resulted in fewer instances of diseases associated with poor sanitation. [illegible] to [illegible] did not present a problem during the month. Reports of [illegible] were numerically insignificant, as they represented less than thirty cases throughout the entire Army. Rodent [illegible] were effectively dealt with [illegible] and proper use of [illegible]. The most [illegible] was attained in the eradication of [illegible] Liberal issues of DDT powder were effective in the [illegible] and [illegible] of American and allied prisoners of war, displaced persons, [illegible] and refugees of war found in the many camps which had been opened or established during the month.

With the advent of improved sanitation, a noteworthy decrease was registered in the [illegible] diseases. There were only [illegible] cases during the entire [illegible] compared with the twelve [illegible] during the month of February.

The summary of [illegible] for the thirty-one-day period showed the following [illegible] of the [illegible] total of 107 [illegible] and [illegible] diseases with three non-[illegible] cases found in the previous month's total of [illegible].



Medical Technician Heinz awarded the Silver Star Medal

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CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

In April, the medical picture changed from one largely concerned with treatment of battle casualties among our own forces to one of control over captured German hospitals, displaced persons camps, Allied prisoner of war encampments, and the like. In no instance was there time to devote the desired complement of attention to the almost inexcusable things which were uncovered. In all instances there was the desire to accomplish better the tasks which unfolded.

There was confusion. Third U. S. Army, as well as other Armies, was burdened with the two-fold task of carrying on its tactical operations and, at the same time, giving assistance to some of its occupational duties. People were homeless, people were sick. Operations proceeded with such rapidity that it was reminiscent of August, 1944; occupational problems were like hundreds of huge disasters rolled into one. The scope of governmental problems, including such as the treatment of the sick, both Allied and enemy, were the most complex that have been faced, perhaps, in all history; the operational end of the war was a dire necessity. Each problem was huge in itself. The dual role into which this and other Allied Armies were forced was unimaginable.

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

Two Medical Corps officers from the Operations and Training Subsection were transferred to units under that command. This constituted a reduction in personnel for the Medical Section, in conformity with Staff Memorandum Number 75, this headquarters, dated 16 December 1944.

The Army Surgeon was promoted from the rank of Colonel to Brigadier General. The Army Surgeon was evacuated through medical channels, during the month to the Zone of the Interior. Colonel Thomas J. Hartford, Medical Corps, reported for duty as the Army Surgeon.

Also during April, under a directive from Twelfth Army Group, public health activities were placed directly under the Army Surgeon. One Medical Corps officer, one French medical officer, and one enlisted man, formerly with the G-5 Section, were transferred physically to the Medical Section, with a view to attaining a closer degree of coordination and control of such matters.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

The training of officers from Army medical units in the fundamentals of the "Army Education Program - Post Hostilities" was given more emphasis, in view of the apparent certainty that the end of hostilities was approaching. Eight officers attended the Information-Education Course, and one officer attended the Instructor Training Course at the Army Information-Education Staff School in PARIS (S-04).

2. Evacuation

The disintegration of the German defenses was quite evident in April; the advances of the Army were extended and were accordingly at maximum speed. As in the past under similar tactical situations, there was a great strain placed on the evacuation facilities as a result of long ambulance hauls. This handicap, however, was offset to some extent by the simultaneous reduction in the number of casualties. Longer hauls of fewer patients has been the general rule during all fast-moving situations.

By the middle of the month, Third U. S. Army had advanced as far east as it was permitted to go under the then existing tactical plan. Because of past experiences under like conditions, a complete change in the Army's mission and direction came as no great surprise. The new plan called for an attack toward the South and the reputed German redoubt. Though a certain disruption of carefully-laid evacuation and hospitalization plans was unavoidable, the change was accomplished without a great deal of difficulty.

Several evacuation problems arose during the month. Three new armored divisions (the 11th, 14th, and 16th) were assigned to Third U. S. Army. All were short at least sixty percent (60%) of their authorized number of ambulances, and the 66th Medical Group was required to furnish ambulances to these divisions for intra-division evacuation. Since the 66th Medical Group was now evacuating all divisions of the Army, its ambulances were scattered throughout the entire Army area with a maximum effective strength at all points.

Road evacuation accounted for most of the total of 17,312 patients who were sent out of the Army area during the month. Of this number, 11,739 went by ambulance to Advance Section, Communications Zone units. The Advance Section, Communications Zone units which operated evacuation holding units for Third U. S. Army were the same as in previous months. They were the 7th, 28th, and 56th field hospitals.

Air and rail medical evacuation holding units functioned in the customary manner with one exception. Consequent to the overrunning of large areas of Germany, many Allied military personnel were recovered from German prison camps, a great number of whom were sick. The Americans, British, and French required evacuation through normal medical channels. In addition, however, large numbers were not sick, but suffered only from malnutrition. These, too, required evacuation. In two areas, they were evacuated through the Third U. S. Army air medical evacuation holding unit operated by the 54th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion. Located at Airfield #47 in [illegible] (M-47), this unit evacuated 1,496 American and British non-patient military personnel. At [illegible] several more thousands of this type personnel were evacuated by air from that unit. In addition, the 54th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion cleared 2,908 U. S. Army patients through its holding unit.

Third U. S. Army and Advance Section, Communications Zone holding units were located at five airfields during the month. At the end of the month, the 7th Field Hospital was located at M-26, BAD HOMBURG (D-75), the 28th Field Hospital was at M-44, [illegible] (D-81), and the 56th Field Hospital was closed at M-26, BAD HOMBURG (D-75), awaiting a move forward.

There was no rail evacuation from Third U. S. Army holding units during the month of April. However, 519 patients were evacuated from the 45th Medical Battalion (provisional hospital for self-inflicted wound cases) at ESCH (F-70) to the 195th General Hospital in VERDUN (C-29). Seventeen other patients were evacuated directly to a train from the 142th Evacuation Hospital in TRIER (L-12).

The locations of evacuation facilities during the month of April will be found in Annex XXIV to the Medical Section report.

3. Hospitalization

During this period, the field hospitals continued to operate in support of division clearing stations, with the exception of the 65th Field Hospital. This unit was relieved from attachment to the 66th Medical Group and attached to the 44th Medical Group to provide assistance to the latter group in giving necessary care to German military hospitals and Allied prisoner of war hospitals and camps.

On 1 April, a report was received that the First Platoon, 16th Field Hospital, attached to the 4th Armored Division, was ambushed by troops of the SS Heinrich Heydrich Division. Two members of the platoon were wounded, the remainder captured intact. The Commanding Officer, 106th Evacuation Hospital and his Chief of Surgery were accompanying this platoon while on reconnaissance for a new site for the 106th Evacuation Hospital. The Chief of Surgery was killed during the initial shooting. The captured personnel and equipment were removed from the scene at ALSFELD (F-68) to BAD HERSFELD (D-46). In that area were about twenty wounded soldiers from the 4th Armored Division. The platoon was placed in operation at that location by the Germans.

On 2 April, the platoon was recaptured by American troops. While in German hands, the unit had cared for fifty-nine patients, of whom thirty-three were American and twenty-six were German. Losses in equipment included the x-ray truck and equipment, one jeep and most of the personal clothing and equipment.

At the end of the month, the attachments of the field hospitals were as follows:

III Corps	XII Corps
1st Plat, 30th Fld Hosp	4th Plat, 16th Fld Hosp
2d Plat, 44th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 16th Fld Hosp
3d Plat, 44th Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 16th Fld Hosp
2d Plat, 56th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 56th Fld Hosp
XX Corps	**66th Medical Group**
2d Plat, 30th Fld Hosp	65th Fld Hosp
3d Plat, 44th Fld Hosp	
1st Plat, 44th Fld Hosp	
2d Plat, 66th Fld Hosp	
3d Plat, 65th Fld Hosp	

As Third U. S. Army continued its advance into GERMANY, the month of April was characterized by rapid movements of the evacuation hospitals. As always in a rapidly-changing situation, hospitals had difficulty in keeping pace with the advancing troops, thereby necessitating longer ambulance hauls for evacuation. Light casualties, however, removed the necessity of hauling large numbers of patients over long distances, thereby creating a compensating effect upon what would have otherwise proved to be a critical situation.

With the advent of warm spring weather, a policy was adopted which provided that hospitals would set up for operation in the field. This facilitated movement and decreased the time required to open in a new site.

The major difficulty encountered during the period occured toward the middle of the month when Third U. S. Army changed direction and proceeded southward. The subsequent change in Army boundaries left the 11th, 14th, 16th, 107th, 130th, and 121st Evacuation Hospitals in First U. S. Army Zone, with the result that it was necessary for these units to move. The 101st Evacuation Hospital at ENGLMARK (D-42) was just outside the Army area, but the location was considered satisfactory for a short period. Most of the evacuation hospitals were closed, pending movement to the south, and on 20 April, only four hospitals were open, including the 12th Evacuation Hospital at FRANKFURT (M-66), which was operating, generally, as a "station hospital". The 130th and 109th Evacuation Hospitals were open in the new Army area, and the 101st Evacuation Hospital was open just outside the Army area.

The change in Army boundary also resulted in the shift of VIII Corps to First U. S. Army and the assignment of III Corps to Third U. S. Army.

On 25 April, the 95th Evacuation Hospital moved to SCHLIERSEE (D-41); the 94th Evacuation Hospital moved to ROSENHEIM (F-12), while the 107th and 121st Evacuation Hospitals planned to move to bivouac sites in the same vicinity as the 12th Evacuation Hospital. The 104th Evacuation Hospital opened at BAD REICHENHALL (D-32).

The 94th Evacuation Hospital began to move into III Corps Zone, and on 29 April opened at SANKT WOLFGANG (F-84). The 107th Evacuation Hospital moved into III Corps Zone at BERCHTESGADEN (D-17) prior to setting up north of BERCHTESGADEN (D-15).

An unusual incident occurred on 14 April when the 52d Evacuation Hospital was strafed by a single German plane attacking a convoy on the nearby autobahn. One officer of an ambulance platoon, stationed at the hospital, was wounded in the attack.

At the close of the month, another temporary change in boundary left the 95th, 93th, and 110th Evacuation Hospitals in the new First U. S. Army Zone. The 110th Evacuation Hospital closed then, but the other two remained open, pending establishment of First U. S. Army hospitals in the area.

In view of transportation shortages and frequent moves over long distances, the G-4 Transportation Section provided three truck companies, one on each of three separate occasions, for movements of the evacuation hospitals. This represented the largest number of vehicles required during any similar period, in addition to the resources of the various hospitals.

The 6th Convalescent Hospital, which had remained at MOULINS-LES-METZ ([illegible]) throughout March, had been closed since 22 March. Non-availability of transportation immobilized the unit, except for the Venereal Disease Section. On 8 April, the unit was moved by rail to KAUB (K-35), and from there to a field site east of KIRRLACH (K-13), where it opened with 1,000 beds on 16 April. Uninterrupted treatment was administered to 117 patients who moved to the new site, even though a large percentage of the patients were receiving penicillin therapy.

On 21 April, the hospital was closed in preparation for movement southward, the Venereal Disease Section having moved to the 104th Evacuation Hospital at BAD REICHENHALL (D-32), where it opened on 20 April.

Toward the end of the month, reconnaissance was made in the vicinity of [illegible] (D-40); although, due to lack of transportation, the unit was again immobile. However, rail transportation was expected to be available within ten days. There were 400 tons of the unit equipment at MAINZ (M-55) and the same amount at KIRRLACH (K-13), to be moved.

Locations of Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month of April will be found in Annex XXIV to the Medical Section report.

An analysis of wounded hospitalized in April is shown below:

a. [illegible] wounded admitted to medical installations "direct" (i.e., [illegible] transfer):

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Designation	Number
(1) U. S. Army Troops	5446
(2) British Army Troops	215
(3) French Army Troops	14
(4) U. S. Navy and Marine Corps	7
(5) British and French Navy	1
(6) Enemy Forces Personnel	185
(7) Civilians	297
(8) Others	32

Note: All of the following in b through f pertains to U. S. Army troops only.

b. General classification of wounds:

(1) Serious	1291
(2) Slight	1971

c. Anatomical classification of wounds:
(Patients with multiple wounds will be classified according to most extensive wounds).

	Admissions	Deaths
(1) Wounds other than burns		
(a) Abdominal	278	52
(b) Thoracic	471	98
(c) Maxillo-facial	526	2
(d) Neurologic		
Head	295	37
Spine	38	2
Nerves	17	0
(e) Extremities		
Upper	1383	2
Lower	1987	7
(f) Buttocks	212	3
(g) Other	395	7
Sub-total	5581	192
(2) Burns - all locations	66	0
Total	5582	192

d. Number of patients with multiple wounds: 1746 36

e. Classification of wounds by causative agents:

(1) Gunshot wounds (rifle, pistol or machine gun	2486	80
(2) Shell wounds (HE, flak, mortar or cannon)	1912	51
(3) Bomb wounds (aerial, grenade, booby trap or cannon)	259	8
(4) Blast injuries (bomb, shell, or mine)	95	0
(5) Wounds from secondary missiles	68	0
(6) Burns (petrol, flak, flame thrower, phosphorus, etc.)	66	0
(7) Others	696	15
Total	5582	192

f. Number of deaths by primary and secondary causes:

GSW, PC rt leg and lt arm	Terminal shock	1
Internal injuries	DOA	1
PCC skull	Meningitis	1
Perf W lt chest	DOA	1
PC skull	Hemorrhage	1
Poisoning (undetermined type)	Neuritis, optic acute	1
GS wound	Damaged cerebral tissue	1
GS wound	Irreversible shock	4
Shell wounds	Hemorrhage	1
GS wound	DOA	1
GS wound	Peritonitis	1
Shell wounds	Hemorrhage	1
Pen W abdomen	Shock, profound, irreversible	4
Pen W abdomen	Shock, profound, irreversible, sustained	1
Perf W abdomen	Anuria	1
Perf W abdomen	Uremia	1
GSW, perf, severe	Hemorrhage and shock	1
GSW, pen, abdomen	Shock	1
GSW, Pen Severe, lt shoulder with lt humerus & extensive blast injury to both lungs	Extensive blast injury to chest	1
GSW, perf, left midaxillary line 11th rib	Shock, severe	1
PC, HSI, skull	Pulmonary edema & congestion	1
Perf W, GSW (rifle) skull	Herniation of brain & shock	2
Pen W, SFW (HE), abdomen amputation lt leg	Shock	1
Multiple Pen W, bomb W, head, arms	Hemorrhage and shock	1
Perf W, GSW, abdomen	Shock	1
Pen W, GSW, neck	DOA	1
Pen W, SFW, chest & abdomen	Pulmonary edema and congestion	1
Pen W, GSW, chest	DOA	1
MW (shell) face	Shock	1
Perf W (shell) abdomen	Shock	1
Pen W (GSW) scapular area	Shock	1
Pen W (shell) skull	None	2
MW (shell) lumbar region	Hemorrhage and shock	1
Perf W (GSW) buttocks	None	1
Pen W (shell) abdomen	Shock	1
Pen W (shell) skull	Shock	1
Pen W (GSW) buttocks	Shock	1
Pen W, skull, PCC skull with brain injury	Shock and respiratory failure	7
Perf & pen W, chest, multiple with hemorrhage	Traumatic shock	4
Pen W, thigh, perf W, small bowel, urinary bladder, PCC pubis rami-superior and inferior	Peritonitis	1
PCC both lower extremities, PCC skull	Extensive brain damage	1
LW face, PCC maxilla, PCC mandible	Acute dilation of stomach	1
DOA avulsion of rt side of face	Shock and extensive tissue damage	1
Perf W of abdomen	Anuria	1
Pen W of abdomen	Shock	1
Pen W of abdomen	Uremia	1
Pen W of chest	Pneumonia	1
Peritonitis	Shock	1
Perf W of chest	Pulmonary embolism	1
Perf W of abdomen	Irreversible shock	1
Perf W of back	Irreversible shock	1
Perf W of chest	Irreversible shock	1
GSW chest	Shock, hemorrhage	2
SFW Chest	Shock, hemorrhage	2
SFW abdomen	Shock, hemorrhage	3
SFW chest, spinal cord injury	Shock	1
Pen GSW, abdomen with evisceration	Shock	1
Pen W, abdomen, chest, head, both lower extremities with PCC rt ankle	Hemorrhage	1
GSW, pen W, lt chest	Transection of spinal cord	1
SFW, perf W, rt abdomen	Peritonitis	1
GSW, FS rt femur, PCC rt tibia	DOA	1
GSW, perf W, abdomen	Cardio-vascular collapse	1
Pen GSW, abdomen	Shock	2
Lac SFW face	Shock	1
Pen GSW lumbar region	Shock	1
Amputation, traumatic, thigh	Hemorrhage and shock	1
Pen SFW rt buttock	Shock	1
Pen GSW chest	Shock	1
SF, perf W abdomen	Shock	2
GSW perf W abdomen	Shock	1
SF, LW buttock	Shock	1
Internal injuries	DOA	1
Perf W, GSW, abdomen	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W, shell, abdomen	Shock, secondary, severe	1
Perf W, GSW, lt chest	Massive hematoma	1
Perf W, GSW, head	Shock	1
Perf W, GSW, lt thigh	Crush syndrome	1
Pen W, shell, rt shoulder	DOA	1
Fracture, cervical vertebrae	DOA	1
Perf W, GSW, abdomen	Shock, secondary, severe	1
Pen W, shell, chest	Uremic convulsions	1
Pen W, bomb, FB skull	Cardio-vascular collapse	1
Pen W, shell, chest	Pulmonary embolism	1
Pen W, shell, abdomen	Irreversible shock	1
Pen W, shell, abdomen	cardio-respiratory collapse	1
GSW, pen head, HSI	Respiratory failure	1
PCC, skull, GSW	Shock	1
PCC, skull, SW	Shock	1
Pen W, chest, GSW	Hemorrhage	2
Extensive W of head, HE	Hemorrhage	1
Extensive W of abdomen HE	Internal hemorrhage	2
Extensive W of head, bomb	Blast effect	1
Extensive W of abdomen	Massive edema and congestion both lungs; congestive heart failure; generalized congestion of all viscera	1
Pen W, abdomen (2 DOA)	None	4
Perf W, abdomen, GSW	None	1
PCC skull, shell	None	1
Tres amp thighs & lt forearm	Gas gangrene and nephrosis	1
PC skull, mine	Pelvic abscess	1
Perf W, shell (HE) paralysis	Shock, respiratory paralysis	1
Pen gunshot W, abdomen	Peritonitis	1
Rupture of spleen and liver	Hemorrhage	1
Pen gunshot W maxillary region	Hemorrhage	1
Perf gunshot W chest	Hemorrhage	1
Perf gunshot W chest	Pulmonary embolus	1
Fracture, compound, skull	Hemorrhage and shock	1
Fracture, compound, skull	Pneumothorax	1
Fracture, simple, skull	Hemorrhage, cerebral	1
Fracture, compound, skull	Penetrating W lt chest wall with penetrating lung	1
GSW, penetrating, occipital region with PCC skull	Encephalitis & hemorrhage (DOA)	1
Fracture, compound, skull	Hemorrhage and shock	2
Skull, fracture severe	None	1
Lac wounds, multiple	Ileum and colon	1
Pen W, chest (DOA)	Shock	2
Pen W, skull (DOA)	DOA	2
Shock, Pen W, lt thigh and lt arm	DOA	1
Pen thoraco-abdominal W, rt with perf of colon	Shock	1
Pen W, buttock, rectum, bladder	Shock	1
Transection of spinal cord, level 11th thoracic	Uremia	1
Multiple lacerations colon and jejunum	Hemorrhage	1
Lac W, colon, duodenum	None	1

g. Number of transfusions of:

(1) Fresh whole blood	311
(2) Stored blood	5992
(3) Dry plasma	7066
(4) Other blood substitutes (does not include crystalloids)	297

h. Number of units of penicillin administered 3,721,460,000

i. Number of amputations:

(1) Upper extremity	65
(2) Lower extremity	84

j. Number of cases showing clinical evidence of gas gangrene:

(1) U. S. Army	16
(2) Other	12

k. Number of wounded evacuated to other hospitals:

(1) U. S. Army	4710
(2) Other	384

4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

Ever-increasing numbers of German military hospitals were being uncovered during the advance of Third U. S. Army. At the beginning of the month, the mission of supervising and controlling these installations was given to the 66th Medical Group. In addition, the group became responsible for the medical care at all allied prisoner of war camps. The 65th Medical Group assumed responsibility for evacuation of XX Corps, in order to free the 66th Medical Group for its important task.

Because of the large number of German medical installations which were being overrun by the Third U. S. Army, a directive was issued on 11 April, effective 1 April, defining the specific responsibilities of the Army Medical Service in regard to such installations.

Under the terms of this directive, German prisoners of war uncovered on the field of battle were to be treated and evacuated through normal medical channels. In the case of German prisoners of war un-

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





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covered in German military or civilian hospitals, a "stay put" policy was to be followed, the tactical situation permitting. At such time as the latter individuals were ready for discharge from the hospital, evacuation to a prisoner of war enclosure was to be permitted. Consolidation of German patients in military or civilian hospitals was to be accomplished wherever possible, and maximum use of German Medical Department personnel, equipment, and supplies was to be made.

With regard to sick and injured Allied prisoners of war which were being uncovered, the directive established a "stay put" policy, with the exception of United States and British prisoner of war patients, which patients were to be transferred to a U. S. hospital and evacuated normally as rapidly as the chain of evacuation load would permit.

Other instructions contained in the directive referred to the policies to be followed in regard to captured German Medical Department personnel, and specific instructions to the Commanding Officers of the 66th and 69th Medical Groups, which were responsible in the forward and intermediate Army area, respectively.

The job of the 66th Medical Group included responsibility for provision of rations and medical supplies which, where possible, were obtained from captured stocks. Necessary fuel was also provided. The German installations were checked frequently to assure proper sanitation, correct triage of the patients, and evacuation of the well prisoners of war to prisoner of war enclosures. Where the situation permitted, smaller hospitals were closed and the patients transferred to other hospitals with available space. By decreasing the number of installations, better control could be maintained.

During this period, it was established that no German patients in these hospitals would be evacuated out of the Army area; only those German wounded uncovered on the field of battle could be evacuated through normal U. S. Army medical channels. Even these patients were sent to German hospitals if their condition permitted and the hospitals were available.

On 15 April, Advance Section, Communications Zone, assumed responsibility for twenty-two of the nearest German hospitals, and established a Medical Center at BAD NAUHEIM (M-66). Two days later, the 69th Medical Group took over the German hospitals in an intermediate zone between the 66th Medical Group and Advance Section, Communications Zone. A total of twenty-six hospitals were taken over by the 69th Medical Group at that time.

The notorious concentration camp (Camp BUCHENWALD) was uncovered at ETTERSBERG (J-47) during April. Approximately 21,000 persons were in the camp when it was overrun, living under most horrible conditions. The 120th Evacuation Hospital, newly arrived in the Army area, was dispatched on 15 April to this camp to provide medical service for the large number of sick, estimated to be 5,000. This unit, plus a clearing platoon, operated for about ten days until relieved by First U. S. Army units. During this time, the hospital did outstanding work in caring for the sick and improving the sanitation of the camp. The 120th Evacuation Hospital was attached to the 66th Medical Group during this period, which attachment continued throughout the month. At the close of the month, the 120th Evacuation Hospital was moving to the vicinity of CHAM (T-48) to care for a large number of displaced persons there.

On the last day of the month, a camp was overrun at HORSTEL (E-19). This camp was reported to contain approximately 30,000 Allied military personnel, with many thousands of them sick. The 153th Evacuation Hospital, which had recently arrived, was immediately dispatched to MUENSTER (E-24) to take over the situation.

Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

The type of warfare waged during the month of April was definitely reflected in a change in emphasis with the category of professional services rendered. With the uncovering of captured German hospitals, displaced persons camps, and Allied prisoner of war enclosures in large numbers, the medical services, as distinct from the surgical, became of greater relative importance.

2. Surgery

With the crumbling of German resistance, the number of casualties in Third U. S. Army dropped to less than half of the number reported during the previous month. Of a grand total of 5,362 wounded and processed through Army medical installations, 4,071 were minor injuries, leaving only 1,291 seriously wounded cases. There were 152 deaths, and of this number, fifty-three were suffering from abdominal wounds, thirty-eight from thoracic wounds, and thirty-seven from wounds of the head. About one-third of these casualties received multiple wounds.

The character of the fighting is further reflected in the types of casualties, in that, for the first time during this campaign, the number of casualties resulting from small arms fire (rifle, pistol, or machine gun) outnumbered those which were incurred as a result of shell fragments. There was considerable sniping, ambushing along the roads, and road block skirmishes where small arms were employed. Small arms fire accounted for 2,484 casualties and eighty deaths, while, 1,291 casualties and fifty-one deaths resulted from shell fragment wounds. In previous months of this campaign, this ratio had been between three and four casualties from shell fragments to one from small arms fire.

2a Medical Services

General medical problems among Third U. S. Army troops presented little change when compared with those encountered during the previous month. There was an overall ratio of medical admissions to surgical admissions of approximately sixty-five to thirty-five, favoring the latter. Medical admissions were largely composed of the type individuals seen in station hospitals and on daily sick call, there being very few of a type to present distinct and difficult diagnostic problems among U. S. Army personnel. Careful and exhaustive study of the latter cases was required.

The most serious problem confronted by the Medical Service was in the form of scattered outbreaks of typhus fever among Allied prisoners of war and displaced persons. This illness appeared in several camps and increased rapidly until adequate sanitary measures were instituted and all personnel, buildings, and clothing were delouused. Within a very short period after the delousing procedures were instituted and made constant regimen, the incidence of the disease began to wane. In addition, malnutrition was very pronounced among the personnel of these categories. To meet the malnutrition ailedy, small feedings of high caloric and high protein content were given these patients. In these groups also there was a high incidence of open cases of pulmonary tuberculosis, which required expert medical and nursing care and early evacuation to proper hospital facilities. Probably the greatest problem in this group was that of educating the patients in proper sanitation and of preventing them from expectorating wherever they might choose, thereby spreading the disease. As a rule, camps were initially dirty beyond description, and the police and institution of proper and adequate sanitation was time-consuming, as well as difficult. The large numbers of individuals of various nationalities in these camps complicated the problems.

During the month of April, a survey of all field artillery liaison pilots was accomplished to determine those suffering from flight fatigue and to make such recommendations as deemed necessary for the adequate conservation of personnel in this group. It was found that out of 290 pilots, only four were suffering from marked fatigue and fourteen from moderate fatigue. These men were recommended for leaves to rest areas, and it was the opinion of the surveying officers that all would be salvaged. The only recommendations forthcoming from this survey was that pilots receive their yearly examinations at Air Corps dispensaries, and that rest and recreation centers be established in the Army Zone for men in this group so that some degree of rotation could be carried out.

Contagious diseases were not prevalent to any appreciable degree during the period. Scattered cases of diphtheria and mumps made their appearance throughout the command; but, in no instance, was anything approaching an epidemic found in any single organization. There were three diphtheria deaths during the month, all of which were of an extremely virulent type, and which resulted from complications rather than the disease itself.

3. Neuropsychiatry

Rapid advances by troops of Third U. S. Army in the face of light resistance was the prime factor in elevating the morale of combat troops to a degree which was probably unapproached at any time since D-Day, with the possible exception of the period which involved the dash across FRANCE in August.

Records of past performances prove that high morale and low neuropsychiatric casualties go hand in hand, and the relationship between these two factors during April, with its light resistance, rapid advances, and consequent high morale, is emphasized more than ever. Out of a total of 23,431 direct admissions during this period, 706 were diagnosed as neuropsychiatric casualties. This marked an all-time low in Third U. S. Army from a percentage standpoint. Seventy-eight and six-tenths percent (78.6%) of the neuropsychiatric casualties were returned to duty, which left an accumulation during the month of only 151 non-effective neuropsychiatric individuals out of the total direct admissions.

With the low record of neuropsychiatric cases, a relatively new problem arose--that of rendering neuropsychiatric opinions on an increased number of administrative and disciplinary cases. In general, these were admitted from combat units for further neuropsychiatric opinion; and, in many instances, with the request that administrative and disciplinary cases be evacuated through medical channels. There was also an increase in the number suffering from chronic alcoholism. This type of individual was, of necessity, returned to a parent unit for administrative or disciplinary action.

4. Dental

The month of April found the Army Dental Surgeon again faced with the necessity of providing dental service to combat units which had driven far in advance of most units where provision of dental facilities was normally available. The laboratory facilities provided in the two medical depot companies and in most of the evacuation hospitals were rendered ineffective because of their inability to follow closely behind the Army's forward elements. Their mission became that of servicing supply and service echelons behind the combat divisions. The extreme value of the mobile type of prosthetic unit was proved beyond all question, once the lines had become extended beyond the point at which semi-fixed installations were effective. Mobile prosthetic teams were sent forward with the combat divisions to insure that dentures would be constructed or repaired without the necessity for evacuating men from the division area.

In the interest of mobility and economy of transportation, the Army Dental Surgeon directed that evacuation hospitals rid themselves of all heavy dental equipment in excess of the Tables of Basic Allowances, retaining only the items necessary to provide an efficient dental service. Hydraulic chairs, dental cabinets, and units which had been used during the winter months when the hospitals operated in buildings were stored with the medical depot companies, to be held until such time as the hospitals could again function in fixed accommodations. The elimination of this heavy equipment expedited movement without impairing the service rendered in the field.

By 14 April, four dental operative trucks which had been attached to Third U. S. Army were completely equipped and manned so that they could begin operation at their respective corps headquarters to work with the medical clearing companies assigned to corps headquarters. The operative teams worked in conjunction with the mobile prosthetic units which had previously been assigned to the medical clearing companies. It was found that this combination permitted complete preparation of all patients for prosthetic appliances, thus accomplishing a most efficient service. The fourth truck was attached to Headquarters Third U. S. Army (Rear) to provide dental service for personnel of headquarters and attached units. No dental officer is provided for in Tables of Organization to service troops of the Army Rear echelon.

Units which had received captured German field equipment were found, upon inspection, to be employing it to its maximum advantage. Of particular value was the combination electric and foot engine and the electric operating light contained in Chest Number 2. Distribution was made chiefly to evacuation hospitals where generators were available for the employment of electrical equipment.

Interest in the newly devised acrylic anti-concussion device, which had been produced under the direction of the Third U. S. Army Dental Service increased to the point that the Artillery Section, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, submitted a request to the Army Dental Surgeon for information relative to the fabrication, use, and results of this invention.

Statistical information relative to dental treatments in Third U. S. Army for the month of April is shown below:

Strength (Reported)	309947
Admissions, Routine	15277
Admissions, Emergency	1205
Sittings	26273
Officer Personnel	417
Enlisted Personnel	441
Restorations	19087
Dentures	1150
Gingivitis	1100
Gingivitis Treatments	1167
Stomatitis, Vincent's	482
Stomatitis, Vincent's Treatments	580

5. Veterinary

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UNIFORMS WORN BY THIRD U. S. ARMY NURSES















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The absence of rain and the abundance of sunshine during April assisted in the maintaining of excellent sanitation at the Quartermaster Class I Supply Points. Ideal weather conditions made the complete utilization of all stocks possible. The greatest losses were sustained in fruits and vegetables. These losses were attributed partially to the extreme perishability of such items as oranges, potatoes etc., and partially to the fact that the packing and handling procedure was not up to the desired standards.

The captured enemy materiel team was notified of numerous newly discovered stockpiles of captured enemy materiel. Included in these stores were two cold storage plants, well filled. One plant, located at FRANKFURT (M-66), contained considerable quantities of tub butter, cheese, frozen beef, pork, veal, and fowl. The other, uncovered at NUERNBERG (Q-40), was filled with a large supply of frozen beef, pork, canned meat, and frozen vegetables. Some of this food was issued to Army troops, but was made available for feeding prisoners of war and displaced persons, the latter through Military Government.

Other captured stores of less perishable nature, such as canned beef, canned pork, and dried vegetables, were placed under guard by the officer in charge of the captured enemy materiel team. These food supplies were issued to prisoners of war and displaced persons, by order of the Military Government, and were conveyed to and issued from six depots, located at FURTH (Q-30), BAMBERG (Q-24), WUERZBURG (M-53), HEIDENHEIM (M-15), ULM (V-89), and PILSEN (L-84). Condition of the items referred to above was generally good. About thirty percent (30%) of the butter at FRANKFURT (M-66) was very rancid, and was reworked by a local dairy. Fowl in cold storage at NUERNBERG (Q-40) was moldy and very badly dressed, but was not otherwise decomposed.

6. Personnel

As the war approached its close, the situation with respect to availability of Medical Corps officers became more and more untenable. New divisions assigned to Third U. S. Army were invariably ten Medical Corps officers short, new evacuation hospitals were eight Medical Corps officers short, each. Accumulation of a number of new divisions and evacuation hospitals during the month resulted in a shortage of approximately 100 Medical Corps officers throughout the Third U. S. Army. Twenty-five Medical Corps officers were secured from Headquarters European Theater of Operations, to help alleviate the shortage. This was all that could be furnished.

Fortunately, casualties were relatively light. Had it not been for this fact, it is possible that there would have been a serious breakdown in the medical service available. In spite of the handicaps involved, all operations divisions were kept up to full strength in Medical Corps officers.

Previous shortages in Medical Administrative Corps officers were absorbed through completion of appointment as Second Lieutenants of a number of applicants whose applications had been pending since January, 1945.

Section 4 - Medical Supply

The rapid advances of Third U. S. Army during April is amply reflected by the number of moves which were required by the units of the two medical depot companies, which are outlined as follows:

Adv Sec No 2, 32d Medical Depot	- from ST WENDEL (Q-59) to HERSFELD (H-35) on 4 April
Adv Sec No 1, 33d Medical Depot	- from MAYEN (L-69) to KAISERSLAUTERN (L-76) on 9 April
32d Medical Depot	- from ST WENDEL (Q-59) to BIRKENFELD (H-76) on 13 April
Adv Sec No 1, 32d Medical Depot	- from HORSTADT (M-23) to GERA (R-06) on 17 April
32d Medical Depot	- from BIRKENFELD (H-76) to WILDEN (P-12) on 26 April
33d Medical Depot	- from KAISERSLAUTERN (L-76) to FURTH (Q-30) on 30 April
Adv Sec No 2, 33d Medical Depot	- from KAISERSLAUTERN (L-76) to FRANKFURT (M-66) on 5 April

Some difficulty was encountered in obtaining transportation for depot movements. As a result, supply lines were sometimes stretched to distances up to 200 miles or more. With a comparative shortage of available transportation, the delivery of supplies to the Advance Sections of the depot companies became a taxing problem. To add to the handicaps mentioned above, notification was received from the Chief Surgeon's Office that, due to the critical nature of air life, only "battle urgency" supplies would be flown across the RHINE River. In addition, all air lift had to be approved by the Army AC of S, G-4, who in turn was required to set up the air lift with SHAEF. This policy resulted in a decided decrease in tonnage received by air. On the 15th of the month, rail facilities were established across the RHINE, and an allocation of five rail cars per day (approximately eighty tons) was made for medical supplies.

The close support rendered the combat troops in the face of long supply lines and minimum transportation is explained by two factors: first, the advance sections of the depot companies were kept in proximity to the fighting troops; second, the relatively small numbers of casualties sustained by the combat troops resulted in a reduction in medical supply requirements.

Three large German medical depots were uncovered during April at TRIER (R-20), KASSEL (H-30), and LAUTERBACH (H-12), respectively, with a combined stock of approximately 11,000 tons. The largest of these depots, located at TRIER (R-2), carried a stock of approximately 7,000 tons. On 15 April, arrangements were made with Advance Section, Communications Zone whereby they took over all captured medical supplies at FRANKFURT (M-66), WIESBADEN (M-36), HAINSTADT (M-36), DARMSTADT (M-64), and MUNSTER (M-04). Three days later, all other captured medical supplies located in the Army area were released to First U. S. Army, as a result of a change in the Army boundaries.

In order to meet the increasing demand for captured medical supplies by prisoner of war enclosures, displaced persons camps, and German hospitals, it was found necessary to establish captured enemy medical supply dumps. Advance Section Number 2, 33d Medical Depot Company, was assigned the task of operating these dumps, and it followed that supply dumps were opened at FRANKFURT (M-66), LAUTERBACH (H-12), and FURTH (Q-30) during the month. The substitution of captured enemy supplies proved invaluable, in that it conserved Army supplies in large quantities.

At a conference with the Chief of the Supply Section, Office of the Chief Surgeon, it was decided to build up the 33d Medical Depot Company at FURTH (Q-30) with an additional 1,500 tons of medical supplies and have them operate as a Communications Zone medical depot until such time as a Communications Zone depot could move in. Plans were made for shipment of approximately 500 tons of medical supplies by rail to this depot weekly.

At the end of April, the 32d Medical Depot Company was located at WILDEN (P-12) in support of XII Corps, while the 33d Medical Depot Company was at FURTH (Q-30) supporting III and XX Corps. There was an estimated 1,000-ton total of medical supplies in Army depots, with no critical shortages existing.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

Rising temperatures and fair weather were favorable for military operations, and did not increase preventive medicine problems for Third U. S. Army troops. However, the uncovering of thousands of displaced persons camps, Allied prisoner of war camps, and German military and civilian hospitals gave rise to new and multitudinous problems of sanitation, water supply, lice infestation, malnutrition, tuberculosis, scabies, furunculosis, and avitaminosis. The squalor, the inadequate of human misery, and the bestiality of planned Nazi atrocities were appalling and defied adequate description. Over 1,000 cases of typhus fever were discovered in the Third U. S. Army area during the period.

2. Venereal Disease Control

A fast-moving tactical situation is invariably accompanied by a low venereal disease rate, and the month of April, with its "blitz" type warfare, was no exception to the rule. No new prophylactic stations (chemical) were established during the month; however, the supply of chemical and mechanical prophylactic materials was adequate. There were only 362 cases of venereal disease reported within the Army, as compared with 419 for March. Of these, over fifty percent (50%) were contracted in PARIS, BRUSSELS, and the RIVIERIA. Fifty-seven cases of syphilis were reported. A statistical breakdown by weeks on venereal disease is shown in Annex XXXVI to the Medical Section report.

3. Communicable Diseases

There was a moderate decrease in the weekly rate of these diseases among Third U. S. Army troops from the last period, a drop from 473 to 428 per 1,000 per annum. Diarrheal diseases decreased from seventeen to seven, and upper respiratory diseases from ninety-two to fifty-five per 1,000 per annum. Infectious hepatitis, however, rose slightly from eighty-six to 110 cases for the month. Diseases represented fifty-two percent (52%) of the total direct admissions. A weekly breakdown of communicable diseases will be found in Annex XLVI to the Medical Section report.

4. Medical Records

A total of 57,980 reports were processed, a decrease of approximately 4,200 reports, when compared to those of the month of March. The decrease was incident to the decrease in total casualties.

5. Non-battle Injuries

The average weekly rate remained unchanged from the previous period. Non-battle injuries represented eighteen percent (18%) of the total direct admissions for the month.

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

The 7th Medical Laboratory made no deviations from its policy of operating in two sections. Locations during the month of April were as follows:

Section I - 1 to 10 April - BAD KREUZNACH (Q-09)
11 to 30 April - SIEGEN (H-46)

Section II - 1 to 3 April - LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81)
4 to 25 April - FRANKFURT (M-66)
26 to 30 April - LAON (O-50)

The number of tests performed by the two sections continued to drop, and there were only 7,953 completed for this period, as compared with 9,168 for the month of March.

The total work for the month of April is broken down as follows:

BASE LABORATORY SECTIONS	NO OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Serology	4833	60.8
Bacteriology	1088	13.6
Chemistry	242	3.7
Pathology	106	1.3
Hematology	24	0.3
Parasitology	8	0.1
Sub-total	6547	79.8
MOBILE LABORATORY SECTIONS		
Venereal Disease Section (6th Convalescent Hospital)	1606	20.2
GRAND TOTAL	7953	100.0

A breakdown of the above tests by type of unit requesting them during the month of April is shown below:

TYPE OF UNIT	NO OF UNITS	NO OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF ALL TESTS
Evacuation Hospitals	15	3256	40.9
Convalescent Hospital	1	2635	33.1
Field Hospitals	9	134	1.7
Miscellaneous Medical Installations		265	3.3
Miscellaneous Tactical Installations		1663	21.0
TOTAL	25	7953	100.0

7. Sanitation

The prevalence of moderately cool temperatures during the month of April precluded any appreciable visitation by flies and other warm weather insects to the extent that they created a menace to the health or welfare of the troops. Few cases of lice infestation were reported among U. S. troops, and those cases which were reported were adequately dealt with by the proper use of DDT Powder.

The completion of organization of additional facilities and personnel for delousing and disinfestation of the camps of Allied nationals, overrun during the month, was effected and work carried out on an extensive scale. Diarrheal outbreaks were minor, and only three such cases were reported during the month. In no case was any definite causative agent found, but emphasis was continuously placed on the practical aspects of mess sanitation, personal sanitation, and water discipline.

Due to the rapidity of movement and the difficulty of travel to the laboratory, there was a great reduction in the number of water

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

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

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On 6 May, the 67th Evacuation Hospital at HAMELN (D-75) and the 128th Evacuation Hospital were relieved of assignment to First U. S. Army and assigned to Third U. S. Army.

On 8 May, when the war ended, several evacuation hospitals were in the process of making reconnaissance for semi-permanent sites where they might occupy suitable accommodations in the occupation zone of Third U. S. Army. The following hospitals were making reconnaissance in the areas indicated below:

24th Evacuation Hospital	LAUTERHOFF (U-20)
35th Evacuation Hospital	[illegible] (W-43)
36th Evacuation Hospital	[illegible] (Y-84)
101st Evacuation Hospital	[illegible] (Y-15)
110th Evacuation Hospital	PASSAU (S-21)
121st Evacuation Hospital	AMORBURG (Y-97)

The 6th Convalescent Hospital was crossed throughout this period. Reconnaissance was being made for a site in the vicinity of [illegible] (Y-15) which would be a suitable semi-permanent location. Suitable buildings were not available, however. Therefore, the unit prepared to set up in the field in the vicinity of NURNBURG (U-40).

Locations of Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month of May will be found in Annex XXXVIII to the Medical Section report.

An analysis of wounded hospitalized in May is given below:

a. Number of wounded admitted "direct" (i.e., not by transfer):

Designation	Number
(1) U. S. Army Troops	576
(2) British Army Troops	121
(3) French Army Troops	19
(4) U. S. Navy and Marine Corps	4
(5) British and French Navy	0
(6) Enemy Forces Personnel	34
(7) Civilians	149
(8) Others	26

Note: All of the following in b through f pertains to U. S. Army troops only.

b. General classification of wounds:

(1) Serious	182
(2) Slight	394

c. Anatomical classification of wounds:
(Patients with multiple wounds will be classified according to most extensive wounds).

	Admissions	Deaths
(1) Wounds other than burns		
(a) Abdominal	41	7
(b) Thoracic	42	4
(c) Maxillo-facial	23	0
(d) Neurologic		
Head	29	6
Spine	6	0
Nerve	3	0
(e) Extremities		
Upper	123	0
Lower	211	0
(f) Buttocks	17	0
(g) Other	30	0
Sub-total	535	18
(2) Burns - all locations	21	0
Total	556	18

d. Number of patients with multiple wounds 128 7

e. Classification of wounds by causative agents:

(1)	Gunshot wounds (rifle, pistol or machine gun)	265	14
(2)	Shell wounds (HE, flak, mortar or cannon)	182	2
(3)	Bomb wounds (aerial, grenade, booby trap or cannon)	16	1
(4)	Blast injuries (bomb, shell or mine)	10	1
(5)	Wounds from secondary missiles	10	0
(6)	Burns (petrol, flak, flame thrower, phosphorus, etc.)	15	0
(7)	Others	68	0
Total		576	18

f. Number of deaths by primary and secondary causes:

FCC, skull, parietal region, midline, perf W mult, left forearm and left arm. FCC left ulna. Pen W foot. LE amps. GSW		1
Pen W bomb, head, FC	Evulsion of brain	1
Pen W brain, SW (MA)	Cerebral hemorrhage & shock	1
Perf W neck with transection spinal cord - gunshot		1
Perf W, GSW, neck	DOA	1
Perf W, GSW, chest	Shock	1
Pen W of abdomen	Perf W of liver	1
SF Pen W abdomen	Peritonitis, acute, fibropurulent with ex toxemia & terminal pulmonary edema	1
Pen & perf W abdominal cavity, SW	Hemorrhage & shock	2
Pen W thoraco-abdominal GSW	Hemorrhage & shock	1
Pen W chest GS	Hemorrhage & shock	1
Basal skull fracture, MBI GSW	Cerebral hemorrhage extending to spinal cord	1
Pen W chest, SSW	Pulmonary hemorrhage	1
Pen W chest, SSW	DOA	1
GSW, perf sv, abdomen with mult perf of jejunum & ascending colon	Peritonitis & gangrene of abdominal wall	1
GSW, Pen W abdomen	Urinary suppression with uremia	1
No cause listed		1

g. Number of transfusions of:

(1) Fresh whole blood	18
(2) Stored blood	535
(3) Dry plasma	952
(4) Other blood substitutes (do not include crystalloids)	96
Total	1651

h. Number of units of penicillin administered 771,316,000

i. Number of amputations:

(1) Upper extremity	6
(2) Lower extremity	13
Total	19

j. Number of cases showing clinical evidence of gas gangrene:

(1) U. S. Army	1
(2) Other	1

k. Number of wounded evacuated to other hospitals:

(1) U. S. Army	426
(2) Other	105

4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

As in the previous month, the 66th Medical Group had the mission of supervising and controlling all German military hospitals in forward areas and also furnishing medical care for recovered Allied military personnel and displaced persons camps. The 66th Medical Group had the same mission in the intermediate Army area; while, in the rear, Advance Section, Communications Zone had control.

For use in recovered Allied military personnel and displaced persons camps, the 120th, 150th, and 151st Evacuation Hospitals were attached to the 66th Medical Group. The 150th Evacuation Hospital was being assigned to Third U. S. Army from Fifteenth U. S. Army, but some of its personnel and equipment had not arrived. The 120th Evacuation Hospital was operating a hospital for displaced persons at CHAM (Z-69). The 150th Evacuation Hospital at WOOSWING (Z-19) was operating a hospital for recovered Allied military personnel. Camps in that vicinity contained 26,748 Americans, British, and French personnel, as well as an unknown number of Russians and Poles. About 2,000 of these were patients in the hospital. The 151st Evacuation Hospital was operating a displaced persons hospital at MADTHAUSEN (W-08). The five concentration camps for political prisoners in that area contained approximately 16,000 persons, 6,000 of whom were patients.

Other camps uncovered and requiring medical services were located as follows:

LAUTERHOFF (U-20) - 5,500 recovered Allied military personnel, with an unknown number of patients.

NEUBAU (Y-77) - approximately 16,000 persons, with 5,000 sick.

EBENSEE (W-52) - approximately 16,000 persons, with 5,000 in need of medical care.

The 34th Medical Battalion, attached to the 69th Medical Group, continued to operate at its location in BAMBERG (U-24) as a provisional hospital for self-inflicted wound patients.

Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

Battle casualties were comparatively insignificant during the first part of May. In fact, there were only 576 among U. S. Army troops during that period. Of these, 182 were classified as serious and 394 as slight wounds.

2. Surgery

Gunshot wounds predominated during the first eight days of May, as they had tended to do in April. Of the total of 576 wounded, 265 were classified as having received gunshot wounds. Another 182 suffered shell wounds; the remainder were from miscellaneous sources.

The surgical services were not particularly hard pressed by reception of Third U. S. Army casualties. The high quality of the service, however, remained the same.

2a. Medical Services

The early days of May presented problems to the Medical Service which heretofore had not been encountered. Foremost among these problems was the initiation of physical profiles for all personnel. The profile system was something entirely new to all medical officers and required considerable study and interpretation before the actual examinations could be accomplished. The Medical Consultant, in conjunction with the Supply Sub-section, formulated equipment lists for the establishment of a number of Phase IV hospitals for prisoners of war. These hospitals were predicated upon the Table of Equipment for a platoon of a field hospital, with minimum utilization of equipment.

Coordinating with the Artillery Section, arrangements were completed whereby observers in the various liaison squadrons would be examined at XIX Tactical Air Force installations to complete requirements for their return to the Zone of the Interior for pilot training.

3. Neuropsychiatry

The previously established fact that light resistance, favorable weather conditions, and high morale are all contributing factors to a low neuropsychiatric rate was borne out very conclusively during the first eight days of May, with the crumpling of the German Armies facing the combat troops of Third U. S. Army. The all-time low rate for Third U. S. Army of three and three-tenths percent of total admission during the month of April was reduced still further in May to the remarkably low figure of two and two-tenths percent. Out of a total of 5,391 total admissions, 103 were neuropsychiatric, and eighty-eight, or seventy-one and five-tenths percent of the latter number were returned to duty. Throughout the entire operational period from 1 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, inclusive, seven percent (7%) of all admissions were neuropsychiatric, and of these seventy-two and four-tenths percent (72.4%) were returned to duty.

4. Dental

Arrangements were made with the Surgeon, V Corps, to provide prosthetic service to the corps forward units through the assignment of a mobile prosthetic detachment. The Corps Surgeon made provisions for the assignment of this truck and team to the medical clearing company supporting the corps, thereby placing the services within range of all units in the corps area.

The Army Dental Surgeon inspected dental supplies from the Siemens Factory, ERLANGEN (U-41) with the officer in charge of captured medical supplies. Certain items, such as lathes, x-rays, transformers, and lathe chucks, were requisitioned for certain units of Third U. S. Army which required them. All supplies were placed in stock at

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the 5th Medical Depot Company for later use.

5. Veterinary

On 1 May, a month after the [illegible] there were 176 cases of foot and mouth disease in the [illegible] Veterinary Corps officer investigated the outbreak and, upon investigation, found that the disease had been inherited with the livestock. A [illegible] officer was secured at [illegible] and with the assistance of [illegible] began vaccinating the [illegible].

An intensive [illegible] of the [illegible] area of [illegible] for the Quarantine [illegible] for [illegible].

4. Personnel

As is typical in the [illegible] there was a shortage of [illegible] officers throughout the [illegible]. This was [illegible] of both a [illegible] and [illegible]. Numerous requisitions [illegible] for additional officers [illegible] as the [illegible] officers [illegible] the [illegible] officers [illegible] the [illegible] officers [illegible]











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NUMBER OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FORMS PROCESSED

Months	No Forms
August	20637
September	27[illegible]7
October	28075
November	[illegible]830
December	[illegible]62
January	[illegible]33
February	[illegible]72
March	[illegible]795
April	[illegible]290
May (1-8)	[illegible]9
TOTAL	[illegible]008

PERCENTAGE OF DEATHS, ALL CAUSES, TO DISPOSITIONS

Months	Deaths	Dispositions	Percentage
August	573	17199	3.3%
September	564	20228	2.7%
October	161	19370	.8%
November	437	30606	1.4%
December	422	36601	1.2%
January	589	[illegible]893	1.3%
February	339	31886	1.0%
March	621	[illegible]45	1.2%
April	239	21678	1.1%
May (1-8)	[illegible]	5157	.8%
TOTALS	5769	261063	1.2%

NUMBER OF U. S. ARMY PATIENTS RETURNED TO DUTY WITHOUT EVACUATION FROM THE ARMY AREA AS COMPARED TO TOTAL DISPOSITIONS, U. S. ARMY PATIENTS

Month	Returned to Duty	Dispositions	Percentage
August	6493	17199	37.5%
September	9428	20228	46.6%
October	11254	19370	58.1%
November	12623	30606	41.5%
December	13809	36601	37.7%
January	16877	[illegible]893	37.5%
February	16680	31886	52.3%
March	16080	[illegible]45	46.6%
April	8356	21678	38.5%
May (1-8)	[illegible]28	5157	[illegible]7.0%
TOTALS	[illegible]254	261863	43.5%

TOTAL DIRECT ADMISSIONS TO THIRD U. S. ARMY MEDICAL INSTALLATIONS

Month	U. S. Army	U. S. Navy	Allies	Enemy	Civilians	Total
August	26137	8	1549	7051	895	35640
September	27112		1098	2616	509	31366
October	16940		116	322	339	17717
November	36452		56	1964	291	38763
December	33222	1	720	1599	352	35894
January	47609		99	1531	270	49509
February	32189		86	1142	230	33647
March	32066	3	268	5693	847	39077
April	21314	10	1707	1211	587	24859
May (1-8)	3391		462	177	305	7435
TOTALS	278282	22	6211	23556	5225	313606

TONNAGE OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES RECEIVED BY MONTH, BY AIR, TRUCK, AND RAIL FROM THE COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

Month	Air	Rail	Truck	Total
August	50	0	440	490
September	40	75	690	805
October	42	143	115	300
November	39	100	195	334
December	21	320	279	620
January	19	371	241	631
February	69	134	193	396
March	75	14	627	716
April	0	78	455	533
May (1-8)	34	0	0	34
TOTALS	399	1265	3025	4749

APPROXIMATE TONNAGE ISSUED BY MONTH FROM ARMY DEPOTS TO THIRD U. S. ARMY UNITS

August	253 Long Tons
September	520 Long Tons
October	370 Long Tons
November	340 Long Tons
December	36[illegible] Long Tons
January	62[illegible] Long Tons
February	561 Long Tons
March	[illegible]26 Long Tons
April	582 Long Tons
May (1-8)	[illegible]0 Long Tons
TOTAL	[illegible]92 Long Tons

NUMBER OF REQUISITIONS FILLED PER MONTH BY ARMY MEDICAL DEPOTS

August	1964
September	[illegible]15
October	[illegible]04
November	[illegible]170
December	[illegible]24
January	[illegible]74
February	[illegible]43
March	[illegible]30
April	[illegible]217
May (1-8)	[illegible]3
TOTAL	[illegible]774

CAPTURED MEDICAL SUPPLIES - TONNAGE ISSUED PER MONTH TO DEPOT COMPANIES

August	52
September	15
October	47
November	12
December	3
January	4
February	5
March	12
April	500
May (1-8)	370
TOTAL	1020

NUMBER OF TRANSFUSIONS

Type	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	1-8 May
Fresh Whole Blood	334	408	488	396	529	432	366	964	311	18
Stored Whole Blood	3115	3615	1502	[illegible]868	5382	7541	[illegible]834	[illegible]842	2995	555
Dried Plasma	7695	5701	1380	5710	[illegible]84	[illegible]946	6240	7243	[illegible]256	982
Other Blood Substitutes	13	21	0	873	[illegible]41	0	0	0	587	96

TOTAL TRANSFUSIONS

Fresh Whole Blood	[illegible]826
Stored Whole Blood	[illegible]39
Dried Plasma	[illegible]67
Other Blood Substitutes	[illegible]34

NUMBER OF UNITS OF PENICILLIN

Months	Number of Units
August	1,668,636,000
September	3,091,310,000
October	1,[illegible]45,600,000
November	1,[illegible]34,[illegible]20,000
December	3,[illegible]86,221,000
January	5,562,[illegible]46,000
February	4,075,[illegible]60,000
March	6,[illegible]29,912,000
April	3,721,[illegible]60,000
May (1-8)	[illegible]771,416,000
TOTAL	35,[illegible]85,715,000

CASES OF GAS GANGRENE

Month	U. S.	Other
August	75	113
September	73	77
October	16	2
November	48	17
December	59	16
January	40	15
February	79	145
March	38	48
April	16	12
May (1-8)	1	1
TOTALS	[illegible]45	[illegible]47

ANALYSIS OF 92,030 U. S. BATTLE CASUALTIES TREATED IN THIRD U. S. ARMY MEDICAL INSTALLATIONS - 1 AUGUST 1944 to 8 MAY 1945

Anatomical Location	Number Cases	Percent of Total Battle Casualties	Mortality Rate For Each Group
Head and Spine	7332	8.0%	8.9%
Face and Neck	5750	6.2%	.9%
Chest	8082	8.8%	7.8%
Abdomen	[illegible]247	4.6%	15.6%
Buttocks	[illegible]380	4.8%	2.2%
Upper Extremity	23042	25.0%	.5%
Lower Extremity	33268	36.1%	.9%
Total Extremity	56310	61.1%	.7%
Other	[illegible]247	6.5%	1.8%
TOTALS	92030	100.0%	

MORTALITY FROM ALL TYPES OF BATTLE CASUALTIES TREATED IN THIRD U. S. ARMY HOSPITALS FROM 1 AUGUST 1944 -8 MAY 1945 AMOUNTED TO 2.78%

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SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS

Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum

Month	Mean Strength	All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		Old & New Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases		Daily Non-effective Rate	
		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
February (5 Wks)	302056	40846	1406	20818	717	4971	171	15057	518	4454	153	535	18.42	1109	38	6147	0.58
March (4 Wks)	309558	24878	1045	11241	472	3082	129	10555	443	2175	91	398	16.71	404	17	2453	0.28
April (4 Wks)	325544	16881	674	8224	328	3024	129	5433	217	1363	54	354	14.14	161	6	3181	0.35
May (2 Wks)	367896	7385	564	4769	337	1916	135	1300	92	736	50	348	24.59	87	6	1934	0.38
Total 15 Wks Above		90530		45052		13133		32345		8678		1635		1761		13715	
Total 26 Wks		165369		72355		19748		74266		9849		2532		1932		43270	
Total 41 Wks	285973	255359	1135	117407	521	31941	142	106611	473	18547	82	4227	18.75	3593	16	56985	0.69

Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum

Month	Mean Strength	Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Frostbite		Trenchfoot		Psycho-neurosis		Malaria		Epidemic Hepatitis	
		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
February (5 Wks)	302056	2	.07	86	3	14	.48	33	1	1086	37	2600	90	2041	70	3	.10	156	5
March (4 Wks)	309558	2	.08	54	2	16	.67	27	1	37	2	599	25	1219	51	14	.59	342	14
April (4 Wks)	325544	4	.16	43	2	16	.64	25	1	10	.40	47	2	471	19	12	.48	439	18
May (2 Wks)	367895	1	.07	41	3	4	.28	12	.85	6	.42	16	1	97	7	13	.92	134	9
Total (15 Wks Above)		9		224		50		97		1139		3252		3828		42		1071	
Total 26 Wks		33		276		13		32		4863		9283		12114		28		102	
Total 41 Wks	285973	42	.19	500	2	63	.28	129	.57	6002	27	12535	56	15972	71	70	.31	1173	5

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CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

1. Operations

a. Medical Group

(1) Evacuation

(a) There should be a single agency with which the Army Surgeon accomplishes all evacuation and miscellaneous medical service. The headquarters and headquarters detachment, medical group, is an admirable instrument for this purpose. By means of headquarters and headquarters detachments, medical battalions, attached to the medical group headquarters, one per corps, all evacuation can be controlled centrally without administrative difficulty and with greater economy of personnel and ambulances.

(b) In a rapid advance, such as took place in August and September, 1944, it is impossible for Communications Zone to evacuate Army hospitals. Initially, at least, the Army should plan to evacuate its own hospitals to Communications Zone. For this purpose, the medical group headquarters serves admirably to operate such evacuation and provide control by the Surgeon.

(c) A complete kitchen and mess section should be included in the T/C and T/E for the headquarters and headquarters detachment medical group. It is impractical for the medical group headquarters to mess with either a hospital or with one of its attached units. Hospitals are not located where the medical group headquarters must be established in a war of movement. Medical group headquarters messing with an attached unit immediately immobilizes the unit or a part thereof. To meet the demands of the tactical situation, the medical group headquarters, as currently organized, may often find itself with a choice of non-strategic location or a place with nothing to eat. A mess team, "A", T/O and E 8-500 should be added in combat to the headquarters and headquarters detachment, medical group, and also to headquarters and headquarters detachment, medical battalion.

(2) Medical Service for Displaced Persons, Recovered Allied Military Personnel, and Captured Military Hospitals:

(a) Where an advancing Army uncovers huge numbers of political prisoners and displaced persons in concentration camps, Allied prisoners of war, and enemy military hospitals, the Army Medical Service is bound to be severely strained. To provide medical service for these overrun installations, it is necessary to have a single Army agency make early contact and provide the necessary medical service and supervision. Such an agency is the medical group headquarters with the necessary units and hospitals attached to perform the mission. Such a task is too complicated and extensive to be combined with the mission of normal Army evacuation. Thus it is necessary to assign this responsibility alone to a single medical group headquarters when confronted with such a problem.

b. Air Evacuation:

(1) Communications Zone must not be expected in a rapid advance to provide medical evacuation holding units at airfields within reach of Army hospitals. Army must have at least one such unit organized and ready. The capacity must be at least 600, and preferably 1,000 patients. The large capacity is necessary when communications with hospitals are difficult and flying weather uncertain. Under such circumstances, the medical air evacuation holding unit must be provided with surgical facilities such as a field hospital platoon. This will provide for surgical emergencies which arise when patients must of necessity be held longer than desirable, due to bad weather precluding air lift. Surgical emergencies also arise in normal evacuation, i. e., hemorrhage under a cast, etc. Nursing care for certain patients is almost essential even though patients are perfectly transportable, e. g., cord transection cases. A complete ambulance company must be provided for such a holding unit to permit rapid loading of planes. Less than this number of ambulances seriously slows the clearing of patients to planes with resulting delay in clearing runways and loading ramps. Weather and season modify the number of flying hours in the day so that rapid loading of planes becomes a very important factor. It is necessary to have eight-man litter squads available to load planes. Necessary litter bearers should be obtained by attaching the litter bearer platoon of a medical collecting company. There should be a Theater reserve of evacuation aircraft set up which will not be effected by supply and tactical demands such as airborne operations.

(2) The air medical evacuation holding unit must be capable of splitting and sending a part to the most advanced field while the remainder of the unit continues to operate. Throughout the campaign, there was no constant system of communication with agencies from which planes were dispatched. Radio communications between airfield and the dispatching agency in Communications Zone is the only practical method, basing requests on actual patients remaining at the holding unit.

(3) The fundamental lesson of air evacuation, which was learned early in the campaign, is that patients must be transportable, as with any means of evacuation. Flying a patient out of the Army area when he is too sick to travel is lethal rather than life-saving. Under the stress of large numbers of battle casualty admission to hospitals, a very careful check on transportability of each patient must be made prior to his trip to an air medical evacuation holding unit.

c. Medical Collecting Companies:

(1) The Army has no use for the medical collecting company as a whole. This does not mean such a unit should be discontinued; however, until such time as a litter bearer platoon is included in the T/O for the evacuation hospital (SH), the litter bearer platoons of collecting companies should be attached to evacuation hospitals, one per hospital. The company headquarters and the station platoon provide the source of medical officers and technicians necessary for medical holding units for field hospital platoons employed as surgical hospitals at division clearing stations to treat non-transportable patients.

(2) The field hospital platoon was of no continued use to the division after the clearing station displaced forward, since it had to remain with the non-transportable patients on hand. The use of the headquarters and station platoon of a collecting company as a holding unit to retain the non-transportable patients made it possible to free the field hospital platoon for movement with the clearing station for continuous support.

d. Clearing Companies:

(1) In rapidly advancing open warfare with a limited number of Army clearing companies available, it is inexpedient to establish Army clearing stations for Army troops. The distance Army troops must evacuate in such situations to obtain second or third echelon medical service is not great enough to warrant the dispersion of Army medical service. Evacuation hospitals must, on the other hand, be augmented to handle unpredictably large influxes of casualties. This is best accomplished by attaching platoons of clearing companies to the hospitals. The clearing platoon may function as a separate unit in conjunction with the hospital, receiving only slightly wounded and sick. The personnel and equipment of the platoon may, on the other hand, be incorporated in the hospital giving it additional capacity for such cases.

(2) The clearing company, as a unit, proved very valuable in the provision of hospitalization for recaptured Allied prisoner of war enclosures and displaced persons camps. When an airborne division was employed as an infantry division, it was found that the second echelon medical service was inadequate. It was necessary to attach a clearing platoon or clearing company to such a division.

e. Evacuation Hospital (SH):

(1) The 400-bed evacuation hospital is not semi-mobile. Given only the organic equipment, this unit could not move the entire T/O and T/E personnel and equipment with its organic transportation by shuttling the organic transportation in two echelons. It was necessary to augment the T/O and T/E with additional equipment, and additional personnel were also required to handle the load when such a hospital was supporting a division. This was due to the fact that, in a war of movement, approximately half of the available hospitals had to be constantly closed and in movement in order to maintain any close support of combat troops. Thus, an evacuation hospital had to be prepared to expand to at least fifty percent above its rated capacity. The additional transportation required to move such an augmented unit complete at one time was approximately twice its organic motor transport. Only in rare instances was it possible in this type of warfare to depart transportation from the Army G-4. It was discovered that the application of available transportation of other evacuation hospitals, or the medical gas treatment battalion, was the only means by which this type hospital could be moved. An important factor, which had to be considered in regard to the availability of transportation from other hospitals to move one of their number, was the hospital's requirements for normal housekeeping and supply functions. Such necessities as hauling of Class I, II, and III supplies, bodies to Graves Registration Section, shifting of surgical teams to other hospitals, returning patients to duty, motor maintenance, etc. often reduced the availability twenty-five to seventy-five percent. All these transportation requirements involved the factor of distance, which was consistently great. The factor of returning to duty of patients remained a fairly constant one, averaging about twenty percent of admissions. It was found that the difficulties of procuring transport of these cases forced hospitals to use their organic transportation in returning personnel to reinforcement installations.

(2) It was proved conclusively that the T/O authorization of skilled surgical personnel was inadequate to handle either the constant volume of surgery or the peak loads. Hence, it was necessary to provide attached surgical teams which might be shifted from hospital to hospital to cope with the demands. This was met by the use of the auxiliary surgical group. During peak load periods, usually immediately after opening of a hospital as the most forward in a sector, the minimum requirement of such teams was two general surgical and two shock teams.

(3) When faced with the necessity for forward displacement the disposition of non-transportable patients presented a problem, since the hospital had insufficient personnel and equipment to leave behind as a holding unit for a week or more and still carry on at capacity in the forward location. This required the attachment of a platoon of a clearing company as a holding unit. It was necessary to leave little or no organic personnel or equipment with such a unit, particularly if the unit had been attached and was working with the hospital to gain familiarity with the type of patient and required care.

(4) Close contact had to be maintained with the Corps Surgeon when an evacuation hospital made reconnaissance for a new site. The evacuation hospital reconnaissance party had to be sent to the Corps Surgeon to obtain or confirm a suggested location, the aim being to get the evacuation hospital within ten miles or less of the front line in offense. This insured evacuation hospitals being placed well forward within adequate support of divisions. The Army level view could not very often locate an evacuation hospital as far forward as necessary.

f. Field Hospitals:

(1) The field hospital had most value in the employment of individual platoons with each division clearing station giving adequate surgical and nursing care for non-transportable casualties. The early surgical care thus provided saved many which would not have survived the longer trip to an evacuation hospital. Here, as in the evacuation hospital (SH), the unit required augmentation of surgical personnel by surgical teams from the auxiliary surgical group. The minimum number of teams to provide round-the-clock operation was two general surgical and two shock teams.

(2) The field hospital platoon is not a mobile unit, unfortunately, and must be attached to the division which must utilize medical battalion transportation and/or quartermaster truck company transportation to move it. Minimum additional transportation was twelve trucks, 2½-ton. A completely mobile surgical hospital of this general type, but with additional surgical staff, was a necessity for the support of a division. To keep the field hospital with the division clearing station in forward displacement, it was necessary to attach the headquarters and station platoon of a medical collecting company as a holding unit for the post-operative patients. This type of emergency should be provided for in the T/O of such a surgical unit to support the division by a two-platoon organization which would permit leap-frog movement of the platoons or forward displacement of one while the second retained the post-operative cases until they became transportable.

(3) It is absolutely essential that this type unit be trained under tactical or ground force supervision rather than by Army Service Forces to insure field and maneuver training. The field hospitals selected for this operation were trained for operation as station hospital type units and not prepared for field operations.

(4) With field hospital platoons attached to corps and/or divisions, the life-saving value of them was soon apparent. Knowing this, the corps or division kept the field hospital platoon close to division clearing station with no urging on the part of the Army Surgeon. Division Surgeons know better than the Army Surgeon could ever know what his present and future needs are.

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c. Evacuation Hospital (75-bed):

(1) This type unit has little or no place in a field Army in a war of rapid and extreme movement, especially when the axis of advance of the Army is frequently and violently changed. The evacuation hospital (75-bed), as presently organized, has barely sufficient transportation to maintain its own housekeeping. In static or semi-static conditions of warfare, and where casualties are heavy, this unit has distinct advantages and can well be utilized by the field Army.

b. Convalescent Hospital:

(1) The convalescent hospital, large and immobile though it may be, was a highly important institution for an Army when well trained replacements were not available from the rear. The size and amount of transportation required to move the unit required that a site be chosen, and movement thereto initiated, which was as far advanced as the most forward evacuation hospital in a rapid advance. The hospital must be closed prior to the time that the evacuation hospitals were so far distanced as to the extent that the ambulance trip reaches the fifty-mile mark. To allow the convalescent hospital to remain open longer, unnecessarily delayed the forward displacement of a portion of the hospital and hence the remaining. In a rapid advance, it was essential that the hospital be closed prior to attaining full capacity in order that one or more sections of the hospital might displace quickly to a forward site.

(2) Prior to initial opening, arrangements must be made to provide transportation through rail for return of patients to reinforcement installations as soon as the first increment of such patients became ready for discharge. This transportation should be allowed to remain at the hospital throughout its period of operation. Failure of such transportation not only causes the hospital to become quickly filled, due to inability to clear beds for more admissions, but requires the hospital less mobile since it must clear some patients before any section can move.

(3) Shortage of qualified medical personnel for diagnosis of syphilis made it necessary to establish a center for diagnosis and treatment of the disease. This is best located at the convalescent hospital. Here ambulatory or chronic gonorrhea is also treated by specialized personnel. This was expedient to lighten the census of evacuation hospitals and also prevent evacuation of such cases to Communications Zone.

(4) Commanding officers of convalescent companies within the convalescent hospital should be combat veterans of the line, who have been reclassified for such work as the result of physical disability incurred in combat. The type of patient handled in the convalescent hospital, men fresh from combat, demands the leadership of combat trained line officers, rather than non-combat trained medical administrative officers of junior grade. Personnel fresh from the battle field respect the leadership of the latter type of officer.

i. Mail Evacuation:

(1) Mail evacuation is only practical when a medical evacuation holding unit can be established within a short distance, not to exceed five miles, of the rail siding to be used. Sufficient ambulances are not likely to be available for rapid loading if the holding unit is more distant or if trains are loaded directly from several distant hospitals. The holding unit must have a capacity of approximately two hospital trainloads. A lesser capacity inevitably results in overcrowding and repeated interruption of the normal flow of evacuation. Here, as in air evacuation, patients must be carefully screened for transportability before transfer from evacuation hospitals lest the holding unit become clogged with non-transportable cases which it will be obliged to hold. Like the holding unit for air evacuation, surgical facilities must exist.

j. Covered Accommodations:

(1) When weather conditions become sufficiently rigorous to require hospitals such as evacuation hospitals and field hospitals to abandon tentage and occupy buildings, a number of problems arose. The procurement of such accommodations itself became a complicated administrative procedure and one which retarded the prompt opening of the hospital in a new location. To speed up the procurement of the necessary approval by the army authorities, it was imperative that all concerned be thoroughly acquainted with the administrative procedure and a uniform system adopted. The reconnaissance of an evacuation hospital for a building site had to be coordinated directly with the corps in which conducted. It was most expedient to have the reconnaissance party secure the approval of the division controlling the area. Rent, clearance of the site had to be obtained from corps. The final Army approval was then obtained in writing by sending the necessary papers to the surgeon. All this was handled through medical channels, with the surgeon at each level obtaining the clearance from his proper general staff section.

k. Evacuation:

(1) The old concept that the higher echelon will evacuate the lower "on call" proved completely inadequate with open warfare and rapid movement. Communications are the prior and directives too great to permit any such system to work. It is necessary for each echelon of medical service to take the necessary evacuation with the next lower echelon so that a system of constant contact and constant evacuation remains in effect through all operations. It was found that the Army must provide a minimum of ten ambulances for evacuation of infantry division clearing stations at all times. This increased during certain operations to as much as thirty ambulances. An armored division requires an entire ambulance company of thirty ambulances at all times when operational. As soon as a new division enters the Army area, contact must be made by evacuation agencies and more ambulances allowed to remain at division clearing station to cover the lag between initiation of operations and the provision of the full ambulance requirement, which is a function of communications. To wait until the clearing station has received motor ambulances before requesting ambulance evacuation would result in overloading that installation, thereby jeopardizing the patients awaiting evacuation.

(2) This same concept of constant evacuation carried down to the first and second echelon medical service. Collecting not any ambulances were kept at or near battalion aid stations where possible or the next-quarter-ton truck ambulance was used. Litter bearers of the medical detachments were kept available near company CP's and aid stations, rather than waiting for someone to locate the aid stations prior to sending up litter bearers.

(3) When an airborne division was employed with a field Army as an infantry division, it was necessary to attach ambulances from Army for use in second echelon evacuation within the division. The T/O and T/E for such an organization provides only one-quarter-ton, 4 x 4 trucks for this purpose which are unsuitable for winter or for anything but short distance evacuation in fair weather. As many as thirty ambulances may be required in certain situations.

(4) Evacuation of evacuation hospitals or clearing stations by ambulance convoy is obsolete. It is impossible for such installations to commit to remain patients a long enough period to make up ambulance convoys. Patients must be evacuated as rapidly as necessary and as ambulance loads are ready for evacuation.

2. Medical Supply:

a. Pharmacy Section in Medical Depots: During the first part of November, a pharmacy was established at each Army medical depot for compounding, storing, and issuing of a limited number of pharmaceuticals. This service was intended for and made available to units, particularly divisions and small medical detachments who were not authorized either personnel or equipment to prepare such pharmaceuticals. Units obtained these by presenting a prescription, signed by a medical officer, to the pharmacy. A few of the more common preparations stocked were paregoric and bismuth, elexir of terpin hydrate with codeine, Brown's mixture, one percent ephedrine sulfate, tincture of green soap, Whitfield's ointment, and calamine solution. The pharmacy section of the depots proved most popular and beneficial to these units, as can readily be seen by the number of prescriptions filled the first three months; an average of approximately 1,550 prescriptions were filled during the months of November, December, and January.

b. Employment of Advance Sections of Medical Depots: During a fast-moving operation, it was found advantageous to have two and sometimes three advance sections mail forward of the base depot. In this type of warfare, transportation was usually very critical and sufficient trucks were seldom available to move the base depot. Locations of advance sections were always coordinated with the corps headquarters, and continuous liaison was maintained between the Corps Surgeon's office, the depot, and the Medical section of the Army Headquarters. This resulted in the advance sections always being located where they could service the maximum number of troops. When picking out or selecting a site for an advance section, a large enough plane to accommodate the base depot was invariably sought. By so doing, a location was readily available for the base section to move into if the tactical situation demanded.

c. Purchasing and Contracting: A purchasing and contracting section was established at each depot for procuring supplies not available through normal channels, and for payment of civilian personnel hired by hospitals of Third U. S. Army. Each section was made up of one officer and two enlisted men, one of whom could speak the native language fluently. Such needs must be anticipated by having available in the company, personnel familiar with this type of work, and linguists who can perform in this capacity.

d. Prosthetic Dental Laboratories in Medical Depots: A prosthetic dental laboratory and clinic was established at each medical depot. It was found through several months' experience, that a laboratory of this type and mechanism had facilities which would better service Corps and Army troops, than mobile dental laboratory trucks. During the period 29 October to 31 December, 1944, approximately 900 prosthetic jobs were completed, which indicates that this section of the depot performed more work with limited personnel than could have been accomplished under mobile conditions.

e. Captured Supplies: Since a field Army is faced with the problem of collecting, classifying, sorting, and disposing of large quantities of captured enemy material, it was found necessary to organize a captured enemy material platoon, consisting of one officer and fifteen enlisted men. This team investigated, guarded, and evacuated captured medical supplies. In addition, it was later found necessary to set up a captured material section in the depot to take charge of sorting and issuing these supplies to displaced persons camps, prisoner of war enclosures, and captured German hospitals. This proved of great value, in that large amounts of American supplies were conserved by the substitution of this captured material.

f. Maintenance Teams: A maintenance team consisting of one officer and two enlisted men, was attached to each medical depot. These teams visited all hospitals bi-monthly to check the maintenance of equipment and status of supply. In addition, they made minor repairs and instructed the personnel in the units on methods of repair and maintenance of their equipment. First and second echelon preventive maintenance in the units is most important in combat when equipment is used to the maximum and replacements of equipment are not always available. Teams of this nature can help immeasurably in keeping equipment in the hospitals in good condition and at the same time keep the Army Surgeon and the medical depots informed as to spare parts and replacement requirements.

g. Maintenance Factors: Depot stock record cards were prepared, which in addition to indicating amounts received, issued and balance remaining, indicated what were issued and amounts issued to all type units. This, in turn, was compiled in a report which indicated the amount of each item that was issued to each different type of unit over a monthly period. From this report and from items authorized by T/E, T/BA etc., and from the recommendations of the Army Medical Laboratory, Consultant Sub-section and Dental Sub-section, a list of essential items to be stocked in army depots was determined. Therefore, only essential items in required amounts were stocked in depots, which, in turn, rendered these installations much more mobile. Mobility is of extreme importance in this type warfare.

3. Professional Services:

a. Surgery:

(1) Early skilled surgical care of the wounded proved its worth. Close-up support with trained surgical teams working in the platoon of a field hospital at the same level as the division clearing station was a big factor in lowering mortality and morbidity in battle casualties in this campaign.

(2) The best support for armored division casualties was achieved through the use of two surgical teams and two shock teams equipped with a PMCO unit, i. e., (sufficient tentage, surgical instruments, and supplies in two trucks) which could move along with and set up next to the collecto-clearing company of the armored combat command. A field hospital platoon then followed to take over the casualties that had been operated upon and the teams were free to move forward again.

(3) Surgical teams were also found to be of value in bridgeheads, across rivers where the wounded could not be readily evacuated. With troops on the offensive, it was found that definitive surgery could be accomplished by surgical teams much farther forward than previously realized.

(4) Adequate shock therapy, using stored whole blood, was one of the most important factors in lowering mortality and morbidity in battle casualties. Blood plasma was of value as a temporary expedient, but was not a substitute for whole blood.

(5) Shock, if not treated early and vigorously, soon becomes irreversible. Some cases which did not respond readily to shock therapy developed anuria and subsequently died. In a series of casualties which developed anuria, deep shock seemed to be the one outstanding factor. Transfusion reactions seemed to be of no particular importance as a cause of anuria in these cases. Alkalinization was not found to be of value in the prevention or treatment of anuria.

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(6) Injuries to the extremities comprised sixty percent of all battle casualties. These injuries were often very mutilating in character. A policy of extreme conservatism in regard to amputations was followed. Sympathetic blocks were performed routinely in those cases where the blood supply had been interfered with. In the majority of cases, this procedure was not found to be of a great deal of value as often the collateral circulation had also been interrupted by the injury. Sixty-five percent of the amputations were traumatic in type, with mutilation often involving the bone, blood vessels, nerves, and muscles. Fifteen percent of the amputations were due to gas gangrene, and twenty percent to major blood vessel injuries.

(7) The repair of major blood vessels was encountered and various materials for anastomosis, including Blakemore tubes, glass tubing, and plastic tubing, were used. None of these methods were found to be universally applicable in the field. However, the incidence of gangrene was twenty percent less in those cases in which vascular repair was attempted than those in which ligation of the injured vessel was practiced.

(8) Surgical measures such as sympathetic block, sympathectomy or injection of novocaine preparations seemed to be of no particular value and contributed little toward lowering the mortality in cases of cold injuries to the extremities (frostbite and trench foot).

(9) The use of sulfanilamide crystals in battle wounds was found to be of little value and in fact contra-indicated where the drug was being administered by mouth or vein. It was felt that wound healing was delayed in those cases where the crystals were used, in some cases the wounds broke down when activity was resumed, and reactions were not uncommon.

(10) The incidence of infection in wounds was very low. The routine use of penicillin by injection coupled with early adequate debridement is felt to be the most important contributing factors.

b. Medical Services:

(1) Penicillin proved effective in the treatment of certain spirochetal infections; namely, syphilis and leptospiral jaundice (Weil's Disease). While it was known before the onset of the campaign that penicillin was a specific for treatment of syphilis, it was during the campaign that the drug was found to cure Leptospiral Jaundice.

(2) A well established blood bank is essential in treating any large numbers of battle casualties. There is no substitute for fresh whole blood in treating the severe shock seen in the wounds of modern warfare. Blood banks should be near enough to the combat zone, to assure delivery of blood with an expiration date of at least seven and preferably ten days. All units hospitalizing patients should have a small refrigerator, so that fresh blood can be available at all times in the most forward areas.

(3) The treatment of venereal disease, other than acute gonorrhea, is best carried out in the detention section of the convalescent hospital. This centralizes contacts and conserves personnel and supplies.

c. Neuropsychiatry:

(1) All of the measures which can be instituted to prevent neuropsychiatric casualties are command prerogatives. First and foremost, the psychotic, mentally deficient, severe psychoneurotic, epileptic, and those with chronic progressive neurological diseases not only are incapable of fighting, but require the time and interest of others who should be in combat. These are unsatisfactory for any form of military service and should not be retained in service in the interest of manpower conservation. When such individuals reach foreign duty and combat units, they constitute a severe liability in their respective units and on the medical evacuation system.

(2) It is necessary for line officers to exercise judgment in evacuating men through medical channels. Soldiers should not be evacuated unless, to the line officer, the medical aspects are clear and unmistakable and not transient in character. The avoidance of indiscriminate evacuation and the selection of proper treatment on the spot is considered imperative.

(3) Neuropsychiatric casualties which can be returned to duty in a period of twelve hours should not be evacuated from the battalion aid station. Those who can be returned to duty with an additional thirty-six hours of rest and treatment should be handled at the regimental aid station. Only those which require a longer period of treatment should be evacuated to clearing station level.

(4) Because of the nature of their assignment, division neuropsychiatrists are in a position to disseminate pertinent information to officers of the line and act in a consultant capacity to Battalion Surgeons. The division neuropsychiatrists must be provided the transportation which they require. In view of the fact that he personally treats from five to thirty percent of total admissions to the clearing station, it is necessary that an adequate T/O and E be provided. Supplies, personnel, and equipment necessary to the psychiatrist were obtained at the expense of the division clearing company, which has an adequate T/O and E for its own needs, but none for others, including the neuropsychiatrists.

(5) The importance of assigning well trained neuropsychiatrists to the divisions cannot be over-emphasized. Those divisions have such men assigned continually committed a lower neuropsychiatric incidence and a higher return to duty rate than those in which an individual without such training was arbitrarily assigned as neuropsychiatrist.

(6) On becoming operational, several divisions attempted to treat all neuropsychiatric problems at division rear. It was the invariable experience that the more men sent to the rear the more it was necessary to return to the rear. All divisions eventually instituted therapy in forward areas and found that the fewer men sent the smaller the number necessary to evacuate. This was graphically demonstrated particularly in those divisions which first set up an exhaustion center in the division rear and then changed the therapeutic policy to the treating of such patients at battalion aid station level.

(7) It was notable that every effort to prevent trench foot and to provide warm clothing contributed to a low neuropsychiatric incidence.

(8) Armored divisions are so constituted that it was at times difficult and sometimes impossible to handle neuropsychiatric casualties at aid station level. This was particularly true in rapidly moving tactical situations. It was necessary to set up a clearing element in each armored division in which the division neuropsychiatrist could treat all neuropsychiatric casualties evacuated from the aid station. The neuropsychiatric incidence rose in armored divisions when the men felt that their objectives were not essentially armored objectives and when they developed a feeling that they were "break troops" and could therefore be used for the duration without a rest. For every such case among the tankers, there were six in the armored infantry. The rate, prevailed among the tankers on one occasion when it was necessary for them to function as foot troops.

(9) Rumors were found to contribute to peaks in the incidence of neuropsychiatric casualties.

(10) Terrain, climatic conditions, type of enemy opposition, and quality of leadership were all found to influence the neuropsychiatric incidence. Those divisions which rotated units whenever the tactical situation permitted had a lower incidence than those which could not or did not.

(11) It was found that after 120 days of continuous combat, riflemen and particularly key noncommissioned officers, through the process of normal wear and tear began to exhibit loss initiative, lower efficiency, and decreased ability to lead troops into battle. This was even more marked at the end of six months of combat. Several divisions found that only three percent of the riflemen who had been in combat for 180 days still remained in the division. Those who did remain were key men and in general repeatedly decorated. These divisions estimated that half of this group had become useless for combat in the same manner that equipment may be worn out to the extent that it is of no further service. These individuals, although numerically present, represented liabilities.

(12) Although many neuropsychiatric cases to all intents and purposes were well when returned to duty, there was, in many instances, lack of confidence, which returned only after the individual had again engaged in combat. Many of these after return earned awards for heroism, some received battlefield commissions, and a high percentage were promoted.

(13) Soldiers who had been wounded and who had been returned to duty were more apt to become neuropsychiatric casualties when returned to duty than those who had not been wounded, or those who had been wounded and not returned to combat duty because of the severity of the wound.

(14) Neuropsychiatric patients who were ready for return to combat when sent directly to combat, in general, did not recur. Among those retained for several days in replacement areas a high percentage tended to recur.

(15) A divisional increase in neuropsychiatric casualties can usually be traced to one regiment and ordinarily to one battalion. As a rule, the increase occurs in the unit which is experiencing the most severe combat.

(16) [illegible] accede positive command or encouragement, the [illegible] to him without evacuation through medical channels. [illegible] rest, his commanding officer should provide it.

(17) It was found necessary to permit neuropsychiatrists in all echelons to have facilities for the practice of medicine. At division clearing station level the psychiatrist had an opportunity for mutual consultations with other doctors and access to x-ray service in the field hospital platoon assigned to his division. A psychiatrist functioned at each evacuation hospital. As a result, neuropsychiatric casualties did not cross normal channels of evacuation. On leaving the division, they went directly to the nearest evacuation hospitals. Here the neuropsychiatrist was called in consultation on a minimum of five percent of all admissions other than neuropsychiatric. He had at hand every facility for x-ray and laboratory diagnosis and consultation with other specialists. This contributed to more accurate diagnosis and therefore a higher rate of return to duty.

(18) Because of the fairly frequent moves of the evacuation hospitals, and the Army evacuation policy, neuropsychiatric casualties could be retained in the evacuation hospitals an average of six days. At the end of this time, neuropsychiatric cases were found to fall roughly into four groups:

(a) Those which had other medical or surgical conditions and in whom there was little or no evidence of nervous or mental disease.

(b) Those cases which could be returned to duty within the six-day period.

(c) Those who in the opinion of the psychiatrist were incapable of further duty because of psychosis, epilepsy, mental deficiency, severe prolonged psychoneurosis.

(d) Those who could be returned to duty with two or three weeks of additional therapy.

The first group was transferred to other hospital services. The second was returned to duty. The third was evacuated to Communications Zone. If the fourth group had been evacuated out of the Army area, many of the individuals would have been lost if they had been transferred to Communications Zone hospitals. It was found necessary to provide an additional echelon of therapy for this group. Three competent neuropsychiatrists and eighteen trained enlisted men were placed in the convalescent hospital for the practice of good clinical medicine. There were facilities for mutual consultation with other specialists and for x-ray and laboratory diagnosis, as well as intensive individual and group physiotherapy, recreational and occupational therapy and a graded intensive physical training program. Eighty-five percent of this group returned to duty of all types within the Army, and fifty percent to full combat duty.

(19) The necessary echelons of therapy were found to be:

(a) The line.

(b) Battalion aid station.

(c) Regimental aid station.

(d) Division clearing station.

(e) Evacuation hospital.

(f) Convalescent hospital.

d. Dental:

(1) Dental officers assigned to field hospitals have the opportunity to do very little professional work in the combat zone. The T/O of field hospitals should be changed to include only one dental officer assigned to the headquarters of the field hospital. By rotation among the platoons of the hospital, one dental officer can provide dental care for all hospital personnel. Patients are held in field hospitals for too short a time to permit definitive dentistry.

(2) Convalescent hospitals offer the opportunity for establishing large dental installations. Convalescent hospitals move less frequently than evacuation hospitals, hence the dental service is [illegible] periods of time without interruption. The T/O [illegible] include eight dental officers and fourteen en-

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listed technicians to provide operative, surgical, and prosthetic service for patients and out-patients. Experience in the Third U. S. Army proved that this increase in personnel and the augmentation of MD Chests No 61 and 62 is required to eliminate the necessity of holding patients in excess of the normal convalescent period.

(3) The assignment of dental officers to group headquarters (i. e., quartermaster, Engineer, Ordnance, Field Artillery, etc.) proved unsatisfactory. Due to a constant change in the number of battalions assigned to groups, the great distance between battalions and lack of close contact, dental officers assigned to group headquarters were unable to fulfill their mission of providing adequate treatment for the troops of the command. Mobile dental teams, assigned to Army or Corps headquarters would provide more adequate treatment for Corps and Army troops.

(4) Excellent prosthetic facilities may be established in Army medical depots. Army medical depots, because of their location in the Army area, and the necessity for all units to send transportation for supplies, offered the most ideal location for dental prosthetic service. The depots moved with the Army's advance, remaining accessible to combat units. Transportation used for supplies was used also for carrying patients to and from troop areas. Prosthetic facilities can usually be provided from a fixed medical depot for Corps and Army troops, with divisions being serviced by mobile units.

(5) Field units authorized an electric generator should be furnished electrical dental equipment. Field dental dispensary equipment is the electrical appliances (operating lights, dental engines, and sterilizers). It was found that a combination electric and/or foot engine is desirable for use with combat troops. The efficiency of dental service with field units was impaired by the absence of a field operating light as a standard item of equipment.

(6) Infantry division dental officers were best employed with the division medical clearing company during combat. In combat, one dental officer could render emergency dental treatment at the regimental aid station. The second of the two regimental dental officers should operate with the division medical clearing company to do definitive dentistry during combat to action. This employment of dental personnel permits those troops who are not committed to action to receive dental attention.

(7) Experience has shown that a dental surgeon is required on the staff of a Corps Surgeon. The employment of such large numbers of organizations within the army prevents the Army Dental Surgeon from keeping in close contact with, and inspecting, all dental facilities throughout the command. The Army Dental Surgeon could coordinate the dental service much more efficiently if a Corps Dental Surgeon were provided.

(8) A greater number of mobile dental laboratories and operative teams are required in warfare involving rapid movement. It was found that mobile dental units (prosthetic and operative teams) offer the maximum service to forward units. These trucks, when attached to division medical battalions, provide uninterrupted dental care and eliminate the evacuation of troops from divisional areas.

(9) Field Dental Prosthetic Chests, MD No 61 and 62 require supplemental equipment. Additional denture flasks are required since only a limited number of cases can be processed in the three flasks contained in MD Chest No 61. An electric dental lathe is essential to prosthetic dentistry. The hand lathe contained in MD Chest No 62 requires an additional man for operation, thus preventing his employment for other work. A Bunsen, gas-lick, two burner, stove is required for the processing of acrylic dentures.

(10) Replacement troops arrived at combat units from reinforcement depots in need of Class I dental treatment. Many combat hours lost because of the necessity for providing reinforcements with dentures or emergency dental treatment, would have been saved if this work had been done on all troops before assignment to combat units, from reinforcement depots.

e. Veterinary:

(1) During the later phases of the campaign and particularly during the last two months, transportation was at a premium, and it was frequently not possible to secure transportation for all personnel requiring it. Each Veterinary Corps officer should be assigned a car, since his work must be done in the field.

(2) Perishable products, such as fresh eggs, oranges, all fresh vegetables, etc. were, particularly during the winter and during wet periods, in very poor condition upon arrive. in the Army area. Assuming that sound products were purchased, but have deteriorated, they should be re-sorted, or boxed if necessary, before being forwarded to the Army area.

(3) It was frequently necessary to break down the fifty-pound cans of powdered milk, thirty-seven-pound lard cans, and twenty-five or seventy-pound cheeses to smaller units in order to issue them. Under conditions which usually prevail in supply points, this is an insanitary procedure. The products become soiled and wet. Milk, lard, and cheese should be processed into units of not more than ten pounds, except for bakery use.

4. Preventive Medicine:

a. Venereal Disease Control: The venereal disease control program in Third U. S. Army was very satisfactory as evidenced by monthly venereal disease reports. However, certain lessons were learned as follows:

(1) That army chemical prophylactic stations must be established in the larger cities and towns in Army areas, regardless of whether or not the area is liberated or conquered; i. e., where women are, there is venereal disease.

(2) That chemical prophylaxis (Station Pro) is the most effective method for prevention of venereal disease.

(3) That all prophylactic stations must be equipped with accessory material to provide hot water, especially during winter months.

(4) The present-day M packette contains a picric acid compound that irritates and is painful to the urethra and because of this, soldiers do not use them after the first experience.

(5) Much of our venereal ointments have a leucite or wax base which will not spread in cold weather. All ointment bases should be similar to bases of our better cold creams.

(6) Each prophylactic station team should be equipped with a small generator and a two-burner stove for setting up stations in areas where heat and light are not available. Light metal collapsible equipment is necessary for setting up a prophylactic station in any place where needed.

(7) Re-emphasis should be made on cartoons, posters, and training films as a part of the venereal disease control program.

b. Immunizations: Field experience proved that the U. S. Army policies and procedures are without equal in the world today. However, typhus fever immunization should be given in the late fall or early winter rather than at other times of the year. This insures maximum protection during months when troops are apt to be more lousy or come in contact with louse infested civilians.

c. Personal Hygiene: During combat personal hygiene, change of clothing and bathing were always far below Army standards. This was especially true during the winter months. This can be remedied to a great extent by providing ample numbers of one and two burner stoves in forward echelons on the basis of one gas stove (one or two burner) per four officers or men.

d. Food supplies and the nutrition of troops during this period were adequate. Monotony of diet is one of the vicissitudes of war. However, the need for hot drinks (coffee and bouillon) in aid stations must be emphasized. In addition to hot drink, ample supplies of whiskey are needed in aid stations during the winter months for use by patients passing through such installations. A small drink helps to relieve tension, and is useful in combatting shock.

e. Transportation: The Medical Inspector of each division must have transportation twenty-four hours per day to accomplish his job in combat.

f. Sanitary Corps Officers: There is a definite need of Sanitary Corps officers--one per division as Assistant division Medical Inspector, and two per corps as members of the Corps Surgeon's staff. These officers are essential for the handling of sanitary problems, thus relieving the Medical Inspector for medical activities alone.

g. Preventive Medicine and Public Health: Every line officer, regardless of rank, in command of troops should have formal practical education in public health medical problems. The G-5 and Military Government officers of all categories should especially receive adequate instruction in these matters.

h. Trench Foot (cold Type Injuries):

(1) It was self-evident that cold type injuries were preventable in seventy-five to ninety percent of the cases. Prevention depends upon a combination of factors:

(a) Adequate, properly fitting winter clothing.

(b) Adequate, properly fitting foot gear or combination of foot gear (shoepacs, regulation shoes, combat boots, and overshoes).

(c) Adequate, proper sized socks.

(d) Continuous, daily sock exchange to combat troops during the winter months.

(e) Rotation of small and large units of combat troops out of the line at frequent regular intervals to enable warming, drying, and changing of individual soldier's wet shoes and socks. Providing tents, huts, dugouts, etc., wherein these things may be done.

(f) Instruction and training of troops in the early recognition of signs and symptoms preceding injury of tissue due to cold and dampness and the individual precautions necessary to prevent frostbite.

(g) Continued emphasis of the command responsibility for the above items.

(h) Frequent inspections (at least once weekly) of feet and foot gear of the command. Necessary corrective action, insofar as possible, being taken on the spot.

(2) Peaks of cold type injuries occurred in very instances when the tactical situation was most acute - units making river crossings against opposition, units pinned down by fire before fortifications, where both the supply of equipment and the normal disciplinary care was difficult to maintain.

(3) New divisions in combat invariably had higher rates of cold injuries for the first few weeks. This was due to the negligence of ordinary personal hygiene with a lack of understanding of the seriousness of the results.

(4) A way of preventing a breakdown in individual foot care and therefore a mass development of cold injury at such a time, is rotation of small groups (ten to twenty) to rear areas daily for short periods of time to allow change of socks, massage, and other methods of warming the feet.

(5) Trench foot control teams at Army and Division levels are worthwhile and necessary in combat during the winter months.

(6) Recommendations:

(a) That a more thorough comprehensive training program in cold type injury prevention be instituted at all command levels, augmented by the use of actual photographs and training films of the results of cold type injuries to the feet and hands.

(b) That all shoepacs be manufactured with steel arch supports, regular heels and high toes.

(c) That continually increasing emphasis be placed upon the command responsibility for cold type injury prevention.

i. Army Medical Laboratory:

(1) Field laboratory experiences in the European campaigns, 1944-45, have shown certain operational problems which were not anticipated in the T/O and E training manuals. Some of these problems and their improvised solutions are presented below.

(2) The medical laboratory as organized and equipped is limited in the scope and of necessity had to be augmented in personnel and equipment to perform satisfactorily.

(3) Mission:

(a) The general mission of the laboratory is to perform such investigations as will protect the health of the Army, determine the cause of epidemics, and provide such laboratory service to medical installations as will aid in rapid diagnosis, minimize evacuation, and speed up restitution of personnel to duty.

(b) It is not possible to provide research facilities and to perform tests which are of theoretical rather than pre-

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tical value. It is therefore essential that such tests be held to a minimum.

(4) Location and Movement: The immediate problems arising in operation were two: first, to be the laboratory close enough to the medical installations so that it was accessible, and second, to have the laboratory in operation at all times so that the performance of needed tests would not be delayed. This was solved by dividing the laboratory into two sections, each able to perform bacteriology and serology. It was felt that pathology and toxicology could be temporarily closed for movement to new locations without impeding essential operations; so these sections were not duplicated. The sections were located near the center of each flank, one thirty to forty miles in advance of the other. As the front advanced, the rear section was closed and reopened on the new location ahead of the other section. During the period of movement, the open section carried on the entire work for the Army without interruption. This two-section arrangement was possible by adding of extra equipment and clerical personnel. The alternate solution in stable situations was to have the smaller units send their specimens to the evacuation hospitals. The latter, in turn, sent the specimens to the base laboratory, through the medical group carriers. This procedure minimized transportation problems for the units, but produced a delay in getting the specimens to the laboratory and the reports to the units.

(5) Added Technical Procedures:

(a) To expedite closing out of syphilitic registers, a complement fixation technique for spinal fluids was established at one of the sections. There was no provision for this originally; and, as a result, additional equipment, animals, and lyophilized complement had to be provided.

(b) Many accidental deaths and medico-legal cases required toxicological examinations, and, as a result, the chemistry section had to be expanded to meet these needs. This was essential, since in combat areas board actions could not be delayed while awaiting reports from the medical general laboratories. A similar limited service had to be provided for the Criminal Investigation Department, since no other facilities were available. Personnel trained in toxicology and certain minimal equipment should be an integral part of the medical laboratory.

(6) Venereal Disease section: In order to expedite the early diagnosis of syphilis by trained personnel, a department consisting of one officer, two technicians, and one clerk was detailed to the 6th Convalescent Hospital. This group more than justified its existence. Its duties called for doing darkfields (as many as fifty a day) urethral smears, and drawing blood for serology.

(7) Personnel:

(a) Additional clerks were essential to maintain the records and send out the reports. Three additional clerks were added, including one for the venereal disease section.

(b) No provision have been made in the T/E for trained personnel qualified to do medical supply and maintenance work. The highly specialized and complicated apparatus and chemicals required skilled individuals for their classification and maintenance. Often, unless repairs could be made at the laboratory, technical sections would be paralyzed while the equipment was sent to the Medical Depot for repairs, which usually required several weeks. One sergeant and one assistant were assigned to do this work, which also included sterilization and maintenance of generators.

(c) Due to the fact that water outlets were not numerous, central washing facilities were established under the supervision of one man. This was augmented by hiring civilian help to do the actual work.

(d) Mobile sections:

(a) Mobile sections are set up at present under impractical plans. Most investigations can be done by an officer in a one-quarter-ton truck and the specimens sent to the laboratory for technical work.

(b) A different type of mobile section to do routine Kahns, bacteriology, and some clinical pathology is needed for servicing an Army Corps operating separately or at a distance from the Army laboratory, e. g. Anzio Campaign, Kiska Pocket. Here a laboratory truck equipped as a small laboratory would have been of great value. Such trucks were not available, though authorized.

2. Sanitation:

(1) Water supply:

(a) Experience showed conclusively that the Army water purification units, especially operated at the start of combat, were unsatisfactory for producing adequate potable water from the grossly polluted streams encountered. In order to produce potable water, it was necessary to provide additional treatment by coagulation and sedimentation before filtration, and reduce the filter rate of portable units to ten gallons per minute.

(b) At a rate of ten gallons per minute, the filter in the portable water purification unit ceases to be the limiting factor in the production of water. The maximum amount of potable water which could be safely produced in a twenty-four hour operative day is approximately 15,000 gallons, or if of seven gallons during daylight hours (winter). An additional filter unit, or a new filter with increased capacity should be provided.

(c) Training of water unit operators should include more of the basic principles of water treatment and care in the maintenance of pumps and equipment.

(d) Serious operating difficulties were encountered during cold weather. Many temporary expedients were required. Study should be made of practical methods and means of protection and operation of water units during below-freezing weather.

(e) With the use of ammonia-alum as currently practiced a chlorine contact period of at least two hours is considered necessary for disinfection of the water. The normal thirty minute period of chlorine contact has been found insufficient to produce potable water based on bacteriological examination of samples.

(f) Consideration should be given to the use of potassium alum as the coagulant in view of the retarded chlorine forcaster and greater disinfectior value of the residual chlorine content, as measured by the orthotolidin test.

(g) The use of the sodium arsenite-orthotolidin method for determining effective residual chlorine should be considered for adoption in Army water treatment control.

(h) Daily residual chlorine tests of the water supply at the point of consumption (faucets) should be carried out under supervision of unit surgeons and records of the results of such tests maintained.

(i) Halazone tablets are not completely effective in treatment for disinfection of water supplies. Burnoline should be made available for all troops.

(j) All water for military personnel used for drinking and culinary purposes should be obtained from chlorine water points, or, in extreme emergency, treated by boiling or with halazone or hypochlorite ampules.

(2) Mess sanitation:

(a) Greater emphasis on personal and mess sanitation is necessary under climate weather and combat conditions to prevent the all too frequent breakdown in sanitation leading to sporadic and even epidemic diarrheal outbreaks. Responsibility for such is one of command, but can only be carried out by frequent and forceful exercise of the essentials of sanitary practices, even under the rigors of combat.

(b) There are two primary purposes of a mess gear washing line. One is the washing and physical removal of all food materials, and the second is the sterilization of the mess gear. Third U. S. Army has consistently recommended sterilization of mess gear immediately before being served, carried out preferably in boiling water; or, in emergency, in a solution of compound, germicidal rinse. The pre-sterilizing dip at the entrance to the mess serving line is considered the most important single point for carrying out sterilization of mess gear. Army regulations should be amended to require such treatment and an additional immersion type heating unit should be included in T/O and E's for each 200 men or fraction thereof.

(3) Insect and Pest Control:

(a) DDT insecticides, judiciously used, proved effective in treatment and control of insect infestations.

(b) In the delousing and disinfecting of personnel in camps, particularly allied prisoner of war and displaced persons camps, the use of insecticide powder alone was not effective in eradicating lice from the camps. Reinfestations occurred in periods as short as eight days. "House cleaning" and treatment of blankets, bunks, and bedding with a DDT insecticide (liquid) should be included in the delousing program for persons who are not to be immediately evacuated.

(4) In the Army Surgeon's Office, there should be at least two Sanitary Corps officers with wide experience in military sanitation, sanitary engineering, and administrative work relative thereto. Liaison and supervisory functions of the Army Sanitary Engineer should be facilitated in the field while one Sanitary Corps officer devotes most of his time to the large volume of routine work.

5. Public Health:

a. Personnel for the performance of Public Health field operations was not freely available because they were pin-pointed with Civil Affairs/Military Government detachments. There was considerable difficulty of transfer of personnel where the need was greatest, and there was no security in personnel, especially when Army boundaries shifted. The number of Public Health officers were also inadequate.

b. Indigenous medical personnel and facilities were not able to cope with the problem of the care of civilian sick and wounded. The Civil Affairs/Military Government directives were dependent upon local medical services to handle this problem.

c. There was no organic transportation for the use of Public Health officers in their field operations. Transportation was procured only by request from Military Government detachments, who were themselves deficient in transport, or by accompanying other officers on missions, which limited the Public Health officers' activities. Without transportation, Public Health officers' value is almost entirely nullified.

d. A. A. B. basic medical units were too bulky, and breakdown for issue, which was necessary many times, was difficult. They were not well balanced units. Many items included were not desired by civilian health officials. They could not meet the demand of displaced persons camps or small institutions.

e. Public Health personnel should be attached to Army Headquarters in adequate numbers in the form of a Public Health Group, to be deployed when the need arises. They should be attached to the Medical Section for better coordination of all military and civilian problems.

f. Civil Affairs/Military Government planning should have made medical units available by Army for specific purposes of caring for civilian emergencies when the situation warranted it.

g. Adequate organic transportation for Public Health officers with drivers should be available to carry out field operations.

h. Smaller emergency medical units should be provided for distribution to civilian institution and displaced persons camps.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX NO. I

COPY

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

COPY

30 April 1944

TRAINING MEMORANDUM:

NUMBER 17 :

TRAINING OF MEDICAL UNITS

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this memorandum is to furnish a general guide for the training of medical units.

2. OBJECTIVE: The objective of the training in the United Kingdom is to insure that all medical units can efficiently perform their primary missions in combat.

3. SCOPE: Further training should perfect the technical training of individuals and perfect the functioning of the unit in the field. Unit commanders should conduct frequent training inspections to determine which subjects require emphasis in training. Practical application will be emphasized; lectures will be reduced to a necessary minimum.

a. All medical personnel will receive training in the following subjects as directed by Hq, ETOUSA:

(1) Mines, Minefields, and Booby Traps. (Trg Memo No 2, Hq ETOUSA, 10 Jan 44 and Trg Memo No 5, Hq TUSA, 21 Apr 44)

(2) Camouflage Training. (Trg Memo 25, Hq ETOUSA, 7 Aug 43)

(3) Defense against chemicals in combat. (Trg Memo No 42, Hq ETOUSA, 23 Dec 43)

(4) Bomb Reconnaissance. (Trg Memo 43, Hq ETOUSA, 23 Dec 43)

(5) Aircraft Recognition Training. (Trg Memo 44, Hq ETOUSA, 29 Dec 43)

b. In addition, training in the following subjects will be included as required:

(1) Physical Conditioning: To develop and maintain the individual's ability to participate in combat.

(2) Discipline: Develop alertness, neatness, and courtesy.

(3) Technical Training: Perfect the technical proficiency of each enlisted man. Wherever possible at least two (2) replacements should be trained for each technical assignment.

(4) Tactical Training: Each unit will set up its complete equipment in the field at least once each week, except evacuation, convalescent and field hospitals, which will set up in the field at least twice each month.

(5) Night Training: At least one (1) night per week will be devoted to night training.

(6) Treatment of Gas Casualties: All personnel will be thoroughly trained in the recognition and treatment of the various types of chemical casualties (Reference OCS ETOUSA, Med Bul No. 17, 15 Mar 44).

(7) First Aid: All personnel will be proficient in rendering first aid treatment to all types of casualties.

(8) Map and Aerial Photograph Reading: All personnel will be proficient in map reading, in the use of the compass and in the use of foreign maps. Application in the field will be emphasized.

(9) Defense Against Mechanized Attack: Identification of friendly and hostile mechanized vehicles and passive protective measures should be stressed.

(10) Defense Against Air and Parachute Attack: Personnel should know the defensive measures which can be used by Medical Department troops.

c. Training will be conducted whenever possible, in the form of field exercises under tactical conditions. Prevailing weather will not alter these field exercises

4. TRAINING AREAS: Training areas may be obtained as outlined in Training Memorandum 11, Hq ETOUSA, 10 Apr 44. Units having difficulty obtaining training areas will notify this headquarters.

5. REPORTS: Formal training reports will not be submitted. Each Army medical unit (except detachments) will forward one (1) copy of each master program to this headquarters. Weekly training programs will not be submitted.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ R. W. HARTMAN
R. W. HARTMAN,
Lt. Col., A. G. D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

ANNEX NO. II

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 23 March Through 7 July 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate per 1000 Per Annum: All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases		Daily Non-Effective Rate	
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 Wk ending 31 Mar 44	81972	786	643	676	567	90	76	0	0	288	248	14	11.78	3	3	7825	18.04
2 Wk ending 7 Apr 44	65475	752	599	681	541	71	56	0	0	360	286	14	11.12	55	44	8017	17.49
3 Wk ending 14 Apr 44	75581	843	580	751	517	92	63	0	0	308	212	16	11.01	5	3	8388	15.81
4 Wk ending 21 Apr 44	161524	1516	485	1319	422	197	63	0	0	482	154	26	8.32	11	4	14700	15.00
5 Wk ending 28 Apr 44	157818	1538	507	1310	432	228	75	0	0	390	129	37	12.19	10	3	14459	15.09
6 Wk ending 5 May 44	173290	1598	480	1290	389	308	92	0	0	448	134	41	12.30	12	4	14957	12.33
7 Wk ending 12 May 44	162780	1680	538	1404	449	276	88	0	0	445	142	52	16.61	7	2	16804	14.22
8 Wk ending 19 May 44	167542	1535	476	1219	378	316	98	0	0	374	116	44	15.66	10	3	15825	13.49
9 Wk ending 26 May 44	166279	1430	447	1199	375	231	72	0	0	366	114	61	19.08	7	2	15363	13.80
10 Wk ending 2 Jun 44	193031	1560	420	1283	345	277	75	0	0	350	94	81	21.79	5	1	16188	11.98
11 Wk ending 9 Jun 44	177833	1474	417	1157	339	267	78	0	0	307	90	91	26.63	19	6	14905	11.99
12 Wk ending 16 Jun 44	162879	1318	420	1002	320	316	101	0	0	231	74	101	32.22	60	19	11627	10.21
13 Wk ending 23 Jun 44	167696	1173	364	914	283	259	80	0	0	216	67	60	18.60	6	2	11413	9.72
14 Wk ending 30 Jun 44	156639	930	311	743	248	187	62	0	0	158	53	55	18.37	15	5	10397	9.54
15 Wk ending 7 Jul 44	136053	533	204	405	155	128	49	0	0	76	29	31	11.84	1	.38	6363	8.68
Average for period	138364	1239	458	1023	384	216	75	0	0	319	129	68	16.49	15	6.76	12440	12.72

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 23 March Through 7 July 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum: Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles all types		Mumps		Scarlet Fever		Typhus Fever		Psycho-neurosis		Malaria		Epidemic Hepatitis	
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 Wk ending 31 Mar 44	61972	9	8	8	7	7	6	36	30	0	0	0	0			3	3	0	0
2 Wk ending 7 Apr 44	65475	1	1	10	8	13	10	18	14	0	0	0	0			2	2	0	0
3 Wk ending 14 Apr 44	75581	2	1	9	6	8	6	24	17	1	1	0	0			2	1	0	0
4 Wk ending 21 Apr 44	161524	1	0	7	2	39	12	29	9	2	1	0	0			5	2	1	0
5 Wk ending 28 Apr 44	157816	7	2	7	2	37	12	20	7	0	0	0	0			2	1	0	0
6 Wk ending 5 May 44	173290	4	1	0	0	24	7	28	8	1	0	0	0	11	3	2	1	0	0
7 Wk ending 12 May 44	162780	2	1	10	3	19	6	38	12	5	1	0	0	4	1	0	0	0	0
8 Wk ending 19 May 44	167542	1	0.3	5	2	11	3	22	7	0	0	0	0	11	3	1	0.3	0	0
9 Wk ending 26 May 44	166279	2	1	9	3	15	5	8	3	0	0	0	0	12	4	0	0	0	0
10 Wk ending 2 Jun 44	193031	1	.27	12	3	9	2	10	3	1	.27	0	0	6	2	9	2	4	1
11 Wk ending 9 Jun 44	177663	2	1	4	1	7	2	32	9	2	1	0	0	13	4	6	2	3	1
12 Wk ending 16 Jun 44	162879	1	.32	1	.32	4	1	14	4	0	0	0	0	6	2	0	0	2	1
13 Wk ending 23 Jun 44	167696	3	1	6	2	2	1	6	2	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	4	1
14 Wk ending 30 Jun 44	156639	1	.32	1	.32	8	3	11	4	1	.32	0	0	6	2	1	.32	3	1
15 Wk ending 7 Jul 44	136053	0	0	0	0	7	3	1	.38	1	.38	0	0	8	3	0	0	4	2
Average for period	138364	3	1.19	6	2.64	11	5	19	8.63	1	.33	0	0	5	2	2	.95	1	1

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ANNEX NO. III

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 14 July Through 28 July 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate per 1000 Per Annum														Daily Non-Effective Rate	
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases			
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 Wk ending 14 Jul 44	101749	521	267	413	215	108	55	0	0	107	55	25	13.05	5	3	3109	4.31
2 Wk ending 21 Jul 44	73107	333	237	256	182	77	55	0	0	44	31	25	17.78	37	26	2517	4.92
3 Wk ending 28 Jul 44	112941	523	241	380	175	143	66	0	0	70	32	49	22.54	7	3	3044	3.85
Average for period	95932	459	248	350	190	109	59	0	0	72	38	34	18.06	16	10	3556	5.33

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 14 July Through 28 July 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate per 1000 Per Annum														Epidemic Hepatitis	
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles all types		Mumps		Scarlet Fever		Typhus Fever		Psycho-neurosis		Malaria			
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 Wk ending 14 Jul 44	101749	1	1	3	2	2	1	6	3	0	0	0	0	6	3	1	1	2	1
2 Wk ending 21 Jul 44	73107	1	1	0	0	2	1	4	3	0	0	0	0	6	4	0	0	2	1
3 Wk ending 28 Jul 44	112941	1	.46	0	0	1	.46	1	.46	0	0	0	0	7	3	0	0	3	1
Average for period	95932	1	1	1	1	2	1	4	2	0	0	0	0	6	3	0	0	2	1

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ANNEX NO III

THIRD U.S. ARMY EVACUATION AGENCIES

AUGUST 1944

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

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THIRD U.S. ARMY HOSPITALIZATION

AUGUST 1944



Map IV

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

ANNEX NO. VI

ANNEX NO VII



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ANNEX NO. VIII

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 4 Aug Through 1 Sep 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum: All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases		Daily Non-Effective Rate	
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 Wk ending 4 Aug 44	119978	691	299	558	112	221	96	212	92	38	16	28	12.12	4	2	2373	2.83
2 Wk ending 11 Aug 44	263777	6117	1205	1337	264	714	141	4066	801	97	19	15	2.96	19	4	1677	1.02
3 Wk ending 18 Aug 44	251438	3804	784	1366	280	603	124	2135	440	53	11	19	3.91	21	4	1217	0.69
4 Wk ending 25 Aug 44	293552	3941	698	1101	195	565	100	2275	403	81	14	19	3.36	37	7	1186	0.58
5 Wk ending 1 Sep 44	312239	5793	962	1509	250	623	103	3661	608	81	13	43	7.14	35	6	1324	0.61
Average for period	248196	4060	789	1054	208	545	110	2469	456	70	14	24	5.89	23	5	1595	1.15

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 4 Aug Through 1 Sep 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum: Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles all types		Mumps		Scarlet Fever		Typhus Fever		Dysentery all types		Malaria		Epidemic Hepatitis	
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 Wk ending 4 Aug 44	119978	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	.43	0	0	0	0	32	14	0	0	3	1.0
2 Wk ending 11 Aug 44	263777	1	2	0	0	0	0	3	1.00	0	0	0	0	331	65	3	1	1	.20
3 Wk ending 18 Aug 44	251438	0	0	2	.41	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	138	28	0	0	2	.41
4 Wk ending 25 Aug 44	293552	0	0	2	.35	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	180	32	3	1	3	1.0
5 Wk ending 1 Sep 44	312239	0	0	2	.33	0	0	2	.33	0	0	0	0	459	76	1	0.17	1	.17
Average for period	248196	.2	.04	1.2	.21	0	0	1.2	.35	0	0	0	0	228	43	1.4	.43	2	.56

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ANNEX NO II

THIRD U.S. ARMY EVACUATION AGENCIES

SEPTEMBER 1944



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

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ANNEX NO. XI

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 8 Sep Through 29 Sep 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Daily Non-Effective Rate	
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases			
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 Wk ending 8 Sep 44	339779	4585	697	1671	254	562	85	2352	358	96	15	58	8.82	49	7	1467	0.62
2 Wk ending 15 Sep 44	223004	5416	1262	1639	382	482	112	3295	768	85	20	67	15.61	23	5	974	0.62
3 Wk ending 22 Sep 44	255785	6282	1316	2575	523	576	117	3351	676	163	33	135	27.00	53	11	1906	0.84
4 Wk ending 29 Sep 44	258475	5358	1077	2173	437	580	117	2605	524	201	40	162	32.56	35	7	1910	1.06
Average for Period	269510	5460	1088	2015	399	550	108	2896	582	136	27	105	21.00	40	8	1464	0.79

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 8 Sep Through 29 Sep 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum																Epidemic Hepatitis	
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Scarlet Fever		Typhus Fever		Psycho-neurosis		Malaria			
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 Wk ending 8 Sep 44	339779	0	0	3	.46	0	0	1	.15	0	0	0	0	275	42	1	.15	1	.15
2 Wk ending 15 Sep 44	223004	1	.2	6	1	0	0	2	.47	0	0	0	0	294	129	1	.23	2	.47
3 Wk ending 22 Sep 44	255785	4	1	3	1	0	0	1	.20	0	0	0	0	266	119	3	1	1	.20
4 Wk ending 29 Sep 44	258475	2	.40	8	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	309	108	3	1	3	1
Average for Period	269510	4	.85	5	1.12	0	0	1	.21	0	0	0	0	477	97	2	.60	2	.46

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ANNEX NO. XII

THIRD U. S. ARMY EVACUATION AGENCIES

OCTOBER 1944



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ANNEX NO. XIII

THIRD U. S. ARMY HOSPITALIZATION

OCTOBER 1944



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ANNEX NO. XIV

On 15 October a directive was published by this headquarters incorporating some changes in surgical procedures and detailing other surgical procedures only generally covered in Annex 16 (Medical Annex) to Operation "OVERLORD".

The changes and further details concerning certain of the surgical procedures are summarized below:

1. Debridement of Wounds: Emphasis was again placed on the wide excision of all damaged muscle, the thorough mechanical cleansing of wounds and the removal of minimal amounts of skin with particular stress on forbidding the excision of circular sections of skin around small wounds, which results in prolonged convalescence and difficulty in making secondary closure.

2. Fractures: Field and evacuation hospitals are responsible for the debridement of compound fractures, and the preparation of the patient for early evacuation in comfort and safety.

a. Fractures of the Femur: It was recommended that these be immobilized in a double circular plaster of paris spica bandage from the toes of the affected leg and from the knee of the sound leg; this should be reinforced by a strut placed posteriorly, with legs spread no more than litter width, with knee slightly flexed. The use of the Foubrut splint for selected fractures of the femur will be permitted.

b. Fractures of the Tibia and Fibula were to be immobilized in the circular plaster of paris bandage from toes to groin.

c. Fractures of the Humerus were to be immobilized by a plaster of paris spica bandage with arm held forward and medially rotated so that the forearm rested in front of the body, with elbow flexion no less than ninety degrees. A plaster of paris velpeau bandage was considered a less satisfactory substitute for the spica. Hanging casts were prohibited.

d. Fractures of the Arm, Wrist and Hand were to be immobilized by circular plaster of paris, extending to the mid-brachial region.

e. For Fractures of the Foot and Ankle: a circular plaster of paris boot was to be used, extending from the toes to just below the knee. All plaster dressings were to be split to the skin and spread.

f. Compression Fractures of the Spine were to be reduced by hyper-extension, and a plaster of paris jacket applied with the patient in this position. For fractures of the lumbar or lower dorsal vertebrae, the jacket must extend from the symphysis pubis to the sternal notch, with an extension of the jacket to and including the head, in the case of cervical and upper dorsal spine fractures.

g. Gunshot Wounds with Fractures of the Spine and Involvement of the Spinal Cord: All spinal injuries with neurologic involvement were to be transported to the nearest evacuation hospital for examination by the neurosurgeon and orthopedist. If the patient could be transported to a general hospital so that surgery could be accomplished there within thirty-six hours he was to be immediately evacuated. If this were not possible all cases in which there was any doubt as to the complete severance of the spinal cord would be given the benefit of exploratory laminectomy by the neurosurgeon. The use of casts for the transportation of these cases was prohibited.

h. Thomas Splints: Thomas full or half-ring splints were to be used only in emergencies by forward medical installations and replaced as soon as possible by plaster of paris circular splints.

i. Metallic External Fixation of Fractures: The use of Steinmann pins incorporated in plaster of paris bone plates and metallic external fixation splints were prohibited.

3. Wounds Involving Major Joints: The earliest possible closure of wounds by secondary suture or skin graft was recommended. The synovia was to be closed at time of debridement, with removal of all foreign bodies in the joints effected. Penicillin solution was to be placed in the joint following closure of the capsule.

4. Amputations: Circular amputation, as described in Circular Letter 101, Office of the Chief Surgeon, dated 30 July 1943, was directed with skin traction applied to effect closure of all stumps.

5. Injuries to the Bones:

a. Danger of prolonged immobilization was stressed. Their treatment as soft tissue injuries with effort directed toward closure of the wound by suture or skin graft, and early active motion was insisted upon. In cases where tendons and bone fragments were exposed, transfer to the nearest plastic center was directed. In selected cases, where skeletal traction was required to secure reduction and immobilization of the metacarpal fractures, its application was to be made through the proximal phalanges, with emphasis on early active motion; this procedure to be employed for a maximum of two weeks and the remaining phalangeal or metacarpo-phalangeal joints left free. Pulp traction was prohibited.

b. Amputation of hands or fingers were to be performed only in extreme cases and then at the most distal point possible.

c. In the case of compound fracture of the digital portion of one finger accompanied by destruction of the flexor and extensor tendons, a prompt amputation of this digit and early active motion of the rest of the hand and fingers were recommended.

6. Neurosurgical Problems:

a. Peripheral Nerve Injuries: A close neurologic examination of all cases in which there are lacerations, no matter how small, of the extremities, was stressed. The ultimate end to be attained was early repair of nerves at special treatment hospitals for neurosurgery. When there was evidence of a nerve injury, the nerve ends were to be approximated as soon as possible and where loss of tissue made this impossible, the ends were to be marked with silk and the patient evacuated promptly to the special treatment hospital in the Communications Zone.

7. Care of the Bladder in Patients with Injury of the Spinal Cord:

a. In the cases of suspected spinal injury and inability by the patient to void, catheterization was recommended, with the catheter left laying.

b. Tidal Drainage was recommended as early as possible, to be continued until complete neurological evaluation, with proper ascertainment that the bladder was properly emptying. After neurological evaluation, it was to be continued if there was evidence of early bladder recovery.

c. Early High Suprapubic Cystostomy was recommended in the following conditions:

(1) Cord bladder secondary to permanent cord damage.

(2) Absence of early bladder recovery.

d. Care of Suprapubic Cystostomies:

(1) Use of large Mushroom or Malecot catheter.

(2) Frequent changes of tubes to prevent infection and encrustation.

(3) Daily bladder irrigations.

8. Care of Nasal Mucosa:

a. In facial wounds where the missile possibly penetrated the nasal mucosa, a complete preliminary examination was directed, to determine possible mucosal damage. If found, the cavity must be packed with gauze strips impregnated with sulfa ointment at the site of injury, to insure healing on both surfaces of the mucosa, and not across the airway at the site. Protection of the gauze from the nose was recommended, and replacement at least every five days to ten days.

b. Prior to discharge, transfer, or evacuation from the hospital of any patient with facial injury which could have penetrated the nasal mucosa, a complete nasal examination for adhesions was directed; any adhesions to be severed and gauze placed to prevent reforming.

9. Management of Colostomies:

a. Performance of Colostomy: Immobilization of the large intestine, when possible, to permit approximation of two and one-half to three inches of bowel within the peritoneal cavity in the formation of the double-barrelled colostomy, was directed.

b. Initial opening in the loop type of colostomy, not exceeding one inch in length and made through the region of the presenting taenia, parallel to the long axis of the presenting bowel, was recommended. Stress was placed on the necessity of a severance of the bowel to completely interrupt the fecal stream in injuries of the rectum or sigmoid below the colostomy site.

10. Litter cases were set to be evacuated to the convalescent hospital.

11. All cases of elective surgery were to be sent to Communications Zone hospitals.

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ANNEX NO. XV

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 6 OCT THROUGH 27 OCT 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1,000 Per Annum															
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases		Daily Non-Effective Rate	
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 6 Oct 44	228,452	4238	962	2303	5.3	407	100	1468	333	294	67	151	34.28	25	6	1074	1.06
2 wk ending 13 Oct 44	227,251	4307	980	2109	4.7	455	104	1743	399	339	77	143	32.80	42	10	1525	1.15
3 wk ending 20 Oct 44	252,274	3995	817	2089	4.26	424	102	432	89	369	76	126	25.96	32	7	1548	0.88
4 wk ending 27 Oct 44	257,658	3485	700	2354	4.7	448	90	683	137	407	82	108	33.77	53	11	1735	0.96
Average for Period	241,409	3756	9??	2207	475	446	101	1083	240	342	76	147	31.45	38	9	1702	1.01

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 6 OCT THROUGH 27 OCT 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Epidemic Hepatitis	
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Scarlet Fever		Typhus Fever		Psycho-neurosis		Malaria			
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 6 Oct 44	228,452	5	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	640	145	0	0	2	0.45
2 wk ending 13 Oct 44	227,251	1	0.23	6	2	0	0	1	0.23	1	0.23	0	0	204	47	0	0	1	0.23
3 wk ending 20 Oct 44	252,274	5	1	7	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	175	35	0	0	0	0
4 wk ending 27 Oct 44	257,658	0	0	10	2	1	0.20	0	0	0	0	0	0	177	36	0	0	2	0.40
Average for Period	241,409	2	0.56	7	2	0.25	0.05	0.25	0.06	0.25	0.06	0	0	299	66	0	0	1	0.27

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ANNEX NO. XVI

THIRD U. S. ARMY EVACUATION AGENCIES

NOVEMBER 1944



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ANNEX NO. XVII

THIRD U. S. ARMY HOSPITALIZATION
NOVEMBER 1944



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ANNEX NO. XVIII

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 3 NOV THROUGH 1 DEC 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum															
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases		Daily Non-Effective Rate	
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 3 Nov 44	21,0004	2786	602	1452	422	415	90	419	91	396	86	141	30.24	59	8	1072	0.64
2 wk ending 10 Nov 44	21,1785	5952	1298	2683	541	968	116	2801	611	547	87	145	31.61	58	12	1149	0.69
3 wk ending 17 Nov 44	21,1440	12755	2804	6111	1174	868	194	5784	1254	535	122	134	29.30	47	11	1134	0.91
4 wk ending 24 Nov 44	21,1744	8402	1772	3862	850	691	147	4669	795	509	110	91	19.66	106	23	1578	0.75
5 wk ending 1 Dec 44	21,1869	8130	1669	4145	850	731	146	3474	674	510	105	90	18.54	211	43	1105	0.74
Average for Period	21,0288	7599	1649	3707	805	669	145	3229	701	481	104	114	24.67	98	20	1321	0.79

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 3 NOV THROUGH 1 DEC 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum															
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Scarlet Fever		Trench Foot		Psycho-neurosis		Malaria		Epidemic Hepatitis	
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 3 Nov 44	21,000	2	.03	10	2	0	0	1	.02	0	0	0	0	124	26	0	0	2	.04
2 wk ending 10 Nov 44	21,178	0	0	10	2	1	.02	0	0	1	.02	2	0	170	35	1	.02	2	.04
3 wk ending 17 Nov 44	21,144	0	0	15	3	1	.02	2	0	2	0	2	0	1367	302	2	.05	1	.02
4 wk ending 24 Nov 44	21,174	0	0	6	1	0	0	1	.02	0	0	2	0	661	147	1	.02	2	.04
5 wk ending 1 Dec 44	21,187	1	.02	41	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	854	172	0	0	2	.04
Average for Period	21,0288	.60	.13	16	3	.40	.09	.40	.09	.20	.04	881	193	694	150	.30	.18	2	.54

(Average for 3 weeks) 1472 322

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ANNEX NO. XIX

THIRD U. S. ARMY EVACUATION AGENCIES

DECEMBER 1944



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ANNEX NO. XX

THIRD U.S. ARMY HOSPITALIZATION

DECEMBER 1944



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ANNEX NO. XXI

THIRD U.S. ARMY MEDICAL DEPOTS

OCTOBER – NOVEMBER – DECEMBER 1944



ANNEX NO. XXII

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 8 DEC THROUGH 29 DEC 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Daily Non-Effective Rate
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases		
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases Rate
1 wk ending 8 Dec 44	218442	6369	1331	3343	699	597	125	2429	508	400	84	106	22.15	140	29	1054 0.61
2 wk ending 15 Dec 44	216820	6659	1377	3274	688	875	184	2410	506	481	102	108	22.68	123	26	1069 0.62
3 wk ending 22 Dec 44	254247	5627	1148	2494	509	834	170	2299	469	383	78	109	22.24	97	20	904 0.51
4 wk ending 29 Dec 44	315769	9024	1578	4411	723	1121	184	4092	671	687	113	100	16.47	91	15	1378 0.64
Average for Period	266320	7045	1359	3381	655	857	166	2808	539	489	94	106	20.89	113	23	1101 0.60

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 8 DEC THROUGH 29 DEC 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum																Epidemic Hepatitis	
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Scarlet Fever		Trench Foot		Psycho-neurosis		Malaria			
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 8 Dec 44	218442	2	.46	19	4	1	.21	2	.46	0	0	498	104	550	115	0	0	3	1
2 wk ending 15 Dec 44	216820	0	0	11	2	1	.21	1	.21	0	0	881	181	370	78	0	0	3	1
3 wk ending 22 Dec 44	254247	0	0	10	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	348	71	316	66	2	.41	5	1
4 wk ending 29 Dec 44	315769	1	.16	21	3	1	.16	2	.33	0	0	994	154	722	130	2	.33	3	.49
Average for Period	266320	1	.15	15	3	1	.15	1	.26	0	0	665	128	509	97	1	.19	4	.87

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ANNEX NO. XXIII

THIRD U. S. ARMY EVACUATION AGENCIES
JANUARY 1945



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ANNEX NO. XXIV

THIRD U. S. ARMY HOSPITALIZATION

JANUARY 1945



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ANNEX NO. XXV

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 5 THROUGH 26 JAN 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Daily Non-Effective Rate	
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases			
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 5 Jan 45	345599	10593	1589	4503	675	1398	210	4692	704	802	120	127	19.11	102	15	1472	0.61
2 wk ending 12 Jan 45	338502	12278	1879	5304	812	1123	172	5851	895	798	122	126	19.36	106	16	5393	2.28
3 wk ending 19 Jan 45	349860	10406	1540	3997	592	1458	216	4951	733	750	111	123	18.28	136	20	2507	1.02
4 wk ending 26 Jan 45	353851	8706	1271	4336	633	1209	177	3161	462	836	122	102	14.99	148	22	2263	0.91
Average for Period	346953	10496	1570	4535	678	1297	194	4664	699	797	119	120	17.94	123	18	2909	1.21

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 5 THROUGH 26 JAN 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum																Epidemic Hepatitis	
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Frostbite		Trench Foot		Psycho-neurosis		Malaria			
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 5 Jan 45	345599	0	0	20	3	1	.15	2	.30	591	89	521	78	874	131	0	0	11	2
2 wk ending 12 Jan 45	338502	0	0	25	4	3	.46	1	.15	1835	281	656	100	633	97	4	1	18	3
3 wk ending 19 Jan 45	349860	2	.30	20	3	1	.15	2	.30	1712	253	476	70	490	73	1	.15	11	2
4 wk ending 26 Jan 45	353851	1	.15	16	2	2	.29	9	1	725	106	554	81	400	58	0	0	22	3
Average for Period	346953	.75	.11	20	3	2	.26	4	.44	1216	182	552	82	599	90	1	.29	16	3

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ANNEX NO. XXVI

THIRD U. S. ARMY EVACUATION AGENCIES
FEBRUARY 1945



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ANNEX NO. XXVII

THIRD U.S. ARMY HOSPITALIZATION
FEBRUARY 1945



Map XXIV

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ANNEX NO. XXVIII

Analysis of 64,389 U. S. Battle Casualties Treated in Third U. S. Army Medical Installations - 1 Aug 1944 to 1 Feb 45

Anatomical Location and No. of each type		% of Total No. of Battle Casualties	Mortality for each sep group
Head & Spine 5075 cases		8%	9.4%
Face & Neck 3770 cases		5%	1%
Chest 5877 cases		10%	8%
Abdomen 2907 cases		5%	15.5%
Buttocks 3745 cases		6%	2%
Upper Extremity 16327 cases	25%		3%
Lower Extremity 23273 cases	35%		1%
Total Extremities 39600 cases		60%	
Others 3615 cases		6%	1.4%
Total 64389 cases		100%	
Mortality from all types of battle casualties treated in Third U. S. Army for six month period			2.9%
The overall mortality including medical and non-battle casualty admissions for same period			1.6%



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SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 2 FEB THROUGH 2 MAR 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum															
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		"Old" & "New" Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases		Daily Non-Effective Rate	
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 2 Feb 45	321427	7266	1164	3991	639	1422	228	1853	297	1148	184	89	14.27	146	23	2300	1.01
2 wk ending 9 Feb 45	299837	8649	1500	4636	804	1107	192	2906	504	1151	200	96	16.65	290	50	1212	0.58
3 wk ending 16 Feb 45	299421	8264	1435	4639	805	911	158	2714	471	959	166	105	18.24	227	39	1355	0.65
4 wk ending 23 Feb 45	297984	7380	1288	3667	640	772	135	2941	513	591	103	120	20.94	283	49	662	0.32
5 wk ending 2 Mar 45	288609	9287	1672	3885	700	759	137	4643	836	605	109	125	22.52	163	29	618	0.31
Average for Period	302056	8169	1412	4164	718	994	170	3011	522	891	152	107	18.52	222	38	1229	0.57

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 2 FEB THROUGH 2 MAR 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum																Epidemic Hepatitis	
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Frostbite		Trench Foot		Psycho-neurosis		Malaria			
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 2 Feb 45	321427	0	0	12	2	1	.16	15	2	660	106	424	68	246	39	0	0	19	3
2 wk ending 9 Feb 45	299837	0	0	13	2	3	.52	7	1	286	50	436	76	352	61	1	.17	21	4
3 wk ending 16 Feb 45	299421	1	.17	16	3	0	0	2	.35	95	16	903	157	373	66	1	.17	19	3
4 wk ending 23 Feb 45	297984	1	.17	32	6	4	.70	4	.70	28	5	334	58	500	87	0	0	40	7
5 wk ending 2 Mar 45	288609	0	0	13	2	6	1	5	1	17	3	503	91	570	103	1	.18	57	10
Average for Period	302056	.40	.07	17	3	3	.48	7	1	217	36	520	90	408	71	.60	.10	31	7

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ANNEX NO. XXX

THIRD U. S. ARMY EVACUATION AGENCIES
MARCH 1945



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THIRD U. S. ARMY HOSPITALIZATION
MARCH 1945



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ANNEX NO. XXXII

THIRD U.S. ARMY MEDICAL DEPOTS
JANUARY — FEBRUARY — MARCH 1945



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SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 9 MAR THROUGH 30 MAR 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Daily Non-Effective Rate	
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		"Old" & "New" Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases			
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 9 Mar 45	304194	7940	1357	3804	650	867	148	3269	559	698	119	109	18.63	187	32	671	0.32
2 wk ending 16 Mar 45	308668	6424	1082	2975	501	755	127	2694	454	640	108	100	16.85	134	23	574	0.27
3 wk ending 23 Mar 45	322540	5772	930	2423	391	797	128	2552	411	501	81	90	14.51	48	8	636	0.28
4 wk ending 30 Mar 45	302829	4742	814	2039	350	663	114	2040	350	336	58	99	17.00	35	6	572	0.27
Average for Period	309558	6220	1046	2810	473	771	129	2139	444	544	92	100	16.75	101	17	613	0.29

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 9 MAR THROUGH 30 MAR 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum																Epidemic Hepatitis	
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Frostbite		Trench Foot		Psycho-neurosis		Malaria			
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 9 Mar 45	304194	0	0	23	4	1	.17	10	2	33	6	364	62	477	82	1	.17	78	13
2 wk ending 16 Mar 45	308668	1	.17	15	3	4	1	5	1	4	1	163	27	312	53	2	.34	67	11
3 wk ending 23 Mar 45	322540	0	0	9	1	6	.97	4	.64	0	0	60	10	257	41	5	.81	97	16
4 wk ending 30 Mar 45	302829	1	.17	7	1	5	.86	8	1	0	0	2	.34	173	30	6	1	100	17
Average for Period	309558	.5	.09	14	2	4	.75	7	1	9	2	147	25	305	52	4	.58	86	14

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ANNEX NO. XXXIV

THIRD U. S. ARMY EVACUATION AGENCIES
APRIL 1945



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ANNEX NO. XXXV

THIRD U.S. ARMY HOSPITALIZATION
APRIL 1945



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ANNEX NO. XXXVI

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 6 APRIL THROUGH 27 APRIL 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Daily Non-effective Rate	
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		"Old" & "New" Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases			
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 6 April 1945	311360	4032	673	1666	273	774	129	1592	266	353	59	65	10.86	39	7	608	0.28
2 wk ending 13 April 1945	317859	4646	760	1989	325	837	137	1820	298	349	57	89	14.56	40	7	691	0.31
3 wk ending 20 April 1945	295236	3723	656	2084	367	818	144	821	145	332	58	76	13.39	42	7	795	0.38
4 wk ending 27 April 1945	377720	4190	616	2485	342	795	109	1200	165	329	45	124	17.07	40	6	1087	0.41
Average for Period	325544	4220	767	2056	328	806	130	1358	219	341	55	89	13.97	40	7	795	0.35

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 6 APRIL THROUGH 27 APRIL 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum																	
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Frostbite		Trenchfoot		Psycho-neurosis		Malaria		Epidemic Hepatitis	
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 6 April 1945	311360	0	0	12	2	3	.50	2	.33	1	.17	1	.17	119	20	1	.17	86	14
2 wk ending 13 April 1945	317359	0	0	6	.98	4	.65	8	1	0	0	1	.16	132	22	3	.49	92	15
3 wk ending 20 April 1945	295236	2	.35	6	1	8	1	6	1	0	0	2	.35	87	15	4	.70	123	22
4 wk ending 27 April 1945	377720	2	.28	19	3	1	.14	9	1	9	1	43	6	133	18	4	.55	138	19
Average for Period	325544	1	.16	11	2	4	.57	6	.83	3	.29	12	2	118	19	3	.48	110	18

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ANNEX NO. XXXVII

THIRD U. S. ARMY EVACUATION AGENCIES
1-8 MAY 1945



Map
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ANNEX NO. XXXVIII

THIRD U.S. ARMY HOSPITALIZATION
1-8 MAY 1945



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ANNEX NO. XXXIX

THIRD U.S. ARMY MEDICAL DEPOTS
APRIL – MAY 1945



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ANNEX NO. XL

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 4 MAY THROUGH 11 MAY 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Daily Non-effective Rate	
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		"Old" & "New" Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases			
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 4 May 1945	337872	3741	576	2112	325	797	123	832	128	293	45	136	20.93	40	6	1024	0.43
2 wk ending 11 May 1945	397919	4244	554	2657	347	1119	146	468	61	413	54	212	27.69	47	6	910	0.33
Average for Period	367896	3993	565	2385	336	958	135	650	95	353	50	174	24.31	44	6	967	0.38

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 4 MAY THROUGH 11 MAY 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum																	
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Frostbite		Trenchfoot		Psycho-neurosis		Malaria		Epidemic Hepatitis	
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 4 May 1945	337872	0	0	15	2	2	.31	6	1	5	.77	15	2	75	12	1	.15	102	16
2 wk ending 11 May 1945	397919	1	.13	26	3	2	.26	6	1	1	.13	1	13	22	3	12	2	32	4
Average for Period	367896	.5	.07	21	3	2	.29	6	1	3	.45	8	8	49	8	7	1	67	10

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

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Ordnance Officer
APO 403

SUBJECT: Transmittal of After-Action Report, Ordnance Section, Headquarters, Third U.S. Army.

TO : The Commanding General, Third U.S. Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Ordnance Section, Third U.S. Army Headquarters, beginning with 23 March 1944 and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapters.

2. This report endeavors to portray the history of Ordnance Service in the Third U.S. Army. Many details have necessarily been omitted but the report describes the more important features of Ordnance Service and the outstanding problems which were met and solved in providing the ammunition, supplying replacement equipment, and maintaining the weapons and vehicles essential for successful combat. The report covers the planning phase in the United Kingdom, the pre-operational phase on the Continent, and finally, the highly successful campaigns in Normandy, Brittany, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Rhineland, and the ultimate defeat of the enemy in Germany.

T. H. NIXON,
Colonel, Ordnance Dept.,
Ordnance Officer.

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ORDNANCE SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



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325TH RIC US ARMY 1945

CHAPTER I
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Ordnance Section, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, at the time of their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM on 29 March 1944, had no indication as to their ultimate destiny. As time went on and plans of the Army were being formulated, it became apparent that the day of actual commitment to combat was near at hand. Some of the numerous problems confronting the ordnance troops are mentioned in the sections that follow. The outstanding responsibilities were the initial planning phase and the equipping of the Army prior to actual commitment.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

The Ordnance Section, Third U. S. Army, arrived in the UNITED KINGDOM with complete authorized strength of eighteen officers, two warrant officers (junior grade), and thirty-three enlisted men. The entire section was in the rear echelon. The section was located at TOFT CAMP near KNUTSFORD, CHESHIRE, ENGLAND, with other service sections of the headquarters and was housed in three small frame buildings.

Immediately upon arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM files were started on all Ordnance officer personnel assigned and attached to Third U. S. Army. As officers of the headquarters visited Ordnance units, pertinent statements were made on the units concerned in order that the Army Ordnance Officer would be familiar with their capabilities.

All sub-sections began operations on 2L March. Instructions were issued directing them to maintain telephonic records in their respective sub-sections. These would be periodically forwarded to the Administration Section for consolidation. A weekly report was required from each sub-section which was consolidated by the Administration Section into a diary.

On 14 April, a bomb disposal officer was attached to the section from the theater headquarters for the purpose of passive air defense organizing, and planning of schools for training of personnel in same.

Staff Memorandum 37, this headquarters, dated 6 May, reduced Ordnance Section authorized enlisted personnel to twenty-eight men and one warrant officer; increased officer strength to nineteen. Five enlisted men were transferred to other staff sections in accordance with this directive.

At the request of the Chief Ordnance Officer, European Theater of Operations, a weekly informal letter was prepared emphasizing various technical problems with which the Ordnance Section had dealt during that week. This letter proved to be very valuable since it kept the Chief Ordnance Officer constantly familiar with current problems of supply and maintenance of Ordnance material.

Headquarters, 179th Ordnance Battalion and 317th Ordnance Battalion were reorganized as the First and Second Ordnance Provisional Group Headquarters respectively on 20 May. The complete battalion personnel was placed on detached service with the provisional groups and the balance of Group T/O brought up to authorized strength by augmentation from attached units.

On 25 May, Ordnance Bulletin Number 1 was prepared and distributed to all Third Army Ordnance units. (See Annex I). This initial bulletin contained Ordnance technical information and a brief analysis of the plan for future bulletins of a similar nature. On 12 June, Ordnance Bulletin Number 2 was published and distributed. (See Annex II). On 23 June, Ordnance Bulletin Number 3 was published and distributed. (See Annex III).

The 69th Ordnance Group was activated on 23 June. Personnel for this group was obtained from the First Ordnance Provisional Group Headquarters which was disbanded. On 25 June, the 70th Ordnance Group was activated. Personnel for this group was obtained from the Second Ordnance Provisional Group Headquarters which was disbanded.

On 29 June, the Ordnance Section was divided into three echelons. The "X" Echelon consisted of ten officers and seventeen enlisted men; the "Y" Echelon consisted of seven officers, one warrant officer, and nine enlisted men; the "Z" Echelon consisted of two officers and two enlisted men. The "X" Echelon departed from TOFT CAMP on this date and proceeded to HIGH WYCH, in southern ENGLAND, southeast of SALISBURY. On 4 July, this echelon moved from HIGH WYCH to SOUTHAMPTON and proceeded to the Continent, arriving there 6 July and was camped three miles north of ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMPTE, FRANCE. (T-19).

In order to accomplish the required work during this planning period, it was found necessary to augment the Ordnance Section with attached personnel as follows:

Dates	Officers	Warrant Officers	Enlisted Men
April	3	1	15
May	4	0	5
June	6	0	6
July	6	0	6

The maximum number of personnel attached at any one time was three officers, one warrant officer, and fifteen enlisted men. The average was five officers and eight enlisted men which indicates that the Ordnance Section of an Army Headquarters is too small, particularly during a planning phase.

SECTION III

OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

An operation journal was started and an operations log was set up for recording telephonic conversations and the results of conferences. This log was used as a source of information for the compilation of the historical record.

The location of Ordnance units was spotted on a map in order to determine their geographical location with respect to each other. As a result of this study, recommendation was made to G-3 to attach Ordnance companies to Ordnance battalions for administrative control on a geographical basis.

A study was made to determine if Ordnance units were located to provide Ordnance service to tactical and other service units. It was found that the Ordnance units were not located with respect to the maintenance and supply load but apparently had been placed where billets were available. Recommendations were submitted to the G-3 Section for immediate movement of these units in order to insure Ordnance service to all units. New units arriving in the UNITED KINGDOM were immediately notified of their supporting Ordnance unit.

Upon completion of a study of the administrative requirements of Ordnance units, a request was submitted to the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, for the assignment or authority to activate two Headquarters and Headquarters Detachments, Ordnance Groups (T/O & E 9-12, 15 April 1944) in order to expedite the organization, administration, training, and operations of Ordnance battalions. Authority was received to organize two Provisional Group Headquarters. This was accomplished by reorganizing the Headquarters 179th Ordnance Battalion and 317th Ordnance Battalion as the First and Second Provisional Groups, respectively. These Provisional Groups were later disbanded by General Order No. 35, dated 3 July 1944, and then activated as Ordnance Groups, per T/O & E 9-12, 15 April 1944. The 69th Ordnance Group which was activated on 23 June was given the mission of operating all forward battalions in direct support of Corps. The 70th Ordnance Group which was activated on 26 June was given the mission of supply for the entire Third U. S. Army, as well as maintenance support to the 69th Ordnance Group and any other Army troops assigned. The 70th Ordnance Group Headquarters was to be the only contacting agency for supply and maintenance with the Advance Section, Communications Zone.

Prior to the activation of the Ordnance Groups, a meeting was conducted by the Army Ordnance Officer which was attended by all Corps Ordnance Officers, all Provisional Group Commanders and their executives, and all Ordnance Battalion Commanders and their executives. During this meeting the Army Ordnance Officer and his staff discussed the Ordnance plan for Continental operations. Copies of "Instructions to Ordnance Units", which in itself was the Ordnance Plan, were distributed with accompanying Ordnance forms reproduced as Annex IV of this report, to be used for the submission of Ordnance reports required by this headquarters. (For complete text of "Instructions to Ordnance Units" see pages 94 through 97 of OVERLORD PLAN) Copies of the Maintenance Plan for Continental operations were also distributed. (See Annex V) Battalion commanders were informed of the companies to be attached to their battalions for this operation. Copies of these plans were furnished to the Chief Ordnance Officer, European Theater of Operations, Ordnance Officer, First U. S. Army Group, and Ordnance Officer, Forward Echelon, Communications Zone.

A tentative troop list for Third U. S. Army was studied and then broken down into the types of tactical units. Estimates were made of the number of Ordnance companies and battalions necessary to support these tactical units. After the number of Ordnance units required had been determined, they were phased in with the tactical units in order to furnish adequate ordnance support.

The Army Ordnance Officer attended a conference at Headquarters First U. S. Army Group with reference to the number of Ordnance units that would be necessary to support Third U. S. Army, by type, and the required phasing of these Ordnance units with the tactical units. For this necessary support, a shortage was found to exist of depot companies, evacuation companies, ammunition companies, heavy maintenance tank companies, and ammunition battalion headquarters.

The Chief Ordnance Officer, European Theater of Operations, called a meeting of Army Ordnance Officers, representatives of Headquarters European Theater of Operations, and First U. S. Army Group, and Ordnance units were assigned based on availability. This list was later revised since units expected from the states had not arrived. The final ordnance troop list is shown in Annex VI.

Ammunition battalion headquarters shortages were eliminated by taking three Ordnance battalion headquarters and making ammunition battalion headquarters out of them.

It was planned that the Ordnance companies being lifted to the Continent during the period up to D + 41 for the Continental operation would take with them vehicles and towed artillery to establish a replacement pool for the tactical units then ashore. Therefore, a driver training program was immediately drafted for the purpose of training ordnance personnel to drive half-track and track-laying vehicles.

The Ordnance Section, Communications Zone, was contacted and arrangements were made for ordnance personnel to attend training courses for waterproofing of armored vehicles and artillery at Ordnance Depot O-617, located at BICKERTON. Training courses for general purpose vehicles at Ordnance Depot O-616 was located at WALLESLEY.

Quotas for training in Waterproofing at Ordnance Depot O-616 and O-617 were not in sufficient quantity to complete training prior to movement date. Therefore, a school was established at CORBLETON by Third U. S. Army. This school was first placed under the operation of VIII Corps to train students in waterproofing of all types of general purpose vehicles. Students who had completed training at the Communications Zone Ordnance depots were selected from units within the Corps to act as instructors in this school. Upon completion of training of the VIII Corps, this school was then placed under control of the Army. Training courses were then allocated to Army units. Corps instructors were relieved as Army instructors were trained.

As more armored units were assigned to Third U. S. Army, it was necessary to immediately establish another school to train the necessary number of instructors in the waterproofing of combat vehicles and artillery before the movement date of the Army units.

The Ordnance Section, Communications Zone, was contacted with reference to waterproofing of vehicles and the availability of materials to be used for training. A training program was drafted whereby all drivers and their assistant drivers would be taught the correct method of waterproofing. This plan was submitted to the AF of S, G-3, for approval, together with a plan for the establishment of a waterproofing school. Communications Zone agreed to provide a limited number of combat vehicle instructors and the waterproofing material for instructional purposes. Communications Zone instructors would be used until such time as Army instructors could be trained. This school was established in the vicinity of MARLBOROUGH and placed under XX Corps for operation.

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This school trained instructors for Army units in combat and general purpose vehicles and artillery. As instructors were developed, they were returned to their units and the units in turn established waterproofing schools for their drivers. By this pyramid method all drivers and their assistants were instructed in waterproofing within a period of two months.

Considerable trouble had been reported from other combat areas on vehicles becoming disabled during beach landings. Subsequently, instructions were drafted for trouble-shooting vehicles which stalled on the beach due to mechanical troubles. These instructions were distributed to students and proved valuable as a training aid since similar troubles developed as a result of wading during waterproofing tests.

A memorandum was submitted to the Chief of Staff for the reorganization under T/O & E 9-7, dated 28 February 1944, with Change 1, dated 28 February 1944, of all Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies under control of Third U. S. Army. All Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squads (Separate) were reorganized under T/O & E 9-500.

It was recommended that all Ordnance units be attached to Corps for movement to the Continent and to revert to Army control upon arrival. Furthermore, Third U. S. Army units that had been attached to First U. S. Army were likewise to revert to Third U. S. Army control. One unit was excepted, the 457th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company, which was attached to Headquarters Special Troops for administration and supply

A list of Third U. S. Army maintenance and depot companies which were in actual operation in the UNITED KINGDOM was submitted to the Ordnance Officer, Southern Base Sector, so that they could be placed in the same supply priority as Communications Zone shops for spare parts. The 444th, 857th, and 781th Ordnance Depot Companies were designated as the main depot companies.

A copy of Third U. S. Army troop priority list, dated 5 June 1944, was forwarded to Western Base Sector, Services of Supply, for use in the distribution of waterproofing materials to Third U. S. Army units in order of priority.

SECTION IV

SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

Upon arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM, the Supply Sub-Section immediately initiated an intensive study of Services of Supply administrative orders and policies currently in effect in the European Theater of Operations.

The supply portion of the Ordnance Annex to Administrative Order Number 1 was immediately prepared. Policies were set forth as indicated in FM 9-5, 11 July 1942, Ordnance Service In The Field, and coordinated with those already set up by the Services of Supply for the UNITED KINGDOM.

The supply of major items of T/E and T/BA equipment to units upon arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM were issued automatically by the Services of Supply. "Must" items listed in the pertinent Standard Nomenclature Lists were shipped with the major items to which they pertained. First echelon tools and spare parts kits for general purpose vehicles were issued with the vehicles. Likewise, organizational spare parts, tools, and equipment for combat vehicles were issued with the vehicles.

Units dealt directly with the Services of Supply base section concerned regarding the availability of initial issue of T/E and T/BA equipment. When trouble was experienced by the units in obtaining critical items of T/E and T/BA equipment, they contacted the supply section of Army who in turn contacted Headquarters Services of Supply as to the availability, and at times specified priority of units to be equipped on critical items of supply.

The supply of material other than the initial T/E and T/BA was made through the following channels:

1. Divisions were supplied through their ordnance companies.

2. Army and Corps troops were supplied through the ordnance depot company of the battalion furnishing ordnance service.

3. Units without organic ordnance support, or without Army or Corps ordnance units to provide supply, submitted their requisitions to the nearest Services of Supply ordnance installations.

Three Army depot companies were put in operation in the UNITED KINGDOM. All other depot companies were completely involved in the task of setting up their vans and requisitioning basic loads.

Tactical units were instructed to submit requisitions for organizational spare parts and accessories direct to Services of Supply depot installations rather than to Army depots first for consolidation. This method was found to be more satisfactory as units were being moved during this period to the concentration area and trouble had been experienced, because of lack of communications, by Army depots in contacting tactical units when their requisitions were filled. Services of Supply experienced the same difficulty on a reduced scale therefore Army liaison officers and enlisted men were placed in all Services of Supply depots for the purpose of notifying units when their requisitions were filled.

Forms that were furnished to Army by Services of Supply to be used in the requisitioning of organizational spare parts and accessories by tactical units were found to be incomplete and outdated and were discontinued after being used a short period of time.

Requisitions for controlled expendable items were submitted through Corps Ordnance Officer (or Army Ordnance Officer in case of Army troops) approved and forwarded to the Chief Ordnance Officer, Headquarters Services of Supply, for action.

Requisitions for controlled non-expendable items were submitted through the Army Ordnance Officer after approval by the Corps Ordnance Officer (for Corps troops) and after approval and consolidation by the Division Ordnance Officer (for Divisional troops). Army troops submitted such requisitions to the Chief Ordnance Officer, Services of Supply, through the Army Ordnance Officer.

Immediately before the shipment of Army to the Continent, arrangements were made by the Army Ordnance Officer with Headquarters Services of Supply to simplify the requisition channels so that troops remaining in the UNITED KINGDOM could continue to be supplied without so much paper work coming through the "S" Echelon of Army.

Instructions for the preparation of requisitions were also included in the Ordnance Annex to Administrative Order Number 1, and complete information was given as to the form and stock numbers necessary to expedite these requisitions through Services of Supply depots.

All units in the Army were required to submit to the Army Ordnance Officer as of the twentieth of each month a "Special Material Status Report" of all authorized and on hand major items. A card system was set up by the supply section for the purpose of recording these figures so that information as to the status of equipment of units in the Army would be available. Between reports, items released by Services of Supply on shipping orders were posted on these cards so as to keep this information current.

Shortly before Army left for the Continent this form was changed to the "Ordnance Material In The Hands of Troops and Combat Loss Report" and made to include additional information necessary for combat operations.

A project to provide items above T/E necessary for the efficient operation of ordnance companies was completed and submitted for approval. Approval was not obtained in time for the items to be issued to the ordnance units while in the UNITED KINGDOM.

Work was started on the requirements of all ordnance items for Continental operation. An extensive study was made of requirements submitted by other Armies in previous operations.

Requirements for vehicles and towed artillery for Phase II (D / 29 to D / 42) were set up by First U. S. Army Group based on fourteen days of maintenance with a reserve of seven days. These major items were phased in by days for transportation to the Continent. The supply section in turn phased these items in accordance with ordnance units ability to carry them to the Continent during this period. Requirements were not put in for Phase III (D / 42 to D / 90) as Headquarters Services of Supply informed Army that depots would be in operation on the Continent to handle requirements during this period. In connection with this a letter was written to the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, a copy of which is reproduced as follows

AG 475 (Ord) 15 May 1944

Subject: Ordnance Supplies, Operation "Overlord".

To : Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, APO 887, U. S. Army.

1. [redacted] (Ord) [redacted] Third United States Army, [redacted] Operational Supply Requirements ([redacted]).

b. Joint Administrative Plan for Operation "Overlord" to Accompany Joint Operations Plan, United Forces, 19 April 1944, Paragraph 1. General, a(4) and (6); Paragraph 2. Supply, a. General, (1)(b) and 3.

c. "Neptune" Initial Joint Plan, EJC 100, 1 February 1944, Section II, Paragraph 2, Supply, a. General (1)(c).

2. It is the understanding of this headquarters that the Commanding General, Communications Zone, for Operation "Overlord" is prepared to assume normal supply functions for all types of Ordnance Supply by D / 41.

3. Based on this assumption, only tonnage was bid in for the maintenance requirements and a seven (7) day reserve for the Third U. S. Army units ashore as of D / 41 (inclusive). First U. S. Army was responsible for bidding in tonnage for the VIII Corps for the same period. In addition, the major items ashore by specific periods was furnished in letter referred to in paragraph 1 a, from D / 42 to D / 90. No ordnance tonnage has been bid in for the period D / 42 to D / 90 for any Third U. S. Army units. The assumption is that the Commanding General, Advance Section, Communications Zone, or Communications Zone, will bid in the necessary tonnage for maintenance requirements and the establishment of a seven day reserve for Third U. S. Army units ashore as of D / 90. This reserve to be in addition to any reserve to be established by the Commanding General, Communications Zone, to support the Ground Forces.

4. To confirm the above assumption, it is requested that the following question be answered:

a. Will the Advance Section of the Communications Zone or the Communications Zone be prepared to meet the maintenance and Third U. S. Army operational reserve demands including the replacement of major items for Class II, Class IV, and Class V Ordnance Supply for all Third U. S. Army troops ashore after D / 41?

For the Commanding General:

/s/ E. L. SLOSSON, JR.,
Capt., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

AG 475 (Ordnance) 1st Ind. 7 June 1944
Headquarters European Theater of Operations, APO 887, U. S. Army.

To: Commanding General, Third United States Army, APO 403, U. S. Army.

1. For the period of contemplated operations D plus 42 to D plus 90, calculations of maintenance and reserve supply requirements were made on the basis of all troops ashore and not broken down into supplies for any one command.

2. However, the Ordnance Service has advised that its provision of supplies for all troops ashore beginning at D plus 41 is adequate to meet the maintenance and authorized reserve demands of the Third U. S. Army.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

/s/ T. I. HARRIS,
Capt., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

Requirements for major items other than rolling stock were set up in chart form based on modified War Department replacement factors for a fifteen day supply for all ordnance maintenance and depot units in the Army. A chart was prepared allocating these items to the various types of ordnance companies as basic loads.

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Authorized spare parts basic loads for divisional ordnance companies were in accordance with the appropriate Standard Nomenclature Lists. Because of the critical nature of supply, basic loads of major items, as listed in appropriate Standard Nomenclature Lists for divisional ordnance units, were not authorized.

Basic load basis for spare parts for non-divisional ordnance maintenance companies was compiled. A chart was produced showing the number of each type major item to be supported by the various types of maintenance companies. These figures were arrived at by taking the total number of each type major item in the Army and dividing by the number of maintenance units that would support these items. This gave each maintenance company a percentage share of each type major item they would support and meant that each company would have a balanced stock of parts for everything they could support. A fifteen day supply was requisitioned in accordance with pertinent Standard Nomenclature Lists Addendas. Restrictions were added by the Army Ordnance Officer that basic loads must be mobile and ordnance units were authorized to vary basic loads to comply with this requirement.

Basic load basis for spare parts for depot companies was compiled. In coordination with this project, the depot companies were divided into two distinct classes: Forward and Main Depots. The forward depots were in turn divided into two types: Forward General and Forward Armored. The forward general depots to carry a preponderance of general purpose parts for the support of infantry divisions. The forward armored depots to carry a stock of combat vehicle and general purpose parts in order to support armored units. The main depots were in turn divided into three types: Main General Purpose, Main Combat Vehicle, and Main Armament. These depots were to stock parts as their titles indicate. The main depots were also to operate the main Army vehicle and tracked artillery pool.

The basic load basis for spare parts for forward depot companies was based on a fifteen day supply in accordance with the quantities of various type major items to be supported which was figured on the same basis as for the maintenance companies. The main depot companies were to carry a thirty day supply based on the total number of each type of item that they would support in the Army.

Restrictions were again added that forward depot loads must be mobile and units were authorized to vary basic loads to comply with this requirement. The main depots were to transport reserve pool vehicles and were to load these vehicles with parts. Additional transportation was to be obtained by use of Ordnance Evacuation Companies, to carry a portion of their load to the Continent.

A cleaning and preserving requirement chart was reproduced and distributed to all tactical units and ordnance units to be used in the requisitioning of fast moving cleaning and preserving materials. This chart was based on figures compiled by the Ordnance Board, Aberdeen Proving Ground.

Basic load charts for the stockage of tires and tubes were compiled and submitted to Headquarters Services of Supply for automatic issue to ordnance units. No figures were available as to replacement factors on these items and the only limiting factor was space needed to carry them. Consequently only a small part of these needs of the Army were carried to the far shore by ordnance units.

Basic loads for the stockage of tools for replacement purposes were compiled and submitted to Headquarters Services of Supply for automatic issue to the main general purpose depot. No figures were available as to replacement factors on these items and again the limiting factor was space to carry these items.

Requirements for artillery tubes, recoil mechanisms, equilibrators, and gun cheek pads were prepared and submitted to Headquarters Services of Supply for shipment to the Continent. The figures used as a basis were obtained from those developed by other Armies in previous campaigns. (See Artillery Tube Chart on Page 118 of OVERLORD PLAN)

The supply section prepared, for the use of ordnance maintenance and depot companies in requisitioning spare parts loads, a special requisition form for each Standard Nomenclature List sub-group. A crew of one officer and twelve enlisted men, all parts specialists, were brought into the Army supply section for this purpose. Two thousand stencils were prepared in two weeks time for the production of these special forms.

The prepared requisition forms reduced, by a large percentage, the man hours normally necessary for the preparation of basic load requisitions. All available interchangeability information was listed with each item on the face of the requisition. Cross-reference between the many ordnance parts numbers was included with each item listed. Complete nomenclature description, and where applicable, size information was given. On subgroups, such as 2½T, requisitions were broken down into many separate requisitions. For example, 2½T Number 1 requisition was for parts that are common to all 2½T vehicles. Numbers 2 to 10 inclusive were requisitions for parts peculiar to the various models of 2½T vehicles. Separate requisitions were prepared for Auto-Lite and Delco-Remy electrical parts and anti-friction bearings using the unit manufacturer's number and interchanging into all the various ordnance numbers that might be used.

Use of the prepared requisition forms did not stop with the requisitioning of a basic load. A retained copy was used by the ordnance unit as follows:

1. Reference list of items stocked by main depots.
2. Quick reference interchangeability list.
3. Cross-reference of various ordnance part numbers.
4. Check list in the editing of requisitions.
5. Parts numbers used for the stocking of all groups.
6. Items stocked in parts common under Federal stock numbers.

Favorable comment was made by Services of Supply depots in regard to these requisitions because much time was saved in the filling of basic loads. Copies were sent to Services of Supply depots to be used in extracting requisitions to other depots. Request was made by the Chief Ordnance Officer, Washington, D. C., for a copy of these requisitions so that they could be studied for use in other theaters.

The supply section interchangeability personnel compiled interchangeability sheets on anti-friction bearings, Auto-Lite and Delco-Remy electrical parts. These charts were distributed to all ordnance maintenance and depot companies.

Upon completion of all basic load charts, a meeting was held with battalion supply officers, depot commanders, and depot officers in order to disseminate this information. The general supply layout was discussed showing channels of supply and naming depot companies designated as forward general, forward armored, main general purpose, main combat vehicle, and main armament. A complete explanation was given as to the use of the specially prepared requisition forms. A simplified and standardized method of depot operation was set forth for use by Third U. S. Army depots.

From this time until the movement of Army to the Continent, the supply section efforts were devoted to expediting critical items of 2½T and 7½A equipment and spare parts loads.

SECTION V

MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

The Maintenance chapter of the Ordnance Annex to Third U. S. Army Administrative Order Number 1 was completed on 7 April.

Ordnance units having been located where billets were available resulted mostly in using units being too far removed from proper supporting maintenance units. A study was made to determine the feasibility of relocating the maintenance units so they could support the same using units in the UNITED KINGDOM as planned for Continental operations. Such a rearrangement was found to be too impracticable because tactical units of different Corps were so intermingled that separate maintenance to each Corps could not be furnished in any given area. Another plan, which was also feasible, was finally adopted and put into use. In this, the UNITED KINGDOM was divided into maintenance areas and a maintenance battalion was assigned to each with the responsibility of contacting all Third U. S. Army troops within it and arranging for ordnance service.

The XV Corps at this time was located in the NORTH IRELAND Base Section and operating according to the desired plan of having supporting maintenance units within their area.

At this time Ordnance maintenance units did not have sufficient equipment or material to adequately maintain all the equipment in the respective areas. Arrangements were made for the maintenance units to do as much of the work as was possible and to refer any overflow to the proper Services of Supply installations.

A standard operating procedure for spot inspections was compiled and check forms prepared in order to facilitate and standardize all maintenance inspections.

Interchangeability charts for automotive spare parts, bearings, starters, generators, etc., were prepared and distributed to all Third U. S. Army Ordnance units. These charts, in many instances, enabled units to consolidate their stockages of spare parts and conserve valuable storage space, as well as their initial intent of showing what parts were interchangeable.

During the latter part of April, instructions were prepared on waterproofing vehicles for an amphibious landing on the Continent. This program was so arranged that all drivers and assistant drivers would receive adequate training in the waterproofing and de-waterproofing of vehicles. It was necessary to construct wading pools for testing waterproofed vehicles and this was accomplished with the assistance of the Third U. S. Army Engineer Section.

A series of check charts for required modifications throughout the Army were prepared and distributed to all Ordnance maintenance units. With the charts as a guide, the units checked the status of modifications on all Ordnance equipment of the using units and in turn accomplished the necessary requisitions for modification kits. This method of requisitioning kits was decided upon as it enabled the maintenance section to keep a constant check on the status of modifications.

In practically all cases units that were authorized ¼-ton and ¾-ton trucks with 12-Volt ignition systems were issued trucks with 6-Volt ignition systems in lieu thereof. A project had been approved authorizing additional radios in Third U. S. Army in connection with an artillery net. The radio sets required 12-Volt ignition systems and the supply of the required modification kits for conversion of these vehicles was critical. It was found necessary for the Army Ordnance Officer to control the release of these kits on a priority basis.

Early in June, the 2nd French Armored Division was assigned to the Third U. S. Army. This organization presented many maintenance problems as the type of equipment it had was different from that issued in the UNITED KINGDOM. Due to the unavailability of a heavy maintenance tank company, the 7th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company was assigned in direct support of the division to facilitate maintenance and supply and to acquaint the division with the Third U. S. Army maintenance and supply channels. Later this company was augmented by combat vehicle repair teams from a heavy maintenance tank company and by supply teams from a depot company.

A survey of the equipment in the division disclosed that a great percentage of its combat vehicles had been driven over many miles of desert and considerable maintenance was necessary. Difficulty had been experienced with its W-670 Engines in the M4A1 Light Tanks, and with the final drives of the Motor Carriage, M7. The M7 deficiencies were corrected by maintenance personnel of the division and 105 model W-670 Light Tank Engines were ordered from the UNITED STATES. All 2 1/2-ton trucks requiring fourth and fifth echelon repairs were turned in to Services of Supply and were repaired or replaced. In general, the division was able to supply its own maintenance and the supporting medium maintenance company then acted primarily as a supply agency.

In order to insure a standard procedure for the keeping of maintenance, as well as supply and evacuation records, a system was devised and forwarded to all Ordnance maintenance companies. A copy of subject letter, which is self-explanatory, is shown in Annex VIII.

Reports from the Continent indicated that the enemy was stringing wire across the roads at about a height of four feet. This action resulted in wrecking a number of ¼-ton and ¾-ton vehicles. Instructions were immediately prepared for mounting a wire cutter on the front of these types of vehicles.

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SECTION VI

AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

Conferences were held with Headquarters Services of Supply and units already established in the UNITED KINGDOM relative to current policies and procedures in the supply of ammunition.

The initial problem was to supply training ammunition to meet current requirements of units assigned to the Third U. S. Army. As no Army ammunition supply points were in existence, it was necessary to make arrangements with the Ordnance Office, Headquarters Services of Supply, to effect supply of ammunition from their installations until such time as Army installations could be established.

As units of the Third U. S. Army moved into areas originally occupied by First U. S. Army troops, ammunition installations formerly operated by the latter were taken over. At the same time new installations were established in strategic locations. The three principal installations were located near CAMMARTHEN (WALES), BRADLEY and BICKLAND.

After the supply procedure for ammunition had been firmly established, work was started on the preparation of basic load data to serve as the basis for combat loading of Third U. S. Army units. Conferences were held with representatives of various type units and with general and special staff sections in order to obtain a sound basis of combat loading. Upon approval by the interested staff sections, this basic load data was incorporated into basic load tables which were published as a directive to all troops. Third U. S. Army units then submitted requisitions to the Ordnance Officer and necessary steps were taken to furnish required amounts and types from Army or Services of Supply installations.

Concurrently with the supply of basic load ammunition, it was necessary to prepare and submit estimates of operational requirements on the Continent. These estimates were to include the ammunition necessary to build up an authorized reserve in addition to current maintenance requirements at such time as the Third U. S. Army became operational on the Continent. These estimated requirements were broken down into two phases, D ∕ 29 to D ∕ 42, and D ∕ 42 to D ∕ 90. As these estimated requirements were limited within tonnage allocations to the Third U. S. Army, several revisions were necessary. Basis of requirements was the unit of fire prescribed by the European Theater of Operations in a letter of 10 December 1943. A reserve of seven units of fire for units on the Continent by D ∕ 41 was planned and a maintenance requirement of one-third unit of fire per day was estimated from D ∕ 29 to D ∕ 90 broken down in two phases as indicated above.

Several weeks after the submission of these pre-scheduled supply requirements, new information was received concerning consumption of ammunition as experienced in other theaters; hence, requirements were revised and extended to include D ∕ 104. These requirements submitted on 25 May were subsequently revised again on 22 June with respect to anti-aircraft ammunition in view of additional new information received regarding consumption of that type of ammunition. (See chart - Annex VIII).

Ammunition companies of unknown ability were arriving in the UNITED KINGDOM from time to time. In order to insure that these companies were properly trained, the Army Ordnance Officer caused frequent visits and inspections to be made. Arrangements were made whereby those companies not operating Army installations were placed on duty in Services of Supply ammunition depots in order that they might become thoroughly familiar with handling of service types of ammunition. The training of these units was closely supervised in order that they might operate more efficiently upon arrival in the combat area.

As only one ammunition battalion headquarters was available in the Third U. S. Army, it was necessary for the Army Ordnance Officer to convert maintenance battalion headquarters into ammunition battalion headquarters for Continental operations. Courses of instruction were provided by a representative of the Ordnance Section to assist the battalion commanders in training their detachments for their new functions. A study was made of existing War Department publications and of directives which were published by various theaters of operation then active. On the basis of this study, a standard operating procedure for Ordnance ammunition groups, battalions, and companies was prescribed.

A general plan for the disposition of ammunition battalions and companies, as well as bomb disposal squads into forward, intermediate, and rear areas was formulated. Also, a tentative command channel for assignment of ammunition units was established. This plan was based on the employment of one battalion headquarters as an ammunition group headquarters which would act as the operating agency for the Army Ordnance Officer. This plan is diagrammatically illustrated by a chart. (See Annex IX).

Tonnage charts, indicating the amount of ammunition, in number of containers and number of rounds, that could be carried in each type standard vehicle were prepared. These tonnage charts were distributed to all combat troops as well as to ammunition units. A copy of the chart is shown in Annex X.

The ammunition portion of the Ordnance Annex to Administrative Order Number 3, dated 20 June 1944, (For Continental Operations) was prepared and is covered in Section I, paragraph 1.a (3), Section II, paragraph 2.a, 2.b, and Section IV, paragraph 13.a. (See Annex XI). Resupply to combat units was to be based on the replacement of expenditures from basic loads. To further eliminate unnecessary paper work, no requirement for the submission of daily expenditure reports by combat units was included in this directive. Instead of cumbersome written allocations, the only requirement placed upon combat units to obtain ammunition at ammunition supply points was the submission of a transportation order containing a certificate to the effect that amounts requested were to replace expenditures from basic loads.

In mid-June, as this headquarters was making final preparations for the supply of ammunition to those Army units still remaining in the UNITED KINGDOM, the Ordnance Officer, XII Corps, was charged with the responsibility of maintaining this supply until all such units departed for the Continent. In order to avoid leaving excess stocks of ammunition in supply points when Army ammunition companies were moved to the Continent, only minimum amounts of ammunition to meet basic load requirements of small units were stocked. Arrangements were made whereby large units would be authorized to draw basic load requirements direct from Services of Supply depots on the basis of transportation orders approved by XII Corps.





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CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

SECTION I

GENERAL

The pre-operational phase on the Continent was largely a matter of maintenance liaison between combat troops, Ordnance units and supply agencies in order to coordinate ordnance support for the proposed operation. Once again the major problem was supply and it was necessary to have expediting personnel on this matter at all times. To this end, the "Z" Echelon was left at CHELTENHAM and proved invaluable in expediting supplies to the Continent and in equipping the units still in the UNITED KINGDOM.

As Ordnance units were being broken in to field conditions during this period, frequent inspections were made for the purpose of stressing field sanitation, guard duty, dispersion, and camouflage discipline.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

On 8 July, the "Y" Echelon proceeded from TORT CAMP to NINE YEWS.

On 11 July, Ordnance Bulletin Number 4 was published and distributed to Ordnance units. (See Annex number XII).

The "Y" Echelon arrived on the Continent 18 July, disembarking at OMAHA BEACH. This made the section complete on the Continent except for two officers and two enlisted men ("Z" Echelon) remaining at CHELTENHAM.

Plans were drawn up to divide the Ordnance Section into two echelons, forward and rear. The original plan called for a small forward command group consisting of the Ordnance Officer, the operations subsection complete, and one officer and one enlisted man from the ammunition sub-section. The Executive Officer, together with the administration, supply, maintenance, and the balance of the ammunition subsections were to be contained in the rear echelon. This plan was later modified (as shown in Chapter III) during operations since the rapid movement of the Army presented adequate communications between the two echelons.

During this pre-operational period of 6 July to 1 August, it was necessary to augment the Ordnance Section with attached personnel consisting of six officers and six enlisted men to assist meeting operational requirements.

SECTION III

OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

After arriving on the Continent contacts were made with Ordnance units that were to be under Third U. S. Army control and as additional units arrived on the Continent they were assigned bivouac areas. Companies were assigned to battalions and battalions to groups in accordance with the general maintenance and ammunition plan for Third U. S. Army.

At this time the VIII Corps was operational under the First U. S. Army and supported by Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 84th Ordnance Battalion with the following Ordnance companies:

833rd Ordnance Depot Company.

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[illegible]th Ordnance Evacuation Company.
[illegible]1st Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank).
[illegible]51st Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank).
[illegible]7th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company.
[illegible]8th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company.
16th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company.
[illegible]0th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company.
[illegible]0th Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA).

As a result of a conference between the Ordnance Officers of the First and Third U. S. Armies, the Ordnance Officer of the latter agreed to furnish Ordnance support to the tactical units loaned to the First U. S. Army. In general this support consisted of one medium maintenance company for each Infantry Division and one heavy maintenance company (tank) for each Armored Division.

Ordnance troops of the Third U. S. Army were organized into three groups. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 69th Ordnance Group headed the forward maintenance and supply battalions and their attached companies, while the rear maintenance and supply battalions were controlled by Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 70th Ordnance Group. The 51th Ordnance Battalion acted as a provisional group headquarters, controlling ammunition and bomb disposal activities.

About the last of July, a check list was received for Ordnance observers which included questions pertaining to information which was desired by the Military Training Division, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, and the Ordnance School, Aberdeen Proving Ground. The purpose of this questionnaire was to collect information which could be used to train replacements of both officers and enlisted men from the Ordnance schools in the UNITED STATES.

A situation map and maps showing locations of Ordnance units were prepared and plans were made for the support of tactical units in accordance with various tactical plans then being considered. Many changes in the plans and utilization of Ordnance units were discussed. These changes were made necessary because many of the units were not as yet present on the Continent, and their availability was more or less indefinitely postponed. Furthermore, since the Order of Battle was changed completely before the Army became operational and frequently thereafter, regrouping of Ordnance units to furnish adequate support was a continuous problem.

On 26 July, in anticipation of the rapid changes in the disposition of Ordnance troops, a daily station list was established and distributed to all units. This list gave the coordinates, road location, and attachment. On 31 July, fragmentary changes of administrative orders were also published after being submitted to AC of S, G-4, by 1600, daily.

At the close of this period the personnel status was as follows:

Personnel assigned and present on the Continent

Officers	Warrant Officers	Enlisted Men
[illegible]430	50	9197

Personnel assigned but not yet arrived

Officers	Warrant Officers	Enlisted Men
211	21	5560

(The above figures include those of the units attached to the First U. S. Army.)

SECTION III

SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

The supply section, after arrival on the Continent, made numerous visits to the Ordnance Section, First U. S. Army, and the Advance Section, Communications Zone, for the purpose of discussing supply procedures. Since First U. S. Army controlled Advance Section Communications Zone and all ordnance supply during the initial stages of our preoperational period, it was necessary to go through that office to obtain urgently needed items which our depot companies were unable to supply from the stock brought over. Arrangements were made with Advance Section Communications Zone and First U. S. Army for certain of their depots to support Third U. S. Army until Communications Zone arrived on the Continent and took over supply responsibility. These conferences and visits continued throughout the month of July. The method used by the First U. S. Army of controlling issues of major items and and certain critical items was studied, but it was decided that the procedure for the Third U. S. Army would be as outlined in Ordnance Annex to Administrative Order Number 5, i.e., items would be obtained on properly authenticated requisition, certificate of combat loss, or direct exchange.

During the pre-operational period much difficulty was experienced because units arrived on the Continent short initial T/E equipment and organizational spare parts and accessories. Individual requisitions for the shortages were approved and forwarded to Communications Zone for action through Advance Section Communications Zone. During a visit to the Ordnance Section, Communications Zone Headquarters at a later date, a representative of the supply section was advised that it was impossible for Communications Zone to handle the requisitions on an individual basis and requested that they be consolidated for T/E shortages and one requisition submitted to cover all shortages regardless of whether they were initial issue or replacement. This was accomplished and units were instructed to submit new requisitions for shortages on supporting ordnance units.

Many ordnance units arrived on the Continent with shortages of major items such as shop trucks, tool sets, and shortages in basic load of spare parts. These shortages were relieved to a great extent by the action taken by the representative of the Army Ordnance Officer in CHELTENHAM who was able to obtain releases for most of the shortages which were lifted to the Continent by ordnance units arriving at later dates. The evacuation companies were used to good advantage in this respect. Several truck companies were utilized to deliver spare parts to the Continent for the Second French Armored Division and Third Army Ordnance depots and maintenance companies.

During the month of July the Army Ordnance Officer made two visits to the UNITED KINGDOM to further expedite the supply of tools and equipment to ordnance units remaining there, and to expedite equipping of the Second French Armored Division inasmuch as plans had been formulated to commit this division earlier than originally anticipated.

Ordnance units were assigned to support specific tactical organizations both in supply and maintenance. Divisions were authorized to contact depot companies through their respective maintenance battalions or companies, whereas other tactical organizations were supported by the proper type maintenance unit which was responsible for their supply and maintenance.

At the request of the Ordnance Officer, Twelfth U. S. Army Group, figures were compiled on major assemblies and major item reserves required to fill the Army "pipeline", i.e., within army maintenance and supply units, and that which the Army Ordnance Officer considered necessary for the Communications Zone to maintain as marked for the Third U. S. Army in order to give proper support.

Much of the time of the supply section was spent on reports, the responsibility for the preparation of which was charged to that section. The most important of these reports were:

1. Consolidated Monthly Status Report on major ordnance items showing "Authorized" and "On Hand" quantities, compiled from "Ordnance Materiel in the Hands of Troops and Combat Loss Reports" received from units as of the 20th of each month. Units submitted reports in quintuplicate for distribution, one each to Chief Ordnance Officer, Communications Zone; Ordnance Officer, Twelfth U. S. Army Group; Army Ordnance Officer; AC of S, G-4; and supply file. The same distribution was made on the consolidated report except that three additional copies were furnished AC of S, G-4, for forwarding; two to AC of S, G-4, Communications Zone; and one to AC of S, G-4, Twelfth U. S. Army Group.

2. Weekly Ordnance Supply Activity Report to Army Ordnance Officer based on reports from forward and rear Ordnance groups listing major items and tonnage received and issued.

3. A Daily Report on the Status of Stocks included only those items of a critical nature and was rendered to AC of S, G-4, for consolidation and submission to Twelfth U. S. Army Group.

SECTION V

MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

As maintenance units arrived on the Continent they were assigned to either the forward (69th) Group or the rear (70th) Group. The forward Group was to be composed of forward and intermediate battalions with the forward battalions in direct support of combat units. Medium maintenance companies were to be in support of infantry divisions and heavy maintenance tank companies for armored divisions. The intermediate battalions were to receive the overflow of work from the forward battalions and would either repair the material or evacuate it to the rear Group, depending upon the tactical situation and the time element involved. The intermediate battalions would also be responsible for the evacuation of unserviceable equipment from the forward collecting points operated by the maintenance companies of the forward battalions. The rear Group having mainly heavy maintenance companies was to evacuate from the forward Group. Major items, major and minor assemblies, and parts were repaired and returned to depot stock. Unrepairable material was stripped of serviceable accessories.

During the latter part of July, the hedgerow cutter, to be placed on medium tanks, light tanks, and self-propelled 105mm Howitzers, was developed and tested. The Commanding General witnessed the tests and directed that all tank units be equipped with this device.

The first target was one per platoon and when this target had been accomplished, then two per platoon. Some of the steel was preserved at the beaches from tetrahedrons that had been placed there by the Germans as beach blocks. One wrecker was lost during this operation as a result of a land mine exploding.

The Navy was approached and asked to procure welding rod and oxygen from ENGLAND as all available stocks on the Continent were exhausted. The Navy cooperated fully in this situation and also obtained from their own stocks many bottles of oxygen and acetylene in addition to tons of welding rod. This material was delivered by them to CHERBOURG for the Third U. S. Army. Upon completion of this fabricating mission 1147 hedgerow cutters had been constructed.

SECTION VI

AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

Upon arrival on the Continent it was realized that even though all units arriving should have complete basic load of ammunition in their possession and that all personnel should have been qualified in the use of their personal arm, there would be many calls for ammunition to fill shortages in basic loads. The Ammunition sub-section of the Advance Section Communications Zone was contacted in order to learn the source of supply to meet these anticipated demands.

As Advance Section Communications Zone had not yet become operational, First U. S. Army controlled all ammunition supply points on the NORMANDY Peninsula, and it was therefore necessary to obtain approval from the Ordnance Officer, First U. S. Army, for any issues made to Third U. S. Army units. First U. S. Army Ordnance agreed to Third U. S. Army units being supplied from ammunition depot #101 until this headquarters became operational.

In most instances the quantities of ammunition requested from Depot #101 were negligible, the only major issues being to the 4th Armored Division. This division obtained permission to turn in the basic load of anti-tank mines and to displace tonnage space on vehicles with other types of ammunition, principally small arms. Due to hedgerow fighting it was also permitted to draw a considerable amount of 57mm canister ammunition in excess of its basic load.

As no ammunition supply points or depots were required during the month of July, ammunition companies were assigned the duties of collecting abandoned United States ammunition and storing enemy ammunition located in the Army area. After collection and segregation, this ammunition was delivered to Communications Zone depots.

Even though the Army was non-operational, bomb disposal squads were indispensible, as unexploded bombs, artillery duds, and booby traps were plentiful.

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About the 29th of July it was evident that due to inadequacy of port facilities and the clearance of unloading ships across over the beaches, previous plans for ammunition supply to the Third U. S. Army must be disregarded. On 28 July, a revised plan covering immediate and future minimum requirements was submitted to the Commanding General, Advance Section Communications Zone. In general this plan, which was approved by higher headquarters, provided for sufficient ammunition to fill the pipelines to the Army and to maintain a reserve of three units of fire in Army and Communications Zone depots and ASPs. A copy of the letter requesting these requirements was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: TPW
Date: 28 July 1944

28 July 1944

AG 471 GNMCO

Subject: Ammunition for Future Operation.

To : Commanding General, Advance Section, Communications Zone, APO 113, U. S. Army.

1. In order that Third Army may be prepared to undertake a future operation, it is considered necessary that a sufficient amount of ammunition to charge the army "pipe lines" be readily available to the Army.

2. There is attached hereto a list of ammunition, marked Inclosure #1, which it is desired be placed north of the probable area of entry into combat of the Third Army. It is suggested that the area in the vicinity of BRICQUEBEC is highly desirable for this purpose. This list does not include sufficient ammunition to charge the entire "pipe line" of the Third Army but includes that which based on present forecast will be sufficient to charge the "pipe line" of the troops engaged in initial Third Army operations. The amount of artillery ammunition is definitely predicated on the probable mission and the anticipated expenditure rate. Such additional ammunition should also be available in Advance Section Communications Zone hands to maintain a level of the quantities listed on the attached chart so as to replace daily expenditures. In this connection, for initial operation, the Army Ordnance Ammunition Group (313th Ammunition Battalion) will be the sole agent of the army in drawing such ammunition.

3. There is inclosed herewith a list of ammunition, marked as Inclosure #2. The ammunition listed on this inclosure has a weight of approximately 7,000 tons. It is requested that immediate releases be given for this ammunition so that Third Army may place it in a static dump to be immediately available to form an Advance ASP when Third Army becomes operative. Upon receipt of approval of this request, information will be furnished as to the location to which delivery of ammunition should be made.

4. It is requested that this headquarters be informed at the earliest practicable date when Third Army may start drawing ammunition against these requirements.

For the Commanding General:

2 Inclosures:
#1 - Ammunition List (for area north of combat)
#2 - Ammunition List (for static dump)

Ammunition companies of Third U. S. Army were loaned to Advance Section Communications Zone for the purpose of giving them field training in the handling of ammunition and also to help the Ordnance Officer, Advance Section Communications Zone, handle the large quantities of ammunition being moved from the beaches to depots.

The Army Ordnance Officer and the Ordnance Officer, VIII Corps, agreed to expand VIII Corps ASPs in order to have a small Army reserve of ammunition properly located when operations commenced. Army ammunition companies were loaned to the VIII Corps in order to handle this ammunition.

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Third U. S. Army became operational at noon on 1 August 1944. Its rate of advance was considerably faster than had been anticipated and a great deal of adjustment was necessary in order to maintain close ordnance support. A good example of this was the placing of heavy maintenance tank companies in support of armored divisions. In such a rapidly moving situation it was almost impossible for this type of unit with its heavy equipment to keep pace with the division and still perform its primary mission. Subsequently, companies of this type were attached to ordnance collecting points, which arrangement proved more satisfactory to all concerned.

The supply of ammunition was a major problem at this time and a considerable amount of transportation was needed. To this end the Army Ordnance Officer had tank transporters utilized as auxiliary transportation.

A standard system of requesting transportation from the AC of S, G-4, for transporting ammunition was attempted but failed because trucks were not always available at the moment they were needed. Therefore, eight Quartermaster Truck Companies were attached to the Ordnance Section for this purpose, and in addition all Evacuation Companies were made available.

Movement of units and supplies during this period was very difficult. The long main supply roads were heavily loaded with traffic and were bottle-necked at AVRANCHES where the fighting was heaviest. This exceedingly rapid movement of the Army necessitated equally rapid displacement of Ordnance maintenance and supply in order to maintain close Ordnance support.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

Upon becoming operational the Ordnance Section commenced functioning in two echelons, with the forward echelon moving to a new location near BEAUCHAMPS (T-22). The forward echelon consisted of the Ordnance Officer, the Operations Section, and part of the Ammunition Section. Later it became necessary to augment the officer personnel of this forward group with three officers from the rear group. These included an executive for the forward echelon and two officers for the Ammunition sub-section. On 3 August, the rear echelon moved to a new location at BEAUCHAMPS (T-22). On 9 August, the forward echelon moved to a location west of POILLEY (Y-99), one mile off Highway N175 on 0715. On 11 August, the rear echelon moved to a location two miles east of POILLEY (Y-99).

On 12 August, an Ordnance Technical Intelligence Unit assigned to Headquarters European Theater of Operations, and attached to Headquarters Twelfth U. S. Army Group was further attached to the Ordnance Section, Third U. S. Army. This intelligence unit, consisting of four officers and four enlisted men, sent one copy of its reports directly to the following: Headquarters European Theater of Operations, Headquarters Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, and Headquarters Twelfth U. S. Army Group. Two copies were sent to the Army Ordnance Officer, one of which in turn was sent to the AC of S, G-2. All information available to the Army Ordnance Officer as to enemy installations, enemy equipment, and other technical data of interest was furnished to the intelligence group.

The forward echelon moved to a location approximately five miles north of LE MANS (Z-90) on 15 August and the rear echelon moved to a location north of LE MANS (Z-90) at ST. SABINE (Z-82) on 17 August. On 20 August, the forward echelon moved to a location northeast of BRAIN (W-15) on 0715. On 25 August, the forward echelon moved to a location near COUCY (W-85) and on 27 August, the rear echelon moved to the same location. On 30 August, the forward echelon moved to a location five miles northeast of SENS (X-62) on 0725 near THORIGNY (X-77).

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SECTION III

OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

At a special conference, original plans for the commencement of operations were reviewed. At the same time, the Ordnance Officer instructed each sub-section to submit a weekly report of their activities, as of 1800 each Saturday. These reports were consolidated and presented to the Commanding General for his information. They furnished a brief summary of Ordnance activities for the preceding week, hitting only the highlights which could affect tactical decisions.

A Scoreboard Section, consisting of two officers and two enlisted men, was set up to keep a record of captured, destroyed, and lost material. This scoreboard was corrected by factual evidence once a week.

Fragmentary changes to Administrative Orders were prepared by the Operations Section and submitted to AC of S, G-4, showing supply points opened as of 011200 August, as follows:

ASP A01 - Three and one-half miles east of ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMPTE (T-19) on Highway 0715.

ASP A02 - On Highway N805, three miles west of CARENTAN (T-18).

ASP A03 - On 0101, six miles southwest of PERIERS (T-27), one mile from road junction 0753 and 0666.

3d4th Ordnance Depot Company (Main Armament Depot) - three miles southwest of BRICQUEBEC (Q-10) on Highway N802.

98th Ordnance Depot Company (Main General Purpose Depot) - three miles southwest of BRICQUEBEC (Q-10) on Highway N802.

837th Ordnance Depot Company (Main Combat Vehicle Depot) - one mile southwest of road junction N802 and 0750.

899th Ordnance Depot Company (Advance Depot) - 1 mile southwest of ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMPTE (T-19) off Highway N400 near CATTEVILLE.

The Group Commanders submitted plans for the operation of their organizations, and after discussion with the Army Ordnance Officer, in the light of the current tactical situation, were adopted. These plans resulted in rearrangement of units within the Groups.

Personnel of the Maintenance Section implemented the Supply Section. This was made necessary since the rapid movement of the Army during this period required that emphasis be placed on supply of major items rather than maintenance work. This personnel was employed particularly to expedite critical supply items.

As in previous months, it was necessary to augment the number of personnel in the various sub-sections to assist in meeting operational requirements. Attachments were made to the extent of thirteen officers and sixteen enlisted men. The specific needs for this personnel were as follows:

Officers

4 - Ordnance Technical Intelligence Unit
1 - Liaison, from Ninth U. S. Army
1 - Liaison, from Twelfth U. S. Army Group
1 - Liaison, from French Forces.
2 - Attached and then assigned to complete T/O strength.
4 - Assist in sub-sections.

Enlisted Men

4 - Ordnance Technical Intelligence Unit.
12 - Assist in sub-sections.

During this period the following awards were given to personnel of Third U. S. Army Ordnance units:

Purple Heart.....32

First casualties (killed and wounded) among personnel in Army Ordnance units due to enemy action occurred during this period and totaled seventy.

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The Operations Section at this time assumed the duties more nearly conforming to its normal function. Furthermore, constant liaison with G-4 was established to maintain situation maps indicating the disposition of tactical and service troops.

To move the large amount of tonnage carried by the Main Depot Companies, Quartermaster Truck Companies were used. A portion of a depot was moved forward to a new area and set up before the remaining portion left the old area, thus continuous operation was maintained.

The 2Lth, 51Lth, and 105rd Ordnance Battalions were placed in direct support of VIII Corps, XV Corps, and XX Corps, respectively. These were the "Forward Battalions", supported in turn by the Intermediate Battalions, and the 70th Ordnance Group.

The total number of Army Ordnance troops under the command of the Army Ordnance Officer at this time, in FRANCE, were:

Officers	Enlisted Men
717	11,856

The number of troops assigned but not yet arrived were:

Officers	Enlisted Men
68	2,028

During the second week of August the combat loading of vehicles was begun. This was accomplished by certain units in the 70th Ordnance Group. This procedure was according to the Ordnance Plan for operations on the Continent.

Various and rapid changes of the tactical situation made it necessary to keep the organization of battalions in the 70th Ordnance Group very flexible. As a result, no using unit was without adequate ordnance support at any time.

Following is a copy of the Operations Report as of 26 August:

1. In the BREST area, one battalion, with attached companies, is providing maintenance and supply for the VIII Corps. The BRITTANY Base Section supplements this battalion with maintenance and supply, and, as the situation develops will take over all collecting points, captured depots, ammunition dumps, and other similar installations. BRITTANY Base Section is providing maintenance to the VIII Corps to the maximum of their ability. After the reduction of BREST and LORIENT, Ammunition Depot #13, and any other Third Army ASPs, will immediately revert to the BRITTANY Base Section, and all Third Army Ordnance Troops will be withdrawn from this area.

2. It was necessary to again move the 70th Ordnance Group, with its three heavy depots, further east to the FOUGERES-VITRE-FOREST. Because of widely separated operations, the responsibility for maintenance and supply has been divided as follows:

(a) The area between the N and S line through STE CALAIS and the N and S line through ORLEANS has been made the responsibility of the 70th Ordnance Group.

(b) The 69th Ordnance Group is responsible for the area forward of the N and S line through ORLEANS.

(c) The area from the N and S line through STE CALAIS, west of the support battalion of VIII Corps, is now the responsibility of the Advance Section Communications Zone or BRITTANY Base Section.

3. Group Commanders have been charged with providing the following in their respective areas:

1. Maintenance and supply of all troops within the area.
2. Maintenance and supply of all troops passing through the area.
3. Provision of Ordnance Road Patrols.
4. In conjunction with Corps, where applicable, provision of Collecting Points.
5. Salvage of unusable Ordnance material - either repair or evacuate to the rear echelon.

4. The 69th Ordnance Group is now constituted as follows:

Supporting	Supporting
3[illegible] Ordnance Battalion	**2Lth Ordnance Battalion**
12[illegible] Ord MM Co (83rd Inf Div)	7th Ord MM Co
10Lth Ord MM Co (29th Inf Div)	L7th Ord MM Co (35th Inf Div)
128th Ord MM Co	127th Ord MM Co (LOth Inf Div)
293rd Ord MM Co (2nd Inf Div)	293rd Ord Maint Co (AA)
503th Ord Maint Co (AA)	501st Ord MM Co (Tk) (Lth Ind Div)
531st Ord MM Co (Tk) (6th Armd D)	5L5th Ord MM Co (PA)
84th Ord Dep Co	833th Ord Dep Co
5L3rd Ord MM Co (8th Inf Div)	5L4.7th Ord MAM Co
3530th Ord MAM Co	5L4.8th Ord MAM Co

Supporting

113rd Ordnance Battalion

135th Ord MM Co (79th Inf Div)
11[illegible]th Ord MM Co
29[illegible]th Ord MM Co (5th Inf Div)
29[illegible]st Ord Maint Co (AA)
5[illegible]th Ord MM Co (Tk) (7th Armd Div)
7[illegible]0th Ord Dep Co
5[illegible],5th Ord MAM Co
35[illegible]th Ord MAM Co

INTERMEDIATE BATTALIONS

3[illegible]th Ordnance Battalion	1[illegible]th Ordnance Battalion	3[illegible]th Ordnance Bn.
5[illegible]th Ord MM Co (Tk)	5[illegible]st Ord MM Co (PA)	305th Ord Maint Co (AA)
81[illegible]st Ord Dep Co	3[illegible],60[illegible]th Ord MAM Co (AM Trk)	520[illegible]th Ord MM Co (PA)
	35[illegible]th Ord MAM Co	9[illegible]3rd Ord MAM Co
	3[illegible]10th Ord MAM Co	3[illegible]46th Ord MAM Co
	3[illegible]63rd Ord MM Co	3515th Ord MAM Co

10th Ordnance Battalion	EVACUATION
18[illegible]th Ord Dep Co	1[illegible]th Ordnance Battalion
27[illegible]th Ord MM Co (AA)(98th AA Brigade)	L[illegible]th Ord Evac Co
537th Ord MM Co (PA)	L[illegible]st Evac Co
90[illegible]nd Ord MAM Co	L[illegible]2nd Evac Co
3[illegible]2nd Ord MAM Co	L[illegible]3rd Evac Co
3525th Ord MAM Co	L[illegible]8th Ord Evac Co

5. The 70th Ordnance Group is now constituted as follows:

19th Ordnance Battalion	26th Ordnance Battalion
3[illegible]3rd Ord MAM Co	3[illegible]th Ord MM Co
26th Ord MM Co	6[illegible]th Ord MAM Co
5[illegible]7th Ord MM Co (PA)	L[illegible]6th Ord Evac Co
985th Ord Dep Co	817th Ord Dep Co
	98[illegible]th Ord Dep Co
	3[illegible]th Ord Dep Co

72th Ordnance Battalion	66th Ordnance Battalion
5[illegible]0th Ord MM Co (PA)	9[illegible]3rd Ord MM Co (Tk)
L[illegible]th Ord Evac Co	513th Ord MM Co (PA)
90[illegible]th Ord MAM Co	296th Ord MM Co
581st Ord MM Co (AA)	3513th Ord MAM Co
501st Ord MM Co (Tk)	3537th O-L MAM Co

312th Ordnance Battalion	317th Ordnance Battalion
910th Ord MAM Co	3[illegible]th Ord MM Co
911th Ord MAM Co	3508th Ord MAM Co
L[illegible]7th Ord MAM Co	
85[illegible]st Ord MAM Co	
911th Ord MAM Co	

6. ASPs and Ammunition Depots are still being kept well forward. Reconnaissance is made well in advance so that the installations are set up immediately as needed. The following installations are now open:

ASP 4605	ASP 4[illegible]	ASP 16
ASP 46	ASP 4[illegible]	ASP 4[illegible]
Ammo Dep #13	Ammo Dep #19	Ammo Dep #17
ASP 18		

7. Personnel and vehicles present on the Continent are as follows:

Officers:	717
Enlisted Men:	11,856
M/V Vehicles:	3,[illegible]34
Total Vehicles:	3,790

SECTION IV

SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

In order to conserve track, particularly of the medium tank chassis type, from unnecessary wear and tear, the Commanding General directed that no heavy track laying vehicles except light tanks would be issued to units operating on the BREST Peninsula until they started east and had passed a North-South line through MENDES (T-00). The armored divisions (Lth and 6th) were to be refitted in the FOUGERES area but because of the rapid movement of the Army, the refitting of these two divisions actually took place further east. All types of track were critical and every effort was made to conserve them.

At a conference held by the Chief Ordnance Officer, Communications Zone, about the middle of August, arrangements were made whereby major items and major unit assemblies would be supplied to the Third U. S. Army based upon a daily status report furnished by the Third U. S. Army. Replenishment requisitions for spare parts storage were to be submitted three times a month: on the fifth, fifteenth, and twenty-fifth. Any emergency requisitions would be filled by Advance Section, Communications Zone. This basis was agreed to providing that the Third U. S. Army pipeline would be filled with parts since the Army was still not fully equipped with initial issue of second echelon parts.

In response to a request from the Communications Zone for reports of battle losses of materiel, the following reports were submitted.

Consolidated Report, 1 to 1L August.
Consolidated Report, 15 to 20 August.
Daily Report, beginning 21 August.

The Daily Report on the Status of Stocks was discontinued and AC of S, G-4 Periodic Report substituted therefor. This report was submitted each Sunday for the preceding week and included the following supply information:

Critical Items.
Battle Losses of Vehicles and Artillery.
Adequacy of Artillery, Small Arms and Combat Vehicle Replacement.
Enemy Equipment Released.
Tonnage received in Army Area.

The Daily Ordnance Status Supply Report compiled from daily reports received from each Ordnance battalion was revised to include the following information:

Authorized Reserve.
Available.
Repairable but not ready for issue.
Backorder (Main battalions only).
Shortage of established level.
Battle losses previous 2L hours.

As of 8 August, axes of supply from the FOUGERES area extended in several directions: to the BREST Peninsula, to ST. NAZAIRE, to ST. MALO, and to ALENCON through LAVAL and LE MANS. By the end of August, the latter axis had been extended eastward and branched to REIMS, CHALONS, and VITRY-LE-FRANCOIS.

On 21 August, the BRITTANY Base Section was charged by the Communications Zone with the supply of all units operating on the BRITTANY Peninsula. Thus the VIII Corps, which was in action on the peninsula, was authorized to deal directly with the base section depots at RENNES since the Main Army Supply Battalions had been moved to the east and supply from that source was impracticable.

Battle losses at this time were considerable, particularly of M8 Armored Cars and Medium Tanks. Much difficulty was encountered in the replacement of this equipment since great distances were involved and tank transporters had to be used in order to conserve track. Lack of rail transportation, and heavy traffic on the main supply roads, further aggravated the situation.

Ordnance units continued to lift to the Continent major items, tools, spare parts and rolling reserve. The release of these items had been obtained by the representative of the Army Ordnance Officer at CHELTENHAM to fill shortages in units already on the Continent.

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Replacement personnel being sent to the Continent were organized into companies and utilized to transport replacement vehicles loaded with spare parts and towed artillery destined for Third U. S. Army depots and replacement pools.

For the period of August the total receipts and issues of the following major items were:

	Received	Issued
Light Tanks	150	117
Medium Tanks	319	289
Combat Vehicles	526	257
Artillery (over 57mm)	135	77
General Purpose Vehicles	2,869	2,794

It was necessary during this month to move the three main depots as follows:

Armament--3[illegible]th Ordnance Depot.

Closed in the vicinity of BRICQUEBEC (Q-10) and opened in vicinity of LANDEAN (Y-48), 6 August.

Closed in the vicinity of LANDEAN (Y-48) and opened in the vicinity of STE. SABINE (Z-25), 17 August.

Closed in the vicinity of STE. SABINE (Z-25) and opened in the vicinity of FONTAINEBLEAU (X-28), 27 August.

General Purpose--98[illegible]th Ordnance Depot.

Same as Armament Depot.

Combat Vehicles--837th Ordnance Depot.

Same as Armament Depot.

These depots performed the mission of supplying Army Ordnance Depots.

SECTION V

MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

As a means of expediting and controlling maintenance, the 70th Ordnance Group was directed to establish a Control Point. This was accomplished and a battalion within the group was designated to operate it.

As all equipment and material, that was meant for maintenance, repair, exchange or salvage, was directed to this point, the flow of work to the maintenance companies in the battalion was controlled and regulated. In this way a large volume of work was systematically and efficiently handled. It was found that by locating maintenance companies close to the control point the amount of work that could be handled was further increased.

To assist in salvaging, sorting, and distributing the work to the various maintenance units, a number of qualified mechanics were taken from the companies and stationed at the control point.

During the first half of August, hedgerow cutters were still being constructed. Up to 1 August, the 2nd French Armored Division had received a total of forty-nine of these devices. The cutters had not been produced in sufficient quantities to meet the total requirements of the 5th Armored Division but production was continued on a twenty-four hour basis and all requirements were eventually met. By the end of August, the mission of fabricating the cutters was completed and the following totals had been constructed: for Light Tanks - 230; for Medium Tanks - 87[illegible]; for Self-Propelled 105 Howitzers, M7 - 43.

After the break-through at AVRANCHES and the subsequent rapid advance of the Army, it was found unnecessary to have a heavy maintenance tank company in support of an Armored Division. The divisions had adequate support from the organic maintenance battalion and the tank companies were required to support self-propelled artillery, separate tank battalions, and tank destroyer battalions.

During the month of August the Maintenance Section, in addition to its normal duties, also assisted the Supply Section in expediting critical items of supply and maintained close contact with the Ordnance Control Points. Maintenance was controlled by the Army Ordnance Officer by means of daily meetings with the Group Commanders, Maintenance personnel, and other personnel concerned.

The Maintenance area on 27 August were as follows:

1. The area between the North and South line through STS. CALAIS (Y-79[illegible]) and the North and South line through ORLEANS was made the responsibility of the 70th Ordnance Group.

2. The area forward of the North and South line through ORLEANS (P-6725) was made the responsibility of the 69th Ordnance Group.

General locations of Headquarters of Maintenance Battalions were as follows:

69th Ordnance Group

Date of Opening	Location	Coordinates
4 August 194[illegible]	W of LA HAYE PESNEL	T-[illegible]
9	SE of POILLEY	T-39
13	SW LA BARONNIERE	T-66
16	SW STE SABINE	Z-[illegible]
21	NW BAYU	W-27
26	W [illegible] PONT-AUX-LOUPS	W-[illegible]
31	NE THORIGNY	X-47

10th Ordnance Battalion

4 August 194[illegible]	NW FERRIERS	T-26
6	Vicinity of LA HAYE PESNEL	T-22
9	SE POILLEY	T-39
12	NW of VALIES	T-[illegible]
17	N of ALENCON	Z-38
19	SE LA LOUPE	P-00
26	W FONTAINEBLEAU	X-29

14th Ordnance Battalion

4 August 194[illegible]	Near LES PERQUES	T-10
12	S LA BARONNIERE	T-66
21	NE ROCHES	T-09
26	W of ORNE	X-56
27	NE MONTARGIS	X-24

185th Ordnance Battalion

4 August 194[illegible]	N of R/J 0127-0612	Q-10
9	E ST JAMES	T-30
13	SE LAVAL	T-71
18	E BOULAYE	T-75
19	SE LA COLOMBE	P-21
26	NE CORLIE	Z-25
31	SW FONTAINEBLEAU	X-29

193rd Ordnance Battalion

4 August 194[illegible]	Near LE VALDECIR	T-10
6	Vicinity of ST MARTIN DE LANDELLES	T-40
9	SW VITRE	T-31
16	N ST AUBINS	T-45
18	NW COURVILLE-SUR-EURE	P-10
24	NW BRANDEVILLE	W-79
25	NW MILLY	X-09
30	SW CHANTEMARIE	X-59
31	Vicinity of HAUTVILLERS	T-26

24th Ordnance Battalion

4 August 194[illegible]	W of LA HAYE PESNEL	Q-22
6	E of PONTORSON	T-20
9	SW LA FONTENELLE-SUR-MANCE	X-69
22	SE LA COLOMBE	P-21
23	S of CHILLIERS-AUX-BOIS	W-85
25	NW COURTERAY at [illegible]AUVILLE	X-45
26	W SENS	X-56
27	N VILLEMAY	X-66
31	Vicinity of VATRY	S-43

514th Ordnance Battalion

4 August 194[illegible]	W of CARENTAN	T-58
6	S of ST JAMES	T-39
9	NW LE BOURGNEUF	Y-66
10	N of VALIES	T-84
12	SW of BEAUFAY	Z-57
16	NW ALENCON	Z-38
22	S of VILDES	W-24
27	E of MONTARGIS	X-34

516th Ordnance Battalion

4 August 194[illegible]	Near LES PERQUES	Q-10
6	VILLEDIEU LES POELES	T-35
9	W of ALAND AIRE	T-35
10	W of HAMELIN	T-30
16	E of CORLIS	Z-25
25	W of PUISEAUX	X-08

520th Ordnance Battalion

Date of Opening	Location	Coordinates
4 August 194[illegible]	Near LE VILDECIR	T-10
9	SE POILLEY	T-39
12	E of VALIES	T-84
16	N of ALENCON	Z-38
22	E of GAULVEN near BREST	P-12

590th Ordnance Battalion

19 August 194[illegible]	N of ALENCON	Z-38
20	N CHATEAUNEUF	X-72
24	N GUERSEY	W-44

70th Ordnance Group

Date of Opening	Location	Coordinates
4 August 194[illegible]	Near BRICQUEBEC	Q-00
9	Vicinity of FOUGERES	T-48
18	W of ST. SABINE	Z-35
27	SW of FONTAINEBLEAU	X-28

19th Ordnance Battalion

4 August 194[illegible]	SW of BRICQUEBEC	Q-10
9	SW of LANDEAN	T-48
26	W of CHATEAUDUN	W-26

66th Ordnance Battalion

4 August 194[illegible]	Near LES PERQUES	Q-10
9	SW of LANDEAN	T-48
18	W of ST SABINE	Z-35
30	NW of FONTAINEBLEAU	X-28

79th Ordnance Battalion

4 August 194[illegible]	Near LES PERQUES	Q-10
9	SW of LANDEAN	T-38
18	E of ST SABINE	Z-35
30	W of FONTAINEBLEAU	X-28

312th Ordnance Battalion

4 August 194[illegible]	Near LES PERQUES	Q-10
9	SW of LANDEAN	T-38
18	W of ST. SABINE	Z-25
23	W of COURTALAIN	W-16

317th Ordnance Battalion

4 August 194[illegible]	SW of BRICQUEBEC	Q-00
9	SW of LANDEAN	T-48
18	W of ST SABINE	Z-35

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SECTION VI

AMMUNITION SUPPLY [illegible]

As the Third U. S. Army became operational it immediately assumed control of four ammunition supply points which had been previously established by the VIII Corps. As three of these installations were too far to the rear adequately serve the using units they were ordered forward to Advance Section Communications Zone on 3 August. In one retained installation, namely, Ammunition Supply Point #4[illegible], in the vicinity of [illegible], storage was built [illegible] tons and continued to serve VIII Corps. At the same time Army Ammunition Depot #1 was established in the vicinity of [illegible]. The original target level of this depot as originally prepared shortly was [illegible] tons, a [illegible] which was later [illegible] to meet the Corps requirements. Rear depots were used to good advantage at this time for completing and consolidating basic loads.

In the night of 3-4 August, the Army ammunition units received their first real combat experience as Depot Number 1 was heavily bombed by the enemy. Approximately 6,000 tons of ammunition was destroyed (about 90%), principally by direct hits and as a result of fragments caused by the [illegible]. Little damage was done to the [illegible] by the [illegible] Automatic weapons fire [illegible] to fly over the [illegible]. A Army Ordnance Officer [illegible] that safety distances should be increased to the extent that it would be impracticable for the enemy to attack other installations. The following safety distances were established on 7 August:

1. Maximum of six tons per stack and minimum of ten yards between stacks.

2. Maximum of thirty tons per group (groups contain stacks) and minimum of [illegible] between groups.

3. Maximum of [illegible] tons per bay (bays contain groups) and a minimum of 150 yards between bays. The bays [illegible] as a single line of ammunition, i.e., along a road.

4. Maximum of 1,500 tons per area and minimum of 1/2 mile between areas.

As a result of cool-headed leadership and many instances of individual heroism, the personnel in and near this area were evacuated with only a small number of casualties. No lives were lost and only four men were seriously injured.

About 20 August, roadside storage of ammunition was tried and found to be an efficient method for a rapidly moving Army. Furthermore, it proved to be a comparatively safe method inasmuch as it was stored according to the safety regulations set up by the Ordnance Officer, and enemy aircraft activity was not very prevalent.

At times it became necessary to augment the ammunition companies for the purpose of transporting ammunition. This was accomplished by utilizing commercial and vehicles from Ordnance maintenance companies and organizing special provisional companies. Maintenance for such periods was accomplished as all available transportation had to be used, including tank transporters.

As Advance Section Communications Zone was responsible for the hauling of ammunition to Army depots only, it was necessary when selecting sites for ammunition supply points that appropriate sites be chosen in anticipation of their eventual expansion into Army depots.

For the month of August the Third U. S. Army ammunition installations were as follows:

Installation	Opened	Closed	Serving	Location
Depot 1	2 August	17 August	ASPs	[illegible]
Depot 2	12 August	17 August	ASPs	[illegible]
ASP #66	12 August	29 August	VIII Corps	[illegible]
ASP 3	14 August	17 August	VIII Corps	[illegible]
ASP 4	14 August	17 August	XV Corps	[illegible]
ASP 5	15 August	17 August	XX Corps	[illegible]
ASP 6	15 August	29 August	XX Corps	[illegible]
Depot 7	16 August	29 August	ASPs	[illegible]
ASP 8	15 August	29 August	VIII Corps	[illegible]
ASP 10	18 August	29 August	XV Corps	[illegible]
ASP 11	17 August	29 August	XII Corps	[illegible]
ASP 12	19 August	29 August	Provisional	[illegible]
ASP 13	22 August	29 August	VIII Corps	[illegible]
ASP 14	23 August	29 August	XII Corps	[illegible]
ASP 15	24 August	29 August	XV Corps	[illegible]
ASP 16	24 August	29 August	XX Corps	[illegible]
Depot 17	28 August	29 August	ASPs	[illegible]
ASP 18	[illegible] August		XII Corps	[illegible]
Depot 19	[illegible] August		ASPs	[illegible]
Depot 22	31 August		XII Corps	[illegible]

Due to long supply lines, shortages of transportation, traffic congestion, and the speed with which the Army was moving forward, there were times when the supply of ammunition was limited to points ten to twenty miles in advance of their original destination. ASPs and ammunition dumps were well [illegible] to meet this emergency for suitable sites were not always available [illegible] which [illegible] units so that installations could be immediately set up as needed. On several occasions ammunition dumps were temporarily located while a particular area was [illegible] for a minor operation. In other instances, because of similar situations, the initial shortage for forward ammunition supply points [illegible] as much as a period of three to four days.

There were [illegible] during the month on stocks in forward ammunition supply points dropped to a dangerously low level due to a four day period when [illegible] all Army transportation was immobilized because of a [illegible] resulting shortages. However, from an ammunition standpoint, [illegible] operate. Only [illegible] to affect the combat efficiency [illegible] as long as supplies had been anticipated and [illegible] transportation was utilized to carry ammunition in excess of [illegible] levels. [illegible] tactical plans based on the [illegible] of ammunition to be carried was [illegible] of the units to support the operations on [illegible] conditions. The quantity handled on this [illegible] 1,173 tons, and the distance traveled by the [illegible] companies in transporting it varied approximately [illegible] miles.

On 27 August the greater portion of Army ammunition supply was established in [illegible] Army Ammunition Supply Points. [illegible] was [illegible] from Chartres, [illegible] was [illegible] of the Army Ammunition Supply Point [illegible] the [illegible] from the [illegible] would be [illegible].



CHAPTER 6
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I

GENERAL

The rapid advance of the Army caused supply lines to be stretched from a distance approximating fifty miles on 1 August to more than 400 miles by 1 September. The problem of supply became increasingly more difficult as the troops moved forward. By mid-September the forward elements were meeting stiff resistance along the MOSELLE River. As this fire Army ordnance maintenance units were grounded and their organic transportation, together with evacuation companies, were used to bring ammunition forward to the Army area. As a result Class II and IV supplies became extremely critical and the Armored Divisions and Corps Artillery both drivers and transportation to move these classes of supplies from the beaches. The lack of replacement units and major assemblies caused maintenance units to perform many major repairs that normally would have been evacuated.

During this period a new plan of maintenance was evolved to guarantee continuous and efficient maintenance support to the forward units. The Advance Section Communications Zone stationed at least one maintenance company in each of the rear[illegible] points of the 70th Ordnance Group to assist in the work and to take over the operation of the points when the Group moved forward. Likewise, the 78th Ordnance Group maintained at least one maintenance company at each of the collecting points of the 66th Ordnance Group. When the forward group (60th) established a new collecting point, then the company which had been operating the 78th Ordnance Group Control Point in conjunction with the Advance Section Communications Zone, was transferred to the most forward collecting point. In this manner, companies were able to work on the control point stock miles of materials for the longest possible time.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION [illegible]

The forward echelon of the Ordnance Section moved to a location twelve miles southeast of CHALONS SUR MARNE (T-54) near LEPINE (T-64) on 4 September. The rear echelon joined the forward at this location on 6 September, but continued to function separately as in the past. On 15 September, the forward echelon moved to a location south of REIMS(T-47) near WITRY(T-57). The forward echelon moved into permanent buildings in REIMS (T-47) on 22 September for the first occupation of buildings by the Ordnance Section since arrival on the Continent.

On 25 September, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 82nd Ordnance Group was activated per General Order No. 61, this headquarters, under T/O A E G-12. This unit was designated to function as the ammunition group headquarters which previously had been a provisional operation carried on by Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 313th Ordnance Battalion. Personnel for this newly activated group was transferred from Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 313th Ordnance Battalion and supporting ammunition companies. Sufficient personnel to form a nucleus for reorganizing the 313th Ordnance Battalion Headquarters was transferred in from other ammunition companies.

The following priority list for the issue of winter clothing and equipment to Ordnance units was recommended to the Quartermaster on 30 September:

Ammunition Companies.
Evacuation Companies.
Maintenance Companies.
Depot Companies.
Battalion Headquarters.
Group Headquarters.

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Casualties (killed and wounded) among personnel of Army Ordnance units due to enemy action during this period totaled five. Accumulative total to date numbered seventy-five.

Status of awards to Ordnance personnel were as follows:

For the current month

Purple Heart.....4
Bronze Star.....7

Accumulative totals to date

Purple Heart.....36
Bronze Star..... 7

The various sub-sections continued to be augmented with the same personnel as in the previous month except that one more enlisted man was added as a driver for the liaison officer from the French Forces.

SECTION III

OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

As a means of controlling the movement of Ordnance troops into new areas, the following procedure was used: After a thorough reconnaissance by Group Commanders or their representatives, recommendations as to the displacement of units forward were submitted to the Army Ordnance Officer. Upon his approval it was then necessary to receive the further approval of the desired areas from the Town Major (if in a town), from each AC of S, G-4, of the major tactical units controlling the areas, and finally the approval of the AC of S, G-3, Accommodations Section. After completion of the move, the Ordnance Operations Sub-Section furnished fragmentary orders to be published as amendments to the current administrative orders.

Due to the loss of so many units to the First and Ninth U. S. Armies, complete reorganization of the 69th and 70th Ordnance Groups was necessary. Companies were transferred between Groups, and Groups themselves reorganized their battalions as follows:

Units of 69th Ordnance Group

24th Ordnance Battalion	193rd Ordnance Battalion
74th Ord MM Co	15th Ord MM Co
147th Ord MM Co	116th Ord MM Co
129th Ord MM Co	256th Ord MM Co
501st Ord MM Co (Pk)	556th Ord MM Co (Pk)
838th Ord Dep Co	840th Ord Dep Co
3447th Ord MAM Co	3445th Ord MAM Co
3446th Ord MAM Co	3511th Ord MAM Co

316th Ordnance Battalion	30th Ordnance Battalion
899th Ord MM Co (AA)	140th Ord Dep Co
520th Ord MM Co (PA)	275th Ord MM Co (AA)
3446th Ord MAM Co	537th Ord MM Co (PA)
3514th Ord MAM Co	3482nd Ord MAM Co
	3525th Ord MAM Co

32nd Ordnance Battalion	14th Ordnance Battalion
13th Ord MM Co	281st Ord MM Co (AA)
32nd Ord MM Co	3461st Ord MM Co
534th Ord MM Co (Pk)	3511th Ord MAM Co
841st Ord Dep Co	3519th Ord MAM Co
3524th Ord MAM Co	

Units of 70th Ordnance Group

66th Ordnance Battalion	79th Ordnance Battalion	26th Ordnance Bn.
1841th Ord Evac Co	849th Ord MAM Co	847th Ord Dep Co
1471st Ord Evac Co	901th Ord MAM Co	981th Ord Dep Co
1472nd Ord Evac Co	911th Ord MAM Co	341th Ord Dep Co
1482nd Ord Evac Co	902nd Ord MAM Co	3417th Ord Dep Co
1484th Ord Evac Co	911th Ord MAM Co	3441th Ord MM Co
1661st Ord Evac Co	861st Ord MAM Co	
1899th Ord Evac Co	861st Ord MAM Co	
	3056th MM Co (AA)	

117th Ordnance Battalion	19th Ordnance Battalion
3447th Ord MAM Co	552nd Ord MM Co (Pk)
2861th Ord MM Co	531st Ord MM Co (Pk)
560th Ord MM Co (Pk)	660th Ord MM Co (FA)
	510th Ord MM Co (FA)
	521st Ord MM Co (FA)
	3510th Ord MAM Co
	3508th Ord MAM Co

Ordnance units lost to First U. S. Army were as follows:

910th Ord MAM Co	301th Ord MM Co (AA)
180nd Ord Dep Co	26th Ord MM Co
185th Ord Bn (Hq/Hq Det)	590th Ord Bn (Hq/Hq Det)

Units lost to Ninth U. S. Army are listed below:

Hq/Hq Det 179th Ord Bn	Hq/Hq Det 312th Ord Bn
Hq/Hq Det 65th Ord Bn	Hq/Hq Det 320th Ord Bn
3430th Ord MAM Co	3537th Ord MAM Co
3532nd Ord MAM Co	447th Ord MAM Co
300th Ord MM Co (AA)	547th Ord MM Co (PA)
525th Ord MM Co (PA)	563rd Ord MM Co (Pk)
844th Ord Dep Co	845th Ord Dep Co
91st Ord MM Squad	667th Ord Am Co
599th Ord Am Co	670th Ord Am Co
666th Ord Am Co	14th Ord MM Co
104th Ord MM Co	128th Ord MM Co
293rd Ord MM Co	3469th Ord MM Co

The responsibility for maintenance and supply was designated as follows: east of the North and South line through CHALONS-SUR-MARNE - 69th Ordnance Group. The area west of the North and South line through CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T-45) - 70th Ordnance Group.

It was projected to move the 70th Ordnance Group and its three main depots forward to an area in the vicinity of VERDUN (T-26). This was necessary because of the Army's rapid advance.

Troops and vehicles then present on the Continent were as follows:

Officers	281
Enlisted Men	18,555
T/E Vehicles	1,119
Total Vehicles	5,111

SECTION IV

SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

Instructions were issued by the Army Ordnance Officer that the 70th Ordnance Group would have complete control over the technical operation of all depot companies in the Third U. S. Army. The 26th Ordnance Battalion (Depot) Battalion in the 70th Ordnance Group) was authorized by the 70th Ordnance Group to balance and transfer stocks, or take any other action necessary, to accomplish control of the technical functions of the depot companies. The armored divisions were authorized to draw replacement of items and major items from the 70th Ordnance Group (26th Ordnance Battalion and 317th Ordnance Battalion) by-passing the forward supporting Ordnance Battalions. This was considered desirable for two reasons in particular. First, the mobile depots in the forward group could not carry the large volume of supplies required by armored divisions, and second, the armored divisions could supply their own transportation for hauling the heavy units peculiar to their organization. Forward ordnance battalions had insufficient transportation to perform this function. However, the armored units were allowed to draw small amounts of supplies from these forward depots.

Instructions were received from the Twelfth U. S. Army Group that whenever there was a transfer between armies, divisions or other organizations all battle losses of materiel and equipment would be made up to the extent practicable prior to the effective date of transfer. These instructions would not act to delay the effective date of transfer.

In addition to the usual reports, AC of S, G-4, was advised daily as to the tonnage of Class II and IV supplies received in the Army area and the method of delivery, i.e., air, Communications Zone transportation or Third U. S. Army transportation.

Agreement was made with the office of the Chief Ordnance Officer, Communications Zone, whereby the Daily Ordnance Status Family Report would be used as the basis for issue of major items to the Third U. S. Army.

XII Corps requested that a major items replacement pool consisting of the following items be established in the 26th Ordnance Battalion to support Corps operations:

10 - Tank, Medium.
10 - Tank, Light.
200 - Launcher, Grenade, M7.
200 - Launcher, Grenade, M8.
12 - Car, Half-Track.
5 - Car, Scout, M3A1.
25 - Truck, 1/4-ton.
10 - Truck, 2 1/2-ton, 6x6, Cargo.
25 - Gun, Submachine, Cal..45.
10 - Gun, Machine, Cal..50, HB, Flexible.
10 - Gun, Machine, Cal..30, M1917A1, Flexible.
3 - Engine, Tank, Medium, AV 075.
6 - Sets, Track, Medium Tank.
6 - Sets, Track, Light Tank.

The pool was established, but it was only possible to supply a few of these items due to overall shortage in the Army.

Medium tanks were in short supply during this period principally because of the heavy losses inflicted in two divisions. Every effort was made to obtain replacements for these two combat organizations. As a result when they left Third U. S. Army's control practically all their shortages had been replaced.

Further replacement of battle losses on medium tanks for armored units of the XII, XV, and XX Corps, during the week ending 16 September completely depleted the reserve at that time in the Third U. S. Army.

Maximum use of transportation was made by utilizing replacement vehicles released by Communications Zone to transport spare parts and major items destined to Third U. S. Army Ordnance depots. Extra track was stripped to tanks being delivered to the replacement pool. Evacuation units, due to their large carrying capacity, were of great assistance when transportation was at a premium.

A request was made on the Twelfth U. S. Army Group for various types of equipment, which it was anticipated would be required for crossing rivers and making attacks on fortified positions. It was contemplated that approximately 150 Assault Tanks, M4A3C, 200 Cargo Carriers M29, and 200 Landing Vehicles, Tracked, would be required.

Instructions were received from Headquarters Communications Zone that it would be unnecessary for the Third U. S. Army to go west of PARIS to secure replacement combat vehicles. Communications Zone would make the transfer to Army transportation at Depot O-6(A) in the vicinity of PARIS.

For the period of September the total receipts and issues of the following major items were:

	Received	Issued
Light Tanks	83	109
Medium Tanks	150	143
Combat Vehicles	992	992
Artillery (over 57mm)	21	30
General Purpose Vehicles	1,667	1,550

By the end of the month the three main supply axes of the previous month were changed and extended as follows:

Main Supply Road No. 1 - REIMS (T-98), MEHRHOLD (T-95), and VERDUN (T-26).

Main Supply Road No. 2 - VITRY-LE-FRANCOIS (T-61), ST. DIZIER (T-50), LUNEY (U-21), TOUL (T-60), and NANCY (U-81).

Main Supply Road No. 3 - TROYES (V-27), JOINVILLE (Z-08), NEUFCHATEAU (Z-43), and EPINAL (V-01).

In order to keep supply abreast of the rapid changes in the tactical situation it was necessary for the three main supply depots to move frequently during this period as follows:

Vicinity of CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T-55), 13 September.
Vicinity of ATRY (T-75), 19 September.
Vicinity of THIAUCOURT (U-63), 25 September.

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SECTION V

MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

In an effort to reduce the number of disabled vehicles on the main supply routes, a network of Ordnance road patrols was formed. To conserve gasoline, workers used for this work, were placed at central points and 1/4-ton trucks were used to patrol the roads. Each patrol had qualified mechanics equipped with hand tools and many on-the-spot repairs were made. This system was quite successful, both in reducing the tire loss on repairs and in keeping many minor maintenance jobs out of the Ordnance shops.

A large German Ordnance depot was captured at SAMPIGNY and was found to contain a huge quantity of ball and roller bearings. A detail from the maintenance section was sent to classify these bearings and to list interchangeability with American stock numbers. Approximately thirty tons of bearings valued at ten hundred and fifty thousand dollars were boxed and turned over to the 70th Ordnance Group for stock in Army depots.

During September several interesting maintenance problems arose. In one instance, much trouble was experienced with the over-riding clutch on the Tractor, High Speed, M4. As replacement assemblies were not available at this time, several methods of field repair were tried. One successful method was finally developed and information regarding it was disseminated to all other Ordnance shops. A considerable number of the captured German bearings were used in this repair, as well some materials that had been locally procured.

Reports of voltage deficiencies on the M7 Generator were investigated and it was found that installation of the Silverstat Voltage Regulator (Ranger T-22V-4E) only partly corrected the condition. The chief cause of low voltages was discovered to be the lack of compression in the Hercules WXL Engine. No parts or unit replacements were available for this type of engine. However, parts were obtained through local purchase and by the modification of captured enemy equipment.

Because of the lack of replacement units it became necessary to rebuild all types of engines. An arrangement was made through the Communications Zone, Ordnance Section, for all radial type engines to be rebuilt commercially while general purpose engines were rebuilt by Communications Zone Ordnance installations. Commercial contracts resulted in an average of twelve rebuilt jobs per day. In many instances, of necessity, engines were rebuilt in the field.

The maintenance report on certain reconditioned major Ordnance items was as follows:

Total General Purpose Vehicles Repaired	1,691
Total Combat Vehicles Repaired	1,72
Total Artillery Repaired	430
Total Small Arms Repaired	1,977
Total Instruments Repaired	1,750

By 8 September the axes of maintenance responsibility were as follows:

East of the North and South line through CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T-66) to the 69th Ordnance Group. The area west of the North and South line through CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T-66) to the 70th Ordnance Group.

During the week ending 16 September the above axes changed as follows:

West of the North-South line through VERDUN (U-26) was the responsibility of the 70th Ordnance Group.

East of the North-South line through VERDUN (U-26) was the responsibility of the 69th Ordnance Group.

General locations of the headquarters of maintenance battalions were as follows:

Opening Date September	Location	Coordinates
	69th Ordnance Group	
9	7 Miles E CHALONS-SUR-MARNE	T-28
14	5 Miles SE TROYES	U-66
	10th Ordnance Battalion	
4	10 Miles SW VERDUN	T-25
10	5 Miles W FORT-DE-MONTSEC	U-63
	14th Ordnance Battalion	
1	5 Miles NE VILLEMAUR	T-91
2	7 Miles SW SEZANNE	S-91
11	Vicinity BAZILLE-SUR	T-01
18	Vicinity VOID	T-40
29	W of NANCY	T-71
	23th Ordnance Battalion	
1	Vicinity of VATRY	T-43
5	Vicinity MENIL-AUX-BOIS	U-32
16	Vicinity TOUL	T-61
27	Vicinity NANCY	T-71
	193rd Ordnance Battalion	
1	Vicinity of MAIZY-LIPPY	T-26
7	Vicinity of VAUCLAIRCOURT	T-15
11	Vicinity of MANONVILLE	U-66
	314th Ordnance Battalion	
1	5 Miles N VILLEMAUR	T-91
15	6 Miles SE WASSY	Z-09
16	5 Miles N MONTCOURT	T-67
27	Vicinity of BATON	V-08
	316th Ordnance Battalion	
1	Vicinity of [illegible]	T-42
17	6 Miles E VERDUN	U-36
	520th Ordnance Battalion	
1	Vicinity of NOGENT-EN-BARIE	T-42
	70th Ordnance Group	
14	Vicinity of AUVE	T-75
25	Vicinity of REMEY	U-54
	19th Ordnance Battalion	
8	Vicinity of FONTAINEBLEAU	X-28
20	Vicinity of MAINVILLE	T-65
	66th Ordnance Battalion	
26	Vicinity of ST. MIHIEL	U-43
	79th Ordnance Battalion	
14	Vicinity of AUVE	T-75
19	Vicinity of MAINVILLE	T-55
	178th Ordnance Battalion	
4	Vicinity of FOUNTAINEBLEAU	X-28
	317th Ordnance Battalion	
20	Vicinity of ST BENOIT-EN-WOEVRE	U-54

SECTION VI

AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

As the Army continued its rapid movement east, all supply services were handicapped by a lack of transportation to move their respective supplies. The Army Ordnance Officer diverted all organic vehicles from ordnance maintenance and supply units in order to move the vital ammunition supply forward. Tank transporters, as well as cargo trucks, were used in this movement. A railhead was opened near MONTIERAUX (T-44) and ammunition was also moved by rail from that point to the vicinity of CHALONS (T-54). As traffic across the SEINE River was congested, it was necessary to establish priority for the movement of ammunition trucks from Depot Number 19 in the FONTAINEBLEAU Forest (X-25) to the railhead. Through the combined efforts of all concerned 19,000 tons of ammunition were moved in a period of approximately five days. In addition to hauling ammunition, the loaded vehicles were routed through replacement depots and thereby furnished transportation for personnel replacements going to the front line units.

During the rapid movement across FRANCE, expenditures of small arms, tank, and light artillery ammunition were relatively high. At the same time it was necessary to move all medium and heavy artillery ammunition forward to insure a supply of these items being available when the tactical situation dictated their use.

As the supply lines became extended the amount of tonnage authorized to be moved to the Army area from the Communications Zone was restricted. Ordnance supplies were allocated a total of 1,780 tons per day, all of which was used for ammunition supply. This small tonnage, together with the fact that the supply of most artillery types of ammunition, particularly 105mm Howitzer, had become critical, made it evident that restrictions on the amounts authorized for expenditure would be necessary.

In September the rationing of critical types of ammunition was put into effect. However, the tonnage allocation authorized for ammunition supply was not adequate to bring in to the Army area the entire amount of critical types authorized for expenditure. As a fairly large stock of non-critical items had previously been established, it was necessary to move forward only those items which had become critical. By careful planning only minimum quantities of these critical items were requested within the authorized tonnage allocation. Rail transportation was augmented by Ordnance truck transportation thus keeping up the flow of supplies.

The attack on the MOSELLE River line was imminent and requests were submitted to the Twelfth U. S. Army Group by the Army Ordnance Officer indicating the ammunition requirements for the XX Corps and to carry out the mission assigned.

Throughout the month of September, the ammunition situation remained critical. It was necessary to establish a system whereby Corps reported daily on the status of critical types in the basic load of units. With this information, the Army Ordnance Officer was able to control the flow of ammunition in such a manner to insure that available supplies were placed in the most strategic place. In many instances battle emergencies necessitated the transfer of ammunition from trucks hauling into the ammunition supply points direct to those of the using units.

During the rapid advance of the Army, careful consideration was given to the use of mobile ammunition supply points, or rolling reserves. However, this plan could not be carried out due to the limited amount of truck transportation available. In one instance, during the advance of the XX Corps from DONCHERY (X-65) to DOMBASLE (U-70) a rolling reserve of approximately 500 tons was maintained behind the Corps. This reserve was accompanied by an ammunition crew; the personnel riding with the ammunition. After four intermediate stops were made, at which time units were resupplied, the remaining rolling reserve was unloaded at DOMBASLE (U-90) and provided the initial stockage for Ammunition Supply Point Number 23.

For the month of September Third U. S. Army ammunition installations were as follows:

Installation	Open	Closed	Serving	Location
ASP 18	27 August	15 September	XII Corps	E of SAULNY (X-76)
Depot 19	27 August	20 September	ASPs	W LA CHAPELLE (X-14)
Depot 30	29 August	7 September	XX Corps	E DONNEMARIE (X-41)
Depot 22	31 August	29 September	XII Corps	SW CHALONS (T-54)
ASP 21	2 September	10 September	XII Corps	NE MONTMORENCY (T-32)
ASP 23	4 September	20 September	XX Corps	DOMBASLE (U-16)
ASP 24	4 September	XII Corp	XII Corps	SW CONFLANT (U-41)
Depot 25	9 September		ASPs	E VERDUN (U-36)
ASP 26	14 September	30 September	XV Corps	SE MONTMORENCY (T-38)
ASP 27	15 September		XX Corps	E MAYVILLE (U-46)
ASP 28	22 September		XV Corps	E MAYVILLE (U-28)
ASP 29	25 September		XII Corps	W NANCY (T-58)
Depot 30	29 September		ASPs	E TOUL (U-70)

During this period 142,220 tons of ammunition were handled and the mileage traveled by the Quartermaster Truck Companies in transporting this tonnage totaled 755,000 miles.

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CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

Ordnance Class II and IV supply had greatly improved in October although a few items remained critical. The development of local resources and the formulation of a purchasing plan indicated some relief was at hand.

Class V supply was extremely short and rationing of artillery ammunition became necessary. During this rationing period much effort was directed toward consolidating Army ammunition stocks for the purpose of supporting any possible operation on either of the two Corps fronts. Further economy resulted within the line units by self-rationing when the total availability of ammunition was made known to them.

A decision to equip all medium tanks with extended end connectors resulted in a huge program of local purchasing. The extended end connectors, also known as 'duck feet', provided greater flotation for tanks enabling them to negotiate muddy terrain.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

The rear echelon of the Ordnance Section moved to the city of NANCY (U-81) on 5 October. The forward echelon moved to the city of NANCY (U-81) on 11 October.

Twelfth U. S. Army Group informed this headquarters that upon request of the Army Ordnance Officer qualified personnel would be supplied for any special problems or difficulties that would arise.

By direction of the Ordnance Officer, Twelfth U. S. Army Group, requisitions were forwarded to his office for five recent graduates of West Point in the grade of Second Lieutenant to be assigned to the 60th Ordnance Group.

Casualties (killed and wounded) due to enemy action during this period totaled seven, thus making the accumulative total to date eighty-two.

The status of awards by the close of the month were as follows:

	Current	Accumulative to Date
Silver Star	1	1
Soldier's Medal	1	1
Purple Heart	13	49
Bronze Star	5	10

Augmentation of the number of personnel in the various sub-sections to assist in meeting operational requirements continued as in previous months, however, slight reductions were made and resulted in the following total personnel being attached:

Officers	Enlisted Men
4 - Ordnance Technical Intelligence Unit	4 - Ordnance Technical Intelligence Unit
1 - Liaison, from French Forces	1 - Liaison from French Forces
	10 - Assist in sub-sections

SECTION III

OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

October found the tactical troops engaged along the MOSELLE River where stiff resistance was encountered. Ordnance troops were moved into buildings during this period and as a result maintenance capabilities were greatly improved.

Personnel and vehicles present on the Continent are as follows:

Officers	962
Enlisted Men	11,181
T/E Vehicles	2,408
Total Vehicles	3,890

The following units were lost by Third U. S. Army to Ninth U. S. Army:

464th Ordnance Evacuation Company
462nd Ordnance Evacuation Company
558th Ordnance Ammunition Company
559th Ordnance Ammunition Company
5610th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company
5625th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company

SECTION IV

SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

During October many items of equipment were obtained from various captured enemy installations. Material deemed useable included jacks, paints and brushes, floor cranes, motorcycle parts, engine blocks, and other items. This material was turned in to Army depots for issue.

Battlefield recovery of small arms was emphasized and a collection drive throughout the Army was instituted. All units were instructed to turn in excess weapons. Unit commanders were held responsible that unauthorized weapons were not retained by personnel under their control. Recovery squads were designated by commanders of all companies, the duties of these squads being to collect and turn in all abandoned small arms. Periodic visits, by Ordnance personnel, were made to all aid stations, hospitals, collection points, and cemeteries for the purpose of collecting weapons. Excess reserves of small arms in Army depots were turned in to Communications Zone depots.

The overall supply picture in the Army indicated that local purchase would be necessary. A representative of the Army Ordnance Officer visited the Advance Section, Communications Zone, the Twelfth U.S. Army Group, and the Communications Zone to enlist their services in the development of local purchases.

The Army representative obtained the concurrence of the above-mentioned agencies and arrangements were made for the Communications Zone, Ordnance Purchasing Section, to let contracts for a number of items of critical supply for the Third U. S. Army. Those first items were of simple construction and therefore easy to manufacture. If these were successfully procured then more difficult items were to be added at a later date.

Ordnance Class II and IV supply had been a decided head to month existence since the Army became operational, with steady loss of ground among certain critical items. Infantry automatic weapons and fire control equipment were in extremely short supply. By the end of October the supply situation had greatly improved although there were a few remaining chronic shortages. Comparative figures of some of the critical items for the month of October are shown in the table below:

Item	On Back Order 6 October	On Back Order End of October
Sub-Machine Gun	1200	None (760 on hand)
Cal..30 Machine Gun	800	90
Cal..30 B.A.R.	730	198
Cal..45 Pistol	1500	None (1997 on hand)
M5 and M13 Binoculars	1650	2466
60mm Mortar	387	177
81mm Mortar	6	0
Compass, M2	366	190
Tanks, Medium	40	10
Launcher, Grenade, M7	1981	390

The improvement in the status of small arms was attributed in part to the recovery drive mentioned in the second paragraph. However, the situation on fire control equipment remained critical and it was [illegible] that no immediate relief was in sight.

By the end of the month the status of tires and tubes had become critical. Communications Zone informed the Army that they would release to them 12 [illegible] days' supply of an anticipated shipment, which was inadequate to supply current needs. Other than this issue, the prospect for future deliveries was not bright. It was not expected that tires and tubes would be received in quantity before sixty days.

U. S. Army registration numbers were assigned and releases written for 897 captured enemy vehicles during the month.

For the period of October the total receipts and issues of the following major items were:

	Received	Issued
Light Tanks	90	88
Medium Tanks	114	88
Combat Vehicles	934	434
Artillery (over 57mm)	127	166
General Purpose Vehicles	2488	2499

The changes in the tactical situation caused the supply lines to be moved more to the North so that the supply zone by the close of this period were as follows:

a. LIBBY (U-21), TOUL (U-60), to NANCY (U-81).

b. [illegible]-LE-DUC (U-12), ST. MIHIEL (U-43), to PONT-A-MOUSSON (U-79).

c. VERDUN (U-86), to METZ (U-66).

d. VERDUN (U-86), METZ (U-47), METZ (U-77), and THIONVILLE (U-69).

The three main supply depots were relocated by 7 October to COMMERCY (U-42), and SAMPIGNY (U-32), the 611th Ordnance Depot Company (General Purpose) being located at the latter.

SECTION V

MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

During October the maintenance section was primarily engaged in routine inspections of maintenance installations and collecting points. No major deficiencies were noted and minor on the spot corrections were made. The principal problem was to correct minor dislocations in service and operating methods incident to movement from field conditions into billets.

The maintenance officer contacted the Ordnance Officer, the division ammunition officer and the G-4 of the 86th Infantry Division, newly arrived in the Theater, and explained to them the principal features of Third U. S. Army Ordnance support.

Arrangements were made to bring additional tank and heavy automotive maintenance companies forward to support the XII Corps and Forward Collecting Point No. 2. This move eliminated the necessity of evacuating heavy major units for repair and salvage.

On 16 October the 70th (rear) Ordnance Group put a new plan of maintenance in effect for the rear Army area. A copy of the plan which is self-explanatory, is attached as Annex No. XIII.

Many items of Ordnance equipment being in short supply it became increasingly important for Ordnance maintenance units to develop the resources at hand. Several instances of ingenuity and diligent experimentation on the part of Ordnance personnel are given below:

a. GMC transfer cases were on deadline for lack of high and low range shifting forks. The maintenance section instructed the units to build up the worn surfaces with weld and machine them down to the correct size. This method worked satisfactorily and the information was disseminated to Ordnance maintenance troops.

b. Experiments conducted by the 69th Ordnance Group proved that medium tank brake lining can be used as a satisfactory substitute for light tank brake lining with a minimum of modification.

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[illegible] ammunition and [illegible] the Army, a program of the highest priority was instituted. It was anticipated that a large [illegible] of ammunition in these items would be made [illegible] by [illegible] the former source.

4. A fix was developed for remachining the threads on armored Jerome spark plugs for use in M-4 Tank Engines. Approximately 1,700 of these plugs were rethreaded and put into stock during October.

Operational necessity dictated the immediate procurement of extended end connectors (track feet) for medium tank tracks. A total of 200,000 was set for 10 November. An order was placed with Advance Section, Communications Zone on operational priority and 24,000 were received. It was evident that local contracts would have to be let in order to meet the target. Local resources were developed by the Ordnance Section in cooperation with representatives of the XII Corps and Advance Section, Communications Zone. Several local contracts were let to manufacture the track feet with Army to supply the end connectors. All tank track in Ordnance installations was evacuated to Collection Point No. 1 or to the Central Point at [illegible] operated by the 13th Ordnance Battalion. At these points Ordnance crews removed the end connectors from worn or damaged track for shipment to local foundries or to Advance Section, Communications Zone, who meanwhile had made arrangements for some of the "feet" to be manufactured in their area. By the end of October, Third U. S. Army Ordnance was turning over approximately 11,000 connectors a day to the manufacturers. There were no fixtures available or completed and installed end connectors at the end of the month but it was believed that the target could be reached. While the above progress was getting under way the representative from the XII Corps suggested, as an emergency measure due to the slow shipment involved, that reinforced channel iron track feet be welded to the track while it was still on the tank. Welding crews were immediately assigned this task on tanks belonging to XII Corps units.





[illegible] Medium tank M-4 fitted with [illegible] end connectors of [illegible] and M-4 [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] medium tank [illegible] end connectors [illegible] (welded anti-compactor).

The maintenance report on certain reconditioned major Ordnance items was as follows:

Total General Purpose Vehicles Repaired	8,156
Total Combat Vehicles Repaired	1,452
Total Artillery Repaired	1,125
Total Small Arms Repaired	15,[illegible]
Total Instruments Repaired	3,[illegible]

The general locations of the headquarters of maintenance battalions were as follows:

Opening Date (October)	Location	Coordinates
12	490th Ordnance Group In [illegible]	[illegible]
	10th Ordnance Battalion In Change	
14	11th Ordnance Battalion Vicinity of [illegible]	[illegible]
6	24th Ordnance Battalion In [illegible]	[illegible]
19	121st Ordnance Battalion In the [illegible] Area	[illegible]
9	124th Ordnance Battalion In [illegible]	[illegible]
14	114th Ordnance Battalion In [illegible]	[illegible]
6	70th Ordnance Group Vicinity of [illegible] In [illegible]	[illegible]
26		[illegible]
8	10th Ordnance Battalion In [illegible]	[illegible]
6	7th Ordnance Battalion Vicinity of [illegible]	[illegible]
	66th Ordnance Battalion No Change	
	79th Ordnance Battalion No Change	
19	117th Ordnance Battalion In [illegible]	[illegible]
9	53rd Ordnance Battalion Vicinity of [illegible]	[illegible]
14	In [illegible]	[illegible]
11	55[illegible] Ordnance Battalion In Third U. S. Army	

Opening of

Ammunition Supply

The month of October found the rate of advance of the Army slowing down as the former border was approached. This made it possible to consolidate existing ammunition stocks into one main depot, Depot Number 26, in the vicinity of [illegible]. However, as the combat units were being reorganized and for operational reasons were being formulated, it was evident that a division of supplies would be advantageous. Foreseeing a possible requirement for close support of an attack along either of two lines of advance, part of the existing and incoming ammunition stocks were diverted into a second depot, Depot Number 11, in the vicinity of [illegible]. This division of supplies provided close support to each of the two forces. It further provided a safety factor to the extent that probable damage to both depots by a single action of the enemy would not be possible.

During the time that Advance Section depots were being stocked, shipments to the Army were curtailed and very little ammunition was received at the Army depots. This lull in operations afforded an opportunity to segregate artillery ammunition by lot numbers, particular emphasis being placed on 105mm Howitzer ammunition.

An example of the necessity for this lot number segregation is the situation found in one supply point. Inspection of 7,145 rounds of 105mm Howitzer ammunition revealed a total of 308 different lot numbers. To cite extreme situations, there were 101 lot numbers consisting of from one to five rounds per lot and only in one instance were there more than 200 rounds of the same lot number found. Ammunition received from Communications Zone contained mixed lot numbers, so a letter was prepared to the Ordnance Officer of that headquarters advising him of the situation. Immediate steps were taken by all concerned to improve the condition and in a short time great improvement was in evidence.

Further advantage was taken of this relative lull to review current methods of operation for the purpose of instituting any changes which would improve the supply of ammunition to combat troops. One of the principal developments resulting from the study was the establishment of a system whereby all ammunition on credit to the Army could be accounted for from the time requisitions were submitted until it was actually received at the ammunition supply points or depots.

For the month of October Third U. S. Army ammunition installations were as follows:

Installation	Open	Closed	Serving	Location
ASP #21	1 September	8 October	XII Corps	5 mi SW [illegible] (U-41)
Depot #25	9 September		ASPs	5 mi E VERDUN (U-56)
ASP #27	10 September		XX Corps	E MAILLY (U-55)
ASP #28	22 September	7 October	XV Corps	E DAINVILLE (U-58)
ASP #29	25 September		XII Corps	N NANCY (U-71)
Depot #30	29 September	13 October	ASPs	E TOUL (U-70)
Depot #31	3 October		ASPs	4 mi S NANCY (U-80)

During this period 102,341 tons of ammunition were handled and the release traveled by the Quartermaster Truck Companies in transporting this tonnage totaled 450,000 miles.

On 12 October a very critical situation in ammunition supply developed as allocations from the Twelfth U. S. Army Group for the period 5 October to 15 October were cancelled and expenditure authorizations for that period were rescinded. In lieu of these allocations, revised amounts were authorized for the period 5 October to 7 November. In several instances the amounts authorized for the new period of thirty-three days were less than those authorized for the original eight day period. This unfortunate situation caused practically all field artillery weapons to be silenced immediately.

Plans were made for the possible future curtailment in the authorized expenditures of ammunition for field artillery weapons by building up relatively large stocks of ammunition for the 75mm, 76mm, 3", and 90mm tank and anti-tank guns. Thus, when the supply of ammunition for field artillery weapons became critical, it was possible to employ tank and anti-tank weapons in their secondary role as artillery. The use of the latter weapons as supporting artillery proved very valuable as the Army continued its advance and took limited objectives despite curtailed expenditures of ammunition for field artillery weapons. Meanwhile, to insure that enough ammunition for tank and anti-tank weapons was on hand at all times to permit their use in their primary mission, minimum Army reserve levels were established. These reserve levels served to maintain a minimum of an estimated three day supply in Army installations.

The accumulation of captured enemy weapons and ammunition of major calibers had been encouraged and as a result a fairly large stock of these items were available to the combat troops. This supply of weapons and ammunition proved valuable as it was very effectively employed against the enemy during the time our own supplies were curtailed. In addition to causing enemy casualties, the employment of his own weapons against him was of great morale value to our troops.

Immediately following the drastic reduction in expenditure authorizations, several conferences were held by representatives of the Twelfth U. S. Army Group, Communications Zone, and the Armies. The primary purpose of these meetings was to develop a supply procedure which would prevent future recurrences of the situation that the Armies had just faced.

On 21 October, the credit system of ammunition allocations was put into effect by the Twelfth U. S. Army Group. Under this system allocations would be made to the Armies on the basis of overall availability and the missions assigned the armies. Only ammunition on hand in Advance Section, Communications Zone, depots would be available to the Armies on credits established by Communications Zone.

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CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The supply situation, as a whole, at this time was brighter than it ever had been although some items were still critical. On the other hand, certain items that had constantly been on the critical list were removed for the first time and depots were stocked to a much greater extent than ever before.

The lack of sufficient amount of anti-freeze caused much concern but a temporary relief was brought about by use of alcohol obtained through channels and from French sources, pending the receipt of a supply of Prestone from the UNITED STATES.

The shortage of ammunition had been relieved to a limited extent by this time although heavy artillery ammunition was still critical. Formal letters of allocation were compiled and forwarded to Corps Commanders specifying the maximum number of rounds per weapon per day that could be expended. These authorized amounts were based on the status of ammunition in the Army area and on anticipated receipts from Advance Section, Communications Zone.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

The forward and rear echelons of the Ordnance Section remained in the city of NANCY (U-81) during this entire period.

Two officers assigned Ordnance Technical Intelligence Unit were relieved from attached to the headquarters thereby reducing to three the number of officers attached. The augmentation of enlisted personnel amounting to fifteen remained the same as in the previous month.

Ordnance Bulletin Number 5 was published and distributed. (See Appendix 14)

Casualties (Killed and wounded) due to enemy action during this period totaled six, thus making the accumulative total to date sixty-eight.

The status of awards by the close of the month were as follows:

	Current	Accumulative to Date
Silver Star		1
Soldiers Medal	1	2
Bronze Star Medal	20	30
Purple Heart	7	56

SECTION III

OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

Units, within the Groups, were reorganized in November as follows:

69th Ord Group

10th Ord Bn	14th Ord Bn	314th Ord Bn
Personnel now being utilized in other Bns.	299th Ord HM Co (AA)	32nd Ord HM Co
	3514th Ord MAM Co	562nd Ord HM Co(Tr)
	3519th O-d MAM Co	81st Ord Dep Co
		3528th Ord MAM Co
		520th Ord HM Co(PA)

314th Ord Bn
7th Ord HM Co
47th Ord HM Co
129th Ord HM Co
501st Ord HM Co (Tr)
698th Ord Depot Co
3447th Ord MAM Co
3460th Ord MAM Co
3465rd Ord HM Co

299rd Ord Bn
156th Ord HM Co
116th Ord HM Co
266th Ord HM Co
536th Ord HM Co (Tr)
660th Ord Depot Co
3444th Ord HM Co
3511th Ord MAM Co
3519th Ord MAM Co

316th Ord Bn
2756th Ord HM Co (AA)
3526th Ord MAM Co
104th Ord Depot Co
281st Ord HM Co (AA)
3482nd Ord MAM Co
537th Ord HM Co (PA)

70th Ord Group

19th Ord Bn
551st Ord HM Co (Tr)
550th Ord HM Co (PA)
853rd Ord MAM Co
901th Ord MAM Co

26th Ord Bn
3441th Ord Depot Co
347th Ord Depot Co
857th Ord Depot Co
981th Ord Depot Co

66th Ord Bn
1405th Ord Trans Co
471st Ord Trans Co
478nd Ord Trans Co
488th Ord Trans Co
489th Ord Trans Co
869th Ord MAM Co

79th Ord Bn
521st Ord HM Co (PA)
552nd Ord HM Co (Tr)
851st Ord MAM Co
908nd Ord MAM Co
911th Ord MAM Co

317th Ord Bn
3456th Ord HM Co
560th Ord HM Co (Tr)
3076th Ord HWD Co

286th Ord Bn
3054th Ord HM Co (AA)
510th Ord HM Co (PA)
3537th Ord MAM Co

Personnel and vehicles present on the Continent were as follows:

Officers	562
Enlisted Men	11,845
T/E Vehicles	2,452
Total Vehicles	4,495

SECTION IV

SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

By 1 November, of the 114,500 gallons of Prestone requisitioned on 8 September, only 2,000 gallons of this critical item had been received. Of the initial requisition 66,000 gallons had been requested for immediate shipment to fill requirements of troops. As time went on, the number of back-orders continued to rise and totaled 69,000 at this time. Since no immediate relief was in sight, the Chief of the Supply Section contacted the Supply Officer of the Communications Zone and requested that the possibilities be investigated of purchasing alcohol for use as an anti-freeze pending the receipt of Prestone. This was successfully accomplished but the problem of transporting it arose as tank cars were not available. This was overcome, however, by the Ordnance Section by use of 200 fifty-gallon metal containers transported by trucks. By the close of the month an additional 5,000 gallons of alcohol were received. Prestone was still in short supply and only 38,500 gallons had been received while back-orders totaled 68,000 gallons.

Tires and tubes of all sizes had by this time been placed on the critical list for a long period and the situation was steadily getting worse. In order to help alleviate this condition the Commanding Officer of the 70th Ordnance Group was instructed that all spare tires and tubes, sizes 7:50 x 20 and 6:00 x 16, on replacement vehicles in the 317th Ordnance Battalion, and all spare tires and tubes of the same size on Ordnance Shop trucks, should be removed and placed in depot stock for issue against back-orders. Replacement vehicles equipped with 6:00 x 16 and 7:50 x 20 tires would be issued less spare tires and tubes as long as those items remained critical. Information was received from the Communications Zone that it was expected that 7:50 x 20 tires would be available within a short period of time in sufficient quantities to fill all existing back-orders but it was not expected that issues of total requirements (approximately 4,500) could be met for sixty days.

The shortage of hot patches was another item of concern during this period. By the middle of the month all back-orders had been filled and the situation was no longer critical but before the end of the month they were back on the critical list again and the back-orders continued to increase in number.

The additional amount of tonnage on hand in the three main depot companies made it desirable to eliminate all stock in excess of current or anticipated requirements. Therefore, instructions were issued to the main depot companies to submit to the Army Ordnance Officer, on the 15th and 30th of each month, a list of items which were considered [illegible]

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[illegible] certain of the items could be made only upon instructions from the Ordnance Officer.

At the request of the Chief of the General Supply Division, Ordnance Section, Communications Zone, it was agreed to submit the periodic requisitions on the 3rd and 18th of each month, instead of on the 5th, 15th, and 25th, as had been the practice for the past several months. It was also agreed that no tonnage bid would be submitted by us inasmuch as our requirements were stated in periodic requisitions and in our daily Major Items Report.

For this period the total receipts and issues of the following major items were:

	Received	Issued
Light Tanks	18	16
Medium Tanks	118	161
Combat Vehicles	691	670
Artillery (over 57mm)	105	92
General Purpose Vehicles	1,955	1,962

The Supply Area and locations of the Main Supply Depots remained the same as in the previous month, except the Armament Depot which moved to the vicinity of TOUL (U-60).

SECTION V

MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

The manufacturing program on extended and connectors was in full swing and deliveries of light connectors from local sources was approximately 3,500 per day. All contracts for the medium type connectors were handled by the Advance Section, Communications Zone, while all Third U. S. Army contracts were switched over to the production of light type connectors. The current status of delivered connectors by type is given below:

	Light	Medium
Advance Section, Communications Zone Contracts	0	100,000
Third U. S. Army Contracts	15,000	5,000
TOTAL	15,000	105,000

Due to the complete lack of certain types of spare parts and equipment, it was necessary once again for the maintenance section to resort to local purchase and improvisation. Several examples of this condition are given below:

a. There were no spare parts of any kind for the Chevrolet Truck, 1-1/2 ton, w/earth borer, used by the Signal Construction Battalions. A number of these vehicles were on deadline for lack of rear axles when some English Bedford axles were located and found to fit after being turned down on a lathe. Local contracts were let for the manufacture of pinions and shafts for the earth borer on these trucks.

b. A quantity of blank engine valves and piston rings were supplied to ordnance maintenance units for the repair of M-7 Generators currently on deadline. The only source of supply for these Generators was from captured materials or local purchase.

Operational needs for tanks were quite high during this period, and in an attempt to alleviate this condition the following method of tank resupply was followed: The 552nd Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Tank Company was set up in NANCY, FRANCE (U-81), an ideally located city in view of the current tactical situation, and operated as a provisional mass tank repair shop. All tanks brought into this company were repaired [illegible] the Army pool. When a using unit turned in a tank [illegible] issued a tally which authorized them to pick up a [illegible] from the pool. In this manner the tactical units [illegible] tanks with scarcely any loss of time.

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The following individuals visited Ordnance installations on the afternoon of 28 November:

President, American Locomotive Company.
President, Oldsmobile Company.
President, Thompson Products Company.
President, Sahlage Lock Company.
Brigadier General, Representative from the Office of the Chief of Ordnance.
Colonel, From Visitors' Section, Twelfth U. S. Army Group.

The party visited the 14th Ordnance Battalion in the vicinity of CHAMPIGNEULLES (U-81) where they witnessed the maintenance of general purpose vehicles, small arms, and artillery. They visited the 552nd Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company where they witnessed maintenance and repair of tanks. They further visited the collecting point in the vicinity of NANCY (U-81) where they noted the character of battle damage and the 857th Ordnance Depot Company in the vicinity of TOUL (U-61) where they observed the tremendous quantities of parts required to service the armored vehicles of the army. The party was accompanied by the Army Ordnance Officer, the Army Maintenance Officer, Commanding Officer of the 69th Ordnance Group, and the Executive Officer of the 70th Ordnance Group.

They observed several tanks being repaired by cutting out sections of the hull or turret and inserting similar sections cut from salvaged tanks. They also were very much interested in the home made extended end connectors which were welded on so many of our medium tanks before local manufacture of them was begun. At the 857th Ordnance Depot Company, they watched the installation of new type end connectors on medium tank track by the use of an inclined roller table and some extemporized pneumatic equipment.

Major items repaired during the month of November were as follows:

Total General Purpose Vehicles	9,147
Total Combat Vehicles	3,018
Total Artillery	1,413
Total Small Arms	11,654
Total Instruments	3,364

The area of Ordnance Maintenance for November was unchanged.

The general locations of the Headquarters of Maintenance Battalions were as follows:

Opening Date November	Location	Coordinates
	69th Ordnance Group	
	No change	
	10th Ordnance Battalion	
	No change	
	14th Ordnance Battalion	
	No change	
	24th Ordnance Battalion	
16	In PETTONCOURT	Q-02
26	In DAIMA IN	Q-13
	193rd Ordnance Battalion	
17	In HAVANGE	U-78

Opening Date November	Location	Coordinates
	34th Ordnance Battalion	
16	In NANCY	U-81
27	In PETTONCOURT	Q-02
	516th Ordnance Battalion	
	No change	
	70th Ordnance Group	
	No change	
29	**19th Ordnance Battalion** Vicinity of [illegible]	P-70
	264th Ordnance Battalion	
	No change	
	66th Ordnance Battalion	
	No change	
26	**79th Ordnance Battalion** Vicinity of NANCY	U-81
	317th Ordnance Battalion	
	No change	
	526th Ordnance Battalion	
3	In VAUCOULEURS	U-40
27	In PONT-A-MOUSSON	U-73
	552nd Ordnance Battalion	
18	In SOMMEDIEUE	Z-39

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SECTION VI

AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

By early November the flow of ammunition from the Communications Zone had increased and the critical shortage in the Army area was relieved to a limited extent. On the first day of the month an informal compilation of the status of critical items was prepared and furnished to Corps Commanders to be used as a guide in the formulation of plans for future operations. This informal information was followed on 5 November by a formal letter to each Corps Commander specifying the maximum number of rounds per weapon per day that could be expended during the period 8 November to 17 November, inclusive. The amounts authorized were based on the status of ammunition in the Army area and on anticipated receipt at that time.

On 15 November a similar letter for the period 18 - 30 November was prepared and forwarded to the Corps Commanders. The amounts specified for this period were considerably less than for the preceding period. The amounts of ammunition which the Army Ordnance Officer obligated was in excess of that physically present in the Army area, but sufficient credits had been established by the Twelfth U. S. Army Group to meet this obligation. This procedure necessitated the expeditious calling forward of ammunition from Advance Section, Communications Zone depots as soon as credits were established by the Communications Zone.

In order to provide close support to the XII Corps for the impending attack to the East, it was decided to establish an ASP well forward in the Corps area. The site selected was East of the MOSELLE River between NANCY (U-81) and CHATEAU SALINS (Q-12). This entire area was extremely difficult for operations due to promiscuous and patterned mine fields which had been planted by the enemy before retreating. In addition to the hazard of mines, the ASP was subjected to enemy artillery counter battery fire directed at Corps artillery batteries located within the ASP boundaries. In spite of these unusual hazards this ASP, No. 35, opened as scheduled, on 8 November.

Based on the disposition of troops and the tactical situation, the Army Ordnance Officer decided to establish a second ASP East of the MOSELLE River to support XII Corps and specific XX Corps units located on the south flank of the latter Corps. This installation ASP No. 34, with an initial stockage of 1,195 tons, opened on 8 November. Resupply to the ASP was suspended for approximately 24 hours due to the flooding of all main supply routes leading to the site. However, alternate routes were located and supply was resumed on 10 November. This ASP was used for a period of approximately three weeks and during this time had the greatest rate of turnover of stocks.

As the XX Corps advanced the Army Ordnance Officer ordered the establishment of a new ASP for the Corps East of the MOSELLE River. This was done in order to eliminate the necessity for using units to cross the river to obtain their resupply. In keeping with the Army policy this ASP, No. 36, was located well forward in the Corps area. As in the case of other installations East of the MOSELLE River extensive mine fields were encountered. In addition to the removal of mines, it was necessary for the ASP commander to call on the Graves Registration Section of the 90th Infantry Division to remove numerous enemy dead from some areas before ammunition could be placed on the ground.

During the month of November a total of approximately 117,863 tons of ammunition were handled by ASP personnel. This tonnage represented the greatest turnover of ammunition for any similar period of time since the Army became operational. The mileage traveled by the attached Quartermaster Truck Companies in transporting this tonnage totaled 1,781,468 miles.

For the month of November the Third U. S. Army ammunition installations were as follows:

Installation	Open	Closed	Serving	Location
Depot	25	9 Sep	15 Nov	ASFs	S VERDUN (U-56)
ASP	27	15 Sep	25 Nov	XX Corps	S HANVILLE (U-55)
ASP	29	25 Sep	16 Nov	XII Corps	W NANCY (U-71)
Depot	31	3 Oct		ASFs	S NANCY (U-84)
Depot	32	7 Nov		XX Corps	In SOMMEDIEU (U-58)
ASP	33	8 Nov		XII Corps	NE CHAMPENOUX (Q-01)
ASP	34	10 Nov		XII Corps	N PONT-A-MOUSSON (U-85)
ASP	35	21 Nov		XX Corps	DISTROFF (U-98)



M10 Tank Destroyer being towed from M25 Tank Transporter.





(Above) Ordnance crew in first stage of replacing track on M-7 Motor Carriage, 105mm Howitzer. This self-propelled weapon is better known as "The Priest".

(Right) Crew completes operation by pulling tread over idler wheel.

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CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

An enemy break-through of the front line in the First U. S. Army area on 16 December caused many changes in the tactical situation, proposed plans, use and method of issue of Ordnance material of the Third U. S. Army. Ammunition that had been located in preparation for an attack by the Army had to be immediately re-located to the northern flank of the Army boundary. Special ammunition that was scheduled to be used on a certain date was used ahead of time. Formal letters authorizing specific amounts of ammunition that could be expended were discontinued and informal letters issued as expenditure guides. Ammunition depots that were about to be placed under control of the Advance Section, Communications Zone, were re-stocked and again became very active installations. In order to maintain close support, mobile rail distribution points were necessary. As another expedient, ammunition from the Advance Section, Communications Zone depots was issued regardless of existing credits. Such a deviation from the usual channels was in cooperation with the efforts being made to expedite supplies in the existing emergency.

Due to the extreme shortage of spare parts and replacement assemblies, the maintenance section resorted to all manner of procurement with emphasis on systematic salvage and local purchase. As a result, many items of ordnance were speedily returned to the using units.

Manpower shortage was alleviated in many instances by the employment of civilians to supplement military personnel. This arrangement proved to be helpful but necessitated additional tools and equipment for the units concerned with this labor.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

The forward and rear echelon of the Ordnance Section remained in NANCY (U-81) during the entire month, except that on 26 December personnel consisting of two officers and one enlisted man, to function as a forward liaison group, moved north with the command echelon of the headquarters to the city of LUXEMBOURG (P-81). Another officer was added to this group on 30 December. The balance of the Ordnance Section remained in NANCY (U-81) with the rear echelon which consisted of AC of S, G-4, and other supply services.

Two quotas for transfer of enlisted men to infantry units were accomplished and resulted in losses in personnel from Army Ordnance units totaling 998. Two enlisted men from the Ordnance Section were also lost to the Infantry as part of the headquarters quota.

One officer from the Ordnance Section and each group headquarters attended a one week course of instruction for Information-Education Officers at the Cite Universitaire in PARIS. This school was for the purpose of postwar planning and activities.

Staff Memorandum Number 73, this headquarters, 16 December 1944, increased the number of enlisted personnel authorized the Ordnance Section to thirty. A requisition was immediately placed with AC of S, G-1, to increase assigned personnel to equal this amount. The augmentation of personnel in the Ordnance Section remained as reported previously.

Casualties (killed and wounded) due to enemy action during this period totaled sixteen, thus making the accumulative total to date 104.

The status of awards by the close of the month were as follows:

	Current	Accumulative to Date
Silver Star	0	1
Soldiers Medal	0	2
Bronze Star	32	62
Purple Heart	8	44

Meritorious Service Unit Plaques were awarded to the following Army Ordnance Units:

2nd Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad
275th Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA)
837th Ordnance Depot Company
984th Ordnance Depot Company

SECTION III

OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

Due to the rapidly changing tactical situation, the 69th Ordnance Group was reorganized as follows:

VIII CORPS	III CORPS	XII CORPS
990th Ordnance Bn	4th Ordnance Bn	21st Ordnance Bn
561st Ord Dep Co	193rd Ord Dep Co	561st Ord Dep Co
87th Ord HW Co	3463rd Ord MM Co	82nd Ord HW Co
256th Ord HW Co	129th Ord HW Co	47th Ord HW Co
553rd Ord MM Co (Tr)	562nd Ord MM Co (Tr)	501st Ord HW Co (Tr)
3425th Ord MAM Co	3558th Ord MAM Co	92nd Ord HW Co
484th Ord Coll Co		3417th Ord MAM Co
506th Ord Mt (AA) Co		3468th Ord MAM Co
	14th Ordnance Bn	316th Ordnance Bn
	131st Ord MM Co (PA)	537th Ord MM Co (PA)
	5804th Ord MM Co (PA)	281st Ord Mt Co (AA)
	299th Ord Mt Co (AA)	275th Ord Mt Co (AA)
	3514th Ord MAM Co	3482nd Ord MAM Co
	3519th Ord MAM Co	

XX Corps
193rd Ordnance Bn
3424th Ord Dep Co
15th Ord HW Co
3444th Ord HW Co
556th Ord MM Co (Tr)
116th Ord HW Co
3515th Ord MAM Co
3511th Ord MAM Co

Personnel and vehicles present on the Continent was as follows:

Officers	564
Enlisted Men	10,176
T/E Vehicles	2,474
Total Vehicles	4,097

SECTION IV

SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

The supply picture for the first half of the month was mostly one of expediting and coordinating shipment of Class II and IV supplies. In addition, necessary reports were submitted which provided the basis of re-supply, from the Communications Zone, of stocks in the Army depots and replenishment of theater stocks in the Communications Zone from the Zone of the Interior.

The break-through of the enemy caused many First U. S. Army tactical and service troops to become separated from their commands. As a temporary solution to the situation, these units were placed under the command of the Third U. S. Army with the Ordnance units being placed directly under control of the Army Ordnance Officer. Battle losses of these organizations were such that with additional losses resulting from accidents caused by icy and snow covered roads the problem of re-supply became great. Army reserves of stock were soon depleted but with the cooperation of the Supply Section, Communications Zone, urgently needed items were forwarded and the critical situation was eased. The supply of combat vehicles became favorable once again but General Purpose Vehicles continued to remain critical; more so than at any other time in the entire campaign.

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To expedite resupply at this time, two officers from the Ordnance Section were dispatched to the III and VIII Corps to get all possible information on troops, installations, shortages, and any other data deemed necessary.

As a result of the counter offensive, traffic circulation was directed northward and the main supply roads became as follows:

a. TOUL (U-61) to VAUCOULEURS (U-46), to ST AMAND (U-47), to AULNOIS (P-62).

b. TOUL (U-61) to ST. MIHIEL (U-74), to CHAMBLEY (U-65), to COMPLAINS (U-66), to AUMETZ (U-79), to METZ (P-70), to LUXEMBOURG (P-81), to WITTLICH (P-84) to KOBLENZ (P-86).

c. NANCY (U-81) to PONT-A-MOUSSON (U-73), to AUBREVILLE (U-74) to METZ (U-89), to PHILIPPEVILLE (P-80), to LUXEMBOURG (P-81), to ECHTERNACH (L-09), to DIEKIRCH (L-15).

By 17 December the three main supply depots had moved to METZ (U-89).

SECTION V

MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

Local purchasing and the placing of contracts had become a very large part of the maintenance picture at this time. It was necessary to maintain almost daily contact with local manufacturers in the NANCY (U-81) region in order to expedite production. In addition to the contracts placed for the manufacture of extended light end connectors, production of which was currently running about 3,500 per day, many other items of a critical nature were being turned out for the Third U. S. Army Ordnance Section.

The increase in deadlined equipment in Ordnance shops was attributable to the extreme shortage of replacement parts and major unit assemblies. Thus, the maintenance section resorted to all manner of procurement in order to get ordnance equipment off the deadline and back into the hands of the troops. Representatives of this section were dispatched to LYONS (X-98) and PARIS (S-04) where they procured fan belts from the Goodrich Tire and Rubber Company. These belts were urgently needed in order to get medium tanks and tank destroyer units back into action. An officer of the section flew to the UNITED KINGDOM to obtain releases on other vitally needed spare parts and assemblies.

A magnetic road sweep was designed with the cooperation of the Engineer Section, and was completed in less than one month. This device was tested and found to be highly successful in sweeping shrapnel and nails from the highways. The plans and specifications were forwarded to Communications Zone with a request that a number of these units be made available to Third U. S. Army for the purpose of sweeping all main roads in the Army area. The great reduction in tire trouble that was noted by the use of this device was sufficient to warrant its manufacture. In many instances there was evidence that the enemy had deliberately thrown nails upon some of the main roads.

The maintenance section conducted a demonstration of a "Gun Submerged Bolt Driving and Punching" gun (also known as the "Dynamite" gun), which had been obtained from the BRITISH Royal Navy salvage crew at TOULON, FRANCE. This weapon was to be used to seal up the doors on captured enemy pill boxes to prevent the reoccupation of them by the Germans after our first wave of troops had passed. Twenty such guns with sufficient ammunition were kept available in the Third U. S. Army depots.

Approximately 40,000 extended end connectors for medium tanks were given to the Southern Line of Communications for the Seventh U. S. Army. In return, that headquarters made available from their stocks many items of supply that were extremely short in this section of the theater.

Many tanks had been rendered hors de combat in the battles raging in the BELGIAN bulge and ordnance maintenance shops were overloaded with tank repair jobs. Through an arrangement with Advance Section, Communications Zone, one of their Ordnance Maintenance Battalions was made available for tank repairs, and to give direct support to our reserve troops along the MEUSE River line. All tanks repaired by this battalion were returned to Army for the replacement pool. Maximum capacity of the battalion shops was fourteen major tank repair jobs at any one time.

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The enemy break-through in the north necessitated exceptionally fast movement of Ordnance Maintenance Battalions in order to maintain ordnance service in the new tactical situation. This was accomplished with no major interruptions of service to the troops.

The maintenance area for 1 December through 16 December was as follows: The area West of the MOSELLE-MEUSE River to the 70th (rear) Ordnance Group. The area East of the River to the 69th (forward) Ordnance Group. When the Third U. S. Army was committed on the southern flank of the BELGIAN bulge, the area of maintenance was changed as follows: Area West of the MOSELLE-MEUSE River and South of the line through METZ-SUR-ALLETTE (P-70), LUXEMBOURG, to the 70th Ordnance Group. Road patrols were maintained on all principal roads in these areas. Radio repair teams were attached to Ordnance Control Points for the installation and repair of radios.

General locations of the headquarters of Ordnance Maintenance Battalions for the month were as follows:

Opening Date December	Location	Coordinates
	69th Ordnance Group	
29	In LUDELANGE	U-98
	44th Ordnance Battalion	
20	In MORHANGE	Q-23
	24th Ordnance Battalion	
11	5 miles SW of SAINT QUIRIN	Q-44
19	Vicinity of TRITTELING	Q-15
25	In ATHUS	P-60
	197th Ordnance Battalion	
2	In LESAVIS	U-97
	514th Ordnance Battalion	
8	In MORHANGE	Q-23
20	In LE GRAND HARAS	Q-44
24	In LUDELANGE	U-89
26	In LUXEMBOURG	P-81
	516th Ordnance Battalion	
4	In HAYANGE	U-78
	690th Ordnance Battalion	
22	In METZ	Q-92
	70th Ordnance Group	
21	METZ	U-85
	19th Ordnance Battalion	
	No Change	
	26th Ordnance Battalion	
16	In METZ	U-85
	66th Ordnance Battalion	
17	In METZ	U-85
	79th Ordnance Battalion	
	No Change	
	517th Ordnance Battalion	
19	In METZ	U-85
	526th Ordnance Battalion	
	No Change	
	532nd Ordnance Battalion	
22	In METZ	U-85

The number of major items repaired in ordnance shops for the month of December was as follows:

Total General Purpose Vehicles Repaired.....	9,031
Total Combat Vehicles Repaired.....	1,719
Total Artillery Repaired.....	1,445
Total Small Arms Repaired.....	22,013
Total Instruments Repaired.....	4,121

SECTION VI.

AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

During the early part of December 1944, emphasis was placed on the establishment of a large well balanced supply of ammunition in ASP No. 36 to provide close and adequate support for the proposed attack of the SIEGFRIED Line by the XII Corps. By 15 December this ASP contained 7,640 tons of well balanced stock. In addition to this supply on the ground, the "pipe line" between the Advance Section, Communications Zone Depots, and the Army area was filled with an approximately equal quantity to provide the necessary re-supply as the attack progressed. Included in the stockage of this ASP was a large amount of specially prepared high explosive shell with a red colored smoke mixture for 90mm anti-aircraft guns. This special ammunition was intended to provide a "flak line" which could be easily identified by aircraft in a closely coordinated ground and air attack. As the requirement for such special ammunition was not known until a few days before the anticipated use, a special request was made to the Commanding General, Advance Section, Communications Zone, to expedite the shipment of this item.

The change in the tactical situation on 16 December necessitated a complete revampment of the ammunition supply plan. To meet this radical change, all incoming shipments were diverted to the northern flank of the Army boundary. In addition, a large amount of ammunition already on the ground was ordered moved to more appropriate locations. Advantage was taken of every conceivable means of transportation to move ammunition to the new front. As an expedient, an entire maintenance battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment was utilized to help coordinate intra-Army rail shipments of ammunition.

By 19 December ammunition was readily available not only to Third U. S. Army troops, but to any and all units that had been cut off from their previous sources of supply by the enemy counter offensive. The



Loading 75mm Ammunition from roadside ASP.

focal point in the new ammunition plan was Depot No. 32, located near ATTON-LE-WOHAN (U-69). This installation, subsequent to the counter offensive, was scheduled to be turned over to the Advance Section, Communications Zone, but was immediately restocked and again became a very large and very active installation. As Depot No. 32 would not provide close enough support to all troops engaged in halting the enemy drive, mobile rail distribution points were established at ATHUS (P-60), FOUCHES (P-52), and FLOWERVILLE (P-22). As the situation at the forward part of the enemy drive was unstable, it was deemed advisable to move the ammunition at the latter point to VIRTON (P-41). The exact composition of the troops which had become dependent on Third Army for support was unknown and it was therefore necessary to provide all types of ammunition at as many points as possible. In addition to these new installations, re-supply was maintained to ASPs 35 and 36, in direct support of the XX, III, and XII Corps. To meet this sudden increase in demands, arrangements were made with Advance Section, Communications Zone, Depot U-611 to make issues to the Army, regardless of existing credits. Through full cooperation of Depot U-611 personnel, it was possible to establish this procedure and then later make all necessary adjustments of records to re-establish the credit system.

On 20 December a recommended air lift was prepared and submitted to the Army G-4. This air lift was provided to supply ammunition, as well as other classes of supplies, to the troops that were cut off in the BASTOGNE (P-55) area. The timely arrival of these supplies played an important part in the ability of the troops in the BASTOGNE (P-55) area to not only survive, but to defeat the enemy.

An outstanding development, the "Posit" fuse, was introduced to the Army during the month of December. On 9 and 10 December, demonstrations of field artillery firing, using "Posit" fused ammunition, were conducted for the XII and XX Corps. Representatives of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance were on hand to advise and to aid in technical instructions during and after these demonstrations. This entirely new and revolutionary fuse was well received by Commanders and gun crews alike. The original plans provided for this new fuse to be first used on 25 December, however, this date was changed to 17 December in order to take full advantage of its characteristics as an aid in stopping the enemy counter offensive.

The only change in ammunition supply policy introduced during the month was the discontinuance of formal letters authorizing specific amounts of ammunition per weapon that could be expended. In lieu of these letters, an informal status of critical ammunition items was prepared and furnished Corps Commanders, the Army Artillery Officer, and Corps Ordnance Officers as an expenditure guide for planning future operations. The initial study was prepared on 1 December and was based on physical quantities of ammunition in the Army area, allocations of credit currently on hand, and amounts of ammunition predicted by the Twelfth U. S. Army Group to be available in the future. Revised studies were prepared every ten days, or at such time that there was a radical change in the predicted future supply status.

For the month of December the Third U. S. Army ammunition installations were as follows:

Installation		Open	Closed	Serving	Location
Depot	31	3 Oct	25 Dec	ASPs	S NANCY (U-80)
Depot	32	7 Nov		ASPs	ATTON (U-68)
ASP	33	8 Nov	27 Dec	XII Corps	SOMMERVILLE (Q-01)
ASP	34	8 Nov	4 Dec	XII Corps	E PONT-A-MOUSSON (U-83)
ASP	35	21 Nov		XX Corps	DIEDENHOFF (U-98)
ASP	37	3 Dec		XX Corps	MARIENTHAL (Q-16)
ASP	38	26 Dec		III & XII Corps	MAMER (P-71)

During this period 151,705 tons of ammunition were handled and the mileage traveled by the attached Quartermaster Truck Companies in transporting this tonnage totaled 1,185,090 miles.

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CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

As in the previous month icy and snow covered roads continued to exist and greatly added to the hazards of vehicles in the combat area.

The enemy counter-offensive gave rise to many problems. Facilities of maintenance shops became heavily ladened with work. Salvage became extremely vital as it was a means of obtaining critical materials for reclamation and repair of major units and assemblies.

The volume of issues of ammunition were still great during the earlier part of the month and it was necessary to continue the use of a railhead for direct issue to using units.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

The Ordnance Section moved from the city of NANCY (U-81) to ESCH (P-70), GRAND DUCHY of LUXEMBOURG on 7 January 1945. The liaison group of three officers and one enlisted man remained on duty with the command echelon in the city of LUXEMBOURG (P-81). At this time the French liaison officer on duty with the Ordnance Section was relieved from attached. A Belgian liaison officer later reported for duty with the section on 25 January and was immediately assigned to the Maintenance Sub-Section to assist in purchasing and contracting functions being carried on with Belgian firms. Other augmentation of personnel in the Ordnance Section remained the same as previously reported.

On 8 January the 6937th Corps Pass Team (Provisional), consisting of two officers and six enlisted men, were placed on temporary duty with the section from Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, for the purpose of instruction, in an advisory capacity, to troops in the use of "POINT" fuzes.

During this period three officers and three enlisted men were added to the Ordnance Technical Intelligence Team, attached to the section, thereby completing authorized strength of five officers and seven enlisted men in the unit.

Officers from Army Ordnance units attended courses at the Army Information-Education Staff School at Cite Universitaire in PARIS (S-14) as follows:

Educational Advisement	1
Information-Education	4
Instructor Training	2

Quotas for thirty day furloughs in the UNITED STATES for rehabilitation, recuperation, and recovery, under the provisions of European Theater of Operations Circular 124, 24 December 1944, were allotted to Army Ordnance units as follows:

69th Ordnance Group	5
70th Ordnance Group	5
82nd Ordnance Group	2

Casualties (killed and wounded) due to enemy action during this period totaled eleven, thus making the accumulative total to date 115.

The status of awards by the close of the month were as follows:

	Current	Accumulative to Date
Silver Star	0	1
Soldiers Medal	1	3
Bronze Star	43	105
Purple Heart	3	67

Meritorious Service Unit Plaques were awarded to following Army Ordnance Units:

Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment, 15th Ordnance Battalion
281st Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA)
552nd Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank)
575th Ordnance Ammunition Company
576th Ordnance Ammunition Company
61.1st Ordnance Depot Company
3511th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company
3519th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company

Accumulative total to date.....12

SECTION III

OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

The rapidly changing tactical situation and the interchanging of divisions within Corps made three reorganizations of the 69th Ordnance Group necessary during the month. At the close of the period the 69th Ordnance Group was as follows:

III CORPS	VIII CORPS	XII CORPS	XX CORPS
14th Ordnance Bn	10th Ordnance Bn	514th Ordnance Bn	195rd Ordnance Bn
838th Ord Dep Co	2nd Ord MM Co	32nd Ord MM Co	147th Ord MM Co
3463rd Ord MM Co	7th Ord MM Co	189th Ord MM Co	1164th Ord MM Co
3528th Ord MAM Co	15th Ord MM Co	611st Ord Dep Co	640th Ord Dep Co
	306th Ord MM Co (AA)	3417th Ord MAM Co	3511th Ord MAM Co
	3423th Ord MAM Co	3418th Ord MAM Co	
	3441th Ord MM Co	857th Ord MM Co	
	3515th Ord MAM Co		

14th Ordnance Bn	316th Ordnance Bn
168th Ord Dep Co	275th Ord Maint Co (AA)
297th Ord MM Co (FA)	281st Ord Maint Co (AA)
299th Ord Maint Co (AA)	501st Ord MM Co (FA)
510th Ord MM Co (FA)	520th Ord MM Co (FA)
553rd Ord MM Co (FA)	537th Ord MM Co (FA)
562nd Ord MM Co (FA)	3422nd Ord MAM Co
3511th Ord MAM Co	
3519th Ord MAM Co	

The loss of Ordnance units to Third Army was as follows:

Hq & Hq Det., 19th Ordnance Battalion
472nd Ordnance Evacuation Company
3526th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company
3554th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
131st Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (FA)
657th Ordnance Ammunition Company

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 10th Ordnance Battalion opened in LIVRAMONT (P-34) on 27 January and was placed on temporary duty with the 82nd Ordnance Group as a railroad battalion operating ammunition trains into Third U. S. Army Depots and Ammunition Supply Points.

ASPs and Ammunition Depots are now located as follows:

a. Ammunition Depot No. 32 - In AUBEL-LE-ROMAN On IC 15[6] (P-663872) - Operated by 583rd Ordnance Ammunition Company.

b. ASP No. 35 - In DISTROFF (U-930826) on OC 73 - Operated by 574th and 576th Ordnance Ammunition Companies. Serving XX Corps.

c. ASP No. 38 - In MAMER on No. 6 (P-763195) - Operated by 573rd, 575th, 598th, 596th, and 657th Ordnance Ammunition Companies and 3076th Ordnance Motor Vehicle Distributing Company. Serving II & XIX Corps.

d. ASP No. 39 - In BELLEIN on Highway 160 (P-405382) - Operated by 619th and 680th Ordnance Ammunition Companies. Serving VIII Corps.

e. ASP No. 40 - In BRAS on N34 (P-686999) - Operated by 570th Ordnance Ammunition Company. Serving III Corps.

f. ASP No. 41 - In WEILER (P-780689) off Highway No. 12 - Operated by 575th, 598th, and 680th Ordnance Ammunition Companies. Serving VIII Corps.

Personnel and Vehicles present on the Continent is as follows:

Officers	695
Enlisted Men	12,351
T/B Vehicles	2,668
Total Vehicles	2,984

Total Quartermaster personnel and vehicles attached are as follows:

Officers	79
Enlisted Men	2,015
Vehicles	780

Civilians employed with Third Army Ordnance is as follows:

Machinists and Mechanics	353
Laborers	450

No change in Quartermaster units attached to the 82nd Ordnance Group.

SECTION IV

SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

On 5 January a TWX was received from European Theater of Operations requesting a report on the status of tanks as of the 5th, 12th, 20th, and 28th of each month. This report was to be dispatched prior to 2400 of the succeeding day and to be marked to the attention of the "Armored Fighting Vehicles and Weapons Section". The report was to include the following information:

a. The designation of all armored divisions, tank battalions, and armored field artillery battalions under the jurisdiction of the Army.

b. The number of serviceable Medium Tanks (with the 75mm and 76mm Guns) on hand.

c. The number of unserviceable but repairable tanks (with 75mm and 76mm Guns) on hand.

d. The number of serviceable Medium Tanks (with 105 Howitzer) on hand.

e. The number of unserviceable but repairable Medium Tanks (with 105 Howitzer) on hand.

f. The number of battle losses on Medium Tanks (with 75mm and 76mm Guns) during the last period.

g. The number of battle losses for Medium Tanks (with 105 Howitzer) during the last period.

h. All types of Medium Tanks including DD's are to be included.

Icy and snow covered roads, as in the latter part of the previous month, continued to be the main cause of many accidents, particularly among general purpose vehicles. This greatly aggravated the already critical supply of these vehicles.

Except for a number of critical major items and unit assemblies, supply activities during this period were normal and consisted mostly of expediting and coordinating shipment of Class II and IV supplies. Some of the more critical items were as follows:

Light Machine-Guns	Fire Control Equipment
Pistols	General Purpose Vehicles
Grenade Launchers	Tires and Tubes
Rocket Launchers	Mat Patches

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Practices which had previously been on the list was finally received in sufficient quantity to fill all requirements.

For the period of January the total receipts and issues of the following major items were:

	Received	Issued
Light Tanks	142	366
Medium Tanks	344	430
Combat Vehicles	344	430
Artillery (over 57mm)	190	130
General Purpose Vehicles	3,140	3,126

By the end of the month as the "Belgian Bulge", caused by the enemy counter-offensive, was practically eliminated the supply lines were as follows:

a. FLAMMERATH (P-14), to LIPPERSCHEID (P-34), to HUTTERATH (P-67).

b. MONSCHAU (P-20), to FLORENVILLE (P-20), to MONSCHAU (P-34), to BAELEN (P-[illegible]), to [illegible] (P-[illegible]).

c. [illegible] (P-42), to [illegible] (P-60), to ARLON (P-62), to BASTOGNE (P-66) to WALDBILLIG (P-77), to [illegible] (P-84).

d. HUNSRUCK (P-47), to ALTRIER (P-70), to [illegible] (P-81), to DIEKIRCH (P-84), to [illegible] (P-86), to [illegible] (P-[illegible]).

e. METZ (P-48), to FRISANGE (P-80), to [illegible] (P-81), to ECHTERNACH (P-83), to BITBURG (P-[illegible]).

f. METZ (P-48), to THIONVILLE (P-88), to SAARLAUTERN (Q-28).

The location of the three main supply depots at this time remained the same as in the previous month.

SECTION V

MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

The facilities of ordnance maintenance shops were severely taxed as a result of the large scale enemy counter-attack in the MEUSE-ARDENNES bulge. The addition of the 567th Ordnance Base Armament Maintenance Battalion to Third U. S. Army Ordnance did much to relieve this strain. This battalion, located in METZ, (P-48) had considerable experience in previous campaigns and was a very valuable addition to the Ordnance at this particular time. They were given the responsibility of maintaining and supplying all Third U. S. Army using units in the area south of METZ (P-48) and west of the MOSELLE River. The battalion turned over all their major items and unit assemblies to companies of the 70th Ordnance Group who were currently engaged in repairing ordnance equipment in the collection point in METZ (P-48). In addition to alleviating a serious shortage of spare parts and unit assemblies, the presence of this organization enabled the 70th Ordnance Group to move several companies from the areas of PONT-A-MOUSSON (P-48), NANCY (P-81), and METZ (P-60) to the north where they were needed to assist in the great amount of work engendered by the break-through.

Maintenance units and collection points were carefully inspected to insure proper handling and care of repairable equipment. Ordnance troops were instructed to thoroughly check for salvage all unrepairable items in order that the maximum amount of critical materials be made available for reclamation and repair of major units and assemblies. Instructions were issued to promptly evacuate and classify all ordnance material uncovered in the BASTOGNE (P-66) area and to report all cases of unnecessary cannibalization to this headquarters.

An artillery calibration team was assigned to check over all condemned major artillery tubes where time and the tactical situation permitted. Their findings enabled Ordnance to better analyze artillery tubes and allow maximum use of the tubes before being condemned.

All track-like vehicles were in danger of being immobilized due to the hazardous condition of the roads caused by ice and snow. This problem was solved by welding manganese steel lugs on every fifth block of steel type track or on rubber type track, by replacing every fifth block with a steel block equipped with a lug. This enabled the vehicles to obtain the necessary traction on icy terrain and to be put back into action. Additional manganese steel was obtained for one of our armored divisions to help them with the speedy modification of their tank track.

A GARAND trigger adapter that fitted into the trigger housing of a rifle, gunshine-gun, etc., making it possible to operate the trigger, without removing gloves or mittens, was captured. The idea was adopted by the maintenance section and a similar gadget was designed and local contracts placed for the manufacture of 95,000 pieces. Deliveries at the rate of 5,000 a day were effected.

A local contract was placed for the manufacture of a strap wrench to facilitate the removal of 105mm fuzes. The strap material used was salvaged from a Quartermaster salvage point.

Close liaison was maintained with all contractors in order to expedite deliveries of the many critical items being manufactured for the Third U. S. Army Ordnance Section.

The maintenance area for January remained the same as that for the period 16 through 31 December.

The number of major items repaired in ordnance shops were as follows:

	January	Accumulative to Date
General Purpose Vehicles	8,537	39,180
Combat Vehicles	2,002	7,733
Artillery	1,907	6,540
Small Arms	19,760	77,291
Instruments	4,854	17,062

The general location of Third U. S. Army Ordnance Maintenance Battalions during January were as follows:

Opening Date January	Location	Coordinates
	69th Ordnance Group	
	24th Ordnance Battalion	
21	In HERBESTHAL	P-63
	193rd Ordnance Battalion	
12	In BASSE YUTZ	U-88
	590th Ordnance Battalion	
2	In CHARLEVILLE	Q-83
10	In WECHSELTRAT	P-34
19	In LIPPERSCHEID	P-34
	70th Ordnance Group	
	526th Ordnance Battalion	
17	Vicinity of METZ	U-85

SECTION VI

AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

By the first of January, the enemy counter-offensive had been sufficiently contained to permit the establishment of a formal ASP to replace the railhead distributing points which had been serving VIII Corps. Even though the Corps would not concur in the establishment of an ASP close to the front lines, the Army Ordnance Officer ordered ASP No. 39 to be opened at WECHSELTRAT (P-34) on 1 January. This extremely close support contributed much to the restoration of confidence in the troops that had previously been forced to withdraw during the enemy attacks. In one instance, armored units passed through this ASP enroute to the active front lines.

The volume of issues at ASP No. 58 (P-71) serving both III and XII Corps, was so large during the early part of the month that it was necessary to continue the use of the ETHE railhead (P-67) to assist in the support of using units. During the first week of January approximately 65% of the ammunition received at this railhead was issued directly to using units, the remainder being placed in ASP No. 58.

As the combat troops advanced, constant reconnaissance for suitable ASP sites and railheads was maintained in forward areas in order to continue the close support policy of the Army. Thus, during the first week of the month daily reconnaissance trips north and northwest of the city of LUXEMBOURG (P-81) were made to find suitable locations to support the III and XII Corps.

As the Third Army attack continued and swung toward Germany, decision was made to provide new ASPs for the III and VIII Corps. These ASPs, Nos. 40 and 41, were located southeast and northeast of BASTOGNE (P-66) respectively, and were served from the railhead located in that city. These installations were established under the most adverse weather conditions yet encountered by the operating personnel, as practically all roads were covered by deep snowdrifts and ice. Snowplows and bulldozers were used throughout the area to clear roads and spaces in the snowbanks where ammunition could be stacked. In order to eliminate the truck haul across the MOSELLE River a new railroad was opened at DALSTEIN (Q-07) to serve ASP No. 35 in support of XV Corps.

At the end of January, as the tactical situation changed, the Army Ordnance Officer initiated action to gradually deplete Depot No. 52, which with its important railhead at ACHEN-LE-MONAN (P-68), had been a focal point in the ammunition supply system during this period. This railhead not only served Depot No. 52, but was used as a transfer point to route ammunition trains to vital areas during the battle against the German offensive.

Two Armored Divisions held in Army reserve, the 8th and 9th, required special assistance during the middle of the month. Since they had no ASP to service them nearby, action was taken to increase the basic load of each division by 1,00 tons. Thus, in the event of emergency, each unit could enter into combat with a comfortable margin of safety pending establishment by Army of an ASP behind them.

Another unit requiring special assistance during January was the 101st Airborne Division. Upon being relieved after its epic stand at BASTOGNE, it was attached to the Seventh U. S. Army. Consistent with the policy of having troops leaving Third Army being well supplied, the Army Ordnance Officer directed that this division be furnished 200 tons of ammunition over and above their basic load. This was accomplished 19 January 1945.

During the month there were two serious mishaps. On 2 January several tons of explosives in Depot No. 31 detonated, resulting in some casualties and damage. Investigation revealed the probable cause to have been action by enemy aircraft. On 10 January forty-four rail cars loaded with ammunition for ASP No. 39 were involved in a train wreck at WECHSELTRAT (P-61). Most of the ammunition either exploded or burned, and all but thirteen cars were destroyed. The Army Ordnance Officer visited the scene of the wreck shortly after it occurred and instructed that every effort be exerted to salvage maximum amounts of ammunition. Four bomb disposal squads, one provisional collecting squad, one ammunition company, and a platoon of a Quartermaster truck company worked forty-eight hours removing unserviceable ammunition and salvage, thereby enabling the railroad maintenance crews to immediately repair the damaged tracks.

The First U. S. Army ASP No. 129, which had been overrun by the Germans during their offensive, was recaptured by Third U. S. Army during the latter part of January. Its stacks were prepared for demolition by the Germans, but only a small portion was actually destroyed. In order to protect using units from unnecessary danger due to the probability of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines having been left by the Germans, this ASP was not reopened. Instead, an ammunition company and three bomb disposal squads were assigned to clear the area, inventory the ammunition, and incorporate it in ASP No. 41.

Another reclamation job, that of gathering up ammunition left unused by the 101st Airborne Division in the vicinity of BASTOGNE (P-66) was given to ammunition collecting squads. This ammunition had been previously supplied to that unit by "air lift".



Roadside Ammunition Supply Point.

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CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The efficiency with which Army Ordnance units had normally operated during past campaigns was greatly hampered during this period by conditions throughout the Army read net which made travel practically impossible in some areas. Transportation of heavy equipment and supplies and evacuation by tank transporter was prohibited except when deemed highly necessary due to the tactical situation.

Modification of medium tanks with additional armor on forward hull was accomplished and proved highly successful when committed to actual combat. Equipping of all medium tanks with 76mm guns was also stressed to provide additional fire power.

Ammunition was moved forward as far as possible by rail in order to relieve haulage by truck transportation. The expenditure of artillery ammunition during the last two weeks of the month surpassed all previous records for a similar period.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

The Ordnance Section moved from the city of ESCH (P-79) to the city of LUXEMBOURG (P-81) on 6 February 1945. The entire section was consolidated at this point when the small liaison group, three officers and one enlisted man, rejoined the section from the Command Echelon, thereby making the Ordnance Section complete in one location for the first time since the start of operations in August. Personnel in the Ordnance Section remained the same as in previous months, with five enlisted men being attached from Army Ordnance units, and attached teams remaining as previously reported.

Officers from Army Ordnance units attended courses at the Army Information Staff School at Cite Universitaire in PARIS as follows:

Information-Education	4
Educational Advancement	1
Instructor Training	1
On-The-Job-Training	2

Quotas for thirty days furlough in the UNITED STATES for rehabilitation, recuperation, and recovery, under the provisions of European Theater of Operations Circular 12[illegible], 21 December 1944, were allotted to Army Ordnance units as follows:

69th Ordnance Group	8
70th Ordnance Group	8
82nd Ordnance Group	4

Meritorious Service Unit Plaques were awarded to the following Army Ordnance Units:

3[illegible]50th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company
650th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Field Army)
129th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
88th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad
Detachments "B" and "C", 158th Ordnance Fire Repair Company

Accumulative totals of this award to date were:

Group Headquarters	None
Battalion Headquarters	1
Companies	13
Detachment, Fire Repair	1
Bomb Disposal Squads	2
Total to date	17

Casualties due to enemy action during this period were as follows:

	Current Killed	Current Wounded	Accumulative Total Killed	Accumulative Total Wounded
Officers	0	0	3	2
Enlisted Men	2	5	3[illegible]	66

The status of awards by the close of the month were as follows:

Officers:	Current	Accumulative Total
Silver Star	0	2
Soldiers Medal	0	0
Bronze Star	1[illegible]	55
Purple Heart	0	5
Enlisted Men:		
Silver Star	0	0
Soldiers Medal	2	4
Bronze Star	25	89
Purple Heart	2	100

SECTION III

OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

The following Ordnance units were assigned to Third U. S. Army during the month of February:

3562nd Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company
666th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank)
256th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
131st Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company
877th Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company
667th Ordnance Ammunition Company
9[illegible]th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad
2[illegible]1st Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad
267th Ordnance Service Detachment (Wess)

The following units were relieved from assignment to Third U. S. Army during the month:

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 19th Ordnance Battalion
472nd Ordnance Evacuation Company
3[illegible]26th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company
7th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
553rd Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank)
568rd Ordnance Ammunition Company
853rd Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company

The 607th Ordnance Base Armament Maintenance Battalion was relieved from attached to Third U. S. Army and returned to control of Communications Zone.

The rear vehicle replacement pool of the 70th Ordnance Group, operated by the 717th Ordnance Battalion, was moved from STAIN (P-47) to WEIL (P-68) due to the fact that the rear Army boundary was moved forward and East of STAIN (P-47).

When the III Corps was lost to First U. S. Army, the 21st Ordnance Battalion, which was supporting III Corps, moved back as an intermediate battalion supporting the 31[illegible]th Ordnance Battalion, which in turn was supporting XII Corps.

At the close of the month, Ordnance Groups providing supply and maintenance to the Army were organized as follows:

69th Ordnance Group

10th Ord Bn
[illegible]nd Ord MM Co
15th Ord HM Co
19[illegible] Ord Dep Co
3[illegible]4th Ord MAM Co
3[illegible]4th Ord MAM Co
5515th Ord MAM Co

3[illegible]th Ord Bn
3[illegible]nd Ord MM Co
129th Ord MM Co
257th Ord MM Co
6[illegible]1st Ord Dep Co
3[illegible]7th Ord MAM Co
3[illegible]8th Ord MAM Co
3[illegible]63rd Ord MM Co

194rd Ord Bn
1[illegible]7th Ord MM Co
116th Ord MM Co
256th Ord MM Co
6[illegible]0th Ord Dep Co
5[illegible]11th Ord MAM Co
5[illegible]2th Ord MAM Co

[illegible]16th Ord Bn
[illegible]th Ord MM Co (FA)
[illegible]th Ord MM Co (AA)
[illegible]th Ord MM Co (FA)
[illegible]th Ord MM Co (Tk)
[illegible]th Ord MAM Co
[illegible]519th Ord MAM Co

[illegible]th Ord Bn
[illegible]th Ord MM Co (FA)
[illegible]th Ord MM Co (AA)
[illegible]st Ord MM Co (Tk)
620th Ord MM Co (FA)
858th Ord Dep Co
3562nd Ord MAM Co

3[illegible]6th Ord Bn
[illegible]th Ord MM Co (AA)
2[illegible]st Ord MM Co (AA)
537th Ord MM Co
666th Ord MM Co (Tk)
3[illegible]82nd Ord MAM Co

70th Ordnance Group

26th Ord Bn
3[illegible]th Ord Dep Co
3[illegible]7th Ord Dep Co
837th Ord Dep Co
98[illegible]th Ord Dep Co
Det B, 158th Ord Fire Rep Co
Det C, 158th Ord Fire Rep Co

66th Ord Bn
1[illegible]5th Ord Evac Co
471st Ord Evac Co
1[illegible]5th Ord Evac Co
1[illegible]9th Ord Evac Co
1[illegible]0th Ord Evac Co
869th Ord MAM Co

79th Ord Bn
521st Ord MM Co (FA)
55[illegible]nd Ord MM Co (Tk)
902nd Ord MAM Co
91[illegible]th Ord MAM Co
877th Ord MAM Co

3[illegible]7th Ord Bn
2[illegible]th Ord MM Co
556th Ord MM Co (Tk)
3[illegible],992nd Ord MAM Co
560th Ord MM Co (Tk)

326th Ord Bn
3[illegible]th Ord MM Co (AA)
531st Ord MM Co (Tk)
550th Ord MM Co (Tk)
90[illegible]th Ord MAM Co
3537th Ord MAM Co
851st Ord MAM Co

The 82nd Ordnance Group was operating ammunition installations at the close of the month as follows:

Ammunition Depot No. 32 - In ARLON-LE-ROMAN on IC156 (T-663872), Operated by 576th Ordnance Ammunition Company.

ASP No. 35 - In DIEDORF on OC73, (T-930826), Operated by 619th Ordnance Ammunition Company. Serving XX Corps.

ASP No. 38 - In MERTZ on No. 6, (P-763195), Operated by 573rd, 575th, 592nd, 596th, and 626th Ordnance Ammunition Companies. Serving XII Corps.

ASP No. 39 - Closed 271200 February 1945.

ASP No. 40 - In PRAM on N[illegible] (P-626659), Operated by 570th, 571th, 575th Ordnance Ammunition Companies, and 3076th Ordnance Motor Vehicle Distributing Company. Serving VIII Corps.

ASP No. 41 - In WEILER off Highway No. 12 (P-720689), Operated by 620th Ordnance Ammunition Company. Serving VIII Corps.

ASP No. 42 - In STEINEM off No. 1[illegible] (P-875380), Operated by 667th Ordnance Ammunition Company. Serving XII Corps.

The following Ordnance units were reorganized during the month:

Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies under T/O & E, 9-7, 30 September 1944.
Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squads under T/O & E, 9-500, Column EE, 11 October 1944.

Personnel and vehicles present on the Continent at the close of this period were as follows:

Officers	626
Enlisted Men	11,768
T/E Vehicles	2,594
Total Vehicles	2,906

Due to the increasing demands for Ordnance Service, it was necessary to employ the following civilian personnel in Army Ordnance units:

Machinists & Mechanics	381
Laborers	1,026

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SECTION IV

SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

Poor road conditions due to sudden thaw during this period necessitated orders by the Commanding General prohibiting the travel of tank transporters over the Army road net, thereby preventing deliveries of heavy equipment, principally tanks and combat vehicles, to the using units. This ban, which permitted necessary repairs, was lifted on special occasions as required by the tactical situation.

Further action was taken on the conversion of all separate Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons from M59 to M24 Light Tanks. This provided a faster, more maneuverable tank mounting a 75mm Gun instead of the former vehicle mounting a 37mm Gun.

The previous shortage of all light machine guns was relieved by receipts from Communications Zone in sufficient quantities to fill existing back orders.

Requirements for brake parts and brake fluid were heavy due to the generally poor road conditions throughout the Army. Communications Zone was requested to expedite regulations on these items which had been placed by main Army supply depots.

A survey of procurement activities in which the procurement section of Army Ordnance and 70th Ordnance Group were engaged, revealed that contracts for over 500 items, ranging from automotive to small arms, artillery, combat vehicle, fire control, and other sundry items, had been negotiated within Third U. S. Army Ordnance Service. This extensive program was necessary in order to fill requirements on materiel in critical supply throughout the Army.

The situation on 2½ ton, 6x6, trucks continued critical during this month, except 2½ ton dump trucks which was critical during the early stages but was relieved near the close of the month.

The supply of combat vehicles was in excellent condition throughout the month.

For the period of February, the total receipts and issues of the following major items were:

	Received	Issued
Light Tanks	163	102
Medium Tanks	235	152
Combat Vehicles	1,401	1,115
Artillery (over 57mm)	184	164

The equipment of Tank Destroyer Battalions was converted from the Carriage, Motor, 3" Gun M10, to Carriage, Motor, 90mm, M36, in order to supply M10 equipment to Sixth U. S. Army Group as per instructions of Twelfth U. S. Army Group.

A limited stock of 76mm guns was received for the purpose of modifying medium tanks equipped with the 75mm gun. This was deemed desirable since the tank equipped with 75mm gun was not considered by the using units to have sufficient fire power to perform assigned missions.

Action was taken to obtain 200,000 stock record cards that were in critical supply and were affecting the operation of Third U. S. Army Ordnance Depots. Contact was made with U. K. Base Sector and they shipped via air express 50,000 of these stock record cards immediately. Wire was also dispatched to Headquarters Communications Zone regarding this critical shortage and action is being taken to supply the total amount required.

A critical shortage of hot patches continued to exist in Third U. S. Army units. Requirements due out to using units were approximately 20,000 boxes. Total receipts during this period amounted to 6,000 boxes, which was highly inadequate to cover requirements.

The chronic shortage of all fire control and sighting equipment was improved somewhat by receipts during the month, but numerous items of this type continued in critical short supply.

By the end of the month the supply lines were as follows:

(a) M26 from LIBRAMONT (P-34) to SCHONBERG (P-58) - 158 to ROUM (L-07).
(b) M18 from LONGUYON (T-49) to ARLON (P-62) - 84 to HOUFFALIZE (P-67) - M26 to ST VITH (P-88).
(c) M4A6 from BRIEY (T-67) to AUMETZ (T-79) - 0264 to RJ No. 4 to LUXEMBOURG (P-81) - No. 12 to WILTZ (P-86).
(d) M5 and No. 5 from ULFLANGE (T-87) to LUXEMBOURG (P-81) - No. 7 to DIEKIRCH (P-84) - No. 17 to SINSPELTEN (P-96) - 1145 to ETTELBRUCK (L-15).
(e) M5 and No. 3 from ULFLANGE (T-87) to LUXEMBOURG (P-81) - No. 11 to SCHIFFLANGE (L-05) - W0857 to ETTELBRUCK (L-15).
(f) M5 and No. 3 from ULFLANGE (T-87) to LUXEMBOURG (P-81) - No. 1 to GREVENMACHER (L-12) - RR 49 to THIER (L-22).
(g) M5 from ULFLANGE (T-87) to THIONVILLE (T-68) - M418 to SAARLAUTERN (O-07) - RR 269 to MORFELDEN (L-51).

The location of the three main supply depots remained unchanged during the month and were located in METZ (P-85).

SECTION V

MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

The Commanding General directed that all M4A3 Medium Tanks equipped with 76mm Gun and all M4A3W Medium Tanks in the Army, not presently equipped with heavy armor plate on the forward hull similar to that on the M4A3E2, be modified with the least practicable delay. A completed model was submitted to the Commanding General which was approved and instructions given to proceed with the modification.

Army Ordnance personnel were assigned the task of removing armor plate from wrecked tanks in collection points and in the field. Many such tanks were found in the area of BASTOGNE (P-65) and elsewhere in the Belgian Bulge. Contracts were made with three local factories for the modification as the eighty-five man hours required per tank would have seriously hampered normal Army Ordnance maintenance. The actual modification consisted of welding an additional two and one half inches of armor on the front hull of all M4A3 and M4A3W medium tanks in the hands of the troops. The tanks in three Armored Divisions were modified in three weeks time with an estimated average of thirty-six tanks per division. The rapid procurement of extra supplies of oxygen, acetylene, and welding rod by Third U. S. Army Ordnance enabled the local contractors to maintain a schedule of ten tanks per day.



Medium Tank from which armor plate has been removed to provide additional armor for modification of other tanks.

Proof of the practicability of this modification was not long in coming. A report was received from the 4th Armored Division that one of their recently modified M4A3E8 medium tanks had suffered a direct hit from a German 75mm shell with the only resulting damage being the complete separation of the additional middle section of armor from the hull. The tank continued in action and succeeded in "bucking out" the opposing vehicle. The crew whose lives were saved by this additional protection were loud in their praises of this modification.

The M4A3E2 medium tank, although equipped with additional armor plate, was still mounted with a 75mm gun. In order to make this tank a more effective assault vehicle, a program was initiated to supply this vehicle with more fire power. 76mm gun tubes were obtained through normal supply channels and the salvage of medium tanks equipped with 76mm tubes. The modification was performed in the Armored Divisions by their organic Ordnance Maintenance Battalions while the tubes in all separate tank battalions were changed over by Army Ordnance Maintenance personnel.

An Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Field Army) from the Advance Section, Communications Zone, was assigned to work in conjunction with Army Ordnance units in the collection point operated by the 326th Ordnance Maintenance Battalion in ESCH (P-70). The sole mission of this unit was the dismantling of salvage material, thus obtaining many useful assemblies and spare parts critically needed in maintenance activities.



Closeup of forward hull of modified medium tank showing results of direct hit by German 75mm Gun.



M4A3W Medium Tank, w/76mm Gun, Modified w/additional armor on forward hull. Center section received direct hit by 75mm shell and was separated from tank which continued attack successfully.

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Ordnance materiel reconditioned by Third U. S. Army Ordnance maintenance units during February was as follows:

	FEBRUARY	ACCUMULATIVE TO DATE
General Purpose Vehicles	9,411	48,893
Combat Vehicles	5,218	10,951
Artillery	1,941	8,154
Small Arms	27,340	104,423
Instruments	4,589	21,431

The maintenance area for February remained the same as that for the period 16 through 31 December.

Location of the main maintenance battalions during the month of February were as follows:

Opening Date February	Location	Coordinates
	69th Ordnance Group No Change	
	10th Ordnance Battalion	
1	In [illegible]	P-56
24	In COCHEM	P-78
	14th Ordnance Battalion	
1	In [illegible]	P-46
16	In [illegible]	P-74
	24th Ordnance Battalion	
16	In [illegible]	P-72
	193rd Ordnance Battalion No Change	
	314th Ordnance Battalion No Change	
	316th Ordnance Battalion No Change	
	70th Ordnance Group	
9	In [illegible]	P-60
	79th Ordnance Battalion	
12	In [illegible]	P-60
	326th Ordnance Battalion	
1	In [illegible]	P-70

SECTION VI

AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

During the month of February ammunition supply was faced with situations that at first appeared to be impossible to overcome. As the frozen ground began to thaw many roads became impassible due to the heavy traffic necessary to move troops and supporting supplies. As all railyards had been either partially or completely destroyed by the retreating enemy these facilities were not immediately available for use. The most seriously affected area was the WITZ (P-75)-BASTOGNE (P-65)-ST VITH (P-88) sector occupied by the VIII Corps.

In order to place ammunition in locations accessible to using units, a new area East of the ST VITH (P-88)-BASTOGNE (P-65) road was opened in ASP No. 41 and stocked from the railhead at BASTOGNE (P-65), even though a large stock of the same items were on hand but not accessible.

The Army Ordnance Officer, faced with the possibility of road conditions becoming more acute, ordered the establishment of an Army reserve of approximately 1,000 tons of carefully selected items east of ST VITH (P-88). This reserve was to be used only in an emergency and in the event that it was impossible for using units to reach other supply installations. Toward the latter part of the month, the tactical situation had progressed satisfactorily and road conditions had improved somewhat so this reserve supply was opened to using units for normal issues.

Road conditions in the XX Corps sector were also bad and in order to conserve what few roads were still open, while necessary repairs were in progress, priority was placed on the rehabilitation of railheads in this area. Incoming rail shipments at the DALSTEIN (Q-07) railhead were divided and appropriate wagons shunted to each of three forward small railheads in division areas. This railhead method of supply to forward units was not considered as being very satisfactory, however, as an expedient to relieve the road conditions, it proved valuable.

Work in Army installations was further complicated by the fact that approximately 50% of all ammunition which had been stacked on snow and frozen ground toppled over as the snow and ground thawed. A large amount of personnel were used to restack this ammunition, thereby reducing the amount of personnel available for issuing and receiving ammunition in installations and railheads. During this period of time it was determined that available storage space was so limited to justify the change in existing safety distances. The size of stacks was increased from 6 tons to 8 tons in order to obtain maximum storage on the limited ground and road space available.

By the 11th of the month, strategically located dumps and installations had been built up to provide adequate supplies for the assault of the Siegfried Line. The penetration of this line completed, the Army was ready to resume its advance to the RHINE. During the last two weeks of February, expenditures of artillery ammunition exceeded amounts expended during any previous similar period since the Army became operational.

Many requests for training ammunition were processed during the early part of the month to provide training for reinforcements and for units that had no opportunity to fire for several months. Another unusual requirement was the increased demand by the Psychological Warfare Section for 105mm Howitzer M2 HC Smoke Shell for reloading with propaganda leaflets. In order to eliminate the day to day basis for supplying this type of ammunition, a request was submitted to Twelfth U. S. Army Group for 30,000 rounds for the exclusive use of Psychological Warfare. This request was approved and the ammunition placed in Army installations earmarked for that purpose.

Total ammunition received from Advance Section, Communications, Zone, during this period amounted to 69,767 long tons. Total ammunition handled by all Third U. S. Army installations amounted to 137,179 long tons.

Total truck mile hauled by trucks under Army Ordnance control for the month was 994,105. Accumulative total to date since 18 November 1944 is 1,494,104.

CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

Activities in Third Army Ordnance Service during the month of March were headlined by a continual forward movement in the wake of the highly successful combat troops of the Army. The problem of transportation of supplies and ammunition once again became paramount and was highly comparable with operations during the liberation of FRANCE. However, through the utilization of all available means of transportation, which included M25 Tank Transporters, M25 Trailers and provisional trucking companies composed of other organic vehicles of Army Ordnance units, this problem was successfully coped with and the vital supplies moved forward.

The movement of the main army supply depots into GERMANY and across the RHINE to the vicinity of FRANKFURT was initiated in the latter part of the month to further shorten Ordnance supply lines of the Army.

The Ordnance supply situation in general was very favorable due to receipts from Communications Zone and the elimination of many items from the critical list. The supply of combat vehicles, in particular, was excellent and afforded an opportunity to furnish immediate replacement to divisions on combat losses.

Ammunition supply under the fast-moving tactical situation into GERMANY and across the RHINE necessitated the continual establishment of ASPs further forward in support of combat units. Mileage covered by the transportation of this vital item during the latter part of the month exceeded all previous records within the Army.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

Five teams consisting of one officer and one enlisted man each, which were made available from the Zone of Interior through the Ground Force Reinforcement System for the purpose of instructing on the operation, care and maintenance of the M29C Cargo Carrier, were distributed as follows in order to locate them with proper unit to carry out their primary mission:

4 Teams - 69th Ordnance Group
1 Team - 70th Ordnance Group

A liaison group consisting of two officers and the Operations Subsection complete moved forward with the Tactical Echelon from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81) to OBERSTEIN (L-72), GERMANY on 27 March.

A quota for seven day leaves of absence at the UNITED STATES RIVIERA Recreational Area, CANNES, FRANCE, for personnel of Army Ordnance units was received on 28 March and allocated as follows:

	Officers	Enlisted Men
69th Ordnance Group	2	20
70th Ordnance Group	2	20
82nd Ordnance Group	1	10

On 29 March, the Ordnance Officer and Forward Ammunition Subsection moved from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81) to OBERSTEIN (L-72), GERMANY to join the forward tactical echelon. On this same date the Assistant Ordnance Officer, Supply, Maintenance, Administration, and rear Ammunition Sub-sections moved with the rear supply echelon to the city of TRIER (L-12), GERMANY. This resulted in the Ordnance Section being again divided into two echelons similar to the setup used in operations across FRANCE.

Personnel in the Ordnance Section remained the same as in previous months, with five enlisted men being attached from Army Ordnance units, and attached teams remaining as previously reported.

Officers from Army Ordnance units attended courses at the Army Information Staff School at Cite Universitaire in PARIS as follows:

Information-Education..... 5
Instructor Training..... 3

Quotas for thirty (30) day furloughs in the UNITED STATES for rehabilitation, recuperation, and recovery, under the provisions of European Theater of Operations Circular 121, 24 December 1944, were allotted to Army Ordnance units as follows:

	Current	Accumulative Total
69th Ordnance Group	7	20
70th Ordnance Group	6	19
82nd Ordnance Group	3	9

Casualties due to enemy action during this period were as follows:

	Current		Accumulative Total	
	Killed	Wounded	Killed	Wounded
Officers	0	2	3	4
Enlisted Men	1	8	35	74

No Meritorious Service Unit Plaques were awarded to Ordnance units during the month.

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The status of awards by the close of the month were as follows:

	Current	Accumulative Total
Officers:		
Silver Star	0	2
Soldiers Medal	0	0
Bronze Star	13	68
Purple Heart	2	7
Enlisted Men:		
Silver Star	0	0
Soldiers Medal	2	4
Bronze Star	7	96
Purple Heart	9	109

French decorations for services rendered in the liberation of FRANCE were awarded Ordnance personnel as follows:

Legion of Honor..... 1
Croix de Guerre..... 25

SECTION III

OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

On 10 March 1945, the 2853rd Ordnance Ballistic and Technical Service Detachment was activated at DETTINGEN (M-89), LUXEMBOURG per authority received from Headquarters, European Theater of Operations through Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group. The unit was attached to Third U. S. Army from Headquarters, Communications Zone and further attached to the 66th Ordnance Group for operations and administrative control. Personnel for this unit was derived from a provisional ballistic team which was operating in the Army area.

The great volume of Prisoners of War captured by advancing troops at this time presented the Provost Marshal with a serious transportation problem and arrangements were made whereby all trucks from Army Ordnance units returning from forward installations, would pick up prisoners from the Division and Corps concentration areas and return them to Prisoner of War enclosures in the rear Army area.

Movement of the 26th Ordnance Battalion, which incorporates the three Main Army Supply Depots, and has been located in METZ (M-85), was started during this period in order to shorten supply lines to the rapidly advancing combat troops of the Army. It was originally planned to locate these depots in the city of MAINZ (W-95), GERMANY, but due to the highly successful forward movement of the Army, and to further shorten the supply lines, it was decided to advance even further to the City of FRANKFURT (M-67) GERMANY. It was anticipated that at least two weeks would be required to complete the movement of these large depot installations which were stocked with approximately 12,000 tons of Ordnance material.

Forward movement of the vehicle replacement pool, operated by the 317th Ordnance Battalion, from METZ (M-85) to ALTEY (M-22) was also started during the latter part of the month. Relocation of this installation, consisting of approximately 2,200 general purpose vehicles, presented a major task due to the distance of 125 miles to be traveled, plus the exceedingly heavy traffic already placed on highways by the forward movement of the Army. Combat vehicles were given priority in this movement as they were currently needed for replacement of battle losses.

The following Ordnance units were assigned to Third U. S. Army during the month:

89th Ord HM Co (Pa)	163rd Ord Bn
506th Ord MAM Co	164th Ord Bn
543rd Ord MAM Co	422nd Ord Evac Co
125th Ord HM Co (Tk)	271st Ord HM Co
67th Ord Am Co	647th Ord Depot Co
545th Ord MAM Co	

At the close of the month, Ordnance Groups providing supply and maintenance to the Army were organized as follows:

69th Ordnance Group

10th Ordnance Bn	514th Ordnance Bn	133rd Ordnance Bn
93rd Ord HM Co	15th Ord HM Co	2nd Ord HM Co
194th Ord Dep Co	47th Ord HM Co	116th Ord HM Co
271st Ord HM Co	257th Ord HM Co	129th Ord HM Co
514th Ord HM Co	401st Ord Dep Co	69th Ord Dep Co
547th Ord HM Co	514th Ord MAM Co	551th Ord MAM Co
615th Ord MAM Co	514th Ord MAM Co	545th Ord MAM Co
615th Ord MAM Co		

163rd Ordnance Bn	164th Ordnance Bn	516th Ordnance Bn
277th Ord HM Co (Pa)	131st Ord HM Co (Pa)	125th Ord HM Co (Tk)
93rd Ord Maint Co	293rd Ord Maint Co (AA)	277th Ord HM Co (AA)
562nd Ord HM Co (Tk)	501st Ord HM Co (Tk)	281st Ord HM Co (AA)
	520th Ord HM Co (Pa)	513rd Ord HM Co (Pa)
	89th Ord Dep Co	537th Ord HM Co (Pa)
	514th Ord MAM Co	565th Ord HM Co (Tk)
	615th Ord MAM Co	647th Ord Dep Co
	545th Ord MAM Co	514th Ord MAM Co
		545th Ord MAM Co

70th Ordnance Group

526th Ordnance Bn	66th Ordnance Bn	26th Ordnance Bn
905th Ord HM Co (AA)	185th Ord Evac Co	514th Ord Dep Co
531st Ord HM Co (Tk)	171st Ord Evac Co	347th Ord Dep Co
553th Ord HM Co (Pa)	145th Ord Evac Co	833rd Ord Dep Co
86th Ord MAM Co	143th Ord Evac Co	941th Ord Dep Co
941th Ord MAM Co	893th Ord MAM Co	Det. B, 154th Fire Repair Co
514th Ord MAM Co	877th Ord MAM Co	Det. C, 154th Fire Repair Co

317th Ordnance Bn	532nd Ordnance Bn	154th Ordnance Bn
2853rd Ord MAM Co	No attached units	888th Ord HM Co (Pa)
554th Ord HM Co (Tk)		902nd Ord MAM Co
560th Ord HM Co (Tk)		
514th Ord MAM Co		
521st Ord HM Co (Pa)		
552nd Ord HM Co (Tk)		

At the end of March, ASPs, Ammunition Depots, and Railheads were located as follows:

ASP No. 35 — In DIEDENHOFEN on GC 73 (T-930826) - Operated by 576th, 619th Ord Am Cos - Serving XX Corps.

ASP No. 38 — In MANDEN on No. 6 (P-763156) - Operated by 573rd, 575th, 592nd Ord Am Cos - Serving XII Corps.

ASP No. 45 — In WENSERWEILER on Highway L-262 (L-733811) - Operated by 675th Ord Am Co - Serving XII and VIII Corps.

Am Dep No. 46 — In BELLSTEIN on Highway L-118 (W-160350) - Operated by 574th, 626th Ord Am Cos - Serving XII Corps.

RHD A-8 — In MONDORF (Q-169920) - Operated by 620th Ord Am - Serving XX Corps.

ASP No. 48 — In BOLLENDORF off Highway 427 (L-823689) - Operated by 572th Ord Am Co - Serving VIII Corps.

Personnel and vehicles present on the Continent at the close of this period were as follows:

Officers.....	641
Enlisted Men.....	12,497
T/E Vehicles.....	2,678
Total Vehicles.....	3,000

Due to the increasing demands for Ordnance Service, it was necessary to employ the following civilian personnel in Army Ordnance units:

Machinists and Mechanics.....	366
Laborers.....	1,042

SECTION IV

SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

As a result of improved weather conditions and repairs to roads and highways throughout the Army road net, it became possible to increase the use of tank transporters and heavy equipment for the movement of combat vehicles and supplies to forward installations.

The supply of combat vehicles, particularly medium and light tanks, was very good throughout the month and the status of medium tanks permitted prompt replacements of battle losses, plus an opportunity to use new tanks on hand in the combat vehicle pool to replace tanks which have been in the hands of troops during all of the past operations in FRANCE, LUXEMBOURG, BELGIUM, and GERMANY and require a complete overhaul.

The critical shortages of tires (all sizes), tubes (all sizes), hot patches, brake parts, and brake fluid from the previous month were relieved during this period as the result of incoming shipments from Communications Zone.

In anticipation of future fast-moving operations, requirements were placed on Communications Zone for a reserve supply of 200 sets of medium tank track and 500 bogie wheel assemblies for medium tanks.

Army Ordnance procurement activities were curtailed during this period due to the limitation placed on procurement at Army levels by The General Purchasing Agent, European Theater of Operations. This permitted only contracts which were not in excess of $1,000 to be negotiated by Army Ordnance personnel. However, the Chief Ordnance Officer, European Theater of Operations, granted special permission to the Army Ordnance Officer to negotiate contracts at the Army level not to exceed $2,000. Contracts in excess of that amount were to be submitted to the Chief Ordnance Officer for approval and possible consolidation with total requirements for similar items in the entire theater.

Supply of fire control and sighting equipment, which had previously been critical, showed improvement and continued to do so during the remainder of the month due to receipts of items on back order.

The situation on 2½ ton trucks was critical at times during the month but was relieved by receipts from Communications Zone to meet necessary requirements.

Two Carriages, Motor, T-41, were issued to the 6th Cavalry Group, in excess of authorized allowances for the purpose of testing to determine desirability for reconnaissance work with the Cavalry. Forty of these motor carriages were allocated by Twelfth Army Group for issue to Tank Destroyer Battalions (Towed) equipped with 3" Guns.

The conversion of seven separate Cavalry squadrons and the reconnaissance squadrons of three armored divisions from M-24 to M-24 Light Tanks was completed. This provided a faster, more maneuverable tank mounting a 75mm Gun instead of the former vehicle mounting a 37mm Gun.

Total receipts and issues of the following major items during the month were:

	Received	Issued
Light Tanks	109	162
Medium Tanks	311	345
Combat Vehicles	369	397
Artillery (over 57mm)	107	100

Movement of the main army supply depots from METZ (M-85), FRANCE to MAINZ (W-95), GERMANY was started in the latter part of the month. The vehicle replacement pool was also placed in the process of being moved forward from METZ (M-85) to a new location in ALTEY (M-22), GERMANY at this time.

SECTION V

MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

All forward Ordnance maintenance units were moved into GERMANY with the exception of one company which was scheduled to move at an early date in the following month. This unit has been assigned to set up a main Army Ordnance control and collection point east of the RHINE River.

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In order to facilitate movement in support of current operations, Ordnance mobile tire repair teams were organized to constantly patrol all main and auxiliary supply routes. These teams were equipped with hot patches, tubes, tires, and air compressors. To the extent of availability, tires and tubes were mounted on wheels in order to effect a direct exchange with vehicles having flat tires.

A repair and replacement program on all two and one-half ton trucks in the Quartermaster Truck Companies was initiated. An Army Ordnance maintenance company was designated to receive, repair, and reissue trucks to these companies at the rate of approximately two companies per week.

A maintenance service station was set up in ST WENDEL (Q-59) for the servicing of replacement vehicles being driven forward from the rear Army Ordnance supply depots. Vehicles were refueled, provided with a maintenance check, and the drivers were messed and billeted at this installation.

The M7 Generator, used with the 90mm AA Guns, was in critical supply due to the shortage of spare parts for the Hercules engine powering this unit. An experiment was conducted in which an M7 Generator was modified to operate with a Cadillac V-8 tank engine. The results were most satisfactory to date and further experiments were being conducted to determine whether or not it would be desirable to substitute the Cadillac or a White half-track engine in lieu of the Hercules.

Through an arrangement with the Seventh U. S. Army, a number of their salvaged M4A3 medium tanks were made available to Third U. S. Army Ordnance. This enabled the continuance of the modification of medium tanks with additional frontal armor plate as mentioned in Chapter IX.

At the direction of the Chief of Staff, a survey of approximately 100 tank casualties, both American and German, was completed. The tanks selected for this survey were those that had been damaged in the HARTGEN (P-55) area. The final report as submitted contained specific data as to the ratio of American versus German tanks rendered inoperative, caliber of projectiles causing damage, and the angle of impact.

Among the items received on local contracts, placed by the maintenance section, were 146,000 brass valve caps, 4,000 electrical control mechanisms for 7-3/4 Rocket Launchers and 150 adapter plates for tank periscope heads.

The project of installing 76mm guns in lieu of 75mm guns in medium tanks, M4A3E2, was continued with a total of forty-five tanks being completely modified. The added weight due to the longer, heavier 76mm gun tube made it necessary to place a counterbalance on the rear of the gun and on the outside rear of the turret. Lead for the counterbalance on the rear of the gun was obtained from salvage storage batteries, while the counterbalance on the rear of the turret was effected by means of heavy steel plate procured from civilian sources. Gun tubes were supplied through normal channels of supply and from salvage tanks. Sighting equipment for the 76mm Gun was not available, therefore 3" gun telescopic sights were substituted to eliminate this problem. The main difficulties encountered were the modification and rearrangement of the ammunition rack and the relocation of the radio which was removed from the turret and placed in the drivers compartment. The bustle in the turret in which the radio was originally located was converted to provide storage for seven "ready rounds" of ammunition. Approximately seventy-five man hours were required to complete the modification.

Ordnance material reconditioned by Third U. S. Army Ordnance maintenance units during March was as follows:

	MARCH	ACCUMULATIVE TO DATE
General Purpose Vehicles	11,437	60,330
Combat Vehicles	3,491	14,112
Artillery	1,882	10,236
Small Arms	86,758	141,091
Instruments	3,926	26,557

Maintenance responsibility was divided as follows:

East of the RHINE River to the 69th Ordnance Group and West of the RHINE to the 70th Ordnance Group. Road patrols and radio repair teams were available in all areas.



Rear view of modified turret showing counterbalancing required for the installation of the longer and heavier 76mm gun.



M4A3E2 Medium Tank shown with 75mm gun before being modified.



M4A3E2 Medium Tank completely modified with 76mm gun. Note the complete rounds on hull showing comparison between 75mm and 76mm shells.



Interior view of turret showing bustle with radio removed and ammunition rack for seven "ready rounds" of 76mm installed.

The location of main maintenance installations during March were as follows:

Operating Date MARCH	Location	Coordinates
69th Ordnance Group:		
	10th Ordnance Bn	
15	In HAUSEN	L-69
26	In HUCH	L-76
31	In ZOLLHAUS	M-28
	11th Ordnance Bn	
8	In HARTGEN	P-85
15	In TRIER	L-12
21	Near CASTELLAUN	L-75
23	In SCHWEPPEN HAUSEN	M-68
29	Near DARMSTADT	M-64
	28th Ordnance Bn	
5	In PELS	P-93
	163rd Ordnance Bn	
21	In BELL	L-69
29	In HASSELBACH	L-76
	195rd Ordnance Bn	
8	In WENICH	L-00
20	In WEISKIRCHEN	L-30
26	In ST WENDEL	Q-59
29	In BAD KREUZNACH	M-03
	514th Ordnance Bn	
5	In BOLLENDORF	L-04
11	In OBSFELD	L-25
14	Near UTZERATH	L-48
19	Vicinity of CASTELLAUN	L-78
21	In BAD KREUZNACH	M-03
29	In GROS GERAU	M-54
30	In OFFENBACH	M-76
31	In SPLESEIM	M-76
	516th Ordnance Bn	
13	In BESCH	L-00
21	In NUNKIRCHEN	Q-39
29	In SCHWEPPENHAUSEN	M-04
70th Ordnance Group:		
	26th Ordnance Bn	
31	Vicinity of MAINZ	M-35
	79th Ordnance Bn	
8	In METZ	U-85
	161th Ordnance Bn	
21	In METZ	U-85
26	In MELLACH	L-10
	317th Ordnance Bn	
	No Change	
	326th Ordnance Bn	
	No Change	
	332nd Ordnance Bn	
	No Change	

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"Jeeps" MPI (ready for issue) in Main Army Vehicle Pool.

SECTION VI

AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

During the early part of March the tactical situation was such that the establishment of large ASPs was not deemed advisable. A large part of the Army was located North of the MOSELLE River and indications were that the eventual axis of the Army's advance would be south of this river. However, to relieve the combat troops of the burden of transporting supplies over almost impassable roads, two temporary ASPs Nos. 47 and 48, were established in close support of the troops north of the MOSELLE.

The next ammunition problem confronted was that of providing support for a crossing of the MOSELLE for III Corps which would attack up the west bank of the WITTE River to cut off the enemy in front of the German border and their water barrier. In order to provide this support, ASP No. 45 was established a short distance northeast of the confluence of the WITTE and MOSELLE Rivers. This installation while only short lived, proved very valuable as it adequately supported this highly successful drive up the WITTE. Also, it later provided a source of supply for the VIII Corps when that Corps crossed the WITTE.

The fast-moving tactical situation, plus the status of rail lines in the Forward Army area, presented the Army Ordnance Officer with problems highly reminiscent of the August campaign in FRANCE. Tank transporters, M-25 Trailers and additional provisional truck companies, formed from organic transportation of Army Ordnance units, were diverted to hauling Class V supplies to ASPs No. 47 and 48, which were newly established close to the WITTE River. The other ASP, No. 47, was started west of the WITTE, however, after approximately 500 tons of ammunition had been installed, the Army boundary was changed and this ASP never opened; all ammunition enroute was diverted to ASP No. 46.

As the Army made its historic crossings of the WITTE and plunged deeper into enemy territory, it became necessary to establish an ASP across this river. ASP No. 49 was opened near ASSWEILER (R-78). This installation was soon too far to the rear for the fast-moving armor, therefore ammunition enroute to restock the ASP was diverted further east to a new location which would become ASP No. 50.

During this historic month Third Army ammunition units handled a total of 130,582 long tons of ammunition. Class V receipts by Third Army from the Communications Zone totaled 31,272 long tons. Trucks hauling ammunition to ASPs accumulated a total of 1,408,789 truck miles during the month. Of this total, 587,819 miles were traveled during the week 25 to 31 March, which is probably the greatest mileage accumulated by any Army for ammunition surely during a comparable period. Accumulative mileage total to date since 19 November 1944 is 6,100,892.

CHAPTER II
APRIL OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The rapid forward movement in support of the highly successful combat troops of the Army continued to create a problem of transportation of vitally important supplies as in the previous month. This was further abetted by the movement of the Army boundaries to the southeast and the mission assigned Third U. S. Army for the drive into the "REICH" area.

Numerous small pockets of enemy troops throughout the Army area resulted in Ordnance personnel being involved in actual combat with the enemy on several occasions, the outstanding action taking place when an ASP was captured by the enemy, held for two days, and then recaptured.

The extremely large quantity of enemy Ordnance installations and material captured as the Army advanced presented a serious problem and necessitated the utilization of a great number of Ordnance troops in maintaining security.

The policy of establishing small ASPs well forward during the fast moving tactical situation was continued. The number of ASPs established and operated during this month exceeded all previous figures for a like period since the Army became operational.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

On 5 April the forward echelon of the Ordnance Section moved from OFFENBURG (L-72) to FRANKFURT (M-56), GERMANY. On 6 April the rear echelon moved from "WITT (L-12) to FRANKFURT (M-56), GERMANY, and set up in a casserne located about one mile from the forward echelon. The forward moved again on the 11th to HERSFELD (N-96) and thence to WIESBADEN (O-31) on the 20th. On 26 April the rear echelon moved to DARMSTADT (N-91) where they were set up with the supply services about one half mile from the casserne housing the now combined forward and tactical echelons.

Personnel in the Ordnance Section remained the same as in previous months, with five enlisted men being attached from Army Ordnance units, and attached teams remaining as previously reported.

Officers from Army Ordnance units attended courses at the Army Information Staff School at Cite Universitaire in PARIS, FRANCE, as follows:

Information-Education..... 1

Quotas for thirty day furloughs in the UNITED STATES for rehabilitation, recuperation and recovery, under the provisions of European Theater of Operations Circular 124, 21 December 1944, were allotted to Army Ordnance units as follows:

	Current	Accumulative Total
40th Ordnance Group	3	24
70th Ordnance Group	2	21
82nd Ordnance Group	2	11

Quotas for seven days leave of absence at the UNITED STATES RECREATIONAL Recreational Area, CANNES, FRANCE, for personnel of Army Ordnance units were received and allocated as follows:

	April		Accumulative to Date	
	Officers	EM	Officers	EM
40th Ordnance Group	5	40	7	60
70th Ordnance Group	5	38	7	58
82nd Ordnance Group	2	10	3	29

Casualties due to enemy action during this period were as follows:

	Current		Accumulative Total	
	Killed	Wounded	Killed	Wounded
Officers	0	0	3	4
Enlisted Men	10	82	45	96

In addition two enlisted men were reported as missing in action.

The status of awards by the close of the month were as follows:

	Current	Accumulative Total
Officers:		
Silver Star	0	2
Soldiers Medal	0	0
Bronze Star	4	72
Purple Heart	0	7
Enlisted Men:		
Silver Star	0	0
Soldiers Medal	0	4
Bronze Star	15	111
Purple Heart	32	141

French decorations for services rendered in the liberation of FRANCE were awarded Ordnance personnel as follows:

Croix de Guerre..... 4

Accumulative totals of French decorations awarded were:

Legion of Honor..... 1
Croix de Guerre.....29

Meritorious Service Unit Plaques were awarded to the following Ordnance Units:

91,496th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company
90,11th Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company
91,11th Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company

Accumulative totals of this award to date were:

Group Headquarters.....	None
Battalion Headquarters.....	1
Companies.....	16
Detachment, Tire Repair.....	1
Bomb Disposal Squads.....	2
TOTAL	20

SECTION III

OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

The 26th Ordnance Battalion, operating the three main army depots, was still engaged in making the move from FRANKFURT (M-56) to a new location in the vicinity of EISENACH (N-76) when the tactical plan of the Army was changed. The new direction of attack caused the entire Army to execute a ninety degree turn to the southeast. The forward elements of the Army moved so swiftly that it was again necessary to relocate the depots and the main Army combat vehicle pool. The depots were set up at FULDA (O-90) and the main vehicle pool, operated by the 517th Ordnance Battalion, was established in the vicinity of HUNFELD (P-90).

During the month of April all Third U. S. Army ammunition companies were reorganized under T/O & E 9-17, dated 17 February 1945.

Personnel and vehicles present on the Continent at the close of this period were as follows:

Officers	661
Enlisted Men	19,344
M/V Vehicles	2,815
Total Vehicles	3,179

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The following Ordnance units were assigned to Third U. S. Army during the month:

Eq. & Eq. Det., 161st Ordnance Battalion
134th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
488th Ordnance Evacuation Company
699th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tk)
928th Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company

Civilian employees working for Third U. S. Army Ordnance had decreased considerably due to the shifting of Ordnance units into GERMANY. The total employed at the end of April was as follows:

Machinists and Mechanics	94
Laborers	250

At the close of April ASPs were located as follows:

ASP No. 35 - 1½ mi SW KULMBACH (O-6407?1) off Hwy 85 - Operated by 574th, and 596th Ord Am Cos - Serving XII Corps.

ASP No. 56 - 3/4 mi SW HAIDENDORF on Hwy 4 (O-390302) - Operated by 576th, 592nd, 619th, and 671th Ord Am Cos - Serving XX and III Corps.

ASP No. 57 - In HILPOLSTEIN off Hwy A3, (T-516713) - Operated by 570th and 575th Ord Am Cos - Serving III Corps - Open.

ASP No. 58 - In NEUNKIRNS, N off Hwy 85, (U-37?935) - Operated by 620th Ord Am Co and 3076th Ord MWD Co - Serving XII Corps.

At the close of the month, Ordnance Groups providing supply and maintenance to the Army were organized as follows:

69TH ORDNANCE GROUP

10th Ordnance Battalion	514th Ordnance Battalion	193rd Ordnance Bn
184th Ord Dep Co	15th Ord MM Co	2nd Ord MM Co
271st Ord MM Co	52nd Ord MM Co	116th Ord MM Co
344th Ord MM Co	147th Ord MM Co	129th Ord MM Co
346rd Ord MM Co	841st Ord Dep Co	840th Ord Dep Co
3515th Ord MAM Co	344?th Ord MAM Co	3511th Ord MAM Co
3519th Ord MAM Co	344?th Ord MAM Co	3528th Ord MAM Co

163rd Ordnance Battalion	44th Ordnance Battalion	316th Ordnance Bn
125th Ord HM Co (Tk)	131st Ord HM Co (FA)	275th Ord Mt Co (AA)
297th Ord MM Co	299th Ord Mt Co (AA)	281st Ord Mt Co (AA)
297th Ord HM Co (FA)	501st Ord HM Co (Tk)	510th Ord HM Co (FA)
306th Ord Mt Co (AA)	520th Ord HM Co (FA)	537th Ord HM Co (FA)
562nd Ord HM Co (Tk)	838th Ord Dep Co	565th Ord HM Co (Tk)
8864th Ord HAM Co	344?th Ord MAM Co	847th Ord Dep Co
	3511th Ord MAM Co	3453rd Ord MAM Co
	3562nd Ord MAM Co	3482nd Ord MAM Co

70TH ORDNANCE GROUP

3264th Ordnance Battalion	66th Ordnance Battalion	26th Ordnance Bn
305th Ord Mt Co (AA)	68th Ord HM Co (FA)	344th Ord Dep Co
531st Ord HM Co (Tk)	124th Ord Svac Co	347th Ord Dep Co
550th Ord HM Co (FA)	169th Ord Svac Co	837th Ord Dep Co
851st Ord HAM Co	171st Ord Svac Co	981st Ord Dep Co
904th Ord HAM Co	185th Ord Svac Co	Det B & C, 159th Ord Tire Repair Co
3537th Ord MAM Co	188th Ord Svac Co	
	189th Ord Svac Co	
	521st Ord HM Co (FA)	
	552nd Ord HM Co (Tk)	
	869th Ord HAM Co	
	920nd Ord HAM Co	
	911th Ord HAM Co	

517th Ordnance Battalion	332nd Ordnance Battalion
2864th Ord MM Co	No attached units.
556th Ord HM Co (Tk)	Working with 70th Ord Group
560th Ord HM Co (Tk)	
877th Ord HAM Co	
3492nd Ord MAM Co	

SECTION IV

SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

The supply situation was very critical during this period due to the lengthened supply lines, caused by the exceedingly swift advances of the combat troops, and the continuous movement of the main army supply depots. It became necessary to move the three main army depots and the main army combat vehicle pool twice in less than thirty days. As a minimum of ten days was required for the complete movement of these heavy installations all the main supply depots were on the move practically twenty days out of the month. To ensure that sufficient replacement vehicles would be readily available to the using units, a number of full track vehicles were transported directly to the forward depot companies bypassing the new location of the vehicle pool then being established at NEUNKIRNS (T-39). Thus using units were enabled to draw replacement vehicles with a minimum of time and travel.

The assignment of the III Corps to the Army necessitated a long road march as this Corps had previously been engaged in the NETH. Hence, many III Corps units were suffering from a serious shortage of tank track and bogie wheels upon arrival in the Third U. S. Army zone. Some relief was obtained by shipments from the Communications Zone and by stripping salvaged tanks in the collection points. However, these items were still in short supply at the close of the month.

A number of M24 light tanks were issued to replace losses on the light tank M5A1 and as replacement on battle losses of the M24 where such issues would not jeopardize the minimum required reserve levels.

Ninety heavy tanks, the new T26E3 (Pershing), were released to the Third U. S. Army at this time. On the orders of the Chief of Staff, forty of these were delivered to the 11th Armored Division and the remainder held in the main army combat vehicle pool. Ten modified tank transporters, for hauling the T26E3 tank, were also released at this time.

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45-TON HEAVY TANKS (PERSHING) READY FOR ISSUE

The unprecedented number of enemy ordnance installations, overrun in the rapid advance of the Army, presented many complex problems. Sufficient personnel were not available to handle all the details involved in processing, investigating, and guarding such captured enemy ordnance as factories, ammunition dumps, abandoned weapons, and large warehouses. Such items of abandoned equipment that presented a threat to security were reported to the 82nd Ordnance Group for immediate action. Arrangements were completed at the end of the month for the assignment of an Ordnance Battalion to assume control of all captured enemy ordnance materiel.

The status of GMC trucks and major unit assemblies, already critical, was further aggravated by the great distances traveled by Army vehicles due to the long supply lines and the constantly shifting Army boundaries. Back orders on GMC trucks had reached the total of 700 by the end of April.

Total receipts and issues of major items for the month were as follows:

	Received	Issued
Light Tanks	61	72
Medium Tanks	142	255
Combat Vehicles	415	645
Artillery (over 57mm)	29	44
General Purpose Vehicles	3,377	3,528

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SECTION V

MAINTENANCE AND SERVICING

All Ordnance maintenance units and installations had moved east of the Rhine by the first week in April. The continuous rapid advance of the Army necessitated the constant shifting of maintenance troops throughout the month. Many of the companies moved as often as seven times in the thirty day period. Ordnance service was constantly pushed forward and at no time were the tactical troops without adequate and close Ordnance support.

The Army Center began collecting a pool of the new Pilot Tarzan heavy tanks, a central unit set up at the Army main combat vehicle park for the purpose of training crews in the maintenance and operation of this vehicle and the firing of the 90mm gun mounted therein. This school was conducted by personnel from the Aberdeen Proving Ground and the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, Washington, D. C. The training of thirty tank crews was completed during this period.

Evacuation system parts for the medium M4 tanks being in the principal item, Ordnance personnel were sent into the old Ordnance Depot at Metz to locate parts [illegible] obtain these parts from salvage. This installation was taken over from the Seventh U. S. Army and the Continental Advance Section. Considerable difficulty was obtained in removing tools, heavy, and readily repairable Pilot "A" M4 tank engines from salvaged tanks. The location of these critical tank parts enabled the Third U. S. Army Ordnance to clear many combat tanks and gun line.

A survey, similar to that conducted in the previous month, was conducted on all enemy tanks located in the Third U. S. Army area east of the Rhine. All tanks were thoroughly checked to ascertain the serial numbers, type and either of gun or machine weapons, and the cause of injury. The results of this survey were turned over to the Commanding General, Third U. S. Army.

Ordnance material reconditioned by Third U. S. Army maintenance units during April was as follows:

	April	Accumulative to Date
General Purpose Vehicles	[illegible]	[illegible]
Combat Vehicles	[illegible]	[illegible]
Artillery	[illegible]	[illegible]
Small Arms	[illegible]	[illegible]
Instruments	[illegible]	[illegible]

Maintenance responsibility was changed twice during the month. The zone of responsibility from 1 through 10 April remained the same as the previous month. Axis from 10 April to 1 April was as follows: Line running from [illegible] (R-62) to Mayen (R-48). Area east of this line to the 69th Ordnance Group and west of the line to the 69th Ordnance Group. Axis from 1 to 30 April was as follows: Route 51 running through Aachen (R-18), Bonn (R-28), Limburg (S-08) to Czech Border (P-62). Area north of Route 51 to 7th Ordnance Group and the area south of the line to the 69th Ordnance Group. Most materiel was maintained on all main routes in the areas and main repair depots were available for the repair and installation of radios.

The location of the main maintenance installations during April was as follows:

3rd Ordnance Group

Opening Date April	Location	Coordinates
	69th Ordnance Group	
1	In [illegible]	R-[illegible]
26	In [illegible]	R-[illegible]
	In [illegible]	S-[illegible]
	104th Ordnance Battalion	
7	In [illegible]	R-[illegible]
15	In [illegible]	R-[illegible]
19	In [illegible]	S-[illegible]
26	In [illegible]	S-[illegible]



FIGHTING TANK WITH 90MM GUN IN FIRING POSITION.

		Opening Date April	Location	Coordinates
11th Ordnance Battalion				
In [illegible]	R-20			
In [illegible]	R-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	S-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	S-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	P-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	R-[illegible]			
161st Ordnance Battalion				
In [illegible]	R-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	R-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	R-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	J-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	R-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	R-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	S-[illegible]			
133rd Ordnance Battalion				
In [illegible]	R-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	S-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	S-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	S-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	S-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	R-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	R-[illegible]			
511th Ordnance Battalion				
In [illegible]	R-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	R-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	R-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	J-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	S-[illegible]			
Vicinity of [illegible]	S-[illegible]			
Vicinity of [illegible]	S-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	P-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	R-[illegible]			
916th Ordnance Battalion				
In [illegible]	S-[illegible]			
Vicinity of [illegible]	R-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	R-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	J-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	J-[illegible]			
In [illegible]	J-[illegible]			
Vicinity of [illegible]	S-[illegible]			

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70TH ORDNANCE GROUP

1	In HOMBACH	M-35
3	In HEILSHEIM	M-56
4	In BAD SOBER	M-57
86	In FORTH	O-30

86th Ordnance Battalion

3	In HOCHST	M-56
86	In FORTH	O-30

146th Ordnance Battalion

7	In BAD SOBERN	M-86

317th Ordnance Battalion

8	In METZ	M-87
88	In HUNSRUCK	T-59

326th Ordnance Battalion

1	Vicinity of ST WENDEL	O-29
7	Vicinity of BOPPARD	O-40
16	In KIRRBACH	M-86
27	In FORTH	O-30

328nd Ordnance Battalion

4	In BAD SOBER	M-57
86	In FORTH	O-30

SECTION VI

AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

On the first day of April, ASP No. 49, which was operated by the 620th Ordnance Ammunition Company and situated near a large pocket of enemy troops, was overrun by the enemy when they attempted to escape to the East. The enemy troops made prisoner the one officer and seventy enlisted men who were operating the ASP and continued to hold the installations until the following day when a task force was sent in to clear the pocket. The ammunition in the ASP was not tampered with nor bothered in any manner while under enemy control, but two stacks were damaged by artillery fire during the activities. Losses to Ordnance personnel as a result of this action amounted to a total of eleven enlisted men killed and wounded.

As the Army continued the rapid advance into the heart of GERMANY the problem of supporting the combat units over long supply lines was accentuated. In the first week of April no railhead had been established east of the RHINE. The policy of establishing small ASPs well forward and leapfrogging these installations was continued. The most forward railhead was at GAU ALGESHEIM (M-25) west of the RHINE and from this point all ammunition was hauled by trucks. Road and bridge conditions did not permit the use of heavy tank transporters across the RHINE.

Rail service up to the RHINE was adequate but ammunition was arriving at the forward railhead in quantities that could not be handled by the available trucking. This was partly due to the long turn around time in hauling to forward ASPs. To relieve the rail situation and to have a balanced stock of ammunition in the Army rear area, Depot No. 46 at WOLLSTEIN (M-13) was built up from the overflow at the railhead. This depot proved extremely valuable as a source of supply for specific items that were needed to supplement the normal stocks of the forward ASPs.

On 10 April, ASP No. 50 at KIRCHHEIM (M-25) near HENNFELD (M-35) was attacked by a small enemy force. The object of the attack was apparently an attempt to obtain vehicles. Five men were hospitalized with minor wounds and one truck was missing as a result of this raid.

The change in the Army boundary on 17 April caused a quick shifting of ammunition installations. The flow of stocks was immediately diverted to the southeast and ASPs 55, at KULBACH (O-67), and 56, at BAIKENDORF (O-52), were opened in support of the XII and XX Corps respectively. The latter proved to be a very valuable installation in the ensuing operation. As the Army completed its ninety degree pivot to the southeast, this ASP was in the advantageous position of being able to serve the III Corps, recently assigned to the Army for the drive into the area of the HERCYNIA.

The shift in Army boundaries found three Third U. S. Army ASPs in the First U. S. Army zone of operations. Two of these installations, Numbers 51, at SCHWABBACH (M-82), and 52 at HEWTWEDA (M-87) were depleted by the transfer of stocks to the new ASPs in support of the XII and XX Corps. The third ASP, number 54, at HIRSCHFELD (M-16), was built up to an approximate 1,500 ton level in order to provide support to the VIII Corps until such time as the First U. S. Army could take over the supply of the Corps.

The tactical troops continued the swift advance towards the HERCYNIAN area and ammunition supply was once again pushed forward. ASP 57 at HILPOLSTEIN (T-97) was opened in support of the III Corps and number 58 at HEWTWEDA (O-59) was established to serve the XII Corps. A new railhead, east of the RHINE, was established at BELL (M-53), near HUTHEIMER (M-53). The new railhead greatly reduced the hauling distances to the forward ASPs.

The month of April found Third U. S. Army Ordnance personnel operating more ammunition installations at any one time than they had since the Army became operational. This was caused by the fast movement of the tactical troops, the constantly shifting Army boundaries, limited rail facilities and the fact that Advance Section Communications Zone were not operating ammunition installations in GERMANY. A total of ten ASPs had been opened and operated during the month.

A resume of the ASPs in operation at the end of April follows:

Installation	III Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
Depot		46	
ASP		51	52
ASP		55	54
ASP	57	58	56

A new record for truck miles traveled was established as a total of 2,539,486 miles were accumulated by vehicles hauling ammunition. The total ammunition handled by Third U. S. Army Ordnance units amounted to 97,588 long tons while receipts from Advance Section Communications Zone amounted to 11,785 long tons for the month of April.

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The closing period of the campaign in GERMANY resulted in considerably light combat losses of Ordnance material, thereby decreasing replacement requirements and subsequent forward movement of general supplies and combat vehicles. However, main depot units in the process of advancing were continued in movement. Maintenance units continued to be very active in furnishing Ordnance service on general purpose vehicles.

Enemy Ordnance installations and material continued to be a serious problem which required utilization of Ordnance troops for security purposes.

The rapid disintegration and final defeat of the Wermacht was reflected in the exceptionally low figures on receipts, issues, and handling of ammunition during this final period.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

Upon movement of the forward echelon of Third U. S. Army Headquarters from ENLAUFEN (O-51) to CRIMMITSCHAU (T-85), a small Ordnance Section liaison group, consisting of one officer and two enlisted men, were sent forward. The balance of the Ordnance forward echelon joined the rear echelon and remained in ENLAUFEN with the other supply services.

Quotas for thirty day furloughs in the UNITED STATES for rehabilitation, reorganization, and recovery, under the provisions of European Theater of Operations Circular 128, 24 December 1944, were allotted to Army Ordnance units as follows:

	Current	Accumulative Total
69th Ordnance Group	2	85
70th Ordnance Group	1	22
82nd Ordnance Group	1	12
Total	4	99

Final figures on Ordnance casualties due to enemy action during the period 1 August 1944 to 8 May 1945 were as follows:

	Killed	Wounded
Officers	3	4
Enlisted Men	45	96
Total	48	100

In addition, two enlisted men were reported as missing in action.

The totals for decorations awarded Ordnance personnel during the campaign were as follows:

Decoration	Officers	Enlisted Men
Silver Star	2	8
Soldiers Medal	0	2
Bronze Star	77	128
Purple Heart	7	141

Meritorious Service Unit Plaques were awarded to Ordnance units during the campaign as follows:

Group Headquarters	None
Battalion Headquarters	1
Companies	16
Detachment, Tire Repair	1
Bomb Disposal Squads	2
Total	20

Total French decorations for services rendered in the liberation of FRANCE were awarded Ordnance personnel during the campaign as follows:

Legion of Honor	1
Croix de Guerre	89

The authorized strength under which the Ordnance Section was operating at the close of hostilities was:

Officers	19
Warrant Officers	1
Enlisted Men	30

In addition five enlisted men were attached from Army Ordnance units to augment the above. Ordnance Technical Intelligence Team No. 3 from Headquarters Communications Zone, consisting of four officers and seven enlisted men, was also attached for intelligence work on enemy equipment.

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SECTION III

OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

During this period the addition of the V Corps to Third U. S. Army resulted in Third U. S. Army receiving the following Ordnance units which were attached to the 69th Ordnance Group:

86th Ordnance Battalion
177th Ordnance Battalion
127th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
252nd Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
295rd Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
463rd Ordnance Evacuation Company
526th Ordnance Evacuation Company
547th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company
202nd Ordnance Depot Company
[illegible]th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company (AA)
[illegible]th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (PA)
557th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tk)
897th Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company
587th Ordnance Ammunition Company
16th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad
17th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad

Ordnance personnel and vehicles present on the Continent at the completion of operations were as follows:

Officers	777
Enlisted Men	15,952
T/E Vehicles	3,[illegible]76
Total Vehicles	3,[illegible]46

Civilian employees in Third Army Ordnance Service were as follows:

Machinists and Mechanics	[illegible]4
Laborers	389

Operations under Third Army Ordnance Service at the cessation of hostilities were organized as follows:

69TH ORDNANCE GROUP

10th Ordnance Battalion

[illegible]4th Ord Dep Co
871st Ord MM Co
[illegible]th Ord MM Co
[illegible]63rd Ord MM Co
[illegible]34th Ord MAM Co
[illegible]39th Ord MAM Co

84th Ordnance Battalion

[illegible]4th Ord HM Co (AA)
[illegible]84th Ord MM Co (Tk)
[illegible]4th Ord MM Co (PA)
[illegible]97th Ord MM Co (Tk)
897th Ord MAM Co

177th Ordnance Battalion

127th Ord MM Co
[illegible]82nd Ord Dep Co
[illegible]52nd Ord MM Co
[illegible]97rd Ord MM Co
[illegible]63rd Ord Evac Co
[illegible],70[illegible] Ord MAM Co

[illegible]th Ordnance Battalion

15[illegible] Ord MM Co
[illegible]82nd Ord MM Co
[illegible]7th Ord MM Co
[illegible]27th Ord MM Co
[illegible]4th Ord Dep Co
[illegible]47th Ord MAM Co
[illegible]84th Ord MAM Co

463rd Ordnance Battalion

1[illegible]9th Ord MM Co (Tk)
897th Ord MM Co (PA)
[illegible]06th Ord HM Co (AA)
[illegible]56nd Ord MM Co (Tk)
[illegible]84th Ord MAM Co

[illegible]rd Ordnance Battalion

[illegible]nd Ord MM Co
[illegible]164th Ord MM Co
[illegible]99th Ord MM Co
[illegible]62nd Ord Dep Co
[illegible]511th Ord MAM Co
[illegible]558th Ord MAM Co

[illegible]th Ordnance Battalion

[illegible]75th Ord HM Co (AA)
[illegible]81st Ord HM Co (AA)
[illegible]30th Ord MM Co (PA)
[illegible]97th Ord MM Co (PA)
[illegible]54th Ord MM Co (Tk)
[illegible]47rd Ord MAM Co
[illegible]82nd Ord MAM Co

70TH ORDNANCE GROUP

26th Ordnance Battalion

[illegible]4th Ord Dep Co
[illegible]7th Ord Dep Co
817th Ord Dep Co
[illegible]4th Ord Dep Co
Det B & C, 190th Tire Repair Co

161st Ordnance Battalion

No units attached - newly arrived.

[illegible]26th Ordnance Battalion

[illegible]05th Ord HM Co (AA)
[illegible]31st Ord MM Co (Tk)
[illegible]50th Ord MM Co (PA)
[illegible]99th Ord MM Co (Tk)
[illegible]91st Ord MAM Co
[illegible]48th Ord MAM Co
3597th Ord MAM Co

66th Ordnance Battalion

[illegible]84th Ord MM Co (PA)
[illegible]42[illegible]th Ord Evac Co
[illegible]65th Ord Evac Co
[illegible]71st Ord Evac Co
[illegible]45th Ord Evac Co
[illegible]48th Ord Evac Co
[illegible]99th Ord Evac Co
921st Ord MM Co (PA)
[illegible]52nd Ord MM Co (Tk)
[illegible]89th Ord MAM Co
908th Ord MAM Co
[illegible]14th Ord MAM Co

[illegible]17th Ordnance Battalion

[illegible]84th Ord MM Co
[illegible]56th Ord MM Co (Tk)
[illegible]60th Ord MM Co (Tk)
877th Ord MAM Co
[illegible],92nd Ord MAM Co

[illegible]32nd Ordnance Battalion

No units attached - Operating with 70th Ord Group Hqs.

82ND ORDNANCE GROUP

[illegible]1st Ordnance Battalion

570th Ord Am Co
573rd Ord Am Co
575th Ord Am Co
587th Ord Am Co
657th Ord Am Co
16th Ord HD Squad
17th Ord HD Squad
19th Ord HD Squad
89th Ord HD Squad
[illegible]4th Ord HD Squad
88th Ord HD Squad

[illegible]50th Ordnance Battalion

57[illegible]th Ord Am Co
5764th Ord Am Co
596th Ord Am Co
680th Ord Am Co
2nd Ord HD Squad
7th Ord HD Squad
[illegible]14th Ord HD Squad
[illegible]25rd Ord HD Squad
30764th Ord WPD Co

[illegible]15th Ordnance Battalion

592nd Ord Am Co
[illegible]90th Ord Am Co
[illegible]86th Ord Am Co
[illegible]7[illegible]th Ord Am Co
5th Ord HD Squad
18th Ord HD Squad
89th Ord HD Squad
90th Ord HD Squad
[illegible]15th Ord HC Squad

Units attached to 82nd Gp Hqs

[illegible],90th Ord MAM Co
291st Ord HD Platoon
267th Ord Mine Detachment

SECTION IV

SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

The rapid disintegration and final defeat of the German Army during this concluding period of operations was marked by considerably light combat losses of Ordnance material, thereby decreasing replacement requirements and subsequent forward movement of general supplies and combat vehicles. However, main depot units in the process of movement were continued forward to the general vicinity of [illegible] (T-69) and POUTE (O-30).

For the purpose of portraying the tremendous task involved in Ordnance general supply to the Army, the following figures representing the issue of major items for the period 1 August 194[illegible] to 8 May 1945 are presented:

Major Items	Total Issued
General Purpose Vehicles	26,905
Combat Vehicles	7,781
Artillery Pieces	4,[illegible]58
Small Arms	197,930
Spare Parts (long tons)	47,611

SECTION V

MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

During the closing period of hostilities maintenance units located in the FRANKFURT (M-56) area were being moved forward to the vicinity of [illegible] (T-69).

Maintenance work on general purpose vehicles was extremely heavy due to the extensive use of truck transportation over extended supply lines during the final weeks of the campaign.

A summar of Ordnance material repaired by Army Ordnance units during the period 1 August 194[illegible] - 8 May 1945 is shown below:

Major Items	Repaired
General Purpose Vehicles	99,[illegible]4
Combat Vehicles	[illegible]1,761
Artillery Pieces	11,613
Small Arms	125,085
Instruments	[illegible]2,740

SECTION VI

AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

As previously reported, Third U. S. Army Ordnance personnel were operating the largest number of Ammunition Supply Points in the history of the campaign. To alleviate this situation as the Army advanced, ASPs Numbers [illegible]8, 51, 53, and 55 were closed out and the ammunition transferred to forward installations. The BELL (M-53) railhead was replaced by a new railhead at [illegible] (T-69) which reduced the hauling distance in supplying ammunition to the forward ASPs.

During this period operational control of V Corps was assumed by Third U. S. Army. ASP No. 60, stocked by First U. S. Army with approximately 750 tons of ammunition, supported this new Corps for the remainder of the campaign. Units located in the southern sector of V Corps were permitted to draw from ASP No. 58, which improved ammunition supply for these troops.

Two new Class V installations, ASPs Nos. 60 and 61, opened on May 1st to support the III and XII Corps in the final stages of the campaign. The assignment of heavy artillery units to police details and the light resistance being offered by the enemy resulted in an extraordinarily low expenditure rate.

At the time of cessation of hostilities, the following is a resume of Ordnance Class V installations in operation:

INSTALLATION	LOCATION	COORDINATES	CORPS III	CORPS V	CORPS XII	CORPS XX
ASP	[illegible]EINEBURG	O-990280	56			56
ASP	WILHELMSTEIN	T-518713	57			
ASP	[illegible]EUTENBURG	U-575955			58	
ASP	[illegible]EUTENLUST	U-[illegible]5905				59
ASP	[illegible]STER-HAUSENBACH	T-998167	60			
ASP	[illegible]TTLEIN	Q-150300			61	
ASP	[illegible]UNSTRASS	P-007882		62		

The following ammunition statistics are offered in closing as evidence of the mission accomplished by Ordnance personnel in the support of Third U. S. Army during the period 1 August 194[illegible] - 8 May 1945:

Long Tons Received	533,885
Long Tons Issued	[illegible]02,345
Tons Handled	1,540,993
Total Truck Mileage	[illegible],101,977

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

SALVAGE MATERIEL IN ORDNANCE COLLECTING POINT
MUNSINGEN STADIUM

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Ord

31

CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

1. CONTROL OF ARMY ORDNANCE UNITS.

a. Since the best planning information is available in the Army Headquarters for any operation, it is necessary that all non-divisional Ordnance troops remain under the control of the Army Ordnance Officer so that the greatest efficiency can be derived from Ordnance Maintenance, Supply, and Ammunition troops. The Army Ordnance Officer's staff, which comprises the Army Ordnance Section, is inadequate to handle the actual operation and administration of the large number of troops required to maintain and supply a Field Army. It is therefore necessary that at least three Group Headquarters be furnished as follows: (a) One Group Headquarters to operate and administer those Maintenance and Supply units in direct support of the forward combat elements; (b) One Group to operate and administer the Main Army Supply and higher echelon maintenance installations; (c) One Group to administer all of the Army Ammunition Supply.

b. That at least three Ordnance Groups, TO/E 9-12, be furnished to administer and operate directly under the Ordnance Officer, in control of the Ordnance troops assigned to a Field Army.

2. MOVEMENT OF ORDNANCE SUPPLIES.

a. Because of the great bulk of Ordnance supplies required to maintain a Field Army, it is necessary that they be moved as infrequently as possible and that they be placed in a strategic position along the main axis of the advance at all times so that no reverse movements will be required to place them in position to support combat troops.

b. The Ordnance Officer should be constantly advised as far in advance as possible of the main axis of advance and any anticipated changes of direction.

3. LOCAL PROCUREMENT OF CRITICAL ITEMS.

a. Numerous items of Ordnance Class II and IV are always in short supply. Supply of these items can often be obtained by direct purchase on local industry

b. It is necessary that the personnel of the Group Headquarters charged with operating and administering the main supply installations be supplemented with a Purchasing Section approximately the size of a Battalion Headquarters, under TO/E 9-76, for the purpose of procuring locally those items which are not immediately available through normal supply channels.

4. DIRECT SUPPLY TO COMBAT UNITS.

a. Ordnance Depot Companies in direct support of combat units must be completely mobile.

b. TO/E 9-57 should be amended to provide four 5-ton trucks, tractor, for each 6-10 ton van, in order that the entire company can move without shuttling.

5. TRANSPORTATION - ORDNANCE DEPOT COMPANIES.

a. Equipment authorized by TO/E 9-57 is inadequate for Depot Companies operating Main Army Depots.

b. Ordnance Depot Companies operating Main Army Depots should each be equipped with twenty additional semi-trailers, 10-ton, Animal and Cargo, and twenty additional 5-ton, Truck, tractors. Also required are two each heavy engineer type cranes for use in handling heavy material.

6. COMMUNICATIONS ZONE DEPOTS.

a. Communications Zone Depots must be advanced as the Army moves forward.

b. Communications Zone Depots at ports should be used only as bulk distribution points and the major portion of Communications Zone Class II and IV supplies should be kept in Depots immediately in the rear of the Army boundaries.

7. SHUTTLE SERVICE - COMMUNICATIONS ZONE TO ARMY.

a. The routine system of delivery of Class II and IV supplies to Army by Communications Zone is not dependable or satisfactory for insuring quick receipt of critical items.

b. Authority must be granted and transportation furnished to the Main Army Depot to maintain continuous shuttle service between itself and Communications Zone Depots for the purpose of delivering urgently needed items.

8. LIAISON OFFICER IN COMMUNICATIONS ZONE DEPOTS.

a. The best service for Army can be had only if a commissioned Army representative or liaison officer is placed in each Communications Zone Depot serving the Army.

b. Main Army Depots should be authorized to place one officer and the necessary enlisted assistants in each Communications Zone depot serving Army for the purpose of expediting Army requisitions, establishing priority for movement of Army supplies and arranging for movement in Army transportation of critical items.

9. MOVEMENT OF MAIN ARMY DEPOT.

a. Movement of Main Army Depot must be held to the minimum.

b. Due to the time required to pack, transport, and set up the large stock of supplies carried by the Main Army Depot, movements of less than 50-75 miles should not be made. Much better service can be rendered by a depot call established there by one continually upon by changing location. The more efficient service rendered offsets the disadvantage of a shorter turn around distance to supported organizations.

10. MOVEMENT OF MAINTENANCE COMPANIES.

a. Maintenance Companies cannot operate efficiently when moving frequently.

b. Movement must be held to the minimum, dependent upon the tactical situation. Maintenance units operating fourth and fifth echelon shops and not in direct support of using units should not move unless they are 75 miles or further behind forward maintenance units.

11. OPERATION OF COLLECTION POINTS.

a. Army rear collection points are most efficiently operated by a heavy maintenance company and the number of collection points are kept to a minimum.

b. Army collection points should be operated by a heavy maintenance company because they have the personnel and equipment required to properly inspect, classify, preserve, and guard and perform all salvage operations in connection with unserviceable ordnance materiel evacuated to Army collection points. One centrally located forward collection point is operated in each Corps by a Medium Maintenance Company. The Corps collection point is moved forward as the forward maintenance companies advance. Intermediate Corps collection points are discouraged. As Corps collection points move forward they are taken over by a rear maintenance battalion and evacuated to the central point. Two maintenance battalions in the rear are designated as collection point battalions. This permits "leap-frogging" battalions and more completely working each point to derive the most from it.

12. SHORTAGE OF EQUIPMENT IN EVACUATION COMPANIES.

a. Ordnance Evacuation Companies do not have sufficient light mobile equipment needed for the evacuation of general purpose vehicles, major units, and assemblies.

b. Ordnance Evacuation Companies should have 4-5 ton tractors and suitable low flat bed trailers for hauling unserviceable general purpose vehicles, engines, power train units, tires, etc. The only source of such equipment at present is from Army reserve.

13. CANNIBALIZING.

a. Unserviceable but repairable and salvage ordnance materiel was found to be wastefully cannibalized by using units.

b. Troops must be trained and educated that repairable ordnance equipment must not be cannibalized and that cannibalization of salvage material must be kept to an absolute minimum. Whenever cannibalization is resorted to, unserviceable item(s) removed must be replaced by unserviceable like item(s). The greatest waste caused by cannibalization is not the removing of a serviceable item, but the failure to replace it with the unserviceable item. A salvage truck from which the carburetor has been removed and not replaced results in exposing the internal parts of the engine to the elements and in all probability rendering a serviceable or repairable engine complete salvage.

14. MOBILITY OF MAINTENANCE COMPANIES.

a. All maintenance companies must be mobile.

b. Heavy maintenance companies should be issued a tractor for each authorized van. In order to provide sufficient tractors to make the companies mobile the equipment must be taken from Army reserve.

15. DIRECT SUPPORT OF ARMORED DIVISIONS.

a. Armored divisions do not require direct support of Army maintenance or supply units.

b. No Army Ordnance units should be placed in direct support of Armored divisions.

16. SUPPORT OF INFANTRY DIVISIONS.

a. The organic maintenance of Infantry divisions is inadequate to furnish the required maintenance and supply support.

b. An Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company should be placed in direct support of each Infantry division to insure adequate Ordnance support of its elements.

17. COORDINATION WITH CORPS ORDNANCE OFFICER.

a. Movement of forward ordnance maintenance troops must be closely coordinated with the Corps Ordnance Officer.

b. Close liaison must be maintained between forward maintenance units and the Corps Ordnance Officer. The Corps Ordnance Officer is always abreast of the immediate tactical situation and his recommendation as to the deployment of ordnance troops directly supporting the Corps is very closely followed. Generally two ordnance maintenance battalions are in support of each Corps.

18. WELL TRAINED AND FORWARD ECHELON OPERATIONS.

a. Rear Ordnance third and fourth echelon can be efficiently operated on a production basis.

b. Controlled salvage and reclamation operations provide lucrative sources of supply and make for efficient and complete salvage and prompt evacuation to base shops of unserviceable but repairable items. A large number of civilian laborers can be used in this operation. Specific ordnance maintenance companies are designated for repair of ordnance specialized equipment (tank transporters, etc.), high mortality vehicles (2½-ton trucks, etc.), and unit assemblies. Small arms sections, as an example, from a number of maintenance companies are pooled to make a sizable working unit.

19. REPORTING OF FIELD DEFICIENCIES.

a. The combat zone is the best proving ground for ordnance materiel.

b. Ordnance maintenance personnel must be alert to observe and report deficiencies which develop in the field. Any field expedients used to overcome deficiencies and recommendations should accompany all reports.

20. AMMUNITION DEPOT COMPANY.

a. One ammunition company per Army should be trained as an ammunition depot company to serve as a nucleus in the operation of depots or large ASPs. One such company is capable of operating two large installations when supplemented by additional ordnance and quartermaster service troops.

b. A unit of this type should be provided to accomplish this mission.

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21. ENEMY AMMUNITION COLLECTING COMPANY.

a. A minimum of one "enemy ammunition collecting company" per Army is necessary to deal with the enormous quantities of enemy ammunition encountered.

b. This organization is essential and should receive special training for this mission.

22. CONTROL OF CLASS II AND IV.

a. It is impractical and involves too much administrative detail to allocate Ordnance Class II and IV items to the using units. Control of issues of Class II and IV should be kept to the absolute minimum consistent with the availability of the items.

b. Where sufficient supplies are received by the Army to cover normal combat losses, resupply should be effected upon the certificate of the unit that the items required are necessary to complete TO/E authorizations.

23. AMMUNITION COMPANY PERSONNEL.

a. The quality of the ammunition company personnel must be improved if adequate and accurate control of the enormous number and variety of ammunition items (including complications caused by component parts) is to be maintained.

b. The highest type of personnel available should be provided.

24. AMMUNITION INSTALLATIONS.

a. The actual size and number of ammunition installations is a problem which is governed by the tactical situation.

b. It has been found desirable, in general, to have one ASP well forward supporting each Corps, with at least one large Army depot located along the main army axis, generally behind the center Corps. Intermediate ASPs for Corps and Army artillery are impractical. In fast moving situations, forward ASPs of 750 - 1,000 tons are desirable, while in slow moving situations, forward ASPs of 2,500 or 5,000 tons are desirable. In general, larger installations can be run more efficiently than small ones and should therefore be favored whenever possible. It has been found in actual practice that small ASPS (750 tons) could be established and ready for operation within 24 hours after location of ASP site.

25. ROADSIDE STORAGE OF AMMUNITION.

a. Roadside storage is preferable to area storage.

b. Roadside storage should be utilized due to the fact that it offers a less profitable target to enemy air attacks, permits faster operations, prevents bogging down in mud, and presents fewer hazards to safety.

26. STOCKAGE OF AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINTS.

a. Stockages and priorities in stocking of ASPs should be determined by Army, after a study of recommendations by Corps.

b. It is essential that this be done to insure maximum use of limited transportation over long supply lines and prompt arrival of necessary items to combat units.

27. LOT NUMBER SEGREGATION.

a. Lot number segregation of ammunition is impractical in the Army area.

b. If issues to using units are to be made in separate lots, shipments into the army area must be in large, unbroken lots. Lot number records cannot practicably be kept in forward Army ASPs; hence, the importance of receipt of segregated ammunition which will permit storage and issue by separate lots.

28. HANDLING OF HEAVY ARTILLERY AMMUNITION.

a. The use of mechanical devices for lifting heavy artillery shells is highly desirable.

b. The development of lifting devices as portrayed in previous chapters should be given immediate consideration.

29. TRANSPORTATION OF AMMUNITION.

a. Transportation of ammunition supplied by Quartermaster Truck Companies often proves inadequate during a fast moving campaign involving extended supply lines.

b. In fast moving situations, additional transport can be made available by temporarily immobilizing ordnance maintenance and supply units as well as some combat units not currently active.

30. TOPPLING OF STACKS - ROADSIDE STORAGE.

a. It has been noted when employing roadside storage in frozen areas that there is a tendency for the stacks of ammunition to topple over as the ground thaws.

b. This problem can be overcome by stacking the ammunition on the verges close to the roads where, ordinarily, a firm foundation is available.

31. LOCATION OF AMMUNITION INSTALLATIONS.

a. Ammunition installations should always be situated so that subsequent troop movement will not interfere with the traffic routes used in supplying said installations.

b. Where the tactical situation permits, the combat troops, particularly armored units, in moving up to the line should not use the same roads being utilized for storage of ammunition. The majority of troop movements occur at night and frequently the ammunition becomes damaged and the life of the roads reduced due to the heavy traffic.

32. PERSONNEL FOR RAILHEAD ACTIVITIES.

a. Sufficient Ordnance personnel have not been trained in the operation of a Class V railhead.

b. In training ordnance personnel in the Zone of Interior more emphasis should be placed on all phases of the operation of a Class V railhead. This is a very important step in ammunition supply and deserves more consideration in training programs.

33. ALLOCATIONS BELOW ARMY LEVEL.

a. Allocations below the Army level are impractical. They are too slow and involve too much paper work. They are effective only when particular items become critical.

a. Ordinary supply should have as its guiding principle automatic resupply to combat units to maintain their basic loads intact. Where a generally short supply exists relative to demands, expenditure control by limiting the number of rounds fired to prescribed limits is feasible.

34. AMMUNITION REPORTS.

a. In general, the Army Ordnance Office requires no reports from Corps or from Army units. Reports on basic load status of selected items may be required at times, but can be called for as necessary. Artillery and other tactical sections of the Army Headquarters may require expenditure reports for specific purposes, but can obtain such reports through their own channels. For Ordnance purposes, with ammunition resupply based on maintenance of basic loads, ASP issues to combat units may be considered equivalent to expenditures.

b. For efficient control of ammunition supply, reports should be kept to a minimum as outlined above.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX NO. 1

Ordnance Bulletin Number 1

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Ordnance Officer

ORDNANCE BULLETIN) 25 May 194_.

NUMBER 1)

SECTION I

Administration

1. INTRODUCTION TO THE THIRD ARMY ORDNANCE BULLETIN:

a. The Third Army Ordnance Bulletin will be periodically published by the Army Ordnance Officer for the dissemination of Ordnance technical information and instructions to Ordnance units and personnel.

b. (1) The Bulletin will be divided and indexed into the special sections below noted:

I - ADMINISTRATION
II - OPERATION
III - MAINTENANCE
IV - SUPPLY
V - AMMUNITION

c. (2) For convenient reference, each section will bear its own sequence of paragraph numbers; reference to a subject will be by these numbers.

c. Changes, deletions, and cross-references will be published as additional paragraphs in the usual manner and will have reference to the previous paragraph which is to be changed, deleted, or modified. Certain paragraphs will make timely reference to other directives of importance to Ordnance units. Changes and deletions so indicated will be immediately posted.

d. An index will be published at intervals with the bulletin.

SECTION II

Operations
oooooooo

SECTION III

Maintenance

1. CARRYING RACKS, GAS CAN: To enable use of both Jerri-Can and Ameri-Can in present carrying racks on vehicles, it will be necessary to install in the bottom of each rack, a wooden board of about 3/4" in thickness, to fit securely. These boards should be painted O.D. color.

2. PERTINENT DIRECTIVES: Attention is directed to the following ordnance technical bulletins as published by Headquarters SOS, ETOUSA, pertaining to theater modification and maintenance of ordnance material, copies of which may be obtained by requisition upon publication section of SOS Depot O-25, while units are stationed within the U. K.

a. TB No. 12 dated 19 April 1943, Abuse of Motor Vehicle Engines.

b. TB No. 1 dated 3 January 194_, Adjustment of Shock Absorbers for M8 armored car.

c. TB No. 2 dated 5 January 194_ pertaining to modification of 57mm Gun--Spare Striker (Firing) Case Assemblies.

d. TB No. 7 dated 5 February 194_. Pre-starting Inspection of Light Tanks M5A1 and Carriage, Motor, Howitzer, M8.

e. TB No. 9 dated 1 March 194_. Charts of U. S. and British Lubricants Equivalent.

f. TB No. 10 dated 2 March 194_. Tank, Light, M5A1 and Carriage, Motor, 75mm Howitzer, M8. Bow Type Transmission Band Adjustment.

g. TB No. 11 dated 13 March 194_ covering correct wiring on Turret Fan, PESCO 6104-4R8 of Medium Tank.

h. TB No. 16 dated 16 March 194_. Modification of Left Auxiliary Shield on 105mm Howitzer Carriage M2A2, to prevent interference of shield with line of sight when sighting on aiming stakes to the front.

i. TB No. 18 dated 24 March 194_ and Change 1 dated 8 May 194_ pertaining to Modification of Handle Latch (B1509A_) on Gun, Machine, Cal. .30, M1919A_, and M1919A5, to prevent difficulty in retracting the cover latch on subject guns when mounted in light and medium tanks and armored car M8.

j. TB No. 17 dated 25 March 194_. Pre-starting instructions for Vehicle with Radial Engines which cannot be hand-cranked.

k. TB No. 20 dated 29 March 194_ pertaining to repair of carriages, Howitzer 105, M2, on which the weld of bracket C75L60 and body D56739 of Support D56740 has failed; also lubrication of Swivel Nut on traversing mechanism on Carriage Gun 3", M1, and Carriage Howitzer, 105mm, M2A2, equipped with enclosed screw traversers.

l. TB No. 22 dated 30 March 194_. Modification of Launcher, Rocket, AT, 2.36", M1A1, to prevent shearing of wire A513621-D by sharp edges of battery compartment Assy, B261129.

m. TB No. 21 dated 31 March 194_ pertaining to Test Firing of Small Arms weapons after repair. Ammunition for Third Army units will be obtained in the same manner as training ammunition.

n. TB No. 27 dated 7 April 194_. Modification of Chute, Metallic Belt Link (C61331) for Gun, Machine, Cal. .50, Browning, M2HB (Fixed and Flexible) to prevent difficulty in assembling the chute, metallic belt link to the gun.

o. TB No. 26 dated 8 April 194_. Prescribing American Wheel Bearing Lubricants and outline procedure for repacking wheel bearings.

p. TB No. 31 dated 17 April 194_. Instructions for installing Elevating Quadrant M9, on 3" Gun M7, Mount M5, on M10 and M10A1 Motor Carriages.

q. TB No. 33 dated 22 April 194_ pertaining to correct marking of Cage, Low and Reverse Transfer Unit Band Adjusting for Tank, Light, M5A1 and Carriage Motor Howitzer M8. Gages properly marked show the upper mark for Low Series and the lower mark for the Reverse.

r. TB No. 34 dated 27 April 194_. Correct tire pressure for 14.00 x 24-20 ply tires as used on truck trailer 40-ton Tank Recovery M25 is 75 lbs. per square inch.

s. TB No. 35 dated 28 April 194_ covers the Installation of Armor Plate in the driver compartment of the M8 and M20 armored cars.

t. TB No. 39 dated 4 May 194_. Modification of Carriage, Gun, 57mm, M1A2 and M1A3 to install a firing handgrip bracket to provide a means of "squeezing" instead of pulling the firing lever to overcome difficulty in holding firmly on target while firing.

u. TB No. 40 dated 5 May 194_. Pertaining to MRP Ordnance C36-4A, of Gun, 57mm, M1, re-taining to firing pin (C256515).

v. TB No. 43 dated 6 May 194_. Modification of Mount, 60mm, Mortar, M2, to reduce backlash in traversing mechanism.

w. TB No. 45 dated 11 May 194_ pertaining to correction in procedure of transmission band adjustment of Light Tank M5A1 and Gun Motor Carriage M7 as shown in TM 9-732 dated 27 November 1943 and TM 9-732B dated 31 January 194_.

SECTION IV

Supply

1. BASIC LOADS FOR ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE COMPANIES:

a. Attention of all Ordnance Maintenance units is directed to [illegible] issued by this section, listing basis for basic load of spare parts for Ordnance Maintenance Companies. (See OVERLORD PLAN, Page 110) Prepared requisition forms will be furnished by the Army Ordnance Officer. Immediate action will be taken to requisition 15 days supply of spare parts when prepared forms are made available.

b. The alert order to units specifies the number of vehicles which the units will have available to transport equipment. The vehicles specified in the alert order include T/E vehicles, addition to T/E vehicles, and TUBA reserve vehicles. If it is found impossible to carry 15 days basic load for vehicles assigned in the alert order, then one requisition will be made up for the parts that can be carried, and an additional one be prepared for later presentation to COM. Z. for immediate action, so that basic load of 15 day supply will be available for combat. In case vehicles are not made available as specified in the alert order, the unit will immediately contact the Army Ordnance Officer and request instructions. Priority will be given in requisitioning parts for the basic loads in the U.K. as follows:

(1) Major items.

(2) Binned parts.

(3) Large and/or heavy unit assemblies.

2. BASIC LOADS FOR ORDNANCE DEPOT COMPANIES:

a. Attention of Ordnance Depot Companies is directed to Annex II to this section. (See OVERLORD PLAN, Page 111)

b. Action outlined for Maintenance Companies in paragraph 1a above will be followed for the number of days supply noted in the annex for type Depot Company. As in 1b above, as much of this load as possible will be carried in all available transport.

3. PREPARED REQUISITION FORMS:

a. The Ordnance Section, TUBA, has prepared, for use of Ordnance Maintenance and Depot Companies in requesting spare parts and supply loads, a specially prepared requisition form for each SNL sub-group.

b. The prepared requisition forms will reduce by a large percentage the man hours normally necessary for the preparation of basic load requisitions. All available interchangeability information has been listed with each item on the face of the requisition. Cross-reference between the many ordnance parts numbers has been included with each item listed. Complete nomenclature description and where applicable size information has been given.

c. On sub-groups such as GMC, the requisitions have been broken down into many separate requisitions. For Example: GMC No. 1 requisition is for parts that are common to all GMC vehicles. Numbers II to X, inclusive are requisitions for parts peculiar to the various models of GMC vehicles. Separate requisitions have been prepared for Autolite and Delco Remy electrical parts and anti-friction bearings using the unit manufacturer's number and interchanging into all the various ordnance numbers that might be used.

d. Use of the prepared requisition forms will not stop with the requisitioning of a basic load. The retained copy can be used by the Ordnance unit as follows:

(1) Reference list of items stocked by main depots.
(2) Quick reference interchangeability list.
(3) Cross-reference of various Ordnance part numbers.
(4) Check list in the editing of requisitions.
(5) Parts numbers used for the stocking of all groups.
(6) Items stocked in parts common under Federal Stock Number.

e. Supplementary requisitions on Form 400 will be submitted for basic load requirements where prepared requisition forms are not furnished, as for tires, cleaning and preserving, etc.

f. Distribution of prepared requisition forms will be made according to the unit's priority. Units will be notified by Army Ordnance Officer when forms are available.

4. MAJOR ITEM REPLACEMENTS:

Listing of Major Item Replacements to be carried by type Ordnance Unit is published in Annex 3 to this section for the information and guidance of all units concerned. These Major Items will be made available to units [illegible] as current stocks permit; no action by or-

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5. T/E 9-76, REVISED:

a. Pending receipt of revised T/A and T 9-76, dated 31 March 1943, the following additions and substitutions are being made available. (Authority 3rd W/Indorsement, File AG 400.34 Op O-3, Hq. ETOUSA, 19 May 1944, to letter subject "Equipment in Excess of T/E", Hq. 319th Ordnance Battalion, dated 27 March 1944) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Ordnance Battalions will submit requisitions for this equipment immediately, citing above letter as authority.

(1) Additional equipment to be issued to Headquarters Detachments, Ordnance Battalions is one (1) scream, latrine, one (1) typewriter, non-portable, one (1) truck 1/4-ton, 4x4; and one (1) truck, 3/4-ton, 4x4, weapons carrier, to be substituted for one (1) truck, 3/4-ton, 4x4, command.

(2) Substitutions in vehicle allowance for the Medical Detachment, Ordnance Battalion are one (1) truck, 1/4-ton, 4x4, cargo, for one (1) truck, 3/4-ton, 4x4 weapons carrier; and one (1) trailer, one ton, two wheel cargo, for one (1) trailer, 1/4-ton, two wheel cargo.

ANNEX NO. 2

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Ordnance Officer
APO 403

ORDNANCE BULLETIN)
NUMBER 2)

12 June 1944.

SECTION I

Administration

2. "INSTRUCTIONS TO ORDNANCE UNITS" - recently issued by this office will be dated 1 June 1944.

SECTION II

Operations

SECTION III

Maintenance

3. TOW BAR FOR TANK, LIGHT, M5A1, AND CARRIAGE, MOTOR, 75MM HOWITZER, M8:

A tow bar has been designed for use with the subject vehicles for towing Ammunition Trailer, M30, which does not give ramp interference in connection with loading or unloading on LST's. Provision of this tow bar are available upon request from the Army Ordnance Officer.

4. ENGINE FAILURE - ARMORED CAR, M8.

Engine failure in Armored Car, M8, is in many cases caused by failure of the gasket which seals the passageway for the oil returning from the filter to crankcase and the water passage from the engine water jacket to the water pump. Failure of this gasket allows the pump to pull the oil from the oil passageway and thus eventually pumping all of the oil into the cooling system. This condition can be corrected by installing a new oil filter mounting gasket (Part No. HM-40852A), tightening the mounting bolts, and periodically checking to ascertain that the bolts remain tight. Two gaskets (used as one) may be required if the mounting has warped. References: Letter, 902nd Ordnance MAM Company, APO 403, dated 13 May 1944, Subject: Defect in Engines in Armored Car, M8, and 2nd Indorsement, Headquarters 3OS, ETOUSA, APO 871, dated 28 May 1944, file AG 451 OPOD.

5. TECHNICAL INFORMATION LETTER NO. 13 FROM OFFICE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE:

This letter contains the following questions upon which information is desired by the Office of the Chief of Ordnance. It is requested that replies be submitted to the Army Ordnance Office, Production Maintenance Section, where they will be tabulated and forwarded.

a. Is there excessive fire dispersion when firing to the front of Half-Track vehicles with the .50 Cal. Machine Gun as it is presently mounted?

b. Is the new water cooling process now being used on combat vehicles satisfactory? The new process has eliminated the use of waterproof tape whenever possible and substituted calcium compound. Also, is the internal rustproof process satisfactory? If deficiency reports are submitted, give all details possible.

c. The 1½ ton, 4x4, Truck, (Chevrolet) dump, is no longer in production. It has been replaced by the 2½ ton 6x6 dump (GMC). The reason for the change from the 1½ ton, 4x4, to the 2½ ton, 6x6 was because the rear axle assemblies of the 1½ ton were not adequate to withstand the loads carried. Recent reports received indicate that the rear two axle assemblies of the 2½ ton truck are giving trouble. Complete detail information is requested covering any wear and failures which have been experienced with the 2½ ton truck, dump.

d. Is any excessive trouble being experienced with the rear front spring shackle assemblies on the 1/4 ton, 4x4, Truck?

e. Reports are still being received that the GMC 2½ ton, 6x6, Trucks, are subject to frame sagging, due to their particular use. It is requested that in each case of such failure a careful check be made to see if any of these vehicles have already been reinforced in accordance with TB ORDB-2.

f. What failures are being experienced with the differential of Truck, 3/4 ton, 4x4?

g. Are failures being experienced with the new repairable type shock absorbers on Truck, ¼ ton, 4x4 (Willys)? How does the percentage of failures compare with the non-repairable type?

h. Is the spring breakage on the Trucks, ¼ ton, 4x4, considered above normal?

i. What failures have been experienced in the front flexible brake hose on the trucks, ¼ ton, 3/4 ton and 2½ ton, and 1½ ton?

j. Scattered reports of failure have been received from theaters concerning the hubs on the T8E Recovery Trailer, 40 ton. This hub has been changed from cast iron to cast steel and information is desired of any further reports of failure, as to whether the latest type cast steel hub has been involved.

6. BOMB DISPOSAL VEHICLES:

Paragraph 3, from Ordnance Weekly Letter No. 23, dated 3 June 1944, Hq. ETOUSA, quoted as follows:-

"Bomb Disposal Vehicles. All Ordnance Officers should call to the attention of their Bomb Disposal Officers the theater regulations on the maintenance, use and operation of military motor vehicles. Due to the red paint on parts of their vehicles, Bomb Disposal organizations now operate the most conspicuous vehicles in the U. S. Army. Since their vehicles are so conspicuous and since they are Ordnance troops, Bomb Disposal organizations must set the example to other U. S. troops by proper care and operation of their vehicles."

SECTION IV

Supply

6. CONSUMABLY ROLL FOR HQ & HQ DET., ORDNANCE BATTALION: Ordnance Bn. Headquarters are authorized in addition to T/A & T 9-76, one (1) Roll, Commissary. Subject equipment may be obtained by submitting properly authenticated requisition on Chief Quartermaster, APO 871, citing as a basis 3rd indorsement, Hq. ETOUSA, file AG 320.3 Op(T), dated 20 May 1944 to letter 319th Ordnance Battalion, dated 16 April 1944, subject: Change to T/E 9-76.

7. BASIS FOR STOCKAGE OF TIRES AND TUBES IN WH-DIVISIONAL ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE AND DEPOT COMPANIES: As listed in Annex I. These items will be issued automatically. Ordnance units will not submit requisition for tires and tubes.

SECTION V

Ammunition

TIRE REQUIREMENTS FOR BASIC LOAD

ORDNANCE COMPANIES

P.S.N.	SIZE	Type tread	Ply	Ord. HM Co.	Ord. MM Co. (AA)	Ord. MAM Co.	Depot Co. (Ind Sem)	Depot Co. (Ind Armd)	Depot Co. (Main Sem)	Depot Co. (Main Armd)	G.P.V.
8-7-18619	600x16	R	8	2	2		8			16	
8-7-19286	750x18	R	10								
8-7-19310	750x20	R	10	8	4	16	32		32	60	
8-7-19332	900x20	R	12						16		
8-7-19389	900x16	R	12		4	8	16		16		
8-7-19460	1000x20	R	12								
8-7-19468	1100x20	R	14			2	2				
8-7-19469	1200x20	R	14								
8-7-18730	1400x18	R	16								
8-7-18685	1400x18	C	12		2	8	8			16	
8-7-17614	600x20	C	12	2						16	
8-7-17630	750x16	C	12			8				16	
8-7-17665	825x20	C	14			8	16			32	
8-7-17775	1100x20	C	12			2				6	
8-7-17785	1100x20	C	12			4				8	

NOTE: These tubes will be issued automatically to Ordnance units and will not be requisitioned.

TIRE REQUIREMENTS FOR BASIC LOAD

ORDNANCE COMPANIES

P.S.N.	SIZE	Type tread	Ply	Ord. HM Co.	Ord. MM Co. (AA)	Ord. MAM Co.	Depot Co. (Ind Sem)	Depot Co. (Ind Armd)	Depot Co. (Main Sem)	Depot Co. (Main Armd)	G.P.V.
8-7-8940	600x20	RC	6	2	2		8			16	
8-7-2995	750x16	RC	8	2	2		8			16	
8-7-8960	11.00x20	RC	16	2			8			8	
8-7-8980	11.00x24	RC	16	2			8			8	
8-7-3200	825x20	C	12	2			4			8	
8-7-3250	900x20		12	2			8		16	32	
8-7-3470	1100x24		20						8	16	
8-7-9988	750x18		10								
8-7-8978	600x16		6	8		16	32		32	64	
8-7-9060	750-20		10	8		16	32		32	64	
8-7-9068	750-20		10	2	2	2	4		32	8	
8-7-9098	900x20		10	2	2	2	4		32	8	
8-7-9087	900x16		8	4	4	8	16		16	32	
8-7-9105	775x22		12								
8-7-9105	1000x22		12						2	8	
8-7-9125	1100x20		12								
8-7-9150	1200x20		14								
8-7-13690	1.00x18	RHC	8	2		2	8		8	16	
	1.00x12		8							8	

NOTE: These tires will be issued automatically to Ordnance Units and will not be requisitioned.

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ANNEX NO. 3

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Ordnance Officer

ORDNANCE BULLETIN)

NUMBER 5) 22 June 1944

SECTION I

Administration

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SECTION II

Operations

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SECTION III

Maintenance

7. STANDARDS OF SERVICEABILITY. Standards of serviceability for shipment of equipment overseas will be as prescribed in OBSF 4-17, dated 4 February 1943, and changes thereto, for combat serviceability. In addition, the following standards will apply.

a. Vehicles. After engine tune up or servicing, vehicles must satisfactorily meet the conditions outlined below before being considered serviceable for overseas operation:

(1) At idling speed with engine at normal operating temperature, the intake manifold pressure must equal or exceed 16" of mercury. This vacuum must be steady and show no great fluctuation between maximum and minimum.

(2) Compression pressure of each cylinder shall not differ from that of any other cylinder by more than 10 lbs. per square inch. This test will be made immediately after the engine has operated from 20 to 30 minutes, and is still at normal operating temperature. The test will be made with all spark plugs removed and the throttle fully opened. The engine crankshaft shall be rotated at least six revolutions per reading.

(3) At a road test including operation in all gear ratios:
   (a) No apparent engine overheating must be experienced.
   (b) Clutches must function without slipping, grabbing, chattering, or binding.
   (c) There must be no unusual noises that cannot be readily corrected.

(4) Wheel and Brake Inspection:
   (a) Tire rims that revolve free of the ground must be concentric to the axle or hub center line within 1/4" per 10" of radius, and must not have a sidewise run out greater than 3/16" per 10" radius.
   (b) Wheel, wheel rim, and wheel ring flanges must be free of indentations and cracks.
   (c) Wheel bearings and wheel bearing grease seals must be in good condition.
   (d) Brake drums must be free of cracks and not badly ridged.

(5) All pneumatic tires must be free of cuts, fabric breaks, or other damage likely to cause early failure, and must have minimum mileage life remaining as shown:
   (a) GE Truck Companies: 2,000 miles
   (b) Other units : 1,000 miles

(6) Electrical accessories, such as ignition coils, condensers, spark plugs, etc., must be capable of meeting minimum performance requirements as specified by the manufacturer in pertinent Technical Manuals.

(7) Each cell of the battery must contain electrolyte having a specific gravity equal to or greater than 1.200.

(8) Continuous band and block type rubber tracks must not have been run more than 500 miles.

(9) Steel tracks must not have been run more than 500 miles on medium tanks and 800 miles on tractors.

(10) Rubber bogie wheels must present a smooth appearance without serious cuts or large pieces torn off. Bogie wheels should be examined for heat blisters or separation of rubber and steel.

SECTION IV

Supply

9. DESIGNATION OF ORDNANCE DEPOT COMPANIES AS TO TYPE:

a. The following depot companies have been designated as Forward General Depots:

830th
859th
985th

b. The following depot companies have been designated as Forward Armored Depots:

814th
841st
182nd
184th
333rd

c. The following depot companies have been designated as Main Army Depots:

857th - Main combat vehicles
984th - Main general purpose
941st - Main armament

All depot companies designated as to type will immediately take necessary steps to requisition basic load and prepare personnel for the operation of type depot designated.

SECTION V

Ammunition

1. Ordnance Technical Bulletin No. 54, Hq. ComZ, ETOUSA, is quoted in its entirety for information on FUZE, NOSE, CONCRETE PIERCING, T105. Corps and Division Ordnance Officers will bring the characteristics and usages of this type fuse to the attention of commanders and staffs involved:

"1. PURPOSE. This bulletin is intended to furnish all concerned, especially Artillery Personnel, with information concerning the design, construction and tactical purpose of the fuse, nose, C.P., T105. It includes all available information including ballistics and instructions for assembly to the particular shell required.

"2. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION. Considerable development work has been done during the past year in the Zone of Interior on methods of effectively destroying concrete structures and fortifications. The tests included firings of all types of field weapons from .50 caliber thru the 240mm Howitzer. Important conclusions resulting from these tests were made:

a. H.E. shells fired with standard type P.D. fuses were effective in concrete destruction because with fuse set at delay they shattered on impact against the hard surface. On super-quick setting only surface damage resulted.

b. S.A.P., A.P., and A.P.C. type projectiles were effective against reinforced concrete because of their penetrating qualities but lacked sufficient explosive punch to do much destruction other than making a hole in the concrete.

"3. From these considerations, it was apparent that an ideal anti-concrete projectile would be one which had the penetrating properties of an AP shot and the detonating force of an HE shell. With this viewpoint in mind, additional experiments were conducted which resulted in the development of a fuse with a hardened steel nose that would strengthen a standard H.E. shell sufficiently to withstand the force of impact against the concrete and reach satisfactory depths of penetration before the functioning of the delay element. This fuse was designated the Fuse, Nose, Concrete Pierc[illegible] T105.

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"4. DESCRIPTION. The fuse, nose, C.P., T105, consists of a hardened steel nose, body, and base assembly of standard fuse contour and containing a delay element assembly of the fuse P.D. M48 fuse (.05 sec. delay). The fuse nose solid nose is made from HD 4140 steel or equivalent, heat-treated to have a Brinell hardness of from 300 to 340. The base of the fuse is threaded to screw directly into the nose threads of the shell body. Standard type boosters cannot be used with this fuse. The T1 booster, which is a M42A2 type booster modified by removal of most of its 2" threads, must be used with the C.P. T105 fuse.

"5. ASSEMBLY AND USE. The fuse, nose, C.P., T105, can be used with standard H. E. ammunition from 75mm to 240mm without any modification to the loaded shell, and is interchangeable with any standard contour fuse (M43, M48, M51, M54, M55, and M57).

"6. For all HE projectiles which contain the standard booster (fixed and semi-fixed ammunition), the standard booster must be replaced by the T1 booster. This is accomplished by removing the booster retaining set screw on the nose end of the shell and replacing the standard booster with the T1. The T1 booster is screwed into the shell body as far as it will go hand tight, and the T105 fuse is then screwed in on top of it. The fuse must be securely tightened so that its shoulder is flush against the nose of the shell. It should be noted that both the fuse T105 and the booster T1 engage the nose threads of the shell.

"7. H.E. shells with fuse C.P. T105 are effective against earth or sandbags as well as concrete. Most earthen cover must be removed before good effect is obtained against reinforced concrete. Shells with fuse T105 are superior to standard AP projectiles in removing reinforcing bars and debris from the impact area. Experience has indicated that embrasures are the most vulnerable parts of pillboxes and should be selected as targets in preference to exposed or covered walls. When it is impracticable or unnecessary to obtain direct hits on embrasures, fire should be directed at the edges of the structure. Shells of 105mm caliber and larger which strike the earth in front of an embrasure will pile sufficient earth in the line of fire to interfere with operation of enemy gun. In order to obtain complete penetration with the least number of rounds, it is essential that repeated hits be obtained against the same impact area. Each such hit weakens the wall progressively, enabling each successive shell to obtain greater penetration than the preceding round.

"8. BALLISTIC CONCEPTS OF FUZE, NOSE, C. P., T105. Effectiveness of fire against reinforced concrete increases with (1) higher striking velocity, (2) larger size of H.E. shell, and (3) greater accuracy of fire. The large shell has several advantages; in addition to affording a higher detonating effect, its greater stability, within the gun and thru the air in general results in smaller dispersion and consequently greater accuracy of fire. Table I is a summary of pertinent information on weapons effective against concrete installations together with actual data obtained at Aberdeen Proving Ground on the number of successive hits (same impact area) of H.E. shell with fuse C.P. T105 required to penetrate reinforced concrete walls. The concrete used in these tests is estimated to be of greater strength than will be found in enemy structures.

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TABLE I

WEAPON	MUZZLE VELOCITY f/s	PROJ. WT.	PROJ. WT. LBS	M.V. CORRECTED TO TEST WT.	PENETRATION IN REINFORCED CONCRETE WALLS THICKNESS (FEET)		NO. HITS REQUIRED TO PENETRATE	RANGE YARDS
Gun, 75mm, M3 or M4	1975	M48	14.6	1.5	5 7		16 24	1000
Gun, 3" M5 or 76mm, M1A2	2600	M62A1	12.8	0.9	5 7		7 15	1000
Gun, 90mm M1	2700	M71	23.4	2	5 7		3 6	1000
How. 105mm M2A1	1550	M1	33.0	4.8	5 7		10 14	1000
Gun 4.5" M1	2275	M64	55.0	4.3	5 7		2 3	1000
How. 155mm M1	1850	M107	95.0	15.0	5 7		4 6	1000
Gun 155mm M1918	2410	M101	95.0	15.5	5 7		3 4	1000
Gun 155mm M1	2800	M101	95.0	15.5	5 7		1 2	1000
Gun 155mm M1	2100	M101	95.0	15.5	5 7		3 4	1000
How. 8", M1	1550	M106	200	37	5 7		2 2	1000
Gun 8" M1	2100	M103	240	21	5 7		1 2	8000
How. 240mm M1	1500	M111	360	54	5 7		1 2	8000

"9. In destroying concrete structures, direct fire at short range is the most desirable method because of accuracy and high striking velocity. However, if this cannot be accomplished because of rugged terrain or harassing enemy fire, longer ranges can be used in which case the larger weapons, i.e. 8" howitzer, M1, 8" Gun, M1, and 240 How. M1 are best to use to take advantage of the heavy shells employed.

"10. Penetration depends on striking velocity. For effective penetration a striking velocity of at least 1400 f/s has been recommended on an empirical basis with 1000 f/s as an absolute minimum. All projectiles in flight lose velocity rapidly due to gravity pull (in ascending trajectory) and air resistance. Thus there is a range (especially for the smaller weapons) beyond which the striking velocity is too low for effective hits. Table II shows the maximum effective range of certain weapons at which the limiting striking velocities of 1400 f/s and 1000 f/s are reached. Also shown in Table II is an indication of accuracy of fire. Maximum ranges are shown at which the probability of hitting three targets of different size is .3 (slightly less than 1 hit per 3 rounds fired). Ranges greater than the values shown in Table II for the weapons listed will result in greatly decreased accuracy and perhaps impractically large ammunition requirements.

TABLE II

WEAPON	MUZZLE VELOCITY PROJ. f/s	PROJ.	MAX. RANGE (YDS) FOR STRIKING VELOCITY OF: 1400 f/s	1000 f/s	MAXIMUM RANGE (YDS) FOR PROBABILITY OF .3 HITTING AGAINST FOLLOWING TARGETS: 7.5 FT SQ. AREA HIGH*	15 FT SQ. AREA 10 FT HIGH*	30 FT SQ. AREA 10 FT HIGH*
75mm M3 & M4	1975	M48	2500	5000	2000	4000	5000
90mm M1 or T7	2700	M71	6000	9000	2000	5000	5000
4.5" M1	2275	M64	6000	**	2000	5000	6000
155mm Gun M1	2800	M101	9000	**	2000	3000	5000
8" How M1	1950	M106	4000	**	6000	9000	12000

* C.I. taken as front edge of target at ground level.

** Striking velocity remains above 1000 f/s.

"11. On the basis of overall effectiveness, the 8" How. M1 with shell HE M106 and charge VII, or the 155mm Gun M1 firing shell M101, are excellent choices. For greater field mobility and good effectiveness at short ranges, the 90mm gun on gun motor carriage M10 firing HE shell M71 or the 4.5" gun M1 on carriage M1 or motor carriage T16 (Now being developed) firing shell HE M64 are excellent choices.

"12. The 8" Gun M1 and the 240mm How. M1 cannot be used easily at short ranges because they do not depress to zero elevation. However, they are excellent choices for long range destruction of concrete structures. Reports from BATAAN revealed that the Fifth Army has used the T105 fuse in these weapons for long range shelling of concrete bridges, approaches and concrete buildings with very satisfactory results. Firings were at ranges of 15,000 yards and up. In firing the 240mm Howitzer M1 at a range of 20,000 yards it was found necessary to make an adjustment of approximately 200 yards increase in range and 2 mils left in deflection from firing table values when using the T105 fuse.

"13. The T105 fuse is both squatter and heavier than the regular fuses in standard use, thereby changing to some extent the interior and exterior ballistics of the projectile with which it is fired. The chamber pressures are only slightly increased and there is a slight loss in muzzle velocity. For moderate ranges, including direct fire at short range, the quadrant elevation for most guns in which the T105 fuse is used will be greater than when using the lighter, longer, standard fuses. This effect of the T105 fuse is greater when used with the lighter projectiles (4.5" and smaller) and becomes progressively less as projectile size increases. For 8" projectiles and larger, the ballistic effect of T105 fuse becomes negligible and firing tables prepared for the standard fuses may be used directly without appreciable error.

"14. Until more adequate data is issued, the following rule and Table III will provide a rough working method for computing quadrant elevation for the T105 fuse.

TABLE III

RULE. From the appropriate firing table devised for a standard fuse but which is replaced by the T105 fuse, compute the quadrant elevation allowing for the effect of an increase in projectile weight and an increase of air density as listed below beyond that which would be used for the standard fuse. For all practicable gun elevations, both of these corrections are applied to decrease range (i.e. for a given range, a higher quadrant elevation will result from using the T105 fuse than from using the standard fuse).

CALIBER	PROJ. WT. IN SQUARES	AIR DENSITY %
75mm Gun	2.5	32
90mm Gun	2.0	19
105mm How.	1.0	14
4.5" Gun	1.5	12
155mm How. & Gun	1.0	5
8" How. or Gun & Larger	0	0

"15. SUMMARY. The foregoing information is summarized for convenience.

a. The fuse, nose, C.P. T105 is a hardened steel body fuse containing a point detonating delay action assembly. When assembled with special booster T1, a standard H.E. shell is converted into an effective destroyer of reinforced concrete structures.

b. The T105 fuse is effective when used in weapons ranging from 75mm gun thru the 240mm Howitzer M1. It is most effective when used in direct fire at longer ranges.

c. For effectiveness and accuracy at short and moderate ranges, the 8" Howitzer M1 is ideal. For mobility of weapon and effective fire power in direct fire at short range, the 90mm and 4.5" guns preferably on motor mounts are most suitable. For accuracy and destroying effect at long ranges, the 240mm How. M1 and 8" Gun M1 are recommended.

d. Ballistics of the projectile are changed when the T105 fuse replaces the standard fuse. The greatest change occurs with the small projectiles; the effect with projectiles 8" and larger is negligible. A rough correction table is provided herein; use of the T105 fuse generally will cause a decrease in range from that expected when using the standard type fuses.

"16. AVAILABILITY OF FUSE, NOSE, CP, T105, IN U. S. A fair supply of fuses CP T105 and T1 boosters is now available in the U.S. Approximately one half of this supply is now in the hands of the First Army. The contents of this bulletin should be circularized to all units using or expecting to use this fuse."

SECTION VI - GENERAL

All Ordnance personnel should read the article, "Recovery of Materiel in Combat" in the May 1944 issue of THE ORDNANCE SERGEANT. This is an excellent article on combat conditions encountered in recovery of materiel.

ANNEX NO. 4

REPORTS TO BE SUBMITTED

Form No. 1: "Materiel in Hands of Troops" and "Combat Loss". Third Army Ordnance Form No. 8, (Reproduced on Pages 98-107 of OVERLORD PLAN) submitted monthly as of 1800 hours on the 20th day of each month to reach Army Headquarters not later than 1200 on the 23rd day of each month. References "Instructions to Ordnance Units", paragraph 6a (9).

Form No. 2: "Status of Ammunition" Third Army Ordnance Form No. 1, (Reproduced on Pages 107-109 of OVERLORD PLAN) submitted daily as of 1800, to reach Army Headquarters not later than 0800 hours the following day. References, "Instructions to Ordnance Units", paragraph 6b (1).

Form No. 3: "Status of Ammunition" Third Army Ordnance Form No. 1, (Reproduced on pages 107-109 of OVERLORD PLAN) submitted monthly as of 0800 the 20th day, to reach Army Ordnance Office not later than the 23rd day. References, "Instructions to Ordnance Units", paragraph 6b (5).

Form No. 3: "Captured Enemy Materiel Report", Third Army Ordnance Form No. 3, (Reproduced on page 109 of OVERLORD PLAN) submitted weekly by designated Ordnance battalions as of 1800 hours, Saturday, to reach Army Ordnance Office not later than 0800 the following Monday. References, "Instructions to Ordnance Units", paragraph 30.

Form No. 4: "Ordnance Major Item Supply Report". Third Army Ordnance Form No. 4, submitted daily by all Ordnance Maintenance and Depot Companies as of 1800, to arrive at Army Ordnance Office not later than 0800 the following day.

Form No. 5: "Ordnance Maintenance Report". Third Army Ordnance Form No. 5, submitted weekly by Ordnance Maintenance Companies as of 1800 Saturday, to arrive at Army Ordnance Office not later than 0800 the following day. Column 1 is self-explanatory and pictures the maintenance situation for the unit reporting. Sheet No. 1 of this report, vertical columns No. 2 to No. 7, inclusive, is a general report showing the maintenance status for general types of equipment. Additional sheets with vertical columns from No. 8 to number required will report on individual major items which are classed as critical by the Army Ordnance Officer. Examples in columns 8, 9, 10 are indicated. When items are reported upon they will be listed in sequence as they appear on the critical item list published by the Army Ordnance Officer. At the bottom of sheet #1 or on additional sheets will be shown items deadlined with the information furnished as indicated.

Form No. 6: "Supply Battalion Report". Third Army Ordnance Form No. 6, submitted weekly by Ordnance Supply Battalions as of 1800, Saturday, to arrive at the Army Ordnance Office not later than 0800 of the following Monday. Under column 1 indicate requisition number of the unit requisitioning or the Supply Battalion's requisition number on Ord. R. Under column 2 enter unit designation. Under column 3 enter total days requisition has been outstanding seven (7) days or over. Under column 4 enter quantities of items on hand in the supply battalion. Under column 5 list items on requisition not filled. If over five (5) items remain unfilled on any one requisition, furnish copy of requisition and do not

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list items. Show on the copy of the requisition only these items unfilled. Under column 6 make any remarks as to contacts made to fill requisition or any other pertinent matter which will aid the Army Ordnance Officer in expediting fulfillment of the requisition.

Form No. 7: Third Army Ordnance Form No. 7, will be used by all TUSA Ordnance units authorized to make allocations of equipment or ammunition.

Form No. 8: "Special Ammunition Report". This report to be submitted by ammunition companies and battalions when the stockage of specified items becomes critical, or as called for by Army.

Form No. 9: "Reconnaissance Report". Submitted by units making reconnaissance of areas for prospective future ASPs, or Depots. Reports to be forwarded to Army Ordnance Officer by Ammunition Companies, Depot Companies, and by other Ordnance Companies when required.

Ord Form No. 4.
Third Army

ORDNANCE MAJOR ITEM SUPPLY REPORT

Organization Reporting_____

Date_____ 1800

(To be submitted daily by all Ordnance Maintenance and Depot Companies as of 1800 covering the preceding 24 hours, to arrive at Army Ordnance Office by 0800 the following day.)

Correct Nomenclature of Items	On Hand as of Last Report	Rec'd Since Last Report	Issued Since Last Report	Balance on Hand Total	Allocated but not Delivered	Unserviceable Reparable	Unserviceable Reparable	Available for Allocation

Allocation Numbers filled since last report____
Allocation Numbers on hand, unfilled_____

Third Army Ordnance Form #6

SUPPLY BATTALION REPORT

Organization or Depot reporting_____

Date_____ 1800_____

(To be submitted weekly by Ordnance Supply Battalions as of 1800, Saturday, to arrive at the Army Ordnance Office not later than 0800 the following Monday.)

Req. No.	Req. Outstanding 7 days or longer UNIT	Time outstanding DAYS	Quantity on Hand	Items on Req.	Remarks
1	2	3	4	5	6

Ord Form No. 5
Third Army.

ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE REPORT

No. of Sheets this Report_____ Organization Reporting_____

Date_____ 1800

(To be submitted weekly by Ordnance Maintenance Companies as of 1800 Saturday, to arrive at the Army Ordnance Office not later than 0800 the following Monday)

1	2 Combat Veh.	3 Gen. Purpose	4 Arty	5 S.A.	6 Instrument	7 Miscellaneous
J/O Issued to Date						
J/O Issued this Week						
J/O Completed to Date						
J/O Completed this Week						
J/O Cancelled to Date						
J/O Cancelled this Week						
Total Jobs in Shops						
Units Evac. to Date						
Units Evac. this Week						
Units Exchanged this Week						
Units Deadlined 24 Hours						
Units Deadlined 72 Hours						

Units on Deadline 72 Hours or Longer

Organization Unit Belongs	J/O No.	Type of Unit	Reg. or W. No.	Date In	Cause of Deadline	Action Taken

Third Army Ordnance Form #7.

ALLOCATIONS No._____

Hqs._____(Unit Issuing) Date and Hour_____

To: _____(Maint.)(Depot)(Am.)(Co.(Bn.)(Op.)

The following allocation of equipment and/or ammunition is made to_____ UNIT _____ CORPS OR ARMY _____

LOCATION

	No. Alloc.	ITEM	Total Alloc. Incl. this one	Remarks
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				

Priority of Delivery_____

This allocation cancels allocation Nos._____

SUPPLY OFFICER
TUSA

The above form will be used by all authorized TUSA units for making allocations of equipment and ammunition.

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TUSA ORD FORM #8 SPECIAL AMMUNITION REPORT

SUBJECT: Status of Essential Stocks. No.

TO :

FROM :

As of (Time) (Date) TWX:

Signature

Line	Code	Nomenclature	on hand	n/a
100	P57AA	Cart., AP, w/Shell, HE, 3in AA Gun		
99	P57AA	Cart., Illum., w/Shell, w/T Fuze, 3.7inch AA Gun		
98A		Shell, Fr, WP1, w/ Lead, 40mm AA Gun		
101	P57AA	Shell, HE, M71, w/Fuze, M54, 75mm AA Gun		
101	P57AA	Shell, AP, M61, w/Fuze, 75mm AA Gun		
98A	P57AA	Shell, AP, M61, w/Fuze, & w/o WP, 75mm AA		
102	P57AA	Shell, HE, M71, w/Fuze M54 or M74A1 (Series) 75mm AA Gun		
96	P57AA	Shell, HE, M51, unfused, 17mm Gun M1		
97	P57AA	Shell, Smoke, WP, M104, unfused, 17mm Gun		
94	P57AA	Charge, Propg., M4, M7 Powder, 17mm Gun M1		
115	P57AA	Shell, HE, M54, w/Fuze M54, 75mm Howitzer		
117	P57AA	Shell, HE, M54, w/Fuze M54, 75mm Howitzer		
116	P57AA	Shell, HE, AP, M67, w/Fuze M67, 75mm Howitzer		
66	P57AA	Shell, HE, M1, w/Fuze M54, 105mm Howitzer M2		
67	P57AA	Shell, HE, M1, w/Fuze M54, 105mm Howitzer M2		
68	P57AA	Shell, HE, AP, M67, w/Fuze M67, 105mm Howitzer M2		
69	P57AA	Shell, Smoke, WP, M60, w/Fuze M67, 105mm Howitzer		
100	P57AA	Shell, HE, M71, w/Fuze M72, 105mm Howitzer M4		
97	P57AA	Shell, HE, M1, w/Fuze M54, 105mm Howitzer M4		
110	P57AA	Shell, HE, M107, unfused, 155mm Howitzer M1		
81	P57AA	Shell, Smoke, WP, M116, unfused, 155mm Howitzer		
83	P57AA	Charge, Propg., M3, 3P, 155mm Howitzer M1		
84	P57AA	Charge, Propg., M4, 4P, 155mm Howitzer M1		
114	P57AA	Shell, HE, M67, unfused, 8" Gun M1		
112	P57AA	Charge, Propg., M4, (equiv), 8" Gun M1		
113	P57AA	Charge, Propg., M7, (canvas), 8" Gun M1		
126	P57AA	Shell, HE, M106, 8" Gun		
127	P57AA	Charge, Propg., M7, 8" Gun		
128	P57AA	Charge, Propg., M10, 8" Gun		
121	P57AA	Shell, HE, M106, w/TNT, unfused, 8" Howitzer M1		
122	P57AA	Charge, Propg., M7, 8" Howitzer M1		
123	P57AA	Charge, Propg., M8, 8" Howitzer M1		
124	P57AA	Shell, HE, M110, unfused, 8inch Howitzer M1		
125	P57AA	Charge, Propg., M4, 8inch Howitzer M1		
87A	P57AA	Fuze, PD, M51, w/booster M43A1		
87A	P57AA	Fuze, PD, M51A1, w/booster M43A1		
90		Fuze, PD, M51A1		
91	P57AA	Fuze, PD, M57, or M99A1, SQ & T		
92	P57AA	Fuze, PD, M67		
95	P57AA	Primer, Percu., M1A1, 75 MM.		
		Fuze, TP, M48		

TUSA ORD. FORM #9. RECONNAISSANCE REPORT

RECONNAISSANCE STARTED FROM AT (Time and Date)

AND COMPLETED AT AT (Time and Date)

MAP COORDINATES MILEAGE CHART

FINDINGS

1. Overlay to accompany this report will be made on current operational map. This overlay will indicate road conditions between rear area and site, and between site and fighting troops.
2. TONNAGE CAPACITY UNDER UNFAVORABLE CONDITIONS: .
3. DRAINAGE: .
4. COVER: .
5. CONCEALMENT: .
6. RECOMMENDED IMMEDIATE ROAD IMPROVEMENTS TO BE MADE BY ENGINEERS:
7. DESIRED ROAD IMPROVEMENTS TO BE MADE BY ENGINEERS:
8. LAYOUT PLAN:
   a. ROADSIDE:
   b. AREA:
9. RECOMMENDATIONS:

SUBMITTED AS OF (Time & Date)

TO:

BY:

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ANNEX NO. 5



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ANNEX NO. 6

SCHEDULE OF ORDNANCE UNITS LIFTED TO THE CONTINENT

	GP HQ	HM HQ	AM HM HQ	HM CO	HAM CO	HM FA CO	HM TK CO	HAM CO	DEP CO	DUKW CO	HWD CO	AM CO	BOS CO	MP. CO AA
D / 21				13										
D / 22							531							
D / 26		84	313	3268	3525 3530	537				188		665	2 5 88	300
D / 28									839					
D / 29					3457 Det.									
D / 31	69	10	150	16						171		626		
D / 34				128					837			592 590		
D / 35									981	172		598		
D / 36				47			552					569		
D / 38												575		
D / 39		11 79 314			3514 3515								89	299
D / 40				256			503							
D / 41				32		521			941	164				
D / 42	70	66											90	
D / 43					3524	547 550								
D / 44					3468				182					281
D / 46		193		15	3532 3537			902						
D / 50		19			3466		534							
D / 51		312					556		995			574		775
D / 53								853				620	91	
D / 54		86	41		3425 3450 3457 Det.	510		889	184			570 573 583		305
D / 59					3508		524			165				
D / 60									838					
D / 62		316		116		515								
D / 68				26	3510							598 647		
D / 70					3519		556							
D / 71		185 320		129	3428		553	904	840	185				
D / 72							538			189				
D / 76												576		
D / 77			65	104	3427									
D / 80								910	843			640		
D / 81					3511	520								
D / 84		590		7 293				847 914						
D / 88											3076			
D / 89								913						
D / 90				286				851						
				3424 3463										

ANNEX NO. 7

Maintenance Supply and Evacuation Records

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

GNMCO 513 (Ord) 29 June 194_

Subject: Maintenance, Supply and Evacuation Records.

To: All Ordnance Maintenance Companies.

1. This office has obtained and will distribute to all maintenance companies two loose-leaf binders complete with fillers and index sheets. These binders are to be used by all maintenance companies and will be the means of keeping records of maintenance, supply and evacuation operations.

2. One binder will be used to record all job order requisitions and requisitions for parts. This book will be divided into sections by branch or service. There will also be a section for each Division served by the company. There are the necessary tab sheets furnished for dividing the binder into sections. Each unit coming to the maintenance company for service will have an individual sheet on which will be recorded the date, work order number, job order request number or requisition number, description of work to be done (including vehicle or gun registration number) or parts requisitioned, whether parts required for repair work or issue are on hand or must be requisitioned (if requisitioned, list requisition number), and remarks, which should contain such information as when work is completed, parts shipped, or if work was evacuated (give evacuation point). On items requiring evacuation, if replacement is made to the using unit from the company pool, in the column marked "parts on hand or on requisition", write "pool". The sheets which are furnished for use in the binder have columns provided for recording the above information.

3. The second binder will be divided into two sections, one section to be used for keeping a record of evacuations and the other section a record of requisitions forwarded by the company.

a. Items which are evacuated will be classified according to type; that is, a section will be provided for trucks, tanks and tank-like vehicles, half-tracks, small arms, artillery and miscellaneous. Under the section for trucks, for example, there will be a sheet for each type truck; that is, 1/4-ton, 3/4-ton, 1½-ton, 2½-ton, etc. The same sheets as used in the first binder are used for recording this work. Ignore the headings on the columns and list the following information systematically: date of evacuation, work order number under which the item was received, requisition number listed in the column marked "customer's requisition number" (cross out the word customer's), unit for whom the item is being evacuated (including registration number), point to which evacuated; and when item has been replaced or repaired and returned to the maintenance company, list under remarks date received and if to be placed in company pool, write pool in parenthesis in the remarks column when evacuation is effected, and when received post the date received in the remarks column. When any sheet becomes filled, a new sheet will be inserted. The old sheet will not be removed, however, until all items are completed or two weeks after starting the new sheet, whichever is the later.

b. The requisition section of this binder will list all maintenance company requisitions. Parts, vehicles, etc., will be drawn from several supply points. In view of the supply procedure, this will, for the most part, classify your requisitions into general purpose, combat, and armament. The same sheets used for recording the other information on work orders and evacuation will be used for keeping this record. Date of requisition, work order number if parts are for any one work order, requisition number listed in column marked "Customer's Requisition Number". (Cross out the word customer's), type of material on requisition, and date requisition is filled will be listed. Do not forget the requisition number is posted in the work order binder if the requisition covers parts, etc., other than for stock. The same procedure on replacement of sheets when the old sheet has been filled will apply as outlined previously.

4. In order that all postings to these records can be made currently, completed work orders and tally-outs should be routed to the individual responsible for keeping the record. The same should apply to incoming requisitions, job request orders, and tally-ins. The procedure for extracting the necessary information for the record is a matter to be worked out in detail by company commanders.

5. The advantage and purpose of keeping these records is to facilitate compiling reports which will be required as a number of work orders completed per week, number of evacuations effected, amount of equipment on deadline and reason therefor, status of requisitions, and availability of materials. This letter is not to be interpreted as the authority for making the above reports.

a. a. There are no objections to using these binders for compiling additional data such as records of inspections, etc.

6. At such time as a unit is moved from one sector to another or withdrawn from the line, the individual sheet which is in the work order binder, will be withdrawn and forwarded to the Army Ordnance Officer by the Ordnance Company. The Army Ordnance Officer will be responsible for forwarding the sheet on to the battalion which will be maintaining the unit in the future. In this way the record of the using unit will follow it and the equipment and supplies it has on order can be gotten to the unit. This procedure will be followed whether or not there are open items on the sheet. No sheets are withdrawn from the evacuation and requisitions binder at any time for forwarding.

Inclosure No. 1

Date	Work Order Number	Customer's Req. No.	Description	Parts in hand or on Requisition	Remarks

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ANNEX NO. 8

THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY

ESTIMATED AMMUNITION MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS

TYPE OF AMMUNITION	Rds/type/day	D / 42 to D / 51	D / 52 to D / 61	D / 62 to D / 71	D / 72 to D / 81	D / 82 to D / 90	D / 91 to D / 104	TOTAL
Cart., Carbine, cal..30	5.00	2,850,000	2,550,000	3,700,000	4,250,000	4,850,000	9,890,000	28,090,000
Cart., Ball, cal..30 5/clip		75,000	84,000	93,000	102,000	108,000	115,000	577,000
Cart., Ball, cal..30 8/clip		2,320,000	2,320,000	2,320,000	2,850,000	3,160,000	5,760,000	18,730,000
Cart., A.P., cal..30 5/clip	Rifle 6.67	46,000	55,000	59,000	66,000	72,000	80,000	376,000
Cart., A.P., cal..30 8/clip	BAR 25.00	1,735,000	1,525,000	1,735,000	2,000,000	2,260,000	4,225,000	15,480,000
Cart., Tracer, cal..30 in clips		90,000	100,000	110,000	140,000	150,000	290,000	880,000
Cart., Ball, cal..30 in clips		241,000	189,000	210,000	220,000	250,000	420,000	1,550,000
Cart., A.P., cal..30 in clips		180,000	150,000	150,000	160,000	190,000	300,000	1,113,000
Cart., A.P. & Tr., cal..30 4-1, 250/PB	83.33	4,395,000	4,440,000	5,170,000	6,645,000	7,900,000	15,750,000	44,240,000
Cart., Ball, cal..45	(SMG 10.00) (Pistol 1.33)	1,065,000	1,065,000	1,065,000	1,590,000	2,115,000	3,350,000	10,250,000
Cart., A.P.-I-Tr., cal..50, 2-2-1	83.33	4,277,000	4,027,000	5,077,000	6,327,000	8,927,000	13,840,000	42,475,000
Shell, H.E., M54 w/S.D. Tr., w/f FD M56, 37mm Gun AA	55.33	78,000	107,000	132,000	137,000	117,000	175,000	746,000
Shot, APC, M59 w/Tr., 37mm Gun, AA		4,100	5,700	7,000	7,200	6,200	9,300	39,500
Shell, H.E. M63 w/f FD M58, 37mm Gun T or AT	13.33	76,000	73,000	84,000	105,000	125,000	235,000	698,000
Shot, APC, M51, 37mm Gun T or AT		35,000	33,000	40,000	50,000	99,000	116,500	353,500
Canister, M2, 37mm Gun T or AT		12,000	11,000	13,000	17,000	20,000	38,800	111,800
Cart., H.E.-T, SD M1I w/f FD M71, 40mm Gun AA	46.00	190,000	190,000	220,000	272,000	246,000	373,000	1,491,000
Cart., A.P.-T, M81, 40mm Gun AA		10,000	10,500	12,000	15,000	13,000	20,000	80,500
Shell, H.E., T18, 57mm Gun	13.33	4,600	3,700	4,000	4,600	5,400	9,500	31,800
Shot, APC-T., M86, 57mm Gun		51,500	42,000	47,500	57,000	99,000	107,000	344,000
Canister, T17, 57mm Gun M1		1,100	950	1,100	1,150	1,300	2,400	8,000
Bomb, Smoke, WP1, 3" Mortar	5.33	6,740	6,600	7,200	11,360	15,980	26,700	74,560
Shell, H.E., M43A2 w/f FD M52, 60mm Mortar	20.00	185,000	155,000	175,000	195,000	225,000	395,000	1,330,000
Shell, Ill. M83 w/f TH, M65, 60mm Mortar		9,600	8,100	9,200	10,200	11,800	20,500	69,400
Shell, Smoke WP, 60mm Mortar		9,200	7,800	8,800	10,000	11,200	21,000	68,000
Shell, Smoke FS, 60mm Mortar		9,200	7,800	8,800	10,000	11,200	21,000	68,000
Shell, H.E., M43A1 w/f FD M52, 81mm Mortar	25.00	81,500	68,500	76,500	86,500	105,500	188,500	605,000
Shell, H.E., M56 w/f FD M53, 81mm Mortar		24,400	21,400	24,400	28,400	33,400	67,500	199,500
Shell, Smoke, WP M57 w/f FD M52, 81mm Mortar		18,700	17,800	20,200	24,700	31,800	61,250	173,250
Shell, H.E., M42A1 w/f FD M48 HC 3" Gun	41.67	48,600	50,000	63,000	77,400	86,400	156,600	489,000
Shell, H.E., M42A1 w/f FD M48A1 HC, 3" Gun				50% OF ALL H.E. TO BE REDUCED CHARGE IF AVAILABLE				
Shot, APC M62 w/f SD M66A1 & Tr., 3" Gun		60,750	47,850	78,750	96,750	108,000	195,000	586,500
Shell, Smoke, 3" Gun		12,150	9,450	15,750	19,550	21,600	62,600	140,900
Shell, H.E., M48 w/f FD M48A1 HC, 75mm Gun	25.00	69,750	74,000	83,000	120,000	160,000	310,700	817,450
Shot, APC M61 w/f SD M66A1 & Tr. HC, 75mm Gun		55,800	59,000	66,000	95,400	126,500	248,550	651,250
Shell, Smoke WP M1I, 75mm Gun		7,000	7,400	8,200	12,000	16,000	32,000	82,600
Shell, Smoke HC HE M59, 75mm Gun		7,000	7,400	8,200	12,000	16,000	32,000	82,600
Shell, H.E. M48 w/f FD M48A1, 75mm Howr	24.67	12,000	12,300	14,000	17,500	20,500	40,000	116,300
Shell, H.E., M48 w/f FD M54, 75mm Howr		3,000	3,100	3,500	4,300	5,100	10,000	29,000
Shell, H.E.A.T. M66 w/f SD M62, 75mm Howr		900	900	1,000	1,300	1,500	2,900	8,500
Shell, Smoke WP M64 w/f FD M57, 75mm Howr		1,700	1,800	2,000	2,500	2,900	5,700	16,600
Shell, APC M72 w/f SD M66A1 & Tr., 76mm Gun	Tank 25.00	22,500	22,900	9,000	11,750	15,750	49,500	130,500
Shell, H.E., M42A1 w/f M48A1, 76mm Gun	Anti-Tank 41.67	18,000	18,000	7,200	9,000	12,600	39,600	104,400
Shell, Smoke HC BI, 76mm Gun		4,500	4,500	1,800	2,250	3,150	10,000	26,200
Shell, H.E. M71 w/f TH M67, 90mm Gun AA	25.00	900	900	1,000	1,200	1,100	1,700	6,800
Shell, H.E. M71 w/f TH M43, 90mm Gun AA		15,500	16,500	18,500	22,000	19,500	30,500	122,500
Shell, H.E. M71 w/f TD M48A1, 90mm Gun AA		900	900	1,000	1,200	1,100	1,700	6,800
Shot, APC M82 w/f SD M66A1, 90mm Gun AA		900	900	1,000	1,200	1,100	1,700	6,800
Shell, H.E. M1 w/f FD M48A1, 105mm Howr M2 & M2A1	58.33	120,600	139,100	151,100	187,700	226,000	469,600	1,294,100
Shell, H.E. M1 w/f FD M54, 105mm Howr M2 & M2A1		85,800	85,000	108,000	135,900	171,500	308,000	894,200
Shell, H.E.A.T. M67 w/f SD M62, 105mm Howr M2 & M2A1		2,800	3,000	3,900	5,000	6,200	13,300	34,200
Shell, Smoke WP M60 w/f FD M57, 105mm Howr M2 & M2A1		12,600	12,100	13,500	18,000	22,500	47,700	126,400
Shell, Smoke HC HE M84, w/f FD M54, 105mm Howr M2 & M2A1		12,600	12,100	13,530	18,000	22,500	47,700	126,400
Shell, Smoke Green, 105mm Howr M2 & M2A1		2,800	3,000	3,900	5,000	6,200	13,300	34,200
Shell, Smoke Red, 105mm Howr M2 & M2A1		2,800	3,000	3,900	5,000	6,200	13,300	34,200
Shell, Smoke Violet, 105mm Howr, M2 & M2A1		2,800	3,000	3,900	5,000	6,200	13,300	34,200
Shell, H.E. M1 w/f TD M48A1, 105mm Howr M5	58.33	20,100	15,500	17,400	18,300	22,000	26,000	119,300
Shell, H.E. M1 w/f TD M54, 105mm Howr M5		8,300	6,500	7,200	7,400	8,800	11,000	49,400
Shell, H.E.A.T. w/f SD M62, 105mm Howr M5		1,700	1,300	1,400	1,500	1,800	2,200	9,900
Shell, Smoke HC HE M84, w/f SD M54, 105mm Howr M5		1,700	1,300	1,400	1,500	1,800	2,200	9,900
Shell, Smoke WP M60 w/f FD M57, 105mm Howr M5		1,700	1,300	1,400	1,500	1,800	2,200	9,900
Shell, H.E. M65, 4.5" Gun M1	33.33	9,600	7,800	7,400	8,400	10,000	16,400	69,600
Charge Prop., M7 HC 4.5" Gun M1		4,800	3,600	3,700	4,200	5,000	8,200	34,800
Charge Prop., M8 SC 4.5" Gun M1		4,800	3,600	3,700	4,200	5,000	12,800	34,800

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THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY

ESTIMATED AMMUNITION MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS (CONTINUED)

TYPE OF AMMUNITION	Rds/gun/day	D ∕ L2 to D ∕ 51	D ∕ 52 to D ∕ 61	D ∕ 62 to D ∕ 71	D ∕ 72 to D ∕ 81	D ∕ 82 to D ∕ 90	D ∕ 91 to D ∕ 101	TOTAL
Shell, E.C. M107, 155mm How Bl	33.33	51,250	42,075	56,350	67,575	78,800	137,700	431,750
Shell, Smoke WP M116, 155mm How Bl		4,525	3,720	5,000	5,985	6,980	12,240	38,450
Shell, Smoke WP M110, 155mm How Bl		4,525	3,720	5,000	5,985	6,980	12,240	38,450
Shell, Smoke HC WE Red, 155mm How Bl		740	610	835	1,015	1,190	2,160	6,550
Shell, Smoke HC WE Green, 155mm How Bl		740	610	835	1,015	1,190	2,160	6,550
Shell, Smoke HC WE Violet, 155mm How Bl		740	610	835	1,015	1,190	2,160	6,550
Charge, Prop M3 SB, 155mm How Bl		27,400	21,960	29,100	34,930	40,700	71,400	225,150
Charge, Prop M4 WB, 155mm How Bl		39,550	32,475	43,525	52,200	60,900	106,575	335,225
Shell, H.E. M114, 240mm How Bl	25.00			900	2,700	4,500	12,600	20,700
Charge, Prop, 240mm How Bl				900	2,700	4,500	12,600	20,700
Shell, H.E. M101, 155mm Gun	33.33	29,580	26,500	29,580	43,860	59,780	66,300	255,600
Shell, Smoke WP M104, 155 mm Gun		5,220	4,730	5,220	7,740	7,320	11,700	41,600
Charge, Prop 155mm Gun M3-17-17A1		5,850	5,850	8,800	13,850	11,550	18,900	71,750
Charge, Prop 155mm Gun M3-M3A1		31,500	28,775	27,725	40,325	37,800	63,000	229,325
Shell, H.E. M106, 8" How Bl	33.33	14,400	10,900	14,400	21,600	24,000	42,000	127,200
Charge, Prop M1 SB, 8" How Bl		1,320	1,240	1,320	6,470	7,200	12,600	38,150
Charge, Prop M6 WB, 8" How Bl		10,080	7,560	10,080	15,130	16,800	29,400	89,250
Shell, H.E. M103, 8" Gun Bl	25.00				3,600	4,050	7,700	15,350
Charge, Prop, 8" Gun Bl, WA					1,900	2,125	4,050	8,075
Charge, Prop, 8" Gun Bl, SB					1,900	2,125	4,050	8,075
Primer, Per 18 Or M81A3		133,450	110,600	138,750	187,550	207,800	366,250	1,144,400
Fuze, TS M67		7,200	7,200	8,250	12,000	14,200	32,000	81,400
Fuze, PT M51A3		79,560	65,250	82,750	114,270	126,200	295,720	663,750
Fuze, PD M48		6,150	5,350	7,250	9,900	10,340	18,720	57,750
Fuze, TD M67A1		54,635	26,795	55,520	46,370	53,150	90,690	286,750
Fuze, TB M72A1		8,350	6,420	8,700	11,900	13,240	21,130	70,550
Fuze, Time CP T105		4,000	5,000	10,000	11,000	12,000	32,000	82,000
Mine, AT, H.E. M1A1		54,000	46,000	52,000	58,000	68,000	126,000	404,000
Mine, AT M6A1		2,700	2,300	2,600	2,900	3,400	6,300	20,200
Mine, AT M5		2,700	2,300	2,600	2,900	3,400	6,300	20,200
Torpedo, Mangalore, M1A1		9,150	9,150	9,150	9,150	9,150	7,000	52,750
Grenade, Hand Frag M61	per Combat Co. 8.33	57,900	52,350	58,000	62,600	68,800	89,550	290,000
Grenade, Hand Offn. M61A1	per Combat Co. 8.33	57,900	54,350	58,800	62,600	68,800	89,550	290,000
Grenade, Rifle AT M9A1	1.67	141,950	133,550	398,550	435,000	490,500	891,500	3,009,000
Grenade, Rifle Frag, Impact, M17		220,900	176,750	199,280	216,525	245,450	588,895	1,647,400
Grenade, Rifle Smoke HC, T-6		18,415	14,740	16,600	18,050	20,450	39,710	127,975
Grenade, Rifle Smoke WP		47,900	39,190	43,000	46,900	53,100	94,000	323,400
Grenade, Rifle Colored Smoke Red		1,500	2,000	2,400	2,500	3,000	5,500	16,900
Grenade, Rifle, Colored Smoke Green		1,500	2,000	2,400	2,500	3,000	5,500	16,900
Grenade, Rifle Colored Smoke Violet		1,500	2,000	2,400	2,500	3,000	5,500	16,900
Fuze, Detn Hand Grenade M54		57,900	52,350	58,800	62,600	68,800	89,550	290,000
Cart., Grenade, Cartime Cal..50, M6	2.00	100,000	100,000	50,000	50,000	60,000	100,000	460,000
Cart., Grenade, Rifle Cal..50, M6		20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	120,000
Rocket, AT 4.5in, M9A1	1.33	151,750	120,410	150,000	186,000	210,000	419,460	1,237,620
Signal, Ground for Proj Bl, Assorted	1.33	8,000	8,000	8,000	8,000	8,000	18,000	58,000
Signal, Ground for Launcher Grenade Assorted		8,000	8,500	9,000	9,000	9,000	8,000	51,500
Signal, Aircraft Assorted	1.33	16,660	12,660	17,660	22,660	28,660	32,000	130,300
Flare, Troop, Recognition, Yellow		1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	6,000
WEIGHT IN LONG TONS		30,764.86	24,015.19	27,838.72	37,049.27	46,216.53	59,091.70	224,980.29
WEIGHT IN MEASURED TONS		32,635.61	25,456.10	29,509.04	39,272.22	48,989.52	62,573.60	238,415.49

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ANNEX NO. 10

AMMUNITION WEIGHTS AND PACKING CHART

ORD OFFICE, HQ. TUSA
MAY 8, 1944

(ALL DATA BASED ON STANDARD OVERSEAS PACKING)

TYPE OF AMMUNITION	CODE	RDS PER CNTR	WEIGHT 1 CNTR	WEIGHT 100 CNTRS	VEHICULAR LOAD UPPER FIGURE—RDS LOWER FIGURE—CNTRS ¼	½	¾	1	4
Cartridge cal .30 Ball									
Rifle Cal .30 AP									
Rifle Cal .30 AP									
Rifle Cal .30 Ball									
Rifle Cal .30 AP									
Rifle Cal .30 Ball									
Rifle Cal .30 Ball									
Rifle Cal .30 AP									
Rifle Cal .30 AP									
Rifle Cal .30 Ball									
Rifle Cal .30 Ball									
Rifle Cal .30 Ball

ANNEX NO. 9

SECRET

THIRD US ARMY AMMUNITION PLAN



AMMUNITION COMMAND CHANNEL



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ANNEX NO. 11

SECRET

Ordnance Annex to Administrative Order No. 3

SECTION I - Operations

1. Operation.

a. To expedite reaction to tactical and service requirements, Ordnance troops may be moved by the following Ordnance Commanders:

(1) By the Company Commander of a company in direct support of a division--the section parties of his company within the divisional area after consultation with and approval from the Ordnance Officer and G-4 of the division.

(2) By the Battalion Commander of a battalion in direct support of a corps--companies of a battalion within the Corps and Divisional areas after approval from Ordnance Officer and G-4 of the Corps.

(3) By Ammunition Battalion Commanders:--ASP's will be established on recommendation of the Ordnance Officer and G-4 of divisions and corps after approval by Army Headquarters. When such recommendation is forwarded to the Army Ordnance Officer, it must specifically state that Corps or Division clearance has been obtained. (As desired by Corps Commander)

(4) By Ordnance Group Commanders:--Battalion headquarters after Army approval of recommendation of the Group Commander.

(5) By the nearest Corps and Division Commanders:--in case of failure of communications or in a tactical emergency.

b. All other movements will be directly by Army.

c. Reports (accompanied by overlays and giving time of opening and closing of installations) of all movements of Ordnance organizations to new locations will be forwarded immediately to the Army Ordnance Officer through Ordnance channels.

d. The closest possible contact (both as to the tactical situation and service requirements) will be maintained by the Ordnance commanders with appropriate officers of supported line organizations. Each Ordnance unit (battalion and company) will be given a special task assignment and specific instructions regarding its execution.

SECTION II - SUPPLY

2. Ammunition.

a. All units will arrive on the Continent with a minimum supply of ammunition as shown in basic load charts.

b. Maintenance:- The estimated rate of expenditure will be available from Com. Z on demand. Estimated requirements by periods have been transmitted to Com. Z.

3. Responsibility.

a. Unit commanders are responsible that their organizations are completely equipped with ordnance material (major items, basic load of spare parts as prescribed in pertinent T/O & E's, T/BA's, SNL's) and basic load of ammunition. After being alerted, these will be obtained as prescribed in Administrative Instructions Preliminary to Mounting, Third Army, dated 26 April 194[illegible].

b. Supply Discipline - Supply Discipline will be enforced with particular attention to the following:

(1) Stocking of excess quantities of material and supplies beyond estimated or anticipated current requirements.

(2) Wasteful use of expendable supplies, such as cleaning and preserving materials, metal stocks, standard hardware, parts common, and small maintenance parts.

(3) Careless handling and storage of supplies and material including damaging of containers in opening and failure to close or reseal containers from which a portion of the contents has been removed.

c. Weapons of Hospital Patients. Weapons coming under medical control due to evacuation of patients, etc., will be turned in promptly by hospitals, and other Medical installations, to the nearest ordnance maintenance company, and a receipt obtained therefor.

4. Method of Issue.

a. General Supplies

(1) Major Items:

(a) Ordnance Maintenance and Depot Companies will issue major items to using troops whom they support in exchange for:

1. An unserviceable major item of the same type.

2. A certificate, signed by an officer, that a major item of the same type has been totally destroyed due to enemy action or accident, abandoned due to enemy action, or destroyed to prevent capture by enemy.

3. In case a unit requires a major item which cannot be supplied from stocks on hand, the unserviceable item will be tallied in on the certificate in 4 a (1) (a) 2 above will be accepted. Replacement will be procured from the depot company in the normal manner.

(b) Ordnance companies will report to the Army Ordnance Officer all major items issued troops of other nations, showing designation of organization to which issue is made.

(2) Spare Parts and Cleaning and Preserving Material Other Than Basic Loads. Normally, except for bulk requisition on spare parts and C.P., material will be issued by Ordnance Maintenance companies to the troops whom they support. Bulk requisitions will be filled by depot companies.

(3) Combat Loading.

(a) All vehicles delivered to units will be "combat loaded" and made complete with all accessories as listed in appropriate SNL's and Technical Manuals, by the Ordnance unit making the delivery. "Combat Loading" requires that the vehicle or weapon be complete and ready to enter combat.

1. All "must items", basic ammunition load, mines, CWS supplies, decontaminating apparatus, fire control equipment, radio, medical supplies, and GI items including rations, will be drawn and properly stowed in the vehicle.

2. All vehicles will be fully serviced with gasoline, oil and water, ready for operation. Standard U. S. (or French, if applicable) ground forces identification marking will be accomplished before making delivery.

(b) All weapons delivered to units in combat must be complete with all accessories. Special attention will be given to artillery pieces to insure that all "Must Items" and fire control equipment are present.

(c) Prior to issue, each weapon or vehicle will be inspected by the issuing company which will prepare "emergency" requisitions for direct delivery to the unit receiving the material covering the items that are short at time of delivery. A copy of requisitions which gives action taken and shortages, will accompany vehicle or weapon. Copies will also be sent to the supporting ordnance organization.

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(4) Commercial gases and Helium - The Corps of Engineers is responsible for supplying cylinders of commercial gases (oxygen, acetylene, nitrogen, and carbon dioxide) and helium in exchange for empty cylinders. Ordnance depot companies will stock an adequate quantity of the above items for supplying the needs of ordnance units who will normally turn in empties to ordnance depots and draw full cylinders. In emergencies, ordnance maintenance companies may draw direct from engineer depots.

(5) Back Orders - Ordnance maintenance and depot companies will establish "back order systems" to insure that all requirements of the using troops for ordnance materiel are filled.

(6) Reports:

(a) "Material in Hands of Troops" and "Combat Loss" reports will be submitted by all combat and service units on the form shown in Form 2 (Reproduced on pages 98 thru 107 of Overlord Plan). Reports will be submitted as of 1200 hours on the 20th day of each month covering the period since last report and will arrive at this headquarters not later than 1200 hours on the 23rd day of each month. In case of excess over T/O & E, authorization will be given.

(b) "Initial Status report of major Ordnance items" will be submitted upon arrival of the Continent or upon reverting to Third U. S. Army control. The report will be made on form No. 2 (Reproduced on Pages 98 thru 107 of Overlord Plan), "Ordnance Material in Hands of Troops and Combat Loss Report".

b. Ammunition.

(1) All units in the Army will secure replacement of expended basic load Class V ammunition on presentation of a request or transportation order to the nearest ASP or Army depot. This request will contain a certificate to the effect that the ammunition required is to replace expenditure from basic load. No ammunition in excess of basic load will be issued except on specific authority of the Army.

(2) Unit of fire will be sent that prescribed by Hq. ETOUSA Ltr., dated 10 December 1943, AG 471 POG.

(3) Unserviceable ammunition with its location clearly defined will be reported to the nearest Ordnance Officer for disposition. U. S. Artillery ammunition unserviceable only by reason of dented cartridge cases will be evacuated to the nearest Class V Supply Point. Malfunctions of ammunition will be reported immediately to the Army Ordnance Officer through channels. Reports will include all available details.

(4) A monthly ammunition supply report will be submitted by all combat and service units, as of COOB the 20th day, to reach Army headquarters not later than 0800 of the 23rd day. Army units will submit reports direct to Army, headquarters; reports from units assigned or attached to Corps will be consolidated by Corps before forwarding to Army. This report will be consolidated by Corps before forwarding to Army. This report will include for each item (a) Balance on Hand (b) Expended in Combat (c) Expended for training (d) Loss due to enemy action.

5. Supply from Com. Z.

a. When Corps are operating separately, to be made in accordance with instructions issued by Ordnance Officer on staff of senior ground commander.

b. When Corps are operating under Army control, to be made available on demand of Army Ordnance Officer or Commanding Officers of Army supply or rear maintenance battalions. Delivery to be made as indicated on the supply request.

SECTION III - Maintenance

6. Responsibility.

a. Responsibility for maintenance of motor vehicles is clearly defined in AR 850-15. Maintenance of equipment in the hands of using troops is a direct responsibility of the commanding officers concerned.

b. Particular attention will be devoted to preventive maintenance. Commanding Officers will make frequent checks to assure that all operations classified under this heading are performed regularly.

c. Ordnance maintenance commanders (Group, Battalion, and Company) will aggressively push maintenance and Ordnance Service forward to the troops supported.

7. Exchange. Vehicle and weapon replacement or exchange, together with prompt evacuation, will be as dictated by the tactical situation.

8. Files. Ordnance maintenance companies will at all times maintain files of pertinent data for each of the organizations they support, showing types of major items with which the organization is equipped, existing shortages, status of action being taken to fill shortages, condition of materiel, and other important information. When the organization moves, this file will be forwarded through Ordnance channels to the maintenance company designated to support the organization in its new location.

9. Records:

a. The following records will be kept:

(1) Duty Roster - WD, AGO Form Number 6.
(2) Preventive Maintenance Service and Technical Inspection Work Sheet #1 - WD, AGO Form Number 461.
(3) Preventive Maintenance Service and Technical Inspection Work Sheet #1 - WD, AGO Form Number 462.
(4) Preventive Maintenance Service and Technical Inspection Work Sheet #1 - WD, AGO Form Number 463.

b. All vehicles will be properly dispatched and records maintained on daily dispatching Record of Motor Vehicles, WD, AGO Form 7361 (old WD, QMC Form Number 754).

c. Drivers of motor vehicles will have the following in their possession:

(1) Drivers' Trip Ticket and Preventive Maintenance Service Record, WD, AGO Form Number 48 (old WD, QMC Form Number 237).
(2) Army Motor Vehicle Operator's Permit, WD, QC Form Number 7460 (old WD, QMC Form Number 226).
(3) Drivers' Accident Report, Standard Form Number 26.

10. Artillery Tubes: Ordnance units supporting artillery will report when 75% of the life of a tube has been shot away. Appendix II (Chart, "Expected Life of Artillery Tubes" as shown on page 118 of Overlord Plan) will be referred to for the expected life of a tube. The report will be forwarded to the Army Ordnance Officer for action.

11. Signal Repair Teams: Signal repair teams will be attached to designated Ordnance companies for the purpose of repair and salvage of radio sets.

SECTION IV - Evacuation and Salvage

12. Evacuation.

a. The purpose of evacuation is to conserve critical equipment by recovering unserviceable Ordnance materiel for repair or salvage purposes in the shortest possible time. Evacuation is the responsibility of all commanders.

b. Tactical units are responsible for evacuation to designated collecting points, generally in the vicinity of an ordnance maintenance or supply organization. Collecting axis may be designated if the situation warrants, and will coincide with the maintenance axis. The evacuation service of the tactical units will be augmented by organic Ordnance units.

c. Evacuation from tactical unit collecting points to Army collecting points will be accomplished by Army Ordnance units. Army collecting points normally will be located near depot companies.

d. General Policy for Ordnance Units. Prompt evacuation of repairable equipment which is beyond the repair facilities, available spare parts, and available time of the organization, will be to the next rear maintenance unit. (This will include tires, tubes, engines, transmissions, axles, generators, starters, carburetors, fuel pumps, and similar items.) Material being evacuated will have attached a tag showing nature of repairs required, unit initiating the evacuation, and the signature of an ordnance officer.

e. Army Ordnance will promptly evacuate to the Base equipment beyond repair within the policy announciated in sub-paragraph a.

[redacted] Evacuation will be held to the absolute minimum dictated by military necessity.

13. Salvage. Ordnance salvage materiel will be evacuated through ordnance channels to the rear battalions.

a. The rear maintenance battalions will, as far as possible, repair and replace in stock repairable sub-assemblies and other usable parts. If beyond their capacity, materiel will be evacuated to the Base Ordnance Shops if repairable, and if not repairable, to the Base Ordnance Salvage Yards.

b. Competent personnel from the Rear Maintenance battalions will make daily visits to Quartermaster Salvage Yards within the Army area to recover usable or recoverable ordnance materiel which may have been delivered direct to the salvage yards.

c. Salvageable ammunition components will be collected and turned in to appropriate ASP's or depots.

(1) Small Arms, cartridge cases and packing materials (i.e. bandoleers, sling, cartons, metallic links, fabric belts, boxes and their tin liners). These will be packed by types in boxes or bags. Each box or bag must bear a certificate showing that the contents are "CERTIFIED FREE FROM EXPLOSIVES" and signed by an officer of the unit concerned.

(2) Artillery Ammunition: Cartridge cases and packing materiel (i.e., fiber containers, cloverleaf packs, wooden boxes and containers) will be packed by types and, where practicable, in the boxes or cartons from which the material is removed. Fired cartridge cases may be shipped loose if containers are not available. Other components will be sorted, packed and marked "Certified Free from Explosives" and signed by an officer of the unit concerned.

SECTION V - Bomb Disposal

14. Location. It is the responsibility of unit commanders to make reconnaissance, mark the location, establish safety precautions and report all unexploded bombs and "duds" wherever found to the Corps or Army Ordnance Officer by the fastest means available. Reports will specify exact location of the bomb or "dud" in terms of six (6) number coordinates of an easily recognized terrain feature. The location of the bomb or "dud" will be given as a definite distance on a given azimuth from the terrain feature given as a reference. The report will state whether or not the unexploded bomb or "dud" is hampering operations or endangering important facilities and give name of officer and organization originating the report.

15. Disposal. Disposal of unexploded bombs and "duds" (except land and AT mines) is an Ordnance responsibility. Bomb Disposal units (Ordnance) will be employed for this purpose. When necessary, the appropriate Ordnance Officer will request the cooperation and assistance of Engineers. Bomb Disposal units will be attached to Corps until the disposal problem indicates other attachments are desirable.

16. Bomb Cemeteries. All disposal will be carried out in place, except where personnel or property that it is desirable to preserve, will be endangered. Bombs and other unexploded missiles that cannot be disposed of in place will be taken to bomb cemeteries for disposal. Bomb cemeteries will be located in cooperation with G-4. Cemeteries will be located a minimum of 400 yards from main highways, railroads, habitable areas, and important installations.

17. Souvenirs. The inserting of anything of an explosive nature for souvenirs is strictly forbidden.

18. Priorities. Priorities for handling unexploded bombs will be established by the Army Bomb Disposal Officer.

SECTION VI - De-Waterproofing

19. De-Waterproofing. Unit commanders are responsible for de-waterproofing. De-Waterproofing of "Must" items will be accomplished as soon as the vehicle is landed over the beach.

a. "Must Items - De-Waterproofing".

[redacted] exhaust pipe, carburetor air intake, [redacted] unit if removed and refill with

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(3) Unseal distributor.
(4) Unseal battery vents.
(5) Unseal crankcase filler tube cap breather.
(6) Unseal crankcase ventilator outlet pipe.
(7) Unseal oil measuring well and insert oil measuring stick.
(8) Unseal vents on differentials, transfer, and transmission cases.
(9) Crankcase and all housings should be checked for water, if water is found, change lubricant immediately.

b. All waterproofing material such as asbestos grease, flexible tubing, soft steel tubing, etc., will be saved and turned in to the nearest Ordnance company. Ordnance companies will immediately turn in all waterproofing materials to the nearest SOS agency. This material is critical. Ordnance companies will aid in de-waterproofing by furnishing contact parties who will collect the waterproofing material. Every effort must be made to keep waterproofing material clean as dirt seriously reduces its effectiveness for re-use.

SECTION VII - Inspection

20. General. Inspection of Ordnance equipment is a continuous responsibility of all commanders. Equipment determined unserviceable, as a result of inspection, will be turned in for replacement. Upon request, Ordnance battalion commanders will furnish inspection teams to determine the serviceability of questionable equipment only. If a unit is ordered to be refitted by the Commanding General, the Army Ordnance Officer will furnish technical inspection and repair teams. Ordnance battalion commanders will be furnished sample inspection forms for all type equipment. These will be reproduced locally.

21. Command Inspections.

a. The Army Ordnance Inspection Service will command inspections of ordnance material in hands of using arms and services of all components of the Third Army.

b. Periodic inspections of units will be made to determine the following:

(1) Operation.

(a) Use of equipment as intended.

(b) Equipment properly designed for the use intended.

(c) Proper training of personnel in use of equipment.

(2) Maintenance.

(a) Performance of adequate and correct first and second echelon maintenance by using personnel.

(b) Availability and proper utilization of third echelon divisional and Army Ordnance maintenance.

(c) Availability and proper utilization of fourth echelon Ordnance maintenance.

(d) Execution of authorized modifications in accordance with current Field Service Modification Work Orders.

(e) Determination of any unauthorized modifications.

(3) Supply.

(a) Unit replacement and direct exchange principle functioning to the maximum degree (i.e., using troops obtaining serviceable equipment by direct exchange for like unserviceable equipment.)

(b) Availability of spare parts and prompt repair of unserviceable equipment.

(c) Critical shortages of Class II and IV supplies in forward ordnance maintenance echelons will be reported to Army Ordnance Officer.

(d) Responsibility for receipt of "X" Ordnance equipment in unserviceable condition as a result of production methods, faulty inspections, improper crating, rough handling, etc.

(e) Utilization by troops of normal ordnance channels of supply.

(f) Proper functioning of depot supply installations.

(4) Special Inspections.

(a) Make such special inspections as may be directed by the Commanding General or the Ordnance Officer.

c. To implement this service, the inspector will:

(1) Utilize personnel of the Army maintenance units as inspectors.

(2) Maintain records of inspections and a schedule of proposed inspections.

(3) Prepare necessary command letters directing inspections.

d. All reports of inspections will be made in duplicate to the Commanding General through the Army Ordnance Officer, a copy being furnished by the inspector director to the Commanding Officer of the unit inspected.

SECTION VIII - Captured Ordnance Material

22. Captured Enemy Ordnance Material. Corps and Division commanders are responsible that all captured enemy ordnance material, other than ammunition, is turned in to the nearest ordnance maintenance or depot company which will apply temporary preservative measures and will evacuate the material through ordnance channels to ordnance battalions. All commanders will exercise the closest supervision to prevent collecting of souvenirs at the expense of possible future use by ourselves or our allies. Care will be taken that captured material is not damaged in any manner or stripped of any parts or accessories, with special attention being paid to preserving complete all optical instruments, sighting and fire control equipment, etc.

23. Location. When captured enemy material cannot be moved to areas under ordnance supervision, the Army Ordnance Officer will be notified promptly of the location by coordinates and position relative to towns, roads, or other landmarks, together with a brief description of types and quantities of material at that point.

24. Ammunition. Captured enemy ammunition, except toxic chemicals, found in original containers showing no evidence of tampering, artillery projectiles, and powder, will be evacuated through ammunition companies to specified enemy ammunition dumps. All loose small arms ammunition, grenades, mines, etc., except toxic chemicals, will be destroyed in place under supervision of qualified ordnance personnel or engineer personnel. Toxic chemical ammunit on will not be handled by ordnance personnel, but will be turned over to CWS. Personnel not especially trained will not move, disturb, fire, or discharge loose and scattered enemy munitions.

25. Grenades. Under no circumstances will enemy grenades in any condition be moved.

26. Mines, Booby Traps and Sabotage Kits. Enemy mines, booby traps, and sabotage kits, whether loose or in original containers, will not be evacuated to ASP's or Depots, but will be disposed of or destroyed as directed by the appropriate engineer officer.

27. Reports. Designated battal ons will submit weekly reports as of 1800 hours each Saturday, covering the period since last report to reach the Army Ordnance Officer by 0900 each Monday, showing information called for on Form #3. (Reproduced on Page 109 of Overlord Plan.)

28. Technical Intelligence. When new or unusual items of enemy ordnance material are captured, report will be rendered by the most expeditious means to the Army Ordnance Officer who will cause the material to be inspected by Ordnance intelligence personnel.

29. Use. Where considered necessary by the unit commander, combat units may use any enemy materiel and ammunition. Report will be made to the Army Ordnance Officer of all enemy material used by our troops for combat purposes.

SECTION IX - Miscellaneous

30. Destruction of Materiel. The destruction of ordnance equipment is a command decision. Commanders are authorized to destroy ordnance equipment when capture is imminent. Each unit is authorized to requisition the necessary explosives and carry them on hand for this purpose. Priority will be given to the destruction of captured enemy materiel in case recapture is imminent.

SECRET

ANNEX NO. 12

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD U. S. ARMY, APO 403

ORDNANCE BULLETIN) 14 July 1944.
NUMBER 4)

SECTION I

Administration

SECTION II

Operations

SECTION III

Maintenance

8. PROVISIONAL WEAR CHARACTERISTICS OF GUNS: The following data is quoted from Headquarters European Theater of Operations, Ordnance Section:

"1. The table shown below was compiled by Colonel Leslie E. Simon based on extensive Proving Ground records and certain records which he has reviewed in the field. It should be understood that it is not the final word from the Chief of Ordnance, but it will serve as an index for use until more exact data becomes available:

PROVISIONAL WEAR CHARACTERISTICS OF GUNS

Weapon	Velocity Drop/ Units Given	Remarks	Advance of Forcing Cone	Initial M.V.
120mm Gun M1	17.5 f.s./1000 rds.	Direct Fire Wpn	0.1" @ 4000 rds.	2870
**57mm Gun M1	8.5 f.s./1000 rds.	Direct Fire Wpn	11" @ 1000 rds.	2975
75mm Gun M1 1897	7.3 f.s./1000 rds.		0.22" @ 7000 rds.	1950
**75mm Gun M1	7.5 f.s./100 rds.		No information	2600
**3" Gun M5	9.0 f.s./100 rds.		0.1" @ 800 rds.	2800
*90mm Gun M1	9.2 f.s./100 rds.		7.0" @ 2000 rds.	2700
105mm How M2A1	2.0 f.s./1000 rds.	Misc. charges fired	0.07" @ 4000 rds.	1550
*120mm M1 (4.7" Gun)	20 f.s./100 rds.		27" @ 1000 rds.	3125
*155mm Gun M1A1	7.5 f.s./100 rds.	Misc. charges fired	No information	2800
155mm How M1	3.3 f.s./1000 rds.	Misc. charges fired	No information	1650
8" How M1	No appreciable drop in 2000 rounds	Misc. charges fired	0.15" @ 1600 rds.	1950
8" Gun M1	33 f.s./100 rds		36" @ 150 rds.	2850
*240mm How M1	3.3 f.s./100 rds.	Misc. charges fired	No information	2300

* Guns which should be calibrated periodically.
** Direct fire weapons which should be calibrated if, and only if, used as field artillery.

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"2. This table indicates AVERAGE rates of wear. A specific weapon may wear somewhat faster or slower, or may have started out with a velocity slightly higher or lower than the tabulated velocity. Nevertheless, the table is a good guide. The simple practice of merely counting rounds rather than some artificial "equivalent rounds" is recommended.

"3. If a gun is calibrated approximately twice during its life, the table should apply well during the interim, just as one mode one's watch occasionally, while tolerating a slight degree of inaccuracy during the interim.

"4. It should be observed, however, that no amount of calibration is as important as keeping ammunition lots straight, as careful, orderly practices, and as the avoidance of mixing some weights of shell without appropriate correction. The shooting of one, and only one, ammunition lot is of utmost importance in the 105mm How and smaller calibers. In calibers larger than 105mm, the use of the same powder lot is important, but projectile lots may be mixed without incurring unwarranted dispersion."

SECTION IV

Supply

10. PORTABLE ANTI-TANK MINE DETECTOR SETS: All Ordnance units will requisition through Signal Section TUSA, allowance of Mine Detector Set SCR-625 in quantities as indicated below:

T/O	UNIT	ALLOWANCE
9-7	Ord. HH Co	2
9-8	Ord. LM Co (Inf Div)	3
9-17	Ord. AM Co	1
9-37	Ord. HH Co TK	2
9-56	Hq & Hq Det., Ht Mn Armd Div	2
9-57	Co, Maint Bn, Armd Div	2
9-177	Ord Bomb Disposal C	12
9-187	Ord Bmn Co	2
9-187	Ord Bmn Co (Coll)	4
9-500	Sqd HD (Sup) or HD Platoon	1

SECTION V

Ammunition

SECTION VI

General

Marking of Captured New Enemy Equipment: The following information pertaining to marking of new enemy equipment is quoted from letter, Hq. ETO, dated 22 June 1944:

"1. Captured enemy equipment of new type and/or design will be collected by Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Teams for technical examination and research study by the service concerned. All such captured enemy equipment will be uniformly and distinctively marked by such teams as indicated:

"a. Consistent with the size of the equipment, a 3" circle stencilled in Signal yellow will be prominently displayed. In addition, the serial number of the tag required by sub-paragraph g below, will be stencilled in black in the center of the Signal yellow circle.

"b. When the size of the equipment prevents its identification as required by sub-paragraph a above, a signal yellow cardboard tag, 3" in diameter, will be attached to it by the Intelligence team selecting it for evacuation.

"c. In addition to the markings required by sub-paragraphs a and b above, each piece of captured new type enemy equipment will have firmly attached thereto the First US Army Group (FUSAG) tags, or a similar type tag to be furnished by this headquarters. These tags will be completely addressed to expedite shipment to final destination.

"2. No captured enemy equipment, except that marked by the Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Teams, will be marked as indicated above."

ANNEX NO. 13

HEADQUARTERS
70TH ORDNANCE GROUP
APO 605, U. S. ARMY

16 October 1944

Subject: Maintenance Assignments.

To : See Distribution.

1. Effective immediately, the following plan will govern maintenance assignments and procedure. All other directives previously issued by this headquarters which are at variance with instructions contained herein are rescinded.

2. Attached hereto is a map sketch showing area over which 70th Ordnance Group exercises maintenance jurisdiction. This area is subdivided into three zones which for purposes of easier definition, will be referred to as North Zone, Central Zone, and South Zone.

3. Each Zone is bounded as follows:

a. North Zone
Bounded on the North by Army left boundary (LOUPPY-LONGUYON)
Bounded on the East by XX Corps rear boundary (LONGUYON-SPINCOURT-ETAIN-FRESNES)
Bounded on the South by Highway N3 (VERDUN-METZ)
Bounded on the West by Army rear boundary (DUN-VERDUN) (MEUSE River)

b. Central Zone
Bounded on the North by Highway N3 (VERDUN-METZ)
Bounded on the East by Corps rear boundary (FRESNES-HEUDICOURT-SOUR-LES-COTES - FRESNES-FLIREY-TOUL)
Bounded on the South by Highways N56 and N4, (BAR-LE-DUC-LIGNY-VOID-TOUL-NANCY)
Bounded on the West by Army rear boundary (VERDUN-SOUILLY-CHAUDENEY-SUR-AIRE - REVIGNY-ST DIZIER-BAR-LE-DUC-LIGNY)

c. South Zone
Bounded on the North by Highway N4, (LIGNY-VOID-TOUL-NANCY)
Bounded on the East by XII Corps rear boundary (TOUL-DOMPAIRE-CONFLANS)
Bounded on the South by Army right boundary (NEUFCHATEAU-CONFLANS)
Bounded on the West by Army rear boundary (BAR-LE-DUC - GONDRECOURT-AUBE-NEUFCHATEAU)

4. The following battalions are assigned zones as follows:
North Zone - 89th Ordnance Battalion
Central Zone - 79th Ordnance Battalion
South Zone - 385th Ordnance Battalion

5. Upon receipt of this correspondence, each battalion assigned to zones per paragraph 4, above, will further subdivide the zone to which it has been assigned into sub-zones, assigning each maintenance company within the battalion to a sub-zone. A report of sub-zone divisions and assignments, accompanied by overlay showing boundaries of sub-zones will be forwarded to this headquarters without delay.

6. Upon assignment of a company to a sub-zone, the company will canvass the sub-zone, contacting all using units located therein, and informing them of the location of the maintenance company. Using units thus contacted will be "picked up" by the maintenance company for permanent maintenance assignment.

7. A list of using units within the sub-zone will be submitted by the company to the battalion, where the list will be consolidated and forwarded to this headquarters.

8. Using units which are stationed along zone boundaries (paragraph 3, above) and which might conceivably be considered to be in either of two zones, will be serviced by the nearest or most easily accessible company.

9. It is understood that the maintenance procedure outlined in this letter will, on occasion, cause questions to arise concerning the function of the control points. In this regard, organizations are reminded that the original purpose of the control point was to clear and distribute maintenance accumulated through channels from the front. It is felt that "using unit" maintenance as described in this letter will not conflict with control point maintenance to any appreciable extent. In order that control points will know at all times the capacity of shops, constant liaison between maintenance companies and control point must be maintained.

10. Companies assigned to sub-zones will be responsible for the patrol of roads within the sub-zone.



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ANNEX NO. 14

HEADQUARTERS THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Ordnance Officer
APO 403

ORDNANCE BULLETIN)
) 6 November 1944.
NUMBER 9)

SECTION I

Administration

SECTION II

Operations

SECTION III

Maintenance

9. The following information from Ordnance Weekly Letter No. 39, Headquarters Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, Office of the Chief Ordnance Officer, is published for your information:

"1. The suggestion of the Ordnance Officer, VIII Corps, for a heavier shield for anti-tank guns to prevent penetration by sniper bullets was referred to the Chief of Ordnance, who has replied as follows: 'Over the past year a carefully coordinated ballistic program has been fired at Aberdeen Proving Ground with the result that 5/8" armor has been indicated for such front line applications. The 3" anti-tank gun M5 shield mounted bracket (3" M1 with the new shield), was designed to take heavier armor. The structural design of the shield on this gun is such as to give as complete shielding as possible with maximum efficiency. Except under rare conditions, this oblique shield of 5/8" armor will defeat small arms fire up through .50 caliber. A similar obliquity shield has been developed for the 37mm M4A1 anti-tank gun.' It is not known how soon these modified carriages will be available in this theater.

"12. It has been determined experimentally by this office that the barrel of the M1919A4 machine gun can be used very successfully in the M1919A6 machine gun.

"13. A Standard Operating Procedure will be issued by the Chief Engineer covering the procurement of industrial gases in France, extracts from which are quoted below:

'The French authorities will assume all costs in connection with any gases obtained.

'Requisitions in the form of SPA ETO Form 105, or demand SPA ETO Form 101, or any other form of requisition which in effect will comply with Standard Operating Procedure No. 10F, "Field Procurement by U. S. Forces in France", will be presented to the manufacturer.

'Units within the Base Sections and Advance Sections should be instructed to place all requisitions for gases through the Base or Advance Section Engineer Supply Officer, who will approve them and direct the unit to whichever industrial gas plant (or Engineer Depot) is selected by him to supply the gas.

'The Base and Advance Section will be responsible for assisting the gas producers insofar as emergency supplies of raw material, transportation, and power concerned, in order to produce gases for U. S. Army use'."

SECTION IV

Supply

SECTION V

Ammunition

SPECIAL

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PROVOST MARSHAL

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL
APO 403

SUBJECT: After-Action Report.

TO : Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, APO 403, U.S. Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Provost Marshal Section, Third U.S. Army Headquarters, beginning with the Pre-operational Period in the United Kingdom and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapters.

2. The multiplicity of responsibilities of the Army Provost Marshal, together with the large number of troops, required the organization and operation of a large Provost Marshal Section. Active operations resulted in the Provost Marshal being responsible for the following:

a. Criminal Investigation.
b. Maintenance of Law and Order including:
(1) Army General Prisoner Stockade.
(2) Army and Battalion Zone AWOL Stockades.
(3) Army Summary Courts.
c. Traffic Control.
d. Prisoners of War.
e. Overrun Allied Prisoners of War.
f. German Interment Camps.
g. Aid to Civil Affairs in handling Refugees.
h. Security of all Lines of Communication in the Army area.
i. Command Post Defense, including Cordon Defense.
j. Maintenance of an Emergency Striking Force in close proximity to Command Post.

3. The Army Commander being kept currently posted of the problems of the Army Provost Marshal and being cognizant of the importance of the various functions made available sufficient troops at all times to make it possible for the Army Provost Marshal to effectively accomplish his mission.

PHILIP C. CLAYTON
Colonel, Cavalry
Provost Marshal

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PROVOST MARSHAL SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



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CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

SECTION I - GENERAL

Plans for the organization of the Provost Marshal Section were formulated and it was announced that the 511th Military Police Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment would function as the Staff of the Provost Marshal Section. The companies of the 511th Military Police Battalion were assigned to Corps as follows:

Company "A" - VIII Corps
Company "B" - XX Corps
Company "C" - XIII Corps

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 511th Military Police Battalion arrived 11 April at Third U. S. Army and reported for duty to the Provost Marshal. It was contemplated that the Provost Marshal Section be organized as follows:

Provost Marshal Section:
a. Provost Marshal
b. Executive Officer
c. Adjutant
d. Chief Clerk

Sub-Sections:
a. Maintenance of Law and Order
b. Traffic
c. Prisoner of War and Refugee
d. Criminal Investigation

The Provost Marshal Offices were established with the Forward Echelon at Camp PEOVER and the Rear Echelon at Camp TOFT.

Planning for the distribution of the Military Police Units assigned to Third U. S. Army resulted in the following:

511th Military Police Battalion - Provost Marshal Section, VIII, XX and XIII Corps.
503rd Military Police Battalion - Third U. S. Army.
512th Military Police Battalion - Third U. S. Army.
217th Military Police Company (Corps) - Assigned XV Corps.

Operational Plans were formulated which warranted a request for the following allotments of Military Police Units to Third U. S. Army:

6 Military Police Battalions
10 Escort Guard Companies
1 Processing Company
1 Criminal Investigating Detachment.

Visits were made by several members of the Provost Marshal Section to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, Headquarters, First U. S. Army Group, Headquarters, First U. S. Army and other Headquarters for the purpose of conferring and discussing Provost Marshal affairs and functions.

The following strength and organization of the Provost Marshal Section, Third U. S. Army was authorized by Staff Memorandum Number 39, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 6 May 1944:

18 Officers
1 Warrant Officer
34 Enlisted Men

ORGANIZATION:

Provost Marshal Headquarters
Traffic Sub-Section
Maintenance of Law and Order Sub-Section
Prisoner of War and Refugee Sub-Section
Investigation Sub-Section

The Provost Marshal Plan, Annex Number 19 to Third U. S. Army Outline Plan, was prepared, approved by the Army Commander, and published. Operational Memorandums were published to implement Provost Marshal Plan Annex Number 19 and consisted of the following:

Circular Number 10, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, Traffic Regulation and Control for Continental Operation, dated 4 May 1944. (See Annex 1).

Operations Memorandum Number 10, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, Traffic Control Signs, dated 3 June 1944. (See Annex 2).

Prisoners of War.

Straggler.

Maintenance of Law and Order.

At this time a study of training exercises in Traffic Control showed clearly the drastic need for additional equipment, especially motorcycles, 1/4 ton trucks, radios, sirens, watches, compasses, individual stoves for dispersed traffic personnel, and additional traffic control equipment. To alleviate this situation action was taken in the form of a request to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, through command channels to secure all items of additional equipment necessary for Military Police Units. The latter was approved by all sections and the Army Commander, Third U. S. Army, and forwarded to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army for consideration, where on 17 June it was approved. (See Annex 3).

An Executive Officer was assigned.

It was planned that the VIII Corps would take part with the First U. S. Army in the invasion of the Continent and a liaison officer from 503rd Military Police Battalion was detailed between this section and VIII Corps.

The Provost Marshal Section was formally announced as a Special Staff Section by General Orders Number 3C, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 8 June. (See Annex 4). The most important advantage of this General Order was direct communication between Provost Marshals of Corps and Divisions and the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army, was authorized on all Provost Marshal and Military Police matters.

A Provost Marshal Planning Conference was held on 13 June with representatives from all Corps, Divisions, Military Police Battalions and Military Police Companies of the Third U. S. Army present. (See Annex 5). The Army Commander addressed the meeting, discussing the importance of traffic control, handling of prisoners of war, appearance of Military Police, aggressiveness on the part of Military Police, and that they should be distinctly marked. He gave his assurance that Military Police in the execution of their duties would be given his full support.

Staff Memorandum Number 47, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 17 June, announced that the Headquarters of the Third U. S. Army would be divided into three groups:

Group "X" - Forward Operational Echelon
Group "Y" - Rear Operational Echelon
Group "Z" - Group remaining after departure of "X" and "Y" Echelons for the Continent.

"X" Echelon of Third U. S. Army Headquarters, with vehicles numbering over 600, departed from TOFT and PEOVER Camps for BRADBURE, England, on 19 June 1944. The entire movement consisted of four serials proceeding on two different routes controlled by the Provost Marshal. The first serial left at 0500, followed hourly by the other serials. (See Annex 6). "Y" Echelon consisting of two (2) officers and six (6) enlisted men remained at Camp TOFT to carry on such duties as might be required. Upon arrival at SALISBURY on the way to BRADBURE an advance detachment from the 503rd Military Police Battalion escorted the various sections to their areas. Headquarters for the Provost Marshal Section was at Whitebury House, WHITSBURY, England.

One officer and two enlisted men departed from WHITSBURY on 4 July to SOUTHAMPTON for movement to the Continent. Company A, 503rd Military Police Battalion also departed for movement to the Continent.

At 0700 July 5, Third U. S. Army Headquarters moved to SOUTHAMPTON by motor convoy for embarkation to the Continent.

This Headquarters departed from SOUTHAMPTON, England, at 0800 July 6, and arrived at UTAH BEACH, France, by LST, at 2300 of the same day.

Departed at 0400 July 7, for de-waterproofing area. Marched from transit area 22 miles and arrived at BLANDAMOUR (T1798) at 1300 hours of the same day. This section located its Headquarters on Road IC22 northeast of BLANDAMOUR (T1798).

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

The Traffic Sub-Section was organized on 15 April 1944 with the Headquarters at Rear Echelon at Camp TOFT.

The pamphlet "Maintenance and Operation of Motor Vehicles," Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, dated 24 January, 1944, with changes, was the publication upon which all rules and regulations were eventually based.

Circular Number 10, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 4 May was published by this Headquarters for the operation of Motor Vehicles on the Continent.

British traffic control equipment was designated as the traffic control equipment to be used by all Allied Forces in the European Theater of Operations, and consisted of Franco plates and discs, directional. Franco plates, metal or wooden material, 15 inches by 17 inches or 17 inches by 30 inches, with white letters on black background would be used for unit, installation or route signs. Discs, directional would be used as follows:

a. Directional discs, white with black arrow pointed toward 12 o'clock indicating main routes forward to the front.

b. Directional discs, white with black arrow and bar perpendicular to the base of the shaft indicating lateral routes.

c. Directional discs, white with black arrow pointed toward six o'clock indicating main down routes to the rear areas.

d. Directional discs, red with white arrows indicating detours from main or lateral routes.

e. Directional discs or equivalent, white with red arrow indicating local routes.

Other traffic control equipment consisted of traffic lamps, reflectorized batons, lamps-flasher type, and sleeves, traffic.

The extreme need for training in British traffic control signs and equipment was evident, and such training was initiated in the 503rd and 511th Military Police Battalions. Observations were made of the progress of training and exercises were to be repeated on numerous occasions continually stressing signs, main road and lateral road; sign postings, traffic control points, policemen, detours, and the making and repairing of all types of signs.

Public address systems were procured from the Signal Section and installed on traffic control vehicles. This equipment proved invaluable in controlling both convoys and individual vehicles on the highways.

The 512th Military Police Battalion was directed to follow a special training program with the primary object of preparing the unit for traffic control duties on the Continent. Emphasis in training was placed on physical condition, traffic control, and special techniques which would be required on the Continent. This program was amplified by the assignment of companies to the Provost Marshal of XXVII District at LIVERPOOL, for duty at the LIVERPOOL Docks and City proper.

On 1 May orders were received from Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, attaching the Battalion to Southern Base Section for duty. The unit was assigned sectors in Devon and Cornwall, with the battalion headquarters stationed at TRURO, Cornwall. For a period of eight weeks the organization worked day and night controlling traffic for troops moving into the marshalling areas, thence to points of embarkation, prior to movement to the Continent.

The experience in escort and traffic control better enabled the battalion to execute its primary mission (traffic control) on the Continent.

The 512th Military Police Battalion was relieved from assignment with Southern Base Section on 17 June. A detail of one officer and twenty-one enlisted men of the 511th Military Police Battalion was relieved from duty in LONDON and reported to Camp TOFT for duty after the 503rd Military Police Battalion had departed for BRAMCORE.

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

Inasmuch as the material available concerning Prisoners of War was negligible, excellent use was made of Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare, and reports from the African, Sicilian and Italian

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campaigns.

Plans were made for the evacuation and processing of Prisoners of War and incorporated into the Provost Marshal Plan, Annex Number 19, dated 11 May.

Visits were made by Chief of Prisoner of War Sub-Section to conferences conducted by other Headquarters pertaining to Prisoners of War and valuable information was gained therefrom.

Requisitions for Prisoner of War tags and Prisoner of War effects bags were made to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army. It was contemplated that this Army would receive 30,000 prisoners of war for the first month of actual operations.

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

The Maintenance of Law and Order Sub-Section was established and preparations were made for the employment of Military Police for the maintenance of law and order on the Continent.

When this Headquarters was stationed at KNUTSFORD, the personnel of the 503rd Military Police Battalion worked in conjunction with the Service of Supply Military Police and Civil Police in the towns of KNUTSFORD, CREWE, MACCLESFIELD, MANCHESTER and ALTRINCHAM.

One company of the 503rd Military Police Battalion was utilized as the Command Post Guard. A restricted area was established in the forward Echelon at Camp PECKER, and divided into Restricted Area North and Restricted Area South. Five types of passes were issued, any one of which would admit the proper holder to the Restricted Areas. These were:

a. Third U. S. Army "Complete" Knowledge Pass (a blue letter "C" superimposed on a white card).

b. Third U. S. Army "Limited" Knowledge Pass (a red letter "L" superimposed on a blue card).

c. Third U. S. Army permanent Restricted Area Pass (a pink card).

d. Third U. S. Army temporary Restricted Area Pass (a buff card following the pattern of (c) above).

e. A Third U. S. Army visitor's Classification Pass (a green card on which is superimposed the letter "C" in blue or "L" in red).

All passes were issued and controlled by the Provost Marshal under regulations prescribed by him.

SECTION V - INVESTIGATION SUB-SECTION

The Investigation Sub-Section was established and the strength of this section consisted of one officer and six enlisted men. The primary duty of this section was the investigation of crimes reported.

The types of crimes investigated while stationed in England consisted of rape, attempted rape, theft, and motor vehicle accidents. Request was made to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, for one Criminal Investigation Section which was vitally needed in order to operate successfully on the Continent.

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

SECTION I - GENERAL

Preparation and planning were continuous. A plan for defense of Third U. S. Army Headquarters was inaugurated upon arrival in France.

"T" Echelon departed Camp TOFT by motor 0730 July 8. Arrived NINE YEWS, (BRANCHE Area) 1700 July 8. It departed NINE YEWS by motor 1900 July 15, for SOUTHAMPTON, embarked on a Liberty ship for the Continent and arrived on UTAH BEACH 0500 July 17. It disembarked 0900 July 18 and moved by motor to join "F" Echelon in vicinity of BLANDAMOUR, (T1799) France.

The Forward Echelon moved from BLANDAMOUR (T1799), France via ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (T1995), LA HAYE DU PUITS (T1484), LESSAY (T1674) to BEAUCHAMPS (T2732) on 21 July.

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

On 6 July the Traffic Sub-Section moved from the beach through the transit area thence to BLANDAMOUR (T1799). The 512th Military Police Battalion had not yet arrived from the United Kingdom and the 503rd Military Police Battalion was detailed for traffic control.

All traffic control at the time, in France, was under the First U.S. Army. Units at BLANDAMOUR (T1799) the Corps and Division units of Third U.S. Army arriving from the United Kingdom were escorted from points of debarkation at the UTAH and OMAHA BEACHES to Third U.S. Army Concentration Areas. The plan for circulation and movement of traffic was coordinated through Traffic Control Headquarters, First U.S. Army and the G-3 Section, Third U.S. Army.

An officer from the Traffic Sub-Section, working in cooperation with representatives of the G-3 and G-4 Sections, Third U.S. Army, was assigned to coordinate the movement of all Third U.S. Army units from the transit areas at the Beaches to their concentration areas on the Normandy Coast Peninsula. Teams of Military Police escorts were assigned to this work from the 503rd Military Police Battalion.

The process of receiving and escorting Third U.S. Army units to their respective concentration areas was continued until the Army became operational.

Approximately 800 units were escorted from the Beaches in the above manner.

The 512th Military Police Battalion arrived in France from the United Kingdom on 18 July. This battalion relieved the 503rd Military Police Battalion in traffic control.

Company "C" of the 503rd Military Police Battalion was attached to the First U.S. Army for a special mission in traffic control, on 20 July, for the attack at ST. LO (T4963)

The supply of British traffic control equipment was low. It was anticipated that when the Third U.S. Army became operational a large supply of this equipment would be necessary, and requests were made to European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army to supply it.

Because of the density of traffic moving over all roads in the COTENTIN Peninsula, little attempt was made to enforce 60-yards interval between vehicles. This resulted in traffic conflicts in villages, at crossroads and road junctions. Traffic control personnel performed their duties in an excellent manner, working long hours to keep the traffic moving despite the density of traffic, and the condition of roads.

The convoys coming from the Beaches to the Third U.S. Army Concentration Areas were passing through the First U.S. Army and Communications Zones Areas which necessitated coordination. The cooperation received was excellent.

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

Upon arrival in France, efforts were made to secure the services of Military Police Escort Guard companies. None were available in the Theater, and it was recommended that a battalion unit of approximately 750 personnel be utilized for the mission of escorting, guarding, and processing prisoners of war. As a temporary measure Field Artillery Battalions with low priority were to be used. The 693rd Field Artillery Battalion was attached to the Provost Marshal Section for escort guard work. Training was conducted in all phases of prisoner of war work. The 693rd Field Artillery Battalion was assigned to its primary duty before the Army became operational, and the 344th Field Artillery Battalion replaced it in prisoner of war work. This new battalion was oriented and given instructions in all phases of prisoner of war duties.

Visits were made to the Advance Section Communications Zone and First U.S. Army prisoner of war Enclosures by the personnel of the Prisoner of War Sub-Section. Valuable information concerning the operation of a prisoner of war enclosure was gained from these visits. Personnel of this Sub-Section were also allowed to actually work at one of these enclosures, thereby gaining experience in this type of work.

One of the main planning functions accomplished by the Prisoner of War Sub-Section was the publication of Circular 37 on Prisoners of War, dated 26 July. (See Annex 7).

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

Upon arrival on the Continent there were no available troops for defense of the Army Command Post other than the Headquarters Sections and the 503rd Military Police Battalion. During the first week each section was instructed to set up its own interior guard including a perimeter defense where exposed boundaries existed. Data regarding personnel and weapons of each section was compiled. Each section was instructed to appoint defense officers, one of whom would be available at all times. A warning system of a long siren blast was provided in event of enemy activity, and each section was instructed to send a liaison officer and two runners to the Provost Marshal Section in the event that an alarm was sounded. The Provost Marshal was designated Defense Commander. One platoon of the 503rd Military Police Battalion was designated as an "alert" platoon, armed and completely mobile, to be on call twenty-four hours a day. In addition to the alert platoon, the 503rd Military Police Battalion furnished two roving patrols encircling the Army Command Post, and traffic posts were doubled during the hours of darkness.

The defense of the Army Command Post was taken over by the 6th Cavalry Group and the 546th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, and their plans for defense were coordinated through the Provost Marshal Section.

All towns in France were initially placed off limits until cleared of mines by engineers, inspected by the surgeon for sanitation, and the civil affairs system in order. Many individual French houses were found to be selling liquor to soldiers and were in effect barrooms. These establishments were also placed off limits, enforcement being made by posting signs, and by having roving patrols circulating throughout the area.

Because the promiscuous firing of weapons was prevalent, notice was published in Circular No. 34, Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, dated 19 July, stating that "All personnel of all units assigned or attached to Third U.S. Army were forbidden to fire weapons except when actually engaged with the enemy, or on an authorized range, or in the performance of guard duty. Any officer or enlisted man who violated these instructions would be tried by Courts Martial."

Patrols were maintained in all towns surrounding the Command Post for the enforcement of all rules and regulations.

SECTION V - INVESTIGATION SUB-SECTION

During the month of July in France, there were relatively few crimes committed in the Third U.S. Army Area.

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

When the Third U.S. Army became operational, the following units were moved over the roadnets of the Army Area:

90th Infantry Division
5th Armored Division
83rd Infantry Division
200 Army Troop Units and Service Units.

The Forward Echelon Third U.S. Army Headquarters was further divided into Groups "A" and "B". Forward "B" departed BEAUCHAMPS (T2732) at 0700 hours 8 August, and arrived vicinity of POILLEY (Y3592) 0840 hours.

Forward "B" Echelon, Headquarters Third U.S. Army departed POILLEY (Y3592) 1130 hours 13 August, arrived vicinity of ST QUEN DES TOUTS (Y5054) 1300 hours. Forward "A" Echelon, Headquarters Third U.S. Army departed POILLEY (Y3592) 1300 hours, arrived vicinity ST QUEN DES TOUTS (Y5854) 1500 hours.

Forward "B" Echelon, Headquarters Third U.S. Army moved by infiltration from ST QUEN DES TOUTS (Y5854) on 14 August, departed 1115 hours and arrived at LA BAZOGE (X3452) 1500 hours.

Forward "A" Advance arrived LA BAZOGE (X3452) 0900 hours on 15 August.

Rear Echelon arrived at ST. SABINE (X3358) 1300 hours on 18 August.

The 13th Military Police Criminal Investigation Section reported for duty. The section consisted of one officer and ten enlisted men. The section was equipped with two 1/4-ton vehicles and two 1/4-ton trailers. The section was assigned to duty in the Rear Echelon with the Investigation Sub-Section.

Forward "A" departed LA BAZOGE (X3452) on 20 August, arrived [illegible] 1300 hours 20 August.

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arrived vicinity of BROU (W1278) at 1600 hours.

Forward "B" departed BROU (W1278) 0800 hours on 25 August, arrived vicinity of COURCY (W9255) PITHIVIERS on GC 109 (W9367) at 1130 hours.

Forward "A" departed BROU (W1278) 1315 hours on 25 August, arrived vicinity of COURCY (W9255) PITHIVIERS (W9367) on GC 109 at 1645 hours.

Rear Echelon, Third U. S. Army, arrived vicinity of COURCY (W9255) PITHIVIERS (W9367) on GC 109, on 27 August.

Forward "B", Third U. S. Army, departed COURCY (W9255) 0830 hours on 30 August, arrived vicinity of COURGENAY (A8477) 1230 hours.

Forward "A", Third U. S. Army, departed COURCY (W9255) 1300 hours on 30 August, arrived vicinity of COURGENAY (A8477) 1630 hours.

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

Main Supply Routes were established on 1 August as follows:

(1) BAICQUEBEC (G1304) to LESSAY (T1876) N800, LESSAY (T1876) to COUTANCES (T2357) GC2, COUTANCES (T2357) to GRANVILLE (T1134) to AVRANCHES (T2817) N173.

(2) Army Rear Boundary to PERIERS (T2772) GC24, PERIERS (T2772) to COUTANCES (T2357) N171, COUTANCES (T2357) to AVRANCHES (T2817) GC7.

Traffic Headquarters operating under Transportation Section, G-4 established Traffic Control Posts as follows:

(1) ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (T1995)
(2) PONT L'ABBE (T2693)
(3) LA HAYE DU PUITS (T1884)
(4) PERIERS (T2772)
(5) COUTANCES (T2357)

Traffic Control, the primary function of the Provost Marshal Section, reached its peak load when Third U.S. Army became operational on 1 August and continued to be a most aggravated problem through 7 August. The 83rd Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division and the 5th Armored Division were moved through the Army Area to meet new tactical dispositions. The traffic density was greatest initially in the COUTANCES (T2357) - AVRANCHES (T2817) areas because of road and bridge bottlenecks. Engineer crews working day and night completed by-passes and constructed bridges which with unremitting Military Police traffic control finally placed the problem in hand. It is doubtful if in the history of our Armies to date a greater traffic problem ever existed than that confronting the Third U.S. Army from LESSAY (T1876) through COUTANCES (T2357) to AVRANCHES (T2817) from 1 August to 7 August.

In the city of GRANVILLE (T1134) the streets had been blocked with concrete blocks at street intersections. This road-block necessitated the use of very crooked and narrow connecting streets to go south and east from the city. A by-pass was placed in effect which connected the north-south highway from the north of the city with highway N124 to the east and N173 to the south. All traffic was diverted over this highway and relieved the congestion in GRANVILLE (T1134).

At AVRANCHES (T2817), which had been heavily bombed and at which place great destruction occurred, highways N173, N811, GC 9 and N176 converged from the north. There was no road available to by-pass the city. This caused a high traffic density through the town on the only highway to the south was N176 to PONTAUBAULT (T2810). Many traffic conflicts occurred in this city, and for days a steady stream of traffic moved through to the south carrying troops, equipment and supplies.

A bridge at PONTS ST. SENIER, (T2918) northeast of AVRANCHES (T2817), had been blown by the enemy and replaced with a timber bridge by the engineers. This bridge was at the junction of highways GC7 and N176 and east-west highway N811. One member of the 512th Military Police Battalion on traffic control duty at the bridge was killed by the bombing at this point, and some vehicles were disabled by bombing in AVRANCHES (T2817) during this period.

Company "C" 503rd Military Police Battalion, was relieved from special duty with the First U.S. Army and reverted to Battalion control. This company was designated as the traffic control company of the Battalion.

The following Traffic Regulating Posts were established on 4 August:

(1) COUTANCES (T2357)
(2) BREHAL (T1841)
(3) GAVRAY (1 officer) (T3041)
(4) GRANVILLE (1 officer) (T1134)
(5) RJ N24 and GC27, vicinity of BEAUCHAMPS (T2732)
(6) BARLEY (1 officer) (T4380)
(7) PONTS ST. SENIER (RJ C227 and N811) (T2918)
(8) AVRANCHES (2 TRP's with 1 officer) (T2817)
(9) RJ GC68 to GC44, vicinity of TOURVILLE (T1656)

All traffic regulating posts north of GC44 - COUTANCES (T2357) - N172 were closed as of 041200 August.

Army Rear Boundary was established on 5 August as follows:

Road GC44 PASSUS (T1256) COUTANCES (T2357) road N172 from COUTANCES (T2357) to Army Boundaries.

The following units of the IX Corps were moved over the Army roadnet to the vicinity of VITRE (T3653) on 8 August:

35th Infantry Division
5th Infantry Division
2nd French Armored Division

The 80th Infantry Division also moved to its new area at 0600.

Traffic control equipment shortage became critical. France plates, discs - directional and other traffic equipment had not arrived from the United Kingdom.

In accordance with TWX, Headquarters, Twelfth U.S. Army Group Rear Boundary of Third U.S. Army was established as follows: (All to Communications Zone).

Highway N776 LE MONT ST. MICHEL (T1611) - PONTORSON (T1602); Highway N176 PONTORSON (T1602) - PONTAUBAULT (T2810); Highway N807 PONTAUBAULT (T2810) - ST. HILAIRE DU HARCOUET (T4703) - Road N179 ST. HILAIRE DU HARCOUET (T4703) to First U. S. Army Boundary.

The front was extending to the south, the southeast and to the west towards the BREST PENINSULA. This required extension of supply routes and traffic control personnel.

The city of LAVAL (Y6846) presented a complicated traffic problem. The enemy had blown out the bridges across the MAYENNE River in this city. A Class 40 bridge was placed, by the engineers, at the south edge of the city. The approach to this bridge from the west was very crooked and tank retrievers could not make the turn onto the bridge. A Class 70 bridge was constructed by engineers the following day and relieved the situation.

Great difficulty was encountered in that many vehicles became lost. The Military Police assisted many of the drivers of these vehicles in locating their units.

One thousand road signs, size 15 inches by 17 inches, painted black were ordered from the Engineer Section, in lieu of France plates, to be delivered in lots of three hundred commencing 20 August.

A traffic circulation plan for the city of FOUGERES (Y3978) was approved and provided for two separate north-south routes through the city with connecting routes for east-west traffic.

One bridge was left intact in the city of LE MANS (Z4037), and highways from the west, north and east converged at this city, causing traffic conflicts. To offset this condition a by-pass was put into effect for traffic going south and east of LE MANS (Z4037) by routing this traffic from N157 to GC37 to CHEVILLE (Z0831), thence east and south over roads to re-enter N157 via GC2 at ST. CALAIS (Y7849). This by-pass afforded some relief, but the city of LE MANS (Z4037) remained a traffic problem while in the Army Area, and required the constant attention of all traffic and Military Police personnel.

The 80th Infantry Division started movement on 15 August from the vicinity of JUBLAINS (Y8965) to an area in the vicinity of MONTMIRAIL (V8466). Route was assigned as follows: IP to N23, east of JC19 - JL4, northeast on N805 to RJ N155 - southeast on N155 to GC41, GL41 to destination. All sensitive points along this route were posted with Army or Corps Military Police for control of the movement in their respective areas.

Signs "One Lane Traffic, No Passing, by order of the Army Commander," were placed at critical points, entrances to towns and narrow points on the highways.

Bridges at CHATEAUDUN (W2361) and ST. DENIS (W2062) were blown on 20 August. The bridge at ST. DENIS (W2062) was replaced by engineers with a four ton timber bridge. At CHATEAUDUN (W2361) a ford was available and used until a Class 40 two way bridge was constructed.

The temporary Army boundary was established as follows on 21 August:

LE MANS (Z4037), to Third U. S. Army, open to First U. S. Army traffic. BONNETABLE (V5778), to First U. S. Army, NOGENT LE ROTROU (V6892), to First U. S. Army, open to Third U. S. Army traffic. COURVILLE SUR EURE (R2C03), to First U. S. Army, DREUX (R3235) road on west bank of EURE River to its junction with the SEINE River, all inclusive to Third U. S. Army. Third U. S. Army to have running rights on the NOGENT LE ROTROU (V6892) - DREUX (R3235) road until Third U. S. Army dumps in the vicinity were cleared.

On 23 August the 80th Infantry Division moved over road net to new assembly area without traffic conflicts.

Company "C", 503rd Military Police Battalion, took over traffic control in CHARTRES (R3602) from IX Corps Military Police, on 23 August. That afternoon General DeGaulle of the French Army was given a welcome in CHARTRES (R3602). The traffic problem created by the French civilians crowding the streets to welcome him was tremendous. All sorts of parades, vehicles and individuals interfered with the free flow of military vehicles through the city streets.

The Main Supply Routes were established on 23 August as follows:

(1) N23 LE MANS (Z4037) to NOGENT LE ROTROU (V6892), N822 to COMPERES (W0892), GC15 to CHAMPFORD (WC7GC), N23 to COURVILLE SUR EURE (R2C04), GC23 to THIMERAY (R2217), GC36 to LE PEAGE (R3618), N154 to DREUX (R3236), N12 to HOUDAN (R5060).

(2) N23 LE MANS (Z4037) to CONNERE (V6346), N827 to BROU (W1278), GC27 to BONNEVAL (W2873), GC17 to VOVES (W4683) to OUARVILLE (W5890) to ETAMPES (W8697).

(3) N157 LE MANS (Z4037) to ST. CALAIS (Y7849) to RJ N826 to MUREY (W1544) to OUZOUER (W3743) to ORMES (W5845), N155 to ORLEANS (F6623).

Improvement in the standardization of signing was made as well as in road discipline and traffic control. The continuous enforcement by all Military Police in stressing the following restrictions helped in no small way to improve the situation:

(1) Interval between vehicles on the highways, including halts - 60 yards.
(2) Double banking of convoys prohibited.
(3) One convoy would not overtake or pass another without authority from a Traffic Regulating Post or the Military Police.

Traffic Regulating Posts were established on 23 August as follows:

(1) BIELLE AIRPORT
(2) CHATEAUDUN (W2361)
(3) CHARTRES (R3602)
(4) DREUX (R3235)
(5) BROU (W1278)
(6) SANCHVILLE (W4374)
(7) ORLEANS (F6623)
(8) ARTENAY (W5459)
(9) ETAMPES (W8697)

On 24 August the bridge at CLOYES (W1555), on N10 was out, and traffic was diverted between CHATEAUDUN (W2361) and N826. It was replaced by a Class 40 Bailey bridge.

The Provost Marshal, Twelfth U. S. Army Group, visited this section on 24 August and discussed traffic problems and traffic control equipment.

The 90th Infantry Division was moved on 26 August from vicinity of LA FERTE BERNARD (V7479) via GC49, N827 to PITHIVIERS (W9367) where it was delivered to IX Corps.

The 80th Infantry Division was moved on 26 August via GC37, GC23, GC80, N823, N817, GC10, N155 to ORLEANS (F6623).

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Main Supply Routes were established on 27 August as follows:

(1) East: Two way VIBRAYE (V7964) to OIGNY (V9363); one way IC 23 to DROUE (W0460), IC87 to COURTALAIN (W0964), HS27 to PITHIVIERS (W9367), OC26 to PUISEAUX (X0969), OC87 to NEMOURS (X2675); two way H375 to MONTEREAU (X4686).

(2) West: Two way MONTEREAU (X4688) H375 to NEMOURS (X2675) one way OC16 NEMOURS (X2675) to LA CHAPELLE (X1881), H51 to MALESHERBES (X0850), OC24 to BERMAISES (W9081), OC18 to MERVILLE (W8184), OC145 to ANGERVILLE (W7564), HS39 to OUARVILLE (W5890), OC17 to CHATILLON (W1367), IC111 to COURTALAIN (W0964), HS27 to OIGNY (V9363) to VIBRAYE (V7965).

(3) HS26 ST. CALAIS (V7849) to ORMES (W5845), H155 to ORLEANS (P6623), H158 to CHATEAUNEUF (P9118), H60 to SENS (X6965), all two way.

Traffic Regulating Posts were established as follows on 27 August:

(1) CHATEAUDUN (W2361)
(2) SAINVILLE (W3774)
(3) ORLEANS (P6623)
(4) ARTENAY (W6459)
(5) PITHIVIERS (W9367)
(6) ORLEANS (P6623) - BRICY AIRPORT (P6623)
(7) NEMOURS (X2675)
(8) MONTARGIS (X3845)

Rear boundaries were established as follows on 27 August:

(1) Corps:

(a) XII Corps: PITHIVIERS (W9367) along H721 to COURCY (W8956), thence along OC109 to CHILLEURS (W8357), thence along OC5 to NEUVILLE (W7557), to ARTENAY (W6459), to SOUGY (W5757) to PATAY (W5057), thence along HS35 to ST. PERAVY LA COLOMBE (W5054), thence along OC3 to ST. SIGISMOND (W4849), to GERMIGNY (W4907), to ROZIERES (W5045), to south lateral boundary, all inclusive to Corps.

(b) XX Corps: ETAMPES (W8896) along H721 to PITHIVIERS (W9367), all inclusive to Corps.

On 26 August the 106th Cavalry Group was moved through the Army Area.

"Vehicle Corrals" were established and announcement was made in Circular 48, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 29 August, (See Annex Number 8) that the following violations would result in detention in these corrals:

Speeding, double banking, light violations, reckless driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, failure to maintain the prescribed 60 yard distance between vehicles when moving or at a halt, disobedience of Military Police traffic directions, and any of the following vehicles passing any other moving vehicle or halted convoy, except by direction of Military Police:

Trucks, 3/4 ton weapons carriers.
Trucks, 1-1/2 ton cargo.
Trucks, 2-1/2 ton cargo.
All other wheeled or track vehicles over 3/4 ton capacity.

Large 4 foot by 4 foot signs to prevent double banking, and passing were constructed and placed conspicuously on the main supply routes.

XV Corps departed IP Route Junction H338 and OC21 on 30 August and moved via OC21, HS37, D27 and D15 to vicinity of LA FERTE GAUCHER (R7530).

A "Red Ball" express route (for priority gasoline, ammunition and other vital material) was established from Advance Section, Communications Zone via H370 to FONTAINEBLEAU (X8991), D10, H375, HS04, HS1, H33 to CHALONS (T9445).

It was necessary to establish one way traffic in many areas because of the poor condition of the roads.

The following restrictions were published in Administrative Orders as follows:

(1) Blackout marker (cat eye) lights would be used forward of Corps rear boundary. Blackout driving lights would be used in rear of Corps rear boundary.

(2) Convoys would not halt on Main Supply Routes for any purpose. When halts were necessary convoys would be moved to side road.

Bridges were reported out at CLESLES (V1800) on 31 August. A change in Main Supply Route was made at this point from MERY (V1697), west as follows:

North on H373 from MERY (V1697) to ETRELLES (V1303), west on OC58a to BAGNEUX (V1803), northwest on OC5 to AMOLURE (V1107). This change was made to by pass a 1/4 mile gravel road outside CLESLES (V1800) which could not withstand heavy traffic.

Over 600 traffic clearances were processed through this Headquarters during the month of August.

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

The first prisoner of war enclosure was opened 1 August in the vicinity of ST. JORES (T2785). This enclosure was taken over from the 462nd Military Police Escort Guard Company, First U. S. Army, and contained thirty-four prisoners of war. The 244th Field Artillery Battalion operated this enclosure.

The prisoner of war enclosure in the vicinity of ST. JORES (T2785) was closed 2359 August 3, 6,352 prisoners of war having been evacuated through it.

A prisoner of war enclosure was established at HARCHY (T2517) 4 August, 1-1/2 miles northwest of AVRANCHES (T2817).

The 437th and 471nd Prisoner of War Escort Guard Companies reported to the enclosure at HARCHY (T2517) on 5 August for duty per paragraph 3, TA Number 4, Headquarters, Twelfth U. S. Army Group, dated 3 August. One platoon from each of the 447th and 442nd Quartermaster Truck Companies was utilized for transporting prisoners from the Division collecting points to the enclosure.

Weekly report of prisoners of war from 011200 August to 058359 August:

Captured	8806
Others	None
TOTAL	8806
Evacuated	8052
BALANCE ON HAND	754

During the night of 7 - 8 August, the enclosure at HARCHY (T2517) near AVRANCHES (T2817), was subjected by the enemy to a combined bombing and strafing attack. A perimeter guard was established as quickly as possible, and as a matter of safe-guarding prisoners of war from the devastating attack they were permitted to leave the enclosure and seek protection in the surrounding area. Twenty-one prisoners of war were killed and sixty-two wounded. Two enlisted men of the 244th Field Artillery Battalion (operating personnel of the enclosure) were killed and several were wounded.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 1, AVRANCHES (T2817), was closed on 8 August, 5,157 prisoners of war having been handled during the period 4 to 7 August inclusive.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 8, at SENS DE BRETAGNE (T1377), was opened on 8 August.

The 2nd Platoon of the 443rd Prisoner of War Processing Company reported for duty at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 2 at SENS DE BRETAGNE (T1377) on 9 August.

Weekly report of prisoners of war from 060001 August to 122359 August:

On hand from previous week	754
Received	17535
TOTAL	18289
Evacuated	11451
BALANCE ON HAND	6838

Total from 1 August to 12 August . 26341

On 13 August a TWX was received from Twelfth U. S. Army Group informing all headquarters that prisoners of war in the hands of the French Forces of the Interior were to be released to the appropriate Army Commander for evacuation.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 4 was established at BRULON (KO936) on 14 August.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 3 was established at SENS DE BRETAGNE (XO569) on 16 August.

Plans liaison was established between this section and Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 2 at SENS DE BRETAGNE (T1377).

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 2 at SENS DE BRETAGNE (T1377) was closed on 19 August, 27,407 prisoners of war being handled by this Enclosure during the period 8 August to 19 August.

Weekly report of prisoners of war from 130001 August to 192359 August:

On hand from previous week	6838
Received	38474
TOTAL	45118
Evacuated	43171
BALANCE ON HAND	1941

Total received to date 64815

The 761st Field Artillery Battalion reported to BRULON Enclosure (KO936) on 20 August and began orientation preparatory to assuming duties at the Enclosure.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 5 was established at COURTALAIN (WO964) on 21 August.

The 738th Field Artillery Battalion was relieved from duty at the BRULON Prisoner of War Enclosure (KO936) on 23 August and assigned to its primary mission.

The 734th Field Artillery Battalion reported to COURTALAIN (WO964) Enclosure on 22 August for prisoner of war escort duty.

A new system for evacuation of prisoners of war was established at this time as follows:

Responsibility for Evacuations:

(a) Corps and Divisions were responsible for evacuation of prisoners of war from Division Collecting Points to a Collecting Point located at the Class I Supply Point of the Corps. Army would supply operating personnel for the above Collecting Point and would be responsible for evacuation of prisoners of war from the Collecting Point located at the Class I Supply Point to the Army Prisoner of War Enclosure.

(b) Army Units - To the nearest Collecting Point located at a Class I Supply Point at a Corps.

(c) Locations - Corps G-1's and Provost Marshals would coordinate with Corps G-4's to locate Collecting Points mentioned above near traffic routes to the supply points.

The Prisoner of War Sub-Section Chief left for tour of inspection of BRITTANY PENINSULA on 22 August to make arrangements on disposition of prisoners of war captured by VIII Corps.

2nd Platoon, 441st Prisoner of War Processing Company, reported for duty at COURTALAIN (WO964) on 24 August.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 4, located vicinity of BRULON (KO936), two miles south of JOUE EN CHARNIE (KO936), was closed on 25 August, 8,771 prisoners of war being handled from 14 to 25 August.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 6 was established three miles east of NEMOURS (X2675) on 0325 on 26 August.

Weekly report of prisoners of war from 200001 August to 262359 August:

On hand from previous week	1941
Received	9198
TOTAL	11139
Evacuated	5904
BALANCE ON HAND	5235

Total received to date 54003

The 2nd Platoon, 441st Prisoner of War Processing Company was

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relieved from duty at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 5, COUTANCES (W9944) by Advance Section, Communications Zone, on 17 August.

Twenty-five .45 caliber Thompson submachine guns were obtained from Ordnance for use by the 734th Field Artillery Battalion, operating a prisoner of war enclosure at MEMCURS (X2675).

A total of 63,369 prisoners of war were received by Third U. S. Army prisoner of war enclosures during the month of August. (See Annex Number 9)

A total of 62,157 prisoners of war were evacuated during the month. 6,677 wounded prisoners of war were received through medical channels, as per report from the Army Medical Section. This figure was not included in the number of prisoners of war evacuated through Third U. S. Army enclosures.

Escapees and evaders evacuated through Third U. S. Army prisoner of war channels during the month of August were 487.

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

All towns in vicinity of Army Command Post were initially posted with "Off Limits" signs and enforcement on 2 August provided by roving patrols of 503rd Military Police Battalion, covering principally BEAUCHAMPS (T2732), VILLEDIEU (T3934) and LA HAYE PESNEL (T2628). Command Boulevard was restricted to use by military personnel on business and all civilians were kept out until cleared by Counter Intelligence Corps, who set up personnel at both ends of the Army command Post for that purpose. This was set up as a Standing Operating Procedure in all future Command Post Areas.

On 8 August roving patrols from the 503rd Military Police Battalion were established in POILLEY (T3592) and nearby towns to enforce "Off Limits" regulations.

The Army Straggler Collecting Point was located in close vicinity to the Command Post of the 503rd Military Police Battalion. Stragglers apprehended were returned to their units or to the replacement depot.

An Army guardhouse was established also in close vicinity of the 503rd Military Police Battalion.

Twenty-six stragglers were apprehended from the period 1 to 5 August.

During the period 6 to 12 August, thirty-three stragglers were apprehended. Two of these were French and were turned over to a French Troop Replacement Center at FONTAINEBAULT (T2810). Of the remainder, sixteen went to 48th Replacement Battalion, four to 53rd Replacement Battalion, three to the 318th Replacement Company and eight to the 319th Replacement Company.

Delinquency reports for the period 6 to 12 August were as follows:

Drunken driving	6
Uniform violation	17
Drunk and disorderly	4
Promiscuously firing of weapons	2
Off Limits violations	9
Speeding	23
Unattended vehicles	4
Pass violations	7
Unauthorized use of vehicle	4
Theft of Government property	2
Larceny	2
TOTAL	78

Commencing 14 August, LABALOGE (Z3453) and LE MANS (Z4037) were patrolled for enforcement of "Off Limits". Advance Section, Communications Zone Headquarters and Service of Supply troops under their control moved into LE MANS (Z4037) during this period and many troops were billeted in town making enforcement of "Off Limits" virtually impossible with available Military Police personnel. The water depot in the heart of LE MANS (Z4037) was ordered closed. Arrangements were made with Advance Section, Communications Zone, to police LE MANS (Z4037). An Army straggler point was opened in LE MANS (Z4037).

Eight stragglers were apprehended during the period 13 to 19 August, of which four were sent to the 53rd Replacement Depot and four to their respective organizations. Delinquency reports for the same period were as follows:

Improper uniform	11
Speeding	48
Reckless driving	10
Pass violations	10
Off Limits	22
Promiscuous firing of weapons	3
AWOL	4
Unattended vehicles	4
Disorderly conduct	4
Driving while intoxicated	2
Intoxicated	5
Larceny	1
TOTAL	126

The Army straggler collecting points in LE MANS (Z4037) and FOUGERES (Y3878) were closed on 22 August as the Army rear boundary was moved forward. An Army straggler point was opened at ST. CALAIS (V7849) Town Square on 22 August. An Army straggler collecting point was established at CHARTRES (R3602) on 23 August.

During the period 20 to 26 August stragglers were collected and disposed of as follows:

Number	Disposition
6	Returned to units
13	35th Replacement Depot
13	48th Replacement Depot

Straggler collecting points at ST. CALAIS (V7849) and CHARTRES (R3602) were closed at 250900 August. Straggler collecting points were opened at MERREVILLE (W8284), CHATEAUDUN (Q2361) and VENDOME (P0411) at 250900 August.

The following delinquencies were reported for the week ending 26 August:

Double banking	21
Parking on highway	1
Unattended vehicle	23
Speeding	54
Unauthorized use of vehicle	13
Overloading	4
Improper blackout	3
Pass violations	17
Indiscriminate firing	8
Off Limits violations	20
Drunk and disorderly	20
Reckless driving	19
Alleged rape	3
Uniform violations	9
Insubordination	1
Others	3
TOTAL	218

The following cities and towns were placed "On Limits" to all troops:

PITHIVIERS (W9367)	JANVILLE (W8572)
BONNEVAL (W2873)	ORLEANS (P6623)
MERREVILLE (W8284)	CHARTRES (W5047)
CHATEAUDUN (Q2361)	VENDOME (P0411)

The Army Commander announced on 26 August that henceforth all cities and towns within Third U. S. Army Area would be "On Limits" to all troops.

All towns were being patrolled by 503rd Military Police Battalion with personnel of the 734st Field Artillery Battalion being used to assist them.

Straggler collecting points were opened and closed as follows:

VENDOME (P0411)	- closed 281200 August
CHATEAUDUN (Q2361)	- closed 291200 August
MERREVILLE (W8284)	- closed 301200 August
SENS (Z6965)	- opened 301800 August
FONTAINEBLEAU (X8991)	- opened 301900 August

The disposition of stragglers apprehended during the last week in August was as follows:

Straggler Collecting Point	Returned To Unit	To Replacement Depot	Trial
MERREVILLE (W8284)	17	3	28
CHATEAUDUN (Q2361)	3	0	3
ORLEANS (P6623)	9	0	9
SENS (Z6965)	2	0	2
FONTAINEBLEAU (X8991)	3	3	6
Provost Marshal Office	1	7	8
TOTALS:	35	13	56

General prisoners evacuated or released during the period were as follows:

To VIII Corps for trial	4
To Advance Section, Communications Zone, RENNES (T0154) for trial	11
To Units	4
TOTAL	19
On hand, Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 6, MEMCURS (X2675)	15
Third U. S. Army guardhouse	17
TOTAL	36

The 761st Field Artillery Battalion was assigned to Military Police duties with the 503rd and the 512th Military Police Battalions. This battalion was used for maintenance of law and order, and traffic control.

SECTION V - INVESTIGATION SUB-SECTION

In the area near BEAUCHAMPS (T2732) the rate of crimes greatly increased. During the week investigations were conducted on numerous reports of rape. Because of the lack of proper identification and description furnished by the complainants considerable difficulty was encountered in solving the crimes.

The following list of serious incidents or crimes were reported during the period from 1 to 5 August:

AWOL	3
Rape	3
Attempted rape	1
Murder	1
Breezing and entering	1
TOTAL	9

No Criminal Investigation Sections were as yet assigned to this Section. This placed a heavy burden on the Investigation Section of this Headquarters and that of the 503rd Military Police Battalion. Additional request was made to higher Headquarters for the assignment of Criminal Investigation Sections to this office.

Serious incidents or crimes reported for the period 6 to 12 August were as follows:

Rape and murder	1
Rape	4
Attempted rape	1
Larceny	2
TOTAL	8

The 13th Military Police Criminal Investigation Section, consisting of one officer and ten enlisted men reported for duty with this Section on the 18th of August. This Section had organically two vehicles which were considered inadequate. Arrangements were made for three additional vehicles, to be used by the Criminal Investigation Section.

The following cases were reported for investigation during the period 13 to 19 August:

Rape	4
Rape and attempted murder	1
Homicide	1
Assault and battery	1
Unlawful Discharge of firearms	2
Murder	1
TOTAL	10

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The following cases were reported for investigation during the period 30 to 26 August:

Rape	1
AWOL	2
Murder	1
Larceny	1
TOTAL	5

During the last week of August, 1944, the following cases were reported for investigation:

Larceny of military property	1
Pillage	2
Assault	1
Rape	3
Mayhem	1
Justifiable homicide	1
Larceny	1
TOTAL	10

CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

A conference was held 1 September with representatives from the Traffic Sub-Section, Military Police Battalions and Field Artillery Battalions present for the purpose of discussing employment of radio communications in the functions of Traffic, Maintenance of Law and Order and Prisoner of War Sub-Sections under supervision of the Provost Marshal.

Forward Echelon "B" departed vicinity of COUROMAY (XB477) 040830 September. Arrived one mile north of HARSON on GC1a (T6541) 041300 September.

Forward Echelon "A" departed vicinity of COUROMAY (XB477) 041300 September. Arrived one mile north of HARSON on GC1a (T6541) 041630 September.

Rear Echelon departed COURCY (U9155) 040830 September. Arrived five miles south of L'EPINE, vicinity of HARSON (T6541).

Forward Echelon "B" departed vicinity of HARSON (T6541) 150830 September. Arrived vicinity of BRAQUIS (U4664) four miles south of ETAIN (U4770) on route N408, 151200 September.

Forward Echelon "A" departed vicinity of HARSON (T6541) 151300 September. Arrived vicinity of BRAQUIS (U4664), four miles south of ETAIN (U4770), on route N408, 151715 September.

Rear Echelon departed HARSON (T6541) 161145 September. Arrived seven miles northeast of ETAIN (U4770) at ROUVRES (U5171) 161600 September.

Forward Echelon departed BRAQUIS (U4664) and arrived in billets in town of ETAIN (U4770) 22 September.

A standing Escort of Honor was provided for General EISENHOWER during his visit on 29 September to Third U. S. Army Headquarters at ETAIN (U4770). This escort was provided from personnel of the 503rd Military Police Battalion, and consisted of two platoons of one officer and thirty enlisted men, each.

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

As the tactical situation became stabilized, the Army Zone became confined and the traffic logistics became that of density, rather than of distance.

Major troop movements were of two kinds, those coming forward into and through Army Area along or parallel to Main Supply Routes and those moving laterally or perpendicular to Main Supply Routes. Additional posts and strengthening of existing posts and patrols were necessary to expedite these moves. In addition to major troop moves, many units of battalion size or smaller were moving daily.

Traffic control on Main Supply Routes changed little during the month. Company C, 503rd Military Police Battalion, Company A, 512th Military Police Battalion and Company B, 512th Military Police Battalion covered Main Supply Routes 1, 2 and 3 respectively, with Company C, 512th Military Police Battalion covering lateral routes and towns not on Main Supply Routes. Supply traffic was heavy and concentrated on two routes; Main Supply Route Number 1 (MS) and Main Supply Route Number 2 (MS4-96). All Main Supply Routes were established on two way roads, greatly facilitating use of traffic control personnel and traffic control equipment. Traffic summary courts were set up at various localities along the Main Supply Routes and tried 415 cases involving traffic violations during the month. An appreciable restraint on speeding and reckless driving was noticeable on all roads after news of these courts was circulated.

Supply of traffic control equipment remained critical and requests to higher headquarters (Twelfth U. S. Army Group) were made to get action. The Engineers' supply channel for this equipment dwindled in Advance Section, Communications Zone where the Transportation Corps was the supply agency for the needed items. Captured sheet metal was utilized as a "stop-gap" measure with the Ordnance cutting and shaping discs, directional, and France plates, and the Engineers painting them. This substitute supply measure, the reclamation of signs on Main Supply Routes no longer used, and more judicial use of signs averted a breakdown of signing in the Army Area. The supply of beacons, reflectorized, was the only item of night traffic control equipment that remained adequate.

A reconnaissance element consisting of one officer from the Traffic Sub-Section, one officer from the Maintenance of Law and Order Sub-Section, one French liaison officer, one non-commissioned officer from the 512th Military Police Battalion, and two drivers with 1/4 ton vehicles and other equipment was formed and put into operation with mission of contacting Corps and Division Provost Marshals, civil authorities, Civil Affairs officers and others in the zones ahead of the Army Service area to discuss Military Police problems, secure necessary billets and office space in advance, secure first hand information of conditions affecting traffic and serve as general coordinators for liaison with related agencies. This unit greatly increased our scope of operations and efficiency.

Much additional road reconnaissance data was provided by advance details of the 512th Military Police Battalion, which made a thorough check of the Army road net. Daily conferences with the Army Engineers amplified and clarified the traffic and road net picture.

A systematic procedure for traffic control was established, and closer liaison and greater exchange of information with the 512th Military Police Battalion, the Engineer Section, the G-4 Transportation Section, and the G-3 Section (Troop Movements) began to secure results. The use of radio communication between Headquarters and outlying key localities increased the mobility of the traffic police and tightened control of the Army Area.

Bridges were reported out at BRAY (U4119), 1 September. All main roads leading to the town were signed indicating this condition.

A blown out bridge at CHALONS (T5445) was replaced on 2 September by a two way Class 40 bridge.

Main Supply Routes were established on 2 September as follows:

(1) EAST: GC 24 to MALESHERBES (XD579), MS1 to FONTAINEBLEAU (X2991), two way. D27 to CR N5, GC12 to MANGIS (S5107), GC56 to GASTINS (S5314), D15 to MONTMIRAIL (V8466), M33 to RJ GC11, GC11 to VINAY (T2354), one way. MS1 to REIMS (T3080), N380 to TOURCELLES-CHAUMONT (TY293), M46 to RJ M47, M47 to ARLON (P6122), two way.

WEST: GC24 to MALESHERBES (XD579), MS1 to FONTAINEBLEAU (X2991), two way. GC39 to RJ GC47 to LE CHATELET (S3502) D13 to LESCHERNES (S4001), D27 to NOZAY (S4920), N304, to CR B9 to CHAILLY (S4132), M34 to CR GC55, GC55 to RUBAIS (S7037), GL8 to VIELSMAISONS (S8242), M33 to CR GL20 to DORMANS (T0161), M3 to RJ GC22, GC22 to SERMIERS (T2969), GC26 to CR M51, one way. MS1 to REIMS (T3080), N380 to TOURCELLES-CHAUMONT (TY293), M46 to RJ M47, M47 to ARLON (P6122), two way.

(2) EAST: GC26 to PUISEAUX (XD969), GC7 to CR M395, M395 to MONTEREAU (A4688), GC18 to LE MERICY (XB399), IC40 to RJ MS1 to SEZANNE (T0522), one way. M34 to VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T6819), M4 to ST. AUBIN S-A (U3115), M58 to PONT A MOUSSON (U7935), two way.

WEST: M450 to BARVILLE (XD460), GC87 and D8 to BEAUMONT (XC942), GC43 to CHATEAU-LANDON (X2663), GC40 to NEMOURS (X2675), M395 to CR GC92 to RJ GC103, GC103 to MISY (X5684), GC75 to CR N51, N51 to ROMILLY (T0499), M440 to ANGLURE (T1107), GC5 to RJ GC98, to GC9 to FERE CHAMPENOISE (T8524), all one way. M34 to VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T6819), M4 to ST. AUBIN S-A (U3115), M58 to PONT A MOUSSON (U7935), two way.

(3) M60 to ORLEANS (P6823), to TOUL (U6401), M4 to NANCY (U8511), two way.

(4) THROUGH TRAFFIC ROUTE (RED BALL): USE OF THIS ROUTE WAS CLEARED THROUGH ARMY TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS. M37 ETAMPES (V8497) to FONTAINEBLEAU (X2991), D10 to RJ M375 to MONTEREAUX (T8621), M304 to RJ M34, M34 to SEZANNE (T0522), N51 to CHAMPAUBERT (T1039), N33 to CHALONS (T5445), M3 to VERDUN (U2865) to METZ (U8557). Two way through route.

Additional and revised Traffic Regulations were incorporated in Circular Number 51, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 3 September. (See Annex 10).

Request was initiated to the Engineer Section for 500 discs, directional, on 5 September for traffic control use. XII Corps requested a supply of this equipment, and ninety-five discs, directional, and fifty flashers, electric, were withdrawn from the 503rd Military Police Battalion Supply and issued to the XII Corps.

The Express Main Supply Route was marked with "Red Ball Express" signs.

Movement of the 79th Infantry Division on 6 September was to be made to a new assembly area southeast of TROYES (Y2972), and elements of the Division moved on 7 September.

The 2nd French Armored Division commenced movement 8 September from the vicinity of COULOMMIERS (S5835) and ROZAY (S4930) to an assembly area southeast of TROYES (Y2972). The 35th Infantry Division and the 79th Infantry Division were also moving at this time and conflicts were reported between elements of these divisions at BRIENNE (Y6283) and east of TROYES (Y2972). This difficulty was corrected in a short period of time and the movement closed without further conflict.

The following restriction was placed in effect on 8 September:

Blackout marker (cat eye) lights would be used forward of Corps Rear Boundary. Blackout driving lights would be used in rear of Corps Rear Boundary.

A Radio Net was established 9 September with radio sets at 512th Military Police Battalion, CHALONS (T5445) and ST. MENEHOULD (T9359). The net was to be expanded as fast as equipment and operating personnel were made available.

The Provost Marshal of Advance Section, Communications Zone, took over traffic control in REIMS (T3080) 092400 September. An air reconnaissance was made for the purpose of observing traffic circulation and control in CHALONS (T5445), TROYES (Y2972), JOINVILLE (X0887), ST. DIZIER (T9509), VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T6819) and CHARMES (X9476).

A representative from the Provost Marshal's Office, Twelfth U. S. Army Group, visited this Sub-Section 10 September and reported that his Headquarters was taking steps to insure that a supply of traffic control equipment was made available to this Headquarters.

Radio communication was established between 512th Military Police Battalion, 503rd Military Police Battalion, ST. MENEHOULD (T9359), REVIGNY (T9829) and VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T9319). Communication between these stations proved satisfactory and afforded rapid transmission of pertinent traffic and maintenance of law and order data.

Advance Section, Communications Zone, took over traffic control in CHALONS (T5445) 11 September, relieving Army Military Police.

Road reconnaissance was made 12 September over highway N3 from CHALONS (T5445) to a point five miles east of VERDUN (U2865) and it was learned that additional traffic control personnel were needed to assure the rapid free flow of traffic.

The radio communication personnel from the 741st Field Artillery Battalion were relieved from duty 13 September and replaced by personnel from the 734th Field Artillery Battalion.

A higher frequency for [illegible] requested from the [illegible] increase the range

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of the Radio Net.

The Ordnance Section dispatched one truck company carrying vital ammunition every two hours, 14 September over the Red Ball Route (H3) from CHALONS (T5445) to a point east of VERDUN (U2865). This movement continued for six days. Extra traffic control personnel were posted along this route to assure free movement of traffic. Tank retrievers were also used in this movement with a subsequent slowing down of traffic on the hills east of VERDUN (U2865).

The civilian traffic on the main highways was constantly increasing and interfered with the free flow of military traffic. This problem was taken up with Civil Affairs and Counter Intelligence Corps with the request that this traffic be controlled and routed over secondary routes.

A tank retriever broke down on a hill five miles east of VERDUN (U2865) on highway H3 on 17 September, blocking traffic. Military Police took charge of the situation and routed traffic over the road shoulders on each side, until a wrecker moved the vehicle into a field and cleared the road.

The large number of vehicles serving the Third U. S. Army railhead in VERDUN (U2865), in addition to those supply vehicles using highway H3, created a high traffic density in the city. The temporary bridge also slowed traffic to some extent. Constant vigilance and expert performance of duty by Military Police kept traffic moving, and no conflicts ensued.

Traffic Court Number 8 moved to ST. DIZIER (T9509), 19 September.

Because of the numerous Air Corps personnel in the vicinity contact was made with the commanding officers of the Air Corps units regarding traffic regulations. These Air Corps units assured this office that they would cooperate in curbing the violation of traffic regulations in that area.

Main Supply Routes were established 19 September as follows:

(1) H3 VERDUN (U2865) to METZ (U6557), GC11 to Y04 vicinity FRESTROFF (Q2477), Y04 to H418, H418 to SAARLAUTERN (Q2880).

(2) H58 ST. AUBIN (U3115) to PONT A MOUSSON (U7735), H410 to RJ H3, H410 vicinity ST. AVOLD (Q2556), H3 to SAARBRUCKEN (Q4570).

(3) H4 ST. AUBIN (U3115) to NANCY (U8511), H74 to SARREBOURG/MINES (Q5197).

(4) H40 TROYES (T9973) to BONNET (I3095), IC38 (4E) to GONDRECOURT (I3493), H64 through NEUFCHATEAU (I6975) to MIRECOURT (I8149), H413 to TANTONVILLE (I8287), H4 to BATON (I9588), D9 to LUNEVILLE (Q0801), H4 to SARREBOURG (Q5015).

Representatives from Traffic and Maintenance of Law and Order Sub-Sections with a French liaison officer as interpreter departed 19 September for road reconnaissance of the Army and Forward Areas.

A tour of inspection was made 20 September of VERDUN (U2865), BAR LE DOC (U1213), ST. DIZIER (T9509), JOINVILLE (I0887), VOID (U4412), COMMERCY (U4220) and ST. MIHIEL (U3935). The town of COMMERCY (U4220) with highways H58 and H64 crossing the center of town was a bottleneck. The approaches to the crossroad were through narrow and crooked streets and no bypass was available. Despite this bottleneck, traffic control personnel kept traffic moving in an orderly manner.

The highway from COMMERCY (U4220) to ST. MIHIEL (U3935), an important lateral route, H64, had a railroad overpass and a river bridge blown. The railroad overpass was bypassed by a temporary road and grade crossing 1/4 mile north of blown bridge. A two way timber bridge was placed in at the river. This bridge would eventually be replaced as the approaches were faulty and the bridge was not high enough above the water line.

The 83rd Infantry Division was turned over to the XX Corps at ST. MIHIEL (U3935) at 231300 September and moved smoothly through the Army Area.

The Engineer Section reported that traffic control equipment was being furnished by local concerns under Army contract.

Provost Marshal, Twelfth U. S. Army Group, reported that traffic control equipment was available in a depot near PARIS (SO140) and that information would be furnished at a later date as to where this equipment could be picked up.

On 23 September the 7th Armored Division moved through the Army Area and was delivered to the First U. S. Army.

The following instructions as announced in Circular Number 58, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 25 September, were put in effect:

Army Light Lims coincided with Corps Rear Boundaries. Vehicle lights would be used as follows:

(a) Full head lights in rear of Army Light Line.

(b) Blackout driving lamps (dimout lights), for vehicles so equipped, from Army Light Line to Division Rear Boundaries.

(c) For vehicles not equipped with blackout driving lamps (dimout lights), marker (cat eye) lights from Army Light Lines to Division Rear Boundaries.

(d) Marker (cat eye) lights for all vehicles in front of Division Rear Boundaries.

Vehicles would not be left unattended unless under immediate surveillance of guards or Military Police.

(a) United States Army vehicles would not be immobilized by the removal of rotors or other vital parts by military or civilian personnel.

Officers would drive vehicles only in an emergency, as defined below:

(a) During a trip if driver is taken sick, is injured, wounded, killed or dies.

(b) In case of fire.

(c) In case of attack (including such attacks as riots, etc.).

(d) In any case of life or death.

(e) In any special cases, when directed in writing by the Installation Commander (or Unit Commander for separated units) where the need is urgent, and is for the good of the Government. However, in no case would this be used as an excuse for an officer to drive for personal satisfaction.

Movement of the 7th Armored Division 26 September was controlled by Army Military Police from RJ H16 and IC69 to LONGUYON (U4596), where First U. S. Army assumes control.

The 83rd Infantry Division moved through the Army Area. An ammunition truck in an element of this Division exploded on highway H401 just northeast of ST. DIZIER (T9509) at CHANCENAY (T9311). Ammunition was scattered on the highway and adjacent fields.

Traffic conflict was reported at OLLEY (U5465) in the XX Corps zone resulting from armored vehicles which were disabled. Ordnance was informed and assisted in removing all disabled vehicles.

The Ninth U. S. Army convoys commenced to move 29 September through the Army Area to assembly area in the vicinity of LUXEMBOURG (P8414). Command Post was to be established at ARLON (P8122).

A road reconnaissance was made 30 September to LUXEMBOURG (P8414) Representatives from the Provost Marshal Office, Ninth U. S. Army, visited this office for observation of Provost Marshal activities.

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 5 at COURTALAIN (H0944) was closed 1 September, 3,784 prisoners of war having been evacuated through this enclosure during the period 22 August to 1 September.

Weekly report of prisoners of war from 270001 August to 082359 September, inclusive:

On hand from previous week. . . .	5225
Received.	14440
TOTAL	19665
Evacuated	13698
BALANCE ON HAND . .	1967

Total number prisoners of war from 1 August to 2 September. . 68443

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 7, two miles west of MEVIGNY (Y9629) on /C14 opened 3 September. This enclosure was operated by the 734th Field Artillery Battalion.

Plans liaison with Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 6 at MENCURS (X2675) was scheduled for one trip daily commencing 4 September.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 3, located vicinity of HUR EN BRETAGNE (XC569), was closed 5 September, 1,578 prisoners of war having been evacuated through this enclosure during the period from 19 August to 5 September inclusive. Battery B, 344th Field Artillery Battalion, was withdrawn from this enclosure and rejoined the Battalion at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 6, MENCURS (X2675).

Notification was received 6 September from Advance Section, Communications Zone, that all prisoners of war would be evacuated to CHARTRES (R3408).

A site for new Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 8 was selected 6 September in the vicinity of FRESNES EN ECVRE (U4657).

TWX received from Twelfth U. S. Army Group dated 8 September advising that Air Force Escapees and Evaders would be evacuated to Hotel Maurice, Rue de Rivoli, PARIS (SO140) Intelligence School, Western European Area.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 6 at MENCURS (X2675), closed 9 September, 11,136 prisoners of war having been evacuated from this enclosure during the period from 25 August to 9 September.

Weekly report of prisoners of war from 030001 September to 092359 September, inclusive:

On hand from previous week. . . .	1967
Received.	5771
TOTAL	7738
Evacuated	4791
BALANCE ON HAND . .	2947

Total number prisoners of war received from 1 August to 9 September 73014

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 8, vicinity of FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4657), twelve miles east of VERDUN (U2865) on H408, was half mile south of H3 (U4658), opened 10 September.

Prisoner of War Enclosures were instructed to make full use of all captured German equipment for clothing the prisoners during cold weather.

The problem of civilians other than TOPT workers evacuated through prisoner of war channels became acute.

The 344th Field Artillery Battalion, located at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 6, at MENCURS (X2675), moved 11 September to Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 8, at FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4657). The following units also moved to the new enclosure at FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4657): 472nd Military Police Escort Guard Company; 467th Quartermaster Truck Company; 498th Medical Collecting Company, 305th Military Police Escort Guard Company; 2nd Platoon, 443rd Prisoner of War Processing Company and Counter Intelligence Corps, Escapees and Evaders, Interrogation of Prisoners of War and Publicity and Psychological Warfare Detachments.

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The following policies were established 13 September with reference to displaced personnel:

(1) No women would be sent to Prisoner of War Enclosures.
(2) Female TODT workers and families of TODT workers would be sent to Civil Affairs (G-5).
(3) Members of Allied Forces with civilian status, such as Russians, French, Belgians, Poles or Czechs would be dealt with by the G-5 Section as displaced persons.
(4) Displaced persons would be sent to the G-5 Section.
(5) Members of French Resistance would be sent to the G-5 Section.
(6) Suspects and enemy agents would be sent to Army Interrogation Center.

Weekly report of prisoners of war from 100001 September to 162359 September, inclusive:

On hand from previous week	2747
Received	7484
TOTAL	9971
Evacuated.	6326
BALANCE ON HAND. . .	3645

Total number prisoners of war from
1 August to 16 September, inclusive:79236

Notice was received 17 September from Advance Section, Communications Zone (84th Regulating Station) that prisoners of war would be evacuated by train daily from VERDUN (U8865) and REVIGNY (T9829) to the rear areas.

Report was received from VIII Corps 18 September that 5141 prisoners of war were evacuated from Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 3, HUR DE BRETAGNE (K0569), directly to Advance Section, Communications Zone, during the period 23 August to 5 September, inclusive.

Received allocation of prisoner of war serial numbers from Provost Marshal, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army (310 900001 - 310 950000). The problem of supplying prisoner of war labor on a permanent basis appeared solved, as the allocation of numbers enabled Third U. S. Army to process prisoners for work details at the hospitals.

All Indian escapers and evaders would be evacuated to Special Counter Intelligence unit in PARIS (SC140) in accordance with letter from Intelligence School Number 9, Western European Area, American Headquarters Command, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, dated 13 September.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 7 at REVIGNY (T9829) was closed 21 September, 12,298 prisoners of war having been handled in this enclosure during the period from 3 September to 21 September, inclusive. Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 9, two miles west of TOUL (U6401) on RC 11[2] opened with the 734th Field Artillery Battalion as the operating unit.

The 2nd Platoon, 643rd Prisoner of War Processing Company summoned to process prisoners of war 22 September at the hospitals.

The 498th Medical Collecting Company was relieved from duty at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 8 and was replaced by the 437th Medical Collecting Company.

Weekly report prisoners of war from 170001 September to 232359 September, inclusive:

On hand from previous week	3645
Received	7560
TOTAL.	11235
Evacuated.	8249
BALANCE ON HAND. . .	2706

Total number prisoners of war from
1 August to 23 September inclusive: 86,826

The Army Surgeon was informed with reference to the employment of prisoners of war in hospitals that Convalescent Hospitals would be allowed a quota of eighty processed prisoners, and all other hospitals would be allowed a quota of forty prisoners.

The use of War Department Provost Marshal General Form Number 1, Prisoner of War Identification Tag, was discontinued 25 September.

Notice was received 27 September from Advance Section, Communications Zone, that all prisoners of war would be evacuated to SUIPPES (T8664).

Memorandum, Instructions on Treatment of Prisoners of War, was prepared 29 September by the Prisoner of War Sub-Section and distributed.

Prisoners of war were permitted to work in medical depots.

Weekly report of prisoners of war from 240001 September to 302359 September, inclusive:

On hand from previous week	2706
Received	3114
TOTAL	4818
Evacuated	4069
BALANCE ON HAND	749

Total number of prisoners of war from
1 August to 30 September, inclusive: 88,940

Prisoners of war handled during the month of September: 25,371. Not included in this total were 2,501 prisoners of war received through medical channels. (See Annex 11).

Total number of Evaders and Escapers for the month of September: 390.

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

During the month of September the boundaries of the Third U. S. Army Service Area became static to a degree which permitted a basis for planning in regard to Maintenance of Law and Order. In order to more efficiently employ Military Police, the Army Service Area was divided into sub-areas which corresponded with extensions of Corps boundaries insofar as was practicable. An officer was assigned to each sub-area with direct responsibility for all maintenance of law and order problems within the area and was given personnel who were distributed throughout the area as particular situations required. Upon the assignment of XV Corps to the Seventh U. S. Army, the sub-areas were readjusted to correspond with extensions of XII and XX Corps areas.

Although the functions of Army Military Police were technically limited to the boundaries of the Army Service Area, police of outside areas has been undertaken in the following instances:

In towns at or near the Army Headquarters when the Army Headquarters was located within a Corps area.

In towns within a Corps area when Corps Military Police were inadequate and where a request or clearance was made by or through the Corps.

In towns within the Advance Section, Communications Zone, which were temporarily left without Military Police because of the advance of the Army boundary.

At 061030 September the 465th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion advised this office through the G-2 Section, Third U. S. Army, that there were sixty-five armed SS Troops in woods south of REIMS (T3080). The 6th Cavalry Group Headquarters was apprised of this matter and took action.

The stockade for U. S. Army General Prisoners was established adjacent to the 503rd Military Police Battalion Bivouac Area 8 September.

During the month all towns and cities in the Army Area were placed and kept "On Limits" to troops. To maintain law and order Military Police personnel were augmented by the assignment of personnel from the 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion in sufficient number to provide adequate patrols in towns and cities frequented by troops. Nine officers and 183 enlisted men from the 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion were given three days special Military Police training prior to assignment to provisional Military Police Platoon organized by the 503rd Military Police Battalion.

During the month walking and/or road patrols were operating in the following towns:

BRAY (U4119)	MEMOURS (X2675)
BAR LE DUC (U1223)	NEUFCHATEAU (X4975)
BOURBONNE (J5534)	NANCY (U8511)
CHENCY (X4968)	ORLEANS (P6623)
CHAMPIGNY (T2881)	PROVINS (S7305)
CLERMONT (U0560)	POINT TORNE (X6473)
CHALONS (T5445)	PUISEAUX (X0949)
COMPLANS (U8465)	ROMILLY (T0499)
CHAUMONT (X0650)	REIMS (T3080)
COMMERCY (U4220)	RETHEL (S5506)
DONNEMARIE (X2644)	SERGNES (X6288)
EPERNAY (T2456)	SOUPPES (X2866)
ESTERNAY (S9284)	ST. MARTIN (T6219)
ETAIN (U4770)	SEZANNE (T0522)
EPINAL (T0554)	SENS (X4965)
FONTAINEBLEAU (X2891)	STE. MENEHOULD (T9359)
FERE CHEMPENOISE (T2584)	ST. DIZIER (T9509)
GAUCHER (S7421)	ST. MIHIEL (U3935)
LIGNY (U2113)	TOUL (U6401)
JOINVILLE (X0697)	THORIGNY (T7136)
LAILLY (X5849)	TROYES (T2972)
LA CHAPELLE (S8128)	VOUZIER (T6094)
LA FERTE GAUCHER (S7530)	VOID (U4411)
MONTEREAU (X4685)	VITTEL (X4657)
MARGIS (X3745)	VENDEUVRE (T3041)
MORET (X3788)	VERDUN (U2865)
MOURMELON (T5465)	VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T6819)
MAILLY LE CAMP (T3914)	WASSY (T9493)
MONTMIRAIL (S9239)	
MERY (T1697)	
MOREMY (J8540)	

During the month the following delinquency reports originated in the Sub-Section.

Unattended vehicles.	101
Uniform violations	119
Speeding	208
Double banking	76
Pass violations.	68
Carrying civilians	42
Reckless driving	32
Drunk and disorderly	29
Unauthorized use of weapon . . .	17
Drunken driving.	7
Officer driving.	6
Refusal to obey Military Police. .	5
Resisting arrest	4
Accidents.	3
Damage to civilian property. . . .	3
Selling rations.	3
Top up on vehicle.	3
AWOL	3
Stole Government property	2
Blackout violation	2
Robbery.	2
Overloading vehicle.	1
TOTAL	936

In addition to the delinquencies above listed, this Sub-Section forwarded ninety-nine delinquency reports by indorsement and received 356 information copies of delinquency reports originated by other Provost Marshals.

Summary Courts: Two roadside courts with Summary Court Martial jurisdiction commenced operation in the Army Area; Number 1 at TROYES (T2972), and Number 2 at CHALONS (T5445). The purpose of these courts was to bring swift justice and immediate punishment to traffic violators and other offenders. Offenses beyond the jurisdiction of the courts were investigated and charges were preferred, signed and forwarded to units concerned for investigation and trial.

The operation of the courts has effected marked improvement in the observance of traffic and other regulations. During the month the courts operated at the following locations: TROYES (T2972), VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T6819), CHALONS (T5445), STE. MENEHOULD (T9359), ST. DIZIER (T9509), COMMERCY (U4220) and VERDUN (U2865).

A summary of cases tried by the Summary Courts for the month was as follows:

	Court Number 1	Court Number 2	TOTAL
Speeding	41	124	165
Passing convoys.	0	27	27
Transporting civilians	6	21	27
Uniform violations	89	62	151
Unattended vehicles.	19	9	28

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	Court Number 1	Court Number 2	TOTAL
Drunk and disorderly	13	4	17
Double banking	27	2	29
Blocking traffic	0	1	1
No pass	62	0	62
Overloading vehicle	3	4	7
Damage to civilian property	0	2	2
Curfew violation	0	6	6
Failure to salute	3	0	3
Discharge of weapon	6	1	7
Disobeying military police	1	0	1
Illegal parking	0	1	1
TOTALS	271	264	535

All Maintenance of Law and Order Headquarters and detachments have been operating as straggler collecting points. During the month these have included the following locations:

SENS (A5965)	STE. MENEHOULD (T9359)
FONTAINEBLEAU (A2991)	ST. DIZIER (T9509)
REIMS (T3080)	JOINVILLE (Z0887)
ROMILLY (Y0499)	TOUL (U6401)
VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T6819)	VITTEL (Z6657)
CHALONS (T5445)	VERDUN (U2665)
TROYES (T2972)	ETAIN (U4770)

Disposition of stragglers during the month was as follows:

To Units	49
To Replacement System	128
To Hospitals	2
TOTAL	179

General prisoners evacuated or released during the month were as follows:

To Units	11
Communication Zone	19
Brittany Base Section	3
81st Replacement Battalion	3
Advance Section, Communications Zone, REIMS (T3080)	3
COMPIEGNE (H4403) Prisoner of War Enclosure	1
Disciplinary Training Center Number 5, TONNERVILLE (00724)	2
XV Corps	1
291th Disciplinary Training Center, England	6
Seine Base Section	1
TOTAL	50

General prisoners on hand in Third U. S. Army stockade, 30 September: 71

Enlisted men, drivers of vehicles, were apprehended for leaving their vehicles unattended with arms in the vehicles. If the drivers of these vehicles were not located the vehicles were driven by the Military Police to a Vehicle Corral. Disciplinary action was taken against all drivers for these violations.

Captured clothing, (such as fur coats, jackets, and fur hats) when worn as outer garments would be in violation of current uniform regulations. In every case involving such an offense the Provost Marshal would confiscate such articles of wearing apparel and turn them in to Quartermaster Captured Stores or Prisoner of War Enclosures for use by German prisoners of war.

Civil Affairs reported on 18 September that a Military Police detail was needed in the town of VITTEL (Z6657), south of NEUFMAISAU (Z4973). VITTEL (Z6657) being in XV Corps Area, the Provost Marshal of XV Corps was notified of the situation.

Civil Affairs reported that two Cafe de Globe in ETAIN (U4770) was operated by alleged collaborationists who were catering to soldiers after curfew. Counter Intelligence Corps and Military Police were advised, and investigation conducted.

XV Corps requested that Army take over the police of the town of VITTEL (Z6657) on 21 September.

Circular Number 59, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 17 September, was published concerning curfew and uniform violations. (See Annex 12) Curfew in all towns was 2000 to 0600 hours. All military personnel would be off the streets and clear of town during curfew.

One platoon from the 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion was dispatched to VERDUN (U2665) on 18 September to aid the Military Police force already stationed there in combing the city for stragglers and AWOLs. The intensive search commenced on this date proved highly successful.

Circular Number 60, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 30 September (See Annex 13) announced the policy with respect to towns and cities in the Third U. S. Army Area as follows:

All towns and cities in Third U. S. Army Area, upon liberation, would initially be placed on limits to all military personnel. Thereafter, towns and cities might be placed "Off Limits" and so signed when deemed expedient by the Army or the Corps Commander concerned.

Curfew in all towns and cities, time to be announced periodically would include the hours of darkness, and would be strictly enforced for both military and civilian personnel.

Liaison With French Authorities.

Two officers of the French Army were attached to this Sub-Section. These officers were employed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a liaison with French Police and Civil Authorities. Through such liaison, which functioned also through local Civil Affairs offices, close cooperation from Civil Authorities was obtained. Concerted action was taken in operation of joint French and American military police patrols. Increased observance of curfew regulations by civilians through enforcement by Civil Police materially assisted in the maintenance of law and order by closing bars, restaurants and other establishments whose operation after curfew hours seriously impairs the maintenance of law and order among military personnel. Civil Authorities gave valuable information concerning AWOLs and stragglers, and assisted in breaking up such practices as the bartering of food and supplies and the frequenting by military personnel of houses of prostitution operated by women known to have associated with the enemy.

SECTION V - INVESTIGATION SUB-SECTION

Following criminal cases were pending final investigation as of 1 September:

Rape	2
Assault	4
Article of War 85	1
Murder	1
Larceny	1
TOTAL	9

The 9th Criminal Investigation Section, one officer and ten enlisted men, reported for duty on 2 September.

Formal orders attaching the 9th Criminal Investigation Section to the Provost Marshal Section, Third U. S. Army, were received from Headquarters, Twelfth U. S. Army Group, i.e., letter dated 6 September 1944, subject: "Troops Assignment Number 63."

Six additional 1/4 ton 4x4 vehicles were assigned on 15 September to the 9th and 13th Criminal Investigation Sections, 3 vehicles per section.

Criminal cases reported and investigated during week ending 16 September were as follows:

Rape	2
Murder	1
Attempted murder	1
Fatal shooting	1
Assault	2
Larceny	3
TOTAL	10

Cases pending 16 September were as follows:

Rape	1
Murder	1
TOTAL	2

Two agents were dispatched to METZ (T0134) for the purpose of attending Courts Martial pertaining to a rape case.

Criminal cases investigated and completed during week ending 23 September were as follows:

Murder	1
Rape	3
Assault	3
Robbery	1
Larceny	2
Petty larceny	1
TOTAL	10

Cases pending as of 23 September were as follows:

Rape	1
Assault	1
Larceny	2
Petty larceny	1
TOTAL	5

Criminal cases investigated and completed during the week ending 30 September were as follows:

Larceny	1
Petty larceny	1
Assault and battery	1
Assault	1
TOTAL	4

Cases pending as of 30 September were as follows:

Rape	4
Murder	1
Assault	3
Fatal shooting	1
Drunk and disorderly (General Prisoner)	1
Larceny	1
TOTAL	12

In compliance with paragraph 19, Operational Instructions, Headquarters, Twelfth U. S. Army Group, dated 15 August, Semi-monthly Report covering period from 15 September to 30 September inclusive, and Monthly Report, covering period from 30 August to 30 September, were submitted to the Provost Marshal, Twelfth U. S. Army Group.

During the month of September forty cases were reported to this office for investigation, of which thirty-six were completed and reports compiled and forwarded. A total of nine cases were carried over from August making a total of forty-nine cases under investigation by this office during the month of September.

The following cases were pending:

Rape	4
Murder	2
Assault	3
Larceny	2
Article of War 85	1
TOTAL	12

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CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Rear Echelon, Third U. S. Army moved on 5 October from ROUVRES EN WOEVRE (U8171) to NANCY (U8511).

The Forward Echelon, Third U. S. Army moved on 11 October from STAIN (U4770) to NANCY (U8511).

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

Circular Number 63, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, dated 6 October was published and distributed. (See annex 14). This circular contained all correct Traffic Regulations and superseded the provisions of Circular Number 10, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 4 May.

Third U. S. Army Military Police took over control of NANCY, (U8511) 6 October. Army traffic control personnel had been functioning in NANCY (U8511) for ten days prior to this date assisting the Provost Marshal of the XII Corps. Ghost points on all highways leading into town were established to prevent unnecessary traffic entering the town. Company "A", 512th Military Police Battalion, was stationed in NANCY (U8511) for traffic control duties.

Civilian traffic was heaviest along highway N4, a Main Supply Route. At TOUL (U6401) civilians were prohibited from using the main bridge and were directed to use a bypass bridge one mile south along the MOSELLE River. Civilian traffic between NANCY (U8511) and TOUL (U6401) was kept to a minimum by forbidding the use of N4 between GONDREVILLE (U8913) and TOUL (U6401). Civilian traffic was extremely dense in NANCY (U8511) proper.

Reconnaissance of CHALIGNY (U7804) was made and Military Police were stationed in PONT ST VINCENT (U7902) to patrol CHALIGNY (U7804) and MESNIL MAISONS (U7903).

Road patrols operated on 10 October between VIRMERULLES (U6144), FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4697), DOMECOURT (U5963), TOUL (U6401), VOID (U6412), LIGNY (U2113) and BAR LE DUC (U1222).

A large volume of traffic for the Ninth U. S. Army was routed from VERDUN (U3865) through STAIN (U4770) to LONGUYON (U6496).

Four special patrols were dispatched to handle special convoys carrying explosives from UTAH BEACH to FOUG (U5612) for the 86th Engineer Battalion.

Supply Echelon, Third U. S. Army moved 12 October from STAIN (U4770) to NANCY (U8511).

Company "A", 510th Military Police Battalion arrived at STAIN (U4770) 26 October from Ninth U. S. Army for assignment to III Corps.

Major Troop Movements through the Army Area during the month were as follows:

5th Infantry Division from FLIREY (U6133) to SPINCOURT (U4984) via N404, N408, and N18.

26th Infantry Division (rear trains Artillery, etc.,) from BAR LE DUC (U1182) to ST NICHOLAS DE PIERREPONT (U9505), N64, N4 and N74.

44th Infantry Division from COMMERCY (U4220) and BAR LE DUC (U1182) to BAYON (U9588), (Seventh U. S. Army) via N64, N54, N60, N4 and N404.

95th Infantry Division from SPINCOURT (U4984) to FLIREY (U6133) via N18, N408 and N401.

9th Armored Division (to Ninth U. S. Army) from VERDUN (U3865) to LONGUYON (U4396) via N64, N405, C65, C64 and N18.

10th Armored Division from VERDUN (U3865) through Army Area to XII Corps.



During the month clearances for over 60 convoys involving over 6,000 vehicles were processed through this section.

Main Supply Routes were established 9 October as follows:

N3, VERDUN (U3865) to METZ, (U8689) C611 to RJ N18 to SAARLAUTERN (Q8680).

Highway Vole Secret, BAR LE DUC (U1182) to RJ N401 to ST MIHIEL, (U3935) N40V to RAMBUCOURT, (U5329) N56 to PONT A MOUSSON, (U7735) N410 to ST AVOLD, (Q8556) N3 to SAARBRUECKEN (Q4570).

N4, LIGNY (U2113) to NANCY, (U8511) N74 to SAARGUEMINES (Q8197).

N409 was closed to traffic between GIRONVILLE (U4823) and BOUCQ (U5418) for maintenance purposes.

The Third U. S. Army Engineer received from Communications Zone, traffic control equipment consisting of 800 batons, reflectorized and 400 lamps, electric flasher type.

Conference was held with Topographic and Operations Sections of the Army Engineer Office 22 October regarding printing of a new road map of Germany, scale: 1:250,000.

A letter was drafted on Vehicle Markings and Current Traffic Regulations, translated into French and made available for distribution to the French Troops stationed in the area.

Drivers of motor vehicles were required to have the following in their possession:

Driver's trip ticket and preventive maintenance service record WD, Form Number 48, (old WD, QMC Form 227).

Army Motor Vehicle Operator's Permit, WD, GO Form 7360, (old WD, QMC Form 228).

Driver's Accident Report, Standard Form Number 26 or 26A.

Rear Boundaries were established 21 October as follows:

XII Corps: From intersection of N57 with north lateral boundary on N57 to RICHARDMENIL (U8901), N15 to CHALIGNY (U7903), thence on N409 to VILLEY LE SEC (U7008), thence northeast on unnumbered road to GONDREVILLE (U8913), thence on VO road to VILLEY ST ETIENNE (U7004), thence on N110.4 to MANONCOURT (U8783), thence northeast on unnumbered road to HINCKVILLE (U8484), thence on N110.13 to NOVIANT AUX PRES, thence on N407 to BERNECOURT (U6129), thence north on N404 to its intersection with north lateral boundary, all to Army.

XI Corps: From intersection of N18 with north lateral boundary vicinity LONGUYON (U4496), south along N18 through SPINCOURT (U4984) to STAIN (U4770), thence along N3C0 to BOUCQ (U5418), thence along N408 to intersection of N408 with south lateral boundary vicinity GUENVILLE (U4328), all to Army.

[redacted] Ground Courier Service was inaugurated covering the following localities: NANCY (U8511), TOUL (U6401), VOID (U6412), LIGNY (U2113), COMMERCY (U4220), BAR LE DUC (U1182), ST MIHIEL (U3935), VERDUN (U3865), METTONCOURT (U5366), VIRMERULLES (U5144) and STAIN (U4770).

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

Letter, subject, "Prisoner of War Labor," Headquarters European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, dated 21 September was received and distributed to all Medical Units employing processed prisoners of war.

The Surgeon, Third U. S. Army was notified that all hospitals located within the twelve mile zone of the nearest organized enemy activity would return all processed prisoners of war to the prisoner of war Enclosure. The 103rd Evacuation Hospital returned thirty processed prisoners of war to the Prisoner of War Enclosure at TOUL (U6401) because the location of this hospital was within twelve miles of the nearest organized enemy activity.

In accordance with request of Provost Marshal, Twelfth Army Group a complete roster of all processed prisoners of war employed at Third U. S. Army hospitals was forwarded to the Provost Marshal, Advance Section Communications Zone.



Notification was made to the Provost Marshals of the XII and XX Corps advising them that prisoners of war would not be retained in the forward areas but would be evacuated to the rear at the first opportunity.

Four processed prisoners of war escaped 14 October from the 39th Evacuation Hospital. One of the escaped prisoners of war was apprehended on the streets of NANCY (U8511).

A German spy suspect, dressed in an American field jacket, crossed the MOSELLE River through our lines, was captured and evacuated by air to the United Kingdom, seriously wounded.

Two German prisoners of war escaped 18 October from Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 8, at FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4698), were apprehended by XI Corps and returned to the Prisoner of War Enclosure.

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The Second Platoon 643rd Prisoner of War Processing Company was relieved from duty with Third U.S. Army at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 8, FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4636), 2 October and returned to Provost Marshal, Advance Section Communications Zone at METZ (T2080). 618 prisoners of war were completely processed for Third U. S. Army by this Unit.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 8, FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4636) closed 170000 October. All units stationed at this Enclosure were transferred to Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 9, at TOUL (U6300). The Enclosure at TOUL (U6300) continued to operate under the 734th Field Artillery Battalion. 4,551 prisoners of war were evacuated through Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 8 during the period from 10 September to 16 October.

Notification was received from Advance Section Communications Zone that prisoners of war would be evacuated to the Central Enclosure at COMPIEGNE (U6403) instead of to BELFORT (T0644).

Letter, subject, "Enemy Protected Personnel," Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army, dated 6 October was forwarded to Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 9, at TOUL (U6300).

Directive for the Procedure and Censorship of Mail of enemy prisoners of war on the continent, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, Office of the Theater Censor, dated 24 September was received and distributed 23 October to all Medical units employing processed prisoners of war.

A Prisoner of War Exchange Officer from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces was attached to this office for duty, 23 October.

A Guard Detail was furnished by the 344th Field Artillery Battalion for the Civil Affairs (G-5) Displaced Persons Center at VERDUN (U6065).

The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Escapers and Evaders Detachment attached to Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 9, at TOUL (U6300) was requested by G-1 to submit a report to the Adjutant General, Security Section, Third U. S. Army on all American Escapers and Evaders.

Statistical report of prisoners of war for week ending 7 October:

On hand from previous week	749
Received	625
TOTAL	1374
Evacuated	1098
BALANCE ON HAND	276

Statistical report of prisoners of war for week ending 14 October:

On hand from previous week	905
Received	2855
TOTAL	3060
Evacuated	2731
BALANCE ON HAND	329

Total prisoners of war from 1 August to 14 October: 92,268.

Statistical report of prisoners of war for week ending 21 October:

On hand from previous week	395
Received	143
TOTAL	458
Evacuated	105
BALANCE ON HAND	353

Total prisoners of war from 1 August to 21 October: 92,521.

Statistical report of prisoners of war for week ending 28 October:

On hand from previous week	353
Received	619
TOTAL	972
Evacuated	542
BALANCE ON HAND	30

Total prisoners of war from 1 August to 28 October: 92,750.

Total number prisoners of war handled during October: 4,822.

Total number of prisoners of war from 1 August to 31 October inclusive: 102,340. (See annex 13).

Total number of escapers and evaders for October: 40.

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

The city of NANCY (U8511) was placed "Off Limits" 6 October to all troops for the purpose of restoring discipline and apprehending and returning all stragglers to their units. In accordance with Circular Number 64, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 6 October, all individual detachments and organizations would enter NANCY (U8511) only on official orders from competent authority. Curfew 2000 hours to 0600 hours would be obeyed by all military personnel and civilians.

Under the direction of the Commanding Officer, 636st Tank Destroyer Battalion, Assistant Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army the efforts of the Military Police, Civil Affairs, Counter Intelligence Corps and the local law enforcing agencies in NANCY (U8511) was placed "ON LIMITS" on a restricted basis. Military Police Detachments in TOUL (U6401), VERDUN (U8065), COMMERCY (U4230), and BAR LE DUC (U1122) were only assisted during the period by personnel detailed to temporary military police duty by units, both white and colored, stationed in and around those cities.

Circular Number 67, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 12 October announced the Pass Policy for NANCY (U8511), France, as follows:

1. Section II, Circular 64, this headquarters, dated 6 October 1944 is rescinded.

2. The following pass policy for military personnel visiting NANCY (U8511) is announced effective 12 October 1944.

a. The City of NANCY (U8511) is off limits to military personnel except as follows:

(1) Five (5) percent only of the Table of Organization strength of units mentioned below may visit NANCY (U8511) on any one day.

(a) XII Corps including all attached and supporting units.

(b) All troops stationed and/or billeted within the city limits of NANCY (U8511).

(c) Troops stationed in the area west of NANCY (U8511) bounded as follows: MOSELLE River from its junction with the MEURTHE River west to DOMMARTIN (U6912) (inclusive), south along unnumbered highway (inclusive) to PONT VILLEY LE SEC (V7008) on the MOSELLE River (inclusive) thence east southeast along the MOSELLE River to Third U. S. Army south boundary.

(2) Passes will not be made effective earlier than 1800 hours and will expire not later than 2000 hours.

(3) Individual passes will be issued. Attention is invited to the fact that identification cards showing that the holder is stationed or billeted in NANCY (U8511) are not passes.

(4) No twenty four (24) hour passes will be issued.

(5) Curfew 2000 hours to 0600 hours will be obeyed by military personnel below the grade of field officer including those stationed and/or billeted in NANCY (U8511).

The Pass Policy for NANCY (U8511) was amended by Circular Number 71, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 20 October, as follows:

Paragraph 2a (2), Section II, Circular 67, this headquarters, dated 12 October 1944, is amended to read as follows:

"2a (2) (a) Passes will not be made effective earlier than 1800 hours and will expire not later than 1800 hours for personnel not stationed and/or billeted within the city limits of NANCY (U8511).

(b) Passes will not be made effective earlier than 1200 hours and will expire not later than 2000 hours for personnel stationed and/or billeted within the city limits of NANCY (U8511)."

In compliance with Staff Memorandum Number 90, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 18 October 1944, officer patrols were inaugurated in the city of NANCY (U8511). These patrols were composed of four Staff Officers who were detailed to patrol the city from 1200 hours to 2000 hours daily, commencing 19 October, for the purpose of checking discipline, conduct and appearance of officers and enlisted men in the city.

At 282000A October an intensive drive was conducted in NANCY (U8511) in cooperation with the Counter Intelligence Corps to enforce strict observance of curfew regulations by both military and civilian population. Between 282000A and 290300A 108 soldiers and some 400 civilians were apprehended. The former were booked by the Military Police and the latter were screened by Counter Intelligence Corps.



Members of the French Gendarmerie were utilized in assisting Military Police at TOUL (U6401) to enforce blackout regulations.

A Refresher School for all Military Police was held 24 October in NANCY (U8511), LIGNY (U8213), and TOUL (U6401). Subjects presented were Provost Marshal Policies, technique of arrest, criminal investigation, maintenance of law and order, traffic technique and preparation of reports and general orientation.

Summary Courts: Although at the time of their inception the Roadside Summary Courts were established to deal primarily with traffic violations and other delinquencies of a less serious nature, the courts not only fulfilled this function but have also broadened their scope of activity.

On many occasions incidents involving assault with a dangerous weapon, attempted rape, robbery, and misappropriation of government property were referred to these courts. In some cases they made preliminary inquiries which laid the groundwork for a complete investigation by the Criminal Investigation Section. In other cases they secured evidence, statements from witnesses, and even prepared charges for the higher courts which must try the offenders.

Summary Court Number 2 was moved 6 October from COMMERCY (U4230) to TOUL (U6401).

During the month Summary Courts were in operation at COMMERCY (U4230), TOUL (U6401), and VERDUN (U8065).

A summary of cases tried by the Summary Courts for the month was as follows:

	Court No. 1	Court No. 2	TOTAL
No Pass	43	174	217
Speeding	38	138	176
Double banking	45	55	100
Uniform violations	24	45	69
Curfew violations	0	97	97
Unattended vehicle	11	44	55
Drunk and disorderly	36	14	50
Transporting civilians	5	28	33

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Summary of cases tried by Summary Courts (continued).

	Court No.1	Court No.2	TOTAL
Overloading vehicle	6	10	25
Unauthorized firing	11	7	18
Reckless driving	1	15	16
Loitering and straggling	0	10	10
Failure to salute	0	6	6
Unauthorized parking	0	5	5
Passing convoys	0	4	4
Miscellaneous	4	12	16
TOTALS	225	630	855

During the month walking and/or road patrols were operative in the following towns:

BAR LE DUC	(U1128)	BOURMONT	(T5465)
CHALIGNY	(U7804)	NANCY	(U8511)
CHAVIGNY	(U8104)	NEUFMAISEAU	(E4955)
CHAUMONT	(E0450)	NEUVE MAISONS	(U7903)
COMMERCY	(U4280)	PONT ST VINCENT	(U7904)
DONCOURT	(U8863)	ST MIHIEL	(U3935)
ETAIN	(U4770)	TOUL	(U8401)
FRESNES EN WOEVRE	(U4459)	VERDUN	(U2865)
JOINVILLE	(E0884)	VIGNEULLES	(U5144)
LEROUVILLE	(U3984)	VITTEL	(E4657)
LIGNY EN BARROIS	(U2213)	VOID	(U4418)

Maintenance of law and order patrols were established in CHALIGNY (U7804), CHAVIGNY (U8104), NEUVE MAISONS (U7903), and PONT ST. VINCENT (U7904), at the request of the XII Corps Provost Marshal.

Cooperation with Corps Provost Marshals: Close cooperation with XII Corps Provost Marshal was maintained during the month particularly in NANCY (U8511) where arrangements were made whereby XII Corps Military Police were utilized in handling delinquencies brought into NANCY (U8511) police headquarters and all such cases pertaining to XII Corps troops were turned directly over to the Corps Military Police.

Delinquencies: During the month the following delinquency reports were processed by the Maintenance of Law and Order Sub-Section:

Pass violations	1498
Uniform violations	573
Unattended vehicles	292
Speeding	248
Unauthorized use of vehicle	185
Drunk and disorderly	127
No trip ticket	129
Double banking	53
Reckless driving	45
Failure to obey Military Police	34
Miscellaneous	17
Overloaded vehicle	13
Unauthorized firing	14
Larceny	9
Officer driving	6
Absent without official leave	6
Disrespect to Military Police	4
Resisting arrest	2
TOTAL	3278

Straggler Collecting Point at VITTEL (E4657) closed 1 October. Straggler Collecting Point at NANCY (U8511) opened.

Straggler Collecting Points were operated during the month at the following locations:

BAR LE DUC	(U1128)	NANCY	(U8511)
COMMERCY	(U4280)	NEUFCHATEAU	(E4955)
FRESNES EN WOEVRE	(U4459)	ST MIHIEL	(U3935)
ETAIN	(U4770)	TOUL	(U8401)
LEROUVILLE	(U3924)	VERDUN	(U2865)
LIGNY	(U2213)		

Disposition of stragglers during the month was as follows:

To Units	30
To Replacement Centers	86
To Hospital	1
TOTAL	126

General prisoners: Data regarding general prisoners evacuated or released during the month was as follows:

To Units	7
To Seine Base	96
To Advance Section, Communications Zone, REIMS	6
To Brittany Base	1
TOTAL	112

General prisoners on hand Third U. S. Army stockade on of 31 October: 46.

SECTION V - INVESTIGATION SUB-SECTION

Criminal cases investigated and completed during the week ending 7 October were as follows:

Larceny	5
Rape	3
Assault	1
Fatal shooting	1
Racial disturbance	1
Drunk and disorderly	1
TOTAL	12

Criminal cases investigated and completed during week ending 14 October were as follows:

Article of War 69	1
Larceny	6
Assault	5
Black market	1
Spy (German)	1
Manslaughter	1
Disorderly conduct	1
Insubordination	1
Disobeying Military Police	1
Conduct unbecoming an officer	1
Refusing to obey order of a Superior Officer	1
TOTAL	20

Criminal cases investigated and completed during week ending 21 October were as follows:

Black market	3
Conduct unbecoming of an officer	1
Larceny	6
Alleged rape	1
Misappropriation of Military property	1
Suspected theft	1
Rape	3
Robbery	1
Assault and battery	1
Misappropriation of military property, (captured enemy equipment)	1
TOTAL	18

Criminal cases investigated and completed during week ending 28 October were as follows:

Misappropriation of Military property	1
Fraud	1
Larceny	2
Assault	3
Alleged assault	1
Black market	1
Rape	1
Spy	1
TOTAL	11

The following cases were pending on of 31 October:

Assault	1
Assault and battery	2
Manslaughter	1
Murder	1
Fraud	8
Black market	1
Sale of salvage	1
TOTAL	9

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

During the month of November the free flow of traffic was impeded by heavy rainfall. Bigneulx crushed out bridges at ARMAVILLE,(U7547) VANDIERES, (U7541) PAGNY,(U8112) CHAMPIGNEULLES, (U8516) and TOUL (U8401) and endangered the south bridge at VERDUN (U8865). Bridges at PONT A MOUSSON (U7726) and ST NICHOLAS (U8905) were temporarily closed and the bridges at NANCY (U8511) were threatened but remained open to regulated traffic. All possible traffic was rerouted through NANCY (U8511) as bridges there were the only ones open on the SEMOUSE - MOSELLE River line. The bridges at PONT A MOUSSON (U7726) and ST NICHOLAS (U8905) were reestablished on 9 and 11 November respectively and by the 14th November additional bridges were in operation at PERNOT (U8230), ROSIERES (U7901), DIEULOUARD (U7609) and CHOYSEES (U8228).

All civilian traffic in the Army area was prohibited 8 November for tactical reasons. Signs were posted in all towns and on all roads. Every available traffic Military Policeman was posted on point and patrol duty to rigidly enforce the no civilian traffic rule. Results were exceptionally good and civilians cooperated excellently. Regulations on civilian traffic were relaxed 11 November to permit essential supply vehicles, doctors' vehicles, and civilian ambulances on designated roads in the Army area, insofar as they did not interfere with military traffic.

A conference with the Prefect, Chief of Police, City of NANCY (U8511) and Public Safety Officer, G-5, was held on XX November resulting in a modified plan for control of civilian traffic being adopted and placed in effect. The civilian population was notified of this plan through publication in all newspapers. Civilian vehicles authorized to travel on Main Supply Routes and secondary roads were issued identifying stickers with license number of vehicle typed thereon. All Military Police and French Police were notified of this plan. Violators of this plan were either fined by the French Police or placed in vehicle corrals, which were established for such purposes at various places along the Main Supply Routes.

Parades and services sponsored by civilians were held in NANCY (U8511), VERDUN (U2865), and LIGNY (U2113) on 11 November, necessitating additional traffic posts and patrols for control, and in VERDUN (U2865) the Main Supply Route was detoured for two hours.

Numerous reports were received of the German Army forcing refugees into our lines to clog up traffic. Civil Affairs placed road patrols with Military Police and cleared the refugees from the main roads.

Traffic Military Police moved into STENAY (P1903), LONGUYON (D4596) and MONTMEDY (P3805), (in First U.S. Army area) to control Third U.S. Army traffic.

Company "B", 518th Military Police Battalion moved forward in the Army area to NANCY (U8511). Army Military Police took over posts in advance Army area BOLBOO.

French Gendarmes of 10th Legion relieved Engineers guarding highway bridges at ST MIHIEL (U3935), VOID (U4418), TOUL (U8401) and PONT ST VINCENT (U7903).

Major troop movements during the month were as follows:

The 10th Armored Division moved from VERDUN (U2865) to XX Corps via XX on 1 November. Road and driver discipline was excellent. Route and destination of the unit were changed while the division was enroute. Military Police were stationed on both routes, and contacted the division in Advance Section, Communications Zone and directed them over the new route through Third U.S. Army Zone, closing at XX Corps 011800.

The 12th Armored Division moved over the road net from LIGNY (U2113) to RAMBUCOURT (U5549) on 29 November.

During the month clearances for over 128 convoys involving over 8,500 vehicles were processed through this section.

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Two truckloads of traffic control equipment, including signs, directional, lamps, traffic, and frames plates arrived from PARIS (80140) 15 November. Batons, reflectorized, were changed slightly; new amber filters were inserted for use in NANCY (U8511) inasmuch as the old type lense was difficult to observe at a distance on rainy nights. 800 blank signs were received from the Engineers for road signing and were distributed to the 512th Military Police Battalion for marking roads in forward areas.

The Light Line was moved up with XII Corps rear boundary to MEUSE River, 18 November, allowing use of lights in NANCY (U8511). A new light line for XII Corps Zone was recommended at line along Highway N55, effective 191800.

Light Line was changed by Section I, Circular 83, Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, dated 26 November, as follows:

a. Army Light Line coincides with Division Rear Boundary.

b. Vehicle lights will be used as follows:

(1) Full headlights in rear of Army Light Line.

(2) Marker (cat eyes) lights for all vehicles in front of Army Light Line.

(3) Red Light "Flashers" on special vehicles are authorized in addition to the above.

c. All obstacles such as trophies, gas cans, camouflage nets, signs, etc., will be removed from the front and rear of vehicles where they obstruct the full benefits of the head and tail lights.

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

The location of Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 10, was selected at FLORANGE (U8281) on 7 November and opened 11 November. Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 9 continued operation at TOUL (U8401).

The 344th Field Artillery Battalion received its primary mission on 5 November and was relieved from assignment with the Provost Marshal, Third U.S. Army. The police, guard, and postal details furnished by the 734th Field Artillery Battalion reverted to their organization so that all personnel would be available for duty in the event two Army Prisoner of War Enclosures would be operated by the 734th Field Artillery Battalion.

At Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 10, FLORANGE (U8281), 11 officers, and 175 enlisted men of the 734th Field Artillery Battalion, the 497th Military Police Escort Guard Company, the 301st Military Police Escort Guard Company, (Advance Section, Communications Zone) a section of the 497th Medical Collecting Company, one platoon of the 647th Quartermaster Truck Company, and Interrogation of Prisoner of War and Counter Intelligence Corps Teams, reported for duty on 11 November.

The 34th Regulating Station ascertained on 10 November that facilities for train evacuation from Third U. S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 10, would be available.

Because of the overcrowded conditions at the Continental Central Prisoner of War Enclosure at STENAY (P1303), the Advance Section, Communications Zone Provost Marshal on 30 November ordered prisoner of war evacuations routed to the Communications Zone Central Enclosure at COMPIEGNE (P6403). This was done until 26 November when this headquarters was advised to route evacuations back to Advance Section, Communications Zone Central Prisoner of War Enclosure at STENAY (P1303).

The responsibility of supplying food and water to the prisoners of war evacuated by train from Army Prisoner of War Enclosures was placed upon the 301st and 306th Military Police Escort Guard Companies, Advance Section, Communications Zone, by the Commanding General, Advance Section, Communications Zone. The 306th Military Police Escort Guard Company was able to draw sufficient five gallon water cans and rations to facilitate the train evacuation of prisoners of war.

Letter, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, file AG 383.6 OMMCY, dated 14 November 1944, subject, "Retention of Prisoners of War by Forward Units," was published and given distribution "A" and "C". See annex 16).

Steps were initiated during this period for the withdrawal of all processed prisoner of war labor as soon as using medical units crossed the German border. Plans were also inaugurated for the illumination of future prisoners of war Enclosures located in Germany.

Letter, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, AG 383.6 GAP-AGE, dated 30 November 1944, subject, "Treatment of Prisoners of War," was distributed to all Division and Corps Headquarters.

Letter, Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, file AG 383.6 OMMCY, dated 12 December 1944, subject, "Procedure at Prisoner of War Enclosures, with Respect to Enemy Soldiers Taken Captive in Civilian Clothing," was published.

It was observed on 13 November that divisions were sending through Prisoner of War Channels, civilians, who, after having been screened by Army Counter Intelligence Corps, were classified as Displaced Persons. With the cooperation of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, these Displaced Persons were evacuated to the Civil Affairs Center at VERDUN (U2865).

Two female German Red Cross workers were evacuated 29 November to Advance Section, Communications Zone from Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 9. Under the Articles of the Geneva Convention they were treated as Protected Personnel.

On 23 November, General ANTON DOSTLER, Storm Trooper, Commander of the METZ (U8539) and SAAR (Q4070) area, and Colonel CONSTANTIN HEYER, Commandant of METZ (U8539), after having been interrogated by the Army Commander, were evacuated to Twelfth Army Group from Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 9.

This Headquarters approved a command letter to be distributed by the Army Surgeon which required Army Hospitals to comply with Third U. S. Army Outline Plan, Annex 19 (The Provost Marshal Plan) dated 11 May 1944, namely to submit daily a roster of enemy wounded, admitted and deceased. If necessary a negative report would be submitted.

On 30 November the Army Medical Section submitted to this office the figures of admissions of wounded prisoners of war to Army Hospitals, for the period 1 November to 29 November inclusive. As some Third U. S. Army Hospitals did not comply with Annex 19, paragraph 4, of 11 May 1944, the Surgeon's total exceeded by 801 the total of admissions reported by the individual hospitals to this section during the same period. This difference was incorporated in the accumulative total of prisoners of war received for the entire period of operations.

Prisoner of War statistics for the month of November:

On hand at Enclosures as of 31 October	142
Received during month at Prisoner of War Enclosures. . .	24133
TOTAL.	24275
Evacuated	13107
On hand at Prisoner of War Enclosures, 30 November . . .	3168
Received during month at Prisoner of War Enclosures. . .	24133
Admitted during month at Third U.S. Army Hospitals . . .	1772
Total prisoners of war handled during November	25918

Total number of Prisoners of War from 1 August to 30 November 1944 inclusive: 128,858. (See annex 17).

Total number of escapees and evadors during November: 32.

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

Battery "A", 734th Field Artillery Battalion, arrived in NANCY (U8511) 2 November for training in preparation for duty on security check points around NANCY (U8511). An Orientation School was conducted for the 734th Field Artillery Battalion on 3 and 4 November, and the Battalion began duty on security screening posts as of 050800 November, and was relieved on the 10th November.

XII Corps Military Police assumed responsibility for Maintenance of Law and Order in ETAIN (U4770) 5 November.

Maintenance of Law and Order patrols were placed in PONT A MOUSSON (U9736) at the request of XII Corps Provost Marshal.

Military Police were posted at a bridge in VERDUN (U2865) on a security measure during hours of darkness at the request of the Twelfth U.S. Army Group Provost Marshal.

Circular 77, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 13 November 1944, announced that all unauthorized enclosures on 1/4 ton and 3/4 ton, 4 x 4, trucks were unauthorized and would be removed immediately.

Circular Number 78, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, 16 November, concerning carrying civilians in Military Transportation was published as follows:

IV. CARRYING CIVILIANS IN MILITARY TRANSPORTATION.

1. Paragraph 2, Section VI, Circular 63, this Headquarters, 1944 series, is rescinded and the following substituted therefor in accordance with letter, Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, file 230 (FE), subject as above, dated 5 November 1944.

a. Civilians may be carried in United States Military vehicles on official business. Written authority will be provided by the responsible officer to the vehicle driver in all cases where carrying civilians in individual military vehicles is permitted in accordance with Section VI, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army pamphlet, AG 451/3 PUB OC, 24 January 1944, "Maintenance and Operation of Motor Vehicles," or to the officer in charge in all cases where displaced persons or refugees are carried in convoy under Civil Affairs military government auspices. In addition to the written authority prescribed herein, convoys of refugees or displaced persons will carry on the lead vehicle a placard "Displaced Persons." The written authority will include date, names of passengers, nature of official business, destination, and organization of the authorizing officer.

b. Military Police will halt all individual vehicles carrying civilians and all convoys carrying displaced persons and check to insure the presence of the written authority as required in paragraph a above. In the case of displaced persons' convoys the letter of authority carried by the officer in charge will be deemed sufficient authentication for all vehicles of the convoy unless special doubt exists with reference to the passengers involved. In case no proper authorization exists the Military Police will conduct the person in charge of the vehicle or vehicles, as the case may be, to the nearest Summary Court for trial or preferment of charges as is appropriate. The civilians involved will be turned over to the nearest Civil Affairs detachment for check-up.

Circular Number 81, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, 22 November, 1944, was published and Section III announced that any fraternizing with prisoners of war or selling or bartering of various articles of personal property would be severely dealt with.

Circular Number 88, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 23 November 1944, announced the policy in regard to individual purchases of food, industrial products, as follows:

I. INDIVIDUAL PURCHASES.

1. In order to prevent inflation and to avoid hardship to the civilian population, the purchase of all rationed or controlled goods and commodities by personnel of this command for their personal use is prohibited.

2. To accommodate troops on pass and by special arrangement with the Commissioner of the French Republic, Region of NANCY, restrictions as to purchase of meals in restaurants, cafes and hotels are relaxed in that portion of the Region of NANCY lying within the Third U.S. Army Zone. Restaurants meeting the sanitary regulations will be provided with a notice, "Authorized for U.S. Military Personnel," which will be posted in a conspicuous place near the entrance.

3. Water in NANCY and numerous cities in the area is grossly contaminated at the present time. Signs indicating "Water is not potable" will be posted in conspicuous places in restaurants where applicable, and such water will not be consumed by U.S. Military personnel.

4. The following products indicate the type of articles that may be purchased by U. S. Military personnel:

Alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages; certain textile products, leather goods and footwear; all paper products; perfume; pipes; and trays; cigarette lighters; photographic equipment; musical instruments;

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fare and antiques.

Two German prisoners who had escaped from an advance Section, Communications Zone Camp were apprehended in VERDUN (U3865) and sent to the Prisoner of War Enclosure at TOUL (U6401) 26 November.

Letter, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, AG 250.1 GNEXY, dated 25 November 1944, subject, "Reporting of Crimes, Offenses and Serious Incidents," was published. (See annex 18).

French civilians from PARIS (B0140) were apprehended in NANCY (U8511) for violation of travel restrictions and were turned over to Counter Intelligence Corps, Communications Zone, for investigation.

Black Market Transactions and Illegal Sales, Possession, and Barter of United Nations Government Property:

During the month of November, Military Police, with the assistance of local police in many instances, conducted searches in FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4637), VERDUN (U3865), MEUVES MAISONS (U7903), TOUL (U6401), and NANCY (U8511), which resulted in the recovery of a large quantity of U. S. Government property. Cases involving black market transactions by civilians were referred to Civil Affairs for appropriate action against civilian offenders through French Courts. Cases in which civilians were found in possession of U. S. Government property were also referred to Civil Affairs and offenders were prosecuted by the French Courts. Instances involving sale or barter of U. S. Government property by military personnel were referred to the Criminal Investigation Sub-Section for investigation to be used as a basis of preferring charges against offenders concerned.

During the month, 2,370 gallons of gasoline, 230 pounds of coffee, 180 pounds of lard, seventy pounds of sugar, fifty pounds of flour, 17,900 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition, four carbines, thirty blankets, thirty-one cases of soap, and a quantity of miscellaneous rations and clothing were recovered as a result of searches made.

Absent Without Leave: The large number of AWOLs on the Continent prompted action by this Sub-Section to intensify efforts of all Military Police for apprehension of such absentees.

It was previously the policy of this Sub-Section to return stragglers and AWOLs to their units through the Replacement System whenever it was impractical to transport them directly to their units. Many instances of stragglers and AWOLs being apprehended two and three times when handled in this manner evidenced a need of change in policy in order to effectively reduce the number of outstanding AWOLs.

Late in the month instructions were issued to all Military Police to detain under arrest all persons apprehended who were AWOL for a period of four days or more. Such persons were either at the nearest Military Police Headquarters or at the Third U. S. Army stockade pending arrival of guards from the unit concerned to return the AWOL under arrest. Men who had been absent from their organizations less than four days were sent to the nearest Replacement Installations as stragglers.

In NANCY (U8511), prisoner of war trucks were used to return AWOLs to XII Corps units, and further utilization of any such available transportation is contemplated.

As an additional measure to reduce the number of outstanding AWOLs, a special roving patrol was put into operation which had the primary mission of spot checking locations throughout the Third U. S. Army area for the apprehension of AWOLs.

During the last week of the month, twenty-two aggravated cases of AWOL ranging from 18 to 110 days were apprehended as a result of intensified efforts by Military Police.

Patrols: The following towns and cities were covered by Maintenance of Law and Order Military Police during the month:

BAR LE DUC	(U1128)	NANCY	(U8511)
CHALIGNY	(U7804)	NEUFCHATEAU	(B4973)
CHAVIGNY	(U8304)	MEUVES MAISONS	(U7903)
COMMERCY	(U4320)	PONT A MOUSSON	(U7735)
DOMECOURT	(U4963)	PONT ST VINCENT	(U7409)
ESCH	(F7301)	ST MAURICE	(U5643)
ETAIN	(U4770)	ST NIHIEL	(U3935)
FRESNES EN WOEVRE	(U4637)	TOUL	(U6401)
HANNONVILLE	(U4851)	VERDUN	(U3865)
LERAUVILLE	(U3485)	VIGNEULLES	(U5144)
LIGNY	(U2113	VOID	(U6412)

Summary Courts were in operation during the month at TOUL (U6401) and NANCY (U8511).

Details of cases tried by the Summary Courts for the month were as follows:

VIOLATIONS	COURT MARTIAL 1	COURT MARTIAL 2	TOTAL
No pass	256	90	346
Curfew	122	10	132
Speeding	9	82	91
Double banking	52	22	74
Reckless driving	1	48	49
Unguarded vehicle	23	18	41
Uniform violations	16	25	41
Drunk and disorderly	21	19	40
Unauthorized use of vehicle		13	13
Unauthorized use of weapon	4	3	7
Transporting civilians		7	7
Loitering and straggling		7	7
Unauthorized use of gasoline		7	7
Disobeying Military Police	2	3	5
Theft		2	2
Disrespect for officer	2	1	3
Negligence on duty	1		1
TOTALS	509	397	866

Delinquencies: During the month the following delinquency reports were processed by the Maintenance of Law and Order Sub-Section.

Pass violations	1421
Out of uniform	543
Leaving vehicle unattended	247
Speeding	207
Disorderly	126
Drunk	99
Carrying unauthorized passengers	92
Double banking	91
No trip ticket	88
Reckless driving	54
Improper use of Government vehicle	49
Tag up on vehicle	33
Failure to obey Military Police	22
Illegal carrying of civilians	14
Officer driving	11
Driving while drunk	9
Theft	4
Assault	1
TOTAL	3118

Stragglers: Straggler collecting points were in operation during the month at the following locations:

BAR LE DUC	(U1128)	NEUFCHATEAU	(B4973)
COMMERCY	(U4320)	MEUVES MAISONS	(U7903)
ESCH	(F7301)	PONT A MOUSSON	(U7735)
FRESNES EN WOEVRE	(U4637)	TOUL	(U6401)
LIGNY	(U2113)	VERDUN	(U3865)
NANCY	(U8511)		

Disposition of stragglers during the month was as follows:

To Units	29
To Seine Base Section	56
To Normandy Base Section	2
Broke confinement	1
TOTAL	88

General prisoners on hand at Third U.S. Army stockade as of 30 November: 20.

SECTION V - INVESTIGATION SUB-SECTION

Following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 4 November:

Murder	1
Assault and battery	1
Larceny	2
Black market	2
Assault	1
TOTAL	7

Following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 11 November:

Sale of salvage	1
Sale of U. S. military property	1
Assault	1
Robbery	1
Black market	1
Manslaughter	1
Shooting French civilian (accidental)	1
Suspected fraud	1
TOTAL	8

Following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 18 November:

Misappropriation of U.S. military property	1
Murder	2
Wrongful disposal of U.S. military property	1
Justifiable shooting	1
Spy (German)	1
Black market	3
Rape	1
Larceny	1
Sale of U.S. military property	1
Assault and battery	1
TOTAL	13

Following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 25 November:

Manslaughter	2
Assault	1
Murder	1
Black market	3
Alleged murder	2
Loss of medical supply	1
TOTAL	10

The following criminal cases were pending final investigation as of 30 November:

Rape	1
Assault and battery	1
Manslaughter	1
Fraud	1
Attempted murder	1
Fatal shooting	2
Alleged murder	2
Black market	2
TOTAL	11

During the month of November forty criminal cases were reported for investigation of which thirty-eight were completed, reports compiled and forwarded.

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CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

On 6 December a plan was initiated and approved, dividing the Army Service Zone into two areas, assigning one Military Police Battalion to each Zone, with complete responsibility for all Provost Marshal activities in that Zone. This new method was effected before entering Germany in order that responsibility be definite and fixed for the security of the Army.

The Military Police Zone was shifted northward 27 December with the 503rd Military Police Battalion assuming responsibility of all area south of and including route N3 and METZ (U8597) with the 512th Military Police Battalion north thereof.

Two convicted German spies sentenced to be shot by musketry were executed at the TOUL (U6401) Prisoner of War Enclosure on 14 December. The sentence was carried out under the supervision of the Army Provost Marshal with the firing squad composed of twelve selected men from the 97End Military Police Escort Guard Company.

On 26 December the Third U. S. Army Forward Echelon Headquarters moved from NANCY (U8611) to LUXEMBOURG (P8414).

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

During the month of December the general condition of the roads was fair, but because of continued rains the shoulders were soft and muddy. Slippery spots were created wherever a vehicle pulled onto the surface from either the shoulders or from a side road. High waters covered roads and bridges in several locations. This necessitated detours and extra traffic control.

Recommendations were made for the lifting of restrictions on civilian traffic west of the MEURTHE-MOSELLE River on 2 December. However, travel restrictions remained in effect east of this line. Conference was held with civilian authorities relative to the restoring of the tramway system in NANCY (U8611), which relieved a large amount of civilian traffic on the main roads leading into the city and operation commenced on 4 December.

Because of an accident on the Main Supply Route in the west side of NANCY (U8511) on 7 December wherein a tank retriever went out of control on a steep hill and crashed into a cafe, demolishing the building, setting it afire, killing the crew and several others, the Main Supply Route was changed to afford a more gradual descent into town.

The fall of the remaining forts at METZ (U8597) on 13 December removed the last major obstacles to uninterrupted use of the road net in that area. N3 was not yet open west of METZ (U8597). Engineers cleared mines, removed road blocks, and repaired the road. The majority of bridge and road maintenance problems were in Corps and Division areas. Minor alterations were made on north and Main Supply Route bridges in NANCY (U8511) to lay gas and water lines across the river on these bridges. This caused no change in the traffic situation. An overpass at PONT A MOUSSON (U7735) was declared useable (Class 70) by the Engineers.

Plans were made for local regional French Police to take over traffic duties in NANCY (U8611) other than on the Main Supply Route. Civilians on roads continued to be a minor problem. Military Police road patrols picked them up and delivered them to Civil Affairs Displaced Persons Center.

On 17 December, after receipt of information of the German breakthrough in the First U. S. Army area, special officer couriers were dispatched to each Military Police Battalion with four troop movement routes. Routes A, B, C and D were initiated and posted. All Military Police personnel with the exception of a small battalion overhead were concentrated on traffic duty at this critical time. (See annex 19). The III Corps moved at once from METZ (U8597) to LONDEF (P5805) and became operational in that sector. The 4th Armored Division was alerted to move at once from its concentration area near FUNETRANGE (Q4720), and at 180200 Combat Command B was enroute using Route A, destination LONDEF (P5805). All these moves crossed at HARCHVILLE (Q1738) at 180330, the 4th Armored Division having priority. No traffic tie-up ensued. Military Police pointsmen and patrols had been stationed in HARCHVILLE (Q1738) and had been alerted as to this situation. Combat Command B and Combat Command A, 4th Armored Division followed Combat Command B on Route A. 80th Infantry Division moved from PUTTELANGE (U9499) to LONDEF (P5805) on Route C followed by the 26th Infantry Division. In addition, eighteen Field Artillery Battalions, eleven Engineer Battalions, two Corps Headquarters, and other special units were moved. Traffic to the north continued unabated. Several detours were necessitated for various reasons; landslips, a weakened bridge, bombing and strafing and several wrecks. On 22 December the 35th Infantry Division commenced movement to the north. An additional bridge (Bailey) was constructed across the canal at METZ (U8597) to alleviate the heavy traffic flow through that city. Two bridges at HARANGE (Q1899) were temporarily out during the night necessitating the detour of 35th Infantry Division movement. This detour was also changed because of bombing of SOULAY (Q0965) the same evening. The roads continued to be occupied by the 35th Infantry Division and Engineer units on 23 December. XII Corps Headquarters moved north with attached troops following. The remainder of the 42nd Infantry Division closed.

One officer and thirty-five enlisted men of the 512th Military Police Battalion were rushed to BASTOGNE (P5597) during the night of 26 December to handle the critical traffic situation in the 101st Airborne Division area.

During the month clearances for over 300 convoys involving over 28,000 vehicles were processed through the Traffic Sub-Section.

A recommendation was made that the Main Supply Route Number 2 be divided between COMPLANS (U8465), JARNY (U8564) and PONTIERRE (Q8040) to make the original route one way eastbound and make the other route, N52b, N406, D60, N52, Q645 and 13, one way, northbound. This change was recommended because of the width and conditions of road net at these places.

A group of enemy planes bombed and strafed a convoy of reinforcements and incidental traffic on highway N53, 10 miles south of LUXEMBOURG (P8414). No direct bomb hits were scored on the road, but the highway was blocked by burning trucks and debris. A bypass through HONSDORFF (P9408) was immediately placed in effect, and highway N53 was reopened to traffic in two hours.

Because of the expansion of the Army Service Area, and also the support of XX, III and VIII Corps in their service areas, signing of road intersections and junctions became extremely important. Hundreds of signs were posted, and extra signing crews were detailed to completely cover the Army area for route numbering and marking.

Electric flasher lamps that had been used in the Army area were collected and delivered to the Corps Provost Marshals for use on bridges and defiles in the Division areas. 3,000 blank route marking signs, and 5,000 numbered route marking signs were received on 8 December from Engineers and distributed to Corps Provost Marshals and Army Military Police Battalions.

Rear boundaries were established on 2 December as follows:

XII Corps: North along highway N414 from intersection south lateral boundary (Q0807) to MOYENVIC (Q1421); highway N55 through CHATEAU SALINS (Q1225) to intersection with north lateral boundary (U9443), all to Army.

XX Corps: North along MOSELLE River from intersection with south lateral boundary vicinity (U7734) to ARNAVILLE (U7647); highway N52b through CHAMBLEY (U8451); JARNY (U8564 to BRIEY (U6913); N406 through AUDUN (U6707) to AUMETZ (U7062); C644 to ESCH (P7301); N4 to intersection north lateral boundary vicinity (P7308), all to Army.

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 9, TOUL (U6401) closed 19 December, 21,191 prisoners of war were evacuated through this Enclosure during the period from 21 September to 17 December 1944.

Third U. S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 11, FOLSCHVILLER (Q8254) which opened on 10 December was closed 20 December. No prisoners of war were evacuated through this Enclosure as military expediency necessitated the early closing.

On 21 December reconnaissance was made for a suitable location of an Army Prisoner of War Enclosure in the area of FLORANGE (U4401), ETRAY (P1503).

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 12, St. Jean Caserne, MARVILLE ST JEAN (U3596) opened 25 December. Operating personnel of this Enclosure was composed of eight officers and 123 enlisted men of the 734th Field Artillery Battalion, the 472nd Military Police Escort Guard Company, the 305th Military Police Escort Guard Company, a portion of the 437th Medical Collecting Company as well as Interrogation Prisoner of War and Counter Intelligence Corps teams. Evacuation of prisoners of war from Enclosure Number 12 to Advance Section, Communications Zone Central Enclosure at ETRAY (P1503) was made by truck as per arrangements made with 26th Regulating Station, Advance Section, Communications Zone Liaison organization.

Two additional Military Police Escort Guard Companies were attached to Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army on 29 December; 483rd Military Police Escort Guard Company reported at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 10, FLORANGE (U8281) and 430th Military Police Escort Guard Company at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 12, MARVILLE ST JEAN (U3596).

VIII Corps Prisoner of War Collecting Point was manned by personnel of the 734th Field Artillery Battalion as this Corps was attached to Third U. S. Army.

Seven German Nationals held at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 9, TOUL (U6401), were evacuated to the French Interment Camp at ECROUVES (U5911). Sixteen of the nineteen German Nationals held at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 10, FLORANGE (U8281), were evacuated to the Displaced Person's Camp at ECROUVES (U5911), as they were German Nationals living in France; the remainder were German Nationals who resided in Germany and these people were interned on 17 December.

Several Divisions requested additional War Department Provost Marshal General Forms Number 1. The Theater Provost Marshal Officer was contacted, but it was learned that there were no more forms available in this theater.

On 18 December, letter, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, file 383.6 OpGA, subject, "Prisoner of War Labor," dated 27 November 1944 was distributed.

Circular 90, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, published 17 December, rescinded the sections of Circulars 9 and 38, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, governing the procedures in the disposition of the effects of enemy dead, and adopted the recommendations as set forth in the memorandum of this office to the Graves Registration Officer, namely that the effects be sent directly to the Effects Quartermaster, Communications Zone, instead of to the nearest Prisoner of War Enclosure.

Prisoner of war statistics for the month of December:

On hand at Enclosures as of 30 November.	2148
Received during month at Prisoner of War Enclosures. . .	17079
TOTAL.	19347
Evacuated	18747
On hand at Prisoner of War Enclosures, 31 December . . .	480
Received during month at Prisoner of War Enclosures. . .	17079
Admitted during month at Third U.S. Army Hospitals . . .	1341
Total prisoners of war handled during December	18420

Total number of prisoners of war from 1 August to 31 December 1944: 146,678. (See annex 20).

Total number of escapees and evaders during December: 3.

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

In accordance with advice from the Theater Provost Marshal a new rigorous policy in returning AWOLs to Military Control was inaugurated 1 December. The program entailed the following four points:

1. A complete list of current Third U.S. Army AWOLs was obtained from the Machine Records Unit and distributed to all Military Police Detachments.

2. All men absent from their organizations without passes and not on duty status were taken to military Police Headquarters and checked against these lists.

3. AWOLs were then held for release in arrest to their organization or for delivery to the Reinforcement System if distance

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rendered the sending of an armed guard impractical. However, men who admitted being absent for more than four days were returned to their units under guard in every case.

4. To supplement the normal Military Police activities, a special mobile patrol was established with the primary mission of apprehending AWOLs.

On 4 December arrangements were made for the conservation of transportation by having trucks which were evacuating prisoners of war from XII Corps Collecting Points to Army Enclosures stop on their return trip at NANCY (U8511) Military Police Headquarters and pick up stragglers. These trucks delivered the stragglers to Corps Provost Marshal.

During the period there was a noticeable decrease in reports of civilians dealing in and possession of U. S. Government gasoline, rations, and other miscellany.

Summary Court Number 2 was discontinued 9 December. Since its inception on 10 September 1944, the court handled 1099 cases involving offenders from 643 separate organizations, resulting in 1389 convictions. In 166 cases, charges against officers and senior non-commissioned officers not subject to the jurisdiction of the court were forwarded to the Office of the Provost Marshal for the proper disposal. Eighty-three men accused of serious crimes were released to their unit commanders pending completion of investigation and trial.

On 10 December, Circular Number 88, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 10 December 1944, pertaining to Unauthorized Enclosures on Vehicles and Restrictions as to Top of Vehicles was published as follows and given distribution "A" and "C".

I. UNAUTHORIZED ENCLOSURES ON 1/4 TON AND 3/4 TON 4 X 4 TRUCKS.

Section IV, Circular 77, this headquarters, dated 13 November 1944, relative to enclosing 1/4 ton and 3/4 ton trucks is amended as follows:

"Flaps attached to the windshields of 1/4 ton trucks for protection against wind and mud are permissible provided they do not extend back beyond the front seat, do not obstruct frontmost vision, and do not interfere with the quick exit of the occupants of the truck."

II. RESTRICTION AS TO TOPS OF VEHICLES.

Paragraph 1, Section VI, Circular 63, this headquarters, dated 4 October 1944, which reads as follows: "The tops on trucks, 1/4 ton, and trucks, 3/4 ton C and K, will be down at all times except during heavy rains" is rescinded.

Circular 89, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army announced on 14 December the amended pass policy and 2100 hours curfew in NANCY (U8511).

The rapidly changing tactical situation and the consequent threat to rear areas made the Military Police organization a primary force in the maintenance of security and the apprehension of suspicious individuals. To meet this need an emergency issue of 1,200 fragmentation hand grenades was made to the 512th Military Police Battalion.

Efforts were made to disseminate all pertinent information to Military Police units as quickly as possible so as to keep the man on post advised of the latest happenings in order that he might be more able to cope with situations as they arise.

Security patrols and the operation of check points and road blocks at key road junctions placed a heavy strain on personnel available for normal Law and Order functions. Town patrol forces were skeletonized to provide the additional security forces, in an effort to avoid drawing upon traffic personnel at a time when heavy and important traffic movements continued. Gaps in Law and Order enforcement were filled in many places by auxiliary police and greater vigilance on the part of unit commanders, who were contacted on the ground and asked to cooperate.

In accordance with the provisions of Circular 120, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, 13 December, 1944, a new system for the handling of AWOLs through Military Police channels was placed in effect during the previous week. Under the new system each Military Police Battalion maintained an AWOL Collecting Center through which AWOLs were returned under Military Police guard to Corps units. AWOLs from other Armies, Air Force and Communications Zone units were cleared through the Army AWOL Collecting Center, located near Rear Echelon, to the Communications Zone AWOL Center. AWOLs from Army troops were held for unit guards. This system placed a new burden on Military Police personnel and transportation, but it was expected to be more efficient than the former method of handling AWOLs through Reinforcement channels, which frequently permitted the AWOL to remain his absence without leave before he could be returned to his unit for disciplinary action.

Upon the displacement of the Forward Echelon the Maintenance of Law and Order Sub-Section became the Rear Echelon of the Provost Marshal Section. One officer and two men represented the Sub-Section in the Forward Echelon.

Details of cases tried by Summary Courts for the month were as follows:

VIOLATIONS	COURT NUMBER 1	COURT NUMBER 2	TOTAL
No pass	233	16	249
Curfew	35	14	49
Speeding	8	25	33
Double banking	16	1	17
Reckless driving		20	20
Unguarded vehicle	15	3	18
Uniform violation	4		4
Drunk and disorderly	9		9
Unauthorized vehicle	1		1
Unauthorized use of weapon	3		3
Transporting civilians	1	1	2
Disobeying Military Police	1		1
Brake arrest		1	1
TOTALS	326	81	407

Straggler Collecting Points operated during the month in ESCH (P7301), NANCY (U8511), PONT A MOUSSON (U7735), TOUL (U6401) and VERDUN (U2865).

Motor and/or walking patrols operated during the month in the following towns and cities:

AVRIL	(U7176)	JARNY	(U8564)
BAINVILLE	(Q0965)	JAVIL	(P7700)
BETTEMBOURG	(P8103)	LANDRES	(U6062)
BRIEY	(U6973)	LONGWY	(P5805)
CHALIGNY	(U7804)	MORHANGE	(Q2037)
CHAMBLEY	(U6651)	MOYENVIC	(Q1420)
CHATEAU SALINS	(Q1025)	METZ	(U8559)
CHAVIGNY	(U8304)	MARS LA TOUR	(U6558)
CLOUANGE	(U6175)	NANCY	(U8511)
COMMERCY	(U4220)	NEUVES MAISONS	(U7903)
CONFLANS	(U6465)	NEUFCHEF	(U7581)
DONCOURT	(U6963)	PAGNY	(U5112)
DIEUZE	(Q2524)	POMPEY	(U6120)
DUDELANGE	(U8099)	PONT A MOUSSON	(U7735)
ESCH	(P7301)	PONT ST. VINCENT	(U7409)
ETAIN	(U4770)	ST. MAURICE	(U5843)
FRESNES	(U4659)	ST. NICHOLAS	(U8505)
FALCKENMONT	(C1849)	ST. AVOLD	(Q2356)
FLAVIGNY	(U7156)	THIONVILLE	(Z7199)
FLORANGE	(U8382)	THIAUCOURT	(U6341)
FOUG	(U5612)	TOUL	(U6401)
HATANGE	(U7682)	VANDIERES	(U7541)
HANNONVILLE	(U4651)	VIGNEULLES	(U5144)

Delinquency reports for the month were as follows:

Pass violations	1022
Unattended vehicle	222
Uniform violations	184
No trip ticket	107
Speeding	102
Double banking	72
Carrying unauthorized passengers	54
Drunk	46
Unlicensed vehicle	43
Selling rations	41
Disorderly	33
Unauthorized use of vehicle	24
Vehicle abuse	33
TOTAL	1971

Disposition of stragglers for the month was as follows:

To Units	83
To Reinforcement Depots	13
TOTAL	76

Absent Without Leave reports:

AWOLs apprehended	166
Total number of days AWOL	2194
Average number of days AWOL per man	13

Third U. S. Army personnel AWOL 31 December 1944 as per Machine Records Unit records: 628.

General prisoners evacuated or released during the month was as follows:

To Units	13
Evacuated to Seine Base Section	67
TOTAL	80

General prisoners on hand at Third U. S. Army stockade as of 31 December 1944: 33.

SECTION V - INVESTIGATION SUB-SECTION

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during week ending 2 December:

Black market	3
Murder	1
Attempted murder	1
Assault with intent to commit rape	1
Alleged larceny	1
Sale of U. S. Military property	1
Alleged shooting	1
Damage to civilian property	1
Misappropriation of U.S. military property	1
Fatal shooting	1
TOTAL	12

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 9 December:

Black Market	2
Rape	2
TOTAL	4

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 16 December:

Larceny	1
Drunk and disorderly	1
Shooting	1
Assault with intent to commit rape	1
Assault with intent to do bodily harm	1
Robbery	2
Misappropriation of U. S. property	1
Confidential investigation	1
Rape	1
Careless discharge of weapon	1
TOTAL	11

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 23 December:

Fraud	1
Larceny of U. S. Army rations	1
Murder	2
Attempted murder	1
Alleged looting	1
Black market	2
Statutory rape	1
Fatal shooting	1
Narcotic case	1
Alleged housebreaking	1
TOTAL	12

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The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 30 December:

Assault with intent to do bodily harm	1
Murder	2
Accidental shooting	1
Black market	2
Fatal shooting	1
Alleged housebreaking	1
TOTAL	8

The following criminal cases were pending final investigation as of 31 December:

Assault and battery	1
Black market	5
Murder	2
Manslaughter	1
Assault with intent to do bodily harm	1
TOTAL	10

SECTION VI - PRISONER OF WAR EXECUTIVE SUB-SECTION

Allied Prisoner of War Camps as follows were overrun by Third U.S. Army: Johannes Dannburg, vicinity of BOULAY (Q1264) on 1 December; CRUTZWALD (Q2468) on 3 December; SARREGUEMINES (Q5157) on 10 December.

On 11 December a detachment of one officer and fifteen enlisted men of the 734th Field Artillery Battalion was sent to handle the administrative matters at the overrun German Prisoner of War Camp at CRUTZWALD (Q2468) which contained approximately 800 Allied prisoners of war. The overrun Allied Prisoner of War Camp at SARREGUEMINES (Q5157) was evacuated by XII Corps to CRUTZWALD (Q2468). On 21 December approximately 500 Allied prisoners of war were evacuated from BOULAY (Q1264) to TOUL (D6401) and after conference with the Army Surgeon, 894 Allied prisoners of war remaining at BOULAY (Q1264) were evacuated to TOUL (D6401).

There were four Contact Officers, Majors, from Prisoner of War Executive Office, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, now attached to Third U. S. Army. One was assigned to each of the Corps, and the latest arrival was stationed at Johannes Dannburg Camp near BOULAY (Q1264) under XII Corps attachment, and engaged in documenting Allied prisoners of war.

On 17 December the 287th Field Artillery Battalion was assigned to Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army. The Battalion was ordered to move to Camp Johannes Dannburg, near BOULAY (Q1264), to take over the administration of the Allied Prisoner of War Camp.

On 30 December a report of the handling of the Allied prisoners of war was submitted by the Prisoner of War Executive Liaison Officer, Third U. S. Army, and forwarded to G-1, Twelfth Army Group, for transmission to Prisoner of War Executive, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces.

SECTION VII - INTERNMENT CAMP SUB-SECTION

On 19 December the Internment Camp Sub-Section of the Prisoner of War Sub-Section was initiated and necessary steps were taken to establish files, notes and Standing Operating Procedures to facilitate the functioning of internment camps when their operation would become necessary in Third U. S. Army Zone.



SECTION VIII - DEFENSE - LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS SUB-SECTION

During the month of December the following installations in the Army area were guarded in connection with security of Line of Communications:

7	Railway tunnels
27	Railway bridges
1	Highway overpass
16	Highway bridges

The following troops were used to guard the above installations:

4405th Quartermaster Service Company.
1st and 3rd Companies, 151st French Infantry Regiment
287th Field Artillery Battalion
51 Gendarmes from the 10th Legion Gendarmes
4th and 6th Squadrons, 4th Regiment, French Republican Guards.

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CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

Third U. S. Army Rear Echelon moved from NANCY (U6511), France, to ESCH (P7301), Luxembourg, on 5 January.

The ever increasing responsibilities of the Provost Marshal in the present operations made it necessary that the Provost Marshal Section be increased by adding Sub-Sections and personnel to properly supervise and administer the 190 officers and approximately 3550 enlisted men operating directly under his control. Following are listed the major items for which the Army Provost Marshal was held responsible:

1. Criminal Investigation.
2. Maintenance of Law and Order, including:
   a. Army General Prisoner Stockade.
   b. Army and Battalion Zone ARCE Stockades.
   c. Summary Courts.
3. Traffic Control.
4. Prisoners of War.
5. Overrun Allied Prisoners of War.
6. German Internment Camps.
7. Aid to Civil Affairs in handling Refugees.
8. Security of all lines of Communication in the Army area.
9. Command Post Defense, including Cordon Defense.
10. Maintenance of an Emergency Force.

At approximately 1650 January 14 a shell of unknown caliber and origin struck an Apartment House at 3-5-7-9 Avenue Pasteur, LUXEMBOURG (P6414), causing considerable damage to the building, killing one civilian, injuring six other civilians and two unknown American soldiers, who were walking along the street.

The Provost Marshal, Fifteenth U. S. Army visited this section 17 January to obtain details on organization and operation of the Provost Marshal Office.

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

A survey was made of LUXEMBOURG (P6414) on 4 January for possible installation of a tramway system, but because tracks were located on main and essential military highways it was deemed advisable not to start the tramway system at that time.

Advance elements of Third U. S. Army Rear Echelon moved from NANCY (U8511) to ESCH (P7301) on 5 January.

Troop Movements were as follows: 90th Infantry Division (three Combat Teams) from THIONVILLE (U8687) to SAEUL (P7427). 94th Infantry Division from REIMS (T3080) to UCKANGE (U8579).

Report was received from Executive Officer of Company "C", 518th Military Police Battalion on road reconnaissance of area north and west of ARLON (P6122), where snow conditions had blocked some roads and restricted traffic to one-way on others, signing of these roads was poor. Extensive and comprehensive corrective measures were taken. Roads were sanded and cindered by patrols, and signs posted by the Military Police.

Extensive road reconnaissance was made in conjunction with the Engineers, to inspect roads, bridges and traffic conditions - route - LUXEMBOURG (P6414), THIONVILLE (U8687), METZ (U8559), MONTEVRE (U9774), BRIEY (U6973), AUDUN (U6488), LONGWY (P5805), ARLON (P6122), and LUXEMBOURG (P6414). Conferred enroute with the Engineers, Provost Marshal XX Corps, Civilian Engineers at METZ (U8557), Commanding Officers of the 503rd and 518th Military Police Battalions, and 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment. Excellent maintenance was observed on all roads vicinity of ARLON (P6122).

The balance of the 90th Infantry Division moves from THIONVILLE (U8687) to SAEUL (P7427), on 7 January. The 94th Infantry Division (one Combat Team) moved from REIMS (T3080) to UCKANGE (U8579). Company "A", 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion moved north for defense.

The Army Light Line was changed 14 January. Full lights were to be used in Division Rear Area, except in "no light" areas such as LUXEMBOURG (P6414), or for special tactical moves when the Corps Commanders desired the use of blackout.

A trip was made to VIII Corps to clarify administrative and operational boundaries between VIII Corps and Advance Section Communications Zone as a report has been received from the 713th Military Police Battalion that VIII Corps was administering their regulations in Advance Section Communications Zone.

Engineers were contacted 17 January to build a bridge on Rue de la Floredieux, which would enable vehicles to bypass LUXEMBOURG (P6414) with all traffic between routes number 7 and 11, and number 1.

A new prearranged messsage code was prepared and sent to the 503rd and 518th Military Police Battalions on 18 January.

A conference was held 19 January with G-4, G-3, and Engineers with reference to troop movements and road conditions. Troop movement routes were designated as such and efforts made to avoid crossing supply traffic with troop movements.

From the Seine Base Section 600 batons, reflectorized, 18 box signs, 64 lamps, electric flasher were received. Distribution of these items was made to the Corps and Military Police Battalions.

Road reconnaissance was made of the route from BASTOGNE (P5559) to WILTZ (P7154), HEIDERSCHEIDERGRUND (P7437), HIERDER (P7644), ETTELBRUCK (P8339) and DIEKIRCH (P8643), on 24 January.

A conference was held with Engineers as to road priority on maintenance of roads. First priority was given to troop movement roads and second priority to Main Supply Routes.

Administrative Order Number 16 established Rear Boundaries on 25 January as follows:

Army Rear Boundary: Beginning at intersection of road N52B with south lateral boundary, vicinity ARLAVILLE (U7446), along road N52B to CHAMBLEY (U6451) - MARS LA TOUR (U6559) - JARNY (U6363); road N390 to CONFLANS (U6465) - ETAIN (U4770); road N18 to LONGUYON (U4696); road N67 to MARVILLE (U3598) - MONTMEDY (P2905); road N381 to CARIGNAN (P1518) to junction with road IC 29, vicinity WX (P1619); road IC29 to junction with IC19, vicinity MESSINCOURT (P1423); road IC19 to MURD (P1529) to junction with road N44 (P1532); road N44 to junction with road N47 (P0834); road N47 to ROUILLON (P0836) - BIEVRE (P0553) - BEAURAING (P0172) to intersection with north lateral boundary (P0073), (all to Third U. S. Army).

Corps Rear Boundaries:

XX Corps: Beginning with intersection of N55 with south lateral boundary vicinity CHESNY (U9252), thence northwest on N55 to METZ (U8658), thence north along MOSELLE River to junction with lateral boundary to XX and XII Corps vicinity THIONVILLE (U8787), all to XX Corps except MOSELLE River to Army.

XII Corps: Beginning with intersection of lateral boundary between XII and XX Corps with N53 vicinity THIONVILLE (U8787), thence north on N53 and number 3 to LUXEMBOURG (P6414), thence east on number 6 and N4 to intersection with lateral boundary between XII and III Corps east of ARLON (P6122), all to Army except THIONVILLE to XX Corps.

III Corps: Beginning with intersection of N4 with lateral boundary between III and XII Corps east of ARLON (P6221), thence west on N4 to ARLON (P6122), N48 to intersection with lateral boundary between III and VIII Corps east of NEUFCHATEAU (P3540), all to Army except ARLON to III Corps.

VIII Corps: Beginning with intersection of N48 with lateral boundary between VIII and III Corps east of NEUFCHATEAU (P3546), thence northwest on N48 to CR N48 - N49 (P1860), thence north on N49 to intersection with north lateral boundary (P2169), all to Army except NEUFCHATEAU to Corps.

A meeting of Provost Marshal and Sub-Section Chiefs with Corps Provost Marshals to discuss policies was held on 31 January. The Light Line was fixed at Division Rear. In Command Post towns behind the Army Light Line through traffic was permitted full headlights.

During the month over 200 convoy clearances involving over 41,000 vehicles were processed through this office.

The 512th Military Police Battalion was employed to support VIII Corps Military Police in the movement of the 95th Infantry Division 29 January by patrolling N4 - ARLON (P6122) and BASTOGNE (P5559).

Major Troop Movements during the month were as follows:

The 8th and 9th Armored Divisions moved to PONT A MOUSSON (U9735) and THIONVILLE (U8687) respectively, on 12 January. Combat Command "B", 10th Armored Division and elements of the 90th Infantry Division moved 16 January. Elements of the 87th Infantry Division moved 15 January without difficulties. The 35th Infantry Division, (Combat Command B) 10th Armored Division, 101st Airborne Division, 76th Infantry Division and other units moved 19 January. The 35th Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division moved through Army area in good order. 101st Airborne Division moved slowly through the Army area because of icy road conditions. Movement of the 101st Airborne Division was completed 16 January. 4th Armored Division moved 23 January through the city of LUXEMBOURG (P6414), using routes 3, 4 and 5. Movement of the 76th Infantry Division commenced and passed through the city of LUXEMBOURG (P6414) during the night of 24 January. 76th and 87th Infantry Divisions moved smoothly 26 January. G-4 Transportation clearance for the movement of the 75th Infantry Division was received. Movement of the 4th Infantry Division on 28 January in BASTOGNE (P5559) was very slow because of heavy traffic in that area.

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

Letter, Twelfth Army Group, file 290 (G-2), dated 28 December 1944, subject, "Enemy Soldiers Apprehended in Civilian Clothing," was disseminated 4 January to all units under the control of this section.

This Office contacted the Quartermaster Field Service Officer, Third U. S. Army, in an attempt to replenish the stocks of captured enemy clothing on hand at the Enclosures.

A definite policy was established by Headquarters, Third U. S. Army on the handling of Allied Nationals who collaborated or served with the enemy, Circular 3, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, 7 January 1945. "Combat Commanders are not authorized to accept the parole of French, Belgian, Netherlands, or Luxembourg Nationals who have served with the German Forces. All Allied Nationals who have collaborated or served with the enemy and who are captured as prisoners of war will be handled and processed as prisoners of war within this command. Disposition of exceptional cases will be made by the Army Provost Marshal in accordance with instructions received from Higher Headquarters."

One thousand prisoner of war personal effects bags, Provost Marshal Service of Supply Form number 4, were sent to the Provost Marshal of III Corps partly filling their requisition for 10,000 bags.

The investigation of the death of a German Prisoner of War at Third U. S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 12 on 5 January was completed. An autopsy was performed by the 7th Medical Laboratory. Results of the autopsy showed that the prisoner of war died of natural, but undetermined causes. A report of the completed investigation was forwarded to the Theater Provost Marshal, Prisoner of War Information Bureau, through Provost Marshal, Twelfth Army Group.

Two German soldiers, who escaped from the Prisoner of War Camp near VERDUN (U2865), were apprehended by Military Police and Counter Intelligence Corps and taken to Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 12 at MARVILLE (U3394) after capture at COSNE (N4464).

Because of the small number of Escapers and Evaders who had been returned to United States Military control during a period of several months, the Escapers and Evaders Detachment (Intelligence School Western European Area 9, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) discussed with the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army, the possibility of withdrawing the detachment to PARIS (S0140) from its location at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 10, FLORANGE (U8381). Under the new plan not only Allied Air Force Escapers and Evaders, but also all Allied Ground Force Escapers and Evaders would be sent to PARIS (S0140).

An escaped prisoner of war, found to be a deserter from the German Army, was taken to Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 10 on 11 January after interrogation by Counter Intelligence Corps, at ESCH (P7301).

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Since Army Military Police Escort Guard Company Detachments had taken charge of the operation of Corps Prisoner of War Enclosures, the medical coverage was furnished by the Corps Surgeons.

The Ordnance Officer, Third U. S. Army approved the change of basic weapon for the 483rd and 472nd Military Police Escort Guard Companies from shotgun, riot type, to sub-machine gun, M3.

This Section submitted a requisition 28 January for 30,000 prisoner of war tags to the Engineer Officer, Third U. S. Army to be printed as a substitute for War Department Provost Marshal General Form number 1.

A copy of the Standing Operating Procedure of Prisoner of War Enclosures, prepared and reviewed by this Section, was sent to the Provost Marshal, Fifteenth U. S. Army on 29 January for his information.

The Provost Marshal VIII Corps requested this office on 30 January to establish an additional Corps Prisoner of War Enclosure because of the two Main Supply Routes in the Corps. As there were not sufficient personnel available, Third U. S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 18 dispatched two trucks to the one Corps Supply Point where there was no Prisoner of War Enclosure to shuttle incoming prisoners of war to the Corps Enclosure.

This Section contacted the 24th Regulating Station, Advance Section Communications Zone 31 January regarding the means of transportation in the evacuation of prisoners of war from Third U. S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 13, Jesuit College, ARLON (P6122).

Prisoner of War statistics for the month of January were as follows: (See annex 24).

On hand as of 31 December 1944	480
Received during January at Prisoner of War Enclosures	15,008
TOTAL	15,488
Evacuated	14,930
On hand at Prisoner of War Enclosures	558
Received at Prisoner of War Enclosures during January	15,008
Admitted at Third U. S. Army Hospitals during January	1,617
TOTAL prisoners of war handled by Third U.S. Army for month	16,625
Accumulative total for entire period of operations, 1 August 1944 to 31 January 1945, inclusive	182,297

Escapee and Evader statistics for the month of January were as follows:

Escapees and Evaders on hand as of 31 December 1944	None
Received during January	1
TOTAL	1
Evacuated	1
On hand 31 January	None

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

Circular Number 8, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 4 January 1945, "Military Control of the City of LUXEMBOURG (P6414) and Vicinity," was published. (See annex 21).

Battery "C", 734th Field Artillery Battalion moved to ESCH (P7301) and commenced training in Military Police work 14 January.

Seven civilians were picked up by Military Police patrols 18 January at HAYANGE (U7882) for curfew violations and fines by French Police.

Circular Number 6, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 26 January 1945, announced the curfew and pass policy in the Army areas. Curfew from 2100 to 0600 hours applied to both military and civilian personnel.

Summary Court Number 1 closed at HAMLY (U8511) on 25 January, and the court personnel were established in LUXEMBOURG (P6414) on 27 January.

During the month a close degree of cooperation was noted between the Military Police personnel and the personnel assigned to static details along the lines of communication. This cooperation was brought about and extended by the exchange of information and the loaning of aid by one group to the other. It was also noted that all organizations were paying a great deal of attention to the checking of personal identification credentials of all persons with whom they came in contact.

Check points were established by the 513th Military Police Battalion in its area for the purpose of screening all personnel, military and civilian, with the exception of convoys. The locations of the check points were changed frequently in order to secure a more complete coverage of the entire Army area.

Motor and/or walking patrols operated during the month in the following towns and cities:

1.	ATHUS	(P4308)	24.	METASCH	(P5426)
2.	AUBANGE	(P6008)	25.	MONTCOURT	(U7974)
3.	AUDUN	(U6688)	26.	JARNY	(U6564)
4.	AUMETZ	(U7093)	27.	LANDRES	(U6062)
5.	AVRIL	(U7176)	28.	LONGLAVILLE	(P5906)
6.	BETTEMBOURG	(P6103)	29.	LONWNY	(P5805)
7.	BRIEY	(U6973)	30.	LUXEMBOURG	(P6414)
8.	HADLAPAGE	(P6709)	31.	MARS LA TOUR	(U6558)
9.	BUTTLOR	(P6837)	32.	METZ	(U6557)
10.	DOMCOURT	(U6963)	33.	MORHANGE	(Q2037)
11.	ERVALIS	(Q0440)	34.	MUNSUYAK	(U7774)
12.	ETON HUY	(P6817)	35.	HAMLY	(U8511)
13.	GONDRANS	(U8465)	36.	NEUFMAITEAU	(P1541)
14.	GUDMLANGE	(U6068)	37.	PETANGE	(P6408)
15.	ESCH	(P7301)	38.	PONT A MOUSSON	(U7735)
16.	FLORENVILLE	(P2820)	39.	PONPEY	(U8120)
17.	FONTOY	(U7365)	40.	ROLLOMME	(P5126)
18.	FLUO	(U5612)	41.	ROUANGE	(P6732)
19.	GARNICH	(P6116)	42.	TINTIGHY	(P3827)
20.	HARAY	(P4028)	43.	TOUL	(U6401)
21.	HALANZY	(P5921)	44.	UCKANGE	(U6579)
22.	HAMIPR	(P3539)	45.	VIATON	(P3281)
23.	HAYANGE	(U7882)			

Details of cases tried by Summary Courts for the month were as follows:

VIOLATION	COURT NO. 1	COURT NO. 2	TOTAL
No pass	155		155
Curfew	16		16
Drunk and disorderly	4		4
Speeding	8		8
Theft	1		1
Unauthorized use of weapon	3		3
Unauthorized use of vehicle	1		1
Unguarded vehicle	23		23
Uniform violation	9		9
Double banking	4	2	6
Transporting civilians	1		1
TOTALS	225	2	227

Straggler Collecting Points operated during the month at the following locations:

1.	ESCH (P7301)	4.	HAMLY (U8511)
2.	LUXEMBOURG (P6414)	5.	PONT A MOUSSON (U7735)
3.	MONTSUYAK (U7974)	6.	TOUL (U6401)

Delinquencies for the month were as follows:

Pass violation	1042
Unattended vehicles	497
Parking on Main Supply Route	59
Trip ticket violation	87
Drunk	76
Uniform violations	110
Speeding	137
Double banking	37
Unauthorized use of vehicles	22
Unauthorized firing of weapons	19
Unauthorized carrying of civilians	21
Vehicle abuse	27
Stealing Government property	12
Selling Government rations	9
Disorderly	2
Reckless driving	2
Drunken driving	1
Stealing Government vehicles	2
Officer driving	1
TOTAL	2197

Disposition of stragglers for the month was as follows:

To Units	60
To Reinforcement Depots	106
TOTAL	166

Data regarding AWOLs for the month was as follows:

AWOLs apprehended	379
Total number of days AWOL	5125
Average number of days AWOL per man	13

Third U. S. Army personnel AWOL as of 31 January per Machine Records Unit records 609

SECTION V - INVESTIGATION SUB-SECTION

The following cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 6 January:

Murder	2
Larceny	1
Assault with intent to do bodily harm	1
Black market	2
TOTAL	6

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 13 January:

Murder	2
Robbery	1
Rape	1
Misappropriation of U. S. Government property	1
Conduct unbecoming an officer	1
Assault with a deadly weapon	1
TOTAL	7

This office received letter from Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group, subject, "Reorganization of Certain Military Police Criminal Investigation Detachments." This letter authorized the reorganization of both the 9th and 13th Military Police Criminal Investigation Detachments, attached to this section, to increase the total of agents to fourteen agents in each Detachment.

The following criminal cases were completed, reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 20 January:

Assault with deadly weapon	1
Black market	4
Accidental shooting	1
Murder	1
Theft (mail)	1
Robbery	1
Misappropriation of U. S. Government property	1
TOTAL	10

The following criminal cases were completed, reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 27 January:

Larceny	2
Assault	1
Looting	1
Misappropriation of U. S. Government property	1
TOTAL	5

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The following cases were pending final investigation on 31 January:

Black market	4
Murder	1
Looting	1
Assault and battery	1
Misappropriation of U. S. Government property	3
Accidental shooting	1
Misapplication of U. S. Government property	1
Disorderly conduct	1
Larceny	2
TOTAL	15

SECTION VI - PRISONER OF WAR EXECUTIVE SUB-SECTION

A Prisoner of War Executive Officer was attached to this headquarters from Prisoner of War Executive Branch Division G-1, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces.

SECTION VII - INTERNMENT CAMP SUB-SECTION

The Internment Camp Officer went to BASTOGNE (P5557) to follow up the assignment of a detail from the 734th Field Artillery Battalion, consisting of thirty-eight men on temporary duty with Civil Affairs Officer as Military Police to check civilian traffic flowing between BASTOGNE (P5557) and NEUFCHATEAU (P3541). The situation was found to be well under control.

After investigation of Grund and Limpertsberg Prisons, LUXEMBOURG (P8414) these camps were found to be crowded and inadequately guarded.

The Internment Camp Officer, on a trip to First and Ninth U. S. Armies, consulted with their Internment Camp Officers on methods employed with respect to Internment Camps.

SECTION VIII - SECURITY SUB-SECTION

Batteries "A" and "B", 734th Field Artillery Battalion were withdrawn from Prisoner of War work and were assigned duties under the Defense Sub-Section by the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army. Their prisoner of war work was taken over entirely by the 430th and 483rd Military Police Escort Guard Companies, which were attached to Third U. S. Army and assigned to Headquarters Communications Zone.

Plan for Defense of Command Post was published. (See annex 22).

A pass system for "Admittance to Lucky Forward Headquarters" was inaugurated, letter, this headquarters, dated 4 January 1945, subject, "Admittance to Lucky Forward Headquarters." (See annex 23).

Annex number 2 to "Plan for Defense of Command Post," dated 3 January 1945, subject, "Plan for Defense of Rear Echelon of Command Post," was published.

Standing Operating Procedure for Interior Security of Lucky Command Post was published 20 January.

Officers of the 267th Field Artillery Battalion completed a reconnaissance of all Railway Lines within the Army area and determined location of important bridges and tunnels that were unguarded or improperly guarded.

Company "A", 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion was made available to this section for defense of Lucky Forward Command Post.

One platoon, Company "A", 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion was detailed to provide security check points on the four Main Supply Routes leading into the city of LUXEMBOURG (P6414).

Officers from the 1st and 3rd Companies, 151st French Infantry Regiment reported to this office to discuss supply and transportation problems.

The following installations in the Army area were guarded in connection with security of Lines of Communication during the month:

36 Railway bridges
7 Railway tunnels
25 Highway bridges
1 Highway overpass
Twelfth Army Group Communication Center, LUXEMBOURG (P8414)
Third U. S. Army Radio Center, LUXEMBOURG (P8414).
Post Telegraph and Telephone Building, METZ (U8557).
Repeater Station, ARLON (P6110).
Post Telegraph and Telephone Building, LUXEMBOURG (P8414).
SHAEF Radio, north SANDWEILER (P8014).
SHAEF Radio, west LONDUF (P5505).

The following troops were used for guarding the above installations:

4405th Quartermaster Service Company.
1st and 3rd Companies, 151st Infantry Regiment (French).
267th Field Artillery Battalion (less Battery "C", being used for defense of Rear Command Post and stockade guard for general prisoners.
734th Field Artillery Battalion (less 13 men on Military Police traffic detail in ESCH (P7301), 25 men for Interior Security of Lucky Forward Command Post, and Headquarters and Service Batteries under control of Prisoner of War Sub-Section.



MILITARY POLICEMAN GIVING DIRECTIONS TO A SOLDIER IN NANCY, FRANCE

SECTION I - GENERAL

Third U. S. Army Rear Echelon moved from ESCH (P7301) to LUXEMBOURG (P8414), on 6 February.

The 10th and 11th Belgian Fusilier Battalions arrived in Third U. S. Army area on the 13th and 14th of February and were placed under the control of the Provost Marshal for use in guarding Lines of Communication.

Four Companies of the 10th Belgian Fusilier Battalion were attached to XII Corps for guarding Lines of Communication installations in the XII Corps area. The balance of the 10th Belgian Fusilier Battalion and the 11th Belgian Fusilier Battalion were given instructions in guard duty and assigned duties in the Third U. S. Army Service area.

The 785th Military Police Battalion (Zone of Interior) was assigned to Third U. S. Army for duty with the Provost Marshal on 18 February. An orientation program and school was conducted in Third U. S. Army policies, rules, and regulations, at the Battalion Headquarters in ESCH (P7301) prior to active operation by the Battalion in Third U. S. Army area.

The Army Area was divided into three Military Police Zones on 25 February, with the 503rd, 512th, and 785th Military Police Battalions servicing the areas directly to the rear of XX, VIII, and XII Corps respectively. Each Battalion was responsible for all Maintenance of Law and Order, Traffic, and Security problems within its assigned Zone.

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

The early thaw and excessive rains during the early part of the month washed out a considerable portion of the Army Road Net. Many miles of main roads and much of the secondary road net were blocked to all traffic, especially in the rear of the VIII Corps area. Railroad beds were used in two locations in this area as one-way roads. Emergency detours and one-way routes were set up to bypass blocked roads. Approximately one-half of the "washed out" mileage was put back in shape by the Engineers by the end of the month. Military Police Patrols reconnaissance reports combined with Engineer reports kept this headquarters abreast of the road situation, and additional policemen and signs were posted on detours. "Bottleneck" towns during this period were BASTOGNE (P5557), NEUFCHATEAU (P6172), ST VITH (P6880), and ARLON (P6122).

Troop movements were heavy during the first part of the period but decreased later during the period. With one exception, troop movement convoys had excellent march discipline. Supply convoys and incidental traffic accounted for the majority of traffic violations and accidents.

Major troop movements during the month were:

6th Armored Division from NAMUR (U8934) to METZ (U8257). 95th Infantry Division from NEUFCHATEAU (P6172) to CUNEYE (X5127). 9th Armored Division from METZ (U8557) to SPRIMONT (X5414). III Corps Headquarters from ARLON (P6122) to First U. S. Army area. Elements of the 4th Armored Division from PETTONANGE (P8103) to MERSCH (P8228). Elements of the 4th Armored Division from MOLHANGE (P8129) to MERSCH (P8228). 65th Infantry Division from LONDUF (P5505) to LUXEMBOURG (P8414). 79th Infantry Division moved through the Army area.

Because of road conditions tank transporters were denied the use of the Army Road Net for several days during the month. In order to properly control such traffic, clearances were secured from the Army G-4 Section.

A Standing Operating Procedure for signing was issued by this office to the Military Police Battalions. This resulted in a great improvement in the signing in the area. All patrols were constantly alert and made efforts to keep all signs clean and properly posted.

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An inspection trip was made by Traffic personnel checking signing and road conditions and memoranda were sent to units concerned for correction of deficiencies.

Selection of a site for Practice Bombing and Rocket Range in the Army area made necessary extra precautions on traffic moves on D6 northeast of AVRIL (U7170) after 5 February.

Traffic and Maintenance of Law and Order personnel were moved forward because of change in Army Rear Boundary effective 062400 February.

The boundary between Military Police Battalions changed at 102400 hours. 503rd Military Police Battalion relieved the 512th Military Police Battalion in the following towns:

PETANGE (P6409)	ATHUS (P6309)
ALBANGE (P6609)	RODANGE (P6802)

New Rear Boundaries for the III and VIII Corps were established and Army Military Police were moved forward.

Air reconnaissance was made on 14 February by the Traffic Chief, of CLERVAUX (P7763), ST VITH (P6668), VEILSALM (P6989), HOUFFALIZE (P6171), BASTOGNE (P5557), and ARLON (P6122).

The supply officer of the 785th Military Police Battalion conferred with this section as to the supply of Traffic Control equipment and authorization of excess equipment so that they could fulfill their mission. A letter was prepared and sent through proper channels for authorization of equipment in excess of Table of Organization and Equipment needed by the 785th Military Police Battalion.

Route N53 was opened on 15 February. This road has been under water for several days and now the water had receded. Continued maintenance of road net was necessary.

The 503rd and 512th Military Police Battalions were informed on 17 February that strict enforcement was necessary on restriction of use of identification panels behind Corps Rear Boundary.

An extensive road reconnaissance was made by the Military Police Battalions and officers of this section on 19 February. The Military Police Battalions submitted their reports to this office and all suggestions and recommendations made by them were taken up with the Engineers and G-4 Transportation. Road reconnaissances were made by an officer of the Traffic Sub-Section of BASTOGNE (P5557), ST VITH (P6668), and HOUFFALIZE (P6171) on 20 February, and of roads and bridges in the area between VIANDEN (P8455) and BITBURG (L1353).

Three hundred plates, France, 17° x 30°, and 500 plates, France, 15° x 17°, were issued to VIII Corps on 21 February. 1,990 lamps, electric flasher, were received at the depot.

On 26 February Headquarters 512th Military Police Battalion moved to LUXEMBOURG (P6414).

During the month of February over 430 convoy clearances involving over 22,000 vehicles were processed through the Traffic Sub-Section.

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

Reconnaissance for an Army prisoner of war Enclosure was made in order to relieve the transportation difficulties experienced in evacuating prisoners of war to Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 18, MARVILLE (U3394).

The Army Surgeon approved the use of Jesuit College, ARLON, (P6122) Belgium, as Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 13 as soon as the accommodations were vacated by the 101st Evacuation Hospital.

On 3 February the 430th Military Police Escort Guard Company was assigned duties at Third U. S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 18, MARVILLE (U3394), and the 437th Military Police Escort Guard Company was assigned duties at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 16, FLORANGE (U8441). The 483rd Military Police Escort Guard Company, reinforced by two officers of the 734th Field Artillery Battalion, was assigned the operation of all Corps Prisoner of War Enclosures under Third U. S. Army.

The 471nd Military Police Escort Guard Company cleared the Army area and departed for the Ninth U. S. Army, where it had been assigned on 4 February.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 14, MARVILLE (U3394), was closed on 6 February after handling 16,454 prisoners of war.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 13, Jesuit College, ARLON (P6122), Belgium, was opened 9 February. All units attached were transferred from Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 12 to this new Enclosure.

Reconnaissance was made for a new Army Prisoner of War Enclosure on 11 February to be established in the northern half of the Army area. The towns of DILTZ (P7154) and DIEDENHOFEN (P8643) were considered possible locations.

The Commanding General, Advance Section, Communications Zone, authorized this headquarters to use the 305th Military Police Escort Guard Company as guards on the road rebuilding details on 11 February. Between 500 and 600 prisoners of war were supplied from Third U. S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 13, ARLON, (P6122) Belgium.

In order to facilitate the evacuation of prisoners of war from VIII Corps Enclosure to Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 13, ARLON (P6122), a new route of evacuation was established. Permission was secured by this office through G-4, Third U. S. Army to use a certain portion of a new route which was also the Main Supply Route of the 6th Armored Division.

The escape of four processed prisoners of war was reported to this headquarters by the using unit, the 17th Reinforcement Depot, on 19 February. One of these four prisoners was apprehended wearing a complete United States Army uniform except for German shoes.

The Provost Marshal, XX Corps, requested that a second Corps Prisoner of War Enclosure be established for the Corps. Personnel who were operating the III Corps Prisoner of War Enclosure were shifted to XX Corps for the operation of the second XX Corps Prisoner of War Enclosure on 21 February.

A conference was held 22 February regarding the replacement of Headquarters and Service Batteries, 734th Field Artillery Battalion at Army Prisoner of War Enclosures. Generally the plan called for the substitution of Headquarters Company, 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion for the Headquarters and Service Batteries, 734th Field Artillery Battalion. It would be necessary to augment the Headquarters Company, 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion with certain commissioned and enlisted personnel and equipment from the 267th Field Artillery Battalion and the Army Military Police Escort Guard Companies to compensate for the difference in strength, organization and equipment in the Headquarters Company of the 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion and that of the Headquarters and Service Batteries of the 734th Field Artillery Battalion.

One of the two XX Corps Prisoner of War Enclosures was closed in order to facilitate the rapid evacuation of Prisoners of War from this Corps, two trucks with necessary guards were attached to one of its divisions.

The XII Corps Prisoner of War Enclosure moved from the City of LUXEMBOURG (P6414) to MERSCH (P8228), on 27 February.

The XX Corps Prisoner of War Enclosure moved from the town of PETITE HETTANGE (U9691), France, to FREUDENBERG (I1305), Germany, on 28 February.

Prisoner of War statistics for the month of February were as follows: (See annex 27).

On hand as of 31 January 1945	550
Received during February at Prisoner of War Enclosures:	33,109
TOTAL	33,644
Evacuated	31,543
On hand at Prisoner of War Enclosures 28 February	2,119
Received at Prisoner of War Enclosures during February	23,106
Admitted at Third U. S. Army Hospitals during February	1,055
TOTAL prisoners of war handled by Third U.S.Army for month	24,161
Accumulative total for entire period of operations, 1 August 1944 to 28 February 1945, inclusive	187,458

Escapee and evadee statistics for the month of February were:

Escapees and Evadees on hand as of 31 January 1945	None
Received during February	35
TOTAL	35
Evacuated	35
On hand 28 February	None

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

Emphasis was placed particularly on law and order and conduct of troops in the City of LUXEMBOURG (P6414) during the month. Military Police were instructed to make on-the-spot corrections wherever the delinquency was of such a nature that it could be completely corrected by the Military Policeman himself. These on-the-spot corrections included such delinquencies as jacket or overcoat unbuttoned, three persons riding in the cab of a vehicle and failure to wear steel helmet when the same was readily available. When the Military Policeman made an on the spot correction no delinquency report was made.

APOLs continued to be handled entirely through Provost Marshal and Military Police channels. Every ASCL apprehended or received by Third U. S. Army Military Police was placed under guard and evacuated to his unit under guard. APOLs from First and Ninth U. S. Armies who were apprehended in the Third U. S. Army area were delivered to the First U. S. Army Provost Marshal and APOLs from Seventh U. S. Army units were delivered to the Seventh U. S. Army Provost Marshal. APOLs from other armies, Air Force, and Communications Zone Units were evacuated to the ASCL Collecting Center, PARIS (30140).

During the month numerous civilians were apprehended between the hours of 2100 and 2400 for curfew violation in the Army area, and were fined by the civilian Police.

Gasoline, grease, oil, and other military supplies were confiscated in Black market raids in ATHUS (P6309), MARCINELLES (U6478), during the month. Other confiscations of lesser amount of Government property were also made during the month in many towns in the Army area. The civilian offenders, in most cases, were prosecuted by the civilian Police, and where U. S. soldiers were involved the cases were investigated by the Criminal Investigation Detachments.

Information was received that during the night of 3 February, nine enemy agents parachuted behind our lines apparently headed for LUNEVILLE (C0401), METZ (U8557), KEHLS (T3080), and NANCY (U8511). Available descriptions were dispatched to all Military Police for apprehension.

Traffic and Maintenance of Law and Order personnel were moved forward because of change in Army Rear Boundary, effective 0600 hours 6 February.

Staff Officer Patrols commenced daily in the City of LUXEMBOURG (P6414) on 7 February, for the purpose of improving conduct of troops and reporting conditions to the Chief of Staff through the Provost Marshal in accordance with Staff Memorandum Number 3, dated 7 February, this headquarters.

A three day drive was instituted on 8 February to improve the conduct of all troops in the City of LUXEMBOURG (P6414), and Military Police activity was supplemented by nightly officer patrols from various Sub-Sections of the Provost Marshal Section. The results were noted improvement in appearance of all personnel.

Curfew in the Third U. S. Army area was extended to 2100 to 0600 hours for civilian personnel and 2200 to 0600 hours for military personnel by Circular Number 11, dated 11 February, this headquarters.

A special pass policy for the City of LUXEMBOURG (P6414) went into effect in accordance with Circular Number 12, dated 13 February, this headquarters.

Section II, Circular Number 15, dated 16 February, this headquarters, announced that the following would be in effect with reference to guarding of U. S. vehicles:

"U. S. Military vehicles would not be left unattended in Third U. S. Army area unless under the immediate surveillance of guards or in authorized guarded Military parking lots."

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Issue of weekly trip tickets was permissible only if vehicle was obviously on a weekly trip and on proper route and mission. This was announced on 17 February.

On 23 February the Alert Platoon of the 512th Military Police Battalion was dispatched to the City of LUXEMBOURG (P6414) to assist in Maintenance of Law and Order duties and was relieved at 2300 hours.

Company "A", 785th Military Police Battalion was assigned to operate the Third U. S. Army Stockade at ESCH (P7301).

Motor and/or walking patrols were operative during the month in the following towns and cities:

1.	ARLON	(P6122)	16.	MAYANCE	(U7848)
2.	ATHUS	(P6302)	17.	HOMBOURT	(U7974)
3.	AUBETTE	(U7094)	18.	HOUFFALIZE	(P6172)
4.	BASCHEMOURT	(U5277)	19.	JARNY	(U8564)
5.	BOUILLON	(P6837)	20.	LONGWY	(P5805)
6.	BOULIGNY	(U0191)	21.	LUXEMBOURG	(P6414)
7.	BRIEY	(U8973)	22.	METZ	(U8557)
8.	CONFLANS	(U8465)	23.	MONTMEDY	(U7774)
9.	DUDELANGE	(U8099)	24.	NEUFCHATEAU	(P3541)
10.	ESCH	(P7301)	25.	PIENNES	(U5681)
11.	ETALLE	(P4026)	26.	REDANGE	(P2126)
12.	FLORENVILLE	(P2620)	27.	ST. HUBERT	(P3462)
13.	FUNTUY	(U7365)	28.	TINTIGNY	(P3627)
14.	HABAY	(U4832)	29.	ULFANGE	(U8574)
15.	HAMIPRE	(P3639)	30.	VIRTON	(P3221)

Summary of delinquency reports processed by this section during the month was as follows:

Pass violations	1144
Trip ticket violations	992
Improper use of U. S. Government vehicle	677
Out of uniform	537
Speeding	441
Leaving vehicle unattended	381
Curfew violations	305
Passing violations	158
Illegal carrying of civilians	61
Drunk	38
Parking violations	36
Disorderly	30
Reckless driving	26
Careless discharge of firearms	24
TOTAL	4873

Details of cases tried by Third U. S. Army Summary Courts during the month were as follows:

VIOLATIONS	COURT NUMBER 1	COURT NUMBER 2	TOTAL
Pass	208		208
Uniform	69		69
Vehicle unguarded	45		45
Speeding	34	1	35
Curfew	19		19
Drunk and disorderly	15		15
Double banking	10	1	11
Unauthorized use of weapon	3		3
Resisting arrest	2		2
Transporting civilians	1		1
Breaking arrest	1		1
Unauthorized use of vehicle	1		1
Misinformation (alais)	1		1
Misappropriation of U.S.property	1		1
TOTAL	407	2	409

Straggler Collecting Points were in operation during the month at the following locations:

1.	ARLON (P6122)	5.	ESCH (P7301)
2.	BRIEY (U8973)	6.	LUXEMBOURG (P6414)
3.	CONFLANS (U8465)	7.	METTUYRE (U7774)
4.	DUDELANGE (U8099)	8.	VIRTON (P3221)

Disposition of stragglers for the month was as follows:

To Units	[illegible]
To Reinforcement Depots	42
TOTAL	117

Summary of AWOLs apprehended during the month was as follows:

Third U. S. Army Units	182
Other Units	91
TOTAL	273
Number of days AWOL	4269
Average number of days AWOL	16

Data regarding general prisoners evacuated or released during the month was as follows:

Released to Units	16
Evacuated to Disciplinary Training Center	133
Evacuated to Units for trial	9
TOTAL	158

General prisoners on hand at Third U. S. Army Stockade 282400 February: 56.

SECTION V - INVESTIGATION SUB-SECTION

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 3 February:

Manslaughter	1
Black market	2
Murder	1
Assault with intent to do bodily harm	1
Robbery	1
Misappropriation of U. S. property	1
Larceny	1
Accidental shooting	2
TOTAL	10

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 10 February:

Rape	1
Assault with intent to commit rape	1
Misappropriation of U. S. property	3
Larceny	2
Black market	4
Murder	1
Absent without leave	1
Assault	1
TOTAL	14

The following criminal investigation cases were completed and compiled and forwarded during the week ending 17 February:

Rape	1
Violation of police restrictions	1
Misapplication of U. S. property	2
Hit and run driver	1
Larceny	1
Assault	2
Fatal shooting	1
Forgery	1
Disorderly conduct	1
Black market	1
TOTAL	12

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 24 February:

Larceny	3
Driving while drunk	1
Assault	2
Black market	1
Murder	1
TOTAL	8

The following criminal cases were pending final investigation 28 February:

Murder	3
Assault with intent to rape	2
Fatal shooting	1
Black market	3
Misappropriation of U. S. property	1
Escape of prisoner	1
Absent without leave	1
Larceny	1
Looting	1
Assault and battery	1
TOTAL	15

SECTION VI - PRISONER OF WAR EXECUTIVE SUB-SECTION

An operations directive for the operation of overrun Allied Prisoner of War Camps, prepared by the Prisoner of War Contact Officer, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, attached this headquarters, was submitted to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, on 22 February for comment and concurrence.

SECTION VII - INTERNMENT CAMP SUB-SECTION

Planning continued for the establishment and operation of Internment Camps. The Standing Operating Procedure for the operation of Internment Camps prepared by this office was submitted to Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1 and G-2, for comment and concurrence on 21 February.

SECTION VIII - LINE OF COMMUNICATION SUB-SECTION

On 9 February, Annex Number 1, corrected copy, "Plan for Defense of Command Post," dated 3 January 1945, was published. (See annex 25).

Annex Number 2 to Plan for Defense of Command Post, dated 3 January 1945, this headquarters, was published 11 February. (See annex 26).

Reconnaissance of railway line was completed on 12 February from LIFRAMONT (P3146) to BOURCY (P6264) for purpose of locating bridges and tunnels to be guarded.

The 11th Belgian Fusilier Battalion arrived in Army area at ESCH (P7301), 131630 February, for guarding Lines of Communication installations. The 10th Belgian Fusilier Battalion arrived in Army area 142100 February, for use by the Provost Maronel for guarding lines of Communication installations. The Headquarters and Headquarters Company and the 1st Company were located at SCHOENFELS (P6226) and the 2nd and 3rd Companies at SCHUTTRANGE (P9414). The 4th and 5th Companies of the 10th Belgian Fusilier Battalion were attached to the 11th Belgian Fusilier Battalion for administration and training.

The 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion assumes responsibility for operation of security check points on highways number 1, 7, and 11, in the vicinity of LUXEMBOURG (P6414) on 23 February.

The following installations in the Army area were guarded in connection with security of Lines of Communication during the month of February:

35 Railway bridges and tunnels
16 Highway bridges
Third U. S. Army Radio Center, LUXEMBOURG (P6414).
SHAEF Mission, LUXEMBOURG (P6414).
Radio Luxembourg, LUXEMBOURG (P6414).
Repeater Station, AUBANGE (P6009).
Twelfth Army Group Radio, ROMAIN (P5505).
Twelfth Army Group Radio, SANDWEILERHOF (P8914).
Post Telephone and Telegraphic Buildings located in the following towns and cities:

LUXEMBOURG (P6414)	BETTEMBOURG (P8103)
[illegible] (P6414)	DUDELANGE (U8099)
[illegible] (P6502)	ESCH (P7700)
[illegible] (P6504)	HASCHARAGE (P6709)

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The following troops were used for guarding the above installations:

1st and 3rd Companies, 151st Infantry Regiment (French, 267th Field Artillery Battalion (less stockade guard for general prisoners - ten enlisted men from Battery "C").
734th Field Artillery Battalion (less twenty-eight enlisted men for interior security of Third U. S. Army Forward Command Post; Headquarters and Service Batteries under control of Prisoner of War Sub-Section).
631st Tank Destroyer Battalion (companies "B" and "C").
11th Belgian Fusilier Battalion plus two Companies (4th and 5th) 10th Belgian Fusilier Battalion attached for administration and training.

The 734th Field Artillery Battalion was relieved from tactical guarding of all installations in the Army area on 24 February. The 267th Field Artillery Battalion took over guarding of all installations in France since Belgian Battalions cannot be used in France. The 11th Belgian Fusilier Battalion was used for guarding installations in the Duchy of Luxembourg and Belgium exclusive of the City of LUXEMBOURG (P8414), which was guarded by two companies from 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.

The following troops were used for defense of Command Posts:

Interior Security:

Company "A", 503rd Military Police Battalion.
Twenty-eight enlisted men from Battery "A", 734th Field Artillery Battalion

Reserve for Defense of Command Post:

Light Tank Platoon, Headquarters, 8th Armored Group.
Company "A", 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.
Two Reconnaissance Platoons, 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.

In the process of relieving the 734th Field Artillery Battalion from duty with the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army the Executive Officer of the 267th Field Artillery Battalion took over command of Third U. S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 13, ARLON (P5122). Assisting him were officers and enlisted men of the 267th Field Artillery Battalion and 631st Tank Destroyer battalion. The Officers of the 734th Field Artillery Battalion, in command of the VIII Corps and XX Corps Prisoner of War Enclosures, were relieved by officers of the 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion and 6th Armored Group respectively.



MILITARY POLICEMAN DIRECTING TRAFFIC IN ARLON, BELGIUM.

CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

During the month of March because of the rapid advance of the tactical units, the Army area expanded considerably, necessitating judicious use of all Military Police and other units that were on duty with the Provost Marshal.

The Forward Echelon departed vicinity of LUXEMBOURG (P8414), 270740A March, and arrived vicinity of IDAR-OBERSTEIN (L7124), Germany, 271200A March.

A Troops Liaison Sub-Section was organized 27 March for the purpose of maintaining liaison with Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, and Assistant Chief of Staff G-5, for employment of troops assigned to the Provost Marshal. These troops would be used for safeguarding captured war material of G-4 and guarding Displaced Persons Camps for G-5.

The Rear Echelon departed vicinity of LUXEMBOURG (P8414), 290830A March, and arrived vicinity of TRIER (L2229), Germany, 291000A March.

Because of the multiplicity of the duties of the Prisoner of War Sub-Section which was handling prisoners of war, German military hospitals, Allied prisoners of war, and Internment Camps; an Allied Prisoner of War and Internment Camp Sub-Section was established to relieve the Prisoner of War Sub-Section of these duties.

The Defense Sub-Section became known as the Security Sub-Section, thereby clarifying its duties, - Security of Lines of Communication and Command Post.

An increase in the number of violations of traffic and uniform regulations was prevalent during the month. The critical condition of roads in the Army area, tire shortage and mechanical failure of vehicles made it imperative that speeding and other traffic violations were curbed as a measure of conservation and discipline. Recommendations were made and approved as follows:

1. An intensive signing program utilizing signs constructed by the Engineers in accordance with Provost Marshal designs were placed by Military Police at appropriate locations. These signs four feet by six feet were simply worded so as to be quickly read and contained traffic speed limits and other vehicle regulations. Maintenance of Law and Order signs stating curfew, uniform, and pass regulations were also posted. These signs eliminated any ignorance on the part of personnel for failure to comply with existing regulations.

2. Battalion Commanders performing Military Police duty were authorized to try as a Summary Court all offenders of existing regulations. These Summary Courts followed the procedure and policies carried out in the operation of the Army Summary Courts.

The Investigation Sub-Section was combined with the Maintenance of Law and Order Sub-Section and revised operational procedure was put into effect providing for a central criminal investigation office located in the Provost Marshal Section (Rear Echelon) and field offices at the Forward Echelon Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, Headquarters of the VIII, XII, and XX Corps, and at the Headquarters of the 503rd, 512th, and 705th Military Police Battalions. The establishment of field offices made it possible to quickly investigate a greater number of serious crimes.

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

The rapid expansion of the Army area required that three subareas be established as follows:

Area number 1 - From the 1939 German border to an arbitrary line drawn from north to south, approximately ten kilometers west of EUPEN (L9095) following highway 1300 to the Seventh U. S. Army lateral boundary. This territory was turned over to the 243rd Field Artillery Battalion that located in SIMMERN (L8555). This battalion controlled traffic only on the three Main Supply Routes.

Area number 2 - From the above mentioned arbitrary line to the western banks of the RHINE River. This territory was turned over to the 70th Infantry Division with Headquarters in BAD KREUZNACH (M1938). The division was given complete control of the entire road net, bridges across the RHINE River, and Maintenance of Law and Order in all towns.

Area number 3 - Entire Army area from the east bank of the RHINE River forward to Corps Rear Boundaries.

The road net in Germany appeared ample for support of operations up to and beyond the RHINE River, although many of the roads with the exception of the autobahns had steep grades and sharp curves. Small towns and numerous streams were traffic "bottlenecks" because of narrow streets and limited number of bridges.

The problem of road and town signing was a major one. A Standing Operating Procedure was published and distributed to the Military Police Battalions. The shortage of signs was critical, and all available means were utilized to produce the quantity of signs necessary in the Army area.

Letter, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, file AG 415 GNMCT, subject, "Town and Route Markings in Germany," dated 9 March 1945, was published. (See annex 29).

Approximately seventy-five percent of vehicular traffic in the Army Service areas during the latter part of the month was on the autobahns, A8 and A4. Extensive road reconnaissances were conducted by this section and the Military Police Battalions. Much of this reconnaissance was made in the forward areas so that conditions might be remedied by the time the Army Service area took over.

During the month clearances for over 367 convoys involving over 42,075 vehicles were processed through the Traffic Sub-Section.

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

During the month of March a record number of prisoners of war were evacuated through Third U. S. Army Enclosures. A total of 142,000 prisoners of war were captured during that time. On 24 March alone, a total of 16,818 prisoners of war were received at the Army Enclosures. On 31 March the daily average since the beginning of operations was 1,357. On 9 March the 200,000th prisoner of war was received at Third U. S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 13, ARLON (P5122), while on the 230th day of operations of Third U. S. Army, 16 March, the 230,000th prisoner of war was evacuated to Third U. S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 14, TRIER (L2229).

With the advance of Third U. S. Army deeper into Germany, numerous Allied Prisoner of War Camps were overrun. The Provost Marshal under the direct supervision of a Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Prisoner of War Executive Officer established the first Allied Prisoner of War Camp at TRIER, (L2229), Germany. Allied prisoners of war who initially were evacuated through Displaced Persons channels were transferred to this Camp, where they were screened, nominal rolls prepared, and thus were started on the right direction to their homelands.

A temporary Internment Camp was opened as an annex to the Prisoner of War Enclosure at TRIER (L2229). The first Internment Camp cases such as Security Threats and War Criminals were received for internment.

The Standing Operating Procedure for Army and Corps Prisoner of War Enclosures prepared by the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army distributed on the 3rd of March to the Provost Marshals of Corps assigned Third U. S. Army, and Corps Prisoner of War Enclosure Commanders for their guidance and information.

The 734th Field Artillery Battalion was relieved from duty with the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army, and assigned to its primary mission. Since 26 August 1944 this battalion handled over 100,000 prisoners of war. The prisoner of war duties performed by this battalion were assumed by elements of the 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 267th Field Artillery Battalion.

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A German Lieutenant General, Graf Von Rothkirch (German Corps Commander), and Major General Vibig, were sent by special evacuation to Twelfth Army Group. The Signal Officer of the German Seventh Army was also taken by special evacuation to Advance Section, Communications Zone, Central Prisoner of War Enclosure at STENAY (P1503) for detailed interrogation.

Information was received from Twelfth Army Group that all German Medical personnel captured should be evacuated by prisoner of war channels as quickly as possible to the German Medical Center at CHERBOURG (Q1383).

A large influx of prisoners of war seriously taxed the evacuation system, but by taking full advantage of the empty supply trucks returning to the rear the problem was controlled.

Because of the distance to Advance Section Communications Zone Central Enclosure, a large "backlog" accumulated in the Army cages. The establishment by Advance Section Communications Zone, of a forward enclosure prevented the reoccurrence of similar incidents.

Army Prisoner of War Enclosures operated at ARLON (P6128), Belgium, number 13; TRIER (L2229), Germany, number 14; BAUMHOLDER (17113), Germany, number 15; and at HOMBURG (H1732), Germany, number 16.

Prisoner of War statistics for the month of March were as follows: (See annex 30).

On hand as of 28 February	2,119
Received during month of March at Prisoner of War Enclosures	136,926
TOTAL	139,045
Evacuated	134,024
On hand at Prisoner of War Enclosures 31 March	5,021
Received at Prisoner of War Enclosures	136,926
Admitted at Third U. S. Army Hospitals during month of March	1,691
TOTAL prisoners of war handled by Third U.S.Army during March	148,217
Accumulative total for entire period of operations, 1 August 1944 to 31 March 1945, inclusive	329,675

Escapees and Evadees statistics for the month of March were as follows:

On hand 28 February	None
Escapees and Evadees for March	2396
Evacuated	2396
On hand 31 March	None

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE of LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

The extension of the Army boundaries during the month resulted in dispersion of Military Police over a wide area. Maintenance of Law and Order patrols in France, Luxembourg and Belgium were reduced to a minimum in order to provide maximum personnel for all localities in Germany. Maintenance of Law and Order personnel became particularly concerned with the circulation and control of displaced persons and civilians. During the latter part of the month numerous disorders were handled by Military Police in the vicinity of the Displaced Persons Center in Germany. All displaced persons were corralled by Military Police and placed in Displaced Persons Camps. Civilian curfew was strictly enforced and all violators were turned over to military government for appropriate action.

Emphasis was placed on control of military personnel in Germany and current regulations providing for movement of military personnel outside of their billets or bivouac area only on official business was enforced. Unit commanders were contacted wherever possible, were informed of current regulations and were requested to exercise closer supervision over personnel of their command. Relatively few violations of the non-fraternization policy were encountered.

Instructions were given to all military police to return Third U. S. Army stragglers to their units by the most expeditious means. Stragglers from other armies and Communications Zone were returned to their unit through Reinforcement channels. AWOLs continued to be held in arrest by Military Police and delivered either to their units or to the AWOL Collection Center in PARIS (S0140).

Section I, Circular Number 23, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 9 March 1945, announced the following policy with reference to "Forcible Entry":

"It has been reported to this headquarters that U. S. Military Forces have forcibly entered civil law enforcement installations in France for the purpose of searching for questionable property. This practice is neither condoned nor will it be tolerated by this headquarters. In the future no such installations will be entered or searched unless approval of this or other appropriate headquarters is secured before such action."

Letter, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, file AG 250.1 GNKCY, subject, "Reporting of Crimes, Offenses and Serious Incidents," was published, 17 March. (See annex 28).

Section II, Circular Number 31, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 24 March 1945, announced the following change in pass policy:

"II. PASS POLICY.

Paragraphs 4 and 5, Section II, Circular 6, this headquarters, dated 26 January 1945, are rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

4. When present stocks of TPM Form No. 3 (Revised March 44) are exhausted, ETO AG Form No. 27 is the only form of pass which will be used. All permanent (Class B) passes will be withdrawn from men to whom they have previously been issued.

5. The following rules will govern the issuance of passes to visit cities and towns in the Third U. S. Army area.

a. All passes will expire at or prior to curfew.

b. No overnight or twenty-four (24) hour passes will be issued.

6. Passes to visit cities and towns outside the Army area may be issued when authorized and in the numbers allocated by this headquarters, in which case unit commanders will acquaint themselves with any requirements in connection with the control or restriction of personnel in the area concerned."

Section III, Circular Number 38, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, announced the following Pass and Curfew Policy:

"III. PASS AND CURFEW POLICY.

1. For troops in France, Belgium, and Luxembourg:

The provisions of Sections I and II, Circular No. 6, this headquarters, dated 26 January 1945, will remain in effect.

2. For troops in Germany:

a. Military personnel will circulate outside of billets or bivouac areas only on official business.

b. No passes will be issued to troops to visit any city, town or area in Germany."

Patrols were in operation during the month in the following locations:

1.	ALTRY (E5906)	14.	BOLLENDORF (L0041)
2.	ARLON (P6128)	15.	BOPPARD (K5619)
3.	ATHUS (P6309)	16.	BOUZONVILLE (Q1376)
4.	AUDUN (U6980)	17.	BRIEY (U6973)
5.	AUMETZ (U7596)	18.	BRODENBACH (K5216)
6.	BAD BERTRICH (K5216)	19.	CLERVAUX (P7261)
7.	BAD KREUZNACH (K5904)	20.	COCHEM (L5471)
8.	BASTOGNE (P5557)	21.	COMSDORF (L0536)
9.	BERNKASTEL (K5806)	22.	DASBURG (P8362)
10.	BETTEMBOURG (P8103)	23.	DIEKIRK (P8242)
11.	BICKENDORF (L1160)	24.	DUDELANGE (U8099)
12.	BIRKENFELD (K5104)	25.	ECHTERNACH (L0535)
13.	BITBURG (L1253)	26.	ESCH (P7301)
27.	ETTELBRUCK (P8340)	49.	PRUM (L0678)
28.	FONTOY (V7[illegible])	48.	REMICH (L0106)
29.	GRAVENMACHER ([illegible]1)	49.	RITTERSDORF (L1066)
30.	HAYANGE (V7832)	50.	ROCDT (P9380)
31.	HOUFFALIZE (P5278)	51.	SAARBURG (L1212)
32.	HOMBOURG (V7974)	52.	ST. HUBERT (P3262)
33.	HOTTERPORT (L7980)	53.	ST. VITH (P8486)
34.	JARNY (U6564)	54.	ST. WENDEL (Q5996)
35.	KASTELLAUN (K5611)	55.	SIMMERN (L8555)
36.	KILCHBURG (L4881)	56.	THIONVILLE (U8687)
37.	LONGWY (P5805)	57.	TRIER (L2229)
38.	LUNEBACH (L0171)	58.	UCKANGE (U8579)
39.	LUXEMBOURG (P8414)	59.	VIANDEN (P8652)
40.	MAYEN (L6292)	60.	VILLERUPT (U6798)
41.	MERSCH (P8228)	61.	VIRTON (P3122)
42.	METZ (U8557)	62.	WALDWISSE (Q1382)
43.	MOYEUVRE (U7774)	63.	WASSERBILLIG (L1083)
44.	NEUFCHATEAU (P3236)	64.	WILTZ (P7454)
45.	OBERWESEL (K5319)	65.	WINNINGEN (K5614)
46.	PRUMSFELD (L0872)	66.	WORRSTADT (K5104)

A summary of the delinquency reports processed by this Sub-Section during the month was as follows:

Pass violations	842
Speeding	406
Uniform violations	328
Unattended vehicles	249
Passing violations	148
Trip ticket violations	136
Curfew violations	64
Carrying of civilians in government vehicles	55
Parking violations	47
Drunk	30
Looting	28
Unauthorized firing of weapons	24
Off limits violations	18
Improper use of Government vehicle	18
TOTAL	2363

Summary Courts: Details of cases tried by Summary Court Number 1 during the month were as follows:

Pass violations	70
Drunk	17
Speeding	16
Uniform violations	16
Unattended vehicle	9
Curfew violation	7
Three in front seat of cab	6
Double banking	5
Unauthorized firing of weapon	5
Trip ticket violations	4
No driver's permit	1
Parking violation	1
Overloading vehicle	1
TOTAL	158

Straggler Collecting Points operated during the month in the following locations:

1.	BAD KREUZNACH (M0938)	8.	ESCH (P7301)
2.	BICKENDORF (L1160	9.	KIRN (L8032)
3.	BIRKENFELD (L5313)	10.	KIRSELBACH (M6353)
4.	BITBURG (L1253)	11.	LUXEMBOURG (P8414)
5.	COCHEM (L5471)	12.	OBERWESEL (K5344)
6.	ECHTERNACH (L0535)	13.	SAARBURG (L1212)
7.	EDIGER (L5865)	14.	TRIER (L2229)

Disposition of stragglers for the month was as follows:

To Units	36
To Reinforcement Depots	12
TOTAL	48

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A summary of AWOLs apprehended during the month was as follows:

Third U. S. Army units	191	
Other units	72	
Total apprehended	263	
Total number of days AWOL		4017
Average number of days AWOL		15

General prisoners: Data regarding general prisoners evacuated or released during the month was as follows:

Released to units	13
Evacuated to Disciplinary Training Center	95
Evacuated to units for trial	13
TOTAL	121

General prisoners on hand at Third U. S. Army stockade, 312400 March: 69.

During the latter part of the month there was a marked increase in the number of serious crimes reported and referred to criminal investigation detachments for investigation.

Investigations.

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the period ending 3 March:

Assault	2
Wrongful disposal of U. S. property	1
Self maiming	1
Misapplication of U. S. property	1
Black market	3
Embezzlement	1
Larceny	1
Murder	2
Sale of cartons	1
Assault with intent to rape	1
TOTAL	14

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 10 March:

Carnal knowledge	1
Complaint of stealing oil	1
Fatal shooting	1
Larceny	2
Conduct unbecoming an officer	1
Assault	1
Misbehavior before the enemy	1
Misappropriation of U. S. property	1
Absence without leave	1
Wrongful disposal of U. S. property	1
TOTAL	11

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 17 March:

Black market	4
Assault and battery	1
Rape	1
Sale of poison liquor	1
Aliered burglary	1
Illegal possession of U. S. property	1
TOTAL	9

The following criminal cases were investigated and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 24 March:

Rape	1
Looting	1
Self maiming	1
Larceny	2
Assault	1
Assault with intent to commit a felony	1
Misappropriation of U. S. vehicle	1
Fatal shooting	1
Possession of excessive money	6
Fraternizing	1
Misappropriation of U. S. Government property	1
Attempted murder	1
Attempted rape	1
Assault and battery	1
TOTAL	16

On 30 March one officer and four non-commissioned officers of Interpreters Corps, Netherlands Forces, were assigned to the Criminal Investigation Section for use with Criminal Investigation Detachments.

The following criminal cases were pending final investigation as of 31 March:

Rape	7
Theft of U. S. supplies	1
Misappropriation of U. S. materiels	1
Shooting of a civilian	1
Fatal shooting	1
Murder	2
Suspected larceny	1
Assault with a dangerous weapon	1
Wrongful disposal of U. S. property	1
Fraternization	1
Battery	1
Larceny of U. S. property	1
Burglary	1
Assault with intent to rob	1
TOTAL	21

SECTION V - ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNMENT CAMP SUB-SECTION

Allied prisoners of war: A report of Allied prisoners of war including French, Belgians, Bulgarians, Russians, Serbs, Czechoslovakians and Rumanians to include British, was investigated on 9 March. An estimated 2,000 to 5,000 Allied prisoners of war were released in the DAUN (L3578), MAYEN (L8292), CUBLENZ (L9495) area by the 4th Armored Division. No camp sites were overrun except stockades of local nursing commandos. Military Government Agencies handled these people as Displaced Persons.

On 15 March Allied Prisoner of War Camp Number 1, Camp Petrisberg TRIER (L2229), was opened. Overrun Allied prisoners of war at this camp were cared for initially and documented before evacuation to communications Zone.

Allied Prisoner of War Executive Officer was directed to establish Allied Prisoner of War Camp Number 1, Camp Petrisberg, TRIER (L2229), as a permanent installation. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, furnished all possible facilities.

A report was received 24 March that in the zone of advance of the Third U. S. Army, two German Prisoner of War Camps were overrun; one in the vicinity of HALBERGER (L7113) and the other in the vicinity of ST. WENDEL (G5997). Allied Prisoner of War Executive Officers made on the spot investigations and submitted detailed reports to higher headquarters.

Nominal rolls on recovered allied prisoners of war were prepared one sent to G-1, Twelfth Army Group, on 14 March, for forwarding to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces.

On 28 March a report reached this office through G-1 that the 26th Infantry Division of XII Corps had overrun a German Prisoner of War Camp containing approximately 400 French Russian prisoners of war. This message was immediately reported to Allied Prisoner of War Officer for action.

Internment Camps.

An Army temporary Internment Camp was installed as an annex to Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 14, TRIER (L2229), on 5 March.

Internment Camp categories were held separate from prisoners of war at prisoner of war Enclosures until such time as a sufficient number had accumulated to warrant the establishment of an Internment Camp.

A temporary Army Internment Camp was opened as an annex to Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 14, TRIER (L2229), on 8 March, to handle such cases as were evacuated by the Corps for temporary or permanent internment.

On 18 March the first Internment Camp cases, such as security threats and war criminals were received for internment at the Third U. S. Army, Temporary Internment Camp, TRIER (L2229).

SECTION VI - SECURITY SUB-SECTION

During the month of March the following installations in the Army area were guarded:

69 Railway bridges and tunnels.
45 Highway bridges.
8 Highway check points.
Twelfth Army Group Radio, KAPELLEN-BERG (P6914).
Twelfth Army Group Radio, RUMAIN (P5305).
Repeater Station, ALBANCH (P6409).
SHAEF Mission, LUXEMBOURG (P6414).
Third U. S. Army Radio Center, STRASSEN (P7815).
Radio Station, JUNGLINSTER (P9324).
Storage room for rare books, NURBURG (L4494).
Electric Power Plant, TRIER (L2229).
Radio Installation, LUXEMBOURG (P6414).
Post Telephone and Telegraphic buildings located in the following towns and cities:

BETTEMBOURG (P6103)	DIFFERDANGE (P6604)
DUDELANGE (U8099)	ESCHSURALZETTE (P6709)
KAYL (P7700)	ROMMELDANGE (P6406)
SELVALA (P6802)	ETTELBRUCK (P6507)
LUXEMBOURG (P6414)	

The following troops were used for guarding the above installations:

247th Field Artillery Battalion.
11th Belgian Fusilier Battalion plus two companies (1st and 4th) 10th Belgian Fusilier Battalion.
631st Tank Destroyer Battalion (less Company "B", relieved from duty with XII Corps as assigned mission of security of Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 14, TRIER (L2229)).

The following troops were used for defense of Command Posts:

Interior security:

Company "A", 503rd Military Police Battalion.

Reserve for defense of Command Posts:

Light Tank Platoon, Headquarters, 8th Armored Group.
Company "A", 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.
Two Reconnaissance Platoons, 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.

The 30th Battalion Chasseurs (French) were utilized for tactical guarding of installations in France and Luxembourg but were relieved from these duties upon entering into Germany.

On 30 March the 270th Field Artillery Battalion was attached to the Provost Marshal Office for duty with the Security Sub-Section.

SECTION VII - TROOP LIAISON SUB-SECTION

The Troops Liaison Sub-Section was organized 27 March for the purpose of maintaining liaison with G-4 and G-5 for use of troops assigned to the Provost Marshal.

Initially the 558th Field Artillery Battalion was attached to the Provost Marshal Section on 27 March for use by G-5 for the guarding of Displaced Persons Camps.

On 28 March the Chief of the Troops Liaison Sub-Section had a conference with Executive Officer, G-4 Section, and with G-4 officers concerned with the handling of captured war materiel. The following

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decisions were reached:

a. That G-4 would keep this section advised as to the location of enemy material, the priority for its safeguarding, and an estimate of the number of personnel that would be required to guard it.

b. That this section would allocate troops assigned to guard captured supplies.

On 29 March a conference was held with G-5 with reference to the use of troops to guard Displaced Persons Camps. The following decisions were reached:

a. That G-5 would keep this section advised as to the location and size of Displaced Persons Centers.

b. That this section would allocate available troops to guard camps.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th Tank Destroyer Group was attached to the Provost Marshal Section.

On 31 March, Headquarters, and Headquarters Company, 4th Tank Destroyer Group was made available to G-4 for use in connection with the handling of captured enemy material.

During the week ending 31 March the 558th Field Artillery Battalion was employed as guards at Displaced Persons Camps as follows:

UNIT	LOCATION
Headquarters and Service Batteries	TRIER (L1229)
Battery "A", and two sections of Battery "B"	LEBACH (G4690)
Battery "B", minus two sections	SAARHOLZBR (L9113)
One half of Battery "C"	WITTLICH (L3913)
One half of Battery "C"	BITBURG (L1353)

Headquarters and Service Batteries were instructed to move to vicinity of WEISBADEN (M3564), on 3rd and 4th April 1945.

The 558th Field Artillery Battalion was instructed to move Battery "B" from SAARHOLZBR (L7113) to vicinity of WEISBADEN (M3564).

The Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces estimate of displaced persons in zone of Allied Expeditionary Forces as of 1 January was 6,500,000 and in zone of Russian Army, 4,500,000. This enormous number of Displaced Persons was expected to require considerable preparation on the part of G-5 and was of vital interest to Provost Marshal operations.



CHAPTER II
APRIL OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

Third U. S. Army Headquarters moved from IDAR-OBERSTEIN (L7124) to FRANKFURT (M4868) on 3 April.

The Army area continued to expand, necessitating the establishment of sub-areas. Area Number 1 extended from the German border of 1939 to an arbitrary line drawn from north to south, approximately ten kilometers west of KOBLENZ (L9095), then followed highway L300 to Seventh U. S. Army lateral boundary. This territory was turned over to the 943rd Field Artillery Battalion located in SIMMERN (L8555), under control of the 195th Field Artillery Group, and controlled traffic on the three Main Supply Routes only. Area Number 2 extended from the afore-mentioned arbitrary line to the western banks of the RHINE River. This territory was turned over to the 70th Infantry Division with headquarters in BAD KREUZNACH (M1938). The Division was placed in complete charge of the entire road net, bridges across the RHINE River, and maintenance of law and order in all towns.

Third U. S. Army Headquarters moved from FRANKFURT (M4868) to HERSFELD (H3954) on 11 April.

Third U. S. Army Headquarters moved from HERSFELD (H3954) to ERLANGEN (G2618) on 22 April.

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

As Corps rear boundaries continued to advance quite rapidly the deployment of the Military Police Battalions required constant attention in order to assure proper control of traffic on Main Supply Routes.

The situation was alleviated to some extent by making use of the autobahns. These super-highways, in good condition, were capable of handling two lane traffic both ways. Intersections were at a minimum and the usual small town "bottlenecks" were almost entirely eliminated.

A number of bridges over the autobahns, and in surrounding towns were blown, and the Engineers cleared away the debris and constructed new bridges. Constant attention was given to all secondary and "feeder" roads which proved to be necessary to the Army road net and the expediting of traffic.

Speeding on the autobahns was a major problem. The Military Police Battalions were alerted and concentrated their efforts on proper control. More than 150 arrests for traffic violations were made daily on these routes.

Constant road and bridge reconnaissance of the forward areas was made by personnel of this office. The information secured aided materially in prior planning and enabled this office to remain conversant with pending traffic problems.

Bridging was still a major problem for the Engineers who continued to do an excellent job.

A traffic count made in the Army area shows that approximately seventy-five percent of the Army traffic travelled via the autobahns.

The establishment of Quartermaster Petrol, Oil and Lubricant Dumps along A4 east and west of ALSFELD (H0900) reduced that route to two lane traffic for two stretches of approximately five miles each.

Traffic routes in HERSFELD (H3959) were changed twice during the period to block off certain areas in which were located vital installations.

All non-military vehicles were stopped, checked for authorization of possession and Army registration, and impounded if such authorization did not exist. Impounded vehicles were turned over to Ordnance.

In occupying the new Army area a condition of inadequately signed roads and bridges existed. In the larger cities, the traffic plans as then existed were bad. Jams up to eight and ten miles occurred out of WURZBURG (N5935) in several directions. A new traffic plan was prepared and placed in operation which resulted in a smooth flow of traffic through the city.

Military Police were extended over an area twice the size normally covered. Traffic was extremely heavy, with troop movements approximating the traffic during the week of December 17 - 25, 1944. This exceedingly heavy troop movement, coupled with necessary supply traffic, enmeshed with equally heavy Seventh U. S. Army road movements choked the main routes in the WURZBURG (N5935), BAMBERG (G2749), ERLANGEN (G2618), NURNBERG (T4299) area.

Check points for non-military vehicles were operated at HERSFELD (H3959), OSTHOFEN (H4165), WEINHOEN (H3821), HUNFELD (H4433), ALSFELD (H0900) and FRANKFURT (M4868).

These check points resulted in approximately 400 vehicles being taken from military personnel not possessing authorization or registration for such vehicles, and also from displaced persons.

Traffic violations for the week ending 21 April were:

Trip ticket violation	18
Improper use of U. S. Government vehicle	4
Speeding	289
Passing violation	111
Reckless driving	2
Unregistered captured enemy vehicle	1
TOTAL	425

Most of the main roads in the Army area during the latter part of the month were Class 8-12, with many defiles, one-way bridges, and bypasses. The road net was inadequate for handling the heavy traffic on army supplies and troop movements, and roads were badly overcrowded. Roads were signed well into Corps areas. Special efforts were made to sign NURNBERG (T4299) and to bypass traffic around the city on the autobahns, A3 and A61. Traffic plan for the city of NURNBERG (T4299) was approved by the Army Engineer and placed in effect, utilizing an inner traffic "ring" to keep traffic out of the center of the city.

Military Police Battalions zones of responsibility were changed three times and extended to enable them to furnish greater assistance to the Corps. The 70th Infantry Division assumed control and responsibility of a larger area (including WURZBURG (N5935)), relieving Army Military Police in that zone. Check points for impounding vehicles (civilian) operated at ERLANGEN (G2618), WURZBURG (N5935), NEUSTADT (W9337), BAMBERG (G2749), and BAYREUTH (G7457). Additional check points operated at SCHWABACH (T9397), NURNBERG (T4299), SULZBACH (G8908), AMBERG area (G9800), and ANSBACH (T0763). Civilians were ordered through the Burgomeisters to keep military routes clean and free of debris and trash. Traffic violations were:

Speeding	29
Double banking	57
Trip ticket violations	6
Unattended vehicles	3
Officer driving	3
Reckless driving	5
Carrying of civilians	1
Unregistered captured vehicles	2
TOTAL	104

Major troop movements during the month of April were:

1st Infantry Division	97th Infantry Division
5th Infantry Division	99th Infantry Division
28th Infantry Division	
65th Infantry Division	101st Airborne Division
70th Infantry Division	
76th Infantry Division	13th Armored Division
86th Infantry Division	16th Armored Division
94th Infantry Division	20th Armored Division

During the month traffic clearances for over 365 convoys involving over 50,964 vehicles were processed through the traffic sub-section.

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SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

The 270th Field Artillery Battalion reported to the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army and was assigned duties under the Prisoner of War Sub-Section. One Detachment of this battalion was dispatched at once to the VIII Corps Prisoner of War Enclosure.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 17, OBER URSEL (M6079) was opened 2 April. With the advance of Third U. S. Army deeper into Germany, many German Military Hospitals were uncovered. A "stay put" policy was applied immediately and these hospitals were guarded under the supervision of the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army through the Army Surgeon. The patients found in these hospitals, if they belonged to the German Armed Forces, were classified as "prisoners of war", and the hospital, a Prisoner of War Camp. The Military Medical Staff of these hospitals were classified as "protected personnel" and were permitted to perform their services under the supervision of the Army Surgeon. A total of fifty-eight German Military Hospitals were reported to this office. These hospitals contained approximately 20,000 prisoner of war patients.

The 377th Field Artillery Battalion reported for duty to the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army and was assigned duties under the Prisoner of War Sub-Section. It was planned to utilize this Battalion as guard personnel for overrun German Military Hospitals.

The 308nd French Truck Company consisting of forty-eight trucks, was attached this section for the evacuation of prisoners of war on 13 April.

The Commanding Officer, 663rd Military Police Escort Guard Company, operating the Corps Prisoner of War Enclosures, was directed to make a tour of the Corps Prisoner of War Enclosures instructing them not to accept civilians or enemy prisoners of war in civilian clothes if they had no identity documents or Arrest Report establishing their military status.

In accordance with instructions published in Counter Intelligence Directive for Germany, Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group, dated 10 April 1945, TODT Workers were no longer classified as prisoners of war, but would be turned over to Military Government.

A new system for guarding German Military Hospitals was initiated 15 April.

Three teams consisting of a representative from the Provost Marshal Office, a Medical Administrative Officer from the 66th Medical Group and a representative from the Army G-2 Section were organized. These teams were given the responsibility of placing the security of German Military Hospitals in the hands of the town Burgmeister and the Commandant of the hospitals.

Instructions were received from Provost Marshal, Advance Section, Communications Zone to evacuate German Officers along regular prisoner of war channels. General Officers, if requested by Twelfth Army Group would be sent there, otherwise no distinction would be made.

Memorandum Number 3, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 18 April 1945, subject, "Captured German Military Hospitals" was published. (See annex 38).

Units of the Seventh U. S. Army guarding hospitals in Third U. S. Army area were relieved and the responsibility for the safeguarding of these prisoners of war was placed upon the local Burgmeister.

Two additional Advance Section, Communications Zone Military Police Escort Guard Companies, the 667th and 481st were placed on duty with this section 25 April for the evacuation of prisoners of war from Army cages in Advance Section, Communications Zone Transient Enclosures.

At a conference on 27 April representatives of the Army Provost Marshal Section and the Army Surgeon discussed the question of releasing low value prisoners of war after screening by G-2 personnel. This category of prisoners of war would include members of the Volkssturm, the extreme aged and youthful members of the army as well as disabled veterans and enemy deserters found behind front lines.

A communication net was established between all Prisoner of War cages in the Army area.

The 600,000th prisoner of war captured by troops of the Third U. S. Army, 28 April, was evacuated to Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 21, LANGERRINN (G8003).

During the month a total of 335 German Military Hospitals were reported to this office including 85,041 prisoner of war patients.

Six Prisoner of War Enclosures were operated by Third U. S. Army during April 1945, as follows:

Number 16, BLETZHEIM (M1732)
Number 17, OBER URSEL (M6079)
Number 18, HATTENBACH (M2950)
Number 19, LAKMA (M9761)
Number 20, KULMBACH (G8574)
Number 21, LANGERRINN (G8003)

A total of 236,734 prisoners of war were received during the month at Third U. S. Army Enclosures. This tremendous influx of prisoners of war in comparison with the months previous, the rapid advance of Third U. S. Army into Germany and the changes in direction of advance created a serious problem of evacuation. The opening of an Advance Section, Communications Zone Prisoner of War Transient Enclosure at BAD KREUZNACH (M1938) and another at MEISENHEIM (M25) vicinity HAINS (M35) alleviated the condition somewhat.

With the large number of prisoners of war in the army Enclosure and with the shortage of operational rations, the problem of securing sufficient rations became acute. Captured German rations were used to the greatest extent possible and plans were made to feed the prisoners of war by Bulk Rations.

Prisoner of war statistics for the month of April were:

On hand as of 31 March	5,021
Received during month of April at Prisoner of War Enclosures	336,734
TOTAL	341,755
Evacuated	186,476
On hand at Prisoner of War Enclosures as of 30 April	55,569
Received at Prisoner of War Enclosures during April	236,734
Admitted at Third U. S. Army Hospitals during April, including overrun German Military Hospitals.	96,180
TOTAL prisoners of war handled by Third U. S. Army during April	332,904

(See annex 31)

Accumulative total for entire period of operations, 1 August 1944 to 30 April 1945, inclusive: 662,579.

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

A concentrated drive was made at TRIER (L1229) on 3 April to clear the town of abandoned jerricans and 93T jerricans were recovered.

The Third U. S. Army stockade was moved from TRIER (L1229) 5 April to FRANKFURT (M8868).

Rifles, shotguns and other weapons in a quantity sufficient to fill two one-fourth ton trailers were picked up in various towns from the Burgmeisters thereof and turned into 851st Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company, ALSFELD (M04), by members of Company B, 516th Military Police Battalion.

At approximately 2005GCB April, three Military Policemen of Company C, 503rd Military Police Battalion, while proceeding east on A6, five miles west of ALSFELD (M0840), Germany, stopped to offer assistance to a 1/4 ton, 4 x 4 vehicle parked on the highway. They noticed German equipment and followed the vehicle whereupon the occupants fired on the Military Police. One SS trooper was killed and the rest escaped into the woods. Visibility was poor and the Military Police returned to the Command Post for a searching party.

An advance General Prisoner Stockade for the handling of general prisoners was established 23 April at ERLANGEN (G3616).

Patrols operated during the month in the following localities:

ALSFELD (M0840)	BRODENBACH (L7980)
ALZEY (K5904)	COBURG (G28)
ASCHAFFENBURG (M29)	DIEZ (M2096)
BAD KISSINGEN (M6780)	EHRANG (G1970)
BAD KREUZNACH (K5904)	EMGELHAUSEN (K5214)
BAD NAUHEIM (M1797)	ERLANGEN (G3616)
BAD NEUSTADT (M7694)	FASSELSHOF (G5975)
BAD ORB (M1580)	FORCHHEIM (G3930)
BAD SALZUNGEN (M7748)	FRANKFURT (M6770)
BAMBERG (G8749)	FRIEDBERG (M7394)
BAYREUTH (G75)	FRIEDRICHSRODA (M8755)
BEDRA (M4564)	GEMUNDEN (M46)
BERNKASTEL (K5806)	GLUECKENTHAL (J0658)
BINGERFELD (K1504)	GOERLITZ (M0404)
BINGEN (M1296)	GREIFFELD (M50)
BITBURG (L2153)	GROSS GERAU (L5304)
BLANKENHAIN (J5558)	HAIDACH (G53)
BOGEL (M0574)	HAMMELBURG (M5570)
BUEDINGEN (K5419)	HANAU (M8471)
BRETTENBACH (M2543)	HERSFELD (M4954)
HOCHST (M5767)	HEILBAUS (G6173)
HOMBURG (M1778)	HERZBACH (G8374)
HUNFELD (M4432)	HUEMMERG (G46)
ISOTEIN (M2563)	ICHSHOFEN (M2436)
JENA (J7065)	SAASEN (M2859)
KARLSTADT (M6643)	SCHLITZ (M2938)
KALTENBRUNN (G87)	SCHLUCHTERN (M29)
KALTELLAUN (K5411)	SCHWEINFURT (M7963)
KATZENGART (L7980)	SOMMERUG (J40)
KILLENBERG (L4891)	VACHA (M6150)
KIRN (K5906)	WEISSENAUEN (M2563)
KISSELBACH (K5416)	WERNECK (M65)
KULMBACH (G8674)	WINDECKEN (M8881)
LANGEN (M6754)	ZEITZMAIN (M0455)
LAUTERBACH (M1828)	LOHR (M3156)
MEINUNGEN (M0928)	

A summary of the delinquency reports processed by this office during the month was as follows:

Away from billet or bivouac area without authority.	167
Pass violations	110
Fraternization.	93
Uniform violations.	83
Looting	19
Drunk	16
Careless discharge of firearms	16
Curfew violations	10
Disorderly.	7
TOTAL	531

Details of cases tried by Summary Court Number 1 during the month were as follows:

Passing vehicles	101
Pass violations.	28
Speeding	20
Uniform violations	19
Fraternization	10
Vehicles not registered.	5
Drunk	3
Looting.	3
TOTAL	188

Straggler Collecting Points operated during the month in the following localities:

BAD KISSINGEN (M6780)	FRIEDRICHSRODA (M8755)
BAD NEUSTADT (M7694)	HANAU (M8471)
BAMBERG (G8749)	HUNFELD (M4432)
BEDRA (M4565)	KARLSTADT (M6643)
BINGENFELD (K1504)	KULMBACH (G8674)
BOGEL (M0474)	MEINLAUS (G6173)
DIEZ (M2096)	HERZBACH (G8374)
ERLANGEN (G3817)	GREIFSEEL (L8368)
FASSELSHOF (G5973)	WEISSBADEN (M3563)
FRANKFURT (M6770)	WURZBURG (M5935)

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Disposition of stragglers for the month was as follows:

To Units	36
To Reinforcement Depots	2
TOTAL	38

A summary of AWOLs apprehended during the month was as follows:

Third U. S. Army units	20
Other Units	24
TOTAL	44

Total number days AWOL .450

Average number of days AWOL . 10

Data regarding general prisoners evacuated or released during the month was as follows:

Released to Unit	17
Evacuated to Disciplinary Training Center	45
TOTAL	62

General prisoners on hand at Third U. S. Army stockade as of 302400B April: 222.

Investigations

The following criminal cases were investigated and reports compiled and forwarded during week ending 7 April:

Rape	2
Murder	1
Alleged rape	2
Murder and assault with intent to murder	1
Murder and alleged rape	1
Shooting	1
Shooting German civilian	1
Alleged larceny	1
Assault with dangerous weapon	1
Wrongful disposal	1
Robbery	1
TOTAL	13

The following criminal cases were investigated and reports compiled and forwarded during week ending 14 April:

Rape	4
Assault with deadly weapon	1
Alleged rape	13
Fraternization	2
Fraternization and AWOL	2
Murder	1
Fraternization and rape	1
Attempted rape and fraternization	1
Neglect of duty	1
Murder and rape	1
Alleged rape and looting	1
Alleged rape and robbery	1
Alleged rape and assault with deadly weapon	1
Alleged murder	1
TOTAL	31

The following criminal cases were investigated and reports compiled and forwarded during week ending 21 April:

Theft of U. S. supplies	2
Rape	13
Sale of poison liquor	1
Murder	3
Rape and robbery	1
Assault with deadly weapon	1
TOTAL	21

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during week ending 28 April:

Homicide	1
Alleged rape	11
Robbery and AWOL	1
Rape	3
Murder	3
Attempted rape	1
Conduct unbecoming an officer	1
Housebreaking	1
Robbery	1
TOTAL	33

SECTION V - ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNMENT CAMP SUB-SECTION

The Allied Prisoner of War Sub-Section was formed from personnel of the S-3 and S-4 Sections, 195th Field Artillery Group Headquarters, with duties of administration and supply of Allied Prisoner of War Camps and documentation, disinfestation and evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War. To accomplish this mission, the 558th Field Artillery Battalion was attached and reported for duty on 15 April, and the 304th French Truck Company was attached to augment our transportation. Later, as the magnitude of the job increased, the 176th, 770th, and 775th Field Artillery Battalions were likewise attached. In addition, nineteen officers from Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces were attached to Third U. S. Army to assist as Allied Prisoner of War Contact Officers.

It was estimated by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces that between 300,000 and 500,000 Allied prisoners of war were in the zone of the Third U. S. Army advance. Until it became impracticable to continue the practice, the Germans moved their prisoners to their rear areas as the Third U. S. Army advanced, with the result that comparatively few Allied prisoners of war were recovered. On 22 April, the German government agreed to leave all Allied military prisoners in their camps, on condition that they were not employed against them in this theater. From 8 April to the present date, the weekly totals of released Allied military prisoners increased as follows: 8 - 14 April, 5,565 (in seven camps); 15 - 21 April, 11,652 (in twenty-nine camps); 21 - 28 April, 38,955 (in nineteen camps).

On 29 April, Stalag VII A at MOOSBURG (Z1095), the largest Allied Prisoner of War Camp yet overrun, was taken by the III Corps. First estimates placed the population of Stalag VII A at approximately 100,000. Reports immediately following the release of the camp listed a total of 28,913 Allied prisoners of war of all nationalities - American, British, French, Dutch, Russian, Yugoslavian, Italian, Serbian, Bulgarian, Brazilian, Greek, Rumanian and Norwegian. Of these 15,568 were Americans and 8,562 British. In addition to the Allied prisoners of war in the Stalag itself, an estimated 75,000 to 100,000 are in the immediate vicinity brought in by the Germans and left in the small towns.

Obviously, the overrunning of such a large concentration of Allied prisoners of war entailed problems of supply, administration, medical care and evacuation, but the camp did not present the difficulties anticipated. With full knowledge of the existence of the camp, the Third U. S. Army had anticipated the need for four ambulance companies, had air reconnaissance of an evacuation strip close to the camp, and had three battalions of artillery attached to the Allied Prisoner of War Sub-Section. The camp proved to be excellently organized internally, however, and no drastic emergency measures were necessary.

On a small scale, each Allied Prisoner of War Camp was handled in the same way as MOOSBURG (Z1095). Contact Officers with the Corps Headquarters were in constant touch with the situation at the front, prepared to go to Allied Prisoner of War Camps as soon as they were overrun and rendered a report on conditions and population and took charge till an Allied Prisoner of War Team arrived and assumed control. The Allied Prisoner of War Team documented and disinfected the Allied prisoners of war for evacuation by air, rail or truck, as the situation required.

During the period 7 April to 30 April, 15,132 Allied prisoners of war have been evacuated from Germany by air, rail, truck and ambulance. Thousands more have been moved to camps with better facilities for their care, until they can be evacuated to the Eastern European countries.

Internment Camp Sub-Section.

The Internment Camp Sub-Section, charged with the supervision and operation of internment camps for war criminals, security threats and other civilian persons whose freedom might endanger the success of the Army, was formed from the S-2 Section of the 195th Field Artillery Group Headquarters.

During the month of April, the Internment Camp Sub-Section operated four camps. The first of these at TRIER (L8229), was turned over to Fifteenth U. S. Army on 10 April, with a population of 674 male and 39 female internees. Camps at OBERSUHL (R6164), and HOLSDORF (J8760) were turned over to First U. S. Army on 24 April, with a combined population of 1,097 male and 39 female internees. At the close of this period, the camp currently under Third U. S. Army control at HERRSBRUCK, (G8707), had 365 male and 21 female internees. Of the 2,805 internees who have been under control of the Internment Camp Sub-Section, 65 were known war criminals awaiting trial.

The Internment Camps have been operated by detachments from Headquarters Battery, 195th Field Artillery Group and by elements of the 558th Field Artillery Battalion. Constant improvement of the camps, under supervision of the operating personnel, has been undertaken.

SECTION VI - SECURITY SUB-SECTION

During the period 1 April to 30 April the Security Sub-Section, Provost Marshal Section, Third U. S. Army was engaged in the Defence of the Army Command Post and in guarding installations along the Lines of Communication. The latter included 144 highway bridges, fifty railway bridges and/or tunnels, thirty-three signal installations, and the following special installations:

Storage room for rare books, NURNBURG (060).
Electric Power Plant, TRIER, (L8229)
Lens factory, BAD KREUZNACH (K5904)
SHAEF Mission, LUXEMBOURG, (P8414)
14th Liaison Air strip
Counter Intelligence Corps Team
Naval archives
Military Police Interpreters (ten enlisted men).

The following troops were used for defense of the Army Command Post:

Interior security:

Company A, 503rd Military Police Battalion.
631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.
474th Infantry Regiment.

Reserve for Defense of the Army Command Post:

Light Tank platoon, 8th Armored Group.
631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.
Two Reconnaissance platoons, 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.
474th Infantry Regiment.

The troops used in the guarding of the Lines of Communication and Signal Installations consisted of:

10th Belgian Fusilier Battalion.
11th Belgian Fusilier Battalion.
867th Field Artillery Battalion.
631st Tank Destroyer Battalion
174th Field Artillery Battalion
770th Field Artillery Battalion
70th Infantry Division
13th Armored Division
195th Field Artillery Group.

During the period 1 April to 9 April the 195th Field Artillery Group operated under this section in connection with the administration and control of the 10th Belgian Fusilier Battalion. On 9 April the 195th Field Artillery Group assumed responsibility for operation of Allied Prisoner of War Sub-Sections. The 70th Infantry Division operated with this section beginning on 2 April; and as the Army area extended that Division assumed responsibility for security in rear areas. On 3 April the 13th Armored Division took over the guarding of installations designated by this section but were relieved two days later, having been assigned subject to being relieved from this section on forty-eight hours notice. The 10th Belgian Fusilier Battalion was relieved of assignment to the Third U. S. Army on 10 April and reassigned to XXIII Corps of the Fifteenth U. S. Army. The 867th Field Artillery Battalion was relieved from assignment to this section on 10 April and assigned to Fifteenth U. S. Army; but on 18 April it was reassigned to the Security Sub-Section for security of Lines of Communication. The 174th Field Artillery Battalion was assigned to this section on 20 April. The 11th Belgian Fusilier Battalion was relieved of assignment to the

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Third U. S. Army on 30 April and reassigned to XXIII Corps of the Fifteenth U. S. Army.

Memorandum, dated 11 April 1945, subject, "Alert Plan for Defense of Headquarters Area," (Forward Echelon), was published. (See annex 33).

Memorandum, dated 14 April 1945, subject, "Alert Plan for Defense of Forward Echelon Headquarters Area," (Daylight Alert), was published. (See annex 34).

Memorandum, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army dated 24 April 1945, subject, "Alert Plan for Defense of Forward Echelon Headquarters Area," was published. (See annex 35).

SECTION VII - TROOP LIAISON SUB-SECTION

The city of FRANKFURT (M8668) was cleared of all unauthorized personnel. In two days a total of 9,000 DI placed persons, prisoners of war and Allied prisoners of war were cleared from the city.

Military routes were kept fairly clear of displaced persons by a system of collection posts, wherein all displaced persons were taken off the highways and sent to Displaced Persons Camps, utilizing empty supply trucks going toward the locations of these camps.

During the month Displaced Persons Camps were located at:

THIER (I3729)	LANGEN (L4690)
BAD HOMBURG (M7183)	WITTLICH (L3913)
BITBURG (I1353)	FRANKFURT (M8668)
WESSELN (M3474)	ALSFELD (N0940)
HERSFELD (L3954)	ERFURT (J3176)
BAD KISSINGEN (M8780)	SCHWEINFURT (M7864)
TRIER (I3290)	KOBLENZ (M2161)
KOBLENZ (L0516)	FULDA (N3819)
BAD KÖNIG (I2648)	WÜRZBURG (N7835)
ASCHAFFENBURG (M0154)	HEIDELBERG (M3177)
KITZINGEN (M7128).	



CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

Third U. S. Army Headquarters, Forward Echelon "A" moved from LANGEN (L3617) to REGENSBURG (U1955) via routes 84, 643, 43, and 86, on 2 May.

Third U. S. Army Headquarters, Forward Echelon "B" moved from WOLFRATSHAUSEN (G3617) to REGENSBURG (U1955) on 3 May.

Upon notification of the cessation of hostilities in Europe the Allied Prisoner of War and Internment Camp Sub-Section reverted to direct control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1. The handling of Displaced Persons and captured enemy material formerly under the supervision of the Troop Liaison Sub-Section of the Provost Marshal reverted to G-5 and G-4 Sections respectively.

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

During the period close support was given to the Corps; the rear 1/3 to 1/2 of Corps Service areas were policed by Army Battalions. It was necessary to establish six Zones of Responsibility. These Zones of Responsibility were assigned as follows: Rear areas were under the jurisdiction of the 70th Infantry Division, the 4th Infantry Division, and the 36th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Brigade. The Forward areas were controlled by the Army Military Police Battalions, namely: 503rd 512th and 795th Military Police Battalions.

As the 36th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Brigade and the 4th Infantry Division were assigned Areas of Responsibility and oriented in Military Police duties, the Army Military Police Battalions were able to rotate a portion of their personnel between rest camp and duty.

Lack of communication to the Military Police Battalions greatly hampered the Military Police operations. The only means of communication were messenger, (slow) and radio (unreliable). The contemplated use of voice radio would greatly increase the mobility and efficiency of Military Police.

The majority of the Main Supply Routes in the Army area were class B - 1½ at best, with many narrow spots and one way bridges. The road net was entirely inadequate to handle the heavy troop and supply movements although the roads were well signed and patrolled by the Military Police units.

Staff Officer Patrols were inaugurated detailing four Staff Officers daily to inspect Third U. S. Army area for any violation of traffic uniform, or civilian vehicle violation.

Liaison was established with V Corps Provost Marshal and reconnaissance was initiated preparatory to shifting the 503rd Military Police Battalion to assist the V Corps.

On 7 May, Military police patrols were dispatched to augment movement of 18,000 to 20,000 Allied prisoners of war from the MOOSBURG camp (T19) to airstrips located in INGOLSTADT (T7125), LANDSHUT (U2603) and STRAUBING (T9439).

Main convoy movements during the first eight days of May were: 97th Infantry Division; 44th Infantry Division; 5th Infantry Division; 14th Armored Division; 4th Armored Division; and III Corps (with attached units).

A Bailey bridge at REGENSBURG (U1955) was damaged by a tank retriever (crane TO load). The bridge closed for repairs and all northbound traffic was rerouted via 316 and N299 through NEUSTADT (M9337) to NEUMARKT (T7182) and NURNBERG (T4299).

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 22 at ERLMAUTH (U2255), three miles east of REGENSBURG (U1955) opened 2 May.

Attachment to the Third U. S. Army of the V Corps made it necessary to reopen Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 20, KULMBACH (O6574).

Letter, AG 383.6 GNMCY, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army dated 5 May 1945, subject, "Evacuation and Release of Special Classes of Prisoners of War," was published. (See annex 36).

The 243rd and 287th Field Artillery Battalions were attached for duty to the Prisoner of War Sub-Section.

Prisoner of war statistics for period 1 through 8 May were:

On hand as of 30 April	55,569
Received at Prisoner of War Enclosures	90,698
TOTAL	146,267
Evacuated	54,553
Balance on hand at Enclosures	91,714
Received at Prisoner of War Enclosures	90,698
Admitted at Third U. S. Army Hospitals	174
Taken at overrun German Military Hospitals	18,032
TOTAL handled by Third U. S. Army (See annex 40).	108,904

Accumulative total for entire period of operations, 1 August 1944 through 8 May 1945: 765,683.

For locations of Prisoner of War Installations during the period of operations see annexes 37, 38, and 39.

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

Summary Court Number 2 was established at REGENSBURG (U1955).

Five patrol teams, each consisting of one officer and eleven enlisted men were assigned areas throughout REGENSBURG (U1955) to investigate any promiscuous firing of weapons and to arrest violators. These patrols operated from 2000 to 2400.

Delinquency reports from 1 through 8 May were:

Uniform violations	248
Away from billet or bivouac without authority	150
Fraternization	34
Drunk	13
Disorderly	11
Looting	9
Unauthorized firing of weapons	6
Pass violations	1
TOTAL	462

Summary Court cases for the period were:

	COURT NO. 1	COURT NO. 2
Double banking	25	
Pass violations	3	3
Uniform violations	2	1
Trip ticket violations	2	
Speeding	1	4
Drunk	1	
TOTAL	34	8

Nineteen stragglers were returned to their units during the period.

AWOLs apprehended during the period were:

Third U. S. Army units	7
Other units	10
TOTAL	17

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For locations of Straggler Collecting Points during the period of operations see annexes 37, 38, and 39..

General prisoners were disposed of as follows:

Released to units	69
To Disciplinary Training Center	98
TOTAL	167

The following cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the period 1 through 8 May:

Alleged rape	13
Rape	10
Alleged murder	2
Manslaughter	2
Murder	2
Looting	1
Alleged looting	1
Alleged rape - suicide	1
Assault with a dangerous weapon	1
Assault with intent to rape	1
Attempted rape	1
Larceny	1
Rape and sodomy	1
TOTAL	37

SECTION V - SECURITY SUB-SECTION

During the period 1 through 8 May, the Security Sub-Section, Provost Marshal Section, Third U. S. Army, was engaged in the security of the Army Command Post and in guarding Lines of Communication.

An alert squad was established by the 63lst Tank Destroyer Battalion to expedite investigation of incidents pertaining to exterior defense of the Forward Command Post. From 2000 to 2400 hours on 8 May five patrol teams each consisting of one officer and eleven enlisted men were assigned areas throughout REGENSBURG (U1935) to investigate any disturbances firing of weapons and to arrest the offenders.

Tactical guarding of thirty-one highway bridges, eight railway bridges, and eight signal installations was accomplished without incident. Guards were also furnished for the following special installations:

Airstrip, 14th Liaison Squadron.
Counter Intelligence Corps Interrogation Team, BAMBERG (C8748).
Naval Archives, TAMBACH (J04)

The following troops were used for security of the Army Command Post:

Interior security:

Company A, 503rd Military Police Battalion.
63lst Tank Destroyer Battalion.

Reserve for security of Army Command Post:

Light Tank platoon, 8th Armored Group
63lst Tank Destroyer Battalion.

The troops used in guarding Lines of Communications and signal installations were:

267th Field Artillery Battalion.
174th Field Artillery Battalion.
63lst Tank Destroyer Battalion.

On 7 May, the 267th Field Artillery Battalion was relieved from its guard responsibilities by the 38th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Brigade, and was assigned to the Prisoner of War Sub-Section. On 8 May, the 174th Field Artillery Battalion was relieved from its guard responsibilities, and assembled to await orders from the Prisoner of War Sub-Section to which they were assigned. The 8th Armored Group received orders to report to the 4th Armored Division to which they were assigned.

When Germany capitulated, the Security Lines of Communications was disbanded, and the security of the Army Command Post was assumed by the 63lst Tank Destroyer Battalion.

CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

DECLASSIFIED

I. The allotment of Military Police units to the Army for operations was inadequate. It has been necessary to reinforce the Military Police units with Field Artillery Battalions and Tank Destroyer Battalions. The Prisoner of War work performed by Escort Guard Companies was continuously controlled by Field Artillery Battalions. Enough time must be devoted to the training of non-military police units on military police duty so that they may efficiently perform their duties.

II. For Military Police units to perform their missions efficiently the Table of Organization and Equipment was increased by certain excess items, namely: vehicles, 1/4 ton; radios; compasses; watches; stoves, gasoline, one burner; motorcycles; guns, sub-machine; trailers, 1/4 ton; pistols, automatic, caliber .45; telephones, field; and cars, scout.

III. For road reconnaissance, liaison type airplanes proved to be the best method for advance traffic reconnaissance and patrolling of congested areas.

IV. The enforcement of regulations is severely handicapped by the absence of uniformity in regulations promulgated by various commands within the Theater and by differences in the degree of enforcement within the Theater and by differences in the degree of enforcement within different major commands.

V. The Provost Marshal Staff Section, of Army, Corps, and Divisions should be large enough to properly supervise and control all activities for which the Provost Marshal is responsible.

VI. The closest coordination and cooperation with G-3 Troop Movements, G-4 Transportation, G-5, G-2 (Counter Intelligence) and Provost Marshals of higher and lower echelons is essential prior to and during operations.

VII. Military Police in the field require direct cooperation and support from local unit commanders and military and civil officials.

VIII. The solution of crimes, and the discovery, apprehension, and punishment of criminals requires prompt reporting of all crimes together with immediately available facts, circumstances, and the protection of evidence left at the scene of the crime. A directive to the Command pertaining to the discovery and reporting of crimes by the most expeditious means greatly assisted in the apprehension and punishment of criminals.

IX. The original system of evacuation of prisoners of war from Division Collecting Points to Army Prisoner of War Enclosures could not be maintained because of the large number of divisions, the limited number of vehicles available for evacuation, and the rapid advance of the Third U. S. Army. Corps Prisoner of War Enclosures were established at Class I Supply Point of Corps to which prisoners of war were evacuated on empty supply trucks and from which Army could evacuate.

X. Prisoner of War processing cannot efficiently be done at Army level. The rapid evacuation of prisoners of war to Communications Zone Enclosures should be the prime task.

XI. The use of a force of Mechanized Cavalry, Tank Destroyer, or similar unit is essential for the security of the Command Post.

XII. Transportation for evacuation of prisoners of war and for transporting rations and water was insufficient. Coordination and cooperation with G-4 Transportation, Ordnance, and Quartermaster Staff Sections are essential in arranging transportation for Prisoner of War evacuation.

XIII. Traffic control equipment should be at all times available at several engineer dumps. Surplus stocks of traffic control equipment should be on hand for any emergency that may arise. The issue of traffic control equipment should be controlled by Provost Marshal Section.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX NO. 1

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

CIRCULAR)
: 4 May 1944
NUMBER 10)

TRAFFIC REGULATION AND CONTROL
FOR CONTINENTAL OPERATION

I. GENERAL.

1. PURPOSE:

a. To establish the responsibility for and the methods of control of road traffic on the Continent.

b. To familiarise U. S. Military personnel with the essential basic rules to be followed to meet operational traffic conditions.

c. This circular is designed to regulate movement of supplies and troops and will not be considered applicable to units in tactical formations engaged in combat operations.

2. DEFINITIONS:

a. Road Traffic: All aspects of the movement of vehicles or foot troops over roads. Its operation consists of road traffic regulations and road traffic control.

b. Road Traffic Regulations: The measures taken to assure the proper movement of road traffic as to priorities, routes, time and destination.

c. Road Traffic Control: The means taken to insure the proper movement of road traffic and to insure that it meets the operational requirements. It is effected by compliance with instructions issued, and by control agencies used by commands within their areas.

d. Main Route: A principal supply or tactical route running generally from the rear forward, designated by the senior commander ashore. It will be marked by a black arrow on white disc.

e. Lateral Route: A principal supply or tactical route, running generally parallel to the front, designated by the senior commander ashore. It will be marked by a black arrow with bar at base of shaft on a white disc.

f. Thru Route: A route normally running through two or more sub-areas of an area, designated by the commander of the latter for the purpose of placing under his own direct command the regulation and control of road traffic thereon. Such routes when designated by the senior commander ashore will be selected from Main or Lateral Routes.

3. BASIC PRINCIPALS:

a. Command Responsibilities: Each Corps and Division Commander will be responsible for the designation, marking, maintenance and control of roads within his area in conformity with the plan of the next higher commander.

b. Organization: To accomplish this traffic control, the headquarters of each division or larger tactical unit will institute, within current T/O, a Traffic Headquarters under supervision of G-4 or a comparable staff section. Its duties will be to prepare Road Traffic Control Plan, to regulate and control Traffic through a central agency, and will include:

(1) Receipt, correlation, and dissemination of road traffic information.

(2) Formulation and publication of road traffic rules.

(3) Supervision and control of Road Traffic Regulating and Road Traffic Control Installations.

(4) Coordination of movement originating in its area with the Traffic Headquarters of other area(s) into which such moves will continue.

II. ROAD TRAFFIC REGULATIONS.

1. ROUTES: Main, lateral, and Thru Routes will be designated by Traffic Headquarters, marked by Provost Marshals and maintained by Engineers within Army, Corps, and Division areas respectively.

2. PRIORITIES:

a. The following priorities will be accorded traffic in the Army Area unless otherwise directed:

(1) Messenger Cars.
(2) Troop movement.
(3) Ambulances.
(4) Staff Cars.
(5) Bire Construction crews.
(6) Supply convoys in this priority: V, III, I.
(7) All other traffic.

b. Area commanders may designate special vehicles to be exempt from the above priorities and such exceptions will be in conformity with higher Headquarters approval and will be specifically marked. For Signal Corps vehicles so exempted, the vehicle will be designated by rectangular markings painted or mounted on the right front and right rear. Such markings will be 9½" long by 6½" wide, painted horizontally blue and white, the upper half being white and the lower half blue. Also, such messenger personnel will wear 4" wide brassards above left elbow, the upper half being white, the lower half blue.

c. For exceptional tactical reasons, units may be moved with priority over all roads with written authority and adequate MP escort. All traffic control agencies to be immediately informed of such priority exception.

3. LIGHTS:

a. Army Light Line: Blackout Markers ("Cat Eye") lights will be used forward of a line designated by Army. In rear of this line, Blackout Driving Lamps ("Dim-out" lights) will be used except during air-raic alerts.

b. Corps and Divisions: Corps and Division Commanders will prescribe such additional restrictions within their respective areas as the tactical situation requires.

4. SPEEDS: The following speed limits will be observed except under those circumstances where operational traffic conditions or exceptional tactical situations dictate otherwise.

a. Daylight: The leading vehicle of a convoy will not exceed 25 MPH on highway outside of cities and 15 MPH in cities or towns. Single vehicles will not exceed 35 MPH on highways and 15 MPH through towns.

b. Night: The leading vehicle of a convoy will not exceed 15 MPH on open highway and 10 MPH through towns. Single vehicles will not exceed 20 MPH on highway and 12 MPH through towns. All night driving to conform to conditions of roads and lights and not to exceed their maximums.

5. DENSITY: The following vehicle density will be standard, except where modified by a commander to meet the requirements of a special tactical situation:

a. March unit will not exceed 30 vehicles.

b. Serial will not exceed 5 march units.

c. Serials and units will conform to road time allotted them and will maintain approximately 75 yards between vehicles and a time interval of 3 minutes between units and 6 minutes between serials.

d. All traffic on the Continent will drive on the right hand side.

e. Nothing in these instructions will be construed as relieving convoy commander of his responsibility for proper convoy discipline and unit control.

III. ROAD TRAFFIC CONTROL.

1. CLASSIFICATION AND MARKING:

a. The British road, bridge and vehicle classifications and marking system will be used. Under this system, a vehicle may cross only bridges bearing classification numbers which are the same or greater than the vehicle's classification.

b. The British type road traffic sign will be used in accordance with Circular 24, ETOUSA, 12 March 1944, in lieu of that prescribed in FM 29-5 and FM 101-15. Pertinent details are displayed on Instructional Chart for Control of Road Movement.

IV. CONVOY

1. CLEARANCE:

a. All convoys of 10 or more vehicles will request clearance through Traffic Headquarters of convoy origin as soon as the necessity for the move is determined.

b. Request for clearance will include the following information:

(1) Headquarters requiring clearance.
(2) Name of Convoy Commander.
(3) Unit to move.
(4) Authority to move.
(5) Total number of vehicles.
(6) Total number of March units.
(7) Total number of Serials.
(8) Heaviest type vehicle in column.
(9) Present location of Unit.
(10) Destination.
(11) Time and date movement desired.
(12) Route desired.

2. CONVOY COMMANDER:

a. The Convoy Commander will be responsible that:

(1) The movement number of the convoy is clearly marked on the front and rear of the lead vehicle of each March unit.

(2) The lead vehicle of the convoy (not to include Convoy Commander's vehicle), or of each column, if convoy is moving in more than one column, is marked with a blue flag and the tail vehicle with a green flag, or if at night, with blue and green lights.

(3) All drivers are informed of the convoy number, the destination, and the route to be followed.

(4) While at the halt that march interval is maintained, that vehicles are moved to the right of the road, using due precaution in mined areas, and that assistant drivers or drivers are stationed in such manner as to assist passing traffic by appropriate signals.

(5) Disabled vehicles are moved off the road and that an attendant is posted to guard the vehicle and assist all traffic past the vehicle. He will report to the nearest traffic control point or Military Police the location of the disabled vehicle and any other obstruction or road damage, which requires attention.

b. A representative of the convoy commander will precede the convoy by at least ten (10) minutes to coordinate with Traffic Control points enroute.

3. PASSING: A convoy will not normally pass a preceding convoy unless same is at the halt. at all times, passing will be accomplished only on proper clearance from the commander of the convoy being overtaken. Every assistance, by appropriate signals, will be given command and staff cars and single vehicles in passing.

4. MILITARY POLICE: The Provost Marshal, within the Army, Corps, and Division areas, will insure that adequate sign posting is made and maintained and will enforce traffic regulations for both civilian and military traffic by maintaining Traffic Control Points, road patrols, and providing convoy escorts when necessary.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

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325TH RIC US ARMY

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HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

R. E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General.

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ANNEX NO. 2

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM: 3 June 1944

NUMBER 10:

TRAFFIC CONTROL SIGNS

1. TRAFFIC SIGNS.

a. Traffic Sign -- A device mounted on a fixed or portable support, whereby notice is given in the form of words or symbols for the purpose of regulating, warning or guiding traffic.

b. There are three main categories of traffic signs:

(1) Regulatory - Stop, Speed, Movement, Parking, etc.

(2) Warning - Slow, Caution, Railroads, etc.

(3) Guide - Routes, Destination, Location, Information.

c. All such signs can be made from the British Traffic Control equipment issued to each Military Police unit in the U. K. Regulatory and Warning signs may be painted on Franco tank signs. Guide signs for routes are furnished, the black arrow on white disc for main routes, the black arrow with bar on tail on white disc for lateral routes and white arrow on red disc for diversions (detours). For local routes other than main routes a sign may be improvised, a red arrow on a white square. The bottom of a four (4) gallon oil or gasoline tin may be used for this purpose.

2. POSTING SIGNS.

a. In posting roads with guide signs, locations and distances will be shown, viz: "Cannes - 5 miles" with an arrow pointing the directions. These signs can be painted on Franco signs. The entrance to towns, villages and cities will also be posted with Franco signs such as "Entering Cannes". Such signs will materially help convoy commanders and drivers in orienting their units and maintaining schedules.

3. TRAFFIC LAMPS.

a. The Traffic Lamp will be used at night to illuminate essential signs at road junctions, route turns and at other points where traffic may go astray.

4. TRAINING.

a. The proper posting of roads and installations is essential to good traffic control and Military Police units will be trained in this work. Problems for each unit down to and including Divisional Military Police platoons will be used by Provost Marshals to train the unit in the use of signs for posting roads. Tests will be given while in the U.K. to insure proper functioning of units when they arrive on the Continent.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

M. G. MADDOX
Colonel, G.S.C., AC of S, G-3.

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

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ANNEX NO. 3

ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT IN EXCESS OF TABLES OF EQUIPMENT FOR MILITARY POLICE UNITS

ITEM	MP Bn Army T/O & E, 19-35	MP Co Corps T/O & E, 19-37	MP Plat Corps T/O & E, 19-97	MP Plat Inf Div T/O & E, 19-7	MP Plat AB Div T/O & E, 19-97	MP Plat Armd Div T/O & E, 19-117
(1) Ambulance 3/4 ton 4 x 4						
(2) Axle, RI-27	2	2	2	2		
(2) Telephone, Fld, TEB	24	8	4	8		
(2) Wire, Fld, W-130	48 mi.	16 mi.	8 mi.	16 mi.		
(3) Mine Detector Set6	6			6		
(1) Compass, lensatic, luminous dial liquid filled, EST-1108 with case	100	30	15	15	15	15
(1) Motorcycle, sole	36	12		6	4	6
(3) Pistol, automatic, caliber .45, M1911 or M1911 A-1	100	25	12	12		
(2) Radio, SCR 193	12	4	2	3		
(3) Stoves, gasoline, 1-burner	45	15		15		
(3) Guns, sub-machine, caliber .45 M-3	20	6		6		
(3) Trailers, 1/4 ton, 2-wheel cargo	6	2	1	2	1	2
(1) Trucks, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4, 6 volt	24	8				
(2) Trucks, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4, 12 volt	12	4	2	3		
(2) Kits, linemans	8					
(2) Photographic Set PH 261						
(2) Title board PH 273						
(1) Watch, wrist, 7 jewel	100	30	15	15	15	15

(1) First priority (2) Second priority (3) Third priority

ANNEX NO. 4

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

GENERAL ORDERS 8 June 1944

NUMBER 30

PROVOST MARSHAL SECTION

1. The Provost Marshal Section is announced as a Special Staff Section, this Headquarters. This Section will coordinate with Provost Marshal Sections of Corps and Divisions in Military Police matters; traffic control, maintenance of law and order, control and disposition of military prisoners of war, displaced and liberated persons, refugees and civilians, collection and disposition of stragglers, coordination with Civil Affairs in matters pertaining to control of the civil population, and criminal investigation.

2. Each General and Special Staff Section will maintain the same relationship and will perform the same type of function with respect to the Provost Marshal Section as with any other staff section.

3. Direct communication between Provost Marshals of Corps and Divisions and the Provost Marshal, this headquarters, is authorized on the above matters.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

R.E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department
Adjutant General

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ANNEX NO. 5

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 337 OMDCT 5 June 1944

SUBJECT: Provost Marshal Planning Conference.

TO : See Distribution.

1. A Provost Marshal Planning Conference will be held at this headquarters on 13 June 1944. This conference will be devoted to a full discussion of Provost Marshal and Military Police functions during the forthcoming operations.

2. Corps and Division Commanding Officers will issue necessary travel orders for attendance of the following officers of their commands at this conference.

a. Provost Marshal, each Corps
b. Provost Marshal, each Division.
c. Commanding Officer, each Military Police Company (Corps) and attached company.

3. The commanding officers of the Military Police Battalions (Army) will issue travel orders for their own attendance.

4. Subjects to be discussed at the conference will include the following:

Provost Marshal Functions
Traffic Control
Prisoners of War and Refugees
Military Police Relations with Civil Affairs.
Maintenance of Law and Order
Straggler lines--location and operation
Investigation.

5. Officers will report not later than 1200, on 12 June 1944 to Lt. Col. DILLON, Building 21, Toft Camp, in order that assignment to billets and other details may be completed prior to this conference.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. HADDOX
Colonel, GSC
A C of S, G-3

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CO 503rd Military Police Bn
CO 510th Military Police Bn
CO 512th Military Police Bn

ANNEX NO. 7

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

CIRCULAR) 26 July 1944
:
NUMBER 37)

PRISONERS OF WAR

1. The Provost Marshal sections in army, corps and division are responsible for the handling, processing and disposing of prisoners of war within their areas.

2. Three considerations for the treatment of Prisoners of War must be kept in mind constantly: (1) the valuable information that can be extracted, (2) the Geneva Convention, and (3) the possibility of mutiny or escape. Rank, property and other rights of prisoners will be respected. In exchange for courtesies to prisoners a strict performance

ANNEX NO. 6



of their own style of courtesies will be exacted. Sight-seers will be kept away. Familiarity (including trade) will be forbidden. All prisoners require a certain amount of guard, administration, segregation, inspection, passive defense, water, messing, shelter, clothing, transport, fire prevention, sanitation, medical care, roll-call and discipline.

3. In forward areas, (battalion, regiment, or division), the prisoners will be tagged, using WD PMG Form #1, revised. Only a head-count is required. It is during this phase of capture, however that prisoners are capable of producing the maximum of tactical intelligence. Of Particular importance is the necessity for immediate search and segregation of Officer, NCO's and other ranks prior to authorized interrogation. Until searched, prisoners must be prevented from organizing, lecturing each other, or mutilating documents.

4. In rear areas, (army or corps), searching and segregation of prisoners will be completed. Subsequent to the completion of searching, the prisoner's effects will be promptly impounded, confiscated or returned to the prisoner. (See Annex 1 "Sample Search In-[illegible] will be informed without delay of the capture of:

(1) [illegible]sers of the rank of Colonel or above.
(2) [illegible]mseographed plan of action, maps, overlays, orders or reports.
(3) Any other unusual source of intelligence.

Segregation will thereafter remain inviolate between:

(1) Officers.
(2) NCO's, including "Unterofficier".
(3) Other ranks, including "Gefreiter".
(4) Females.
(5) Special prisoners.
(6) Deserters.
(7) Others.

5. The handling of prisoners, including escorting them in movement and processing them at an enclosure, will probably require the use of personnel of combat units to be designated on short notice. Military Police, when available, will assist. All concerned will insure that disarmed prisoners are protected from acts of violence, and that property of prisoners is protected from petty larceny for "vengeance" or "souvenirs". Prisoners will not receive wages for administration, installation and maintenance of enclosures, tending wounded, or services of a similar nature. During the processing of prisoners a "nominal roll" will be prepared for each segregated group, (referred to in Par. 4), and for each rank of commissioned officers, each roll to be in alphabetical order, and sub-divided into groups of fifty (50) names. Each line of the roll will indicate from left to right:

(1) Name
(2) Rank.
(3) Nationality
(4) Serial number
(5) Date of capture
(6) Place of capture
(7) Notation showing whether or not an impounded bag or envelope is in the custody of the escorting guard.

6. Forms. WD-PMG Form No. 1 (white cloth tag), if available, will be attached to each prisoner. This tag is presently in use in Third U.S. Army Area by Corps and Divisions. Time permitting, the tag will show the following essential information:

(1) Name
(2) Rank
(3) Nationality.
(4) Serial number
(5) Notation showing whether or not an impounded bag or envelope is in the custody of the escorting guard.

WD-PMG Form No. 4, (pink "Card of Capture" in duplicate), will be used only when prisoners are detained for one week or longer for the purpose of labor or any other reason. By the time prisoners reach Army, or a higher echelon, the following two (2) basic records will have been completed:

(1) The nominal roll, (referred to in Par. 5).
(2) The record showing the grand total of prisoners of war to date arriving through all channels, including medical.

Report will be submitted to the Army Provost Marshal by each Division and Corps Provost Marshal as of 2359 B Hrs. each Saturday, and will include the following information covering the preceding week:

(1) Number of prisoners of war on hand as shown in preceding report.
(2) Number of prisoners of war captured during the preceding week.
(3) Number of prisoners of war gained, other than captured, indicating source.
(4) Number of prisoners of war lost, indicating cause.
(5) Balance of prisoners of war on hand.

Report will also specify:

(1) Number of military personnel
(2) Civilian Personnel
(3) Spies.
(4) [illegible] criminals

DECLASSIFIED

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(5) Sick
(6) Wounded.

(See Annex 2 "Prisoners of War Report").

7. Special cases. On request of G-2, certain selected prisoners of war may be specially escorted to a higher echelon, by ground or air transportation, or detained. Sick and wounded prisoners of war in the hands of Medical Corps personnel will be reported to the most convenient S-2, report to be accompanied by captured documents, prisoners statements of military value, and an estimate of his availability for interrogation. German Air Force or Naval prisoners will be interrogated only by personnel authorized from U.S. and/or Royal Air Forces or U.S. or Royal Navy, respectively. Any enemy aircraft crashing in the area of or coming under control of Third U.S. Army will be guarded on a 24 hour basis, by the unit discovering the aircraft to prevent all personnel except authorized intelligence personnel of U.S. and/or Royal Air Force from touching the aircraft. Prisoners of War suspected of espionage will be promptly turned over to G-2 accompanied by any captured material. The capture, and all other facts incident thereto, of such prisoners will be classified SECRET. Allied escapees or evadors from enemy captivity will be turned over to the Provost Marshal for evacuation following interrogation locally by the "E & E" Section of G-2. Accused war criminals will be accompanied by a written statement of a U.S. Army Officer, specifying the details, upon commitment.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

R. E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General.

ANNEX 1: Sample Searching Instructions.
ANNEX 2: Prisoners of War Report.

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ANNEX 1 TO CIRCULAR NUMBER 37 8 July 1944

(Sample Searching Instructions)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PERSONNEL IN CHARGE OF SEARCH TABLES

TABLE LETTER: _____

Articles to be examined and handed back to prisoner of war:

1. Gold and other valuables; watches, rings, cigarette cases, lucky trinkets, fountain pens, gold or silver pencils, and other personal articles of a similar nature having intrinsic or personal value.

2. Medals, decorations or certificates of name and identity discs.

3. Toilet requisites EXCEPT razors, manicure sets or scissors, etc.

4. Cigarettes, cigars or tobacco.

5. Gas masks.

6. Pay books.

Articles to be taken away from prisoner of war as "Of Military Value", by receipt given.

1. Firearms or weapons of any kind including files, saws, hammers, etc.

2. All mechanical spare parts of any kind.

3. All military equipment including belts, webbing, haversacks, water bottles and all aluminum.

4. Blankets, bedding, civilian clothes and suitcases.

5. Preserved foods of all kinds.

6. Matches or forms of spirit or alcohol.

7. All unused paper or writing paper and empty notebooks.

8. Inks of any kind.

9. Medical drugs and stores.

NOTE: Numbers 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 9 MUST be placed in separate receptacles in rear of search tables.

Articles to be placed in lensumied bag:

1. Maps or military documents. Printed or written.

2. All publications acquired before or after capture.

3. Visiting cards, odd names and addresses scribbled on scraps of paper.

4. All written or printed materials including letters or postcards, diaries, notebooks, photographs, etc.

5. Cameras, compasses, binoculars or any other form of precision instrument.

6. Cigarette lighters.

7. Knives, scissors, straight razors and manicure sets.

8. Currency of all kinds. (Receipt will be given).

ANNEX 2 TO CIRCULAR NUMBER 37.

PRISONERS OF WAR REPORT

Unit reporting _____ Reporting for (day) (hr) ending 2359 (Date) 1944

Prisoners of War figures below will, in each case, include hospitalized sick and wounded.

	Off.			Refugees		War Criminals		Others		TOTAL	
	Gen'l	W.Off	Pvte	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
1. Balance on hand as of preceding report											
2. Gains: a. By capture											
b. By other sources											
c. Gains from Commands other than TUSA											
3. Total, (No. 1 and No. 2)											
4. Losses: a. By evacuation to Army Enclosure											
b. By evacuation to Hospitals											
c. Other losses											
5. Total losses											
6. Balance on hand as of this report. (No. 3 less No. 5).											

7. REMARKS: _____

For the Provost Marshal:

_____
(Signature)

_____
(Arm or Service)

ANNEX NO. 8

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

CIRCULAR)
NUMBER 48) 29 August 1944

SECTION I - Enlisted Passes.
SECTION II - Vehicle Corrals.

EXTRACT EXTRACT

I. ENLISTED PASSES.

Enlisted men of the Third Army will be apprehended and turned over to Straggler Collecting Points unless they occupy status as follows:

a. On duty.

b. In Bivouac Area.

c. On written pass. Passes will not be issued to enlisted men to visit towns or cities which are off limits.

II. VEHICLE CORRALS.

1. Vehicle Corrals will be established at once under the supervision of the Army Provost Marshal for the detention of violators of traffic rules and regulations. Vehicles and drivers impounded in "Vehicle Corrals" will be held from one (1) to twelve (12) hours for booking, and to remove from the highways those vehicles and drivers constituting a menace to the controlled flow of traffic.

2. The following violations will warrant detention in "Vehicle Corrals": Speeding, double-banking, light violations, reckless driving, driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, failure to maintain the prescribed 80 yard distance between vehicles when moving or at a halt, disobedience of Military Police traffic directions, and any of the following vehicles passing any other moving vehicle or halted convoy, except by direction of Military Police:

Trucks, 3/4-ton weapons carriers
Trucks, 1-1/2-ton cargo
Trucks, 2-1/2-ton cargo
All other wheeled or track vehicles over 3/4-ton capacity.

EXTRACT EXTRACT

By Command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

R. E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General

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ANNEX NO. 9

PRISONER OF WAR REPORT
FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST 1944
BY ENCLOSURES

ENCLOSURE	PERIOD OF OPERATION	RECEIVED	EVACUATED	ON HAND 31 AUGUST
St. Jores	Aug 1 - 8	6362	6362	0
PWE No. 1, Auranches	Aug 4 - 7	5197	5197	0
PWE No. 2 Zone de Bretagne	Aug 8 - 19	27407	27407	0
PWE No. 3 Mer de Bretagne	Opened 19 Aug	1273	985	288
ASCZ Brittany Zone	Opened 24 Aug	3274	3274	0
PWE No. 4 Evron	Aug 14 -25	8771	8771	0
PWE No. 5 Courtalain	Opened 30 Aug	3783	3717	66
PWE No. 6 Dumoure	Opened 25 Aug	7252	6494	758
TOTALS		63369	62157	1212
Medical admissions		6677		
TOTAL RECEIVED		70046		
Escapees and Evaders		488	477	11

ANNEX NO. 10

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

CIRCULAR)
NUMBER 51)

3 September 1944

EXTRACT

EXTRACT

SECTION II - Traffic Regulations.

II. Traffic Regulations.

The following traffic regulations in addition to the provisions of Circular No. 10, this headquarters, dated 4 May 1944 are effective and will be strictly enforced in order to insure the uninterrupted flow and efficient control of road traffic on the continent.

1. a. The following speed limits will be obeyed during daylight hours:

(1) 25 MPH: All convoys.

(2) 30 MPH: All individual trucks (including 3/4 ton weapons carriers and over, wheeled or track).

(3) 40 MPH: Passenger cars, 1/4 ton trucks (jeeps) and trucks 3/4 ton C & R (jeeps), and motorcycles.

(4) In towns and cities all vehicles not to exceed 25 MPH.

b. The following speed limits will be obeyed during darkness

(1) 15 MPH: All wheeled and track vehicles including 3/4 ton weapons carriers and over and all convoys.

(2) 30 MPH: Passenger cars, trucks, 1/4 ton (jeeps), trucks 3/4 ton C & R (jeeps), and motorcycles.

2. Up to Corps rear boundaries blackout driving lamps, American or British type, will be used.

a. Vehicles equipped with only one approved blackout driving lamp will prepare the other headlight lens in the approved manner i.e.: lens to be painted black and a rectangular aperture two inches wide and three-eighths of an inch high, its base line will be two inches below and parallel to a horizontal line through the center of the lens.

b. Signs indicating end of Army Dimout Light Zone will be posted on all main routes by the Army Provost Marshal.

c. Forward of Corps rear boundaries "CAT EYES" lights only will be used by all vehicles.

d. Red light "Flashers" on special vehicles are authorized in addition to the above.

3. Rear vision mirrors will be so adjusted habitually as to be useable in watching for traffic approaching from the rear.

4. a. Directional discs, white with black arrow painted toward twelve o'clock indicate main routes forward to the front.

b. Directional discs, white with black arrow and bar perpendicular to the base of the shaft indicate lateral routes.

c. Directional discs, white with black arrow painted toward six o'clock indicate main down routes to the rear areas.

d. Directional discs, red with white arrows indicate detours from main or lateral routes.

e. Directional discs or equivalent, white with red arrow indicate local routes.

5. France plates, metal or wooden material, 15" x 17" or 17" x 30", with white letters on black background will be used for unit, installation or route signs, except Medical Corps signs which will be red on white background. No other size, type or colored signs will be used except as authorized by the Army Commander.

6. a. Trucks, 1/4 ton (jeeps) will not be overloaded. Not more than four persons will be carried except in operational emergencies at or near the front lines.

b. Drivers will not smoke while driving.

7. The tops on trucks, 1/4 ton (jeeps) and trucks, 3/4 ton C & R (jeeps) will be down at all times except during heavy rains.

8. Civilians will not be carried in U.S. Military vehicles except as indicated hereinafter; Counter Intelligence Corps personnel, Military Police, and Civil Affairs personnel are authorized to carry civilian personnel when necessary on official business.

9. On military highways voluntary halting, stopping or parking for any purpose is forbidden unless all wheels of the vehicle are clear of the normally travelled road surface.

10. Disabled vehicles will be towed or pushed off the road surface immediately.

11. Double banking of halted vehicles or moving vehicles on a highway by 3/4 ton weapons carriers and all other heavier wheeled or track vehicles is forbidden at any time.

12. Motorcycles, passenger cars, trucks, 1/4 ton (jeeps) and trucks, 3/4 ton C & R (jeeps) may pass other halted or moving vehicles on a highway provided there is a 40 yard gap into which the passing vehicle may rejoin the traffic column.

13. a. All vehicles in convoys will habitually maintain 40 yards distance from the vehicle ahead, both, while moving and at a halt. Vehicles authorized to overtake will do so only where there is a full 40 yard gap available ahead.

b. Convoy or individual vehicles will maintain the 40 yards distance between vehicles when entering towns or cities or approaching heavy traffic intersections.

14. All officers will assume the responsibility for apprehending violators of the above regulations and conducting them to the nearest military police post or "Vehicle Corral".

15. "Vehicle Corrals" will be established by Military Police at convenient points along traffic lanes for the detention and booking of traffic violators.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

JOHN J. GAFFEY
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

SEAL

R. E. CUMMINGS
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General

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ANNEX NO. 11

PRISONER OF WAR REPORT
FOR THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1944
BY ENCLOSURES

ENCLOSURE	PERIOD OF OPERATION	ON HAND 31 AUG.	RECEIVED	EVACUATED	ON HAND 30 SEPT
PWE No. 3 Mer de Bretagne	Closed 5 Sept	288	199	587	0
ASCZ Brittany Zone	Closed 6 Sept	0	1867	1867	0
PWE No. 5 Courtalain	Closed 1 Sept	66	1	67	0
PWE No. 6 Dumoure	Closed 9 Sept	758	3884	4642	0
PWE No. 7 Reviguy	Sept 3 - 21	0	12296	12297	1
PWE No. 8 Fresnes en Woevre	Opened 11 Sept	0	3936	3794	142
PWE No. 9 Toul	Opened 21 Sept	0	3386	2780	606
TOTALS		1212	25971	26034	749
Medical admissions			2501		
TOTAL RECEIVED			28072		
Escapees and Evaders		11	390	400	1

PRISONERS OF WAR RECEIVED FROM 1 AUGUST THROUGH 30 SEPTEMBER			
	RECEIVED AT ENCLOSURES	RECEIVED AT MEDICAL UNITS	TOTAL
August	63369	6677	70046
September	25971	2501	28072
			98118

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ANNEX NO. 12

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

CIRCULAR)
: 27 September 1944
NUMBER 50)

EXTRACT EXTRACT

SECTION II - Curfew
SECTION IV - Uniform Violations.

II. CURFEW

Curfew in all towns is 2000 to 0800 hours. All military personnel will be off streets and clear of town during curfew hours.

IV. UNIFORM VIOLATIONS.

1. Captured clothing (such as fur coats, jackets, and fur hats) when worn as outer garments are in violation of current uniform regulations.

2. In every case involving such an offense the Provost Marshal will confiscate such articles of wearing apparel and turn them in to Quartermaster Captured Stores or Prisoner of War Enclosures for use of German prisoners of war.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

R. E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department
Adjutant General

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ANNEX NO 13

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

CIRCULAR)
: 30 September 1944
NUMBER 60)

SECTION I - Policy with Respect to Towns and Cities in Third Army Area.

EXTRACT EXTRACT

I. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TOWNS AND CITIES IN THE THIRD ARMY AREA

1. Section VI, Circular 45, this headquarters, dated 17 August 1944, is rescinded.

2. All towns and cities in Third Army Area, upon liberation, will initially be placed on limits to all military personnel. Thereafter towns and cities may be placed "Off limits" and so signed when deemed expedient by the Army or the Corps Commander concerned.

3. Curfew in all towns and cities, time to be announced periodically, will include the hours of darkness, and will be strictly enforced for both military and civilian personnel.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

R. E. CUMMINGS
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department
Adjutant General

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ANNEX NO. 14

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

CIRCULAR)
: 4 October 1944
NUMBER 63)

TRAFFIC REGULATION AND CONTROL
FOR CONTINENTAL OPERATION

I. This circular supersedes the provisions of Circular 10, current series, this headquarters, dated 4 May 1944.

II. GENERAL

1. PURPOSE:

a. To establish the responsibility for and the method of control of road traffic in the Army Area.

b. To familiarize U.S. Military personnel with the essential basic rules to be followed to meet operational traffic conditions.

c. This circular is designed to regulate movement of supplies and troops and will not be considered applicable to units in tactical formations engaged in combat operations.

2. DEFINITIONS:

a. Road Traffic: All aspects of the movement of vehicles or foot troops over roads. Its operation consists of road traffic regulations and road traffic control.

b. Road Traffic Regulations: The measures taken to assure the proper movement of road traffic as to priorities, routes, time and destination.

c. Road Traffic Control: The means taken to insure the proper movement of road traffic and to insure that it meets the operational requirements. It is effected by compliance with instructions issued, and by control agencies used by commands within their areas.

d. Main Route: A principal supply or tactical route running generally from the rear forward, designated by the senior commander.

(1) Directional discs, white with black arrow pointed toward twelve o'clock will be used to indicate main routes forward to the front.

(2) Directional discs, white with black arrow pointed toward six o'clock will be used to indicate main down routes to the rear areas.

e. Lateral Route: A principal supply or tactical route running generally parallel to the front, designated by the senior commander. Directional discs, white with black arrow and bar perpendicular to the base of the shaft will be used to indicate lateral routes.

f. Detours: Directional discs, red with white arrow will be used to indicate detours from main or lateral routes.

g. Local Routes: Directional discs, or equivalent, white with red arrow will be used to indicate local routes.

h. Through Route: A route normally running through two or more sub-areas of an area, designated by the commander of the latter for the purpose of placing under his own direct command the regulation and control of road traffic thereon. Such routes when designated by the senior commander will be selected from Main or Lateral Routes.

3. BASIC PRINCIPLES:

a. Command Responsibilities: Each Corps and Division Commander will be responsible for the designation, marking, maintenance and control of roads within his area in conformity with the plan of the next higher commander.

b. Organization: To accomplish this traffic control, the headquarters of each division or larger tactical unit will institute, within current T/O, a traffic headquarters under supervision of G-4 or a comparable staff section. Its duties will be to prepare Road Traffic Control Plan, to regulate and control traffic through a central agency, and will include:

(1) Receipt, correlation, and dissemination of road traffic information.

(2) Formulation and publication of road traffic rules.

(3) Supervision and control of Road Traffic Regulating.

(4) Coordination of movements originating in its area with the Traffic Headquarters of other area(s) into which such movements will continue.

III. ROAD TRAFFIC REGULATIONS:

1. ROUTES: Main, Lateral, and Through Routes will be designated by Traffic Headquarters, signed by Provost Marshals and maintained by Engineers within Army, Corps, and Division Areas respectively.

2. PRIORITIES:

a. The following priorities will be accorded traffic in the Army Area unless otherwise directed:

(1) Priority cars so marked (General Officers' vehicles)
(2) Messenger Cars
(3) Troop Movement
(4) Ambulances
(5) Staff Cars
(6) Wire construction crews
(7) Supply convoys in this priority: V, III, I.
(8) All other traffic.

b. Area commanders may designate special vehicles to be exempt from the above priorities and such exceptions will be in conformity with higher headquarters approval and will be specifically marked. For Signal Corps vehicles so exempted, the vehicle will be designated by demountable rectangular markings mounted on the right front and right rear bumpers. Such markings will be 9½" long by 6½" wide, painted horizontally blue and white, the upper half being white and the lower half blue. Also, such messenger personnel will wear 4" wide brassards above left elbow, the upper half being white, the lower half blue.

c. For exceptional tactical reasons, units may be moved with priority over all roads with written authority and adequate MP escorts, all traffic control agencies to be immediately informed of such priority exception.

3. LIGHTS:

a. Army Light Line coincides with Corps rear boundary.

b. Vehicle lights will be used as follows:

(1) Full headlights in rear of Army Light Line.

(2) Blackout driving lamps (dimout) for vehicles so equipped from Army Light Line to Division rear boundary.

(3) For vehicles not equipped with blackout driving lamps (dimouts), marker ("CAT EYES") lights from Army Light Line to Division rear boundary.

(4) Marker ("CAT EYES") lights for all vehicles in front of Division rear boundary.

(5) Red Light "Flashers" on special vehicles are authorized in addition to the above.

c. All obstacles such as trophies, gun cons, camouflage nets, signs, etc., will be removed from the front and rear of vehicles where they obstruct the full benefits of the head and tail lights.

4. SPEEDS: The following speed limits will be observed except under those circumstances where operational traffic conditions or exceptional tactical situations dictate otherwise.

a. Daylight:

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(1) 25 MPH: All convoys
(2) 30 MPH: All individual trucks (including 3/4 ton weapons carriers and over, wheeled or tracked).
(3) 40 MPH: Passenger cars, 1/4 ton trucks, and trucks 3/4 ton C & R, and motorcycles.
(4) In towns and cities no vehicle to exceed 25 MPH.

b. Night (blackout)
(1) 15 MPH: All wheeled and tracked vehicles including 3/4 ton weapons carriers and over, and all convoys.
(2) 30 MPH: Passenger cars, 1/4 ton trucks, and trucks 3/4 ton C & R, and motorcycles.
(3) At night, with standard headlights daylight speed limits will prevail behind Army light lines.

3. DENSITY: The following vehicle density will be standard except where notified by a commander to meet the requirements of a special tactical situation:

a. March unit will not exceed 30 vehicles.

b. Serial will not exceed 5 march units.

c. Serials and units will conform to road time alloted them and will maintain 50 yards between vehicles at all times, and a time interval of 3 minutes between march units and 6 minutes between serials.

d. All traffic on the Continent will drive on the right hand side.

e. Nothing in these instructions will be construed as relieving a convoy commander of his responsibility for proper convoy discipline and unit control.

IV. ROAD TRAFFIC CONTROL:

1. CLASSIFICATION AND MARKINGS:

a. The British road, bridge and vehicle classification and marking system will be used. Under this system, a vehicle may cross only bridges bearing classification numbers which are the same or greater than the vehicle's classification.

b. (1) Frame plates, metal or wooden material, 15" x 17" or 17" x 20", with white letters on black background will be used for unit, installation or route signs. No other size, type, or colored signs will be used except Medical Corps signs as prescribed in Letter, Headquarters Third United States Army, AG 615 GNMCH-4, dated 16 June 1944, subject: Signs for Medical Units, and as authorized by the Army Commander.

(2) For location of administrative and tactical Headquarters of Command Posts: Unit insignia for Army, Corps and Division; unit designations for other units. Telephone code names will not be used.

V. CONVOYS:

1. CLEARANCE:

a. Entry into Third Army Area - All units or detachments (American or Allied) will secure permission from Army Headquarters prior to entering Third Army Area.

b. All convoys of 10 or more vehicles will secure clearance through Traffic Headquarters of convoy origin as soon as the necessity for the move is determined.

c. Request for clearance will include the following information:

(1) Headquarters requiring clearance.
(2) Name of Convoy Commander.
(3) Unit to move.
(4) Authority to move.
(5) Total number of vehicles.
(6) Total number of march units.
(7) Total number of serials.
(8) Heaviest type vehicle in column.
(9) Present location of unit.
(10) Destination.
(11) Time and date movement desired.
(12) Route desired.

d. Unauthorized convoys will be halted by military [illegible] and will not be allowed to proceed until clearance is obtained.

2. CONVOY COMMANDER.

a. The convoy commander will be responsible that:

(1) The convoy commander will ride in that position in his convoy that will insure close supervision of his convoy at all times.

(2) The movement number of the convoy is clearly marked on the front and rear of the lead vehicle of each march unit.

(3) The lead vehicle of the convoy (not to include Convoy Commanders vehicles) or of each column, if convoy is moving in more than one column, is marked with a blue flag and the tail vehicle with a green flag, or if at night, with blue and green lights.

(4) All drivers are informed of the convoy number, destination, and the route to be followed. A strip map of the route will be furnished each driver when practicable, and, if in cases not practicable, the route numbers and principal towns along the designated route.

(5) While at the halt that march interval (60 yds) is maintained; that vehicles are moved to the right of (and off) the normally travelled surface of the road, using due precaution in mined areas, and that assistant drivers or drivers are stationed in such manner as to assist passing traffic by appropriate signals.

(6) Disabled vehicles are moved off the road and that an attendant is posted to guard the vehicle and assist all traffic past the vehicle. He will report to the nearest traffic control post or Military Police the location of the disabled vehicle and any other obstruction or road damage which requires attention.

b. A representative of the convoy commander will precede the convoy by at least ten minutes to coordinate with the Traffic Control points enroute.

3. PASSING: All vehicles in convoys will habitually maintain 50 yards distance from the vehicle ahead, both, while moving and at a halt. Vehicles authorized to overtake will do so only where there is a full 50 yard gap available ahead.

VI. RESTRICTIONS:

1. The tops on trucks, 1/4 ton, and trucks, 3/4 ton C & R, will be down at all times except during heavy rains.

2. Civilians will not be carried in U. S. military vehicles except as indicated hereinafter: Counter-Intelligence Corps personnel, Military Police, and Civil Affairs personnel are authorized to carry civilian personnel when necessary on official business.

3. Drivers will not smoke while driving.

4. Trucks, 1/4 ton, will not carry more than four persons except in operational emergencies at or near the front lines.

5. Not more than one person beside the driver will ride in the cabs or front seats of any vehicles.

6. Halting of vehicles:

a. On military highways voluntary halting, stopping, or parking for any purpose is forbidden unless all wheels of the vehicle are clear of the normally travelled road surface.

b. Disabled vehicles will be towed or pushed off the road surface immediately.

c. Double banking of halted vehicles or moving vehicles on highways by 3/4 ton weapons carriers and all other heavier wheeled or tracked vehicles is forbidden at any time.

d. The halting of vehicles on military highways in towns is forbidden.

7. Motorcycles, passenger cars, trucks 1/4 ton, and trucks 3/4 ton C & R, may pass other halted or moving vehicles on a highway provided there is a 50 yard gap into which the passing vehicle may rejoin the traffic column.

8. All individual vehicles, as well as convoys, will maintain the 50 yard distance between vehicles when entering towns or cities or approaching heavy traffic intersections.

9. Rear vision mirrors will be so adjusted as to be useable in watching for traffic approaching from the rear.

10. Officers will not drive military vehicles unless:

[illegible] driver is taken sick, is injured, wounded, killed or [illegible] (during trip).

b. In case of fire.

c. In case of attack (including riots, etc.).

d. In any case of life or death.

e. In any special case, when directed in writing by the Unit or Installation Commander where the need is urgent, and is for the good of the Government. This will in no case be used as an excuse for an officer to drive for personal satisfaction.

11. Vehicles will not be left unattended unless under immediate surveillance of guards or in authorized guarded parking lots.

12. U. S. Military vehicles will not be immobilized by the removal of rotors or other vital parts by military or civilian personnel.

13. All officers will assume the responsibility for apprehending violators of the above regulations and conducting them to the nearest military police post, "Vehicle Corral," or Summary Court.

14. Vehicle Corrals:

a. Vehicle Corrals will be established at once under the supervision of the Army Provost Marshal for the detention of violators of traffic rules and regulations. Vehicles and drivers impounded in "Vehicle Corrals" will be held from one (1) to twelve (12) hours for booking, and to remove from the highways those vehicles and drivers constituting a menace to the controlled flow of traffic.

b. The following violations will warrant detention in Vehicle Corrals: speeding, double-banking, light violations, reckless driving, driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, failure to maintain the prescribed 50 yard distance between vehicles when moving or at a halt, disobedience of Military Police traffic directions, and any of the following vehicles passing any other moving vehicle or halted convoy, except by direction of Military Police:

Trucks, 3/4 ton weapons carriers
Trucks, 1-1/2 ton cargo
Trucks, 2-1/2 ton cargo
All other wheeled or tracked vehicles over 3/4 ton capacity.

15. Summary Courts: Summary Courts will be established under the supervision of the Army Provost Marshal to bring swift justice and immediate punishment to traffic violators and other offenders. These courts will be moved to critical points as required, and will be set up and try offenders on the spot. Offenses beyond the jurisdiction of the courts will be investigated and referred to appropriate commander for necessary action.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

R. H. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department
Adjutant General.

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ANNEX NO. 15

PRISONER OF WAR REPORT
FOR THE MONTH OF OCTOBER 1944
BY ENCLOSURES

ENCLOSURE	PERIOD OF OPERATION	ON HAND 30 SEPT	RECEIVED	EVACUATED	ON HAND
PWE Number 7 [illegible]		1	0	1	0
PWE Number 8 [illegible]	Closed 15 Oct 44	142	415	557	0
PWE Number 9 [illegible]		666	2660	3064	142
TOTALS		709	3015	4321	142
MEDICAL ADMISSIONS			307		
TOTAL			4322		
ESCAPEES AND EVADERS		1	40	41	0

PRISONERS OF WAR RECEIVED FROM 1 AUGUST 1944 THROUGH 31 OCTOBER 1944

	RECEIVED AT ENCLOSURES	RECEIVED BY MEDICAL UNITS	TOTAL
AUGUST	63269	6677	70046
SEPTEMBER	25971	2501	28072
OCTOBER	3015	307	4322
TOTALS	92256	9485	102340

ANNEX NO. 16

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 383.6 GNRST 14 November 1944

SUBJECT: Detention of Prisoners of War by Forward Units.

TO : See Distribution.

1. It has been brought to the attention of this headquarters that forward elements are retaining captured enemy personnel for labor purposes within their units.

2. In many instances these prisoners of war are from key enemy units, and such valuable intelligence information is lost by their retention.

3. All prisoners of war, in accordance with existing policy, will be evacuated to the Corps Collecting Point immediately upon capture.

4. Attention is directed to the following publications prohibiting the working of prisoners of war anywhere within twelve miles of the nearest enemy frontline:

a. Letter, SHAEF, AG 383.6-3 GAP-AGM, dated 11 April 1944, subject: "Employment of Prisoners of War."

b. Letter, Headquarters ETOUSA, AG 383.6 OpOA, dated 21 September 1944, subject: "Prisoner of War Labor."

c. Annex Number 19 to TUSA Outline Plan, Operation Overlord, Provost Marshal Plan, dated 11 May 1944.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

L. L. HAMLY,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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ANNEX NO. 17

PRISONER OF WAR REPORT
FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER 1944
BY ENCLOSURES

ENCLOSURE	PERIOD OF OPERATION	ON HAND 31 OCT	RECEIVED	EVACUATED	ON HAND
PWE Number 9 TOTAL		142	10686	9919	909
PWE Number 10 [illegible]	Opened 11 Nov 44	0	13447	12188	1259
TOTALS		142	24133	22107	2168
MEDICAL ADMISSIONS			1779		
TOTAL			25912		
ESCAPEES AND EVADERS		0	32	32	0

PRISONERS OF WAR RECEIVED FROM 1 AUGUST 1944 THROUGH 30 NOVEMBER 1944

	RECEIVED AT ENCLOSURES	RECEIVED BY MEDICAL UNITS	TOTALS
1 AUGUST 1944 to 31 OCTOBER 1944	98,886	9,486	108,360
NOVEMBER 1944	24,133	1,779	25,912
TOTALS	116,988	11,264	128,252

ANNEX NO. 18

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 250.1 GNRST 25 November 1944

SUBJECT: Reporting of Crimes, Offenses and Serious Incidents.

TO : See Distribution.

1. Corps and Division Commanders will submit to the Army Provost Marshal, this headquarters, not later than the third day of each month, a summary showing the number of crimes, offenses and serious incidents, by classification, as listed below, occurring during the preceding month in their respective areas. Non-Division and non-Corps units under immediate control of this headquarters will submit report directly to the Army Provost Marshal.

a. Theft of U. S. Government property, including vehicles, subsistence stores, firearms, ammunition, drugs, etc.

b. Disorders or incidents of physical violence between U. S. troops, Allied and U. S. troops, and/or civilians.

c. U. S. Army motor vehicle accidents involving death or serious injury.

d. Any other serious incident involving U. S. military personnel with civilian or military personnel.

e. Escape from custody or confinement by U. S. military prisoners.

f. Murder.

g. Sodomy.

h. Rape.

i. Arson.

j. Burglary.

k. Housebreaking.

l. Forgery.

m. Larceny (where the value is more than $50.00).

n. Robbery.

o. Manslaughter.

p. Mayhem.

2. In addition to the above a brief description of the crime or incident charged or suspected will be reported and will include:

a. Name, rank, serial number and organization of offender.

b. Crime charged or suspected, or a brief description of the incident being reported.

c. Name(s) and description of the victim(s).

d. Time, date, and place of the offense or incident being reported.

e. Action taken.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

L. L. HAMLY
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj.Gen.

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ANNEX NO. 19

TRAFFIC CONTROL ROUTES
FOR MOVEMENT THIRD U.S. ARMY UNITS TO BASTOGNE OPERATION



ANNEX NO. 20

PRISONERS OF WAR REPORT
FOR THE MONTH OF DECEMBER 1944
BY ENCLOSURES

ENCLOSURE	PERIOD OF OPERATION	ON HAND 30 NOV	RECEIVED	EVACUATED	ON HAND
PWE Number 9 TOUL	Closed 17 Dec 44	909	3619	4528	0
PWE Number 10 FLORANGE		1259	10306	11392	172
PWE Number 11 FOLSCHVILLER	Opened 19 Dec 44	0	0	0	0
PWE Number 11 FOLSCHVILLER	Closed 20 Dec 44	0	0	0	0
PWE Number 12 MARVILLE ST.JEAN	Opened 26 Dec 44	0	3154	2846	308
TOTALS at PWEs		2168	17079	18767	480
MEDICAL ADMISSIONS			1341		
TOTAL			18420		
ESCAPEES AND EVADERS		0	3	3	0

PRISONERS OF WAR RECEIVED FROM 1 AUGUST 1944 THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1944

	RECEIVED AT ENCLOSURES	RECEIVED BY MEDICAL UNITS	TOTALS
1 August 1944 to 30 November 1944	116,988	11,264	128,252
December 1944	17,079	1,341	18,420
TOTALS	134,067	12,605	146,672



GROUP OF GERMAN PRISONERS CAPTURED IN NEUFCHATEAU-BASTOGNE SECTOR OF BELGIUM WAITING TO BE CHECKED IN BY G-2

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ANNEX NO. 21

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

CIRCULAR)
NUMBER 2)

4 January 1945

MILITARY CONTROL OF THE CITY OF LUXEMBOURG AND VICINITY

1. By direction of the Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, the Commanding General, Third U. S. Army, assumes military control of the City of LUXEMBOURG and vicinity.

2. Responsibility for cordon defense and the defense of command posts will remain as at present. Existing plans of the Twelfth Army Group and the Third U. S. Army will be carefully coordinated in order to insure prompt and decisive action, the effective operation of those plans as a whole, and the elimination of confusion and doubt in the minds of those charged with their execution. Third U. S. Army will be prepared to take over all defense responsibilities now borne by Twelfth Army Group when called upon to do so.

3. Curfew: Civilian curfew will be from 2000 to 0600 hours daily.

4. The following pass policy for military personnel visiting, stationed at, or billeted in the City of LUXEMBURG, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, is announced effective 5 January 1945, except that passes for troops under command of or designated by Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group, and Headquarters, Ninth Air Force will be issued in accordance with their present instructions.

5. a. The City of LUXEMBURG is off limits to other military personnel except that five (5) percent only of the T/O strength of units mentioned below may visit LUXEMBURG on any one day.

(1) All Corps, including all attached and supporting units.

(2) All troops stationed and/or billeted within the city limits of LUXEMBURG.

(3) Army Troops, Third United States Army located within the boundaries of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

b. No twenty-four (24) hour passes will be issued.

6. Existing regulations regarding the use of the prescribed "passcard" will be strictly adhered to and enforced by all concerned.

7. United States military vehicles will not be left unattended in the Third United States Army area unless under the immediate surveillance of guards or in authorized military parking lots (Circular 88, this Headquarters, 10 December 1944).

8. All buildings will be completely "blacked-out" in accordance with scheduled hours as published. It is the responsibility of persons occupying quarters or offices to see that they are "blacked-out."

9. Army Regulations 600-35, relative to the proper wearing of the uniform, will be strictly enforced.

10. Traffic Regulation and Control will be enforced as outlined in Circular 63, this Headquarters, 4 October 1944, with changes.

11. Third U. S. Army personnel will be governed by existing Third U. S. Army directives, not mentioned above.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

R. T. CHAMBERS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General.

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ANNEX NO. 22

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

3 January 1945

PLAN FOR DEFENSE OF COMMAND POST

(Destroy all copies dated 18 December 1944, and annexes thereto).

1. GENERAL:

This plan establishes a procedure and designates forces for the defense of the Command Post Area against attack by enemy personnel or sympathizers.

2. PLAN:

a. Annex No. 1 (Detailed Plan for Defense of Lucky Forward Command Post).

b. Annex No. 2 (Detailed Plan for Defense of Lucky Rear Command Post).

3. FORCES AVAILABLE:

a. See annexes.

b. Anti-aircraft Artillery gun positions located on the outskirts of the Command Post Area have the primary mission of defense against air attack and secondary mission of warning and defense against ground attack.

c. Company A, 503rd Military Police Battalion provides an interior guard for the defense of the Command Post proper. This guard has a primary mission of restricting entrance to Command Post to authorized personnel and a secondary mission of investigating and reporting unusual occurrences and evidences of hostile activity in the immediate area of the Command Post.

d. Headquarters Company, Third U. S. Army, provides an additional force for the close-in protection of the Command Post proper. This force will normally operate under the Commanding Officer, Company A, 503rd Military Police Battalion and will require not more than one hour to be assembled from its several primary duties.

4. PROCEDURE:

a. Report of hostile activity will be made by fastest available means of communication to the Provost Marshal (LUCKY 27 or 20). Such reports will give the who, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW of the hostile activity reported.

b. Upon receipt of reports indicating possible activity against the Command Post Area, the Provost Marshal will order the officer in charge of command post security to execute the plan of defense.

c. The officer in charge of command post security will keep the Provost Marshal informed at all times as to the progress of the action.

d. Immediate reports of hostile activity will be made by the Provost Marshal to the following in the order indicated:

(1) Chief of Staff (Lucky 5 or 106).
(2) G-3 (Lucky 32).
(3) G-2 (Lucky 2).
(4) Headquarters Commandant (Lucky 115).
(5) Deputy Chief of Staff (Lucky 107 or 230).
(6) Anti-aircraft Officer (Lucky 48).
(7) Engineer Officer (Lucky 15).

e. Each General and Special Staff Section Chief will, upon notification from the Provost Marshal's Office that the plan for the Defense of the Command Post is in effect, assemble his respective staff officers, arrange for the safeguarding, transportation, or destruction of classified documents, and stand by for further orders from the Chief of Staff. If necessary, this force may be used in whole or in part in the defense of the Command Post.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

R. W. HARTMAN
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen

ANNEX NO. 23

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 381 - SHMCY

4 January 1945

SUBJECT: Admission to Lucky Forward Headquarters.

TO : All General and Special Staff Sections, Forward Headquarters, Third U. S. Army.

1. This letter supersedes letter dated 29 December 1944, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, subject, "Admission to Lucky Forward Headquarters." Instructions contained herein are effective this date.

2. To insure greater security, the following additional instructions to letter, Command Post Security, dated 23 December 1944, this headquarters, will be complied with. Certain portions of the area occupied by this headquarters or its installations will be designated as "Restricted Areas."

a. The interior and exterior of Headquarters buildings, billets, and messes are hereby designated as "Restricted Areas."

3. Offices and Quarters: All entrances to the building occupied by Lucky Forward Echelon except those under guard will be blocked.

4. Dismount Point: A dismount point for all personnel below the grade of General Officer is established at the main entrance gate:

a. Only the following vehicles, in addition to those of General Officers, will be allowed to enter the enclosure:

(1) One passenger vehicle per staff section. (Identified by new type windshield sticker).

(2) Signal, utilities, mail and supply service trucks.

5. Liaison officers and military personnel regularly on duty within a "Restricted Area," or whose official duties necessitate visiting such areas, will be issued a special pass provided by the Provost Marshal's Office. This pass will be presented to MPs at entrances to Headquarters, billets, and messes.

a. The pass will be a card printed in a characteristic color scheme with the signature of the holder. Each pass will have a number which will be on file in the office of the Provost Marshal and this number will not be changed. Each pass will bear initials of the Provost Marshal. Each Section Chief will be responsible for issuing passes to

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the personnel of his Section. The Provost Marshal will supply Chiefs of Sections with the necessary numbered blank passes. The Chiefs of Sections will furnish the Provost Marshal with a list showing the personnel to whom these passes have been issued, recorded by number. Each Staff Section will notify the Provost Marshal of any deletions or additions to its section roster.

b. The meaning and use of this pass will be treated as Secret information by all personnel. The pass will be carried on the person at all times and must be presented to Military Police for entrance to the "Restricted Area" only in conjunction with AGO Form 65-1 for officers, or with identification tags for enlisted men.

c. Loss or compromise of the pass will be immediately reported to the Provost Marshal with a statement of the circumstances.

d. At irregular intervals the Provost Marshal will issue new cards with a new characteristic color scheme and design, at which time the old cards will be recalled and will no longer be valid for admission to the "Restricted Areas."

4. Persons desiring admission to "Restricted Areas" who do not have the pass designated above will be considered visitors and will be admitted by the following procedure:

a. Each section will submit a complete roster of enlisted men and officer personnel working in the Command Post to Provost Marshal. Unless known by the MP on duty, all officer AGO cards and enlisted men "dog tags" will be checked against this list by the MP on duty at desk. In event an officer desiring entrance is not on the list, interested Section will be called by phone and an officer will come to the entrance desk and vouch for the visitor. A special colored identification pass card for visitors will be given such officer, who will surrender same on leaving the building.

b. Civilian personnel: Civilians will be admitted to a "Restricted Area" only on official business. The visitor will be escorted to reception desk where his credentials will be examined and he will be required to state the nature of his business. The officer he desires to visit will be contacted by telephone and with his approval only, the visitor will be escorted by an officer of section concerned to his office, after his name, address, nationality, time of arrival and name of the officer to be contacted have been entered in a register prepared and maintained by the Provost Marshal at the reception desk. At the completion of the visit it will be the responsibility of the officer contacted to insure that the visitor is escorted from the "Restricted Area", checking out at the reception desk as he leaves. The time of departure will be entered in the register. Military Police will intercept all civilians who are found unescorted within a "Restricted Area" or who attempt to leave one without properly checking out.

c. Incoming Articles and Packages: All packages, other than US mail, brought into buildings occupied by the Headquarters will be inspected for hidden explosives. In event of suspicion on the part of Military Police on duty, the package and bearer will be referred immediately to CIC or Engineer Technical Intelligence.

d. Any officer having a special pass accompanied by a visitor on official business may secure the visitor's admission to a "Restricted Area" by personally vouching for him; he will, however, be responsible that the visitor confines his activities to the official business on which he came and that he leaves promptly upon its completion. Civilians admitted under this procedure will be recorded in the register as described in Paragraph 4b above.

5. Admission to areas and installations of this Headquarters other than those designated as "Restricted Areas" will be in accordance with existing regulations.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

R. W. HARTMAN
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Adj. Gen.

ANNEX NO. 24

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PRISONER OF WAR REPORT
FOR THE MONTH OF JANUARY 1945
BY ENCLOSURES

ENCLOSURE	PERIOD OF OPERATION	ON HAND 31 DEC	RECEIVED	EVACUATED	31 JAN 45 ON HAND
PWE Number 10 FLORANGE		178	4210	4184	198
PWE Number 18 MARVILLE		306	10790	10746	350
TOTALS AT PWEs		460	15008	14930	558
MEDICAL ADMISSIONS			1617		
TOTAL			16625		
ESCAPEES AND EVADERS		0	1	1	0

PRISONERS OF WAR RECEIVED FROM 1 AUGUST 1944 THROUGH 31 JANUARY 1945

	RECEIVED AT ENCLOSURES	RECEIVED BY MEDICAL UNITS	TOTALS
1 AUGUST 1944 TO 31 DECEMBER 1944	134,067	12,605	146,672
JANUARY 1945	15,008	1,617	16,625
TOTALS	149,075	14,222	163,297



GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR CAPTURED IN THE SAAR TRIANGLE

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ANNEX NO. 25

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

9 February 1945

ANNEX NO. 1 to "Plan for Defense of Command Post" dated 3 January 1945.

PLAN FOR DEFENSE OF FORWARD COMMAND POST
(Corrected copy - destroy all copies dated 3 January 1945).

1. FORCES AVAILABLE:

Company A, 503rd Military Police Battalion (one platoon).

3 Officers, 91 enlisted men (approximately).
2 trucks, 2½ ton, cargo.
8 trucks, ¼ ton.
Individual weapons

AAA units assigned mission of protection of Forward Command Post against aircraft. To be used from own positions against ground attack to prevent positions and/or Command Post Area from being overrun by the enemy.

2 Reconnaissance platoons, 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.

2 Officers, 42 enlisted men
4 cars, armored M8 with armament.
8 trucks, ¼ ton, with machine guns, caliber .30.
Individual weapons.

Light Tank Platoon, Headquarters 8th Armored Group

1 Officer, 30 enlisted men.
3 tanks, light, M3A1, with armament.
3 half-tracks, M3, with machine guns, caliber .50.
Individual weapons.

Headquarters Company, Third United States Army

2 Officers, 100 enlisted men (approximately).
Individual weapons

Company A, 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion

5 Officers, 165 enlisted men.
14 trucks, ¼ ton.
3 trucks, 1½ ton.
2 cars, armored utility, with armament.
12 half-tracks, M3A3, with armament.
1 truck, 2½ ton cargo.
13 guns, machine, caliber .30.
9 guns, machine, caliber .50.
12 guns, 3" M1 (towed).
15 Launchers, rocket.

2. MISSIONS:

a. Company A, 503rd Military Police Battalion (CP Guard).

(1) Interior Security of Command Post.
(2) Protection of the Commanding General's Quarters.
(3) Protection of War Room and Commanding General's Office.

b. AAA Units - Normal.

c. The Reconnaissance Platoons, 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion and the Tank Platoon, Headquarters, 8th Armored Group will constitute the initial striking force to meet ground attack.

d. When ordered by the officer in charge of Command Post Security, the Headquarters Commandant will assemble the Headquarters Company, Third United States Army. After the unit is formed, the Company Commander will report to the officer in charge of Command Post [illegible] strength and location of the unit.

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c. Company A, 612st Tank Destroyer Battalion will occupy prepared gun positions in event of a breakthrough to Luxembourg from the EAST, NORTH, or SOUTH.

4. SUCCESSION OF COMMAND:

a. The officer in charge of Command Post Security will be the senior officer in the Defense Section of the Army Provost Marshal Office.

5. COMMAND POST:

a. Command Post of Command Post Defense Force will be established at Provost Marshal Section, Third United States Army (Lucky 30 or 37).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

R. A. HARTMAN,
Lt.Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

ANNEX NO. 26

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

11 February 1945

ANNEX NO. 2 to "Plan for Defense of Command Post" dated 3 January 1945.

PLAN FOR DEFENSE OF REAR ECHELON OF COMMAND POST
(Corrected copy - destroy all copies dated 16 January 1945.

1. FORCES AVAILABLE:

Company A, 503rd Military Police Battalion (two platoons).

1 Officer, 60 enlisted men (approximately).
Individual weapons.

Headquarters Company, Third U. S. Army (Rear Echelon).

2 Officers, 100 enlisted men.
Individual weapons.

Forces assigned mission of Protection of Lucky Forward Headquarters.

(See Annex No. 1, dated 9 February 1945).

2. MISSION:

a. Platoon of Company A, 503rd Military Police Battalion (CP Guard).

(1) Interior Security of Command Post Buildings (in event of emergency, men off duty will be used to double all posts).

b. Headquarters Company, Third United States Army.

(1) When ordered by the officer in charge of Command Post Security, the Assistant Headquarters Commandant will assemble the personnel of Headquarters Company, Third United States Army. After the unit is formed, the Company Commander will report to the officer in charge of Command Post Security with the strength and location of the unit.

c. Forces assigned mission of Protection of Lucky Forward Headquarters.

(1) See Annex No. 1, dated 9 February 1945.

3. SUCCESSION OF COMMAND:

a. The Officer in Charge of Command Post Security will be the senior officer in the Defense Section of the Army Provost Marshal Office.

4. COMMAND POST:

a. Command Post of Command Post Defense Force will be established at Provost Marshal Section, Third United States Army (Lucky 30 or 37).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

R. A. HARTMAN
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

ANNEX NO. 27

PRISONER OF WAR REPORT
FOR THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY 1945
BY ENCLOSURES

ENCLOSURE	PERIOD OF OPERATION	ON HAND 31 JAN	RECEIVED	EVACUATED	28 FEB 45 ON HAND
PWE Number 10 FLORANGE		198	13941	12956	1083
PWE Number 12 HARVILLE	Closed 8 Feb 45	360	2508	2868	0
PWE Number 13 ARLON	Opened 9 Feb 45	0	6763	5727	1036
TOTALS AT PWEs		558	23106	21345	2119
MEDICAL ADMISSIONS			1055		
TOTAL			24161		
ESCAPEES AND EVADERS		0	35	35	0

PRISONERS OF WAR RECEIVED FROM 1 AUGUST 1944 THROUGH 28 FEBRUARY 1945

	RECEIVED AT ENCLOSURES	RECEIVED BY MEDICAL UNITS	TOTALS
1 AUGUST 1944 TO 31 JANUARY 1945	149,075	14,222	163,297
FEBRUARY 1945	23,106	1,055	24,161
TOTALS	172,181	15,277	187,458

ANNEX NO. 28

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 250.1 GSNCY 17 March 1945

SUBJECT: Reporting of Crimes, Offenses and Serious Incidents.

TO : See Distribution.

1. All crimes, offenses and incidents of a serious nature committed within the Army area and involving United States property or United States Army personnel and Camp Followers will be reported to the Criminal Investigation Section, Office of the Provost Marshal, this headquarters.

2. The crimes listed below will be reported immediately upon discovery by fastest available means and, upon request of the Corps or Division Provost Marshal, will be investigated by the Criminal Investigation Section, Office of the Provost Marshal, this headquarters, Rear Echelon.

Murder Manslaughter Rape Sodomy
Arson House Breaking Burglary Robbery
Forgery Larceny Racial Violence
Theft, Misappropriation and Misapplication of United States property.

3. When the crimes listed above in paragraph 2 are reported by civilians to Civil Affairs Detachments, Military Police, or other military units the report will be forwarded without delay by fastest available means to this headquarters.

4. When one of the subject crimes is reported to this headquarters all available information will be given, including the names of personnel involved, the place and time and any action already taken by the unit reporting the crime.

5. Necessary action will be taken to protect material evidence available at the scene of the crime until the arrival of agents of the Criminal Investigation Section. The unnecessary handling or disturbance of such evidence will be avoided. In appropriate cases guards will be posted to prevent destruction of evidence.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

R. A. HARTMAN
Lt.Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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ANNEX NO. 29

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 415 GNECT 9 March 1945

SUBJECT: Town and Route Marking in Germany.

TO : See Distribution.

1. The following instructions (excerpted in part from paragraph 6, Change No. 1 to Administrative Instructions No. 2, Headquarters, Third United States Army, 4 December 1944) will govern road and town marking in Germany.

a. The Emergency Road Map 1:250,000, sheets K48 - K50 - K51 L48 - L50 - L51 will be used from German border through Germany. Road numbering on these maps is as directed by Twelfth Army Group.

b. The main highways marked on the map (and on the ground) by a number within a rectangle (example [159]) are highways marked and used by the Germans and will be similarly remarked by the Provost Marshal.

c. Highways marked on the map with a letter "L" and a number within a circle (example (L 150)) are unmarked highways (on the ground) in Germany. The markings as shown on the Emergency Road Map are the arbitrary highway markings which will be used by U. S. Armies. The marking of highways with these arbitrary numbers is the responsibility of the Provost Marshal.

d. Highways marked on the map with letters "A" and a number within a triangle (example ) are Autobahns (4 lane highways) and will also be marked with arbitrary numbers.

2. a. The Corps Provost Marshals will mark highways and towns with road marking and town designation signs in conformity with the Emergency Road Map. In order to eliminate confusion and expedite traffic, roads and towns will be marked at the earliest possible moment after passing to our control. Supplemental signing will be accomplished by the Army Provost Marshal.

b. Signing will be accomplished as follows:

(1) 8" x 17" black on white signs will be used for route markings.

(2) 8" x 30" black on white signs will be used for town markings.

3. At the present time, in addition to the Emergency Road Map, scale 1:250,000, the Germany Road Map, scale 1:300,000, is widely used. The only roads numbered on this map are the main highways (Reichs-strassen), which are marked on the ground, and are shown by this map symbol (41).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

R. W. HARTMAN,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Adj. Gen.

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" & "E"

ANNEX NO. 30

PRISONER OF WAR REPORT
FOR THE MONTH OF MARCH 1945 BY
ENCLOSURES

ENCLOSURE	PERIOD OF OPERATION	ON HAND 28 FEB	RECEIVED	EVACUATED	ON HAND
PWE Number 10 FLORANGE	Closed 9 Mar 45	1083	4848	5931	0
PWE Number 13 ARLON	Closed 9 Mar 45	1036	9908	10944	0
PWE Number 14 TRIER	Opened 8 Mar 45	0	85856	85355	501
PWE Number 15 BAUMHOLDER	Opened 21 Mar 45 Closed 30 Mar 45	0	32695	32393	101
PWE Number 16 ECKELSHEIM	Opened 31 Mar 45	0	4419	0	4419
TOTALS at PWEs		2119	136926	134884	5081
MEDICAL ADMISSIONS			5291		
TOTAL			142217		
ESCAPERS AND EVADERS		0	2396	2396	0

PRISONERS OF WAR RECEIVED FROM 1 AUGUST 1944 THROUGH 31 MARCH 1945			
	RECEIVED AT ENCLOSURES	RECEIVED BY MEDICAL UNITS	TOTALS
1 AUGUST 1944 TO 28 FEBRUARY 1945	172,181	15,277	187,458
MARCH 1945	136,926	5,291	142,217
TOTALS	309,107	20,568	329,675

ANNEX NO. 31

PRISONER OF WAR REPORT
FOR THE MONTH OF APRIL 1945 BY
ENCLOSURES

ENCLOSURE	PERIOD OF OPERATION	ON HAND 31 MAR	RECEIVED	EVACUATED	30 APR ON HAND
PWE Number 14, TRIER	Closed 5 Apr	501	1,557	2,058	0
PWE Number 15, BAUMHOLDER		101	0	101	0
PWE Number 16, ECKELSHEIM	Closed 5 Apr	4,419	20,985	25,404	0
PWE Number 17, OBER URSEL	Opened 2 Apr Closed 14 Apr	0	29,485	29,485	0
PWE Number 18, HATTENBACH	Opened 5 Apr Closed 19 Apr	0	54,036	54,036	0
PWE Number 19, LAUMA	Opened 14 Apr Closed 22 Apr	0	63,586	63,586	0
PWE Number 20, KULMBACH	Opened 22 Apr	0	18,890	3,136	15,754
PWE Number 21, LANGENSENDELBACH	Opened 24 Apr	0	48,185	8,370	39,815
TOTALS at PWEs		5,021	236,724	186,176	55,569
MEDICAL ADMISSIONS - including overrun German Military Hospitals			96,180		
TOTAL			332,904		
ESCAPERS AND EVADERS		0	41	37	4

PRISONERS OF WAR RECEIVED FROM 1 AUGUST 1944 THROUGH 30 APRIL 1945			
	RECEIVED AT ENCLOSURES	RECEIVED BY MEDICAL UNITS	TOTALS
1 AUGUST 1944 TO 31 MARCH 1945	309,107	20,568	329,675
APRIL 1945	236,724	96,180	332,904
TOTALS	545,831	116,748	662,579

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ANNEX NO. 32

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

18 April 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO..... 3:

CAPTURED GERMAN MILITARY HOSPITALS

1. In the Corps Zones.

a. The Corps Surgeon, in whose area the captured hospital is located, will immediately notify the Liaison Officer, 66th Medical Group, and the Army Surgeon, giving the name and location of the hospital together with an estimate of the number and classification of the German Military Staff and patients. In his report he will include the status of food and medical supplies.

b. The Army Surgeon will in turn transmit this information to the Commanding Officer, 66th Medical Group, and to the Provost Marshal, Third U.S. Army, for information only.

c. The Corps Commander will form the necessary number of teams to immediately proceed to the captured hospitals and institute measures as outlined below. Each team will consist of one representative from the Corps G-2 Section for screening purposes and one officer representing the Corps Provost Marshal. The Commanding Officer, 66th Medical Group, will coordinate with the Corps Commander to furnish one medical officer for each team. These teams will contact the Military Government Detachment nearest to the hospital to be taken over, and arrange for an officer of that detachment to accompany them.

d. The Commanding Officer, 66th Medical Group, will administer these hospitals, to include supervising medical care, screening the patients to be sent to prisoner of war enclosures, supplying the hospitals with food, medical supplies, etc. He will also be responsible for consolidating patients and captured German medical personnel of these hospitals into other captured German hospitals to the limit of facilities and time available.

e. The duties of the teams will be:

1. To proceed to the hospital overrun.

2. Prepare a roster of all German military personnel in the hospital, and deliver copies to the Army Surgeon, Commanding Officer, 66th Medical Group, Corps Provost Marshal, Town Burgomeister and the German Commanding Officer of the hospital.

3. Definitely place responsibility for the operation and guarding of the hospital and the detention of all German military personnel therein on the local Burgomeister and the hospital Commanding Officer. This responsibility will be jointly assumed.

4. Cause the local Burgomeister to furnish necessary guards.

5. Prepare necessary regulations for control of the hospital.

f. The primary duties of the various members of the team are:

1. The Military Government Representative will:

(a) Make the necessary contacts with the Town Burgomeister and any other German authorities concerned.

(b) Arrange for necessary guards through the Burgomeister.

(c) Make frequent inspections of the hospital and frequent checks on the Burgomeister.

2. The Medical Officer will:

(a) Determine which of the prisoner patients can be immediately evacuated into prisoner of war channels.

(b) Determine which must be retained as patients.

(c) Make a survey as to the adequacy of medical care and sanitation and take initial corrective action.

(d) Make a survey and report to the Commanding Officer, 66th Medical Group, as to the status of food, water, medical and other Class II and IV supplies.

(e) Initiate action on other medical questions.

3. The G-2 Representative will:

(a) Check and screen all patients.

(b) Identify, tag and list all "S.S." personnel.

(c) Render a report to the appropriate Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of: Identity of any members of the "S.S." of counter-intelligence interest, identity of such other personnel of present or future operational intelligence value, such as technicians, together with a brief summary of the interrogation.

(d) Arrange with the Medical Officer for the concentration of "S.S." personnel that cannot be evacuated due to physical condition.

4. The Provost Marshal Representative will:

(a) Arrange to receive into prisoner of war channels all patients to be evacuated immediately and others to be evacuated as they become convalescent.

(b) Insure that all "S.S." personnel are evacuated with proper tag, or, if not to be evacuated, concentrated in special groups.

(c) Make a thorough search of the buildings and premises for arms and other weapons, contraband articles and radio transmitters, paying particular attention to X-Ray rooms and installations of a suspicious nature.

(d) Seize and turn in all articles enumerated in paragraph (c) above.

(e) Search all patients in accordance with letter, Office of the Provost Marshal, Third U.S. Army, "Instructions for Personnel in Charge of Searching Prisoners of War". All items listed in column two of that directive will be confiscated and proper disposal made thereof.

(f) Determine the number of guards necessary and their locations.

(g) Institute a pass system for entry and exit.

g. The Corps Provost Marshal will be responsible that visiting patrols check the German military hospitals at frequent and irregular intervals. Health conditions, sanitation, meals and cooking facilities will be checked. A check will be made of supplies on hand and consumed. Bed checks will be made. Copies of inspections reports will be forwarded to the Commanding Officer, 66th Medical Group, and to the Provost Marshal, Third U.S. Army, for his information.

II. In the Army Area.

a. When Corps rear boundaries move up and the Army takes over German Military Hospitals in former Corps territory, the Army Provost Marshal will immediately assume responsibility for them in conjunction with the Army Surgeon and G-5. The Provost Marshal will act in accordance with Section I, paragraph g, above.

b. Should it become necessary to take over German Military Hospitals that have not been processed by Corps as directed in Section I above, the procedure will be the same as directed in Section I, only executed by Army personnel instead of Corps personnel.

c. The Army Surgeon and the Army Provost Marshal will keep a posted map showing location of all German Military Hospitals in: (1) Army Area; (2) Corps Areas.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

R. E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:
"A"
85 - CO each Corps
5 - CG each Div.
15 - PM, Third Army
75 - G-5, Third Army
5 - Surgeon, Third Army
5 - G-2, Third Army
15 - CO, 66th Med Gp.

ANNEX NO. 33

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

11 April 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : See Distribution.

ALERT PLAN FOR DEFENSE OF HEADQUARTERS AREA
(Forward Echelon)

1. The following plan will go into effect upon a warning signal sounded by a siren inside the Kaserne area, during the hours of darkness, or if the Kaserne is attacked.

2. All enlisted personnel will immediately assemble, with arms, pistol or rifle belts and ammunition in front of the building in which they are quartered under command of the following officers:

Building A - One of the G-2 Duty Officers.
Building B - One of the Artillery Duty Officers.
Building C - One of the Provost Marshal's Duty Officers.
Building D - A Headquarters Company Officer, assisted by an officer from the 302d QM Car Company.
Building F - An officer from the Headquarters Commandant's Section.

3. It is the responsibility of each of the sections mentioned in paragraph 2 to insure that officers on duty are familiar with this plan.

4. When the troops are formed, the troops commander will report immediately with a runner to the Provost Marshal's Section in Building C for instructions.

5. The Duty Officer in the Office of the Provost Marshal will immediately telephone the following officers, in the priority indicated, stating that the Headquarters has been alerted for a ground attack:

Officer	Day Phone	Night Phone
Provost Marshal	27	147
Chief of Staff	5	106
Deputy Chief of Staff	107	144
A C of S, G-3	3	226
Signal Officer	10	167
Headquarters Commandant	115	---
A C of S, G-2	2	149

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

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J. J. HAMLIN,
Major, AGD,
Asst Adj Gen

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" (Fwd Ech)

ANNEX NO. 34

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

12 April 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : See Distribution.

ALERT PLAN FOR DEFENSE OF FORWARD ECHELON HEADQUARTERS AREA
(Daylight Alert)

1. Unnumbered memorandum, this headquarters, subject, "Alert Plan of Defense of Headquarters Area (Forward Echelon)" dated 11 April 1945, will be effective between the hours of 1800 and 0800 daily.

2. This memorandum prescribes the defense plan which will be effective between the hours of 0800 and 1800 daily.

3. The daylight alert (0800 - 1800 hours) plan will go into effect upon the sounding of sirens, inside the Kasserne area, or if the Kasserne is attacked.

4. a. Each section of the headquarters proper will designate a skeleton force of officers and enlisted men to remain on duty in the offices to man telephones and protect records.

b. The remaining personnel will immediately assemble, with arms, pistol or rifle belts, and ball ammunition in front of the building in which they are quartered under the command of officers from the following sections.

Building A - A field grade officer from the G-3 Section.
Building B - A field grade officer from the Engr. Section.
Building C - A field grade officer from the PM Section.
Building D - A field grade officer from the Arty Section.
Building F - An officer from the Headquarters Commandant's Section.

5. It is the responsibility of each of the sections mentioned in paragraph 4 to assure that officers on duty are familiar with this plan.

6. When the troops are formed, the troop commander will report immediately with a runner to the Provost Marshal's Section in Building "C" for instructions.

7. The Provost Marshal's Office will immediately telephone the following officers, in the priority indicated, stating that the headquarters has been alerted for a ground attack:

Officer	Office phone	Residence Phone
Provost Marshal	27	147
Chief of Staff	5	106
Deputy Chief of Staff	107	146
A C of S, G-3	3	228
Signal Officer	10	147
Headquarters Commandant	115	
A C of S, G-2	2	145

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

R. W. HARTMAN,
Lt Col., A.G.D.,
Asst Adj Gen.

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" (Fwd Ech)
"H"

ANNEX NO. 35

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

24 April 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : See Distribution.

ALERT PLAN FOR DEFENSE OF FORWARD ECHELON HEADQUARTERS AREA

1. Unnumbered memorandum, this headquarters, subject, "Alert Plan for Defense of Headquarters Area (Forward Echelon)" dated 11 April 1945, and unnumbered memorandum, this headquarters, subject, "Alert Plan for Defense of Forward Echelon Headquarters Area (Daylight Alert)" dated 14 April 1945, are rescinded.

2. This memorandum prescribes the defense plan for this headquarters which will go into effect upon the sounding of sirens, inside the Kasserne Area, or if the Kasserne is attacked by ground or airborne forces.

3. a. Each section of the headquarters proper will designate a skeleton force of officers and enlisted men to remain on duty in the office to man telephones and protect records.

b. The remaining personnel will immediately assemble, with arms, pistol or rifle belts, and ball ammunition in front of the buildings and commanded by (see paragraph 4).

4. a.

Building No. and personnel	Commanders 0400 to 1800	Commanders 1800 to 0400
1. No assembly.		
2. Hq Co	Hq Co Officer	Hq Co Officer
3. Staff Sections therein	Field grade officer, Arty Section	One of the Arty Duty officers.
4. Staff Sections therein	Field grade officer, PM Section.	One of the PM Duty officers.
6. Staff Sections therein	Field grade officer, G-3 Section.	One of the G-3 Duty officers.
8. All Engr Type	CO, 1098d EUD	CO, 1098d EUD
9. MP Company	MP Company Officer	MP Company Off.
10. 503d QM Car Co 3457 Ord MAM Co	QM Car Co Officer	QM Car Co officer.

b. When the troops are formed, the commanders will report immediately, with a runner, to the Provost Marshal Section in Building No. 4 for instructions.

5. a. Ammunition DP - Headquarters Supply, Basement, south end Building No. 1.

b. Aid Station - Building No. 2.

6. a. Messages to the Provost Marshal, Building No. 4.

b. The Provost Marshal's Office will immediately telephone the following officers, in the priority indicated, stating that the headquarters has been alerted for a ground attack:

OFFICER	OFFICE PHONE	RESIDENT PHONE
Chief of Staff	5	106
Deputy Chief of Staff	107	511
A C of S, G-2	3	228
Commanding General, Rear Echelon	Lucky Rear 4	---
Signal Officer	10	510
Headquarters Commandant	115	---
A C of S, G-2	2	515

7. It is the responsibility of each section mentioned in paragraph 4 to assure that officers on duty are familiar with this plan.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

J. J. HAMLIN
Major, AGD,
Asst Adj Gen.

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" (Fwd) - 2 each
"H"

ANNEX NO. 36

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 383.6 GNMCY 6 May 1945

SUBJECT: Evacuation and Release of Special Classes of Prisoners of War.

TO : See Distribution.

1. Release of Certain Classes of Prisoners of War.

a. All prisoners of war of the following categories who, after screening by G-2 personnel, are found not to be security threats will be released.

(1) Members of the Volkssturm.

(2) Enemy deserters and discharged enemy soldiers, sailors, and airmen apprehended in rear of the front, out of uniform.

b. The following procedure will be employed in Army and Corps Prisoner of War Enclosures to effect the release:

(1) After screening, prisoners of war of the above classes will be segregated.

(2) Military Government passes without exemptions will be prepared for each prisoner of war showing on his address the town in which he is to be transported.

(3) These prisoners of war will then be transported to towns within the Army area in accordance with a priority to be determined by the Assistant Chief of Staff G-5, Third U. S. Army and turned over to the Burgermeister.

(4) Burgermeisters will be directed to provide useful employment for these persons, preference to farming.

c. All Military Government, Military Police, CIC and other agencies involved in the apprehension of prisoners of war will be informed of this procedure in order to minimize the rearrest of released prisoners of war.

2. German Military patients in captured German Hospitals who, if they were U. S. patients would be sent to duty, will be evacuated to the nearest Army Prisoner of War Enclosure.

By Command Of General PATTON:

R. W. HARTMAN
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" & "F"
AC of S, G-5, TUSA - (75)
PM, TUSA - (75)
SURGEON, TUSA - (50)

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DECLASSIFIED

ANNEX A NO. 37

PRISONER OF WAR INSTALLATIONS and STRAGGLER COLLECTING POINTS



PM
XVI

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

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

ANNEX A NO 39

PRISONER OF WAR INSTALLATIONS

AND STRAGGLER COLLECTING POINTS

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ANNEX NO. 40

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Public Relations Section
APO 403

SUBJECT: After Action Report.

TO : The Commanding General, Third United States Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Public Relations Section, Third United States Army Headquarters, beginning with 27 April 1944, and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapters.

2. During the Third Army's sensational dash across France and its subsequent operations in Luxembourg, Belgium, and Germany, this Section furnished the world press daily accounts of the Army's feats. The thirty-five (35) to fifty (50) correspondents travelling with the Army were provided with transportation, mess, billets, and high speed communications with Paris, London, and New York. In addition, the Section coordinated the Public Relations activities of the Corps and Divisions assigned to the Army. These activities resulted in the Third Army and its units receiving more news and pictorial space in the world press than any other American Army.

3. This report is submitted as a record of the Section's activities, and with the hope that it may prove helpful in future operations.

James T. Quirk

JAMES T. QUIRK,
Lt Col, QMC,
PRO.

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PUBLIC RELATIONS SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



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CHAPTER I
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

Section I - General

The Public Relations Section, Third US Army, developed in the field in France and was molded by the conditions of operating in a campaign of extremely rapid movement.

Originating as a branch of Publicity and Psychological Warfare, Third US Army, pending organization of the section later to be known as G-5, the G-2 Section coordinated basic administration matters. Its roots were in the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Detachment of the First US Army Group which was charged by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force with the mission of conducting public relations and psychological warfare activities for the First and Third US Armies in the liberation of western Europe.

Third US Army was to fulfill its Publicity and Psychological Warfare mission through the operation of detachments of personnel from First US Army Group working under the direction of the Third US Army Headquarters staff.

These detachments were to be made up from the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Detachment, and the 72d Publicity Service Battalion, First US Army Group, and attached or assigned to the Third US Army as the situation required.

On 27 April, two officers reported to the Army Commander, Third US Army, for duty from First US Army Group. After discussing public relations and psychological warfare with him, the Chief of Staff, and Assistant Chief of Staff, the ranking officer was instructed to set up a Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section for the Third US Army.

During May and June, plans, including the T/O and T/E, (see Annex II) were drawn for the Public Relations Branch. During this organizational period, an officer arrived from the United States 26 May and was appointed Third US Army Public Relations Officer. He took charge of arrangements for public relations and for the creation of a press camp for war correspondents who were to be assigned to the Third US Army during combat operations in France.

During this time, psychological warfare and the 72d Publicity Service Battalion remained at Group level at CLEVEDON (T69), Somerset, England.

Organization and operations plans for the Public Relations Branch were completed by 7 June.

Generally, Public Relations was charged with the mission of fulfilling requirements of accredited War Correspondents in the Third US Army operations.

Basically, the task of providing facilities enabling the correspondents to work during operations on the Continent involved three fundamental provisions.

These were food and shelter; transportation to combat areas; communicating facilities and transmission facilities for news copy, and an information service by which the correspondents could be briefed on combat developments.

The Public Relations Officer was to be assisted in this mission by four subsections.

The function of the Press Section was to provide the world press with an accurate and timely information service of Third US Army activities.

The function of the Radio Section was to assist broadcasters in obtaining complete Third US Army radio coverage such as would not violate security or impede military operations.

The function of the Pictorial Section was to assist pictorial correspondents in obtaining the type of photographs to accomplish their missions and to transmit pictures in negative form to designated higher headquarters for processing and clearance.

The Information Section was to maintain adequate situation maps of the Third US Army Sector to enable accredited war correspondents to plan their activities in advance. The section was to keep the correspondents informed on hours of briefing by the Army Commander and staff officers and to supply the correspondents and drivers with maps of the combat zones.

In addition, the plan contemplated the assignment of conducting officers who were to guide the correspondents to the front.

In addition to the foregoing sections, an administrative section was set up to provide transportation, messing, billeting and other services.

With the appointment of a General Staff Corps officer as Chief of Section on 1 June, Publicity and Psychological Warfare in Third US Army became a General Staff Section, G-5. At that time, it was the only G-5 section in the Armies of the United States.

A pool of eight broadcasting officers was created, including the Press, Radio and Photo Officers plus five others. An Assistant Public Relations Officer was appointed.

During June, the procurement of personnel and the requisitioning of equipment (see annex 2) continued.

It was stressed by European Theatre Operations United States Army that the military public relations system be extended downward from Army level to insure adequate coverage. To realize this program, the Army Commander directed Corps and Divisions assigned to Third US Army to name public relations officers. The Public Relations function was to be carried on down to lower echelons with the appointment of public relations non-commissioned officers in battalions, companies and special detachments. To coordinate this program, Corps and Division Public Relations Officers were called into conference at Third US Army Headquarters.

The conference between the Public Relations Officer, Third US Army, and the Public Relations Officers of the XII, XV, and XX Corps; the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Armored Divisions and the 5th, 6th and 35th Infantry Divisions was held 10 and 11 June at TOFT CAMP (K29) for briefing, planning and discussion.

The Public Relations Officers assembled at 0900 10 June and were taken to PEOVER CAMP (K29) where the Army Commander personally outlined the objectives he hoped to attain through their efforts and the cooperation of the Corps and Division Commanders.

The Army Commander stressed the need of obtaining accurate and rapid home town news coverage of the activities of the "little men" of Third US Army from a morale standpoint. Liberal recognition should be given acts of bravery by the prompt award of appropriate citations and decorations. Corps, Division and Separate Unit commanders should recognize the importance of the public relations function and the desirability of adequate personnel and equipment to accomplish it.

Following this interview, the Public Relations Officers were acquainted with the functional plan of the G-5 Section and its objectives.

On 11 June, an open forum session was held at which all of the Public Relations Officers were requested to list their operations within their own commands. These reports indicated a lack of experienced personnel and equipment. The Public Relations Officers were also instructed to submit reports when public relations plans in their units developed.

On 12 June, the Public Relations Officer was notified by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force that a total of forty-four news, radio, magazine, Army and Allied correspondents were to be phased into the G-5 Section. Working on this basis, the Section hastened the completion of requisitioning equipment and personnel.

The initial task of Public Relations Branch in the operations of a military public relations program was the assembly of biographical and historical information from Third US Army Corps and Divisions.

The task of gathering this information was initiated and supervised by virtually all officers of the Section. Following the Public Relations Officers Conference, unit Public Relations Officers were instructed to submit the biographical material and photos as well as the unit histories.

Copies of this information were made as it was received and submitted to Public Relations Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, and the First US Army Group.

With its equipment and its personnel assembled, the G-5 Section prepared for overseas movement to France. The administrative branch and the Public Relations Branch of the Section arrived at BRICKHAZEN MANOR (U53), the staging area, 28 June. There it was joined by the psychological Warfare Branch, the 72d Publicity Service Battalion's Second Service Team and forty-three war correspondents on 3 July.

Inherent in the organization of Publicity and Psychological Warfare at that time were dual functions which, from an operational standpoint, were not related. Publicity existed to inform the world of Third US Army activities via civilian and military reports. Psychological Warfare existed to influence the minds and undermine the will of the enemy, to boost the morale of subject civilian populations and to determine the attitude and trend of thought of the enemy and of subject civilians. Its objective was the preparation, distribution and control of propaganda, with the goal of convincing the enemy that his cause was lost and of instilling into the minds of friendly civilians confidence in the Allied cause.

Section II - Press

Personnel of the Press Sub-Section consisted of one officer and one enlisted man.

During the pre-operational period, the section devoted its activities almost exclusively to the compilation and filing of biographical and historical information received from Corps and Divisions. Copies of these data were made and forwarded to the Public Relations Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, and First US Army Group.

The section also cleared and forwarded to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces 130 news items and photographs received from units.

In addition to the biographical data filed, photos of key unit officers were filed as received.

To keep a daily record of news and photographic material received from the Corps and Division Public Relations Officers, a Copy Register and a Photographic Register were set up. These registers recorded the date, the news item or photo was received, the origin and the identifying slug.

It became standard order of procedure in the section to register and forward immediately all copy and photographs received.

Section III - Radio

Personnel of the radio section consisted of one officer and one enlisted man.

Radio correspondents were to handle straight news coverage and commentary in much the same manner as the press correspondents. This coverage involved live broadcasts, emanating from rear areas and under the direction of First US Army Group. In this instance, the main concern of the Radio Section was to be adequate transportation for the broadcasters between Headquarters, Third US Army, and the transmitter.

Primarily, however, the Radio Section was to be concerned with a second type of coverage which included outside broadcasts and interview programs.

Front line recordings were to be made by magnetic wire recorders. By close contact with the AC of S, G-2, and the AC of S, G-3, the Radio Section was to advise radio correspondents of actions suitable for such recordings and to suggest possible slants and methods of coverage.

Scripted live programs were to be developed for direct transmission from the field to the United Kingdom or the United States. The Section was to be ready to clear and facilitate requests for personnel to be used on these programs and to supply ideas and suggestions for programs of this nature dealing with Third US Army operations and personnel.

Small stations recordings were also to be made. These were to be designed for small United States radio stations without correspondent representation. They were to serve to give personal publicity in home districts to men of the Third US Army. A portable recording unit was to be taken into divisions to make as many interviews as possible with men

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those homes are in a given locality. These recordings were to be released through the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section. First US Army Group, and the Radio Department, Public Relations Section, European Theatre Operations United States Army.

In May, an agreement was reached between the Public Relations Officer, First US Army Group, and the British Broadcasting Corporation that British Broadcasting Company portable recording gear should be installed in a Third US Army vehicle and used on a pool basis by all broadcasters.

This equipment became available early in June. It was shock mounted in a quarter ton trailer which was converted into a miniature recording van. When it was tested at the time, it was found to be entirely satisfactory from an operating standpoint. At the same time, a British Broadcasting Company engineer was accredited to the Third US Army through Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force to work with and service the recording gear.

It was eventually established that live broadcasts would emanate from Army level via the Signal Corps Radio 399.

This left the Radio Section only the British Broadcasting Company equipment with which to work. Since the network broadcasters must have priority on the use of this equipment, there seemed to be little likelihood at that time that the hometown recording program would be very extensive. Nevertheless, a limited number of discs were secured and set aside for eventual use for this purpose.

Section IV - Pictorial Section

Personnel of the Pictorial Section consisted of one officer, who reported late in June on temporary duty from First US Army Group. No enlisted men were assigned to this section which did not become operational during the planning phase of Third US Army. The Pictorial Officer worked with other officers to perfect the plans of the entire Public Relations Branch and assisted in the assembly of biographical, historical and photographic records for the Press Section.

Section V - Information Section

Personnel of the Information Section included one officer, attached to G-2 from First US Army Group, and one enlisted man attached from the 72d Publicity Service Battalion.

During the planning phase in the United Kingdom, the world's war fronts were plotted on small scale maps. After the invasion, progress of the Continental operation was plotted on overlays on large-scale maps and kept up to date. During this period, an officer supervised the information room operations.

Section VI - Censorship

Prior to the embarkation of the Third US Army for France, Press Censorship was centralized and operated in the Ministry of Information, LONDON, under First US Army Group.

Censorship teams were made up and assigned to the various Army Groups and Armies. But rather than have the teams physically moved to the locations of the respective units and so lose touch with the current picture, they continued to operate at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force until such time as their respective units embarked.

Section VII - Publicity Service

During the pre-operational period in the United Kingdom, the 72d Publicity Service Battalion remained with the First US Army Group in CLEVEDON (T09) with its service groups and communications.

Section VIII - Administrative Section

Personnel of the Administrative Section included one officer and six enlisted men.

During the planning period, the sub-section handled the requisitioning of equipment (see annex II).

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

Section I - General

On 3 July, the Second Service Team joined the G-2 Section at BROCKENHURST (U53). At the same time, forty-three war correspondents arrived.

The following day at 1800 hours, the Section proceeded in convoy to SOUTHAMPTON (U83) from which port it embarked for France the morning of 5 July.

The Section disembarked at UTAH BEACH (T19) on the afternoon of 7 July and proceeded immediately to the Third US Army bivouac area in the vicinity of ISIGNY, FRANCE (T19), where the press camp began operating the following day.

Since the Third US Army was not operational, facilities for censorship and transmission of war correspondents' copy were not available during the month. It was necessary, therefore, to dispatch correspondents' copy to First US Army by officer courier for censorship and transmission or via Air Delivery Letter Service to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Ministry of Information, LONDON.

Correspondents' copy was logged as it was received and marked for courier to First US Army censors or Air Delivery Letter Service, LONDON.

During this period, the physical set up of the camp was housed in squad and pyramidal tents in the half-acre apple orchard.

The war correspondents were housed in three squad tents. Public Relations operations were conducted in a fourth squad tent. In a fifth was the information room and briefings were held there twice daily.

Two pyramidal tents served as an orderly room for the 72d Publicity Service Battalion's Second Service Team and administration headquarters. In addition to two mess tents, one for the officers' and correspondents' mess and the second for the enlisted men, a correspondents' dining room was set up in a sixth squad tent.

Transportation was dispatched as requested and no priority was given to news services or agencies. Since there were only seventeen quarter ton vehicles available to cover all transportation requirements at the outset of operations, a ruling that jeeps would not proceed on news missions with less than three correspondents had to be formulated.

Later in July, three additional quarter ton vehicles were added. Meantime, the correspondents themselves assisted in easing the transportation shortage by bringing back to camp, more or less in usable condition, four German Volkswagens found abandoned at the front. These vehicles, however, were not generally available to the section until August since it was necessary for Ordnance to check and paint them.

It was from this camp that the correspondents covered the historic battles of the LA HAYE DU PUITS (T18), LESSAY (T17), PERIERS (T27), and ST. LO (T24) sectors.

During July, an approximate total of 345,055 words were logged and dispatched.

Following the break-through in Normandy, the Section prepared to move in order to bring the correspondents within driving distance of the front.

Correspondents who reported 3 July to the BROCKENHURST MANOR (U53) staging area were as follows:

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Broderick, Edward, [illegible]
Carlisle, J.K., Detroit News
Clark, Maureen M., London News Chronicle
Cooper, F.J., BBC
Crawford, Kenneth, Newsweek
Cronin, R.A., Chicago Tribune
Carriva, E.A., New York Times
Dodd, K.M., Associated Press
Driscoll, J.F., New York Herald-Tribune
Duff, Robin, BBC
Genet, Pierre, AFI
Gottlieb, S.H., Still Pool
Grundin, Tom, Blue Network
Grant, Donald, Look
Grune, Philip, London Evening Standard
Hugo, Tom (Pvt), Stars and Stripes
Hunt, P.J., BBC
Lovitt, Emil, Yank
Littell, Robert, Reader's Digest
Loveland, R.A., Cleveland Plain Dealer
Manning, Paul, Midnight Syndicate
Haynes, E.J., Reuters
McDonald, B.J., Chicago Daily News
Moaklin, John, Chicago Sun
Miller, R.G., UP
Morse, Ralph, Still Pool
Priestley, T., Newsreel Pool
Prince, W.J., London Times
Rosenzig, W., King Features
Ryan, C.J., London Daily Telegraph
Shadell, W.F., CBS
Shoop, Duke, Kansas City Star
Stokes, R.L., St. Louis Post-Dispatch
Tremaor, Tom, Los Angeles Times
Wallard, J.H., Chicago Times
Whitney, P., San Francisco Chronicle
Wingert, R.T., Stars and Stripes
Wolf, T.H., NBA
Wolfert, Ira, NANA

Additional correspondents joining the Press Camp during July were Ernest Hemingway of Collier's, D.H. Mackenzie of the New York Daily News, D.H. McNicoll of the Australian Consolidated Press arrived on 22 August and Larry Meier of the Mutual Broadcasting System arrived on 23 August.

Section II - Press

Operating as a clearance agency for copy received from Corps and Division Public Relations Officers, the Press Section cleared and forwarded for censorship and distribution 177 news items and eight photographs. Of this total, seventeen news and feature stories and two photos emanated from the Section itself.

Units which submitted news items and the type of items received are broken down as follows:

UNIT	PROMOTIONS	AWARDS	MOVEMENT	TOTAL	PHOTOS
XX Corps	1			1	2
445th AAA Bn	9			9	
PRO, TUSA	3	14		17	2
12th Evac Hosp	1	3	3	10	1
4th Armd Div	13		9	22	
6th Armd Div	25	25	65	111	3
106 Cav Rcn Sq	7			7	
Totals:	60	40	77	177	8

The non-operational status of Third US Army during this period accounted for the scarcity of copy.

Geographically, the news material received covered the activities of men from the Seaboard and Middle Atlantic states preponderantly. Midwestern items [illegible] regularly mail re-

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How extensively this news material, which was forwarded to Public Relations Officer (Press Section) European Theatre Operations United States Army and Chief, Public Relations Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, was used - or even whether it was released by censorship during the month - was never determined. It was presumed that the bulk of news material submitted would be held until Third US Army was announced as operating on the Continent.

In many instances, the lower echelons passed on news tips which personnel of the Press Section brought to the attention of the war correspondents.

During this pre-operational period on the Continent, it was desirable on numerous occasions to coordinate more closely the activities of the Unit Public Relations Officers and to give guidance to several Unit organizations whose personnel had little newspaper background.

Copy was logged by slug, correspondent's name and organization, approximate number of words, time received and time dispatched via courier as well as destination for transmission - First US Army or Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. The following table is designed to give a weekly picture of the copy log.

Date	ADLS	Army Comm (FUSA)	Prewix (FUSA)	Total Items	Total Wordage
8-14 July	120		83	203	106,995
15-21 July	54	8	84	146	68,225
22-31 July	77	42	130	249	127,835
Totals:	253	50	297	598	305,055

Of the 253 items logged ADLS, 65 were photos and sketches and 13 were recordings.

Section III - Radio

Upon arrival in France, when it was learned that the Third US Army would not become operational for some time, radio correspondents (see annex 5) therefore were included in the agreement that was reached with First US Army Public Relations Section for transmission of Third US Army copy. The correspondents made their broadcasts to LONDON and to NEW YORK via [illegible], the First US Army transmitter.

During this period, the portable recorder in the quarter-ton trailer was put to extensive use. Due to its size and extreme mobility, recordings were made closer to the front line than had ever before been possible. In several instances, the vehicle was moved to within 500 yards of the infantry line which was then south of LA HAYE DU PUITS.

As had been anticipated, there was little time left for its use in hometown recordings. Some hometown recordings were made and these were released through the Public Relations Officer, First US Army Group.

When it became known that the Third US Army would soon become operational and the radio silence accordingly lifted, the Radio Officer visited the Public Relations Officer, 21st Army Group (British), and arranged for the assignment of frequencies to be used for live broadcasts, the Signal Corps Radio 299 having arrived in the meantime. There remained only the necessary tests to determine whether it would be possible to reach LONDON. These would have to wait until the radio silence was lifted.

Section IV - Pictorial

Liaison was established between the Pictorial Section of Third US Army and the Public Relations Division Pictorial Section of Twelfth US Army Group on the Continent as soon as Army Group established headquarters, and policies and desires of Army Group for pictorial coverage were made known to various Third US Army Signal Photo units through close contact with the Signal Photo Section of Army Headquarters. A comprehensive outline of still and motion picture coverage desired by Supreme Headquarters was studied in detail and a number of assignments given by the Signal Photo Officer to units under his jurisdiction to fulfill these requirements. Three War Correspondent still photographers were with the Press Camp during this period, and operated daily among units at the front and behind the lines, their film being transmitted undeveloped by courier to the First US Army facilities, from where it was forwarded to LONDON for developing, censorship, and retransmission to destination. The Section compiled a photographic file of unit biographical pictures, and the Pictorial Officer, in addition to other duties, assisted the Public Relations Officer in various matters.

Section V - Information Room

The Information Officer set up his map boards in a squad tent and, assisted by an enlisted man, plotted the Normandy situation daily. The disposition of Allied and enemy troops, as reported daily by AC of S, G-2 and AC of S, G-3, was marked on overlays on which also was recorded the movement of battle.

The briefing periods were at 1030 hours and at 2030 hours. The briefing Officer, acting as liaison officer with AC of S, G-2 and AC of S, G-3, narrated developments for the correspondents and indicated changes in the situation on the mapboard.

Following the briefing, correspondents questioned the briefing officer and submitted to him requests for such other information as could be made available.

Toward the end of the month, it was found expedient to set up the briefing and information Room in a small tent, leaving the squad tent solely as a correspondents' work room.

A guard was maintained twenty-four hours daily at the Information Room and was doubled after dark.

Section VI - Administration

The Administration Section consisted of two officers, one acting as camp commandant and the other as administrative officer, and four enlisted men.

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

Section I - General

When the Third US Army became operational 1 August, the Press Camp moved to a bivouac area in the vicinity of SAVIAT (T5L), setting up operations there 3 August in three hedgerowed fields.

The Army Communications unit and Mackay Radio had joined the camp two days prior to departure from NORMANDY (T19). Due to the radio silence imposed before Army became operational, radio could not be operated there. The censorship returned from First US Army on 1 August.

It was not until 4 August at SAVIAT (T5L) that the Signal Corps CW transmitter, 399 Radio Voice transmitter, and the Mackay Radio went into operation. With the censors present, it then became possible for the first time to utilize all planned facilities and to flash the news of Third US Army operations in France to the press of the world.

The possibility that the enemy could use the radio signals as an aid in locating the Army Headquarters, and the advantages of operating within buildings, led the Public Relations Officer to obtain permission for the section to operate some distance away from the forward echelon of Headquarters and to house office operations indoors.

This was done for the first time 11 August when the Press Camp moved to ST. JAMES (T39) where operations were set up in a schoolhouse near VILLALAE (T39). Correspondents, officers and enlisted personnel and administrative functions were housed under canvas in an adjacent bivouac area.

On 12 August, the psychological warfare functions were returned to Army Group level. The Public Relations Officer took complete charge of all Public Relations functions and the section became known as the Public Relations Section, a special staff section.

This change marked the disbandment of Publicity and Psychological Warfare as a single function. It had been proved in field operations that functionally and operationally, Publicity and Psychological Warfare had little in common and each branch had operated separately since arriving in France.

From ST. JAMES (T39), the Section moved into a chateau in the vicinity of PORT BRILLET (T55) 15 August. Mess for correspondents was held in the building for the first time, but sleeping quarters and administrative functions were housed under canvas on the grounds. The Public Relations operation as well as the Information Room and Work Room occupied the basement of the chateau.

On 15 August, the Section moved to a chateau near LAQUINTE (Z24) in the vicinity of LEMANS (Z43).

To keep within a reasonable distance of the rapidly moving front, the Press Camp moved to a chateau at MONTERRAU (W18) 19 August and then to a chateau at PITHIVIERS (W96) 23 August.

On 24 August, on the eve of the liberation of PARIS, a small group of Third US Army Public Relations personnel was ordered into the city to assist US Army correspondents and Twelfth US Army Group. This force consisted of two officers, one enlisted man and two vehicles.

The force proceeded with correspondents to RAMBOUILLET (R62), about twenty miles from PARIS. There the force as well as correspondents and military personnel of First US Army and Twelfth US Army Group were forced to wait pending the cessation of hostilities in the capital.

A copy desk for the logging of correspondents' copy was set up in the main salon of the Hotel Le Grand Veneur, RAMBOUILLET (R62), which had been taken over by Group for news operations.

Nearly 400 pieces of copy and service messages describing the PARIS situation were logged that day and dispatched to Mackay at Third US Army and Press Wireless at First US Army for transmission.

During the afternoon of 24 August, correspondents waited restlessly for some indication as to when they could be able to proceed into the city. The Twelfth US Army Group Public Relations Officer advised them in a briefing that the Germans, after starting to evacuate the city under terms of a truce with the Free French Interior, were bringing armor back into the city to make a stand. The truce had been broken.

It was planned to set up press headquarters at the Hotel Scribe in PARIS as soon as it was possible to enter the city. All military personnel remained alerted throughout the night in readiness to move.

As the newspaper representatives of the press of the Allied nations - the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, Canada and Australia -- massed the floors and grounds of the hotel, French tanks rumbled through the streets of RAMBOUILLET (R62) enroute to the capital.

On 25 August, it was decided to start for PARIS. On reaching the suburb of LONGJUMEAU (S02), this party halted while it was determined what the situation was within the city itself.

Meantime, jeeploads of correspondents passed and continued on into PARIS, but soon returned reporting that they could not cross the SEINE River because of the fighting on the right bank.

The correspondents were looking for a place in which to write copy. Since it was impossible to continue on as planned, a blacksmith's house was taken over as a temporary copy room. The Frenchman offered his entire house and shop for this purpose.

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While the correspondents wrote the first stories of the liberation of PARIS in the sultry at LE NOROMBY (#62), correspondents returning from the embattled city were flagged down and steered into the improvised copy room.

When copy had been logged and was ready for dispatch, couriers were tailed, both British and American, and requested to take the copy to the airstrip at CHARTRES (#74) from which it would be flown to Ministry of Information, LOAC M, for censorship and transmission.

It is estimated that more than 15,000 words on the initial PARIS story were cleared by the Press Services and Agencies in this manner and it is also believed that the curbside operation saved from eight to twelve hours delay which otherwise would have occurred.

At 1900, the press party proceeded into the city to the Hotel Scribe where a copy desk was set up under the supervision of Group and maintained there during the hectic days that followed liberation.

On 27 August, a Third US Army Public Relations Officer made the first courier flight into PARIS in a Piper Cub. The plane was piloted by a 12th Liaison squadron officer and landed at the ISSY-LES-MOULINEAUX (#66) for transmission via Mackay. The courier service was continued for several days.

The Third US Army forces returned to LITHUANIA (#96) 30 August. The following day, the Press Camp moved to the CHATEAU DE VALDURANT.

Meantime, the production of copy from military sources was stimulated by the announcement of Third US Army as operational and during August, the first operational month of the Army, 861 news items were received by the Press Section and forwarded to European Theatre Operations US Army and Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force for distribution....compared to 177 in July.

On 31 August, General Order Number 50 announced the disbandment of the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section.

Stressing the importance and desirability of hometown news of the individual soldier, the Army Commander was sympathetic toward all reasonable requests of the section, and during his press conferences, repeatedly called attention to his personal desire that the personnel of Third US Army receive the recognition they so rightly deserved.

The following correspondents were assigned and operated from the Press Camp as of 1 August:

Ball, W.D., Associated Press
Belden, J., Life
Bookhurst, J.A., Newsreel Pool
Broderick, M.J., Still Pool
Carlisle, J.M., Detroit News
Clark, W.M., The London News Chronicle
Cooper, Fred, NBC
Crawford, K., Newsweek
Cronin, E.A., Chicago Tribune
Currivan, T.A., New York Times
Dodd, E.H., Jr., Associated Press
Driscoll, J.F., New York Herald-Tribune
Duff, Robin, BBC
Gossat, Pierre, AFI
Gottlieb, [illegible], Still Pool
Grant, Donald, Look Magazine
Grune, Phillip, London Evening Standard
Hemingway, E., Colliers
Hoge, J. (Pvt), Stars and Stripes
Huse, Fred, INS
Levitt, Saul, Yank
Littell, Robert, Reader's Digest
Loveland, Roelif, Cleveland Plain Dealer
Mackenzie, D.N., New York Daily News
Manning, Paul, McNaught Syndicate
Maynes, W.D., Reuters
McNicoll, D.H., Australian Consolidated Press
Moquaid, Paul, Chicago Daily News
Mecklin, John, Chicago Sun
Meier, Larry, Mutual
Miller, H.C., United Press
Morse, Ralph, Still Pool
Priestley, J., Newsreel Pool
Prince, W.D., London Times
Reauswig, W., Kinr Features
Ryan, C.D., London Daily Telegraph
Shaw, C.C., CBS
Shoop, Duke, Kansas City Star
Stokes, R.L., St. Louis Post-Dispatch
Treanor, T., Los Angeles Times
Wellard, J.M., Chicago Times
Whitney, P., San Francisco Chronicle
Zingert, H.T., Stars and Stripes
Wolf, T.N., NEA
Wolfert, Ira, NANA

The following correspondents joined the Press Camp in August:

Randy Dixon, PITTSBURGH Courier, 1 August
Rudolph Dunbar, Associated Negro Press, 1 August
Ollie Stewart, BALTIMORE Afro-American, 1 August
Edward Tolles, CHICAGO Defender, 1 August
H.V. Boyle, Associated Press, 11 August
Gordon Parkill, American Magazine, arrived 15 August by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force order.
R.W. Richards, United Press, 17 August
H.C. Taylor, Reuters, arrived 15 August and departed 21 August for Second British Army.
Marcel Wallenstein replaced Duke Shoop for the KANSAS CITY Star on 17 August.
Gordon Frazier, Blue Network, arrived 20 August to replace Tom Grandin.
D.C. Monick, AFI, arrived 17 August
J.R. Wilhelm, Reuters, arrived 20 August to replace Taylor.
William Randolph Hearst, Jr., arrived 21 August for INS.
Andrew Tully, BOSTON Traveler, replaced Gordon Gaskill 22 August.
W.A. Douglas arrived 25 August to replace John Mecklin for the CHICAGO Sun. Mecklin replaced Douglas 4 September.
Austin Lake, INS, arrived 31 August
Lawrence H. Youngman, OMAHA World Herald, arrived 22 August and was attached to the 35th Infantry Division.

With communications facilities operational at this time, wordage of the war correspondents increased from 305,055 in July to 518,505 in August. The following table is designed to show the volume of copy and method transmitted:

Date		Mackay	ADLS	Army Comm	Voice	Presi (FUSA)	Total Items	Words (Estimated)
1-7	Aug	193	52	46	18	58	361	129,140
8-14	Aug	186	90	64	8		352	105,423
15-21	Aug	231	171	103	8		513	159,755
22-31	Aug	388	124	11	2		526	124,185
TOTAL		998	437	224	36	52	1752	518,506

Of the 518,505 words transmitted, 9700 were broadcast by the Signal Corps Radio 399.

Of the 437 items sent ADLS, forty-three were packages of photo negatives and eighteen were recordings for radio broadcasts.

Items included both news copy and service messages.

Press Wireless (PRESWI) was used by Third US Army correspondents in filing copy from RAMBOUILLET (R62) and PARIS. Similarly, many correspondents assigned to First US Army dispatched copy via Mackay Radio, the transmitter at Third US Army.

Section II - Press

During August, the Press Section continued the registering and forwarding of copy received from Corps and Divisions.

Additional historical and biographical information was received and the Section supplemented its picture file of Third US Army personnel. Seven feature stories emanated from the Section itself which was primarily occupied with the registration and forwarding of unit material and suggesting news possibilities to lower echelons.

The following is a summary of news copy received, source and type of story:

Unit	Promotions	Awards	Interest	Total
Hq, TUSA PRO			9	9
6th Armd Div		29	47	76
4th Armd Div	11	140	14	166
5th Inf Div			76	76
106 Cav Rcn Sq		1	1	2
XII Corps	26	6	8	40
284 FA Bn	10			10
313 FA Bn			1	1
8th Inf Div	3	35	25	63
90th Inf Div	64	121	5	210
12th Evac Hosp	8			8
XV Corps			1	1
5th Armd Div			14	14
26 Inf Div		166	18	184
7th Armd Div			3	3
29th Inf Div		1		1
TOTAL	142	501	218	861

Section III - Radio

The Signal Corps Radio 399 went into operation 4 August and during that day, continued efforts were made to contact LONDON. The British Broadcasting Company monitors finally were reached at 1830, thirty minutes before the first scheduled broadcast.

In the days that followed, the readability of the 399 signal did not improve until the Press Camp reached the vicinity of LAVAL (Y64). It was estimated that at best there was a fifty per cent chance of the broadcast being received intelligibly in LONDON.

For the most part, radio commentators were forced to work either with recordings or with CW transmission of their stories. The Signal Corps Radio 399 had not proved satisfactory for long distance transmission.

As soon as Twelfth US Army Group had established its headquarters in France, the Radio Officer asked that the Group transmitter, a 3 KW, be made available to Third US Army as a relay. It finally was agreed that this could be done, but this transmitter was not in operation by the end of August.

The second week in August, Twelfth US Army Group requested that Third US Army furnish a combat report for the Army Hour broadcast.

The radio officer accordingly took wire recording equipment to ST. MALO (S81) and succeeded in getting two recordings, both from a forward observation post overlooking the CITADEL where a force of Germans continued to resist.

One of these recorded the voices of infantrymen who were participating in the assault on the fortress. The other was a straight narrative describing its actual surrender.

Upon returning to Army Group with these recordings, it was established that Third US Army would henceforward have its weekly spot on the Army Hour.

Two other trips were made during the month for this purpose. One involved three days of travel with the 7th Armored Division on its drive from DREUX (R33) to MELUN (S20).

The recording was made in this case from the IP and at H-hour of the attack on MELUN (S20).

The second recording was made from the American Memorial at BELLEAU WOOD (U76). Its theme was a comparison between the battle there in July, 1918, and the present drive.

During the month, the disc recording gear was not available to the Section for hometown recordings.

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Section IV - Pictorial

Arrival of the 2d French Armored Division in France, marking the return of the first French troops to their soil, was thoroughly covered by means of still and motion picture photography at the beginning of the operational period. Photographers, both Signal Corps and War Correspondent, met the Division on its ships in the Channel, photographed personnel and equipment coming ashore, filmed units and individuals of the division passing through the Peninsula and going into first bivouac, and photographed it in combat action. During August it was discovered that War Correspondent photographers preferred to work in teams of two, one still and one motion picture man, working independently of writing correspondents. A transportation policy was laid down, as a result, which permitted two photographers so operating to use one jeep, with regularly assigned trailer for transportation of their special equipment. Desires of Twelfth US Army Group for public relations pictorial coverage by Signal Corps units were submitted to the Signal Photo Section. The Pictorial Officer was assigned temporarily to assist in pictorial coverage of the liberation of PARIS, working with Twelfth US Army Group.

Section V - Information Room

The Information Room and Work Room became the center of correspondents' activities. Twice daily briefings were continued by the Briefing Officer who maintained close liaison with AC of S, G-2 and AC of S, G-3.

The progress of the Third US Army through France was shown daily on the large scale maps as well as dispositions of Allied and enemy troops.

Section VI - Administration

Administrative and Public Relations functions were consolidated under the Chief Clerk. The Administrative Officer and the Camp Commandant coordinated their activities more closely to improve the efficiency of Press Camp servicing.

Section VII - Communications

The Signal Corps CH (Continuous Wave) transmitter and 300 (Radio Voice) became operational 4 August.

The communications platoon consisted of one officer and eighteen enlisted men.

It was originally planned to handle press copy, operational messages and correspondents' broadcasts, but experience with this type of transmission at First US Army during July indicated that CW operation was not rapid enough to handle war correspondents' copy without highspeed facilities and personnel to handle highspeed transmission which the unit lacked.

Since press copy had no priority and was subject to delay because of operational priority on the Signal Corps channel, and, since no separate channel was allocated for press copy, it was necessary to handle practically all press copy via Mackay. This included British correspondents' copy which reached LONDON via NEW YORK.

The 300 voice transmission was not satisfactory because it was necessary to broadcast a greater distance than the transmitter was designed to cover. A relay was needed and this, itself, had to be reasonably mobile, but during the month the relay point was not set up.

Since it was shown during the pre-operational period that Signal Corps transmission would not accomplish the mission, arrangements were made with the Mackay Radio Corporation for commercial facilities to transmit to LONDON and to NEW YORK the correspondents' press copy which constituted the major traffic of the Press Camp.

According to Mackay Radio Corporation records, a total of 380,586 words were transmitted during August operations.

Section VIII - Censors

On 1 August, when the Third US Army became operational, the censorship team returned. The first night, censoring was conducted under difficult conditions.

The team had arrived at a new bivouac area late at night and accommodations had not been completed, since the camp had just completed a move.

Copy and wordage censored by the censorship team is tabulated as follows:

Week	Total Submissions	Total Words
1-6 Aug	134	90,630
6-13 Aug	277	101,908
13-20 Aug	338	109,999
20-27 Aug	299	99,075
27 Aug - 3 Sept	254	50,948
TOTALS	1307	448,560

CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

Section I - General

Press Camp operations continued at SOMME-VESLE (T74) until 11 September when the camp moved to PUXE (U84) in French Lorraine, in the SPAIN (U49) - COMPIAGNE (U66) area.

During the month six new correspondents were assigned to the Press Camp and eighteen departed.

The camp continued operations at PUXE (U84) during the remainder of the month. Correspondents assigned as of 30 September were:

Ball, Edward D., Associated Press
Belden, J., Life
Bockhurst, John A., Newsreel Pool
Broderick, J.H., Still Pool
Carlisle, John M., Detroit News
Clark, Norman M., The London News Chronicle
Crawford, Kenneth, Newsweek
Cronie, Robert A., Chicago Tribune
Despouey, Arturo, NBC
Downton, Eric, Reuters
Driscoll, J.F., New York Herald-Tribune
Gallagher, Wes, Associated Press
Grad, Jules, Sgt., Stars and Stripes
Graham, Fred, New York Times
Grant, Donald, Look Magazine
Greene, Hamilton, American Legion Magazine
Grune, Philip, London Evening Standard
Hase, Pierre J., INS
Levitt, Saul, Yank Magazine
Loveland, R.A., Cleveland Plain Dealer
Lucas, Nemo C., Rio de Janiero "Anoite"
Mackenzie, D.K., New York Daily News
Mazo, Earl, Lt., Stars and Stripes
McNicoll, D.R., Consolidated Australian Press
McQuaid, B.J., Chicago Daily News
McVane, John, NBC
Morse, Ralph, Still Pool
Priestley, T.A., Newsreel Pool
Prince, W.F., London Times
Rensswig, W., King Features
Richards, Robert W., United Press
Rollins, B.H., Still Pool
Ryan, Cornelius, London Daily Telegraph
Small, Wilson, C., United Press
Tully, Andrew, Boston Traveler
Wallenstein, Marcel, Kansas City Star
Wellard, James H., Chicago Times
Wilhelm, John H., Reuters
Wolf, T.H., Newspaper Enterprise Alliance
Youngman, L.W., Omaha World-Telegram (35th Inf Div)

New arrivals for the month of September:

Beattie, Edward W., Jr., United Press. Arrived 9 September. (Captured by Germans on 12 September.)
Bryan, Wright, NBC, arrived 7 September. (Captured by Germans on 12 September.)
Despouey, Arturo, NBC, arrived 24 September on orders from PRO, Twelfth US Army Group, for seven days.
Gallagher, Wes, Associated Press, arrived 1 September to replace Boyle.
Grad, Jules, Sgt., Stars and Stripes, arrived 22 September.
Graham, Fred, New York Times, arrived 4 September to replace Curriven.
Greene, Hamilton, American Legion Magazine, arrived 29 September for assignment to 83d Division.
Lucas, Nemo C., Rio de Janiero "Anoite" arrived 26 September on seven-day basis.
Mazo, Earl, Lt., Stars and Stripes, arrived 1 September.
McVane, John, NBC, arrived 24 September on seven-day basis.
Small, Wilson C., United Press, arrived 22 September to replace Edward Beattie.

Departures for the month of September:

Beattie, Edward W., Jr., United Press, captured by Germans on 12 September.
Bryan, Wright, NBC, captured by Germans 12 September.
Curriven, K.A., New York Times, left on 4 September. He was replaced by Fred Graham.
Dixon, Randy, Pittsburgh Courier, reaccredited to Communications Zone, left on 21 September.
Dodd, Howell N., Jr., Associated Press artist, left on 6 September.
Douglas, William A., Chicago Sun, reaccredited to Communications Zone, left on 4 September.
Dunbar, Rudolph, Associated Negro Press, reaccredited to Communications Zone, left on 21 September.
Frazier, Gordon, Blue Network, dropped from rolls 28 September. Assigned to First US Army.
Gosset, Pierre, AFI, reaccredited to Communications Zone, left on 4 September.
Hearst, William Randolph, Jr., INS, dropped from rolls 28 September. His status became that of Distinguished Visitor.
Hoge, Thomas A., Pvt., Stars and Stripes, dropped from rolls 28 September.
Lake, Austin, Boston American, dropped from rolls 28 September.
Littell, Robert, Reader's Digest, departed 4 September
Mecklin, John M., Chicago Sun, left for England 23 September.
Miller, R.C., United Press, evacuated to England 4 September.
Malick, D.O., AFI, reaccredited to Communications Zone on 4 September.
Steward, Ollie, Baltimore Afro-American, reaccredited to Communications Zone on 21 September.
Tolos, Edward, Chicago Defender, reaccredited to Communications Zone on 21 September.
Whitney, P., San Francisco Chronicle, left 4 September.
Wolfert, Ira, NANA, reaccredited to First US Army, left 24 September.

Items logged at the Press Camp during September totalled 2218. Copy was dispatched via Mackay Radio, the Press Camp's transmitter, Army Communications, and Air Delivery Letter Service as follows:

Mackay	1889
ADLS	130
Army Communications	99
Total	2118

In addition, six items were routed to Twelfth US Army Group, bringing the total number of items to 2118. Estimated wordage was 445,808.

Section II - Press

A total of 7756 items, including fourteen photos and two construction blueprints were received from twenty-four Third US Army units during the month and forwarded to PRO, Press Section, Headquarters, Communications Zone (Forward), ETOUSA, for clearance and distribution. This total is broken down as follows:

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Promotions	869
Awards and Citations	867
General Interest	4883
Photos	14
Films	8
Total	7788

Units submitting material were: 26 Infantry Division, 4th Armored Division, 9th Infantry Division, 7th Armored Division, 6th Infantry Division, XII Corps, 14th Liaison Squadron, XV Corps, XX Corps, 35th Infantry Division, 43d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 79th Infantry Division, 90th Reconnaissance Squadron, 80th Infantry Division, 83d Infantry Division, 94th Medical Gas Battalion, 84th Field Artillery Battalion, 249th Engineer Combat Battalion, 344th Ordnance Company, 359th Infantry Regiment, 411th Military Police Battalion, 13066th Engineer General Service Regiment, Army Nurse Corps (ETOUSA) and Public Relations Office, Third US Army.

The September total of 7788 items was an increase of 4894 over the August total of 861 items. The July total was 177. Total number of items cleared at this headquarters during the two months of Third US Army operations on the Continent was 8816. The grand total of all items cleared and forwarded during pre-operational and operational periods to date (30 September) was 8793.

In addition to forwarding news items and photos for general release, general and human interest stories were forwarded to the editor, Stars and Stripes, and to the editor, Yank Magazine. All material was made available to war correspondents.

At the request of the AC of S, G-2, an investigation was made of the origin of stories which appeared in the British Press and in the Army newspaper, Stars and Stripes, alleging that troops of the First US Army had burned WALLENDORF, a German village northwest of TRIER, in reprisal for sniping. A retraction published in Stars and Stripes 19 September charged that the story had emanated from a Third US Army correspondent. It quoted First US Army authorities as stating that the village had been set aflame by artillery fire to reduce it as an enemy stronghold and had not been put to the torch. The investigation showed that a flash sent by an Associated Press correspondent with the Third US Army Press Camp, which referred to previous copy describing artillery action in the vicinity of the village, had been ambiguously worded so that when read alone it gave the impression that the village had been put to the torch. The investigation showed also that at no time was the word "reprisal" used in connection with the reduction of the village. The conclusion that the idea "reprisal" had been inferred by cable desks in LONDON and by Stars and Stripes and injected into the story seemed reasonable.

Section III - Radio

During the first week of September Third US Army's spot for the Army Hour was recorded at CHATEAU THIERRY (886) and BELLEAU WOOD (876). Later a second Army Hour spot was made with the 43d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, a Third US Army unit moving on Germany.

It was established that ETOUSA Radio was servicing hometown recordings made with the magnetic wire recorder. The recorder was then used for stories and interviews featuring Third US Army personnel.

A recorded description of the fortification system of METZ (U85) and a report of the stiffening German resistance along the entire line was made. Two home town recordings were made with personnel of forward units and sent to ETOUSA for processing.

At the month's end no radio correspondents were assigned to Third US Army.

Section IV - Pictorial

Two newsreel and three still photographers were assigned to PRC, Third US Army in September, and were assisted in their mission by the Pictorial Officer. Close liaison was maintained with Army Pictorial Service.

Section V - Information Section

The Information Section maintained maps showing the situation of Allied and enemy troops on all European war fronts. The Allied-German front from below SWITZERLAND to Northern HOLLAND was shown on a G3G6 map of 1:850,000 scale. Units of the Seventh, Third and First US Armies were shown down to and including regiments.

As the situation became somewhat static on the Third US Army front, a G3G5 map of 1:100,000 scale was posted and Third US Army units down to and including battalions were shown. For the first time since the American break-through on the Normandy front it became possible to show a cohesive front line.

Since the BRITTANY Peninsula was the scene of only one important action, the siege of BREST, a large-scale map of that area was not used. American and German forces engaged in the action were shown on a map of 1:100,000 scale. On a 1:4,000,000 map of Europe, the Russo-German, Italian and French battle lines were shown. G-2 Section reports made possible the maintenance of a very clear picture of the enemy situation and Germany's western front.

Section VI - Censorship

An estimated total of 450,005 words were cleared by censors during the month in 2161 submissions. Submissions and wordage by week follows:

Week Ending	Submissions	Wordage (Estimated)
9 September	458	111,267
16 September	618	134,870
23 September	718	123,188
30 September	367	90,680
TOTALS	2161	450,005

Section VII - Communications

The Mackay Radio Corporation transmitter, direct outlet to NEW YORK from the Third US Army front along the MOSELLE River for war correspondents, set what is believed to be a European Theater of Operations record in transmitting a message from a correspondent to a client in NEW YORK in seventeen minutes. Another message reached a NEW YORK client in twenty-one minutes.

According to Mackay records at the Press Camp a total of 491,617 words were transmitted during September.

Difficulties in finding spare parts for the transmitting equipment were solved temporarily by the discovery of a German transmitter which was dismantled for parts.

No major breakdowns in transmission occurred during the month, and the transmission was not blacked out by atmospheric conditions for longer than several hours at a time.

Operations of Signal Corps radio and teletype transmission had an output of ten to fifteen messages daily. Approximately fifteen messages were received daily.

Teletype had been in service only a short time and was used as a relief means of transmittal for radio.

A broadcast was made via JEVA (Third US Army Press Camp radio, to BBC of two minutes duration. Interference was so bad that the broadcast was not received. It was rebroadcast the following day and a recording was made in LONDON.

NBC International tried to make a recording but it could not be received properly in LONDON. It was tried again and finally got through, but the reading was only fair. One broadcast, of one-and-a-half minutes duration, was made to NBC.

CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

Section I - General

Routine Press Camp operations continued at PARIS (U56), in the MAIN-COMBLES area.

Press Camp moved to outskirts of city of NANCY (U81), 12 October. Several buildings were obtained for the use of the section and for the first time since arriving on the Continent all personnel as well as operations were housed indoors.

Press Camp functioned at NANCY (U81). During the month ten correspondents arrived at the camp and seventeen departed.

Correspondents assigned as of 31 October were:

Beckhurst, John, Newsreel Pool
Broderick, Hugh J., Still Pool
Clark, Norman E., News Chronicle
Crawford, Kenneth, Newsweek
Cronin, Robert A., Chicago Tribune
Currivan, E.A., New York Times
Downton, Eric, Reuters
Driscoll, J.F., New York Herald-Tribune
Gallagher, Wes, Associated Press
Grad, Jules (Sgt), Stars and Stripes
Grune, Phillip, Evening Standard
Hawkins, Lewis, Associated Press
Hess, F.J., INS
Levitt, Saul, Yank Magazine
Mauo, Earl (Lt), Stars and Stripes
McNicol, D.N., Consolidated Australian Press
Mecklin, John M., Chicago Sun
Morse, Ralph, Still Pool
Oldhan, Jack, Rotha Films (121 Evac Hosp)
Priestley, T.A., Newsreel Pool
Prince, W.J., London Times
Ray, Cyril, BBC
Rowsome, F., King Features
Richards, Robert E., United Press
Rollins, Byron M., Still Pool
Ryan, Cornelius, London Daily Telegraph
Sheahan, J.O., Chicago Tribune (artist)
Small, Wilson C., United Press
Stokes, Richard L., St. Louis Post Dispatch
Unwin, Stanley, BBC Engineer
Willard, James M., Chicago Times
Wilhelm, John R., Reuters
Youngman, L.E., Omaha World Telegram (asgd 35th Inf Div).

Arrivals for month of October were:

Currivan, E.A., New York Times, on 26 October.
Fowler, Nick, Dallas News, on 25 October for temporary duty with 90th Infantry Division.
Hawkins, Lewis, Associated Press, on 12 October.
Hearst, William Randolph, Jr., on 13 October.
Mecklin, John M., Chicago Sun, on 13 October.
Oldham, Jack, Rotha Films, on 24 October for temporary duty with 101st Evacuation Hospital.
Ray, Cyril, BBC, on 24 October.
Sheahan, J.O., Chicago Tribune artist, on 11 October.
Stokes, R.L., St. Louis Post Dispatch, on 11 October.
Unwin, Stanley, BBC engineer, on 28 October.

Departures for month of October were:

Hall, Edward D., Associated Press, for United Kingdom 16 October.
Beldin, J., Time and Life, for Twelfth Army Group 18 October.
Carlisle, John M., Detroit News, for USA on 2 October.
Despouy, Arturo, NBC, for Twelfth Army Group on 2 October.
Fowler, Nick, Dallas News, for Sixth Army Group 31 October.
Graham, Fred, New York Times, for Ninth Army 31 October.
Grant, Donald, Look Magazine, for USA on 2 October.
Greene, Nanc[illegible] Legion Magazine, for Twelfth US
Gro[illegible] Ninth Air Force on 16
[illegible]

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Loveland, Roslif, Cleveland Plain Dealer, for USA on 23 October.
Lucas, Reme G., Rio de Janiero Ancita, for Twelfth Us Army Group 6 October.
Mackenzie, Donald E., New York Daily News, for Paris 30 October.
MacQuaid, B.J., Chicago Daily News, for Second British Army 18 October.
McMann, John, NBC, for Twelfth US Army Group 2 October.
Tully, Andrew, Boston Traveler, for Ninth US Army 21 October.
Vallenstein, Marcel, Kansas City Star, for Ninth US Army 18 October.
Wolf, F.N., Newspaper Enterprise Alliance, to Communications Zone 5 October.

Copy logged at the Press Camp during October totaled 1272 items, which were dispatched via Mackay Radio, Army Communications, Air Delivery Letter Service and Air Mail as follows:

Mackay	1055
Army Communications	126
ADLS	53
Air Mail	38
Total	1272

Estimated wordage was 192,274.

Section II - Press

A total of 6220 items, including thirty-one photos, were received from twenty-one organizations in Third US Army and forwarded to Press Section, PRO, Headquarters Communications Zone (Forward) for clearance and distribution during October. This total is broken down as follows:

Promotions	580
Awards and Citations	1923
General Interest	3686
Photos	31
Total	6220

Units submitting material included: 4th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 6th Armored Division, XII Corps, XII Corps Engineer, 12th Evacuation Hospital, 14th Liaison Squadron, 17th Armored Group, XX Corps, 26th Infantry Division, 35th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, 86th Chemical Battalion, 90th Infantry Division, 106th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 128th AAA Battalion, 248th Combat Engineer Battalion, 514th Quartermaster Group, 739th Field Artillery, Army Nurse Corps, and Public Relations Office, Third US Army.

The October total of 6220 items was a decrease of 1535 from the September total of 7755. The August total was 841, and the July total 177. Grand total of items forwarded after clearance at this headquarters during the three months of Third US Army operations on the Continent was 14,836, and for all items cleared and forwarded during pre-operational and operational periods 15,013.

In addition to forwarding news items and photos to PRO Communications Zone for release, duplicates of general and human interest stories were forwarded to Stars and Stripes and to York. All material was made available to war correspondents.

Section III - Radio

Mechanical failure of both the wire recorder and its portable power unit resulted in the procurement of a new recorder and a new power unit (PE 214). The new power unit was of a different type from any previously used in this section, being much more compact and considerably lighter in weight. In combination with the new wire recorder it proved most satisfactory.

Army Hour recordings were made from an observation post overlooking the fortifications of METZ (U85) from a division in reserve, and from a division preparing itself for winter fighting. "Hometown" recordings were made at an infantry regiment, a medical collecting station, a combat engineer battalion, a field artillery battery and an ordnance company.

The British Broadcasting Company's miniature recording "van" - equipment mounted in a quarter-ton trailer - was again prepared for use after being idle since late August.

Section IV - Pictorial

Two enemy and three still photographers were assigned to PRO, Third US Army in October, and were assisted in their mission by the Pictorial Officer. Close liaison was maintained with Army Pictorial Service.

Section V - Information Room

The Information Room maintained maps showing the situation of Allied and enemy troops on all European war fronts. As the situation was relatively static, it was possible to show a cohesive "front line." Maps of the Russian and Italian fronts were maintained on the basis of radio newscasts, the only available source of information and one which provided only a very general picture. G-2 Section reports made possible the maintenance of a very clear picture of the enemy situation on Germany's western front.

Using radio newscasts as the source of information, a map was prepared showing the progress of the American invasion on LEYTE, in the PHILLIPPINE ISLANDS.

Section VI - Censorship

For the month of October, total items submitted to Field Press Censorship at Army level were 1329, with a total wordage of 353,870. Photographs submitted totaled 511.

Section VII - Communications

Mackay Radio Corporation's transmitter handled 207,213 words during the month. There were no major breakdowns in transmission.

Radio and teletype operations by Army Communications group averaged approximately the same as in September, ranging from ten to fifteen messages (about 1000 groups) per day. Messages received averaged about fifteen daily.

Teletype service was facilitated by means of an excellent tie-up with Third US Army Headquarters Signal teletype board. During the latter half of the month more than the usual amount of British press copy was handled by teletype.

On the last three days of October voice tests to LONDON were made with the 399 transmitter. On the 30th of October a test was made to Twelfth US Army Group.

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

Section I - General

Routine Press Camp operations continued at NANCY (U81). During the month twenty-six correspondents arrived at the camp and twenty-eight departed. The twenty-nine correspondents assigned as of 30 November were:

Cannon, J.J., M/Sgt, Stars and Stripes
Cassidy, W., (Facility visit) Philadelphia Evening Bulletin
Clark, H.M., London News Chronicle
Cronin, R.A., Chicago Tribune
Currivan, E.A., New York Times
Downton, Eric, Reuters
Driscoll, J.F., New York Herald-Tribune
Edinger, J., France-Presse Agency
Grune, F., London Evening Standard
Haacker, G.T., Still Pool
Hawkins, L., Associated Press
Huss, F.J., INS
Levitt, Saul, Yank Magazine
Mackenzie, D.K., New York Daily News
Martin, R.G., Stars and Stripes (Divisional coverage)
Mazo, Earl, Lt., Stars and Stripes
McCardell, Lee, Baltimore Sun
Priestley, T.A., Newsreel Pool
Prince, W.J., London Times
Ray, Cyril, BBC
Reusswig, W., King Features
Richards, R.W., United Press
Rollins, Byron H., Still Pool
Ryan, C.J., London Daily Telegraph
Sheahan, J.O., Chicago Tribune (artist)
Small, W.C., United Press
Tully, Andrew, Boston Traveler
Unwin, S., BBC engineer
Wellard, James H., Chicago Times

The twenty-six arrivals for the month of November were:

Brogan, J.A., Jr., vice-president of INS, for facility visit on 16 November.
Cannon, J.J., Stars and Stripes, on 27 November.
Carpenter, Iris (Miss), London Daily Herald, for facility visit, on 19 November.
Cassidy, W., Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, for facility visit with Nineteenth Tactical Air Force, on 25 November.
Davis, F.M., Life, for facility visit, 17 November.
Diquelou, R., Parisien Humanite, for facility visit, 19 November.
Dixon, K., Associated Press, 9 November
Edinger, J., France-Presse Agency, 1 November.
Haacker, G.T., Still Pool, 10 November.
Levitt, Saul, Yank Magazine, 15 November.
Loxton, Barbara, South African "Newsek," for facility visit with Third US Army medical units, 26 November.
Mackenzie, D.K., New York Daily News, 17 November.
Mann, A., Mutual Broadcasting, for facility visit, 12 November.
Martin, R.G., S/Sgt, Stars and Stripes, for divisional coverage, 23 November.
McCardell, L., Baltimore Sun, 3 November.
Priestley, T.A., Newsreel Pool, 11 November.
Reusswig, W., King Features, 2 November.
Cronin, R., Chicago Tribune, 2 November
Richards, R.W., United Press, 10 November.
Robinson, H., New York Herald Tribune, for facility visit, 25 November.
Rollins, B.H., Still Pool, 14 November.
Stewart, O., Baltimore Afro-American, for facility visit with 761st Tank Destroyer Battalion, on 8 November.
Stirling, Monica (Miss), Atlantic Monthly, for facility visit with Third US Army medical units, 26 November.
Tully, A., Boston Traveler, 11 November.
Wellard, J.H., Chicago Times, 27 November.
Werner, O.A., Associated Press, for facility visit 26 November.

Departures for November, totalling twenty-eight, were:

Ball, E.D., Associated Press, for USA, 12 November.
Bockhurst, J.A., Newsreel Pool, for United States via Paris, 24 November.
Broderick, H.J., Still Pool, for USA via Paris, 29 November.
Brogan, J.A., Jr., vice-president INS, 19 November.
Carpenter, Iris (Miss), London Daily Herald, 20 November.
Cook, T.D., Newsweek, to Sixth US Army Group, 9 November.
Crawford, K., Newsweek, 10 November.
Davis, F.M., Life, 23 November.
Diquelou, R., Parisien Humanite, 23 November.
Dixon, K., Associated Press, for Ninth US Army, 29 November.
Gallagher, W., Associated Press, 5 November.
Grad, J., Stars and Stripes, 5 November.
Loxton, Barbara, South African "Newsek," 28 November.
Mackenzie, D.K., New York Daily News, 10 November.
Mann, A., Mutual Broadcasting, 18 November.
McNicool, D.R., Consolidated Australian Press, for USA via Paris, 24 November.
Mecklin, J.M., Chicago Sun, 12 November.
Morse, H., Still Pool, 21 November.
Oldham, J., Rotha Films, 7 November.
Robinson, H., New York Herald Tribune, 28 November.
Stewart, O., Baltimore Afro-American, 14 November.
Stirling, Monica (Miss), Atlantic Monthly, 28 November.
Stokes, R.L., St. Louis Post Dispatch, for USA via Paris, 1 November.
Tully, A., Boston Traveler, to Ninth US Army, 10 November.
Wellard, J.H., Chicago Times, 5 November.
Werner, O.A., Associated Press, 29 November.

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Wilhelm, J.B., Reuters, 20 November.
Youngman, L.W., Omaha World Telegram, for USA via Paris, 1 November.

Copy logged at the Press Camp during November totaled 3426 items as against October's 1272. These were dispatched via MacKay Radio, Army Communications, Air Delivery Letter Service and Air Mail according to the following table:

MacKay	2891
Army Communications	422
ADLS	111
Air Mail	2
Total	3426

The estimated wordage of 556,390 for November is the largest monthly total thus far.

Section II - Press

A total of 3925 items, including eighty photos, was received from eighteen organizations in Third US Army and forwarded to Press Section, PRO, Headquarters, Communications Zone (Forward) NTOUSA, for clearance and distribution during November. This total is broken down as follows:

Promotions	385
Awards and Citations	1022
General Interest	438
Photos	80
Total	3925

Units submitting material included 4th Armored Division, 4th Special Service Company, 5th Infantry Division, 6th Armored Division, XII Corps, 12th Evacuation Hospital, XX Corps, 26th Infantry Division, 35th Infantry Division, 77th Finance Disbursing Section, 80th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, 95th Infantry Division, 106th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 166th Signal Photo Company, 157th Signal Replacement Company and 514th Quartermaster Group.

The Public Relations Section, Third US Army, submitted sixty-three items, thirty of which were photos. These items originated with this headquarters.

The November total of 3925 items is a decrease of 2295 from the October total of 6220. The September total was 7755, August 861, and July 177. Total number of items forwarded after clearance at this headquarters during the four months of Third US Army operations on the Continent is 18,761. Grand total of all items cleared during the pre-operational and operational periods to date is 18,938.

In addition to forwarding news items and photos to PRO, Communications Zone (Forward), for release, duplicates of general and human interest stories were forwarded to Stars and Stripes and to Yank. All material was made available to war correspondents.

Section III - Radio

Radio correspondent Cyril Ray, BBC, and Stanley Unwin, BBC engineer, were at the Press Camp during the entire month. Arthur Mann, of Mutual Broadcasting System, spent several days at the Camp arranging a special series of recordings dealing with Third US Army's Psychological Warfare Section. "Red" Mueller, National Broadcasting Company, attached to PRO, Twelfth US Army Group, made several broadcasts from JEWA.

Standby Army Hour spots were made from the 26th Infantry Division and from a Quartermaster Truck Company. In accordance with instructions from the Public Relations Division of the War Department a special recorded interview was made with a colored Quartermaster jeep driver whom GENERAL PATTON had decorated for heroism at CHATHAINOIS. This recording was for Mutual's "Your Army Service Forces" program. Eighteen hometown recordings were made. Mechanical difficulties with the wire recorder prevented making more recordings.

The Radio section assisted in making arrangements for an enlisted man from the 9th Infantry Division to participate in a broadcast beamed to the United States from Paris.

Section IV - Pictorial

Two still and one newsreel photographers were assigned to Third US Army's Press Camp and were assisted in their work by the Pictorial Officer. Close liaison was maintained with Army Pictorial Service.

Section V - Information Section

The Information Room maintained maps showing the situation of Allied and enemy troops on all European fronts and one showing the progress of the American campaign on LEYTE, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. Maps of the Russian, Italian and Philippine campaigns were maintained on the basis of newscasts, the only available source of information. G-2 Section reports made possible the maintenance of a very clear picture of the enemy situation on Germany's western front.

On 1:100,000 maps emphasizing terrain features, progress week by week since opening of the November drive was indicated by shading.

On 1:25,000 maps, the German defensive plan from LUXEMBOURG approximately to SAARBRUCKEN was shown.

Section VI - Censorship

For the month of November, total items submitted to field press censorship at Army level was 3624, with a total wordage of 372,412. Photographs submitted totaled 236.

Section VII - Communications

MacKay Radio handled 446,999 words during November, with no major breakdowns in transmission.

Transmission via Army Communications, by both radio and teletype, averaged thirty to forty messages per day (7000 to 8000 groups). Incoming messages averaged twenty-five daily (1500 to 2000 groups).

Although there was still some difficulty with relay service at Army Group level, teletype handled the bulk of the traffic. On the whole, the teletype service was much more satisfactory than was expected.

The radio was open twenty-four hours a day but because of a very crowded frequency after 1700 hours it did not prove to be a satisfactory means of clearing traffic should the teletype fail during a rush period.

Tests to LONDON using JELG at Twelfth US Army Group as a relay, proved satisfactory. Some recordings were broadcast to BBC and were received satisfactorily, although reception was impossible after 1700 hours.

Tests to PARIS direct proved very satisfactory. With the Army station in PARIS acting as a relay, one broadcast direct to NBC in NEW YORK was originated with very good results.

CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

Section I - General

The Press Camp conducted operations at NANCY (D81), FRANCE, until 26 December and then set up routine press operations at ESCH (P70), LUXEMBOURG. During the month twenty-five correspondents arrived and thirty departed. The twenty-eight correspondents assigned as of 31 December were:

Ball, R.D., Associated Press
Cannon, J.J., M/Sgt, Stars and Stripes
Cronin, Robert A., Chicago Tribune
Downton, Eric, Reuters
Driscoll, J.F., New York Herald Tribune
Haacker, C.T., Still Pool
Hawkins, Lewis, Associated Press
Johnston, Richard J., New York Times
Lang, Will, Time Magazine
Lee, Jack, INS
Levitt, Saul, Yank Magazine
McCardell, Lee, Baltimore Sun
McCarthy, J.W., M/Sgt, Yank Magazine
McNulty, Anthony J., Stars and Stripes Photographer
Picard, Marcel, Agence Francaise Presse
Priestley, T.A., Newsreel Pool
Ray, Cyril, BBC
Richards, R.W., United Press
Rollins, Byron H., Still Pool
Ryan, C.J., London Daily Telegraph
Schuck, Hugh J., New York Daily News
Sheahan, J.G., Chicago Tribune (artist)
Small, Wilson C., United Press
Unwin, Stanley, BBC engineer
Wallard, James H., Chicago Times
Weston, Joseph, Prt, Stars and Stripes
White, Samuel, Consolidated Australian Press
Wiant, Toby, Associated Press

The twenty-five arrivals for the month of December were:

Bain, Leslie B., McNaught Syndicate, arrived 15 December for facility visit.
Berson, Roger, French Photo Presse, arrived 9 December for facility visit.
Calmer, Ned, Columbia Broadcasting System, arrived 3 December for facility visit.
Capa, Robert, Life and Time Magazine Photographer, arrived 12 December.
Droit, Michel, Radio Diffusion Francaise, arrived 24 December for facility visit.
Folliard, Edward, Washington Post, arrived 23 December for facility visit.
Hauser, Ernest, Saturday Evening Post, arrived 21 December for facility visit.
Johnston, R.J., New York Times, arrived 30 December.
Krueger, Jose, Chicago Herald American, arrived 14 December for facility visit.
Lang, Will, Time Magazine, arrived 27 December.
Lee, Jack, INS, arrived 28 December.
Lower, Elmer, Life Magazine, arrived 3 December for facility visit.
Martin, M.C., Lt. General, British Army, Retired, Military Advisor, London Daily Telegraph, arrived 8 December for facility visit.
McDowall, James, Kemsley Newspapers, arrived 12 December for facility visit.
McCarthy, Joseph H., M/Sgt, Yank Magazine, arrived 29 December for facility visit.
Peterman, Ivan B., Philadelphia Inquirer, arrived 7 December for facility visit.
Pateuil, Andre, Radio Diffusion Francais, arrived 24 December for facility visit.
Picard, Marcel, Agence Francaise Presse, arrived 30 December.
Silverman, David, Life Magazine, arrived 3 December for facility visit.
Schuck, Hugh J., New York Daily News, arrived 15 December.
Stead, Ronald, Christian Science Monitor, arrived 15 December for facility visit.
Stokes, Richard L., St. Louis Post Dispatch, arrived 9 December for facility visit.
Van Lee, Leyn, Radio Diffusion Francaise, arrived 24 December for facility visit.
Werner, Oscar A., Associated Press, arrived 10 December for facility visit.
Weston, Joseph, Prt., Stars and Stripes, arrived 29 December for facility visit.
White, Samuel, Consolidated Australian Press, arrived 28 December.

The thirty departures for the month of December were:

Bain, Leslie B., McNaught Syndicate, 18 December.
Berson, Roger, French Photo Presse, 16 December.
Calmer, Ned, Columbia Broadcasting System, 5 December.

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Capa, Robert, Life and Time Photographer, 22 December.
Cassidy, Morley, Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 6 December.
Clark, Norman M., London News Chronicle, 16 December.
Currivan, Gene, New York Times, 29 December.
Droit, Michel, Radio Diffusion Francaise, 29 December.
Edinger, Jacques, Agence Francaise Presse, 29 December.
Folliard, Edward, Washington Post, 26 December.
Grune, Phillip, London Evening Standard, for United Kingdom on leave and business consultation with his office 18 December.
Hauser, Ernest, Saturday Evening Post, 26 December.
Huss, F.J., INS, for USA via Paris on 16 December.
Krueger, Jess, Chicago Herald American, 16 December.
Lower, Elmer, Life Magazine, 5 December.
Mackenzie, D.K., for USA via Paris, 16 December. New York Daily News.
Martin, H.G., Lt. General, British Army, Retired, Military Advisor, London Daily Telegraph, 11 December.
Martin, Ralph G., Stars and Stripes, returned to Twelfth US Army Group 8 December.
Mann, Karl, (Lt), Stars and Stripes, for Paris 22 December.
McDowell, James, Kemsley Newspapers, 17 December.
Peterman, Ivan H., Philadelphia Inquirer, 12 December.
Peteuil, Andre, Radio Diffusion Francais, 29 December.
Prince, W.J., London Times, for United Kingdom via Paris on leave and business consultation 20 December.
Pennewig, W., King Features, for USA via Paris 18 December.
Scherman, David, Life Magazine, 5 December.
Stead, Ronald, Christian Science Monitor, 18 December.
Stokes, Richard L., St. Louis Post Dispatch, 16 December.
Tully, Andrew, Boston Traveler, on leave to Paris to make Christmas Broadcasts to the United States on Massachusetts personalities, 19 December.
Van Lee, Loys, Radio Diffusion Francaise, 29 December.
Werner, Oscar A., Associated Press, 29 December.

Copy logged at the Press Camp during December totaled 2901 items as against November's 3426. These were dispatched via Mackay Radio, Army Communications and Air Dispatch Letter Service according to the following table:

Mackay	2310
Army Communications	422
ADLS	169
Total	2901

The estimated wordage for December totaled 453,795. The November total was 556,390.

Section II - Press

A total of 7780 items, including sixty-six photos, were received from twenty-nine organizations in Third US Army and forwarded to Press Section, PRC, headquarters Communications Zone (Forward) ETOUSA, for clearance and distribution during December. This total is broken down as follows:

Promotions	862
Awards and Citations	5683
General Interest	1169
Photos	66
Total	7780

Units submitting material included 4th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 6th Armored Division, 9th Armored Division, 10th Armored Division, 12th Evacuation Hospital, XII Corps, XX Corps, 26th Infantry Division, 33rd Field Artillery Brigade, 35th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, 87th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, 93rd Signal Battalion, 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion, 95th Infantry Division, 145th Engineer Combat Battalion, 179th Field Artillery Battalion, 273rd Field Artillery Battalion, 375th Ordnance Maintenance Company, 404th Field Artillery Group, 696th Field Artillery Battalion, 738th Field Artillery Battalion, 739th Field Artillery Battalion, 775th Field Artillery Battalion, 1117th Engineer Combat Group, and Surgery, Third US Army.

The Public Relations Section, Third US Army, submitted forty-six items, eighteen of which were photos. These items originated this headquarters.

The December total of 7780 items is an increase of 3855 over the November total of 3925. The October total was 6220. The September total was 7755. The August total was 861 and the July total 177.

Total number of items forwarded after clearance at this headquarters during the five months of Third US Army operations on the Continent is 26,541. Grand total of all items cleared and forwarded during the pre-operational and operational periods to date is 26,718.

In addition to forwarding items, both news and photos, to PRC, headquarters Communications Zone (Forward) ETOUSA, for release, duplicates of general and human interest stories were forwarded to Stars and Stripes and to Yank. All material was made available to war correspondents.

Section III - Radio

There were nine combat diary reports during December. Seven Christmas recordings were made. There were two recordings for the Army Hour. Two recordings of "front line choir" at the 35th Infantry Division were made. There were 120 recordings released after censorship for hometown consumption. A War Department request for a broadcast from LUXEMBOURG was received.

Section IV - Pictorial

Two still and one newsreel photographer were assigned to Third US Army's Press Camp and were assisted in their work by the Pictorial Officer. Close liaison was maintained with Army Pictorial Service.

Section V - Information Room

During December the Information Section maintained a G-2, G-3 situation map, scale 1:250,000, of the western front showing dispositions of both Allied and enemy troops by division and higher units. A map of 1:100,000 scale of the Third US Army sector was maintained showing locations of Third US Army and sectors of the Third US Army and the Seventh US Army was maintained to show progress of the two armies' offensives. Units down to regiment, and sometimes down to battalion, were shown.

During the battles for METZ (U85), SAARLAUTERN (U28), and SAARGUEMINES (U45), maps of 1:250,000 were maintained which showed exact locations and types of fixed enemy defenses.

Progress week by week of the Third US Army's offensive which began 8 November, were shown on a 1:100,000 map shaded to emphasize terrain features.

With the beginning of the German Army's counter-offensive on the western front against the First US Army's VIII Corps, a 1:100,000 scale map of this area was posted and units down to regiment were shown in their proper positions.

Section VI - Censorship

For the month of December, total items submitted to field press censorship at Army level was 3801 with a total wordage of 700,652. Total releases and hometown mailers was 554. Photographs submitted totaled 485.

Section VIII - Communications

Mackay Radio handled 343,443 words during December, with no major breakdowns in transmission.

The operation of both the radio and teletype, with the latter representing the principal means of communications, had an average output of 6,940 to 7,000 groups representing the texts of approximately thirty messages daily. Messages received showed an increase over the month of November with an average of twenty-five messages handled having about 2,000 groups daily.

The voice broadcast circuit between this station and British Broadcasting Corporation, LISBON, was maintained during December with messages being handled daily. Broadcasts by correspondents, the Radio Officer's and one enlisted man's recordings, were received satisfactorily in LONDON.

Traffic was limited when the Press Camp moved to a new location, as the only means of communications at the time was the radio, SCR-399.

The combined station AXD-JEVA was open twenty-four hours a day and the required personnel on duty was over that span to maintain teletype, radio, code and messenger service.

CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

Section I - General

Routine Press Camp operations continued at ZSCH (P70). During the month thirty correspondents arrived and twenty-five departed. The thirty-two correspondents present as of 31 January were:

Bohrod, Aaron, Time and Life
Bryson, John, Blue Network
Busch, Noel, Time and Life
Common, James J., M/Sgt, Stars and Stripes
Clark, Norman M., London News Chronicle
Coffey, Pat, Yank Photographer
Cronin, Robert A., Chicago Tribune
Currivan, Gene, New York Times
Downton, Eric, Reuters
Driscoll, Joseph F., New York Herald-Tribune
Edinger, Jacques, Agence Francaise Presse
Flores, John T., Time and Life Photographer
Griffin, Bulkley S., Worcester Telegram Gazette and Hartford Times.
Haseker, Charles T., Still Pool Photographer
Hawkins, Lewis, Associated Press
Levitt, Saul, Yank Magazine
McCardell, Lee, Baltimore Sun
McNulty, Anthony J., Stars and Stripes Photographer
Murray, Edward J., United Press
Newman, Larry, International News Service
Penn, David, Office of War Information
Priestley, T.A., Newsreel Pool Cameraman
Prince, W.J., London Times
Reid, Robert, British Broadcasting Company
Richards, Robert B., United Press
Rollins, Byron H., Still Pool Photographer
Ryan, Cornelius J., London Daily Telegraph
Sheean, James Vincent, North America Newspaper Alliance
Tully, Andrew, Boston Traveler
Unwin, Stanley, British Broadcasting Company Engineer
White, O.E., Melbourne Herald
Wiant, Thoburn, Associated Press

The thirty arrivals for the month of January were:

Bohrod, Aaron, Time and Life, arrived 25 January
Blanchard, Claude, France-Soir, arrived 1 January for facility visit.
Bryson, John, Blue Network, arrived 27 January
Busch, Noel, Time and Life, arrived 25 January
Clark, Norman M., London News Chronicle, returned from leave in London, 6 January
Coffey, Pat, Yank Photographer, arrived 6 January
Crevasse, Pierre, Radio Diffusion Francaise, arrived 23 January, for facility visit.
Currivan, Gene, New York Times, arrived 6 January
Dearing, Joseph, Colliers, arrived 1 January for facility visit
Edinger, Jacques, Agence Francaise Presse, arrived 6 January.
Farr, Walter, London Daily Mail, arrived 5 January.
Flores, John T., Time and Life, arrived 29 January
Griffin, Bulkley S., Worcester Telegram Gazette and Hartford Times, arrived 18 January.
Hutton, Geoffrey W., Melbourne Argus, arrived 23 January, for facility visit.
Mitchell, Patrick C., Stars and Stripes, arrived 1 January
Morrison, Allan M., Stars and Stripes, arrived 2 January, for facility visit.

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Murray, Edward J., United Press, arrived 28 January.
Newman, Larry, International News Service, arrived 3 January.
Penn, David, Office of War Information, arrived 28 January.
Perronet, Paul, Radio Diffusion Francaise, arrived 1 January for facility visit.
Prince, W. J., London Times, arrived 6 January from leave in United Kingdom.
Reid, Robert, British Broadcasting Corporation, arrived 31 January.

Rolland, Jacques, Paris Ce Soir, arrived 2 January for facility visit.
Sartres, Andre, France-Soir, arrived 2 January, for facility visit.
Sheean, James Vincent, North American Newspaper Alliance, arrived 22 January.
Thompson, Reginald W., London Sunday Times, arrived 17 January, for facility visit.
Tully, Andrew, Boston Traveler, returned from Paris 3 January.
White, C. E., Melbourne Herald, arrived 23 January.
Wiant, Toby, Associated Press, arrived 2 January.
Zalewski, Maurice, Journal "Liber Soir", arrived 18 January, for facility visit.

The twenty-five departures for the month of January were:

Ball, Edward D., Associated Press, 3 January.
Blanchard, Claude, France-Soir, 8 January.
Cremesse, Pierre, Radio Diffusion Francaise, 27 January.
Dearing, Joseph, Colliers, 22 January.
Farr, Walter, London Daily Mail, 25 January, on leave to Paris.
Hutton, Geoffrey W., Melbourne Argus, 26 January.
Johnston, Richard J., New York Times, 6 January.
Long, Will, Time and Life, 24 January.
Lee, Jack, International News Service, 6 January.
McCarthy, Joseph W., Yank, 11 January.
Mitchell Patrick C., Stars and Stripes, 26 January, on leave to Paris.
Morrison, Allan M., Stars and Stripes, 6 January.
Perronet, Paul, Radio Diffusion Francaise, 18 January.
Picard, Marcel, Agence Francaise Presse, 8 January.
Ray, Cyril, British Broadcasting Corporation, 6 January, suspended for illegal broadcast.
Rolland, Jacques, Paris Ce Soir, 18 January.
Sartres, Andre, France-Soir, 8 January.
Schuck, Hugh J., New York Daily News, 22 January, on leave to England.
Sheahan, Joseph G., Chicago Tribune, 25 January, on leave to Paris.
Small, Wilson C., United Press, 15 January.
Thompson, Reginald W., London Sunday Times, 26 January.
Wellard, James H., Chicago Times, 16 January, on leave to United Kingdom.
Weston, Joseph, Stars and Stripes, 11 January.
White, Samuel, Consolidated Australian Press, 10 January, on leave to United Kingdom.
Zalewski, Maurice, Journal "Liber-Soir", 27 January.

Copy logged at the Press Camp during January totaled 3246 items as against December's 2901. These were dispatched via Mackay Radio, Army Communications and Air Dispatch Letter Service according to the following table:

Mackay	2409
Army Communications	657
ADLS	180
	3246

The estimated wordage for January totaled 501,840. The December total was 453,795.

Section II - Press

A total of 8388 items, including 110 photos, were received from thirty-eight organizations in Third Army and forwarded to Press Section, PRD, Hq Communications Zone (Forward) ETOUSA, for clearance and distribution during January. This total is broken down as follows:

Promotions	1615
Awards & Cit	5889
Gen Interest	1344
Photos	110
Total	8388

Units submitting material included 4th Armd Div, 6th Inf Div, 9th Inf Div, 5th FA Gp, 6th Armd Div, VIII Corps, 9th Armd Div, 9th TD Gp, 10th Armd Div, 11th Armd Div, 12th Svce Regt, XII Corps, 17th Airborne Div, XX Corps, 26th Inf Div, 28th Inf Div, 35th Inf Div, 42nd Cav Rcn Sq, 70th TK Bn, 80th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 91st Chem Bn, 94th Med Gas Bn, 93rd Sig Bn, 94th Inf Div, 95th Inf Div, 101st Airborne Div, 466th AAA Bn, 469th FA Bn, 774th TD Bn, 1304th Engr GS Regt, 3180th Sig Serv Bn, 3280th Sig Serv Co. Hq AAA Units, AG Third U S Army and G-3 Third U S Army.

The Public Relations Section this Headquarters submitted sixteen items. These items originated this Headquarters.

The January total is an increase of 598 over the December total of 7790, having totaled 8388. The November total was 9988. The October total was 6280. The September total was 7785. The August total was 841 and the July total 177. Total number of items forwarded after clearance at this Headquarters during the six months of Third United States Army operations on the Continent was 34898. Grand total of all items cleared and forwarded during the pre-operational and operational periods to date was 350?8.

In addition to forwarding items, both news and photos, to PRD, Communications Zone (Forward) ETOUSA, for release, duplicates of general and human interest stories were forwarded to Editor, "Stars and Stripes," and Editor, "Yank." All material was made available to war correspondents.

Section III - Radio

There were seven combat diary reports during January. There were four Army Hour recordings and three Army Service Forces recordings. There were 107 recordings released after censorship for hometown consumption. The Section also assisted with five recordings for Radio Francais.

Section IV - Pictorial

Two still, one newsreel and a "Yank" photographer were assigned to Third U S Army's Press Camp and were assisted in their work by the Pictorial Officer. Close liaison was maintained with Army Pictorial Service.

Section V - Information News

During January, the Information Section provided two daily briefings for correspondents assigned to the Third U S Army and one daily briefing for the General and Special Staff Officers of Headquarters, Third U S Army.

A world map showing the Russian and western battle front was maintained from combined G-2, G-3 and radio news reports.

On a map of 1:250,000 scale, the western front picture was shown down to and including units of division size along the Allied front in western Europe. Both Allied and enemy units were shown.

Third and First U S Armies were shown on a map of 1:100,000 scale. Allied and enemy units down to and including Regiment were shown in their proper positions.

During the month of January, the Information Section maintained G-2 and G-3 situation maps of the entire western front. The situation on the western front was kept correct through use of a map of 1:100,000 scale.

Section VI - Censorship

For the month of January, total 8 mms submitted to field press censorship at army level was 3371 with a total o

censorship at army level was 3371 with a total wordage of 938,378. Total releases and hometown mailers was 1560. Photographs submitted totaled 1153.

Section VII - Communications

Mackay Radio handled 410,286 words during January with no major breakdown in transmission.

The operations of both the radio and teletype had an average output of 8,000 to 9,000 groups daily for the first two weeks and 8,000 to 6,000 for the last two weeks. These groups represented approximately twenty-five to thirty messages daily. Messages received were about the same as December and averaged about twenty-five with a fluctuating group count of 8,000 to 8,800 daily.

Teletype difficulties increased greatly and at times it was almost impossible to get a proper connection through to our relay station at Twelfth U S Army Group.

The voice cost circuit to LONDON, British Broadcasting Corporation, was maintained throughout the month.

CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - General

Press Camp operations were conducted at LUXEMBOURG CITY (PRA), LUXEMBOURG, during the month. During February, sixteen correspondents arrived and fifteen departed. The thirty-two correspondents assigned as of 28 February were:

Ball, Edward D.	Associated Press
Bryson, John	Blue Network
Cannon, James J., M/Sgt	Stars and Stripes
Clark, Ryerson M.	London News Chronicle
Costello, William	British Broadcasting Corporation
Cronin, Robert A.	Chicago Tribune
Currivan, Gene	New York Times
Downton, Eric	Reuters
Driscoll, J.F.	New York Herald Tribune
Edinger, Jacques	Agence France Presse
Foucherand, Louis	Marseilles Press
Griffin, Walkley S.	Worcester Telegram & Hartford Times
Hoecker, Charles T.	Still Pool
McBrien, Robert J.	Yank
McCardell, Lee	Baltimore Sun
McNulty, Anthony J.	Stars and Stripes
Meyer, Robert	United Press
Mitchell, Patrick C.	Stars and Stripes
Newman, Larry	International News Service
Penn, David	Office of War Information
Priestley, T. A.	Newsreel Pool
Prince, W. J.	London Times
Reid, Robert	British Broadcasting Corporation
Richards, Robert W.	United Press
Rollins, Byron H.	Still Pool
Ryan, Cornelius J.	London Daily Telegraph
Shadel, W.F.	Columbia Broadcasting Corporation
Sheahan, Joseph Gary	Chicago Tribune (Artist)
Sheean, James Vincent	Redbook (HAHA)
Tully, Andrew	Boston Traveler
dear, J.R.	Fort Worth Star Telegram
Wiant, Toby	Associated Press

The sixteen arrivals for the month of February were:

Abramson, Robert J., Yank, arrived 8 February for facility visit.
Alexander, Arthur E., Yank, arrived 8 February for facility visit.
Ball, Edward, Associated Press, arrived 19 February.
Rost, Jacques, Paris Combat, arrived 15 February for facility visit.
Costello, William, British Broadcasting Corporation Engineer arrived 25 February.
Epstein, Clifford, Detroit News, arrived 9 February for facility visit.
Foucherand, Louis, Havre

Foucherand, Louis, Marseilles Press, arrived 18 February for facility visit.
[illegible], arrived 18 February for fa-
[illegible], arrived 28 February.

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Meyer, Robert, United Press, arrived 1 February.
Mitchell, Patrick C., Stars and Stripes, arrived from leave 1 February.
Schutz, Hugh J., New York Daily News, arrived from leave 1 February.
Shadel, W.F., Columbia Broadcasting System, arrived 12 February for facility visit.
Shanahan, Joseph G., Chicago Tribune, arrived from leave 26 February.
Spear, J.R., Fort Worth Star Telegram, arrived 9 February.
Sullard, James H., Chicago Times, arrived from leave 2 February.

The fifteen departures for the month of February were:

Abramson, Robert J., Yank, 12 February.
Alexander, Arthur H., Yank, 12 February.
Bohrod, Aaron, Time and Life, 24 February.
Boste
Bost, Jacques, Paris Combat, 24 February.
Busch, Noel, Time and Life, 5 February.
Coffey, Pat, Yank, 24 February on leave.
Epstein, Cliff.M, Detroit News, 14 February.
Hawkins, Lewis, Associated Press, 14 February.
Lachin, Maurice, Paris Combat, 17 February.
Levitt, Saul, Yank, 2 February.
Murrey, Edward J., United Press, 1 February.
Silcock, Hugh, New York Daily News, 16 February.
Uren, Stanley, British Broadcasting Corporation, 12 February.
Sullard, James H., Chicago Times, 23 February.
White, O.E., Melbourne Herald, 6 February.

There were 1841 items logged at the Press Camp during February as against 3446 for the month of January. These were dispatched via Mackay Radio, Army Communications and Air Dispatch Letter service in the following table:

Mackay	1298
Army Communications	371
ADLS	54
	1821

The estimated wordage for the month of February totaled 337,990. The January total was 501,540.

Section II - Press

A total of 4997 items, including 98 photos, were received from thirty nine organizations in Third United States Army and forwarded to Press Section, PRC, Headquarters, Communications Zone (Forward) European Theater Operations United States Army, for release and distribution after clearance, during February. This total is broken down as follows:

Promotions	772
Awards & Cit	3367
Gen Interest	763
Photos	98
Total	4997

Units submitting materiel included 3d Cav Gp, III Corps, 4th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div, 5th Inf Div, 6th Armd Div, 6th Cav Gp, VIII Corps, 9th TD Gp, 9th Armd Div, 10th Armd Div, 11th Armd Div, 12th Evac Hosp, XII Corps, 13th Chem Bn, XV Corps, 17th Airborne Inf, XX Corps, 26th Inf Div, 30th Inf Div, 43d Cav Sq, 45d Cav Sq, 76th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 91st Chem Bn, 94th Inf Div, 94th Med Gas Bn, 95th Inf Div, 1clst FA Bn, 204th Engr Com Bn, 246th Engr Com Bn, 275th Ord Maint Co, 276th Armd FA Bn, 803d TD Bn, 974th FA Bn, and 1137th Engr Com Gp.

The Public Relations Section, Third United States Army, submitted forty four items. These originated this Headquarters.

The February total was a decrease of 3361 over the January total of 8358. Total number of items forwarded after clearance at this Headquarters during the seven months of Third United States Army operations on the Continent was 38096. Grand total of all items cleared and forwarded during the pre-operational and operational periods to date was 40973.

In addition to forwarding items, both news and photos, to Public Relations Officer, Communications Zone (Forward), for release, duplicates of general interest as well as human interest stories, were forwarded to Editor, "Stars and Stripes," and Editor, "Yank." All materiel was made available to war correspondents.

Section III - Radio

Radio operations for the month of February included two live shows via 398 for combat diary, three wire recordings for combat diary, and a wire recording for the Army Hour via Twelfth U S Army Group. One wire recording was also sent to the United States for network release via Paris.

A total of 133 "hometown" recordings were sent via Paris. A total of 197 Third U S Army combat personnel were interviewed during the month. The estimated wordage of "hometown" radio releases cleared through censors and sent via Paris totaled 105,000 as an estimated figure.

During the month the section assisted the British Broadcasting Corporation correspondent in filing dispatches via Paris on the wire recorder. Blue Network correspondent broadcast to United States four times weekly via Twelfth U S Army Group transmitter and Mackay Radio transmitter.

New equipment obtained by the section this month now makes it possible to send complete recording units to three sectors of the Third U S Army front simultaneously. A complete recording unit, including the power unit, can be placed in a jeep with three correspondents and units are available to radio correspondents at all times.

Section IV - Pictorial

Two still and one newsreel photographer were assigned to Third U S Army's Press Camp and were assisted in their work by the Pictorial Officer. Close liaison was maintained with Army Pictorial Service.

Section V - Information Room

During February, the information Section maintained situation maps of the western front showing dispositions of both Allied and enemy troops by division and higher units. The offensive surge of the Russians also prompted an additional map of the eastern front.

A detailed 1:50,000 map was maintained of the entire Third U S Army front and late in the period a 1:25,000 scale map introduced, covering the main spots of activity on the western front. 1:250,000 and 1:100,000 scale maps were kept on Allied and enemy troops on different sectors of the western front.

Briefings for the correspondents were conducted twice daily with G-2, G-3 liaison, Corps and Division Public Relations Officers as the main source of information.

Section VI - Censorship

Total items submitted for the month of February to field press censorship at army level was 3183 with a total wordage of 916,080. Total releases and hometown mailers was 1439. There were 1243 photographs submitted.

Section VII - Communications

Mackay Radio handled 304,521 words during the month of February with no major breakdown in transmission.

The combined radio and teletype had an outgoing 6500 groups which represented approximately thirty to thirty-five messages daily. Teletype handled the bulk of the traffic. Radio acted as an emergency means of communications with Twelfth U S Army Group. Incoming traffic ranged from twenty to twenty-five messages with a group average of 8500 words daily.

A daily report was made on outgoing traffic and a weekly report submitted for more accurate checking on figures.

Radio handled several voicecasts. They were received satisfactorily during the day.

CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

SECTION I - General

Press Camp operations were conducted on German soil for the first time during the month at ZIAR-OBERSTEIN (LY8). Third United States Army again received the bulk of newspaper and radio coverage for their smashing SAAR-MOSELLE-RHINE Triangle operations. During the month Third United States Army troops crossed the Rhine in strength while armor swept east and north in spectacular gains. The spectacular movements of Third United States Army during the month were considered as one of the greatest operations in military history.

Thirty correspondents arrived and nineteen departed during March. The thirty four correspondents assigned as of 31 March were:

Ball, Edward D.	Associated Press
Bryson, John	Blue Network
Cannon, James J., M/Sgt	Stars and Stripes
Clark, Norman M	London News Chronicle
Coffey, Pat	Yank (Photographer)
Costello, Gillian	British Broadcasting Corporation
Cronin, Robert A.	Chicago Tribune
Currivan, E.A.	New York Times
Deroche, Louis	Agence France Presse
Driscoll, J.F.	New York Herald Tribune
Griffin, Balsley S.	Worcester Telegram & Hartford Times
Hewston, Charles T.	Still Pool
Kerr, McFee	Reuters
Lake, Austen	Boston American
Levitt, Saul	Yank
McCardell, Lee	Baltimore Sun
Meyer, Robert	United Press
Mitchell, Patrick C.	Stars and Stripes
Newman, Larry	International News Service
Packard, Reynolds	United Press
Priestley, T.A.	Newsreel Pool
Prime, W.J.	London Times
Reid, Robert	British Broadcasting Corporation
Richards, Robert W.	United Press
Rollins, Byron H.	Still Pool
Ryan, Cornelius J.	London Daily Telegraph
Scherman, David	Still Pool
Sheahan, Joseph Cary	Chicago Tribune (Artist)
Tully, Andrew	Boston Traveler
Wear, J.R.	Fort Worth Star Telegram
White, O.E.	Melbourne Herald
White, Samuel	Consolidated Australian Press
Zinet, Toby	Associated Press
Wilkinson, Lawrence	London Daily Express

The thirty arrivals for the month of March were:

Berson, Roger, arrived 20 March for facility visit.
Coffey, Pat, Yank, returned from Paris 25 March.
Deroche, Louis, arrived 31 March.
Ide, Maurice, arrived 21 March for facility visit.
Fleisher, Jack, arrived 27 March for facility visit.
Francotte, Robert, arrived 30 March for facility visit.
Hall, John, arrived 27 March for facility visit.
Huss, P.J., arrived 25 March for facility visit.
Jordan, Max, arrived 12 March for facility visit.
Kerr, McFee, arrived 7 March for facility visit.
Lake, Austen, arrived 7 March for facility visit.
Lee, Jack, arrived 16 March.
Levitt, Saul, arrived 25 March.
Lewis, Boyd, arrived 16 March for facility visit.
Mejat, Francois, arrived 5 March.
Morse, Ralph, arrived 7 March for facility visit.
O'Connell, John, arrived 10 March for facility visit.
Olsen, Sidney, arrived 20 March for facility visit.
Packard, Reynolds, arrived 28 March for facility visit.
Plambeck, Herbert, arrived 9 March for facility visit.
Scherman, David, arrived 26 March for facility visit.
Small, Wilson C., arrived 8 March for facility visit.
Warth, Douglas, arrived 6 March for facility visit.
Webb, Clifford, arrived 31 March for facility visit.
Werner, Oscar A., arrived 15 March for facility visit.
White, O.E., arrived 5 March.
White, Samuel, arrived 4 March.
Wilhelm, John H., arrived 21 March for facility visit.
Wilkinson, Lawrence, arrived 23 March.
Zalewski, Maurice, arrived 5 March for facility visit.

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The nineteen departures for the month of March were:

Downton, Eric, 11 March.
Edinger, Jacques, wounded and dropped from rolls 25 March.
Fletcher, Jack, 31 March.
Fouchereau, Louis, 16 March.
Jerome, Max, 24 March.
Lee, Jack, 28 March.
Lewis, Boyd, 19 March.
McBrian, Robert, 28 March.
McNally, Anthony J., 9 March.
Mejat, Francoise, 31 March, in Paris on leave.
Morse, Ralph, 9 March.
O'Connell, John, 28 March.
Penn, David, 30 March.
Plambeck, Herbert, 26 March.
Sheean, James Vincent, 15 March.
Small, Wilson C., 16 March.
Stokes, Richard L., 27 March.
Werth, Douglas, 19 March.
Zalewski, Maurice, 20 March.

There were 5581 items logged at the Press Camp during March as against 1821 for the month of February. These were dispatched via Meskay Radio, Army Communications and Air Dispatch Letter Service to the following table:

Meskay	4725
Army Communications	654
ADLS	202
	5581

The estimated wordage for the month of March was 526,695 as against 337990 for the month of February.

Section II - Press

A total of 6,246 items, including 107 photos, were received from thirty five organizations in Third United States Army and forwarded to Press Section, PRC, Headquarters, Communications Zone (Forward) European Theater Operations United States Army, for release and distribution after clearance, during March. This total is broken down as follows:

Awards & Cit.	3805
Com Interest	719
Promotions	1515
Photos	107
Total	6246

Units submitting material included 3d Cav Gp, III Corps, 4th Armd Div, 4th Inf Div, 5th Inf Div, 6th Armd Div, VIII Corps, 10th Armd Div, 11th Armd Div, XII Corps, XX Corps, 26th Inf Div, 65th Inf Div, 76th Inf Div, 80thInf Div, 87th Inf Div, 89th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 91st Chem Bn, 824 Med Gas Bn, 94th Inf Div, 126th AAA Bn, 191st FA Bn, 275th Ord Maint Co, 286th FA Bn, 482d AAA Bn, 571st QM Co, 635th AAA Bn, 736th FA Bn, 748th Tk Bn, 785th MP Bn, 811th TD Bn, 96lst Engr Maint Co and the 13036 Engr Serv Regt.

The Public Relations Section this Headquarters submitted 88 items. These items originated this Headquarters.

The March total of 6246 items showed an increase of 1749 over the February total of 4497. Total number of items forwarded after clearance at this Headquarters during the eight months of Third United States Army operations on the Continent was 46162. Grand total of all items cleared and forwarded during the pre-operational and operational periods to date was 46319.

In addition to forwarding items, both news and photos, to Public Relations Officer, Communications Zone (Forward), for release, duplicates of general interest as well as human interest stories, were forwarded to Editor, "Stars and Stripes," and Editor, "Yank." All material was made available to war correspondents.

Section III - Radio

Radio operations for the month of March included fourteen recordings for combat diary, four recordings for the Army Hour, eight "hometown" recordings, three recordings for the National Broadcasting Corporation, one recording for the British Broadcasting Corporation, one recording for radio station WHO, DES MOINES, IOWA, and one recording for the Blue Network.

The radio section also assisted correspondents from the British Broadcasting Corporation, the National Broadcasting Corporation, the Blue Network and the radio station WHO, DES MOINES, IOWA.

During the month of March emphasis was placed on Third United States Army operations rather than on "hometown" releases. An estimated 35,000 words cleared through field censors.

Section IV - Pictorial

Two still and one newsreel photographer were assigned to Third United States Army's Press Camp and were assisted in their work by the Pictorial Officer. Close liaison was maintained with Army Pictorial Service.

Section V - Information Room

During March, the Information Section maintained situation maps of the western Front showing dispositions of both Allied and enemy troops by division and higher units. An additional map of the Russian campaign on the eastern Front was also maintained.

A detailed 1:50,000 map was maintained of the entire Third United States Army front as well as a 1:25,000 scale map, covering the main spots of activity on the western Front. 1:250,000 and 1:100,000 scale maps on Allied and enemy troops on different sectors of the front were also kept.

Briefings for the correspondents were conducted twice daily with G-2, G-3 and G-3 liaison. Corps and Division Public Relations Officers provided some source of information.

Section VI - Censorship

Total submissions for the month of March to field press censors at army level was 6363 for a total wordage of 1,474,569. There were 2013 photographs submitted.

Section VII - Communications

Meskay Radio handled 468,469 words during the month of March with no major breakdown in transmission.

The combined radio and teletype, with the latter handling the bulk of traffic and the former serving as the only means of communications at the end of March with Twelfth United States Army Group, had an outgoing average of 9,000 groups daily, representing approximately forty to fifty messages. The incoming traffic comprised about thirty messages with an average of 3,000 groups daily.

A daily report was made on outgoing traffic and a weekly report was submitted for more accurate checking on figures.

Radio handled several voicecasts which were received satisfactorily during the day.

CHAPTER II
APRIL OPERATIONS

SECTION I - General

During the month, Press Camp operations were set up at BAD HOMBURG (K68) on 3 April, at HERSFELD (H35) on 11 April and at ERLANGEN (031) on 25 April. Powerful moves of Third United States Army troops overran the BUCHENWALD (J47) and ORDRUF (J15) concentration camps and forced crossings of the LAAB and DANUBE Rivers. Enemy resistance appeared at the breaking point before the continued drive of Third United States Army forces.

Sixteen correspondents arrived and twenty six departed during the month. The thirty five correspondents assigned as of 30 April were:

Ball, Edward D.	Associated Press
Bryson, John	Blue Network
Clark, Norman M.	London News Chronicle
Costello, William	British Broadcasting Corporation
Carriven, Osma	New York Times
Davenport, Russell	American Mercury (facility visitor)
Driscoll, J. F.	New York Herald Tribune
Faust, Hal	Chicago Tribune
Griffin, Bulkley S.	Worcester Telegram & Hartford Times
Haasbee, Charles T.	Still Pool (Photographer)
Hamer, Ed L.	National Broadcasting Corporation
Katzander, Howard L.	Yank
Lasmeur, Larry	Columbia Broadcasting System
Haynes, S.J.	Reuters
McCarrell, Lee	Baltimore Sun
Mejat, Francois	Newsreel Pool (Cameraman)
Mitchell, Patrick C.	Stars and Stripes
Newman, Larry	International News Service
Packard, Reynolds	United Press
Priestley, T. A.	Newsreel Pool
Prince, W.J.	London Times
Reid, Robert	British Broadcasting Corporation
Richards, Robert W.	United Press
Rollins, Byron	Still Pool (Photographer)
Ryan, Cornelius J.	London Daily Telegraph
Scherman, David	Still Pool (Photographer)
Sheehan, Joseph Cary	Chicago Tribune (Artist)
Stokes, Richard L.	St. Louis Post Dispatch
Stoneman, William H.	Chicago Daily News
Terrell, John	Newsweek
Tully, Andrew	Boston Traveler
Wiant, Toby	Associated Press
Wilhelm, John H.	Reuters
Williamson, Laurence	London Daily Express

The sixteen arrivals for the month of April were:

Bodin, Paul, Combat, Paris, arrived 18 April for facility visit.
Corbici, Mare, Toulouse Press, arrived 18 April for facility visit.
Davenport, Russell, American Mercury, arrived 29 April for facility visit.
Faust, Hal, Chicago Tribune, arrived 18 April.
Fyfe, George, London Daily Telegraph, arrived 13 April.
Hamer, Ed L., National Broadcasting Corporation, arrived 18 April.
Jordan, Max, National Broadcasting Corporation, arrived 3 April for facility visit.
Katzander, Howard L., Yank, arrived 26 April.
Lasmeur, Larry, Columbia Broadcasting System, arrived 20 April.
Haynes, S.J., Reuters, arrived 6 April.
Mejat, Francois, Newsreel Pool, returned from Paris 8 April.
Penn, David, Office War Information, arrived 4 April.
Shadel, W.F., Columbia Broadcasting System, arrived 1 April.
Small, Wilson C., Saturday Evening Post, arrived 6 April for facility visit.
Stoneman, William H., Chicago Daily News, arrived 29 April.
Terrell, John, Newsweek, arrived 3 April.

The twenty six departures for the month of April were:

Berson, Roger, French Photo Press, 2 April.
Bodin, Paul, Combat, Paris, 30 April.
Corbici, Mare, Toulouse Press, 21 April.
Cannon, James T., Stars and Stripes, 20 April, on leave to Paris.
Deroche, Louis, Agence France Press, 28 April, on leave to Paris.
Ede, Maurice, Combat, 2 April.
Francotte, Robert, Belgian Radio, 2 April.
Fyfe, George, London Daily Telegraph, 21 April.
Hall, John, London Daily Mail, 20 April.
Haas, Pierre, International News Service, 30 April.
Jordan, Max, National Broadcasting Corporation, 18 April.
Kerr, McPee, Reuters, 9 April.
Lake, Austen, Boston American, 24 April.
Levitt, Saul, Yank, 30 April.
Meyer, Robert, United Press, 1 April.
Olson, Sidney, Life and Time, 3 April.
Phillipot, Jacques, Belgian Radio, 5 April.
Penn, David, Office of War Information, 26 April.
[illegible], Columbia Broadcasting System, 20 April.
[illegible] Post, 24 April.
[illegible] April.
[illegible], 21 April.
[illegible], 20 April.

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Gerner, Oscar A., Associated Press, 15 April.
White, G.L., Melbourne Herald, 18 April.
White, Samuel, Consolidated Australian Press, 25 April.

There were 4830 items logged at the Press Camp during April as against 5581 for the month of March. Those were dispatched via Mackay Radio, Army Communications and Air Dispatch Letter Service to the following table:

Mackay	4457
Army Communications	149
ADLS	224
	4830

The estimated wordage for the month of April was 608,560 as against 526,695 for the month of March.

Section II - Press

A total of 4143 items, including 134 photos, were received from thirty seven organizations in Third United States Army and forwarded to Press Section, PRC, Headquarters, Communications Zone (Forward) European Theater Operations United States Army, for release and distribution after clearance, during April. This total is broken down as follows:

Awards & Cit	2666
Gen Interest	748
Promotions	396
Photos	134
Total	4143

Units submitting material included 2d Cav Gp, III Corps, 4th Armd Div, 5th Inf Div, 6th Armd Div, VIII Corps, 9th TC Gp, 11th Armd Div, 13th Armd Div, XII Corps, XX Corps, 26th Inf Div, 33d Med Depot Co, 65th Inf Div, 70th Inf Div, 71st Inf Div, 76th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 84th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 89th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 93d Sig Bn, 94th Inf Div, 94th Med Clr Bn, 97th Inf Div, 99th Inf Div, 115th AAA Bn, 133d Engr Bn, 183d Engr Bn, 233 FA Bn, 590th AAA Bn, 736th FA Bn, 811th TD Bn, 974th FA Bn, 1123d Engr Gp, 1303d Engr Serv Regt.

The Public Relations Section this Headquarters submitted 28 items which all originated from this Headquarters.

The April total of 4143 showed a decrease of 2103 over the March total of 6246. Total number of items forwarded after clearance at this Headquarters during the nine months of Third United States Army operations on the Continent was 50285. Grand total of all items cleared and forwarded during the pre-operational and operational periods to date was 50443.

In addition to forwarding items, both news and photos, to Public Relations Officer, Communications Zone (Forward) for release, duplicate items of general interest as well as human interest stories, were forwarded to Editor, "Stars and Stripes," and Editor, "Yank." All material was made available to war correspondents.

Section III - Radio

Radio operations for the month of April included four Army Hour recordings, fifteen Combat Diary recordings, and fifteen recordings for "hometown" releases. The Section assisted Third United States Army radio correspondents with sixteen recordings.

The Section also assisted Blue Network, PHILADELPHIA and DES MOINES radio correspondents with on the spot recordings by supplying required gear in the field.

Section IV - Pictorial

Two still and one newsreel photographer were assigned to Third United States Army's Press Camp and were assisted in their work by the Pictorial Officer. Close liaison was maintained with Army Pictorial Service.

Section V - Information Room

During April, the Information Section continued the regular schedule of two briefings daily for the war correspondents and maintained both the 1:100,000 and 1:250,000 scale maps.

The 1:100,000 scale was maintained as the operational map of the Third United States Army front while the 1:250,000 scale map represented the overall picture of the Western Front.

With the meeting of the Americans and Russians fast approaching, distances between the two units were kept at all times. In addition, general news from the other world battle fronts was given at the briefings for the war correspondents' information.

Section VI - Censorship

Total submissions for the month of April to field press censors at army level was 4591 for a total wordage of 1,119,395. There were 1636 photographs submitted.

Section VII - Communications

There were no major breakdowns in transmission during April during which time Mackay Radio handled 608,560 words.

The combined radio and teletype had an outgoing average of 3000 groups daily, representing approximately twenty to twenty five messages. Physical wire seems presented difficulties this past month. Urgent, operational priority and priority messages were given preference at all times.

Weekly reports were submitted for more accurate checking on outgoing traffic and several welcomests were handled satisfactorily.

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - General

Press Camp Operations moved to [redacted] (U15) on 2 May and was at that location when Victory in Europe day was announced. Although officially the war was brought to a successful conclusion on 8 May, action continued on the Third United States Army sector as isolated groups of the enemy continued to resist in [redacted]. The Third United States Army remained as the last army to see action on the Western Front. It was estimated that since operations began 1 August 1944, Third United States Army would account for a million prisoners in their sweep through [redacted] and [redacted] and smashing offensives across [redacted].

Up to and including 8 May, a total of three correspondents arrived and five departed. The thirty three correspondents assigned as of 8 May were:

Ball, Edward D.	Associated Press
Bost, Jacques	Paris Jour soir
Bryson, John	Blue Network
Clark, Norman H.	London News Chronicle
Costello, William	British Broadcasting Corporation
Cunliffe, Gene	New York Times
Deroche, Louis	Agence France Presse
Driscoll, J. F.	New York Herald Tribune
Fowle, Val	Chicago Tribune
Griffin, Bulkley S.	Worcester Telegram & Hartford Times
Hamaker, Charles T.	Still Pool Photographer
Hamer, Ed L.	National Broadcasting Corporation
Kaltenborn, Edward L.	Yank
Lasseur, Larry	Columbia Broadcasting System
Haynes, J.	Reuters
McDaniell, Lee	Baltimore Sun
Mitchell, Patrick C.	Stars and Stripes
Newman, Larry	International News Service
Packard, Reynolds	United Press
Penn, David	Office War Information
Priestley, Thomas A.	Newsreel Pool Cameraman
Prince, H. J.	The London Times
Relf, Robert	British Broadcasting Corporation
Richards, Robert W.	United Press
Robbins, Byron E.	Still Pool Photographer
Ryan, Cornelius	London Daily Telegraph
Scherman, David	Still Pool Photographer
Sheahan, Joseph D.	Chicago Tribune (Artist)
Stoneman, William H.	Chicago Daily News
Terrell, John	Newsweek
Want, Toby	Associated Press
Wilhelm, John	Chicago Sun
Wilkinson, Laurence	London Daily Express

The three arrivals including 8 May were:

Bost, Jacques, Paris Combat, 2 May for 21 day facility visit.
Deroche, Louis, Agence France Press, 2 May from Paris.
Penn, David, Office War Information, 2 May from Paris.

The five departures including 8 May were:

Coffey, Pat, Yank Photographer, 2 May for Paris.
Davenport, Russell, American Mercury, 7 May.
Vejat, Francois, Newsreel Pool, 2 May for Paris on leave.
Stokes, Richard L., St. Louis Post Dispatch, 2 May for Paris.
Tully, Andrew, Boston Traveler, 4 May for Paris

There were 1101 items logged at the Press Camp up to and including 8 May. These were dispatched via Mackay Radio, Army Communications and Air Dispatch Letter Service to the following table.

Mackay	1052
Army Communications	8
ADLS	41
	1101

The estimated wordage for the eight days of operation in May was 104,262.

An overall total of 27,909 items were logged at the Press Camp since Third United States Army operations began 1 August 1944 up to and including 8 May 1945 with the following log table showing the disposition.

Mackay	23184
Army Communications	3146
ADLS	1579
	27909

An estimated wordage for the entire Third United States Army campaign was 1,600,506.

Section II - Press

A total of 2212 items, including 107 photos, were received from twenty three organizations in Third United States Army and forwarded to Press Section, PRC, Headquarters, Communications Zone (Forward) European Theater Operations United States Army, for clearance and distribution up to and including 8 May. This total is broken down as follows:

Awards & Cit	1623
Promotions	207
Gen Interest	275
Photos	107
	2212

Units submitting material included III Corps, 2d Cav Gp, 4th Armd Div, V Corps, 5th Inf Div, 9th TC Gp, 10th Armd Div, 11th Armd Div, XII Corps, 13th Armd Div, 14th Armd Div, 16th Armd Div, XX Corps, 26th Inf Div, 66th Inf Div, 70th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 86th Inf Div, 95th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 97th Inf Div and 99th Inf Div.

The Public Relations Section this Headquarters submitted thirty five items which all originated this Headquarters.

The abbreviated May total of 2212 submissions boosted the total number of items for the ten month and 8 days of Third United States Army operations to 52,067. Grand total of all items cleared and forwarded during the pre-operational and operational periods to date was 52,674.

In addition to forwarding items, both news and photos, to Public Relations Officer, Communications Zone (Forward) for release, duplicate of general interest as well as human interest stories, were forwarded to Editor, "Stars and Stripes," and Editor, "Yank." All material was made available to war correspondents.

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Section III - Radio

In addition to several recorded programs for the "Army Hour" and "Combat Diary" this Section made plans for facilitating radio coverage of Victory in Europe Day activity on the Third United States Army front.

Wire recording apparatus was installed at the Mackay Radio transmitter for relaying recorded programs to New York. For relaying recorded material to the British Broadcasting Corporation in London, special apparatus was installed in the Army communications transmitter (SCR). Special Victory in Europe Day recordings by both American network correspondents and the British Broadcasting Corporation correspondent, were received both in New York and in London in a matter of minutes after they were made in the field.

Two "Army Hour" recordings, seven "Combat Diary" recordings and a Victory in Europe Day message by General G. S. Patton, Jr., were all made with wire recorders.

Section IV - Pictorial

Two still and one newsreel photographer were assigned to Third United States Army's Press Camp and were assisted in their work by the Pictorial Officer. Close liaison was maintained with Army Pictorial Service.

Section V - Information Room

The Information Section continued the regular schedule of two briefings daily for the war correspondents and maintained both the 1:100,000 and 1:250,000 scale maps up to and including 8 May.

The 1:100,000 scale map was maintained as the operational map of the Third United States Army front while the 1:250,000 scale map represented the overall picture of the Western Front.

In addition, general news from the other world battle fronts was given at the briefings for the war correspondents' information.

Section VI - Censorship

Total submissions for the 8 days of operations in May was 1320, as handled by the field press censors at army level. The total wordage was 289,052 with 325 photographs submitted.

It was estimated that in the entire Third United States Army campaign since operations began 1 August 1944 until its termination 8 May 1945, press censors handled 30,325 submissions, 7129 photographs, and totaled an estimated 7,010,603 words.

Section VII - Communications

The combined radio and teletype had an outgoing average of approximately 1500 groups daily which represents 15 messages for the period 1st May to 8 May inclusive. Incoming traffic ranged from 20 to 25 messages with a varying groupage of approximately 2000 to 2500 daily for the same period.

The weekly report provided more accurate checking and included the number of voicecasts. Teletype facilities were limited.

Since Third United States Army operations began on 1 August 1944 until its elimination on 8 May 1945, it is estimated that the outgoing groups totaled 1,250,000 while the incoming groups totaled 500,000.

CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

Ten months in the field have demonstrated that the Public Relations organization as set up in the Third United States Army is adequate for the handling of approximately forty (40) correspondents and can handle as many as fifty. This organization has proven sufficient to provide billets, transportation, mess, briefing, censorship and communications.

Field experience has demonstrated that the Press Camp must operate near the advance elements of the Army Headquarters, and therefore must be highly mobile. This is especially true of communications equipment which must be able to make moves up to 150 miles and be in operation the same day.

COMMUNICATIONS: The most effective means of communications has been the Mackay commercial transmitter operating directly from the Army to New York from which point news could be rapidly distributed. This transmitter also adequately handled voice transmission for the major American networks.

Teletype has been used with varying success. When it was in operation copy could be moved to both Paris and London in sufficient quantities for the Allied correspondents assigned here. The major difficulty encountered was in securing a circuit for the handling of press traffic only. When it was necessary to use tactical circuits it was found that operational traffic seriously delayed press copy so that much of it was received too late to be used by newspapers.

Except for a brief period in Northern France the SCR-399 has been adequate for voice or CW communications. The difficulties in voice transmission were due to the fact that no adequate frequency could be made available and the low power of the set proved inadequate as the distance lengthened. CW transmission, in general, got through but because no high speed transmitter could be procured it proved to be inadequate for the handling of press copy.

BRIEFINGS AND NEWS DISSEMINATION: The crux of the whole Public Relations operation has been the briefing given twice daily. Although correspondents secured their color and some operational stories at the front they were dependent upon the briefings for the overall operational picture of the Army. Although the briefings were always factual and periodically accurate, operations of the Army could be presented on that stress was placed upon the items of news interest which the Army was most anxious to convey to the public. Experience has demonstrated that the briefing officer must have complete access to all information available to G-2 and G-3, and he must secure this information promptly. The fact that this information was always available from these two sections made possible a complete and detailed presentation of Third United States Army's operations.

Briefing on forthcoming operations has always been a difficult problem. The policy in general has been to tell the correspondents of forthcoming operations at the latest possible moment, but sufficiently in advance of the operation to permit the correspondents to make their own arrangements for coverage. There has never been a security violation in the handling of any of this information. It is felt that apprising the correspondents of forthcoming operations obviates dangerous speculation on their part and at the same time makes it possible for intelligent coverage.

It is vitally important that the Public Relations Section be advised immediately of any piece of information which the Army desires to withhold from publication either temporarily or permanently. Without this specific advice the Public Relations Section may authorize the publication of what appears to be a routine item of news interest without realizing some larger implication with which the Section may not be familiar.

CENSORSHIP: The desirability of withholding information regarding operational units until the enemy was believed to have that knowledge is best determined at army level. The primary responsibility for censorship should be an army function and the field press censors should be under control of the Army Commander rather than higher headquarters.

CORPS AND DIVISION PUBLIC RELATIONS: It has been amply demonstrated that Corps and Division Headquarters have need for a Public Relations organization. Although there is no Table of Organization provision for such personnel, every such unit has had to provide a Public Relations Section by taking grades and ratings from other sources. Without the material supplied by Corps and Division Public Relations Officers the coverage which the Third United States Army was given in the world press could not have been accomplished. Within Corps and Divisions it was noticeable during operations that favorable publicity had good effect on the morale of the troops while unfavorable publicity had the reverse effect. It is strongly recommended that a revised Table of Organization for Corps Headquarters and Infantry and Armored Divisions should make provisions for a Public Relations Section.

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

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Quartermaster
APO 403

QM 314.7 - GNMCQ-6

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal.

TO : Commanding General, Third U. S. Army, APO 403, U. S. Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Quartermaster Section, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, beginning with the planning phase for the operation, covering the period from 23 March to 6 July, and continuing at designated intervals by chapters.

2. This report is general in character. The chapters were written periodically as the operation progressed, under the stress of campaign conditions. Each chapter was intended to be complete for the period covered. Repetition and to some extent contradictions were unavoidable. The campaign was characterized by rapid advances, long distances, and frequent and sudden changes. Space and the stress of circumstances did not permit a more detailed account of the methods and improvisations employed. The undersigned desires to express his appreciation of the generous support given by the Communications Zone; and by the officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men of his own section, without which the mission could not have been accomplished.

E. BUSCH,
Colonel, QMC,
Quartermaster.

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QUARTERMASTER SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



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SECTION VIII..... QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION
SECTION IX..... FIELD SERVICE SECTION
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CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Quartermaster Section began operating in the United Kingdom on 23 March. Initially, efforts were devoted to studying the conditions of supply in the United Kingdom in relation to the equipping of troops.

The Quartermaster supply system (except for Class III supplies) in the United Kingdom was controlled and operated by the Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, through Base Section Quartermasters. Gasoline was normally delivered in bulk to commercial tanks and pumps, which were secured from British sources and operated by using units. Other Class III products - namely, oil and lubricants - were distributed in packaged form. Quartermaster supply plans for units while they were still in the United Kingdom were set forth in Quartermaster Annexes to two administrative orders: Administrative Order Number 1, published on 15 April; and Administrative Order Number 2, which applied only to the 2d French Armored Division, published on 24 May. These plans served to coordinate the supply of units assigned and attached to the Third U. S. Army.

Concurrently, plans were being developed for preparing units for embarkation. Work was begun on 28 March on the Quartermaster Annex to "Administrative Instructions Preliminary to Mounting" (Alert Instructions). The draft was completed on 15 April and the annex was published under the date 26 April. This set of instructions furnished complete information to troop commanders concerning the special equipping of their units prior to embarking for the far shore. Separate instructions were prepared for the 2d French Armored Division. The Quartermaster Annex to "Administrative Instructions Preliminary to Mounting for the 2d French Armored Division" was published on 16 June.

The chief task of the Section was planning for the coming operation. From the beginning, considerable effort was devoted to the study of plans and directives of higher headquarters for the operation "Overlord". Data were assembled and tabulated for use as the bases for the planning work. Continual liaison and coordination with higher headquarters and other staff sections were required before the final plan evolved. The Quartermaster supply plan for Continental operations was begun on 16 April, completed on 10 May, and published on 15 May as Annex Number 15 to "Third U. S. Army Outline Plan, Operation 'Overlord'". The Quartermaster plan defined the responsibility of the Army Quartermaster and acquainted Quartermasters and supply officers of lower echelons with the special conditions pertaining to supply in the projected Continental operation.

The Office of the Army Quartermaster had the following divisions:

Army Quartermaster
Executive Officer
Administrative Division
Supply Division
Graves Registration Division
Field Service Division

For security control, because of the high classification of the plans, a small planning and liaison group was organized, consisting of one officer, one warrant officer, and three enlisted men. This group worked directly under the supervision of the Army Quartermaster and the Executive Officer.

Preparations for the movement of the Headquarters to the Continent were made during the latter part of June. The Section was divided into four groups for the movement:

	OFFICERS	WARRANT OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	ARRIVED ON CONTINENT
Advance Group	4	0	3	26 June
"X" Group	8	1	23	4 July
"Y" Group	3	0	16	18 July
"Z" Group	3	2	4	18/26 August

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

The Administrative Division performed its normal tasks during this period.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

The Supply Division performed three major functions during the period spent in the United Kingdom. First, it assisted in writing the plans for Continental operations. Secondly, it prepared pre-scheduled requisitions for supplies to be shipped to the Continent for the Third U. S. Army. These requisitions for supplies were broken down by days from D / 24 through D / 41 in accordance with tonnage allocations from higher headquarters. Contact was maintained with the Services of Supply to ascertain the status of shipments. And, finally, it performed the necessary work incident to equipping troop units prior to their departure for the Continent.

SECTION [illegible]

[illegible] the supply of troops in the [illegible] by the Services of Supply [illegible] activities were confined to drafting plans, preparing pre-scheduled requisitions, and standardizing procedures.

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SECTION V - CLASS II AND IV SECTION

The equipping of troops then stationed in the United Kingdom was the major function performed by the Class II and IV Section.

During the period 1 to 27 June, a group of officers and men of the 350th Quartermaster Depot Company, Supply, operated with the section for the purpose of standardizing depot procedure. This proved to be a valuable preauditory measure.

SECTION VI - CLASS III SECTION

The Class III Section was not active in supplying troops in the United Kingdom. Its operations were confined to drafting plans, calculating Class III requirements, and preparing pre-scheduled requisitions.

The commanders of all gasoline supply companies then assigned to the Army were briefed and procedures were outlined to them.

SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

The Graves Registration Division was organized on 15 April. The decision to create a separate division to handle Graves registration matters resulted from a study of the reports from other theaters, particularly North Africa and Sicily.

The basic procedure governing all matters connected with burials, cemeteries, and registration of graves was written by the Division in cooperation with the G-1 Section. This directive was published on 25 May as Third U. S. Army Circular Number 9.

Two graves registration companies (the 603d and 824d), were assigned to the Army on 15 May. Not organizations lacked experience. The personnel was sent to the Cambridge Military Cemetery on a plan to gain practical experience until moved to the Marshalling Area. The companies were furnished with extra equipment, such as shovels, picks, grave markers, rubber gloves, and embossing machines, prior to departure from the United Kingdom.

SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

The initial problem of the Quartermaster Troop Section consisted of compiling a list of Quartermaster service troops estimated as necessary to support the operation as it was planned at that time. Although the original list was finalized 31 March, a final settlement was not made until 24 June. All units then in the United Kingdom were, with few exceptions, processed by the Services of Supply and employed in the operation of depots and other services of supply establishments. Many units had arrived from the United States at the time the Army Headquarters embarked for the Continent. Such units as were assigned were inspected and every effort was made to prepare them for the coming operation. All units were placed under battalion and group supervision.

The following is a list of Quartermaster units with the estimated number required, the number assigned by 5 June, and the final number authorized:

	ESTIMATE REQUIREMENT	UNITS ASSIGNED AS OF 5 JUNE	FINAL NO. OF UNITS
Hq & Hq Det, QM Group	6	1	3
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	-	1	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	14	4	4
QM Depot Company, Supply	-	3	2
QM Gasoline Supply Company	16	7	11
QM Graves Registration Company	5	2	4
QM Laundry Company	8	2	5
QM Railhead Company	8	4	7
QM Salvage Collecting Company	5	1	3
QM Service Company	36	19	19
QM Bakery Company, Special	6	2	7
QM Salvage Repair Company	4	1	3
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	5	0	2
QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile	2	0	1
QM Sales Company	2	0	0
QM Base Petroleum Supply Company	8	0	0
QM Petroleum Products Laboratory (Mobile Section)	1	1	1

SECTION IX - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

The Field Service Section was charged with all operations connected with salvage collecting, salvage repair, field range repair, laundering, and petroleum testing. It also had control of captured supplies and operated the Labor Pool. Its duties in the United Kingdom were confined to preparing the assigned technical units for the coming operation.

Field range repair was provided for by scheduling a small group of men selected from the Fifth Quartermaster Service Company. They were provided with tools, equipment, and spare parts prior to going to the Continent. The services performed by these men proved to be extremely satisfactory.

SECTION X - SALVAGE SECTION

The Salvage Section was not operational during the period covered by this chapter. Plans for salvage activities on the Continent were formulated.



CHAPTER 2
PRE OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Quartermaster Section arrived on the Continent in four groups: the Advance Group, on 2d June; the "A" Group, on 6 July; the "B" Group, on 18 July; and the "C" Group, on 1A and 2A August.

This chapter covers the period from 6 July, when the "A" Group arrived, to 011200 B August, when the Third U. S. Army became operational. The first few days were limited to becoming acquainted with the supply situation on the Continent. Thereafter operations were devoted to establishing Quartermaster service for Third U. S. Army troops being concentrated in the north-central part of the CHERBOURG Peninsula.

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

The Administrative Division, in addition to performing its normal functions, made preparations for submitting the required operational reports to higher headquarters.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

Supplies on the Continent were all under the control of the First U. S. Army. A rear boundary had not been established. Since a major port had not been opened, supplies requested on pre-scheduled requisitions had not been shipped to the Third U. S. Army, but sufficient Quartermaster supplies were available in the beach dumps. The advance Section Communications Zone was operational only during the last third of July. Initially, all supplies for the Third U. S. Army units on the Continent were drawn from First U. S. Army supply points and beach dumps. The Advance Section Communications Zone was given control over the supplies at "UTAH" Beach during the latter part of July, after which time this agency furnished supplies to the Third U. S. Army.

SECTION IV - CLASS I SECTION

Food supplies for Third U. S. Army units were furnished direct from First U. S. Army Supply Point Number 2, in the vicinity of ST JACQUES DE NEHOU (T12-988), until 16 July. This supply point was turned over to the Third U. S. Army for operation on 16 July and redesignated Class I Supply Point Number 1. Two additional points were opened, Number 2 on 23 July, also in the vicinity of ST JACQUES DE NEHOU (T14-953), and Number 3 on 27 July, in the vicinity of HAUTEVILLE. (T09-2100).

Bakery operations began at Supply Point Number 1 on 21 July. The first wheat of six loaves of bread was delivered by the Commanding Officer, 3007th Quartermaster Bakery Company, to the Army Commander.

During the period 1 to 31 July a reserve of 1,500,000 operational rations was accumulated in the supply points in preparation for the impending operations. The Army Commander inspected Supply Point Number 1, including the bakery, on 28 July and commended the operating units for their efficiency.

SECTION V - CLASS II AND IV SECTION

Class II and IV Depot Number 1 was opened for the supply of troops in the vicinity of ST JACQUES DE NEHOU (T14-948) at 171200 B July. This depot not only made issues to troop units, but operated a sales store for sales to officers, warrant officers, and nurses. Class II and IV reserves to the extent of approximately a fifteen-day supply were built up prior to 31 July.

SECTION VI - CLASS III SECTION

Class III supplies for Third U. S. Army units were furnished from a First U. S. Army supply point in the vicinity of ST JACQUES DE NEHOU (T12-988) through 14 July. This installation was taken over by the Third U. S. Army on 15 July and redesignated as Class III Supply Point Number 1.

A reserve stock of 1,500,000 gallons of gasoline, together with a suitable stock of diesel and balanced oils and greases, was transported from "UTAH" Beach and stored in Supply Point Number 1 and other points in the vicinity of ST JACQUES DE NEHOU (T19) and LA HAYE DU PUITS (T18).

The pipe line from CHERBOURG (O12) to LA HAYE DU PUITS (T18) was rushed to completion and began discharging at the latter place on 30 July. This was most fortunate and timely.

SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

The personnel of the Graves Registration Division gained valuable experience during this period from frequent visits to collecting points and cemeteries of the First U. S. Army. No cemeteries were in operation by the Third U. S. Army.

Two graves registration units had arrived on the Continent, the 824d Quartermaster Graves Registration Company (less one platoon) and the 603d Quartermaster Graves Registration Company. The former was attached to the VIII Corps and the latter to the XV Corps. Both units were placed at First U. S. Army cemeteries to gain experience.

SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

A division area for arriving Quartermaster units was selected in the vicinity of ST JACQUES DE NEHOU (T14). A beach party of one officer and one enlisted man was established to receive incoming Quartermaster units at the beach. As the units arrived they were met at the beach, conducted to the bivouac area, and placed under group and battalion control.

The following Quartermaster units were available when the Third U. S. Army became operational at 011200 B August:

Hq & Hq Det, QM Group	1
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	3
QM Service Company	10
QM Railhead Company	4
QM Gasoline Supply Company	7
QM Depot Company, Supply	1
QM Salvage Collecting Company	2
QM Salvage Repair Company (Loaned by ASCZ)	2
QM Bakery Company (Are Loaned by ASCZ)	3
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	1
QM Graves Registration Company	2 (Less one Platoon)
QM Laundry Company	2

SECTION IX - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

The specialized units, such as fumigation and bath, bakery, salvage

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collecting, and salvage repair companies, were put to work upon arrival. Laundry units were attached to each Army hospital and to the medical depot. The graves registration companies were turned over to the Graves Registration Division; railhead companies, to the Class I Section; and gasoline supply companies, to the Class III Section.

SECTION X - SALVAGE SECTION

Salvage operations were initiated on 19 July in an area adjacent to Class II and IV Depot Number 1. The salvage point was operated by the following units: one salvage collecting company and one section each from a fumigation and bath company, a laundry company, and a salvage repair company. The last-named unit was loaned by the Advance Section Communications Zone. Unrepairable articles were evacuated to the salvage dump at "UTAH" Beach. Everything that could be saved was fumigated, laundered, and, if necessary, repaired, and placed in stock at the depot for release. This set-up was so effective that the decision was made to continue it during the coming operations.

Field range repairs were initiated at Class II and IV Depot Number 1 on 19 July. The repair section was comprised of a selected group from the 3434th Quartermaster Service Company. They had received special schooling before leaving the United Kingdom. Tools and spare parts had been shipped to the Continent with the organization. This small group repaired and returned to troop units approximately 500 separate pieces of equipment before 1 August.



AIRPLANE DELIVERING [illegible] SUPPLIES IN CONTAINERS

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Third U. S. Army became operational at ST JACQUES DE NEHOU, in Normandy (T19), at 011200 B August.

The Army Headquarters occupied the following successive locations during the month of August:

PLACE (Vicinity)	DATES	DISTANCE OF MOVE (Miles)
ST JACQUES DE NEHOU (T19)	(6 July) - 1 August	
BEAUCHAMPS (T23)	1 - 8 August	45
ST JAMES (T39)	8 - 12 August	40
LAVAL (T64)	12 - 14 August	35
LE MANS (T34)	14 - 20 August	64
BROU (W18)	20 - 25 August	60
PITHIVIERS (W95)	25 - 30 August	68
THORIGNY (X87)	30 August - 4 September	67
	TOTAL	379

The Quartermaster Section, initially, was split between the forward and rear echelons. This arrangement was discontinued 13 August. The problems incident to a fast-moving situation required the presence of the greater part of the Section with the forward echelon. Two officers of the Supply Division, augmented by officers from a battalion headquarters, remained in the rear areas to control the movement of supplies to the forward supply points. Other officers were secured to guide convoys to these frequently changed forward points.

The problem of getting essential combat supplies, in sufficient quantities and at the proper times, to the forward elements became increasingly complicated and difficult as the advance continued. After the fall of AVRANCHES (T21), the VIII Corps moved westward through the Brittany Peninsula. The remainder of the force, which before the end of August included the IV, XX, and XII Corps, moved southeast and east in the direction of CHARTRES (R30). This situation required that separate supply arrangements be made for the two forces which were moving in opposite directions.

It was clearly established, in the early days of the operation, that the conventional methods of supply prescribed by the field manuals had but little application to the immediate problem. There were very few expedients that were not employed. The problem was met through the combined efforts of the Advance Section Communications Zone, the Army, and the forward elements working together as a team.

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

The Administrative Division performed its normal duties during this period.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

The plan of supply required that daily telegrams be submitted for Class I and Class III supplies forty-eight hours in advance. Initially, the telegrams were sent by liaison officer direct to the Advance Section Communications Zone; later the 24th Regulating Station assumed this function.

The delivery of supplies was to be accomplished by the Advance Section Communications Zone direct to designated supply points within the Army area. This plan required modification from time to time, because of the constantly increasing distances and lack of adequate transportation facilities. A large portion of the supplies was delivered by the Advance Section Communications Zone to "base" supply points and advance depots, from which Army trucks made distribution to supply points in the rear of corps.

Army supply points were maintained generally on the basis of one Class I and one Class III point per corps, and one or more for Army troops in the rear part of the Army area. Corps and Army troops obtained their supplies from the nearest supply point. It was not possible, under the strained conditions, to keep supply points as close to the troops as is prescribed in the field manuals or in the numbers recommended by them. Annex Number 1 indicates the locations, designations, and times of opening and closing of supply points for the period 1 to 31 August.

The VIII Corps having moved westward through the Brittany Peninsula, a separate supply plan was required. During the initial stages, supplies were delivered direct to the Army supply points in the rear of the corps. It was arranged on 10 August that all supplies for the VIII Corps would be delivered by Advance Section Communications Zone to Army Supply Point Number 12, in the vicinity of DOL (W90). The Corps was to arrange for distribution from that point to the forward elements in the vicinity of LORIENT (G72), VANNES (H16), REDON (T05), and BREST (T99). This arrangement continued until the Brittany Base Section opened at REDON at 211200 B August. The Base Section then became the medium of supply for the VIII Corps. Responsibility for supply remained with Army. The Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 5434 Quartermaster Group, was sent to the BREST area to represent the Army Quartermaster. Separate daily telegrams were initiated by the Group Commander on 18 August. The supply problem was considerably alleviated when landing craft began unloading across the beaches in the vicinity of MERLATI (R41) about 20 August. Train service was established a few days later. The supply of this Corps was successfully accomplished.

The eastern force, consisting of the XV, XX, and XII Corps and the greater portion of Army troops, was supplied principally by truck train and, to a lesser degree, by railway and airplane. The following paragraphs give, in general, the successive steps in supplying the eastern force.

Westward of LAVAL (T64), Advance Section Communications Zone truck trains delivered Class I and Class III supplies direct to Army supply points. Army trucks supplemented these shipments by hauling supplies from the Army reserve stocks in the vicinity of ST JACQUES DE NEHOU (T19) and from the pipe-line terminus at LA HAYE DU PUITS (T18).

Advance Section Communications Zone opened Quartermaster Depot Number 15, near LAVAL (T64), on 13 August. The greater portion of Class I and Class III supplies was delivered to this depot. Army transportation delivered the supplies to forward points, approximately seventy miles eastward.

Advance Section Communications Zone opened Quartermaster Depot Number 120, in the vicinity of LE MANS (V46), on 20 August. No change was made in the method of distribution to forward supply points.

Advance Section Communications Zone opened Quartermaster Depot Number 120, in the vicinity of ARLIS (R60), on 24 August. The previous distribution arrangements were continued.

Airplane deliveries commenced on 18 August to LE MANS (V46) and continued for several days. Deliveries were restricted to gasoline.

Airplane deliveries were initiated to the MEUCY (W95) airstrip, ten miles north of ORLEANS (P62), on 27 August and continued for three days. Approximately 100,000 gallons of gasoline and 200 tons of rations were received at this location.

Railway deliveries began at LE MANS (V46) on 17 August, at MEUCY (W17) on 23 August, and at CHARTRES (R30) on 25 August. The service was irregular because of track conditions; however, a very considerable quantity of supplies was received.



SUPPLY FOR VIII CORPS, BEING DELIVERED ACROSS BEACHES AT MERLATI

Army reserve stocks, consisting of 1,500,000 rations and 1,500,000 gallons of gasoline, had been accumulated in the vicinity of ST JACQUES DE NEHOU (T19) and LA HAYE DU PUITS (T18) prior to 1 August. Because of short shipments from Advance Section Communications Zone, these reserves had to be drawn upon from the very beginning of the advance. The Class III reserves were depleted on 7 August; for the remainder of the month, supply was on an uncertain basis. Receipts were somewhat erratic and there were many anxious moments.

SECTION IV - CLASS I SECTION

Food and other Class I supplies were issued in sufficient quantities throughout the month of August. A critical period developed between 10 and 12 August, when shipments to the Army were short approximately 350,000 rations. The difference was made up by exhausting the reminder of the Army reserve and a portion of the unit reserves held by troops. During the remainder of the month the daily average deliveries to the Army were sufficient for maintenance and for reconstituting unit reserves. The Army reserve, however, remained in a precarious condition.

The following types and quantities of rations were issued:

"B" ration	None
10 in 1 ration	51.0%
"C" ration	23.5%
"K" ration	25.0%
5 in 1 ration	0.5%
	100.0%
"D" ration (Additional)	6.7%

Average daily issues for same period:

Army Troops (Average strength, 1,000,000 troops, less VIII Corps)	212,745
Actual daily issues	225,346
Difference	12,601

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The over-issues can be explained by, straggling prisoners of war, casuals in the army area, and issues to replacement depots.

Gratuitous issues of emergency rations were issued on a weekly basis. Eight issues were available in some instances, because of transportation limitations.

Bakeries operated continuously during the month, with the exception of one or two days when the supply of flour was exhausted. Each Class I supply point was furnished a bakery company. This proved to be a highly successful arrangement. Fresh bread was supplied to all troops and did much to relieve the monotony of the operational-type ration, particularly the C-ration, which was issued regularly.

Refrigerated supplies were initiated on 4 August when the 148th Quartermaster Refrigeration Company, Mobile, began operating under the Class I section. This company performed an important service in an outstanding manner. Until its arrival, only white milk stores became available in the Class I depots. The source of supply was [illegible] dairies. Deliveries to troops were made at the Class I supply points.

Captured stores of frozen meats and vegetables, amounting to 150 tons, were reported on 31 August in the vicinity of St Malo (V15). The enemy had left [illegible] the refrigeration machinery. The Class I officer immediately dispatched a sufficient number of refrigerator vans to secure the supplies. They were evacuated and issued to front-line troops. Thirteen carloads of potatoes, consigned to points in Germany, were captured in the vicinity of St Malo (V15), on 31 August and issued to troops of the VIII Corps.

Fresh eggs and onions were issued to troops on several occasions. Priority was given to hospitals.

SECTION V - CLOTHING AND EQUIPAGE

A shortage of clothing and equipment developed during the month of August. The advance of the Army was so rapid that depots could not be kept within close supporting distance of the troops. Transportation was not available, because of the necessity for hauling rations and gasoline.

Maximum use was made of salvage material, a considerable quantity of which was renovated and reissued.

Army Quartermaster Depot Number [illegible], operated by the 298th Quartermaster Depot Company, initially was [illegible] in operation at [illegible] (V82), until 31 August. This depot issued approximately 90% of supplies from 1 August until it closed.

Army Quartermaster Depot Number [illegible] operated by the 298th Quartermaster Depot Company, Army, operated at [illegible] (V74), [illegible] northwest of [illegible], until it closed 8 August. A fire started by the explosion of [illegible] were issued, eighty per cent of which were reconditioned salvage materials.

Army Quartermaster Depot Number [illegible] operated by the 298th Quartermaster Depot Company, Army, opened [illegible] at the junction of highways [illegible] and remained open until 8 August. The issues from this depot included a considerable quantity of salvaged material, consisting of [illegible] at blankets, salvaged cots, water cans, toilet paper, and grit soap.

SECTION VI - [illegible]

It was learned, finally, that the [illegible] stations of gasoline in reserve would be used for emergency use. Requirements from the beach kept against heavy telegram requests were short of requirements. It was necessary, sometimes, to start drawing the reserve at [illegible] and this supply was exhausted on 31 August. Daily issues during this period were [illegible] than [illegible] anticipated. Supply of Class III, of both fuel and engine oils, was adequate to meet all requirements. The shortage was in the [illegible] of the Army's tactical units. The shortage was in the [illegible] of the Army's tactical units. The shortage was in the [illegible] of the Army's tactical units



CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

Headquarters Third U. S. Army, on 1 September, was located in the vicinity of THEMERY (Z87), approximately ten miles northeast of SENS (Z69). The Headquarters occupied the following successive locations during the month of September:

PLACE (Vicinity)	DATES	DISTANCE OF MOVE (Miles)
THEMERY (Z87)	(30 August) - 4 September	
CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T54)	4 - 15 September	85
STAIN (U47)	15 - 30 September	63
	TOTAL	148

The Army, on 1 September, was far ahead of schedule. It had advanced so far from its base of supplies that any failure to satisfy the daily telegram requests, obviously, would have a serious effect. It had not been possible to accumulate Army reserves, nor had the Communications Zone been able to establish intermediate depots.

Critical periods in the supply situation affected the Army as a whole. First, the gasoline supply was so critical through 1 to 4 September that the Army, for all practical purposes, was immobilized. Secondly, ration receipts were short of daily telegram requests during 8 to 13 September, necessitating the reduction of unit reserves. Captured stocks were utilized to the extent available to make up deficiencies. Thirdly, gasoline again became short on 20 September and a system of rationing was inaugurated. Tonnage allocations, which were controlled by higher headquarters, were sufficient only for maintenance and operations on a reduced scale.

Winter clothing and equipment, including the replacement of battle losses, presented a major problem. It was not until the forward progress of the Army had slowed down that a solution was found. The Army received splendid cooperation from the Communications Zone and a considerable quantity of supplies began arriving by truck, railway, and airplane before the end of the month.

The Army included the following major elements on 1 September:

VIII Corps: 6th Armored Division, 3d Infantry Division, 8th Infantry Division, 29th Infantry Division, 83d Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
XII Corps: 4th Armored Division, 35th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
XV Corps: Corps Troops only.
XX Corps: 7th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

The following major changes occurred during the period 1 to 30 September:

The VIII Corps was assigned to the Ninth U. S. Army on 5 September.

The XV Corps was assigned to the Seventh U. S. Army on 29 September.

The 2d (French) Armored Division and 79th Infantry Division were assigned to the Third U. S. Army on 5 and 7 September, respectively. Both were assigned to the XV Corps and were transferred with the Corps to the Seventh U. S. Army.

Combat Command B, 6th Armored Division, was attached to the Third U. S. Army on 10 September. The Division was assigned on 16 September and became Army Reserve.

The 83d Infantry Division was assigned to the Third U. S. Army and to the XX Corps on 21 September.

The 7th Armored Division was assigned to the First U. S. Army on 26 September.

The following were the major elements on 30 September:

XII Corps : 4th Armored Division, 35th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
XX Corps : 5th Infantry Division, 83d Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
Army Reserve: 6th Armored Division.

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

The division performed its normal functions.

The number of reports required by various headquarters, including sections of the Army Headquarters, increased considerably. A study was made with a view to reducing this burden, but with the usual result.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

The Quartermaster supply situation within the Army on 1 September was unsound, especially as to Class III supplies. The supply line was extremely long and transportation facilities had not kept pace with the increasing distance. Class I supplies on hand at the start of September were adequate for maintenance plus a small reserve. The Class III position had taken a bad turn around 25 August and became steadily worse. The situation as to gasoline remained extremely critical until 5 September, when it started to improve. The Class I situation was not good from 8 to 13 September, because of short receipts from the Communications Zone.

The most advanced Army supply points on 1 September were in the general vicinity of CHALONS (T54). The most advanced Communications Zone depot was Quartermaster Depot Number 120, at ARLIS (R60). The bulk of Quartermaster supplies for the Army was delivered by the Communications Zone to two points: Quartermaster Depot Number 120 and Army Supply Point Number 2B5, at FONTAINEBLEAU (L29). The approximate distances from these two points to Army supply points in the vicinity of CHALONS (T54) were 157 and 100 miles, respectively.

During the month telephone connections were installed for the first time to all supply points and railheads. The rapid advance and movement of supply points had never permitted this in the past. Communications are highly essential in the coordination of the supply of an Army.

Railway deliveries from the beach were initiated to the following points during the month by Advance Section Communications Zone trains:

SEZANNE (T62)	7 September	(Class III)
SOMMEDIEU (T42)	7 September	(Classes I, II and IV, III)
VERDUN (U26)	14 September	(Classes I, II and IV, III)
EPERNAY (T25)	6 September	(Class III)
LEMONVILLE (U32)	14 September	(Classes I, III)
TOUL (U61)	23 September	(Class II and IV)
JOINVLLE (U66)	23 September	(Class II and IV)

Airplane deliveries were initiated to the following places:

SENS (T97)	5 September	(Class III)
HENNEVILLE (Q42)	6 September	(Class III)
ST DIZIER (T90)	13 September	(Class III)
STAIN (U47)	10 September	(Classes II and IV, III)
TOUL (U61)	29 September	(Classes II and IV, III)

Advance Section Communications Zone depots were operated in the following locations:

QM Depot operated by		
58th QM Base Depot Company	ARLIS (R60)	Up to 7 September
QM Depot operated by		
62d QM Base Depot Company	SOMMEDIEU (T42)	Opened 8 September
QM Depot operated by		
62d QM Base Depot Company	LEMONVILLE (U32)	12 to 26 September
QM Depot operated by		
62d QM Base Depot Company	TOUL (U61)	Opened 26 September

These depots were, in effect, transfer points at Advance Section Communications Zone truckheads and railheads. (Except at the base depot at TOUL (U61) the accumulated stocks were negligible; the Army took over the supplies as fast as they were received and transported them, using Army trucks, direct to Army supply points.)

The following tonnage allocations (long tons) were imposed during the month:

DATE	QM ALLOCATION	OTHER SERVICES	TOTAL ALLOTMENT TO ARMY FOR ALL SERVICES
1 September	1,200	800	2,000
5 September	2,090*	1,410	3,500
25 September	2,070	1,430	3,500
27 September	1,833	1,267	3,100

*From 11 to 24 September, 500 tons of the Quartermaster allotment were given to Ordnance on alternate days; and from 17 to 25 September, twenty tons were given to Chemical Warfare Service.

The tonnage requirements for Quartermaster supplies varied somewhat because of the changes of major elements. The following represents a general estimate of the daily tonnage for Quartermaster supplies required for full operations for the Army during September:

Class I	900 long tons
Class II and IV	125 long tons
Class III	1,400 long tons
TOTAL	2,425 long tons

The problem of forwarding supplies to Army supply points was considerably reduced after the advance slowed down. The supply points were advanced close behind the troops, and the Class II and IV depots were moved forward to VERDUN (U26) and TOUL (U61), within easy hauling range of the troops.

Railway service improved greatly during the month. Advance Section Communications Zone truck convoys no longer came to the Army area, but transferred their loads to railway cars at SOMMEDIEU (T42). Two railheads, VERDUN (U26) on the north side and LEMONVILLE (U32) - later advanced to TOUL (U61) - on the south flank, served for the supply of the Army, except for supplies delivered by air.

Army supply points in operation during September are shown in Annex Number 2 to this report.



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and STAIN (U47) exceeded 3,400 tons between 5 and 11 September. Railway deliveries to SOMMEDIEU (T42) and ETREAT (T25), for the period 8 to 12 September, accounted for 1,366 tons. The remainder was delivered by truck convoy.

Advance Section Communications Zone took over Army Supply Point Number 2BB, near FONTAINEBLEAU (L29), on 8 September as a decanting point for tank trucks operating between that point and the pipe-line terminal at CHANTENAY (K90) (advanced to DOURDAN (K70) on 22 September). Army transported the packaged gasoline from Supply Point Number 2BB on trains operated by the Third U. S. Army between ST GERMAIN (U40), SOMMEDIEU (T42), VERDUN (U26), and LERONVILLE (U52).

The railhead for the bulk of Quartermaster supplies was shifted from LERONVILLE (U52) to TOUL (U61) on 24 September. Bulk gasoline in tank cars began arriving at TOUL (U61) on 24 September, but this was discontinued after three days because all tank cars were required for aviation fuel. Thereafter, all gasoline received was in packages. The Class III railhead was shifted from TOUL (U61) to DOMGERMAIN (U50), three miles southwest of TOUL, on 27 September, in order to relieve the congestion at the latter place. At the end of the month all gasoline deliveries to the Army area were by railway to VERDUN (U26) and DAMVILLE-MAIN (U50), except for small deliveries by airplane to STAIN (U47) and TOUL (U61).

Gasoline again became short of requirements on 20 September, because of tonnage limitations. The following table shows the daily telegram requests and the receipts from 21 to 30 September:

DATE	DAILY TELEGRAM REQUEST (Gallons)	RECEIPTS (Gallons)
21 September	388,744	167,475
22 September	405,152	281,450
23 September	235,680	254,755
24 September	284,400	294,075
25 September	356,288	274,010
26 September	308,192	451,490
27 September	281,964	219,635
28 September	231,456	238,085
29 September	243,520	181,360
30 September	238,856	346,765

Rationing was again employed. Limitations were placed on allowances to divisions, as well as to corps and Army troops. Every gallon that could be saved was placed in reserve in specified Army supply points to provide against emergencies and to be prepared to take full advantage of tactical opportunities. The front was relatively static at this period.

Empty cans became critical at the Communications Zone refilling points. The mortality rate for cans had exceeded expectations. The Army made strong efforts to collect and evacuate as many empties as possible, and the slowing of the advance provided the opportunity to give this matter close supervision. During the latter part of the month, more cans were returned than were received.

SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

The personnel of the Graves Registration Division was divided between the forward and rear echelons of the Army Headquarters. One officer and nine enlisted men were located with the rear echelon to work in cooperation with the Adjutant General Casualty Section in processing burial records. The remainder of the division, consisting of one officer and one enlisted man, remained with the forward echelon to supervise the location and operation of cemeteries.

It was planned, originally, to operate one cemetery for each corps, under corps supervision. It was for this reason that a graves registration company and a service company were attached to each corps. It was discovered that this was not a workable plan. Cemeteries, from the start, had been under army supervision. Except for very brief periods, not more than one cemetery had been in operation at the same time. All corps had found it possible to evacuate to the one place. It is worthy of remark that the VIII Corps evacuated its American dead to the ST JAMES (T29) Cemetery during the entire campaign in the Brittany Peninsula.

The most difficult problems are those incident to identification and paper work. At the start, the dead were brought to corps collecting points in trailers. The loaded trailers were exchanged for empty trailers and the bodies were taken to the cemetery without unloading. This system proved unsatisfactory from the identification standpoint. The bodies later were unloaded at the corps collecting points and identifications were carefully checked. This materially added to the labor involved, but it reduced the number of unidentified to a low figure.

The officers and men of the Quartermaster graves registration companies are deserving of high praise for the manner in which they performed their difficult and depressing task. The following units operated with the Army during all or a part of September:

607th QM Graves Registration Company
608th QM Graves Registration Company
609th QM Graves Registration Company
624th QM Graves Registration Company

During the third week, supplies of mattress covers, personal effects bags, and crosses were very low. Only 985 mattress covers and 850 personal effects bags had been received on requisitions since 1 September and substituted captured stores were nearly exhausted. As none of these items were available through normal supply channels, trucks were dispatched to the beach, a distance of 300 miles, to secure the items. By the end of September the necessary supplies were available in sufficient quantity and through normal channels. The Quartermaster depots for Class II supplies were keeping a reserve stock specifically earmarked for cemetery use.

Prisoner of war labor was found to be the best suited for work at the cemeteries, but the graves registration companies with their limited transportation were unable to transport the prisoners to and from the cemeteries. Quartermaster service troops, although less efficient than prisoners, had to be relied upon. Civilian laborers worked hard only the first few days; when they were well fed and then paid they lost all interest in their work.

The total burials for September were 4,192. Of these, 2,668 were American, forty-six were Allied, and 1,478 were German.

The following cemeteries were in operation:

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1, ST JAMES (T29), and the German Military Cemetery adjacent thereto, which had opened 071200 B August, were transferred to the Ninth U. S. Army at 051200 B September.

The German Military Cemetery, LESNEVEN (R11), near BREST (T99), which had opened 241200 B August, was also transferred to the Ninth U. S. Army at 051200 B September.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1, VILLENEUVE-SUR-AUVERS (R90), and the German Military Cemetery adjacent thereto, which had opened 251200 B August, were closed for burials to the Third U. S. Army at 061200 B September and turned over to Advance Section Communications Zone.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1, CHAMPIGNEUL (T44), and the German Military Cemetery adjacent thereto opened 011200 B September and were closed for Third U. S. Army burials at 301200 A September and turned over to Advance Section Communications Zone.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1, ANDILLY (U61), and the German Military Cemetery adjacent thereto opened 121200 B September. These cemeteries remained open beyond the period covered by this chapter.



SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

The following Quartermaster troop units were assigned or attached to the Third U. S. Army as of 30 September:

Hq & Hq Det, QM Group	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	3
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	4
QM Depot Company, Supply	2
QM Gasoline Supply Company	6
QM Graves Registration Company	3
QM Laundry Company	4
QM Railhead Company	6
QM Salvage Collecting Company	3
QM Service Company	17
QM Bakery Company, Special	5
QM Salvage Repair Company	3
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	2
QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile	1
QM Sales Platoon	1
QM Tank Truck Company	2
QM Petroleum Products Laboratory (Mobile Section)	1

The quality of service troops varied; however, the fact remains that they got the job done. The officers, almost without exception, gave their very best efforts.

SECTION IX - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

Laundry units were kept in close support of all Army hospitals. These units performed well. Laundry units not required for hospital service and bath units were located close behind the front-line troops. More bath units were required than were available. This is one of the best morale features of the Quartermaster Corps; but, unfortunately, the units were not to be had.

The Quartermaster Petroleum Products Laboratory (Mobile Section) ran 208 tests, sampling 182,750 gallons of gasoline. As a result of these tests, 10,000 gallons were found suitable for Army use. It should be noted that this was not the entire amount of captured gasoline used during the month.

A detail consisting of one warrant officer and fourteen enlisted men was organized on 20 September for the purpose of checking, guarding, and warehousing captured supplies.

The movement of laundry and salvage repair units was found to be difficult with the reduced number of tractors currently allowed. Six additional tractors were loaned to the Army Quartermaster by the Communications Zone on 26 September to supplement the organizational tractors.

SECTION X - SALVAGE SECTION

The salvage plan was reorganized after the tactical situation became more stable. A complete salvage point, consisting of repair, fumigation, salvage collecting, and laundry facilities, was established close in the rear of each corps. Direct support was given to combat units in repairing and renovating clothing and equipment. The volume of salvage in Army installations during the month was lower than expected. Front-line units salvaged and reissued everything possible, because of the scarcity of new supplies in the depots. Salvage handled during the month included:

Class B	204,701
Class C	45,190
Class X	137,262
TOTAL	387,153

All Class B and Class C items were processed and returned to depots for reissue.

The stove repair units, operating with the Class II and IV depots, made repairs to the following items:

Fire units	942
Lanterns, Coleman	601
Stoves, [illegible] and two-burner	385
Heaters, [illegible] type	
Pumps	

The lack of parts seriously hampered operations. These repair units worked with good spirit, and they improved greatly in technique and inventiveness.

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CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS



FIRST INTRA-ARMY TRAIN 27 OCT 1944



CLASS I CLASSIFICATION YARD AND DEPOT AT TOUL

GAM
6

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U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at ANGILLY (UK1) and the German Military Cemetery adjacent thereto were in operation during October.

SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

The following Quartermaster troop units were assigned or attached to the Third U. S. Army as of 31 October:

Hq & Hq Det, QM Group	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	3
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	6
QM Bakery Company, Special	5
QM Depot Company, Supply	2
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	3
QM Gasoline Supply Company	7
QM Graves Registration Company	3
QM Laundry Company	5
QM Petroleum Products Laboratory (Mobile Section)	1
QM Railhead Company	5
QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile (Less One Section)	1
QM Sales Platoon	2
QM Salvage Collecting Company	3
QM Salvage Repair Company	3
QM Service Company	19
QM Tank Truck Company	2

SECTION IX - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

A warehouse was secured in NANCY (UK1) for the purpose of consolidating all captured enemy materiel. At this place all types of captured enemy supplies were received, inventoried, and issued. During October approximately 400 truckloads of captured materiel were transferred to this point.

Bad weather during October made it desirable to place troop units and installations under cover. This was especially important in the case of the latter, which require hard standings for efficient operations. After much effort, suitable covered accomodations were secured for both men and installations.

Early in October, when an additional company became available, a complete fumigation and bath company was operated by Army for each corps. Three companies were in operation within the Army.

During the month 106,823 men were bathed in divisional areas. This number does not include men who were bathed by Engineer and locally operated units.

SECTION X - SALVAGE SECTION

With the improved Class II supply situation, many soldiers could turn in unserviceable garments for replacement and the salvage program was accelerated over the previous month.

The following items of salvage were handled during this period:

Class B	336,941
Class C	48,677
Class A	79,957
TOTAL	465,565

All Class B and Class C items of clothing were fumigated, laundered, and, when necessary, repaired and sent to the Class II and IV depot for reissue. Salvage repair companies repaired 52,635 items during the month.

Field range repair units and typewriter repair teams operated at base camps at the Class II and IV depots and at salvage repair points. During the month repairs were made to the following items:

Fire units	1,086
Heaters, immersion type	39
Lanterns, gasoline	869
Stoves, cooking, one and two-burner	1,087
Typewriters, portable	79
Typewriters, non-portable	79
Range, hard	114



CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

Army Headquarters remained at NANCY (UK1) throughout the month of November.

Plans for the coming offensive were nearing completion at the beginning of the month. The principal efforts of the Office of the Army Quartermaster were directed toward meeting this situation. It was planned to place reserves of rations and gasoline in strategic locations east of the MOSELLE River. This proved to be a sound measure because the river was rising and at the start of the offensive had reached flood stage. Many of the temporary bridges were unusable for several days. Sites had been selected, but the stocking of the supply points was delayed until the last moment for reasons of secrecy. The Third U. S. Army offensive began on 8 November. Reserve supplies were adequate. A total of 2,344,541 rations was in the Army area at supply points, mobile reserve points, and storage points; 1,926,235 gallons of gasoline were likewise strategically located. The divisions averaged four days of Class I and five days of Class III supplies on hand, the accumulation of these reserves having begun in October. Army ration stocks had been built up to the prescribed level by the middle of October, but it was not until 7 November that a sufficient reserve of gasoline had been accumulated. By the twentieth of the month, gasoline on hand had been built up to five and one-half million gallons. Quartermaster activities proceeded according to plan.

The composition of the Army remained substantially the same during the month. The following were the major elements:

III Corps: Corps Troops only.

XII Corps: 4th Armored Division, 6th Armored Division, 26th Infantry Division, 35th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

XI Corps: 10th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, 95th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

The strength of assigned units was 249,889 on 30 November. The total number of troops supplied by the Army was 311,836, including Communications Zone, Ninth Air Force, French, and miscellaneous troops.

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

Eight French railway wine tanks, each with a capacity of 5,000 gallons, were requisitioned for use as water reservoirs. These were filled with water and placed at Class III railheads for fire-fighting purposes.

A project of printing 40,000 ten-page booklets on "The Rules of Land Warfare" was undertaken and accomplished for the Judge Advocate Section. Captured enemy paper was used and the printing done by a French firm.

[illegible] handling of war materiel and services from civilian sources [illegible] in value. A highlight was the initial use of civilian dry-cleaning facilities. Five thousand salvaged overcoats and 3,000 salvaged blouses were processed through this arrangement.

On 5 November, the Office of the Army Quartermaster was reorganized by adding an Operations Section to the Supply Division. The Operations Section had been in actual operation since early in August. The principal functions of this section were to supervise and control all Quartermaster supply operations in the field, including the receipt, classification, and forwarding of supplies to Army supply points, and to anticipate and make arrangements for meeting the requirements of the changing tactical situation.

During November three officers and four enlisted men of the Quartermaster Section received the Bronze Star Medal for meritorious service, by General Orders published by Headquarters Third U. S. Army. In Quartermaster units one officer was awarded the Silver Star and one officer and four enlisted men were awarded the Bronze Star Medal, by General Orders, Headquarters Third U. S. Army.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

An allocation of 2,950 long tons daily was available to the Army Quartermaster during November. The supply situation was greatly improved over previous months. Only Class II and IV gave cause for anxiety. Much progress was made toward completion of the winterization program however, serious shortages of several critical items existed.

Railways, both in the Communications Zone and in the Army area, were now operating in good volume and on reliable schedules. The celebrated Red Ball Express truck convoys in the rear area were discontinued. Practically all supplies were transported from the Communications Zone to the Army receiving points by railway. One emergency shipment of diesel was lifted by air direct from the United Kingdom to airfields at ST DIZIER (UK9) and VERDUN (UK8). Truck shipments from the Communications Zone were since except for a considerable quantity of gasoline delivered by tank trucks. Within the Army area, railway trains, under Army control, were used for distributing Class I and Class III supplies to all supply points that could be located on lines in operation. Supply points not accessible to railways were supplied by Army trucks or a combination of railway and truck. A railway bridge across the MOSELLE River immediately north of METZ (UK1) was completed on 20 November, enabling trains to proceed to [illegible] (UK5), METZ (UK1), MONTOY (UK2), and [illegible] (UK3). This was the only railway line in operation east of the MOSELLE during the month.

Class I and Class III supply points were maintained in close support of combat units. At least two supply points for both Class I and Class III supplies for each corps were in operation throughout the month, and additional supply points were maintained west of the MOSELLE River for Army troops. The first Class III supply point was opened for issues east of the MOSELLE River on 14 November; the first Class I point opened on 19 November.

Class I supplies for the period 1 to 24 November, inclusive, were delivered by the Communications Zone to the Army Class I depot at TOUL (UK2). The Army Quartermaster classified the supplies at this point and reshipped by railway and/or truck to the Army supply points. The Advance Section Communications Zone for some time had been building up a Class I intermediate depot at VERDUN (UK8). This depot, Q-178, opened on 25 November and took over the function of sending daily trains to designated Army supply points. The new procedure was a great improvement and, for the first time since the start of the campaign, established a system of Class I supply in close agreement with the field needs. The Army depot at TOUL (UK2) was retained as a reserve point for operational-type rations. Two daily trains from VERDUN (UK8) were dispatched to Army railheads located, for the most part, along the MOSELLE River at METZ (UK1), [illegible] (UK4), CHARLEY (UK5), AZOUN (UK6), CHATEAU SALINS (Q17), and MARSAL (Q12). The last two points were east of the MOSELLE River in the southern part of the Army zone. Army trucks transported supplies from the railheads to such supply points as were not located on operating railway lines.

Class II and IV supplies continued to be delivered to the Army Class II and IV depot at TOUL (UK2).

Class III supplies, in bulk, were delivered to the Army at the three principal receiving points - DUNKERQUE (UK9), NANCY (UK1), and MARCHIENNES (UK3). Packaged gasoline shipped from the Communications Zone was received at [illegible] (UK2), from which point the trains were dispatched to Army railhead supply points. Railway facilities enabled distribution to be made to [illegible] (UK4), CHARLEY (UK5), METZ (UK1), CHATEAU SALINS (Q17), [illegible] (UK9), [illegible] (Q13). The last two points were east of the MOSELLE River.

Coincident with the change in Class I supply [illegible], the daily

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Depot Number 6, near TOUL (U61), remained the sole Army Class II and IV supply point. The base for supply remained at Depot Q-180, at REIMS (T37), operated by the Communications Zone



INTERIOR VIEW OF CLASS II AND IV DEPOT NUMBER 6, AT TOUL

SECTION VI - CLASS III SECTION

The gasoline situation was satisfactory on 1 November, and improved steadily throughout the month. There was a shortage of diesel, however, and it was necessary to arrange for an emergency shipment of 400 tons by air direct from the United Kingdom and a like amount by railway from CHERBOURG (O12). The air shipment, scheduled to be completed before 7 November, was accomplished in part when a total of 287 tons was received on 10 and 11 November. Rail shipments of diesel, however, began soon afterwards in quantities that permitted the accumulation of a reserve of approximately 32,000 gallons by 16 November. Almost 2,000,000 gallons of gasoline were on hand at the start of the offensive on 8 November, excluding unit loads. The month closed with 3,604,565 gallons in Army supply points and reserve points.

During previous months the policy of the Communications Zone had been to supply packaged gasoline to the Army as far as practicable. As the cans had been emptied, they had been shipped to the rear for refilling. The turn around, because of the long distances, had required so much time that a critical shortage of cans had resulted. It was decided, therefore, that the Army should be furnished 1,000 net tons of bulk gasoline daily, which would be decanted by the Army. This program was initiated on 2 November, when 258,650 gallons of bulk gasoline (796.4 net tons) arrived at DOMREMAIN (U90). Any additional amount required was to be furnished in packages, provided that the cans were available. Most of the decanting, as explained above, was carried out at three places. It was possible to decant 1,000 net tons (375,000 gallons) daily, but an amount in excess of this figure would have required more equipment. Receipts for the month were forty per cent bulk and sixty per cent packaged.



DECANTING GASOLINE FROM RAIL CARS

In preparation for the offensive, two reserve points were established on 6 and 7 November east of the MOSELLE River and stocked with 430,350 gallons of V-80 gasoline: one point was two miles east of NANCY (U81) and the other at ATTON (U73). On 10 November, an additional 219,750 gallons were loaded aboard cars and held as a mobile reserve at MONDEL (Q01). When the supply points became congested, 1,198,730 gallons of V-80 gasoline were turned over to the Advance Section Communications Zone to be held in the vicinity of VERDUN (U26).

Two bulk storage plants in NANCY (U81), with a capacity of 310,000 gallons, and another in LUNEVILLE (U86), with a capacity of 800,000 gallons, were taken over during November. These contained 600,000 gallons at the end of the month.

Receipts of gasoline totaled 12,137,026 gallons for the month. This was ten per cent in excess of the daily telegram requests. Daily issues averaged 303,921 gallons of V-80 gasoline and 10,288 gallons of diesel. Consumption was much lower than anticipated. The daily consumption of liquid fuel was approximately eight and twenty-three one-hundredths pounds (net) per man per day; for oils and greases the amount was two-tenths of one pound. In this connection it must be remembered that the troops advanced over relatively short distances and that supply distances were relatively short. Higher headquarters had prescribed that overall Class III requirements be calculated on the basis of fifteen and forty-seven one-hundredths pounds (gross) per man per day. In the light of experience, this is considered to represent the amount that is required in a fast-moving, long-distance operation such as prevailed during the month of August.

Two fires at decanting points resulted in a loss of 16,000 gallons of gasoline, 10,266 cans, and one 100-gallon-per-minute dispenser. The first fire, at DOMREMAIN (U90) on 7 November, was caused by hot coals from a switching engine; the second, at NANCY (U81) on 16 November, resulted from the backfire of a dispenser engine. The loss in cans was offset by 13,000 German cans recovered from a factory in BASSE YUTZ (U88), near THIONVILLE (U88).

The coal situation improved greatly. Between 19 and 21 November, 295 cars were received from the Communications Zone. Total receipts for the month were 8,678 tons. Sufficient coal was available to fill all requests.

The Theater Commander, accompanied by the Army Commander, visited Supply Point Number 50, at NANCY (U81), on 16 November.

SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

A marked increase in the number of isolated burials had become apparent by 1 November. This presented a serious problem with respect to establishing identity. There was instituted on the second of this month a comprehensive check list for the identification of bodies interred in isolated localities. Upon locating a body, graves registration personnel consulted the civil authorities of the nearest village and other local civilian and military personnel prior to disinterment. An overlay was then made, tieing in the location of the grave with permanent landmarks. All available circumstances were noted - for example, whether the body was buried by the enemy or by civilians, on what date the burial occurred, who handled the personal effects, and what records were available. It was found by following this system that absence of identification tags or other positive identification was no barrier to definite identification in ninety-five per cent of the cases.

Much progress was made in improving the technique incident to the identification of unknowns. By arrangement, Ordnance units retrieving tanks with bodies charred beyond immediate identification called in a representative of the Graves Registration Division before moving the tanks. This resulted in early identification of remains, since all pertinent data as to position of the bodies in the tanks, personal effects, and immediate surroundings often accomplished recognition of the bodies by members of their organizations. Six cases of potential unknowns were solved during the month through this new method.

The system of evacuating bodies from the divisions to the cemetery was modified on 4 November. A separate collecting point manned by Army graves registration personnel was established to operate with each division, and in cooperation with the division graves registration officer. In addition, twelve teams, each consisting of three men, a driver, and a weapons carrier, were placed in a central pool at the cemetery for emergency assistance where needed. Corps graves registration officers rendered valuable service in coordinating operations within the divisions. Under the earlier system, several collecting points were operated to serve each corps. The localizing of collecting points simplified identification procedure and proved to be much more efficient than the previous system.

On 27 November, an understanding was reached with the Ninth Air Force regarding the identification of Air Force personnel not previously reported to this Division but buried in the Army area. Prompt identification was made of ten out of the sixteen unknowns.

During the three days beginning on 21 November, it was found necessary to call on 550 prisoners of war to handle the large volume of work. Portable arc lights secured through the Engineer Section were used for the first time for night burial activity.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at ANDILLY (U61), which had opened at 121200 B September, closed for American burials at 050600 A November, but remained open for Allied burials. American burials here totaled 3,307; Allied, sixty-three. The adjacent German cemetery remained open. U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at LIMEY (U62) opened at 050600 A November.

Burials during the month totaled 5,676, of which 3,672 were American, eight were Allied, and 1,996 were enemy.

A commemorative service was held on Armistice Day at the LIMEY (U62) cemetery.

The Graves Registration Division remained with the rear echelon of the Army Headquarters throughout the month.



COVERED PROCESSING AREA AT A THIRD U. S. ARMY CEMETERY

SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

The following Quartermaster troop units were assigned or attached to the Third U. S. Army as of 30 November:

Hq & Hq Det, QM Group	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	3
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	6
QM Bakery Company, Special	5
QM Depot Company, Supply	2
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	3
QM Gasoline Supply Company	7
QM Graves Registration Company	3
QM Laundry Company	5
QM Railhead Company	5
QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile	1
QM Sales Platoon	2
QM Salvage Collecting Company	3
QM Salvage Repair Company	3
QM Service Company	24
QM Service Detachment (Petroleum Products Laboratory) (Mobile Detachment)	1

Higher authority directed that, with the entry of the Army into Germany, prisoners of war could not be utilized for labor details. To meet this situation, five additional service companies were assigned to the Army. Two companies were allocated to the Army Medical Section for use with evacuation hospitals, which had throughout the entire campaign used prisoner-of-war labor only.

The Army Commander commended the officers and men of the 485th Quartermaster Refrigeration Company, Mobile, published in Section III, General Orders Number 100, 30 November 1944, for outstanding performance of duty from 10 August to 25 September. Elements of this company entered HOMECOURT (U77) on 9 September on the heels of the combat troops and, before the town was reported clear of the enemy, secured and protected 2,600,000 pounds of beef, property of the German Wehrmacht.

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416,473
80,780
193,183





ABOVE
OVERALL VIEW
OF
BATH INSTALLATION
RIGHT
BATHERS
RECEIVING
CLEAN CLOTHING



LEFT
SHOWER TENT

BELOW
DRESSING TENT



CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

Army Headquarters remained at NANCY (Q81) until 26 December, when the forward echelon moved to the city of LUXEMBOURG (P81). The Quartermaster Section, which had been with the forward echelon since 13 August, remained after 26 December with the rear echelon in NANCY (Q81).

Initially during the month, efforts of the Army Quartermaster were directed toward the support of the continuing offensive to the east. Supply points and service installations were maintained in close support of the combat troops. The enemy counter-attack on 16 December, however, against the First U. S. Army in Belgium and Luxembourg was destined to have a far reaching effect on the Third U. S. Army tactical and consequent supply operations.

By 18 December the German counter-offensive on the First U. S. Army front had reached a critical stage. As a result the tactical plan of the Third U. S. Army was changed to counter this thrust. Instead of proceeding with the offensive to the east, in the direction of SAARBRUECKEN (Q47), the Army directed its power toward the north, through Luxembourg and eastern Belgium. The new tactical plan required the III and XII Corps to move quickly to the vicinity of ARLON (P62) and LUXEMBOURG (P81), respectively. The VIII Corps came under Third U. S. Army control in the area of BASTOGNE (P55). The XX Corps remained on its current front east and south of the MOSELLE River. The right (southern) boundary of the Army was changed and the zones of action of the III and XII Corps were taken over by the Seventh U. S. Army.

The supply plan of the Army was necessarily changed. Quartermaster supply points and reserves of rations and gasoline that had been placed east of the MOSELLE River were shifted to the north and west of the MOSELLE. Stocks of rations and gasoline were loaded aboard railway cars and held as mobile reserve, so that rapid movement could be effected as the military situation developed and clarified itself. The supply situation had in general been sound since the first of the month, with adequate reserves of rations and gasoline at supply points and reserve points. On 19 December 1,120,652 rations and 4,071,074 gallons of V-80 gasoline were on hand in the Army area; and an additional 660,000 operational-type rations were held in reserve for the Army at the Advance Section, Communications Zone depot at VERDUN (U26), Q-178. The divisions had an average of three and two-tenths days of Class I and four and eight-tenths days of Class III supplies on hand.

The composition of the Army changed frequently and radically during the month. On 16 December the 10th Armored Division was attached to the First U. S. Army. With the change in the tactical plan, the VIII Corps, including the 9th Armored Division, 10th Armored Division, 4th Infantry Division, 28th Infantry Division, and 101st Airborne Division, was transferred to the Third U. S. Army. The 87th Infantry Division was relieved from assignment to the Third U. S. Army and passed to the control of the Seventh U. S. Army on 21 December. Later in the month the 87th Infantry Division returned to the Third U. S. Army and the 11th Armored Division and 17th Airborne Division came under its control. From 16 December to the end of the month, the strength of the Army was increased abruptly from approximately 255,000 to approximately 350,000. The additional troops supplied by the Army increased also from a daily average of 50,000 to an average of 70,000.

The following were the major elements of the Army on 1 December:

III Corps: Corps Troops only.

XII Corps: 4th Armored Division, 6th Armored Division, 26th Infantry Division, 35th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

XX Corps: 10th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, 95th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

The strength of the Army was 249,089, and with the addition of Communications Zone, Air Force, French, and miscellaneous troops, the total for which the Army was responsible for supply amounted to 311,906.

The following were the major elements of the Army on 31 December:

III Corps: 6th Armored Division, 26th Infantry Division, 35th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

VIII Corps: 9th Armored Division, 11th Armored Division, 28th Infantry Division, 87th Infantry Division, 17th Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division, and Corps Troops.

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XII Corps: 4th Armored Division, 4th Infantry Division, 5th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

XX Corps: 10th Armored Division, 90th Infantry Division, 95th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

The strength of the Army on 31 December was 351,291. The Army also was supplying 27,114 Communications Zone, 38,015 Ninth Air Force, 2,749 French, and 2,063 miscellaneous troops, which brought the total number of troops supplied to 421,232.

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

A new table of personnel allotments for Headquarters Third U. S. Army was published in Staff Memorandum Number 73, dated 16 December. The allotment for enlisted men of the Quartermaster Section was decreased by eight men. The Section's authorization was nineteen officers, three warrant officers, and forty enlisted men.

A plan for the training of infantry riflemen was announced on 7 December. Five per cent of the assigned strength of Army, corps, and division headquarters and of the assigned white service units were to be sent to an infantry training center established at METZ (U85). The Commanding Officer, 519th Quartermaster Group, was directed to effect the transfer of enlisted men from Quartermaster organizations concerned. Later in the month an additional five per cent were called. As a part of this program two enlisted men from the Quartermaster Section were transferred to the 87th Infantry Division and three were transferred to the 95th Infantry Division. One hundred and twenty-four enlisted men from ten Quartermaster units were transferred to the Infantry Training Center at METZ (U85).

During the month the Bronze Star Medal, for meritorious service, was awarded to eight officers and warrant officers and four enlisted men of Quartermaster units by General Orders published by Headquarters Third U. S. Army.

The Administrative Division continued to be active in making purchases and requisitioning local services and material. To meet an urgent operational necessity, 2,185 yards of white cloth were requisitioned from a French wholesale establishment on 24 December, to be used for making tunics for snow camouflage. Local printing facilities were extensively used for the printing of certain forms that were in short supply.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

The overall Quartermaster supply situation in the Army continued to be favorable. The status of certain Class II items, however, was extremely critical. This situation was aggravated when, on 19 December, the supply of the VIII Corps became a Third U. S. Army responsibility. Battle losses of clothing and equipment included items that were already in short supply. Extended efforts were made to resupply all units having sustained battle losses. The Supply Division promptly reacted to the problems incident to the abrupt increase in the strength of the Army.

During the early part of the month the chief concern of the Supply Division was to supply the attacking forces to the east. Supply points were located well forward in support of the combat troops and reserves of rations and gasoline were strategically located east of the MOSELLE River. In addition to the Class II and IV Depot Number 7, established at METZ (U85) on 6 December for troops of the XX Corps and later also for III Corps troops, another depot was opened for the troops of the XII Corps. It was established at SARRALBE (Q44) as Depot Number 8 on 17 December.

The development of the enemy counter-offensive, however, on the First U. S. Army front resulted in a change of the direction of the Third U. S. Army's advance. The III and XII Corps moved quickly northward to ARLON (P62) and LUXEMBOURG (P81), respectively, and the VIII Corps came under Third U. S. Army control in the area of BASTOGNE (P55). Arrangements were made on the evening of 18 December to establish Class I and Class III supply points for units of the III and VIII Corps at LONGWY (P50) and LIBRAMONT (P34), which were to open on the following day. The Operations Officer of the Quartermaster Section arrived at LONGWY (P50) early on 19 December to complete arrangements for the opening of supply points in the new area and to coordinate all Quartermaster activities on the new front. LONGWY (P50), formerly at the rear of the northern flank of the Army area but now in the center of the direction of movement, was selected as a railhead and regulating point.

A special train loaded with rations, arrangements for which had been made the previous evening, was dispatched from the Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-178, at VERDUN (U26), to Class I Supply Points Number 64, at LONGWY (P50), and Number 67, at LIBRAMONT (P34). At 1000 A hours on 19 December 85,000 rations from VERDUN (U26) had arrived. A transfer of 100,000 gallons of gasoline and allied products, by truck transport, from Army Class III Supply Points Number 439, at MANGIENNULLES (U67), and Number 57, at ELZANGE (U96), had been completed. These shipments arrived and issues were initiated within twelve hours after preliminary arrangements had been made. Class I and Class III Supply Points Number 66 actually opened at 191000 A December.

A shift of Quartermaster supply points and reserve points was begun immediately. Four Class I and four Class III supply points, all of them east of the MOSELLE River, were closed. Only one Class I and one Class III supply point, then in support of the XX Corps, remained east of the river. A portion of the supplies in these points was loaded aboard railway cars and held as a mobile reserve and the remainder was transferred to new points opening to the north and west of the MOSELLE River. The shift of supply points is graphically illustrated in Annex Number 5B to this report.

In accordance with a previous agreement between the Quartermaster, Seventh U. S. Army, and the Army Quartermaster on the matter of supply responsibilities resulting from changes in Army areas, Class I Supply Point Number 58, at HAMONT (Q12), and Class III Supply Point Number 58, at HARCOURGES (Q13), were released to the Seventh U. S. Army at 241400 A December. A stock of 97,750 rations and additional miscellaneous items was turned over with the Class I supply point and 151,137 gallons of V-80 gasoline and additional allied products were transferred with the Class III supply point. Also, thirty-two cars of coke and 514 tons of coal were included in the supplies that were transferred.

As a result of a change in the Communications Zone supply procedure in support of the Army, the daily tonnage allocation of 2,950 long tons for Quartermaster supplies was no longer in effect. This daily allotment of tonnage imposed by higher headquarters had been in effect since 25 October. Distribution of all classes of supplies from the Communications Zone to the Army was, for the first time in the campaign, in conformity with procedures outlined in field manuals.

Under this system the Army Quartermaster submitted requests for Class I and Class III (POL) requirements by daily telegram through the 24th Regulating Station to Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-178, at VERDUN (U26). Supplies were shipped by the Advance Section Communications Zone to Army supply points and railheads designated in the daily telegram. This system was already in effect for Class I supplies, beginning on 24 November. It was not until 11 December, however, that Class III (POL) supplies were requested and distributed as outlined.

Army requirements for Class II and IV supplies were requisitioned for ten-day periods and were submitted direct to the Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-180, at REIMS (T37). Class II and IV supplies, with some exceptions, were forwarded to Army supply points by Communications Zone train or truck transport. The first such request was submitted for ten-day requirements beginning on 7 December.

Requests for Class III (Solid Fuels) based on thirty-day requirements covering the three succeeding months were submitted by the Army Quartermaster to the Quartermaster, Advance Section Communications Zone. Dependent on final allocation based on requirements of the Army and availability, solid fuel was shipped forward to the Army supply points direct from mines or from Advance Section Communications Zone depots in the forward areas.

The railroads continued to be the chief means of transporting supplies. With the exception of small quantities of supplies arriving by airplane and by truck, all supplies came into the Army area on Communications Zone trains. Only in an emergency were Army trucks dispatched to Communications Zone depots to bring forward supplies.

The Army Quartermaster Operations Officer continued to supervise the activities at the Army Class I and Class III railhead and control points, which were, in effect, Army regulating stations. Points in operation until 18 December included BRIEY (U77) on the northern flank and CHATEAU SALINS (Q12), east of the MOSELLE River, on the southern flank. The latter point was relocated on 10 December at LENING (Q33). On 19 December an additional regulating point was established at LONGWY (P50) to serve the new front and on 22 December LENING (Q33) was closed.

The Army supply points in operation during the month are shown in Annex 5A to this report.

SECTION IV - CLASS I SECTION

Class I supply continued to function with efficiency during December. Total receipts for the month were 29,085.1 long tons and total issues were 26,921.0 long tons, or 11,788,505 rations, an average daily issue of 380,274. Eighty-four and four-tenths per cent of the issues went to Army units and fifteen and six-tenths per cent to units not assigned or attached to the Army but operating in or adjacent to the Army area. Seventy-six per cent of the month's issues were "B" rations; ten and three-tenths per cent, "10-in-1"; five and seven-tenths per cent, "C"; and eight per cent, "K". Rations on hand in the Army area at the beginning of the month totaled 1,263,671; at the end of the month, 1,544,466. In addition 660,000 operational-type rations were held for the Third U. S. Army at Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-178, at VERDUN (U26).

It had become necessary to carefully conserve operational-type rations because of the short supply. To permit increased issues of "B"-type rations to units for emergencies, a portion of the operational-type ration reserves normally held at each Class I supply point was replaced by 25,000 "B"-type rations. Type-"K" rations, especially, were in short supply in the Army Class I reserve, and during the last week of the month stocks of this type of ration were exhausted at the Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-178, at VERDUN (U26). The demand from the combat troops for type-"K" rations increased sharply the last third of the month. The percentage increase amounted to approximately twenty-four per cent.

A special Christmas dinner was provided for all troops of the Army. The menu furnished about one and one-half pounds of turkey per man, and included cranberries, fresh apples, and raisin bread. In addition, a gratuitous issue of 350,000 cigars and 700,000 bars of candy was distributed to the troops. It was necessary to dispatch five ten-ton trucks to LE HAVRE (L42) to pick up these gratuitous items to insure their issue on Christmas Day. At the request of the VIII Corps, because of the fluid tactical situation, the issue of the Christmas menu to that corps was delayed until 29 December.

A new policy was inaugurated for the distribution of operational-type rations. The availability of "K" rations to front-line troops was increased to a maximum of fifty per cent of the total operational-type rations issued. The availability of "K" rations to service troops in rear areas was decreased to a maximum of ten per cent of the total number of operational-type rations requested. Special authorization from this headquarters was required for requests in excess of allowances prescribed above.

With the advent of cold weather, difficulty was encountered with vegetables and canned goods freezing. Such measures as were possible were taken to alleviate this condition. Dehydrated vegetables were not available in sufficiently large quantities to be used as a substitute for canned components, and supplies of powdered milk were insufficient to replace the canned product.

A highlight in bakery operations during the month was the production by five bakery companies of 1,056,428 pounds of bread in one week. This represented a production of fifty per cent above rated capacity. Bread continued to be issued daily with all rations. The supply of coffee remained critical, which necessitated an increase in the [illegible] fresh coffee roasting facilities operated by the Quartermaster Service [illegible] to provide roasted and ground coffee in quantities required. To supplement these facilities, the Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-178, at VERDUN (U26), shipped daily, beginning on 21 December, 15,000 pounds of fresh roasted coffee to the Third U. S. Army. At no time, however, did the troops suffer from a shortage of coffee.



OPEN STORAGE AND RAMP TO SECOND FLOOR AT CLASS II AND IV DEPOT NUMBER 7, AT METZ

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Considerable efforts were made to increase the number of issues of fresh meats and other perishables which were substituted for canned components of the 10-in-1 ration. Issues during the month included the following items:

Item	Pounds per 100 Rations
Beef, Roasting and Frying	8
Beef, Ground	6
Beef, Boiling and Stewing	6
Pork Loins	4
Frankfurters	4
Cold Cuts	1
Chicken	3
Turkey	1
Bacon	1
Butter, Fresh	23

Weekly issues of Post Exchange items continued to be made gratuitously to the troops. Although cigarettes and certain toilet articles remained in short supply, the situation in regard to comfort items was satisfactory.

After the shift of supply points to the northern front had been effected, Class I supply Point Number 51, at SAINT DIZIER (D51), remained the only Army Class I point in the southern part of the front zone. To effect a saving in rail transportation, this point was supplied, beginning on 24 November, from the Atlanta Depot, at TOUL (D81), instead of the Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-178, at VERDUN (D26). The Atlanta Depot, a Class I depot operated by the Advance Section Communications Zone, ended 1,826 tons December one-half mile west of TOUL (D1) and served as a supply point for Advance Section Communications Zone troops and Army troops in the vicinity.

Class I daily trains from the Advance Section Communications Zone depot at VERDUN (D26), with few exceptions, arrived on satisfactory schedules at Army railheads and supply points. Railway cars were commodity-loaded, which facilitated the handling and issue of rations at Army points.

SECTION V - CLASS II AND IV SECTION

The clothing and equipment situation was in general satisfactory, but several shortages of a critical nature persisted. The abrupt increase in the troop strength, when the VIII Corps became a part of the Army, materially affected the Class II supply situation. In addition, the combat losses sustained by many units of that corps intensified the problem of supply of certain critical items. Class II and IV supplies totaling 4,080 long tons were received during December at all depots, an average of 144.5 long tons per day. On 31 December 2,800 long tons of supplies were on hand in the depots. Requisitions processed totaled 1,299, an average of 42 per day, four per cent more than in November.

The major problem in December was the replacement, during the latter part of the month, of combat losses sustained by certain units of the VIII Corps prior to the attachment of the Corps to the Third U.S. Army. Included in the estimated losses were 55,000 sets of wool trousers, shirts, and underwear, 55,000 wool overcoats, 55,000 field jackets, 12,000 combat jackets, 16,000 pairs of overshoes, 55,000 raincoats, 33,000 pairs of wool socks, 12,673 mess cans, 42,518 shelter halves, and 96,000 blankets. A special requisition was sent to the Communications Zone and all available supplies were dispatched to the Army besides through the Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-178, at VERDUN (D37). Requipment of these units had first priority and it was accomplished, except for items that were not available, within ten days.

Although certain items required for the winter comfort and welfare of the individual soldier had become available in varying quantities, the situation was not entirely alleviated. The immediate attack for the availability of special winter clothing for arm ed-service personnel and parka-type overcoats was not reassuring. Sufficient numbers of sweaters, however, had been received to complete an initial issue to all units. Mess cans, canteen cups, small and medium-size raincoats, sleeping bags, shelter halves, mufflers, overshoes, and field jackets were the items most urgently needed. Although the shortage of mess gear by the end of the month was alleviated, all demands for this item had not been met. Overshoes in considerable quantity, particularly in large sizes, were required to complete the initial issue to all troops. A large shipment of overshoes was received, but it was necessary to issue them to replace combat losses.

Experience gained as a result of depot personnel applying water-resistant material to shoes, indicated that the highest degree of water resistance could be obtained by first applying dubbing, thoroughly working it into the leather, and then applying impregnite. Both dubbing and impregnite were on hand at Class II and IV depots in sufficient quantities for issue to all troops.

Additional time and mileage in the combat area became an urgent necessity. Four hundred and fifty mobile units were released to the Army on 27 December at Communications Zone Depot Number Q-177, at LAON (D54), by the Twelfth Army Group. Arrangements completed for shipment to Army Depot Number 4, at MONTET (D39), for immediate issue to forward patrols. One thousand two hundred mobile units, an equal amount of dressed oil were received from the Communications Zone for servicing rockets, railroads, and aerials. Information received from the classification Zone was that the white cloth was immediately available on the continent. About 2,000 mattress covers, from which 1,000 suits could be made, were secured at Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-178, at VERDUN (D26). The 203th Quartermaster Salvage Repair Company began the manufacture of pants from these mattress covers.



SNOW CAMOUFLAGE UNIT WINDSHIELDS BY THE 203TH QUARTERMASTER SALVAGE REPAIR COMPANY

Depot Number 6, near TOUL (D81), remained in operation throughout the month and was in reality the base Quartermaster Class II and IV Army depot. From this depot shipments to the other depots were made both by truck and by rail. It served all troops at the beginning of the month; but after the opening of depots 7, 8, and 9, it served only Army troops in the general vicinity. The officers' sales store at this depot closed on 9 December and reopened at the METZ (U85) Depot on 11 December.

Depot Number 7, at METZ (U85), opened at 1400 A December and remained open throughout the remainder of the month. It served XII and XX Corps troops and Army troops in the vicinity. Supplies for this depot had been, until 19 December, transported entirely by trucks, as there was no operating rail line into METZ (U85). Subsequent to this date, shipments for this depot were made by rail to MARS LA TOUR (U65), where they were transferred by depot personnel to trucks and hauled to the depot.

Depot Number 8, at ARNAVILLE (U44), which opened 171200 A December and closed 1130A A December, served XII Corps troops and Army troops in the vicinity. It was closed in anticipation of the opening of another depot on the new front to the north.

In order to better serve units of the VIII Corps refitting in the vicinity, Depot Number 9, at LUNEVILLE (T54), was opened 231200 A December. It received open A rounds at the remainder of the month and served III and VIII Corps troops and Army troops in the vicinity.

The base for Class II and IV supply continued to be Depot Q-140, at VERDUN (T37), operated by the Advance Section Communications Zone. To coordinate delivery of Quartermaster supplies, the Army Quartermaster was represented by a Liaison officer who was stationed at the depot.

Because of a shortage of stocks, it was decided to establish American Red Cross, War Department, and Army headquarters and corps and Army troops. They were placed on sale at the officers' sales stores in METZ (U85) and NANCY (T81) and the mobile sales stores serving the corps and divisions.

SECTION VI - CLASS III SECTION

The gasoline situation remained satisfactory throughout the month. The shortage of allied Class III products, which was critical at the beginning of the month, was completely corrected by 17 December. Gasoline receipts totaled 36,559.4 long tons, or 10,577,491 gallons, fifty-five per cent over requests. In the Army area on 1 December were 3,558,056 gallons of 7-80 gasoline and on 31 December were 2,789,993 gallons.

On 11 December a change in the method of Class III supply to the Army was inaugurated. The Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-178, at VERDUN (U26), became the base for Class III supplies for the Third U. S. Army. Before this date the Army had submitted the daily telegram through the 24th Regulating Station to the Advance Section Communications Zone for full requirements, including bulk. Beginning on this date, bulk shipments of 1,000 tons were to be shipped automatically to the Army direct from the Communications Zone. No telegram or other request was necessary. Requests for packaged gasoline and allied products required in addition to the bulk allocation were to be placed, beginning on this date, on a daily telegram and submitted directly to Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-178, at VERDUN (U26).

Three decanting points were in operation during the greater part of December. Two, at NANCY (U81) and MANGIENNLLES (U67), operated continuously throughout the month. A third point, at DOMGERMAIN (U50), which closed on 7 December, was reopened on 23 December. Another was established at Supply Point 58, at HARDIANGE (Q13), on 17 December and operated until 24 December, when the Seventh U. S. Army took over this point. After the change in the tactical situation, the daily receipt and decanting of 1,000 tons of bulk gasoline became too great a responsibility for the Army. As the result of a conference between the Army G-4, Army Quartermaster, and G-4, Advance Section Communications Zone, on 20 December, bulk gasoline shipped to the Army was reduced to 500 net tons daily. Shipments of bulk gasoline, however, continued to arrive spasmodically, which did not allow full utilization of the Army decanting facilities.

From 22 November until 7 December the Advance Section Communications Zone had held 228 cars of packaged gasoline on sidings at LANDRES (U68) in support of the Army. On 7 and 8 December these cars were unloaded at Army supply and reserve points. There was then no mobile reserve until 21 December, when loaded cars were placed at DOMGERMAIN (U50). To eliminate concentration of the mobile Class III reserve held aboard rail cars, it was decided on 23 December to distribute cars to several points. Seven railheads for the storage of this mobile reserve were selected - VALLEROY (U66), PONTOY (U78), OGNEVCOURT (U57), MARON (U70), FOUG (U51), DOMGERMAIN (U50), and SORCY (U41) - and the maximum amount to be stored at each point, except DOMGERMAIN (U50), was set at 200,000 gallons. DOMGERMAIN (U50) was chosen as an additional holding point on 30 December.

A loss of Class III supplies by fire resulting from enemy action occurred when Supply Point Number 438, at MANGIENNLLES (U67), was attacked by enemy aircraft on the night of 22 December. Part of the installation was damaged and decanting operations suspended, but repairs were made and decanting resumed within three days. Losses included 100,000 gallons of gasoline, a quantity of allied products, and 30,000 gasoline cans.

December was the first full month during which coal was issued to all troops. In October and November coal had been issued only to hospitals, to Army, corps, and division headquarters, and to miscellaneous users such as coffee-roasting units, shower installations, and rest centers. It was not until 28 November that coal was available for issue to

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all troops. The Army secured coal from three sources - local French mines, captured enemy stocks, and the Communications Zone. Coal issued during December totaled 8,297 tons, an increase of 241 per cent over the preceding month. A total of 6,141 tons was received from the Advance Section Communications Zone, a decrease of twenty-nine per cent from the preceding month. This indicated an increase in the use of captured and indigenous coal. Increased consumption of coal, however, beginning about 23 December, reduced the coal stocks in the Army area to approximately 4,000 tons by 31 December. The sharp increase in consumption of coal reflected the change in the direction of the Third U. S. Army advance to the north where climatic conditions were colder, and also the sudden increase of the troop strength of the Army.

SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

Arrangements were made with the Signal Section, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, to photograph unknown American soldiers whose remains were in such condition as to make photographs useful in establishing identity. On 10 December, for the first time in the campaign, photography was used to help identify unknown soldiers.



The Army railhead and decanting point at MANCIEULLES (U67), which had opened on 11 November, was in operation throughout December. The Advance Section Communications Zone constructed at this point a gasoline bulk storage and decanting tank, with a capacity of 210,000 gallons, the project being completed on 4 December. Gasoline was pumped from tank cars into this tank and then decanted by gravity into cans on the rail siding. From here the packaged gasoline was transported by rail to Army supply points.



Toward the end of the month the processing of American bodies at the cemeteries was hindered because German bodies clothed in American uniforms and having American identification tags were being received. Photography was very helpful in this situation, for photographs of suspected bodies could be sent to the units to which the soldiers were supposedly assigned, making positive identification much easier. Fingerprinting was also valuable in establishing the identity of these bodies.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at ANDILLY (U61) was turned over to the Advance Section Communications Zone at 090800 A December. This cemetery had closed for American burials on 5 November, but remained open for Allied burials.

Cold weather and snow delayed graves registration operations. The heavy snowfall especially hindered the recovery of bodies, as it was difficult to search the battle area. More labor was needed at the cemeteries as a result of the longer time required to dig graves in the frozen earth.

The status of all graves registration supplies, except for embossing plates, was satisfactory. A thirty-day supply, based on 5,000 burials per month, for the Army Graves Registration Service was stocked at Army Class II and IV depots.

Because of the changes in the tactical situation, cemeteries had to be opened in the new zone of operations. The following openings and closings of cemeteries reflected the shift to a new front:

The German Military Cemetery at ANDILLY (U61) closed at 200800 A December and was turned over to the Advance Section Communications Zone at 220800 A December. A total of 4,838 enemy burials had been made at this cemetery since its opening on 12 September.

German Military Cemetery Number 1 at DORVILLER (Q15) opened at 200800 A December, closed at 230800 A December, and was turned over to the Seventh U. S. Army at 240800 A December. Twenty-two enemy burials were made in this cemetery.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 2 at LINEY (U62) closed at 300800 A December and was turned over to the Advance Section Communications Zone at 310800 A December. A total of 5,611 American burials had been made at this cemetery since its opening on 5 November.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at GRAND FAILLY (U39) and an adjacent German cemetery opened at 230800 A December.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at HAMM, Luxembourg (V81), and an adjacent German cemetery opened at 290800 A December.

During December 4,924 burials were made, of which 3,021 were American, one was Allied, and 1,902 were enemy. Of the American dead, twenty-five were unknown, eight-tenths of one per cent.

SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

The following types and numbers of Quartermaster troop units were assigned or attached to the Third U. S. Army as of 31 December:

Hq & Hq Det, QM Group	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	4
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	7
QM Bakery Company, Special	7
QM Depot Company, Supply	2
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	4
QM Gasoline Supply Company	9
QM Graves Registration Company	4
QM Laundry Company	6[illegible]
QM Railhead Company	7
QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile	1
QM Sales Platoon	2
QM Salvage Collecting Company	3
QM Salvage Repair Company	3
QM Service Company	26
QM Service Detachment (Petroleum Products Laboratory) (Mobile Detachment)	1

After the VIII Corps came under the control of the Third U. S. Army, the following units, formerly with the First U. S. Army, were assigned or attached to the Third U. S. Army:

Hq & Hq Det, 588th QM Battalion, Mobile
571st QM Railhead Company
300th QM Gasoline Supply Company
3916th QM Gasoline Supply Company
3042d QM Graves Registration Company
3062d QM Bakery Company, Special
598th QM Laundry Company, Semimobile
972d QM Service Company
3218th QM Service Company

The number of laundry and fumigation and bath companies in support of the Army throughout the campaign had been short of requirements. In order to fulfill adequately all requirements for the Army at its current strength, ten laundry companies and six fumigation and bath companies could have been utilized.



In addition to mobile officers' sales stores operating in divisional areas, stationary stores for officers' and nurses' clothing were maintained at Class II and IV depots and in various strategically located cities. During December officers' stores were located at Depot Number 6, at TOUL (U61), until 9 December, at Depot Number 7, at METZ (U85), beginning on 11 December, and in NANCY (U81) throughout the month; and a nurses' store was located at Depot Number 6.



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The Meritorious Service Unit Plaque was awarded to the 295th Quartermaster Depot Company, Supply, for meritorious service between 17 July 1944 and 31 October 1944. The award was published in General Orders Number 102, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, dated 3 December 1944. This unit established the first Third U. S. Army Quartermaster Class II and IV depot on the Continent.

The following quartermaster units which supported the Third U. S. Army early in the campaign were commended by the Army Commander for outstanding performance of duty and high efficiency during the periods indicated:

561st QM Tank Truck Company (750 Gallon)
1 August 1944 to 12 September 1944

400th QM Tank Truck Company (750 Gallon)
2 August 1944 to 12 September 1944

Operating day and night without regular rest or regular meals, the men of these units delivered more than 2,000,000 gallons of gasoline during the period named and traveled approximately 775,000 vehicular miles. The commendation was published in General Orders Number 110, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, dated 16 December 1944.

SECTION IX - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

The Captured Enemy Materiel Detachment had operated in METZ (U85) since 22 November. Among the huge quantities of captured German supplies which it located and collected in METZ (U85) was a large amount of bridge equipment and other Engineer supplies found at a German warehouse at ARS SUR MOSELLE (U75). These supplies were released to Army Engineer Section representatives.

The petroleum products laboratory began to make more frequent tests of incoming shipments of gasoline and allied products at all Army supply points. Recent tests had determined that in some instances water and other foreign elements were present in petroleum containers.

Despite the cold weather and the fact that the change of the Third U. S. Army front required the movement of all bath installations, during the month 118,857 men were bathed. Divisional troops had first priority on bath service. Fortunately, it was possible, in almost every case, to locate bath installations in the forward area under cover in buildings which could be readily heated. The exchange of underclothing continued at all points.

The normal procedure at bath points was to issue clean clothing to bathers after bathing. Soiled clothing would be laundered, fumigated, sized, and subsequently reissued. Sufficient stocks of insecticide powder, delousing, had become available to permit its use at all bath points. By the direct application of the powder to bathers and to their clothing, considerably less time and effort were required. As a result, fumigation chambers at bathing points were no longer required. All fumigation chambers, except two per company, which were used at the salvage points, were returned to the Communications Zone.

Early in the month a standardization of tentage was made, and extra equipment was provided for all fumigation and bath companies. Each platoon was issued six squad tents in lieu of storage tents, two booster pumps, and an additional 200 feet of hose. Tent stoves for heating the dressing tents had been issued previously.

A SERIES OF PICTURES SHOWING LAUNDRY OPERATIONS



Maintenance of shower bath units became a problem. This was especially true of two fumigation and bath companies equipped with obsolete and non-standard units. Parts for these particular units were not available and considerable improvisation was necessary to keep them in operation. Spare parts for bath units were, generally, in critical supply.

Frequent requests were received from troop units for additional laundry service. Only six and one-quarter companies (fifty sections) were available and were employed as follows:

Fifteen sections to Medical installations.
Twenty-four sections to troops.
Eleven sections to Quartermaster salvage installations.

The majority of laundry units had operated throughout the campaign without serious maintenance difficulties; however, the short supply of spare parts and operating supplies, though improved, had been a handicap to operations and proper maintenance of laundries. During December, generators from five power plants were repaired by local civilian concerns. Nevertheless, laundries, operating at almost full capacity, processed 3,646,214 pounds during the month.

SECTION X - SALVAGE SECTION

The policy of maintaining a complete salvage repair set-up in close support of each corps was continued. Each of these installations included one salvage repair company, one salvage collecting company, three sections of a laundry company, and fumigation facilities consisting of two fumigation chambers. Considerable difficulty was encountered in finding locations with suitable cover and hard standing for such installations and yet in close proximity to a source of water necessary for the laundry operations.

Salvage collecting points operated by small detachments from the salvage collecting companies were maintained at each Class I supply point. Salvage brought to these points was separated and sorted into general classifications by these teams. Salvage was evacuated further by returning empty ration trucks or by salvage collecting vehicles to the salvage repair installations, where classification was completed by the remainder of the salvage collection personnel. All repairable articles, within the capability of the repair companies, were fumigated or laundered, then repaired and returned to Army Class II depots for reissue. The salvage collecting personnel, in addition to classification of salvage, assisted in painting helmets and intrenching tools, repairing mess gear, and cleaning overshoes and other equipment.



Throughout the campaign, up to this time, only those items that could not be repaired by Army Quartermaster repair units had been evacuated to the Communications Zone. These had included scrap items classified as Class "X". During this month, however, because of the shift of the Third U. S. Army front and the unprecedented amount of salvage collected, it was necessary to ship a considerable quantity to the rear. Almost twenty-eight per cent of the total salvaged items collected, or 316,091 unclassified items, were shipped to the Advance Section Communications Zone Depot G-180, at METZ (T37). Of the total of 1,141,049 items collected during the month, 824,958 items were classified. This was an increase of twenty-three per cent over the preceding month. The items were classified as follows:

Class B	524,469
Class C	74,455
Class X	226,034

Items of clothing and equipment amounting to 113,219 were repaired during the month, representing a fifty-five per cent increase over the preceding month. These were delivered either to Class II depots or to bath installations for reissue.

The fumigation of all clothing at salvage repair points was discontinued. The Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, advised that laundering was sufficient to render clothing and equipment clean and sanitary. Fumigation was continued, however, for all items which were not laundered.

Field range repair units and typewriter repair teams made repairs to the following items:

Fire units	3,185
Heaters, immersion type	55
Lanterns, gasoline	2,988
Stoves, cooking, one and two burner	1,769
Typewriters, portable	193
Typewriters, non-portable	171
Pumps, hand	141
Machines, mimeograph	2
Machines, miscellaneous	9

The supply of spare parts for field ranges, one and two-burner stoves, gasoline lanterns, and immersion-type water heaters, which had been unsatisfactory for some time, was considerably improved by the end of the month. Typewriter parts and special tools for repair of noiseless typewriters were particularly critical.

The 2,185 yards of white cloth which had been requisitioned by the Quartermaster Purchasing and Contracting Officer on 24 December from local French civilian sources, were delivered to the 300th Quartermaster Salvage Repair Company. This unit completed approximately 700 improvised snow tunics in less than twenty-four hours, and made immediate delivery to Army Class II and IV Depot Number 7, at METZ (U85). The suits were allocated to the XII and XX Corps for issue to patrols.

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CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Quartermaster Section was with the rear echelon of Army Headquarters throughout the month, at HARCT (U81) until 7 January and at HECH (P70), in Luxembourg, beginning on that date.

The Army continued its attack to the north against the German salient through Luxembourg and eastern Belgium. Contact was made with the First U. S. Army on 15 January in the vicinity of HOUFFALIZE (P57), Belgium. The direction of the major attack was then shifted to the northeast, north of the MOSELLE River, toward the Siegfried Line defenses. Since the tactical situation did not move rapidly, the physical problems confronting the Army Quartermaster were not so great as those which had prevailed during the preceding two months. The more static situation permitted the maintenance of supply points and Quartermaster service installations in close support of the troops. In the area of the current operations the limited road net imposed continued transportation problems, particularly during the latter part of the month, when the advance neared the German border.

Composition of the Army and status of its major units changed frequently during the month. The 17th Airborne Division was attached to the Third U. S. Army on 1 January, remaining assigned to the XVIII Corps (Airborne). The 94th Infantry Division was assigned to the Army on 6 January. The 9th Armored Division and 28th Infantry Division were relieved from assignment to the Third U. S. Army and assigned to the Fifteenth U. S. Army on 8 January. The 8th and 9th Armored Divisions were attached to the Third U. S. Army for supply and administration on 11 January, but remained assigned to the Fifteenth U. S. Army. The 10th Armored Division passed to the control of the Commanding General, Sixth U. S. Army Group, on 17 January. The 76th Infantry Division was relieved from assignment to the Fifteenth U. S. Army and assigned to the Third U. S. Army on 18 January. The 101st Airborne Division was relieved of attachment to the Third U. S. Army and the Twelfth U. S. Army Group and attached to the Sixth U. S. Army Group, remaining assigned to the XVIII Corps (Airborne), on 20 January. The 75th Infantry Division (less the 134th Regimental Combat Team) passed to the control of the Sixth U. S. Army Group on 22 January.

The following were the major elements of the Army on 31 January:

III Corps:	4th Armored Division, 35th Infantry Division (134th Regimental Combat Team only), 17th Airborne Division, and Corps Troops.
VIII Corps:	11th Armored Division, 4th Infantry Division, 87th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, 95th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
XII Corps:	6th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 76th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
XX Corps:	26th Infantry Division, 94th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
Army Reserve:	8th Armored Division and 9th Armored Division.

The following table shows the total number of troops the Army had the responsibility of supplying at the beginning and the end of the month:

	1 JANUARY	31 JANUARY
Assigned Strength of the Army	353,655	362,937
Advance Section Communications Zone Units	25,336	27,305
Ninth Air Force Units	37,033	23,755
French Units	2,271	3,179
Miscellaneous Troops	2,344	1,325
TOTAL	420,639	418,501

In addition there were considerable and varying numbers of prisoners of war, civilian laborers, and civilian mine technicians who were supplied with rations.

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

Approximately 9,000 square yards of felt material were requisitioned by the Quartermaster Purchasing and Contracting Officer from a local French civilian source. This material was used for making insoles for shoe pacs. To replace broken pick handles at the Army cemeteries, 1,200 were requisitioned from a local source.

During January the Bronze Star Medal, for meritorious service, was awarded to seven officers and eighteen enlisted men of Quartermaster units by General Orders published by Headquarters Third U. S. Army.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

The Quartermaster supply situation in the Army remained generally satisfactory. Several Class II and IV items were still critically short, but others that had been on the critical list were received in sufficient quantity during the month. Shortages that had occurred in general were not such that they hampered operations. The solid-fuel shortage was serious, but had improved considerably by the end of the month.

As a result of the change in the tactical situation and the consequent change in Army boundaries, shifts in supply installations were made. Class I Supply Point Number 51, at CHAMPIGNEULLES (U81), and Class III Supply Point Number 50, at HARCT (U81), were turned over to the Seventh U. S. Army on 23 and 27 January, respectively. The Third U. S. Army, however, continued to supply these points through daily telegram requests for stockage of the Class I supply point including 31 January and the Class III supply point through 2 February. Class II and IV Depot Number 6, at TOUL (U61), was closed, although it remained as a reconsignment point until its supplies could be moved to depots to the north. Gasoline decanting was discontinued at HARCT (U81) and at DOMGERMAIN (U50). After the change of the Army's southern boundary all the above installations were in the Seventh U. S. Army area.

Because of the tactical situation on the front of the XX Corps early in the month, Class I and Class III Supply Points Number 65, at FREISTROFF (Q07) and at FIRLANGE (Q07), were somewhat critically located. Stocks at those points were held down to a one-day supply. Stock levels at Class II and IV Depot Number 7, at METZ (U85), also were reduced. Before the end of the month, however, the improved tactical situation permitted unrestricted operation at these installations.

All classes of Quartermaster supplies were requested by and delivered to the Army under the same system that had been in effect during December. The great majority of the supplies were transported to Army supply points by railway direct from the Communications Zone. No Quartermaster supplies were received in the Army area by airplane, and only approximately one-third of the Class II and IV supplies arrived by truck transport.

With the completion of a railroad bridge over the MOSELLE River at THIONVILLE (U88) on 3 January, rail facilities were available to all Class I and Class III supply points. The Class II and IV Depot at METZ (U85), Number 7, could not be reached by train; consequently, supply trains for that point were dispatched to MARS LA TOUR (U65) and MAGONDANGE (U87), from which Army trucks transported the supplies to the depot. Every effort was made to insure maximum use of existing operating railroad facilities to serve Quartermaster supply installations. During the latter part of the month, however, it became necessary to use more truck transport to supply newly established supply points in northern Luxembourg and eastern Belgium.

In continuance of the policy of maintaining a mobile reserve of rations and gasoline to support the attack against the German salient established in December, a considerable quantity was held aboard railway cars. Mobile reserve holding points were established along the MEUSE River to the north of VERDUN (U26), including the following points: DUN (U19), MOUZON (P01), SAULMORY (U19), CARIGNAN (P11), MARGUT (P01), and STENAY (P10). Other holding points west of the MOSELLE River and north of METZ (U85) were established at PONTOY (U78), ROULANGE (U78), ROMETZ (U79), and VALLEROY (U66).

Later in the month a rail-car shortage developed in the Communications Zone, as the result of which the greater part of the reserves were unloaded.

The Army Quartermaster Operations Division continued to function at the Class I and Class III railhead and regulating points. Points in operation during the month included BRIEY (U77) and LONGWY (P50). The Operations Officer was located at LONGWY (P50), through which point practically all Quartermaster Class I and Class III supplies were routed. BASTOGNE (P55) became a rail forwarding point on 30 January.

The Army Quartermaster supply points in operation during the month are shown in Annex Number 6 to this report.

SECTION IV - CLASS I SECTION

Class I supply was very satisfactory during January. Total receipts for the month were 36,138.5 long tons and total issues were 34,800.4 long tons, or 15,399,811 rations, an average daily issue of 496,769. Army units received eighty-four and six-tenths per cent of the

[redacted] and units attached for rations received fifteen and four-tenths per cent. Eighty-four and [illegible] per cent of the month's issues were "A"-type (or "B"-type [illegible]) and five-tenths per cent were "10-in-1"-type; three and [illegible] per cent were "C"-type; and five and two-tenths per cent were "K"-type. Rations on hand in the Army area at the beginning of the month totaled 1,134,964, and at the end of the month, 1,393,090. An additional 660,000 operational-type rations were held in reserve for the Army at Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Number Q-178, at VERDUN (U26).

A shortage of "K"-type rations had developed during the last week of December. Since 11 December the issue of this ration to combat troops had been restricted to fifty per cent of the operational-type rations requested, but on 22 January an increase in receipts permitted the lifting of this restriction. Issues, however, were still limited to combat troops.

Following instructions from the Chief Quartermaster, European Theater of Operations, a change in the designation of "B"-type rations went into effect. The ration containing fresh meats and vegetables which was currently being issued daily was designated as the "A"-type ration instead of the "B"-type. Perishable components were being issued regularly as substitutes for canned components of the "B"-type ration. The designation of the "B"-type ration held as reserve, having canned-meat components, was not changed.

Condiment issues heretofore had been made semi-monthly, on the first and fifteenth. This basis having proved inadequate, it was arranged to make three issues per month, on the seventh, seventeenth, and twenty-seventh.

Gratuitous issues of toilet articles, candy, and cigarettes were generally satisfactory. Razors and razor blades, however, were in short supply. Effective with the issue on 28 January, the allotment of cigarettes was seven packages per man per week instead of five packages.

During the first part of the month fresh meat and butter were in short supply, because of delays in the arrival of reefer vessels from the United States. This situation was relieved during the latter part of the month; but weekly issues on the basis of ten meals per week, authorized by the Communications Zone, were not possible.

Fresh oranges, shelled eggs, and fresh vegetables were issued on several occasions during January. Losses due to freezing were not considerable, because of the extra precautions taken.

SECTION V - CLASS II AND IV SECTION

The Class II and IV supply situation was generally favorable; however, the abrupt increase in troop strength that had occurred during the preceding month and the larger number of battle losses needing replacement still affected this class of supply. Clothing and equipment received during January totaled 5,973.75 long tons, an average of 192.7 long tons per day. On 31 January 4,707.5 long tons of supplies were on hand in the depots, an increase of sixty-eight per cent over 31 December. Requisitions processed totaled 12,975, an average of 419 per day, twenty-six per cent more than in December.

Several items that had long been seriously short were removed from the critical list. Sufficient gasoline lanterns, canteen cups, and field jackets were received to meet most demands. With the issue of shoe pacs the overall footgear situation in all units was considered very satisfactory. Overshoes had been short in supply in sizes eleven and above prior to this time. Cleaning and preserving materials remained critically short. Among the principal items in short supply at the end of the month were ordinary issue soap, tufted brushes, scrubbing brushes, corrugated cans, one-burner stoves, office supplies and equipment, and barber kits.

Seven hundred tons of special winter clothing for the Army were delivered by Communications Zone trucks and trains to Army Depot Number 9, at LONGWY (P50). The shipment consisted of shoe pacs, insoles, arctic and ski socks, ponchos, trigger-finger shell mittens, trigger-finger insert mittens, wool mufflers, cotton field caps, cotton trousers, and trouser suspenders. The items were allocated to combat units and no [illegible] stocks were retained in Army depots. Infantry divisions [illegible] and armored divisions, 4,000 [illegible] with two pairs of insoles and two pairs of socks, [illegible]. In anticipation of calls for replacement of insoles, a large quantity of felt was purchased in the local markets.

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A schedule was arranged for units to draw supplies at Army Class II and IV depots and published in Administrative Order Number 27, this headquarters, dated 5 January. Units were to be served only at designated depots and on days assigned. Requisitions were to be submitted on an assigned day for the troops concerned, and issues were to be made on the next assigned day.

A difficult supply problem was the equipping of reinforcements and casuals coming into the Army area. This task necessitated almost a complete initial issue of individual equipment. Since stock levels in the depots were based on maintenance factors only, a heavy burden was placed on the Army Class II and IV supply. At a conference at the office of the Chief Quartermaster on 26 January, a new procedure for the issue of II and IV supply of the 12th Reinforcement Depot was developed. Under this system the 12th Reinforcement Depot would submit to the Army Quartermaster twenty-day requisitions for full requirements of all quartermaster Class II and IV items, and the Army Quartermaster, after indicating the destination desired for the supplies, would forward the requisitions to the Commodities Firms. Reinforcement requisitions were not to be consolidated with the Army periodic maintenance requisition. This plan would go into effect after the current requisition period.

Depot Number 6, near TOUL (Dull), which had opened on 20 September, closed for issues at 1200A 1 January, but continued to operate as a storage and reconsignment point until its supplies could be moved.

Depot Number 7, at METZ (Ud5), remained in operation throughout the month and served the troops of III and IX Corps and Army troops in the vicinity.

Depot Number 7A, near CHATEAU (Ud4), opened on 12 January as a storage depot and remained in operation throughout the remainder of the month. Clothing and equipment over immediate requirements for issue to the troops being served at Depot Number 7 were shipped there because of the prevailing tactical situation.

Depot Number 9, at LONGWY (Fy5), remained in operation throughout the month. It served the troops of III and VIII Corps and Army troops in the vicinity. Owing to the lack of suitable buildings, this depot operated in the open, exposed to severe winter conditions. Although handicapped by weather and transportation difficulties, this depot functioned with high efficiency. It was through Depot Number 9 that the battle losses of the VIII Corps, which resulted from the German breakthrough, were replaced and maintenance furnished to a large percentage of the troops engaged in the BASTOGNE area.



OPEN STORAGE AT DEPOT NUMBER 9, LONGWY, FRANCE

SECTION VI - CLASS III SECTION

The gasoline supply situation was favorable during January. Gasoline received totaled [illegible] gallons, seventy-six per cent over requests. Issues of [illegible] gallons, an average daily issue of [illegible] gallons per day, the highest of the campaign up to that time. In the Army area on 1 January were [illegible] gallons of 74-octane gasoline and on 31 January were 2,[illegible]74 gallons.

The gasoline dispensing point at MANCHESTER (Ud7) operated continuously throughout the month. The point at METZ (Ud5) closed [illegible] and reopened at [illegible] on 1 January, remaining open until 31 January. The point at [illegible] opened on 25 January. During the month [illegible] gallons were distributed to the [illegible] troops. A daily report of issues was rendered to the Army, but shipments did not arrive accurately.

Because of the cold weather, 74-80 gasoline, which has the lowest vaporization test in artillery fuels, [illegible] a mixture of 74-80 and aviation [illegible] was obtained from [illegible] for that purpose. Stocks of the 74-octane gasoline were in existence at the [illegible]. While gasoline was tested by the [illegible] Laboratory, it was found unsatisfactory for use in the engines of [illegible] vehicles. Efforts were made from the [illegible] to obtain a satisfactory fuel. At the time the [illegible] gasoline were at [illegible] 74-80 [illegible] and later [illegible] operation was [illegible] to [illegible] Twenty-first Army Group. In the future [illegible] gasoline [illegible] supplies to the element by air [illegible] element was the [illegible] [illegible] Army Group. Additional [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] have been made, more had been received by the end of the month.

The coal supply situation at the beginning of the month was critical. As the result of the [illegible] of the Army Group [illegible] increased shortages of the Army as [illegible] weather and [illegible] the Army area of operations [illegible] Requirements [illegible] were being made directly to the receiving [illegible] were initiated to reduce the [illegible] ration from [illegible] per day. [illegible] headquarters were [illegible] supplies by fifty per cent. The supply for hospitals, however, remained unchanged.

Several measures were employed to meet the coal situation. The [illegible] of all [illegible] was [illegible]. They [illegible] the [illegible] III Corps [illegible] the [illegible] A [illegible] the [illegible] was [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

An enemy shell of an unidentified type landed in the area of the semi-mobile laundry operated by the 1st Section, 4th Platoon, of the 452d Quartermaster Laundry Company, located with the 104th Evacuation Hospital in the City of LUXEMBOURG (PH1), at 121910 4 January. The shell did considerable damage to two mobile laundry vans, which were replaced, and one tractor, which was repaired. Seven men were injured, three seriously.

The supply of spare parts for Quartermaster general and special purpose equipment, although improved, was not entirely satisfactory. Replacement parts, particularly for bath units, continued to be critical. Nearly all equipment had received long, hard usage and maintenance was becoming an increasing problem.

Because of a change in Army boundaries, the Captured Enemy Materiel Depot at NANCY (U81) was closed and the supplies moved to the Captured Enemy Materiel Depot at METZ (U85).

SECTION I - SALVAGE SECTION

Again this month, as in December, it was found impossible to classify all of the huge amount of salvage collected. Of the 1,473,269 items collected during the month, however, 1,432,269 were classified, an increase of seventy-four per cent over the preceding month, and only 41,000 were shipped without classification directly to the Communications Zone. The items were classified as follows:

Class B	707,221
Class C	111,797
Class I	613,251

Salvage repair companies repaired 69,804 items of clothing and equipment during the month. These were delivered either to Army Class II and IV depots or to bath installations for reissue.

Field range repair units and typewriter repair teams continued operations at base shops located at the Class II and IV depots, and at salvage repair points. During the month repairs were made to the following special purpose items:

Fire units	2,811
Heaters, water, immersion type	100
Lanterns, gasoline	2,187
Stoves, cooking, one and two burner	2,133
Typewriters, portable	210
Typewriters, non-portable	249
Pumps, hand	117
Machines, mimeograph	6
Machines, miscellaneous	7



INTERIOR OF MOBILE TYPEWRITER REPAIR VAN

The following supplies, formerly handled by the Quartermaster Class II and IV depots, were turned over to field-range-repair units for stocking and issuing:

Parts for gasoline lanterns
Parts for one and two-burner stoves
Parts for fire units for field ranges, M-1937
Parts for immersion-type water heaters

Salvage repair units were responsible for stocking and issuing tent-patching cement and material.

In addition to the normal repair operations, all Quartermaster salvage repair units assisted in the manufacture of special items, including 3,198 snow-camouflage suits and a large number of felt insoles for shoe pacs, and the modification of 15,000 identification panels for the Army Signal Officer.

CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Quartermaster Section was with the rear echelon of Army Headquarters throughout the month, at ESCH-ALZETTE (FT0), in Luxembourg, until 6 February and at LUXEMBOURG CITY (PH1) beginning on that date.

The major offensive continued in the sector north of the MOSELLE River to the east through the Siegfried Line defenses. PRUM (LO7), Germany, fell to troops of the VIII Corps on 12 February; and BITBURG (L15), Germany, was captured later in the month by troops of the XII Corps. A secondary drive in the XX Corps sector between the MOSELLE and SAUER Rivers toward TRIER (L22) had gained considerable headway by the end of the month. The tactical operations throughout the month were such that Quartermaster activities were normal and no difficulties, except for problems of transportation, were experienced. Warmer weather, causing the snow and ice to melt, and the heavy military traffic on the existing limited road net resulted in extremely bad road conditions, which adversely affected truck transport, particularly in the VIII Corps zone. Despite impaired transportation facilities, however, it was possible to maintain adequately at all times supply points in the forward areas.

Frequent changes occurred in the composition of the Army during the month. Reassignment to other commands resulted in a decrease of one corps headquarters, three divisions, and one regimental combat team. The 134th Regimental Combat Team of the 35th Infantry Division was relieved from attachment to the III Corps and the entire division was assigned to the Ninth U. S. Army. The 84th Armored Division was relieved from attachment to the Third U. S. Army. (It was relieved from assignment to the Fifteenth U. S. Army and assigned to the Ninth U. S. Army.) The 95th Infantry Division was relieved from assignment to the Third U. S. Army and assigned to the Ninth U. S. Army. The 17th Airborne Division was relieved from attachment to the Third U. S. Army and the Twelfth U. S. Army Group and attached to the First Allied Airborne Army (U. S. Increment), remaining assigned to the XVIII Corps (Airborne). Headquarters III Corps was relieved from assignment to the Third U. S. Army on 11 February and assigned to the First U. S. Army. The 10th Armored Division was relieved of attachment to the Sixth U. S. Army Group, remaining assigned to the Third U. S. Army; and the 9th Armored Division was relieved of attachment to the Third U. S. Army, relieved of assignment to the Fifteenth U. S. Army, and assigned to the First U. S. Army.

The following were the major units of the Army on 28 February:

VIII Corps: 6th Armored Division, 11th Armored Division, 4th Infantry Division, 87th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

XII Corps: 4th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 76th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

XX Corps: 10th Armored Division, 26th Infantry Division, 94th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

The following table shows the total number of troops the Army had the responsibility of supplying at the beginning and the end of the month:

	1 FEBRUARY	28 FEBRUARY
Assigned Strength of the Army	353,635	304,348
Advance Section Communications Zone Units	25,864	24,058
Ninth Air Force Units	27,290	27,158
French Units	1,794	2,514
Miscellaneous Troops	2,871	1,920
TOTAL	411,454	359,998

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

During February the Legion of Merit, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services, was awarded to one officer of the Quartermaster Section through General Orders published by Headquarters European Theater of Operations; and the Bronze Star Medal, for meritorious service, was awarded to seven officers and six enlisted men of Quartermaster units through General Orders published by Headquarters Third U. S. Army.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

The general supply status remained sound during the month. The shortages of both solid fuel and 73-octane gasoline were relieved. The supply of clothing and equipment improved steadily and the critical list of Class II and IV items was further reduced.

A new supply procedure for the Continent went into effect during February. This plan was set forth in Standing Operating Procedure Number 7, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, dated 2 February. Armies were to be supplied from advance depots through daily telegrams and requisitions submitted to regulating stations. For Class I and Class III supplies daily telegrams would be submitted by each army to the appropriate regulating station, which would forward them to the designated issuing depot. For Class II and IV supplies twenty-day requisitions would be sent to the regulating station and forwarded from there to the issuing depot. The depot was to be responsible for shipping requirements through the appropriate regulating station to the army. The regulating stations were to expedite and maintain, by close coordination with the issue depots and the armies, the flow of supplies to the railheads and supply points designated by the armies within their areas. Essentially the new procedure placed more responsibility on the regulating stations.

The above procedure had previously been in effect for Class I and Class III supply in the Third U. S. Army, but it was a change from the former Class II and IV procedure of submitting requisitions directly to a designated depot. The first requisition under the new system was for the period from 21 February to 10 March.

The method of supply to the Army from the rear continued to approach more nearly the procedure as outlined in field manuals. Practically all supplies came into the Army area by rail, although a considerable quantity of Class II and IV items arrived by truck and a very small portion of all classes came by air lift. The base for Class I and Class III supplies was the Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Number Q-178, at VERDUN (U26); for Class II and IV, the Communications Zone Depot Number Q-180, at REIMS (T37). The Army service area remained relatively constant in size throughout the period, being roughly from ten to fifteen miles deep and eighty-five miles wide. Generally two or three Class I and Class III supply points in this area served Army troops. From the corps rear boundary to the front lines the distance was approximately twenty-five miles.



CLASS I SUPPLY POINT NUMBER [illegible] OPERATING FIRST IN GERMANY

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

The XIX Corps Area, on the north [illegible] twenty-five miles in width. [illegible] First Army on 1 February the three divisions were placed under the control of the [illegible] Corps. In this area the terrain was the limited road and rail net [illegible] active area. A movement of a few [illegible] As a result of the thawing weather, [illegible] after the tenth of the month and by the [illegible] because of dirty weather, [illegible] used to the greatest extent possible, [illegible] of mud-stabilizing [illegible] [illegible] were established, where supplies were [illegible] portation to forward supply points [illegible] Point Kamer A [illegible] at Nimfo. [illegible] larly difficult [illegible] passage of the [illegible] III Joint Army [illegible] made to the [illegible] was necessary [illegible] were [illegible] points averaged five [illegible] eight to thirty miles [illegible] corps were served by rail transportation.



REMOVING "K"-TYPE RATIONS FROM PACK ASSEMBLY

The zone of operations of the XIX Corps, [illegible] of the XIII Corps, was [illegible] latter [illegible] for the period February [illegible] were [illegible] III Joint Army [illegible] made to the [illegible] was necessary [illegible] were [illegible] points averaged five [illegible] eight to thirty miles [illegible] corps were served by rail transportation.

The XV Corps front [illegible] the [illegible] River line from [illegible] its army's southern boundary. Its area was the narrowest, varying from [illegible] twenty-five miles in width. Fifteen [illegible] points or rail [illegible] Class I and two for Class III supplies were established [illegible] fifteen to twenty miles to the rear of the front-line troops.

Quartermaster supply points in operation during the month are graphically illustrated in [illegible] this report.

SECTION II - CLASS I SUPPLY

Class I supply [illegible] operations during February. Ration receipts for the [illegible] an average of [illegible] per day. [illegible] per cent of the issues were [illegible] and the [illegible] per cent by [illegible] B rations and 10 per cent [illegible] were [illegible] [illegible] per cent of the [illegible] were [illegible] [illegible] were [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

The solid-fuel situation in the Army improved during the month, not only because of increased shipments from the Communications Zone, but also because of decreased consumption due to warmer weather. Although the shortage of coal and coke, which had existed for several weeks, was relieved, more frequent and regular shipments were needed for complete maintenance and for the building of an Army reserve. By 11 February approximately three days of supply of coal and coke were on hand in the Army. Receipts of coal totaled 10,605 tons, of which 8,487 were from the Communications Zone and 2,118 were from indigenous sources; and issues totaled 9,264 tons. On 28 February 2,059 tons of coal were on hand.

SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

Approximately twenty per cent of the deceased personnel delivered to cemeteries were without identification tags, making the process of identification difficult and uncertain. Instructions on the wearing of identification tags were published in Circular Number 20, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, dated 25 February 1945. It directed that organization commanders insure full compliance with the Army Regulations governing the wearing of identification tags and that lost tags be immediately replaced with a substitute until new tags could be secured.

The melting of the snow revealed many bodies in the BASTOGNE (P55) area that had remained after the retreat of the Germans. Throughout the month graves registration collecting teams continued to search this area. Also, many unburied bodies were still being recovered by collecting teams in the area of METZ (U85) and SAARLAUTERN (J72).

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at HAMM, Luxembourg (P81), and the adjacent German Military Cemetery remained in operation throughout the month. U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at FOY, Belgium (T56), and an adjacent German cemetery opened on 4 February. The American and German cemeteries at GRAND FAILLY (U19), which had opened on 23 December, closed on 3 February and were turned over to the Advance Section Communications Zone. Total burials made in the GRAND FAILLY (U19) cemeteries were 2,741 American, eighteen Allied, and 1,443 enemy.

During February 8,265 burials were made, of which 3,699 were American, seventeen were Allied, and 4,549 were enemy. Of the American dead, thirty-seven (one per cent) were unknown. This was the first month since the beginning of operations in which the number of German burials had exceeded the number of American.

SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

The following types and numbers of Quartermaster troop units were assigned or attached to the Third U. S. Army as of 28 February:

Hq & Hq Det, QM Group	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	3
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	8
QM Bakery Company, Special	7
QM Depot Company, Supply	2
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	5
QM Gasoline Supply Company	7
QM Graves Registration Company	4
QM Laundry Company	6½
QM Railhead Company	6
QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile	1
QM Sales Platoon	2
QM Salvage Collecting Company	3
QM Salvage Repair Company	3
QM Service Company	23
QM Service Detachment (Petroleum Products Laboratory) (Mobile Detachment)	1

The following Quartermaster units were released by the Third U. S. Army to other armies:

200th QM Gasoline Supply Company
3877th QM Gasoline Supply Company
574th QM Railhead Company
456th QM Laundry Company (Detachments "C" and "D")
3218th QM Service Company
4404th QM Service Company
4405th QM Service Company

The 3d Platoon, 680th Quartermaster Laundry Company, was loaned to the Army by the Advance Section Communications Zone.

The Meritorious Service Unit Plaque was awarded to the following units by General Orders, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, for service between the dates indicated:

UNIT	DATE
258th QM Railhead Company	16 October 1944 to 22 December 1944
352d QM Railhead Company	24 July 1944 to 22 December 1944
3007th QM Bakery Company, Mobile	3 November 1944 to 3 January 1945
3034th QM Bakery Company, Mobile	6 October 1944 to 26 December 1944

SECTION IX - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

The Captured Enemy Materiel Detachment was active in the exploitation of enemy stores. A valuable acquisition in SAARLAUTERN (J72) was a large quantity of office supplies which were critically needed. Usable items of enemy materiel were also removed from FORT GRIANT and FORT JEANNE D'ARC, near METZ (U85). Supplies for which the Army had no need were released to the Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Number C-176, at VERDUN (U26), which included 916,000 pounds of dunnage, twelve cooking stoves, 207 cans of printers' ink, 100,000 cardboard cartons, and 6,000 pounds of uncut paper.



CAPTURED HEATING AND VENTILATING EQUIPMENT IN ENEMY MATERIEL WAREHOUSE AT METZ

Bath units continued operations in divisional areas. Men bathed during the month totaled 206,401, an increase of thirteen per cent over January and the greatest monthly total since the beginning of the campaign. The exchange of clean underwear and socks for soiled items was continued as a regular procedure.

Laundry units operating in forward areas and at hospitals also achieved a record production figure. Laundry processed during the month totaled 4,929,993 pounds, which was an increase of eleven per cent over the preceding month.

Laundry tests were conducted on samples of new types of winter clothing. As a result of the tests, it was concluded that the sweater, high neck, wool, olive drab; trousers, wool, olive drab, twenty-ounce; and jacket, wool, olive drab, ETO, were unsuitable for laundering and should be dry cleaned. The jacket, field, M1943; trousers, field, cotton; and jacket, field, pile, could be successfully laundered. Results of this study were to be incorporated in the recommendations for the type of winter uniform considered desirable in this theater.

SECTION X - SALVAGE SECTION

Of the 1,594,678 items of salvage collected during February, it was possible to classify 1,296,097 items, eighty-one per cent of the total; and the remaining 298,581 unclassified items were shipped directly to the Communications Zone Depot Number C-180, at REIMS (T37). Class "E" and unrepairable scrap items were also evacuated to the rear. The items were classified as follows:

Class B	769,542
Class C	151,116
Class X	375,439

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CLOTHING REPAIR SECTION

During the month 72,638 items of clothing and equipment were repaired by salvage repair companies and returned to Army supply channels for reissue to troops.

Field range repair units and typewriter repair teams, operating at base shops and salvage repair points, repaired the following items:

Fire units	3,206
Heaters, immersion type	113
Lanterns, gasoline	2,259
Stoves, cooking, one and two burner	2,200
Typewriters, portable	307
Typewriters, non-portable	267
Pumps, hand	114
Machines, mimeograph	2
Machines, adding	5
Machines, miscellaneous office	11
TOTAL	8,484

All Quartermaster salvage repair companies were engaged in the manufacture of special items. They had completed a large number of suits for snow camouflage before the manufacture of that item was discontinued about the middle of the month. These units also made felt insoles for shoe pacs, money bags, and other miscellaneous items. One company modified a total of 23,253 identification panels for the Army Signal Officer.



SALVAGING FIRE UNIT PARTS

DE

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CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Quartermaster Section was with the rear echelon of Army Headquarters at [illegible] (F81), until 29 March and at TRIER (L22), Germany, after that date.

During the month the tactical operations of the Third U. S. Army progressed with increasing speed. At first the major effort was north of the [illegible] River. A bridgehead was established across the [illegible] River by troops of the XII Corps early on 1 March and another drive by the XX Corps effected the capture of TRIER (L22) on 2 March. From the [illegible] River line the advance continued successively to the XII Corps and VIII Corps breakthrough resulted in a drive to the RHINE River. The XII Corps then swung south and established a bridgehead across the lower MOSELLE River on 13 March. The advance of this corps continued rapidly; WORMS (M41) was taken on 20 March and LUDWIGSHAFEN (M51), was captured on 22 March. COBLENZ (L89) was cleared on 19 March by troops of the VIII Corps.

Meanwhile the XX Corps, attacking from the SAAR River bridgeheads, drove through and met forces of the XII Corps on 26 March, this juncture resulting in the encirclement of large enemy forces south of the MOSELLE.

A bridgehead across the RHINE River was established on the night of 22-23 March. The development to the north and east of this and other crossings had by the end of the month effected further spectacular gains by the Third U. S. Army. By 31 March armored spearheads had crossed the FULDA River and were nearing KASSEL (C24).

As in the month of February, the chief problem of the Army Quartermaster was one of transportation. The relatively warm and dry weather resulted in rapid improvement of road conditions, which had been very bad during the previous month. Good roads, and always network of well-paved roads in the large evening area, part of nearly each of the MOSELLE and east of the RHINE, favored tactical operations. However, inclined to the fast-moving situation, the long distances imposed transportation problems of no small magnitude. By cooperation and teamwork between the Army and the Advance Section Communications Zone, the essential Quartermaster supplies were transported the long distances from the Army railheads, which were established generally along a north-south line through TRIER (L22), and west of the RHINE and MAIN Rivers, to forward Army supply points.

The composition of the Army changed often during March. By the end of the month the Army had lost the 17th Armored Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 94th Infantry Division and gained the 65th Infantry Division, 71st Infantry Division, and 95th Infantry Division. The following were the major units of the Army on 31 March.

VIII Corps. 76th Infantry Division, 87th Infantry Division, 89th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

XII Corps. 4th Armored Division, 11th Armored Division, 26th Infantry Division, 71st Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

XX Corps. 6th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 65th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

The Army had the responsibility of supplying the following troops at the beginning and the end of the month:

	1 MARCH	31 MARCH
Assigned Strength of the Army	304,695	312,304
Communications Zone Units	20,695	17,714
Ninth Air Force Units	24,125	7,793
French Units	1,910	0
Miscellaneous Troops	3,216	421
TOTAL	354,131	339,148

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

During March efforts of the Quartermaster Purchasing and Contracting Officer were particularly devoted to purchasing office supplies and requisitioning facilities for the printing of certain blank forms.

The Legion of Merit, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services, was awarded to one officer of the Quartermaster Section through General Orders published by Headquarters European Theater of Operations; and the Bronze Star Medal, for meritorious service, was awarded to one officer of the Quartermaster Section and two enlisted men of Quartermaster units through General Orders published by Headquarters Third U. S. Army during the month.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

The Quartermaster supply situation remained in the generally satisfactory state that had existed during the preceding two months. Adequate stocks of all classes of supplies were on hand in the Army area.

Because of rapid advances, only a few supply points remained situated at Operating Railway Ends. Most points were stocked by truck transport hauling from railheads, which were located at [illegible] (F83), [illegible] (F84), BITBURG (F98), WITTLICH (G12), TRIER (L22), and [illegible] (L91). Early in the month the Advance Section Communications Zone began operating railheads in the Army area, taking over the Army railheads at [illegible] (F83) and ZWEIBRUCKEN (I84) on 9 March and later, on 19 March, moving to [illegible] (L91), north of TRIER (L22), after the rail line to that point had been placed in operation. Movement of Class I and Class III supplies from the railheads by truck transport to forward supply points was under the supervision of the Quartermaster Operations Officer. The dispatching of the necessary supply trains required overall coordination and assured the most use of the available truck transportation, both that provided by the Advance Section Communications Zone and Army transport not required for tactical operations.

The chief difficulty in regard to transportation was the rapidly extended supply lines. From TRIER (L22) to the RHINE River the distance was approximately sixty airline miles; and Class III supply point Number 109, at KASSEL (C24), was approximately forty-five airline miles farther to the east.



Priority was given to the rehabilitation of the railroads from the MOSELLE (L29) and TRIER (L22) area to MAINZ (M35) and railway service was scheduled to be in operation early in April. With the inauguration of rail service considerable truck transport could be relieved for use forward and east of the RHINE River, hauling from proposed railheads in the vicinity of MAINZ (M35).

An air lift was arranged and deliveries of considerable quantities of gasoline were made to forward airfields beginning on 30 March. To supervise the receipt of the airlift and to coordinate the distribution of supplies east of the river, the Army Quartermaster Operations Officer moved to the RHINE River crossing area. In view of limited bridge facilities at the RHINE River crossing and the extended supply lines, the air deliveries of gasoline were timely and materially assisted in stocking forward supply points.

The fast-moving tactical situation was reflected in the shift of supply points to the east. On 1 March only two Class I and one Class III points were located in Germany, and on 26 March all Class I and Class III points were in Germany. On 28 March the first supply points opened to the east of the RHINE River, Class I and Class III Number 108, at [illegible] (M54) and in the vicinity of DARMSTADT (M54), respectively. On 31 March two more points, one for each class of supply, opened across the river.

Annex Number F shows the Quartermaster supply points in operation during March.

SECTION IV - CLASS I SECTION

Class I supply again functioned efficiently during March. The following table gives pertinent statistics on Class I activity:

Receipts for Month	14,929,459	Rations
Issues for Month	14,199,755	Rations
Average Daily Issue	458,060	Rations
Issues to Army Units	89.7	Per Cent
Issues to Unassigned Units	10.3	Per Cent
Issues of "A"-Type Rations	69.7	Per Cent
Issues of Operational-Type Rations	30.3	Per Cent
On Hand at End of Month	1,995,360	

Because of the speed of the advance, it was not feasible to issue "A"-type rations to combat troops. Effective with the arrival of shipments on 28 March, no "A"-type rations were delivered to supply points other than Number 94, at TRIER (L22). Operational-type rations issued were supplemented with fresh bread, coffee, milk, and sugar; and by authorization of the European Theater of Operations, one-half of one fresh meat meal daily was issued as a supplement with "C" and "K" rations. The record-breaking capture of prisoners was reflected in heavy issues of "B"-type rations.

The demand by combat troops for "B"-type rations became very heavy during March. In order to conserve this type of ration, it was directed that issues be limited to the following maximum per cents of the total operational-type rations issued:

UNITS	PER CENT
Non-Combat Units	25
Hospitals	50
Combat Units	100

During March issues of fresh meat and butter were made frequently. The following issues were made from Army supply points:

ITEM	NUMBER OF ISSUES	RATION PER 100 MEN
Beef, Roasting and Frying	6	45 pounds
Beef, Boiling and Stewing	8	35 pounds
Beef, Ground	7	30 pounds
Pork, Boneless	5	42 pounds
Ham, Smoked	1	45 pounds
Chicken	6	60 pounds
Cold Cuts (Salami and Bologna)	2	14 pounds
Frankfurter	6	30 pounds
TOTAL	41	
Butter	31	7 pounds

All condiment items had been extremely critical at various times throughout the entire campaign. For about two months, during December and January, no shipments had been received; and reduced shipments had arrived since that time. Local contracts for procurement in Europe had not been successful. Issues during the latter part of March were complete, however, and it was anticipated that future requirements would be met.

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SECTION V - CLASS II AND IV SECTION

The supply of Quartermaster Class II and IV items continued to be generally satisfactory. Total receipts of clothing and equipment during March were 2,862.9 long tons, less than half the receipts in February. This decrease was due to the large stocks on hand in the Army depots and also reduced requirements for winter clothing and equipment. Requisitions processed totaled 11,764. At the end of the month 4,874 long tons of supplies were on hand in the depots.

The list of critical shortages was further reduced. At the end of the month items short in supply included barber kits, twenty-four and thirty-two gallon corrugated nesting cans, one-burner stoves, wire-staple machines, tufted brushes, and duplicating machines.

A major problem of the month was moving Class II and IV supply facilities forward to serve front-line troops. Originally it was planned to open a depot at TRIER (L22); but because of the rapid advances of the Army, it was decided to establish a depot farther forward. In the meantime Class II and IV supplies that had been consigned to TRIER (L22) were unloaded and held temporarily at that point. A site for Supply Point Number 11 was chosen in the vicinity of BAD KREUZNACH (W03), but the opening of the depot was delayed because of the unavailability of truck transportation for the transfer of supplies from the TRIER (L22) off-loading point. Pending the opening of the depot, this new installation served as an advance supply point for forward combat troops, where requisitions were processed and delivery made by Army trucks from the railhead at TRIER (L22) or from Depot Number 10, at LUXEMBOURG (P81). The establishing of advance points for processing requisitions and making delivery of supplies was found to be a workable method of supplying forward troops with clothing and equipment. The following advance supply points, all at Class I points, also were in operation during various periods:

NUMBER	LOCATION	OPENED	CLOSED
77	DEIFELDT (P77)	050800 A February	071200 A March
80	BITBURG (P98)	070800 A March	101200 A March
89	PERL (Q09)	010800 A March	181800 A March
96	MULLENBORN (L18)	100800 A March	121800 A March
98	KELBURG (L48)	120800 A March	251800 A March

Depot Number 7, at METZ (U85), which had opened on 8 December, closed on 18 March; and Depot Number 10, at LUXEMBOURG (P81), was open throughout the month.

A test of three types of winter combat clothing had been conducted in the 4th Armored Division and 26th Infantry Division from 10 February to 25 February. A report based on observations in these divisions was made to the Twelfth U. S. Army Group, recommending a uniform including a jacket, combat, winter (modified); jacket, field, wool, olive drab (Class A uniform); trousers, field, wool, twenty-four to twenty-six ounce; trousers, combat, winter (modified); and helmet, combat, winter (modified). It was further recommended that the trend be toward simplification of the combat uniform, a reduction in the number of composite items, less weight, and more warmth, durability, water repellency, and wind resistance.



CLOTHING SECTION, DEPOT 10



OVERSHOES AND SHOES STORED UNDER TARPAULINS, DEPOT NUMBER 10, LUXEMBOURG

The Army Quartermaster and the Class II and IV Officer attended a conference held at the Office of the Chief Quartermaster, European Theater of Operations, from 17 to 19 March, on the subject of winter-clothing requirements for 1945-1946. In attendance were representatives of the Office of the Quartermaster General, Washington, D. C., and of all U. S. army groups and armies on the Continent. At this, the second such meeting, various items of winter clothing and equipment were discussed, the results of certain tests reviewed, and final recommendations made to the War Department. The following items were recommended for the winter combat uniform:

Jacket, field, M1943
Jacket, field, pile, olive drab, or jacket, field, wool (ETO type)
(Availability to determine which of these to be issued)
Shoe pacs (for part of Army strength)
Overshoes (for part of Army strength not issued shoe pacs)
Cap, cotton, field
Trousers, cotton, winter
Trousers, wool, olive drab, twenty-two ounce



CLEANING AND PRESERVING MATERIALS SECTION, DEPOT 10



OPEN STORAGE AREA, DEPOT NUMBER 10, LUXEMBOURG

SECTION VI - CLASS III SECTION

Gasoline and allied products were furnished the troops in adequate quantities to support fully the military operations. Receipts and issues of V-80 gasoline and allied products were higher than in any other month since the beginning of the campaign. The following table presents statistics on V-80 gasoline (in gallons):

Receipts for Month	17,080,580
Issues for Month	16,820,994
Average Daily Issue	542,613
Largest Day's Issue	733,375
On Hand at Beginning of Month	2,223,100
On Hand at End of Month	2,894,041

As the advance developed and supply lines beyond operating railroads became extended, the problem of gasoline supply became increasingly difficult. In order to utilize fully truck transport in the Army for use forward of the railheads, bulk shipments were requested. Most decanting operations in the Army area were carried on under the supervision of the 53d Quartermaster Base Depot, an Advance Section Communications Zone unit, at points at KERDORF (L05), WITTLICH (L35), ARENTHAL (L55), and WEINSHEIM (M03). When the lines of supply increased in length and transportation became critical, however, the Advance Section Communications Zone began shipments of bulk gasoline by tank truck to forward Army supply points not on operating railway lines, making necessary the resumption of decanting by the Army. Throughout the month continued efforts were made to secure the maximum use of equipment and facilities at hand. A spirit of cooperation existed between the Communications Zone and the Army in endeavoring to provide this vital fuel for the advancing troops.

The delivery of gasoline by airplane, beginning on 30 March, was opportune and effectively contributed to the support of combat units. The following table shows receipts of V-80 gasoline in gallons at airfields on 30 and 31 March:

AIRFIELD	LOCATION	30 MARCH	31 MARCH
Y-54	CHER CLM (M34)	162,500	50,000
Y-72	BUTTGENBACH (L94)	5,500	54,000
Y-74	[illegible]		96,000
Y-81	[illegible] (L01)	3,000	
Y-83	LIMOGES (L27)	45,000	235,000
	TOTAL	216,000	435,000

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U. S. MILITARY CEMETERY, HAMM, LUXEMBOURG

[illegible] QUARTERMASTER GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

A letter from the Office of the Chief Quartermaster, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, dated [illegible] directed the establishment of a policy in regard to temporary military interments, to be applied effectively:

1. Individual graves were not to be disturbed unless removal was [illegible] necessary by military operations.

2. Military dead were to be buried by local civilian authorities only [illegible] permission in either case [illegible] American cemeteries, [illegible] or German public cemeteries [illegible] by the U.S. Army. The method was to depend on local conditions.

3. Permanent records [illegible] to [illegible] personnel returned to England to [illegible] identification [illegible] graves. By 7 March the [illegible] of 10 cemeteries had been established, and by the end of the month [illegible] of these had been [illegible].

It must be [illegible] the work of evacuation [illegible] by hostilities, [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible] of the [illegible] evacuation [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible] evacuation [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible] of the [illegible] of

CHAPTER II
APRIL OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Quartermaster Section remained throughout April with the rear echelon of Army Headquarters at the following locations:

EISA (L22), Germany	(29 March) to 6 April
FRANKFURT AM MAIN (M67), Germany	6 April to 26 April
[illegible] (G31), Germany	26 April to _____

During April the Army advanced rapidly across Germany from a short distance east of the RHINE River to points inside Czechoslovakia and Austria. Early in the month the Army continued its advance north from the FRANKFURT (M67) area, seized KASSEL (G20) on 4 April, and then moved east toward MEININGEN (G04) and SUHL (G29), and neared the Czechoslovakian border. On 22 April a new tactical plan went into effect. The III and XX Corps, which had taken over a portion of the Seventh U. S. Army area, in the vicinity of AUMUENZ (H84), GARMISCH (G24), and MUNICH (G47), altered southeast toward GERA (N73), PLAUEN (N82), and ZWICKAU (N84) along the CZECHO River. The III Corps continued its advance to the Czechoslovakian border and then swung southward along the border on the Army left flank.

The shift of the Army front presented a logistical problem of distances comparable to that of the month of August 1944, during the Third U. S. Army's dash across France. The distance from the VAIHINGEN (M36) area to the most forward supply point in the direction of the northeastern front was approximately 184 miles and after the shift had been made, the distance to the most forward supply point toward the southeast at the end of the month was approximately 249 miles. Also, the transfer of Quartermaster supply and service installations was handicapped because it was dependent entirely on the already strained truck transport and communications. In spite of these difficulties, essential Quartermaster service was provided for the Army.

The order of battle changed radically during the month. The VIII Corps was transferred to the First U. S. Army, continuing to operate in its current area; and the III Corps was acquired, moving to the right flank of the new Army front. Only eight divisions that had been with the Army on 31 March remained on 30 April. The following were the major units on the latter date:

III Corps: 14th Armored Division, 99th Infantry Division, 106th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

XX Corps: [illegible] Division, 35th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

Army Reserve: 10th Armored Division and 63rd Infantry Division.

The Army had the responsibility of supplying the following troops at the beginning and at the end of the month:

	1 APRIL	30 APRIL
Assigned Strength of the Army	315,934	44,934
Communications Zone Units	15,394	11,492
Ninth Air Force Units	9,492	16,528
Miscellaneous Troops	1,814	2,584
TOTAL	341,654	377,543

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

The Soldier's Medal, for heroism, was awarded to one enlisted man of a Quartermaster unit, and the Bronze Star Medal, for meritorious service, was awarded to two officers of Quartermaster units, both through General Orders published by Headquarters Third U. S. Army during the month.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

The situation regarding Quartermaster supply was generally satisfactory until near the end of the month, when lengthened supply lines and consequent inadequate transportation facilities resulted in all classes of supplies becoming critical within the Army area.



AIR DELIVERY OF GASOLINE TO FIELDS IN VICINITY OF FRANKFURT, GERMANY

The supply of the Army from the rear was by successive stages, an arrangement which essentially included delivery by Advance Section Communications Zone truck transport from railheads to designated Army transfer or base points, from where Army transportation made delivery to supply points. The Quartermaster Operations Officer continued to supervise and coordinate the movement of Class I and Class III supplies by truck transport from the transfer points to forward Army supply points. Two Army railheads, at HEIDENHEIM (M25) for Class I and at KIRCH ISCHELHEIM (M25) for Class III supplies, opened, the first train arriving with rations at HEIDENHEIM on 4 April. The Advance Section took over the operation of these railheads on 8 April, while on the same date the Army established a forward transfer point at ALSFELD (M04); and the Advance Section forwarded by truck Army Class I and Class III requirements to ALSFELD, a ninety-mile haul. Because of the continuing rapid advances by the troops, the Army transfer point was moved fifty miles farther to the east, to SIEGMACH (M86), on 13 April.

Frequently Army supply points were forty to eighty miles beyond transfer points and the front lines often were equally as far from the supply points. Although supply points were not so close to the troops as desired, the primary consideration was the maximum use of all transportation, of that available to divisions, corps, the Army, and the Communications Zone. The turn-around time imposed by the increasing distances for all links in the supply chain became very long. The Advance Section was able, however, to make deliveries to certain rear Army supply points. In the forward areas transportation was conserved by locating Class III supply points in the vicinity of airfields and by having units, when it was convenient, draw supplies directly from the fields.



VITAL CARGO BEING UNLOADED FROM C-47's

The delivery by C47 planes of considerable quantities of rations and V-80 gasoline at airfields, particularly in the forward areas, enabled the Army to move on despite strained surface transport. Approximately ten and three-tenths per cent of the total rations and twenty-two and two-tenths per cent of the total V-80 gasoline received during the month were delivered by air transport.

With the change in the tactical plan, the axis of supply during the last one-third of the month had shifted abruptly from the northeast to the southeast, the base remaining in the area of HAINZ (M36) and FRANKFURT (M67). Despite strained transportation and communications facilities, the shift of supply points to the new front was effected quickly and efficiently. Within an hour after receiving the official directive concerning the new tactical plan, the Quartermaster Operations Officer began diverting Advance Section Communications Zone trucks from EISENACH (M86) to the new transfer points at BAMBERG (G24) and NUERNBERG (N53), and soon moved to BAMBERG himself. In order to support the military operation, the Army Quartermaster moved more than 1,000,000 rations and 1,000,000 gallons of gasoline to the base points before the roads became overly congested with troop movements.

The rehabilitation of railway lines did not keep pace with the rapidly advancing Army. A railway bridge across the RHINE River at MAINZ (M35) was completed on 14 April, and shortly thereafter a railhead for Class III supplies was established at KARL (M96). On 25 April, when rail facilities had opened as far as NUERNBERG (N53), the Army transfer point was moved to NUERNBERG (O51).

Twenty-three supply points for Class I and the same number for Class III opened in April. Supply points in operation during the month are shown in Annex Number 9.

SECTION IV - CLASS I SECTION

Receipts of rations were spasmodic but adequate during the month, and issues were heavier than in any preceding month of the campaign. The following are statistics on Class I supply:

Total Receipts for the Month	14,809,721	Rations
Receipts by Air for the Month	1,531,600	Rations
Issues for the Month	13,725,531	Rations
Average Daily Issue	457,518	Rations
Issues of "A"-Type Rations	19.4	Per Cent
Issues of Operational-Type Rations	80.6	Per Cent
On Hand at End of the Month	2,381,110	Rations

Because of the extremely long supply lines and congested transport, the problem of distributing balanced "A"-type rations to the troops was very difficult. Greater use of operational-type rations was necessary; in fact, in per cent of total rations issued, the increase over the preceding month was from thirty and three-tenths per cent to eighty and six-tenths per cent. Operational-type rations were supplemented with fresh bread, coffee, and small quantities of fresh meat. The Army, however, made every effort to utilize "A"-type rations to the maximum extent practicable.

As a result of the critical supply of rations late in the month, higher headquarters directed that German food supplies be used for Allied prisoners of war, Allied displaced persons, German prisoners of war, and German civilians, and that the Army conserve United States ration stocks and restrict the use of such rations to Allied Forces, United States and British prisoners of war, and United States and British civilian internees. In the event that it was necessary to issue operational-type rations to prisoners of war, the European Theater of Operations authorized the following scale:

Type "10-in-1"	1/2 Ration per Man per Day
Type "C"	2/3 Ration per Man per Day
Type "K"	2/3 Ration per Man per Day

Whenever possible, excess items of the "A"-type ration were to be issued for prisoners instead of the operational-type.

Forty-three issues of fresh meat and twenty-four issues of fresh butter, all hauled to supply points by Army refrigeration vans, were made during the month. In addition, such items as bacon, shelled eggs, cheese, and oranges were received from the Advance Section Communications Zone and issued to all troops subsisting on the "A"-type ration.

Refrigeration plants in good condition were taken over by the Army in FRANKFURT AM MAIN (M67) and NUERNBERG (O40) and were later turned over to the Advance Section Communications Zone to be stocked and operated. Mobile refrigeration units received perishable supplies from the FRANKFURT plant for all Army supply points, and the unit was moved to NUERNBERG when the plant there had been stocked.

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ARMY
CLASS I
TRANSFER
POINT,
NURNBERG,
GERMANY

SECTION V - CLASS II AND IV SECTION

The Class II and IV supply situation was critical at the end of April. [illegible] affect to keep the rapidly moving [illegible] supplied with vital materiel and, in line by the transportation shortage, [illegible] of Class II and IV supplies from the [illegible] were exhausted until April, transportation allotted for shuttle and [illegible] supplies was strongly invoked to the movement of [illegible] and [illegible] was sufficient [illegible] April, no more had been received at the forwarding point at [illegible] by the end of the month. The following tables [illegible] a comparison of Class II and IV supply activity [illegible] April with that of the preceding month:

	MARCH	APRIL	INCREASE
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible] in March, however, had been [illegible] the first part of April [illegible] of the large stocks of [illegible] the early [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

DECLASSIFIED

SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

The Graves Registration Division continued to work in close cooperation with the Adjutant General Casualty Section and the Army Machine Records Unit and moved with them from SCHIFFLINGEN (F70), Luxembourg, to BAD KREUZNACH (M93), Germany, on 2 April, to FRANKFURT AM MAIN (M67), Germany, on 8 April, and to DARMSTADT (G91), Germany, on 27 April.

Instructions received from Headquarters European Theater of Operations regarding the burial of military personnel directed that the establishment of military cemeteries for the interment of American and Allied deceased in Germany be held to a minimum and that, when practicable, the evacuation of such deceased be made to cemeteries in liberated countries. Because of the great amount of German territory occupied during April and long evacuation distances, however, it was found necessary to open three cemeteries for American, Allied, and enemy dead in Germany. The following table gives statistics on cemeteries in operation during the month:

CEMETERY	LOCATION	OPENED	CLOSED	TOTAL BURIALS SINCE OPENING
U. S.	HAMM (F81), Luxembourg	29 December	1 April	6,915 U. S.
German	HAMM (F81), Luxembourg	29 December	1 April	5,466
U. S.	STOCKSTADT (M05), Germany	26 March	11 April	893 U. S. 7 Allied
German	STOCKSTADT (M05), Germany	26 March	11 April	508
U. S.	BUTZBACH (G60), Germany	4 April	22 April	662 U. S. 38 Allied
German	BUTZBACH (G60), Germany	4 April	22 April	448
U. S.	EISENACH (M86), Germany	11 April	22 April	365 U. S. 8 Allied
German	EISENACH (M86), Germany	11 April	22 April	216
U. S.	NURNBERG (G40), Germany	19 April		*308 U. S. * 9 Allied
German	NURNBERG (G40), Germany	19 April		*147

*Total burials as of 302400 B April.

The Army Graves Registration Service supervised the establishment of a cemetery on a prominent hill overlooking the town of OHRDRUF (J15) for the 150 dead inmates found at the OHRDRUF concentration camp. A thorough investigation revealed that no United States personnel were among the deceased. The labor was performed by German civilians of OHRDRUF, and the burgomaster of the town was made responsible for the maintenance of the cemetery.

Burials for the month, which, because of the speed of the advance and lessening resistance, were fewer than in the past five months of Third U. S. Army operations, included 1,690 American, of which forty-one were unidentified, 130 Allied, and 964 enemy, making a total of 2,784.

SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

Under the control of the Army Quartermaster were two group headquarters. One of them, the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 553d Quartermaster Group, was currently performing military government duties under supervision of the G-5 Section, this headquarters. All remaining Quartermaster units were attached to the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 519th Quartermaster Group. The battalion headquarters - with the exception of the 496th, which continued to operate directly under the supervision of the Quartermaster Operations Officer - all had administrative control of varying numbers of service units. The aggregate personnel strength of these units, as authorized by Tables of Organization, was 360 officers, twenty-two warrant officers, and 12,644 enlisted men. The following chart shows the number, type, and attachment of Quartermaster units:



CAPTURED CANNED MEAT STORED AT WAREHOUSE, FURTH, GERMANY

TYPE OF UNIT	NUMBER	ATTACHMENT	TOTAL (Type of Unit)
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	2	519th QM Group	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	9	519th QM Group	9
QM Bakery Company, Special	7	553d QM Battalion	7
QM Depot Company, Supply	2	519th QM Group	2
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	5	271st QM Battalion	5
QM Gasoline Supply Company	7	5th QM Battalion, Mobile	7
QM Graves Registration Company	4	537th QM Battalion	4
QM Laundry Company	7	304th QM Battalion	7
QM Railhead Company	6	307th QM Battalion	6
QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile	1	307th QM Battalion	1
QM Salvage Collecting Company	3	273d QM Battalion	3
QM Salvage Repair Company	3	273d QM Battalion	3
QM Sales Platoon	2	519th QM Group	2
QM Service Detachment (Petroleum Products Laboratory) (Mobile Detachment)	1	5th QM Battalion, Mobile	1
QM Service Company	2	5th QM Battalion, Mobile	
	5	568th QM Battalion, Mobile	
	3	95th QM Battalion	
	8	224th QM Battalion	
	2	271st QM Battalion	
	3	273d QM Battalion	
	3	537th QM Battalion	26

All Quartermaster units previously attached to the Third U. S. Army but assigned to the Communications Zone, except the two sales platoons and the detachment of the petroleum products laboratory, were relieved from assignment to the Communications Zone and assigned by Twelfth U. S. Army Group orders, on 27 April, to the Third U. S. Army. Efforts had been made since the beginning of the campaign to secure the assignment of all units to the command, in the interest of facilitating administration and control, and improving morale. The desire to wear the Third U. S. Army shoulder insignia was universal.

The following Quartermaster units were released by the Third U. S. Army to other commands:

571st QM Railhead Company
3936th QM Gasoline Supply Company
680th QM Laundry Company (3d Platoon)

The following Quartermaster units were assigned to the Third U. S. Army:

566th QM Railhead Company
3913th QM Gasoline Supply Company
3070th QM Laundry Company

SECTION IX - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

The activities of the Captured Enemy Materiel Detachment increased as more German territory was occupied. Depots were opened in FRANKFURT AM MAIN (M67), EISCHBERG (H68), KULMBACH (G67), FURTH (G40), and WURZBURG (H53).

The highest priority was given to the uncovering of food, blankets, and clothing for liberated Allied prisoners of war (except United States and British, who were furnished United States supplies), Allied displaced persons, and German prisoners of war. In order to exploit fully the captured enemy food stores, the Quartermaster Field Service Division was allotted a battalion headquarters and an additional service company. A large task was the collection of supplies of captured foods of assorted components in central warehouses so that a balanced ration could be prepared and distribution simplified. The depot at FURTH (G40) was used primarily for assembling and warehousing captured foodstuff.



MISCELLANEOUS CAPTURED FOODSTUFFS ASSEMBLED FOR DISTRIBUTION

During April 152,557 men were bathed by Quartermaster fumigation and bath units, and 3,807,468 pounds of laundry were processed by Quartermaster laundry companies. Owing to the extremely mobile situation, production figures of both the bath and the laundry units were lower than for the past several months.

SECTION X - SALVAGE SECTION

The following are the salvage figures for April:

	NUMBER OF ITEMS
Salvage Collected during Month	1,640,897
Salvage Classified - Total	1,249,765
Class B	855,767
Class C	95,708
Class X	298,290
Unclassified Salvage Shipped to Communications Zone	391,132

Salvage repair units repaired 64,619 items of clothing and equipment for reissue to troops, and also 5,401 special-purpose items, including fire units, immersion-type heaters, gasoline lanterns, oil and two-burner stoves, and typewriters. The figures are smaller than those for several previous months largely because of the highly mobile tactical situation.

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Because of a lack of [illegible] it was impossible to evacuate salvage from all collecting points in forward Army areas. The Advance Section Communications Zone was requested to take over approximately 700 tons of salvage at a salvage point at EISENACH (M86) and fifty tons at Class I Supply Point Number 121, at NUREMBERG (G75), and relieve Army guard details at these points.

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CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS



C 47 TO THE RESCUE!

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RECEIPTS BY CLASS OF SUPPLY (LONG TONS)

	CLASS I	CLASS II	CLASS IV	CLASS III (A)	CLASS III (MOTOR FUELS)	* TOTAL
August	27,141.2	205.05	64.75	43,431.1	0	70,842.1
September	23,048.0	1,418.4	447.91	34,529.3	0	59,443.6
October	26,139.0	3,458.53	1,092.17	25,496.09	0	56,185.79
November	25,028.6	2,719.28	858.72	40,823.25	8,674.0	78,103.85
December	29,085.1	3,404.03	1,075.27	36,553.4	6,141.0	76,258.8
January	30,138.5	4,540.05	1,433.7	49,700.18	5,665.0	91,477.43
February	28,284.2	5,384.8	429..	44,052.6	8,497.0	86,647.8
March	33,601.1	2,291.4	571.5	64,862.7	5,143.6	106,470.9
April	32,621.9	435.2	335.7	77,007.6	700.0	111,100.4
May (To 082600)	10,081.4	551.7	752.1	23,047.2	0	34,432.4
TOTAL	268,969.7	34,439.44	7,661.22	439,286.91	44,820.6	774,561.87
Per Cent of Total	34.7	4.2	.9	56.7	4.5	100.0

SECTION IV - CLASS I SUPPLY

The Class I situation was complicated in early July by the great number of enemy prisoners of war and of Allied displaced persons the Army had the responsibility of supplying. Although sizable stocks of captured food continued to be recovered, sufficient food for all of these persons for any great length of time was not immediately available. Civilian facilities were exploited. Surveys were initiated in the Army area for bakery plants and flour mills that might be pressed into operation to relieve the strained Army food situation. A civilian bakery in AMIENS (T60) was taken over by the Army and put into operation with a German prisoner-of-war staff, using canned ingredients, to produce bread for German prisoners. Before hostilities had ceased, this installation produced 105,264 pounds of bread.

At 0900 8 May 1,507,000 rations were on hand at supply points and reserve points in the Army area.

Adequate quantities of rations were issued to the troops at the cessation of hostilities by conversion of special rations for [illegible] at various times. In view of operations during the months preceding August and April, when the tactical situation was fluid and the supply lines became greatly extended, the 10 in 1 ration was replaced by "A"-type rations supplemented by the 10 in 1 ration. Also introduced were "B"-type hospital supplements for medical treating stations and "A"-type rations supplemented by the 10 in 1 ration that proved generally satisfactory throughout the [illegible]. The following graph shows issues of rations by per cent of total rations issued during the period 1 August to 8 May, inclusive.

PER CENT ISSUES BY TYPE OF RATION
BY MONTHS





(NOT TO SCALE) IN WAITING LINE (ABOVE) AND IN ISSUE LINE (BELOW), CLASS I SUPPLY POINT NUMBER 128, NURNBERG, GERMANY



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SECTION VI - CLASS III SECTION

The Class III supply position, critical at first, improved during the period. Receipts of V-80 gasoline for the first eight days of May averaged 860,487 gallons daily and issues averaged 769,160 gallons. On hand at supply and reserve points at 082400 B May were 967,956 gallons of V-80 gasoline.

Gasoline rationing was inaugurated on 5 May and discontinued on 8 May. During these three days all Third U. S. Army units except those of the V and XII Corps were limited to fifty per cent of their average daily requirements based on the period from 26 April to 4 May.

The demands for gasoline fluctuate sharply with any major movements of an army, and since it is often difficult to maintain a steady flow from the rear, the maintenance of reserves of gasoline in the army area is of paramount importance. The following graph shows the actual daily levels of gasoline in the Third U. S. Army area from 1 August to 8 May as compared with the authorized five-day level, using a factor of one and fifty-six-hundredths gallons per man per day:

ISSUES OF PETROL, OILS, AND LUBRICANTS

ITEM		JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	(To 082400) MAY
V-80	(Gallons)	799,222	11,492,831	9,270,295	6,504,020	9,117,635	11,331,256	14,230,799	11,846,287	16,820,994	21,317,768	6,153,280
Diesel	(Gallons)	18,190	402,812	291,258	310,695	308,635	370,662	458,792	394,723	407,394	359,404	129,450
SAE 10	(Gallons)	1,785	26,956	25,880	41,259	42,167	73,417	160,253	86,997	37,306	42,311	4,838
SAE 30	(Gallons)	18,470	147,991	115,510	109,172	99,171	150,508	154,032	167,116	267,389	263,746	93,903
SAE 50	(Gallons)	4,945	67,655	51,800	25,594	30,734	34,298	20,254	41,931	70,931	98,812	19,657
Gear Oil	(Gallons)	9,845	35,178	37,680	26,742	20,247	29,545	25,475	33,560	43,008	56,208	12,219
Kerosene	(Gallons)	4,300	10,054	20,235	45,220	55,286	65,680	116,951	93,840	88,925	84,975	22,665
GP No. 1	(Pounds)	12,614	86,361	89,309	92,399	50,611	69,075	86,556	95,866	104,364	137,630	37,620
GP No. 2	(Pounds)	9,814	63,557	62,097	59,921	30,633	33,715	28,193	48,215	62,269	83,980	4,266
WB No. 3	(Pounds)	3,592	9,378	5,399	12,217	4,264	4,924	3,446	- -	- -	574	426
WB No. 4	(Pounds)	271	1,457	1,737	4,127	2,482	3,962	2,764	2,127	3,108	6,067	882
White Gas	(Gallons)	- -	3,910	3,810	8,860	11,600	15,530	20,258	20,435	24,886	21,772	6,065
R-73 Gas	(Gallons)	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	84,590	103,691	25,490

PERCENTAGES OF OIL AND GREASES TO V-80 GASOLINE

ITEM		JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	MAY
Diesel	(Gallons)	2.27	3.50	3.14	4.77	3.38	3.36	3.21	3.33	2.42	1.69	2.04
Oil	(Gallons)	3.15	2.11	2.08	2.70	1.88	2.29	2.35	2.49	2.23	1.90	1.92
SAE 10	(Gallons)	0.22	0.23	0.28	0.63	0.46	0.65	1.13	0.73	0.22	0.20	0.07
SAE 30	(Gallons)	2.31	1.29	1.25	1.67	1.08	1.33	1.08	1.41	1.59	1.24	1.52
SAE 50	(Gallons)	0.62	0.59	0.56	0.39	0.33	0.30	0.14	0.35	0.42	0.46	0.32
Gear Oil	(Gallons)	1.23	0.31	0.41	0.41	0.22	0.26	0.18	0.28	0.26	0.26	0.19
Kerosene	(Gallons)	0.54	0.09	0.22	0.69	0.60	0.59	0.82	0.79	0.53	0.31	0.37
Grease	(Pounds)	3.30	1.40	1.71	1.97	0.97	0.99	1.09	1.23	1.01	1.07	0.70
GP #1	(Pounds)	1.58	0.75	0.96	0.81	0.56	0.61	0.62	0.81	0.62	0.65	0.60
GP #2	(Pounds)	1.23	0.55	0.67	0.92	0.34	0.30	0.20	0.41	0.37	0.39	0.06
WB #3	(Pounds)	0.45	0.08	0.06	0.19	0.05	0.05	0.25	- -	- -	0.002	0.007
WB #4	(Pounds)	0.03	0.013	0.02	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.018	0.028	0.014
White Gas	(Gallons)	- -	0.03	0.04	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.17	0.17	0.10	0.098
R-73 Gas	(Gallons)	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	0.50	0.48	0.41



SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

The cemetery for American and Allied dead and the adjacent cemetery for enemy dead at NUERNBERG (040) were the only ones open to Third U. S. Army burials from 1 to 8 May.

Army graves registration personnel made rapid strides in improving the technique of identifying unknown bodies. It was expected that continued research would result in identifying all the remaining American unknowns at some of the cemeteries. The following table presents statistics on burials of American unknowns for the period 1 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, inclusive:

	NUMBER OF BURIALS	NUMBER OF UNKNOWNS	PER CENT OF UNKNOWNS
Army Ground Force Personnel	26,700	122	0.46
Army Air Force Personnel	347	35	10.00
TOTAL BURIALS	27,047	157	0.58

Normally during the campaign the Army kept only one cemetery open for all troops and opened a new cemetery, road conditions permitting, when the distance of evacuation exceeded 100 miles. The following chart lists the burials made in Third U. S. Army cemeteries during the period of hostilities:

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U.S. MILITARY CEMETERY, CHAMPIGNEUL, FRANCE





U.S. MILITARY CEMETERY, ST. JAMES, FRANCE

KIEL
ROSTOCK
HAMBURG
EMDEN
BREMEN
BERLIN
GERMANY
AMSTERDAM
THE HAGUE
ROTTERDAM
NETHERLANDS
OSNABRUCK
HANNOVER
BRUNSWICK
MAGDEBURG
BREDA
ESSEN
DORTMUND
KASSEL
DRESDEN
ANTWERP
GHENT
BRUSSELS
BELGIUM
DUSSELDORF
KOLN
WEIMAR
CHEMNITZ
LILLE
LIEGE
NAMUR
GIESSEN
KOBLENZ
FULDA
PLAUEN
COBURG
FRANKFURT
WIESBADEN
MAINZ
ASCHAFFENBURG
BAYREUTH
EGER
BAMBERG
WURZBURG
PLZEN
LUXEMBOURG
TRIER
LUDWIGSHAFEN
MANNHEIM
NURNBERG
SAARBRUCKEN
METZ
REIMS
SOISSONS
ABBEVILLE
DIEPPE
CHERBOURG
LE HAVRE
ROUEN
CAEN
BREST
ST BRIEUX
AVRANCHES
PARIS
DREUX
CHALONS SUR MARNE
CHARTRES
MELUN
NANCY
LORIENT
RENNES
VANNES
SENS
TROYES
ORLEANS
EPINAL
CHAUMONT
AUXERRE
ST NAZAIRE
NANTES
TOURS
FRANCE
BOURGES
DIJON
BESANCON
POITIERS
VICHY
LIMOGES
GENEVA
LYON
BORDEAUX
MILAN
ITALY

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BURIALS IN CEMETERIES ESTABLISHED BY THIRD U. S. ARMY

(11200 8 AUGUST 1944 TO 2400 8 MAY 1945

	ARMY				AIR FORCE				ARMY			
	KNOWN	NOT KNOWN		TOTAL	KNOWN	NOT KNOWN	TOTAL	KNOWN	NOT KNOWN	TOTAL	TOTAL BURIALS
		AAF	AAF								
U. S. MILITARY CEMETERY, EPINAL, FRANCE	250	5	0	255	0	0	0	- -	- -	- -	256
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, ST. JAMES, FRANCE	2,265	15	1	2,281	35	6	41	890	203	1,093	3,195
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, ST. HONORINE, FRANCE	605	5	1	611	26	6	30	196	42	238	679
GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERY, LENNEVEN, FRANCE	- -	-	-	- -	-	-	-	279	61	340	340
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, VILLERS-BOCAGE, FRANCE	263	1	0	264	9	9	18	197	21	218	500
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, CHAMBOIS, FRANCE	516	3	9	526	1	7	8	190	36	226	760
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, AMBLIE, FRANCE	3,299	7	0	3,306	47	16	63	4,153	640	4,893	8,202
U. S. MILITARY CEMETERY, LIMEY, FRANCE	5,607	4	2	5,613	0	0	0	- -	- -	- -	5,613
GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERY, DERVILLER, FRANCE	- -	-	-	- -	-	-	-	16	6	22	22
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, CHANG FAILLY, FRANCE	2,729	11	1	2,741	17	1	18	1,150	293	1,443	4,202
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, FLY, BELGIUM	2,184	30	3	2,217	21	5	26	2,716	680	1,396	5,639
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, MARS, LUXEMBURG	6,870	34	11	6,915	0	0	0	4,800	868	5,668	12,383
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, HENNEF, GERMANY	892	1	0	891	7	0	7	508	64	572	1,472
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, HOFHEIM, GERMANY	656	4	2	662	29	9	38	391	57	448	1,148
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, HEIDELBACH, GERMANY	359	1	5	365	8	0	8	172	44	216	589
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, NURNBERG, GERMANY	617	1	0	618	2	0	2	223	39	262	882
TOTALS * Total Air Force personnel, known and unknown, included in this figure - 347	26,890	122	35	* 27,047	200	59	259	15,681	4,094	18,775	46,081

It should be noted that in cases of discrepancy between figures in the above table and those presented in monthly chapters, the differences are the result of adjustments made after continued investigation and research in connection with the identification of unknowns.

SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

The following types and numbers of Quartermaster units were assigned or attached to the Third U. S. Army as of 2400 8 May.

Hq & Hq Det, QM Group	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	10
QM Bakery Company, Special	8
QM Depot Company, Supply	2
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	6
QM Gasoline Supply Company	8
QM Graves Registration Company	5
QM Laundry Company	8
QM Railhead Company	7
QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile	1
QM Sales Platoon	2
QM Salvage Collecting Company	3
QM Salvage Repair Company	3
QM Service Company	28
QM Service Detachment (Petroleum Products Laboratory) (Mobile Detachment)	1

SECTION II - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

The collecting, warehousing, and issuing of captured enemy material assumed increasing magnitude and importance as the campaign advanced. The following table shows the captured supplies handled under the supervision of the Field Service Division from 1 August to 8 May:

Class I (Tons)	21,765
Class II (Items)	
Clothing	1,580,397
Individual Equipment	1,049,850
Footwear	896,555
Organizational Equipment	3,552,680
Expendable Items	632,699
Class III	
Petrol (Gallons)	434,050*
Diesel (Gallons)	95,555
Engine Oil (Gallons)	37,620
Gearlube (Pounds)	4,900
Grease (Pounds)	6,683
Class IV	
Post Exchange Items	400,000

* In addition approximately 500,000 gallons of captured gasoline were used by units in late August and early September.

It should be stated that large quantities of clothing and equipment, items for which the Class II and IV depots had no need, were released directly to the G-5 Section for use of Civil Affairs or Military Government authorities. All usable items not required by the Army were turned over to the Advance Section Communications Zone. Captured salvage and scrap materials, not included in the above figures, were immediately released to the Advance Section.

Although priority for bath service was always given to divisional units, the demand for this service was never fully met. Bath units were almost entirely allocated to corps for movement and control of service schedules for divisions.

FIELD SET-UP
SALVAGE POINT
NUMBER 25
REGENSBURG,
GERMANY



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The following table shows the employment of Quartermaster laundry units and pounds of laundry processed by months during the operational period of the Army:

EMPLOYMENT OF QUARTERMASTER LAUNDRY COMPANIES

	TOTAL COMPANIES		MEDICAL CORPS (Sections)	TROOP UNITS (Sections)	SALVAGE POINTS (Sections)	LAUNDRY PROCESSED (Pounds)
August	5 (-1)*	40 Sections	18	8	6	556,563
September	4	32 Sections	16	8	8	2,630,541
October	5	40 Sections	20	16	4	3,549,186
November	5	40 Sections	15	14	11	3,203,260
December	6½	50 Sections	15	24	11	3,646,214
January	6½	50 Sections	14	26	10	4,429,100
February	6½	50 Sections	14	26	10	4,929,993
March	6½	50 Sections	15	26	9	5,827,952
April	7	56 Sections	15	32	9	3,807,468
May (To 082400)	8	64 Sections	15	40	9	1,080,535
TOTAL						35,660,812

* One company (eight sections) en route to join.

Quartermaster service companies had varied employment. The following chart illustrates the variety of duties of this type of unit:

EMPLOYMENT OF QUARTERMASTER SERVICE COMPANIES

From 1 August 1944 to 8 May 1945

	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	(To 082400) MAY
QM Operations Labor Pool	1½	6	2	4½	2½	2	2	3	5	6
Class I	3									
Class II and IV	½	½	½	1	1½	1½	1½	2½	2½	2½
Class III	3½	3	4	4	5	2½	3	3	2	2
Salvage							1	1	1	1
Graves Registration		1	2	3	4	4	4	4	2	1
Attached to Seventh U. S. Army						2				
Captured Enemy Materiel								1	2	4
Medical				½	2	2	2	2	2	2
Field Range Repair	½	½	½	½	½	½	½	½	½	½
Attached to Corps	5									
Ordnance	3	3	5	5½	5½	6½	5	5	5	5
Engineer	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Signal	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Transportation	1		1	1						
Provost Marshal					1	1				
TOTAL COMPANIES	21	17	19	24	26	26	23	26	26	28

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SECTION X - SALVAGE SECTION

The salvage activities during the operation are presented in the following tables:

SALVAGE PROCESSED (By Items)

	CLASS B	CLASS C	CLASS X	TOTAL	UNCLASSIFIED
August	132,294	43,667	53,200	272,713*	0
September	204,701	45,190	137,262	387,153	0
October	336,911	48,697	79,957	465,565	0
November	416,473	80,780	193,383	690,636	0
December	524,469	74,455	226,034	824,958	316,091
January	707,221	111,797	613,251	1,432,269	41,000
February	769,542	151,116	375,439	1,296,097	298,581
March	1,156,580	154,474	491,880	1,802,934	19,900
April	855,767	95,708	298,290	1,249,765	391,132
May (To 082400)	449,307	32,638	145,357	627,302	379,400
TOTAL	5,553,265	838,522	2,614,053	9,049,392	1,446,104

* Included in the total are miscellaneous items amounting to 63,552.

Reclaimed clothing and equipment returned to the Class II and IV depots amounted to 3,151 long tons. All Class X and unclassified items were evacuated to the rear to Communications Zone depots.

Items repaired by month by Quartermaster repair companies are shown below:

	*NUMBER OF COMPANIES	REGULAR SUPPLIES	SPECIAL PURPOSE ITEMS	TOTAL
August	3½	20,175	450	20,625
September	3½	33,010	2,041	35,051
October	3½	52,635	4,109	56,744
November	3½	72,539	11,057	83,596
December	3½	113,219	8,513	121,732
January	3½	69,804	8,022	77,826
February	3½	72,638	8,484	81,122
March	3½	128,456	8,971	137,427
April	3½	64,619	5,401	70,020
May (To 082400)	3½	22,502	1,015	23,517
TOTAL		649,597	58,063	707,660

* One-half company shown was the one platoon of a service company trained as a field range repair unit.

Regular supplies consist of clothing, individual equipment, and footwear; while special purpose items include office machines and equipment, fire units, immersion heaters, and lanterns. It is noteworthy that during the operational period 3,373 typewriters, 22,608 fire units, and 16,921 gasoline lanterns were repaired. Lack of parts often hindered work; nevertheless, these units performed an indispensable service to troops.

* * * *

The chapters of this report were written at the end of each month as the campaign progressed, in most instances under the stress of difficult, hurried, and trying conditions. The indulgence of the reader is earnestly requested concerning the errors, omissions, and repetitions that have entered into these pages as the result of circumstances.

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CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

LESSONS LEARNED

GENERAL

1. When a landing is made on a hostile shore, an operations group of Quartermaster officers of the Advance Section, Communications Zone, should be attached to the staff of the Commander of tactical troops. This group, operating under the tactical commander until a rear boundary is designated, should begin operations immediately upon landing. It should organize the beach dumps and be charged with the distribution of supplies from the very beginning. As the beachhead is expanded, this group should remain in charge of the beach dumps and thus gradually develop the beginning of a communications zone. The Army Quartermaster should perform only his primary functions in regard to tactical troops. This would insure a well-organized, smoothly operating supply system before the first army rear boundary is designated and before the situation becomes mobile.

2. The regulating station is organized to operate in connection with a well-developed railway system. It is not well adapted to a fast-moving situation with the major dependence on truck transport. It should operate in close proximity to the source depots rather than in the army service area.

3. Divisions, both armored and infantry, have inadequate Quartermaster facilities.

SUPPLY

4. The impetus of supply should be from the rear; however, during rapidly changing situations, the supply agencies in rear of the Army do not always possess a sufficiently complete picture to insure quick readjustment. The movement of these elements and installations should be closely synchronized with the army they are supporting.

5. Quartermasters of all echelons are not equipped to carry out their supply missions unless they have sufficient transportation under their own control or under an organization of subordinate status.

6. Supply points for Class I and Class III supplies, under mobile conditions, normally were maintained on the basis of one for each corps and from one to three for Army troops. The distances from supply points to using units varied from a few miles to as much as fifty or more miles.

7. Issues of supplies direct to the transportation of using units are not practicable under mobile conditions. Divisions universally prefer to draw in bulk and make their own breakdowns. Units smaller than a division can be given their choice of method. In a rapidly changing situation, supply points are moved so often that it is not practicable to keep the smaller units informed of the changes.

8. Elaborate standing operating procedures are not well adapted to changing situations and are not necessary. The things that can be included in such compilations either have been covered in basic training or can be imparted through fragmentary operating instructions and/or supervising officers. It is a good plan to consolidate instructions from time to time in order to keep them current.

9. Reserves of Class I and Class III maintained in the army area depend to a great degree upon the rapidity of movement, the efficiency of the railway system, and the amount of truck transportation available. In static situations, five days of Class I and Class III and fifteen days of Class II and IV are adequate; in mobile situations the stocks must be reduced and, at the same time, the agencies supporting the army from the rear must be speeded up.

10. The daily telegram system of requisitioning supplies is not suitable for a fast-moving operation when far removed from the source of supplies. It is only in fairly static situations that this method of requisitioning has proved reliable.

11. Supply discipline of the American soldier, if improved, would be highly beneficial.

12. The operational-type ration is indispensable to a mobile operation. The type "A" ration is suitable for ninety-five per cent of all troops in a static situation, eighty per cent in a moderately mobile situation, and forty per cent when highly mobile. The principal limiting factor in the use of the "A" ration is transportation.

13. Operational-type rations, when used for more than three days, require a supplemental issue of bread and coffee. An occasional issue of meat, butter, and fresh fruit is highly necessary.

14. Bakeries are best operated under the Class I officer and organized under a single battalion headquarters. The British-type equipment is excellent and can keep up even during fast movements. Critical bakery supplies are best handled by pooling them under control of the battalion commander.

15. The most practical method of issue is to permit units to draw from the nearest supply point, submitting ration requests direct to the supply point commander. The supply point commander submits his record of issues and his daily inventory report direct to the army Class I officer as of a specified hour, usually 1L00. The Class I officer maintains a status card for each unit on which is recorded its Table of Organization strength, actual strength, and a record of daily ration issues and weekly Post Exchange issues. The system has demonstrated its value under the conditions peculiar to this campaign. The Machine Records Unit cannot be depended upon to furnish the correct ration strength; usually from 50,000 to 60,000 additional troops are inside the army area.

16. The gratuitous issue of Post Exchange items when sales facilities are not available is essential to health and morale. Units must register at the supply point three days in advance of drawing. The available stock is then prorated among all units.

17. The railhead company should be redesignated as a "ration supply company." This should be its only function. Present strength is adequate and enables it to "leap-frog." This unit should be organized to enable it to function under mobile conditions and in locations not on operating railway lines. Except in a purely static situation it seldom operates a "railhead." The unit should have sufficient organic transportation to enable it to assist in maintaining its stock and to increase its mobility.

18. The supply of Class II and IV in a highly mobile situation over great distances is extremely difficult. These classes receive lowest priority in allotting available transportation.

19. Present-type winter combat clothing is not entirely satisfactory. It is not sufficiently warm, wind resistant, water repellent, or shrink proof. The wide range of sizes makes it difficult to maintain balanced stocks in depots. Two depot companies are required for an army and each should have sufficient organic transportation to perform its function.

20. The duffle bag is a source of waste in a war of movement. The bags usually must be stored in an inaccessible place far to the rear. The soldier must be given issues of new items direct from the depots.

21. An uninterrupted flow of POL supplies is the most important and most difficult of all Quartermaster supply functions in a mobile situation. A temporary failure can have more disastrous and far-reaching effects than the failure of any other class of supplies. The situation becomes extremely critical when Army reserves have been exhausted and the flow from the Communications Zone is even temporarily suspended. The gasoline supply company is too small and should have additional organic vehicles to assist in maintaining its operation.

FIELD SERVICE

22. Quartermaster troop units are best handled by assigning them to battalions on a functional rather than a geographical basis: e. g., railhead companies under one battalion and gasoline supply companies under another. Although all battalions were attached to a single group headquarters, two might have been better.

23. The basic training of Quartermaster troops and troop officers has highly important effects over results. The best units are those that have been trained realistically.

24. The allocation of laundry units to field armies is inadequate. The present-type company is too large. Small, self-sustaining units with two or four trailers would be more suitable. Each medical depot and hospital and each division should have a laundry section of appropriate capacity as a part of its organic equipment. Tractors are required on the basis of one per trailer.

25. The fumigation and bath companies are inadequate in number and equipment. These units do much for morale. The exchange of clothing has proved highly beneficial. Divisions should have their own bath units.

26. Captured enemy materiel is of great importance. It can be handled properly only under a special organization for which no provision is made under the present Tables of Organization. This organization must function close behind the assault troops. Unless this is done, much valuable property is lost or needlessly destroyed.

27. Quartermaster officers should be selected as far as possible from those who have had experience with combat troops and whose efficiency ratings are excellent or higher. It is extremely important that the officer possess the correct point of view. The training of officer candidates should instill a high sense of discipline and personal responsibility and should include effective instruction in company administration.

28. Group and battalion headquarters enlisted personnel should be selected from the types whose background fits them for this specialized work. There are too many headquarters in which the officers must of necessity perform practically all the clerical work.

GRAVES REGISTRATION

29. The graves registration company cannot perform its required functions as now organized and equipped. This has been the subject of separate reports.

30. Cemeteries are best operated under an army rather than corps or division. One cemetery for an army is adequate in most situations. Evacuation up to 100 miles is entirely practicable under suitable road conditions and when casualties are low.

31. Graves registration is best handled by a separate section in the Office of the Army Quartermaster. The section obtains best results when it works intimately with the Adjutant General's Casualty Section and the Army Machine Records Unit.

32. Collecting teams under Army control composed of five graves registration men and two three-quarter ton trucks with one-ton trailers are required for divisions. The division and smaller units evacuate the dead to the division and/or corps collecting points. Identification must be carefully checked and established at the collecting point.

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CONCLUSIONS

1. The Advance Section, Communications Zone, should be represented on the staff of the Army Commander when a landing is made on hostile shores. This operating group should play a major role in establishing and operating the beach dumps.

2. The regulating station should be organized, trained, and practiced to enable it to adapt its operations to fast-moving and improvised conditions.

3. The Quartermaster organization for armored and infantry divisions should be made the subject of special study. Each division should have a laundry platoon, a bath unit for each regimental combat team, a shoe and textile repair section, and a battalion headquarters. The armored division needs more transportation.

4. The supply agencies of the Advance Section, Communications Zone, in support of a field army in a mobile operation should be under the control of the Army Commander.

5. The Quartermasters of all echelons should have sufficient transportation under their own control to accomplish their missions. As a general rule, there are fewer trucks available for Quartermaster supply in a mobile situation than in static periods, whereas the reverse should be the case.

6. Supply discipline should receive careful consideration during basic training. It is recommended that the vital importance of conserving supplies be given the prominence it deserves. All ranks should be included.

7. Operational-type rations are excellently adapted to mobile warfare. Provision should be made for supplementary issues of coffee, bread, meat, butter, and fruit when the operational ration is used for more than a few days.

8. The British-type bakery equipment with coffee roaster added is excellent for mobile and/or static situations.

9. It is recommended that the railhead company be redesignated as a "ration supply company." Its organic equipment should include forty-eight two and one-half ton trucks.

10. The duffle bag should be eliminated as a part of field equipment. It is the source of much waste. Units should have the means for carrying reserves of essential clothing and equipment. An exchange system should be prescribed within the unit. The division could, if given the equipment, launder the soiled clothing and repair the shoes.

11. The gasoline supply company should have fifty additional laborers, better fire-fighting equipment, and forty-eight two and one-half ton trucks as organic equipment.

12. The winter combat uniform should receive careful consideration as to greater simplicity, added warmth, and more wind and water resistance.

13. The depot company, supply, should have forty-eight two and one-half ton trucks as organic equipment.

14. The means for insuring adequate and uninterrupted POL supplies from the communications zone to the army area warrants continued and expert study.

15. In the training of Quartermaster units and officers more emphasis should be given to field training, actual functional work, sense of personal responsibility, and company administration. An outstanding weakness has been the failure to develop junior officers and non-commissioned officers.

16. Laundry companies should be reorganized into small, self-supporting units. Laundry units should be included in the organic equipment of the following: divisions, medical depots, evacuation and convalescent hospitals, and salvage repair companies.

[illegible] not need the fumigation units. The latter should be with the salvage units. The present troop basis for bath units is grossly inadequate. Divisions should have bath units as a part of their organic equipment.

18. A "Captured Material Section" is recommended for each field army. It is suggested that such a section be organized to include all classes of supply of all the supply services.

19. The graves registration company is recommended for special study with a view toward changing its organization and equipment.



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ANNEXES









SUPPLY POINTS
AUGUST 1944
QUARTERMASTER SECTION
THIRD U.S. ARMY
ANNEX NO. 1

CLASS I · CLASS II & IV · CLASS III

SCALE
MILES 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50

ASCZ

CHERBOURG · CAEN · LISIEUX · EVREUX · PARIS · MEAUX · SEZANNE · MELUN · MONTARGIS · SENS · MORET SUR SEINE · ETAMPES · CHARTRES · DREUX · ARGENTAN · FLERS · AVRANCHES · GRANVILLE · COUTANCES · ST LO · BARNEVILLE · ALENCON · MAYENNE · FOUGERES · DINAN · ST BRIEUC · BREST · MORLAIX · VANNES · REDON · RENNES · VITRE · LAVAL · LE MANS · LA FLECHE · CHATEAUDUN · ORLEANS · BETHIVIERS · NOGENT LE ROTROU

QM
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

SUPPLY POINTS
SEPTEMBER 1944
QUARTERMASTER SECTION
THIRD U.S. ARMY
ANNEX NO. 2

CLASS I · CLASS II&IV · CLASS III · ASCZ

WAREHOUSE SCENE AT CLASS I,I AND IV DEPOT NEAR TOUL


CLASS III GAS DECANTING POINT AT NANCY


INTERIOR OF CLOTHING REPAIR TRAILER

SUPPLY POINTS
OCTOBER - 1944
QUARTERMASTER SECTION
THIRD U.S. ARMY
ANNEX NO. 3

CLASS I · CLASS II&IV · CLASS III



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

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

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SECRET

SUPPLY POINTS*
FEBRUARY - 1945
QUARTERMASTER SECTION
THIRD U.S. ARMY

CLASS I CLASS II & IV CLASS III

SCALE
MILES

ANNEX NO. 7



* Class I Supply Points Number [illegible] and Number 8) and Class III Supply Points Number 82 and Number 84 were established on the [illegible] Peninsula during the month of August. See Annex Number 1.





ANNEX NO. 6

SUPPLY POINTS
JANUARY - 1945
QUARTERMASTER SECTION
THIRD U.S. ARMY

CLASS I CLASS II & IV CLASS III

SCALE
MILES

SECRET



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SUPPLY LINES ACROSS RIVERS





ANNEX NO 8



SUPPLY POINTS*
MARCH 1945
QUARTERMASTER SECTION
THIRD U.S. ARMY

SCALE

CLASS II CLASS III



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

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

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD U.S. ARMY
Office of the Signal Officer
APO 403

SUBJECT: After-Action Report.

TO : Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, APO 403, U.S. Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Signal Section, Third U.S. Army Headquarters beginning with 25 March 1944 and continuing with the properly designated intervals by chapters.

2. It is believed that this report again illustrates the importance and complexity of modern military signal communications. The availability of such communications is greatly dependent upon the proper type and quantity. These two factors will inevitably determine the success or failure of any signal communication system.

3. The initial signal plans called for a greater number of Signal Corps troops than were ever available during operations on the Continent. There never was a period when additional signal personnel could not have been used to great advantage. This disadvantage was overcome, however, by the ingenuity, loyalty, and persistence of the Signal Corps soldier who remains imbued with our traditional slogan; "Get the message through".

Elton F. Hammond

ELTON F. HAMMOND
Colonel, Signal Corps
Signal Officer

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SIGNAL SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



HEADQUARTERS

1. Supervision and coordination of activities of Signal Section Staff, Army signal troops and signal section staffs and troops of subordinate echelons.

ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL SUB-SECTION

1. Maintenance of Signal Section files. 2. Procurement and assignment of signal reinforcements and, procurement, assignment and transfer of Signal Corps Officers. 3. Reproduction and distribution of SCI items and other signal documents. 4. Supervision of all rear echelon communications.

COMMUNICATIONS SUB-SECTION

1. Planning, direction and supervision of the tactical employment of Signal Operation and Signal Construction Battalions of the Army Signal Service. 2. Obtaining information concerning signal systems of corps and lower units and commercial and other signal facilities in Third U.S. Army area. 3. Preparation and provisions for extending Army signal system to relieve corps and divisions of operating and maintaining rear installations, thus permitting these units to push their systems forward. This includes preparation and continuous revision of Line Route Map, Circuit Diagram, Radio Net Diagram and VHF Radio Relay Diagram. 4. Studying traffic handling in all Army units, and, on this basis recommending changes in construction, operation and maintenance procedures and equipment to expedite or improve such handling. 5. Coordination of action with training sub-section for changes in established SOP and with Supply sub-section for procurement of suitable equipment. 6. Preparation of items of SCI dealing with frequency and call sign allocations, row register index, air warning broadcast, air-ground visual code, identification panel code, pyrotechnic code and telephone code names. 7. Preparation of signal circulars covering operation of Army communication system.

PLANS AND OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

1. Coordination of activities of operational signal units and of Army Signal sub-sections with policies and directives laid down by Signal Officer, Third U.S. Army and higher headquarters. 2. Maintenance of tactical situation map, location of operational units and station troop lists. 3. Supervision of section and unit histories, investigations, location and inspection of billeting spaces and bivouac areas and reception of visitors.

PHOTO SUB-SECTION

1. Keeping Signal Officer informed on all photographic matters. 2. Coordination of activities of Photo Assignment Officer and Commanding Officer of Signal Photo Company in order to provide necessary and adequate coverage for news, tactical and historical purposes. 3. Control and approval of all orders for photographic prints needed for tactical and historical purposes. 4. Responsibility for supervision and expediting transmittal of War Department film to Army Pictorial Service laboratories.

SIGNAL SECTION TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

SUB-SECTION	OFFICERS						EM
	BRIG GEN	COL	LT COL	MAJ	CAPT	LT	
HEADQUARTERS	1	1					4
ADMIN & PERS				1			7
PLANS & OPER			1				5
COMMUNICATIONS			1		5		11
SIGNAL INT SERV				1		3	11
SUPPLY			1		1		11
PHOTO				1			2
	1	1	3	3	6	3	51

SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SUB-SECTION

1. Maintenance of liaison with Army G-2 on all signal intelligence matters. 2. Supervision of all operational activities of Army and corps radio intelligence companies. 3. Radio counter measures. 4. Signal counter intelligence. 5. Solution of special codes and ciphers. 6. Examination and reproduction of captured signal intelligence and communication documents and dissemination to units and sections concerned. 7. Interrogation of special PW's and dissemination of information thus gained. 8. Maintenance of cryptographic, transmission and physical security in the Army. 9. Distribution of codes and ciphers. 10. Preparation of Army code and cipher SOI items. 11. Supervision of Army SIAM Company, Army Signal Pigeon Company and the Army Weather Detachment. 12. Supervision of all Army messenger and message center activities. 13. Supervision of wire, radio and messenger facilities for signal intelligence purposes.

ENEMY EQUIPMENT INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

1. Collection, evaluation and disposition of captured enemy signal equipment. 2. Providing high authorities with detailed technical reports and suitable specimens of "new enemy equipment" in order that the maximum exploitation of this type of intelligence may be achieved. 3. Assisting Army Signal Service in determining availability and capability of enemy equipment for utilization.

SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

1. Procurement, storage and issue of signal equipment and maintenance of records pertaining thereto. 2. Supervision of operation of Army Signal Depot and Army Signal Repair. 3. Procurement of non-standard items from captured enemy signal equipment for utilization. 4. Maintenance of records pertaining to allowances of [illegible] 54 Collection, reclamation and [illegible] disposal of signal equipment.

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CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

Section I - General

The time prior to 26 March was occupied primarily with the following matters:

a. Clarification of administrative principles to be observed.

b. Policies and methods to be followed on inspection trips.

c. Outline for communications orientation talks.

d. Maintaining by sections of a log of daily activities.

During this same period Signal Supply channels were established and brief courses in Signal Supply procedures were initiated for officers of battalion level and higher, in order to smooth out combat operation procedure.

Approximately on 25 March all personnel of the Signal Section had reported for duty. A conference was held on Signal Corps procedure and the status of Signal units. The exact locations of assigned and attached Signal Corps units were determined and arrangements were made to bring the 160th Signal Photo Company to England from its station in North Ireland and to include the 55d Signal Construction Battalion in the scheduled messenger route.

During this same period, the Army Signal Service was streamlined with a view to complete operational efficiency and liaison was established with higher headquarters. The status of the 4th Armored Signal Battalion was reviewed and it was agreed with the [illegible] Section that the best policy would be to retain control of this unit for the possible reinforcement of one of the corps. Shortly thereafter arrangements were completed with the Western Base Section's 1,20 Signal Construction and Maintenance Team for the inspection and repair of the damaged equipment of this battalion. The 1st, 51, and 4th Signal Liaison Teams were relieved from Third U.S. Army while the 7th Signal Liaison Team remained for possible use with the 20 French Armored Division. A request was made that the 111th Signal Radio Intelligence Company be assigned to Third U.S. Army. Finally, an officer representative of the Signal Section was dispatched to the First U.S. Army Group to assist in planning the forthcoming operations.

At the same time over-all policy changes were being assimilated into Third U.S. Army procedure. The Theater Signal Officer advised that Top Secret messages could be encoded in normal cryptographic systems on the condition that the words TOP SECRET were buried in the text. Message centers down to and including corps, were directed to use a rubber stamp, giving instructions for paraphrasing on all registered classified messages. The Air Department furnished information that 15 December 1943 replacement factors were to be used in forthcoming operations and it was directed that figures based on actual consumption of field wire and similar signal supplies to show the average replacement rate per day, per unit, of each major type would be included in the final report to the War Department.

By 15 April, operational plans had reached a tangible state. The First U.S. Army Group's Signal Outline Plan, which could not be published until the Group became operational, was received with a request for comments and return. It was also requested that Third U.S. Army Signal planning follow this outline as closely as possible in order that differences could be kept to a minimum.

Frequent conferences were held with the Signal and Communications Officers of the lower echelons to acquaint them with the functions of the Signal Section, outline changes in procedure and policy, and to discuss the forthcoming operations from a Signal aspect. Instances were encountered where it was considered unnecessary for unit Signal Officers to possess complete knowledge of the operation, although usually the very nature of their responsibilities required such knowledge if they were to serve their commanders effectively.

At one of these meetings the proposed operation "J" or JIAM was discussed. This Service (Signal Information and Monitoring) monitors friendly radio nets at division level, deciphers the message and immediately transmits information of value directly to army by radio. This speeds the transmission of vital information direct to army headquarters. "J" Service is the British counterpart of this system. The Signal Officer was notified that "J" Service personnel would have to be drawn from the troops at our disposal. It was decided that until more permanent arrangements could be made, the 6th Cavalry Group would act as the Army Information Service.

Signal Officers were also instructed that Signal troops would have to be prepared to clear their own path through minefields during the construction of wire lines. In view of this, it was stressed that it would be necessary to familiarize all personnel concerned with the operation of the SCR-625 and that a sufficient quantity of these mine detectors would have to be made available to do the job.

One of the most far-reaching Signal changes at the time, was the adoption of a new type radio call-up procedure. Representatives of the Signal Section, First U.S. Army Group, visited the Third U.S. Army for the purpose of acquainting responsible officers with Link Sign Procedure. Differences between this method and the old double call sign system were outlined. Particular emphasis was placed on the fact that, to a large degree, transmission security depended upon the understanding staff and Signal Officers had of correct radio procedure.

In addition to the installation and coordination of the wire system required within and without the headquarters, Signal troops received further training experience by assisting the General Post Office with several telephone construction projects. Clearance from higher headquarters, required before a unit could be assigned a mission of this type, was received and the 55d Signal Construction Battalion completed its assigned projects in commendatory fashion.

At about this time a communication link was proposed between European Theater of Operations U.S. Army and Allied Forces Headquarters ALLIED. The following information was furnished concerning estimated requirements of the Third U.S. Army.

a. Amount of traffic for Allied Forces Headquarters through European Theater of Operations U.S. Army, if any. 1000 groups per day.

b. Precedence of messages. 45% Operational Priority, 45% Priority, 10% Routine.

c. Average groups per message: 50.

d. Number of messages per twenty-four hour period: 20.

e. Security: 10% Top Secret, 90% Secret.

Subordinate units, in the meantime, were aligning their Signal policies to conform to those outlined by the Signal Section. In some cases, requests for changes in policy or permission to vary from standard procedures were forwarded by these units. After discussion and consideration, certain of these requests were granted, others were not. The 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade, for example, proposed that Third U.S. Army Signal policy allow all Tank Destroyer Private Line Commanders W-8 telephones and test clips. This was to permit the respective Commanding Officers to call in on any line available in the combat area in case of emergency. The request was disapproved and strict orders were issued against any tapping of wire lines. It was felt that any benefits gained by wire tapping were more than offset by the possible interruption of priority calls.

Planning had now reached the point where it was particularly necessary to guard against breaches of security and to insure proper security precautions at all times. Messages were frequently being sent regarding the forthcoming operations and maps, plans, diagrams, and appendices to the master plan were in the process of preparation. It was of great importance to insure the integrity of all intelligence contained in documents of Top Secret and Strict classifications. At a conference held by the Chief of Staff, Third U.S. Army, the following points were brought out:

a. Each Section Chief would make a complete inventory of Top Secret matter in his possession and make sure that all was registered.

b. Necessary orders be given to prevent unauthorized personnel from entering restricted parts of the message center.

c. A check be made to insure that storage facilities in all message centers provided adequate security. Top Secret material would always be kept locked in the safe when not in use.

By the first week of June attention had been directed to the Signal problems which would arise when the Third U.S. Army commenced its movement towards and on to the Continent. It was estimated that minimum needs in the event of a displacement in the United Kingdom, were 20 trunks and 150 locals. The 150 locals could be field phones, and we could use our own switchboards. Further, in a conference with the Chief of Staff, Third U.S. Army, it was directed that a study be made of communications between forward and rear echelons when on different sides of the channel, with details to be shown in diagrammatic form. (See Annex 1.)

The Signal Officer was requested to prepare a simple code indicating types of units, for short messages to be used between Commanding Generals of forward and rear echelons.

To provide full Signal operating strength for Army Headquarters, European Theater of Operations U.S. Army was requested to furnish additional personnel to operate facilities in the rear echelon. The request was approved by the Signal Officer, European Theater of Operations U.S. Army and the personnel made available until D plus forty-five. The Signal Officer, XX Corps, was informed that in compliance with instructions for preparation for Overseas Movement, all Army detachments attached to corps become corps responsibilities.

A conference was held by the Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, and the following Signal matters were taken up directly with the Commanding General, Communications Zone:

a. The necessity for one additional Signal Operation Battalion and one additional Signal Construction Battalion was emphasized. These additional units had been approved, but were not yet available in the Theater. It was requested that, even though they could not immediately be made available, they be activated and furloughed as soon as possible. The point was brought out that the lack of these battalions might hold up the advance of the Third U.S. Army.

b. The matter of the return of Signal Corps equipment projects to Third U.S. Army through routine channels was discussed. Certain of these projects were returned for revision downward, although they were similar to those of the First U.S. Army which had been approved. It was requested that in future cases of this sort, proper representatives from this headquarters be asked to visit London or elsewhere to make necessary adjustments.

By 15 June, two cross-Channel air dispatch services had been arranged for. The first was a straight air dispatch letter service already put in operation by the Ninth U.S. Air Force. The second was a special service by the 10th Photo Group to provide a connecting link between advance and rear echelons of the Army center serving the Third U.S. Army and the XIX Tactical Air Command.

On 20 June, displacement was made to the Marshalling Area at NINE YANKS (7.45) and traffic began, preliminary to embarkation for the Continent. The communications network at the new command post site was temporary, utilizing two general post office switchboard at Braemore House and a field switchboard at NINE YANKS (7.45). Communication was available by direct line to the rear echelon at Toft Carr and to Southern Base Section. Ten trunks were operating between Braemore House and NINE YANKS (7.45).

The Chief of Staff, Third U.S. Army, directed forward echelon "A" loaded on vehicles on a ten-hour alert basis from 1400, 2 July, and the 501st Signal Operation Battalion, 511 Signal Construction Battalion, and 160th Signal Photo Company were phased for movement immediately thereafter.

The Deputy Chief of Staff stated that on his visit to the target area, all supplies, except ammunition and Signal, seemed adequate. The surface and Signal supplies had not yet landed, operations due to capture of many commercial installations and because the distances involved within the beachhead area were not great.

The advance party of the Signal Section departed for the Continent at 0145, July. The Signal Officer, XX Corps, arrived and was orientated on the status of administrative and personnel matters to be handled for Third U.S. Army in his capacity as Signal Officer, rear echelon, Third U.S. Army. The Signal Section, leaded 4 July, departed for the embarkation area, and embarked on military transport, John D. Whittier. The vessel cleared her moorings at 0015 and dropped anchor at Tarbert at 2400, July. Unloading was completed at 0811.30 and the LST beached at 0830, July.

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Section II - Administration and Personnel

The period spent in the United Kingdom was one of adjustment, necessary changes and improvements to bring an Army Signal Service to operational efficiency being effected in this subsection and the following actions taken:

Authority was requested from First U.S. Army Group to requisition 15% overstrength of company grade officers, warrant officers and enlisted men for all Signal Corps units assigned, or to be assigned.

The Signal Officer, First U.S. Army Group, approved a request for Assistant Signal Officers in Infantry divisions in the grade of major.

Reorganization of Signal Radio Intelligence Companies was made to include Type 18 Traffic Analysis Unit. Information was received from the European Theater of Operations U.S. Army, that reorganization under new T/O & E's would not be required. In this connection the 40th Signal Battalion was directed to return to the old T/O & E 11-15, dated 1 April 1942, and any reorganization that had been effected was cancelled.

Under the proposed replacement system, replacement requisitions of Signal personnel were directed to be forwarded directly from units to this headquarters by any available means of communication. Such information would be acted upon as soon as received. The informal reports must then be confirmed as soon as possible by formal requisition.

On the 19th of April negotiations were started for the Air Transport Command to assist in getting supplies to Signal units located in North Ireland. This plan later materialized and the action was of the utmost importance to Signal Supply.

Corps submitted lists of current Signal Officer shortages existing in their units.

It was necessary to shift personnel between various Signal Units to fill urgently needed requirements. Replacements of high-speed radio operators were expected about 15 May.

Signal Units assigned or attached to the Third U.S. Army and located in North Ireland were moved to England to facilitate control, operation and preparation for the operational period.

The Air Force District Personnel Officer was asked to make available any excess Air Corps personnel with Signal Corps training. European Theater of Operations promised to support the proposed trade of basics for this personnel. Several replacements were acquired in this manner.

Great numbers of routine personnel assignments for training and many reports were handled.

Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

The major responsibilities of Signal Intelligence Service during the period in the United Kingdom were:

a. Supervising the training of radio intelligence companies.

b. Supplying cryptographic devices, documents and instructions.

c. Maintaining signal security through inspection, monitoring and instruction.

d. Supervising counter-signal intelligence plans in Third U.S. Army in conformity with the overall plans of European Theater of Operations U.S. Army.

e. Planning for signal intelligence, cryptographic and signal security activities during operations.

Four Signal Service Companies (SI) were activated, equipped and given intensive training, including operational experience in southeastern England after D-Day, for their functions as radio intelligence companies for Third U.S. Army's corps. Their training, like that of the Army Signal Radio Intelligence Company, was coordinated closely with Signal Intelligence Service, European Theater of Operations U.S. Army, to insure uniform radio intelligence training throughout the Theater of Operations.

The largest distribution of a cryptographic item was that of Slidex, a new type of cryptographic device for traffic of low grade security. A total of 17,000 Slidexes was issued in the United Kingdom. Two schools were conducted to train officers of Third U.S. Army Staff and of subordinate units in the use of this device.

A monitoring team at Army Headquarters made periodic checks to insure maintenance of telephone security. Radio monitoring was accomplished by European Theater of Operations U.S. Army during this period, but it was anticipated that this function would be carried out later by a SIAM Company scheduled to be assigned to Third U.S. Army for operations. When word was received from European Theater of Operations U.S. Army, however, that the SIAM Company could not be trained in time for initial combat, plans were made to make security monitoring a function of radio intelligence companies. Complete signal operation instructions of Army units were furnished the Army Signal Radio Intelligence Company for this purpose.

Although teletype lines in the United Kingdom were classified as secure for secret messages in the clear, Third U.S. Army still required all secret messages to be encryptographed. This gave valuable pre-operational training to code room personnel, accustomed the staff to writing messages for encryptographing, and brought to light many difficulties in paraphrasing, stereotyped phraseology and other factors inherent in encryptographing messages. They were corrected as they arose. From the adoption of this policy between 12 April and 30 June, the Third U.S. Army Code Room handled 721,000 code groups.

Throughout the United Kingdom the volume of all radio traffic was regulated from week to week in such a manner as to thwart enemy signal intelligence agencies. Regulation of training traffic in Third U.S. Army for this purpose was controlled through Signal Intelligence Service in accordance with the plans of higher headquarters. Assistance also was given by Signal Intelligence Service to certain specialized counter-signal intelligence units operating under higher headquarters' direction in the Third U.S. Army zone.

When Signal Intelligence Service was made responsible for Detachment ZY, 21st Weather Squadron, arrangements were made for twice daily weather forecasts for the staff, plus special weather data for Artillery and anti-aircraft Artillery firing.

To establish proper security control over reproduction of secret and top secret war maps and highly classified signal intelligence documents, a small photographic detachment was added to Signal Intelligence Service on 15 May.

Section II - Communications

During the planning period in the United Kingdom, the Communication Subsection supervised the operation of communication facilities then in use, and worked on plans for the operational period after D-Day. Wire trunk facilities were all obtained from the British General Post Office and consisted of General Postoffice circuits made available through the various base sections. Wire plants and possible routes were studied and used as a basis for personnel, equipment, and material requirements. The number of circuits necessary, to various installations within and beyond our headquarters, were established. A study was made of British Multi-Airline open wire construction and the necessary information disseminated to the construction companies of Army and Corps. The same procedure was followed with French open wire and cable.

Close liaison with higher Signal echelons was maintained and every effort was made to bring the Army Signal Units and those of lower echelons into complete agreement on operational procedure. Signal Operation Instructions, and procedure in the form of Signal Circulars, were compiled and issued as part of the Third U.S. Army Plan. Signal Operation Instructions were exchanged with the 21st Tactical Air Command for mutual benefit. To meet the demand for speedy transmission of messages by other than electrical means between headquarters Third U.S. Army, subordinate unit headquarters and supply installations, it became necessary to establish an air messenger service. This operated to all parts of England and to units in Northern Ireland.

Corps and Army troops using radio were instructed to submit monthly reports of detected violations of radio transmission security. These reports were compiled and forwarded to Signal Intelligence Service for study and corrective action.

The procurement of special equipment allotted to us was a constant problem, especially as regards radio link, carrier, and field scramblers. A procedure for using CF 1 and 2 equipment in conjunction with the SCR-399 for teletype was developed by this section and put in operation by the 301st Signal Operation Battalion. The speech channels plus four teletype channels worked very well.

To insure a minimum of interference in Frequency Modulation radio operation a system of channel allocation was designed and put in operation. This replaced the old method of turning loose all FM channels to organizations authorized this equipment. The Third U.S. Army received twenty-nine radio frequencies for Army circuits and Army troops. The SCR-245, 536, 511 and the 500, 600 and 600 series were allowed to operate on all channels and Third U.S. Army allotted them under the above plan.

It was found that the code block assignment made to Third U.S. Army was not applicable to the French language. A request was made to European Theater of Operations U.S. Army for a block assignment to meet this specific problem in order to provide for the needs of the 2d French Armored Division.

To provide necessary information on mine fields to our construction battalions, it was arranged with the S-2 Section that the Signal Section receive distribution of S-2 mine field maps. Three copies were furnished, one for each Construction Battalion and one for the Communication Subsection which was made available to the Signal Operation Battalion.

Section II - Plans & Operations

In many respects, the Plans and Operations Subsection continued the work originally started by them in the States. This consisted of arranging for training facilities, checking the training programs in use, and arranging for the testing of the various Signal Units. The new equipment involved made it necessary for special schools to be set up and a rigid control exercised on the facilities available.

Classes were conducted for representatives of each staff section in the use of Slidex, radio telephone procedure, Signal Operation Instructions and message writing, and in the correct use of the message center.

A radio test team was formed and conducted tests in radio procedure and security prior to releasing Third U.S. Army units from the radio silence imposed by European Theater of Operations U.S. Army.

Section II - Supply

The Signal Supply Subsection was assembled by 26 March and work on the planning phase for coming operations was started the next day. Arrangements and plans to equip Third U.S. Army units with Table of Basic Allowances equipment and supplies were made immediately.

Equipping of units was the responsibility of the Services of Supply in the United Kingdom. Due to the number of organizations, the frequency of arrivals, the difficulty of movements within England, coupled with the current overloads on the English transport system, it became necessary for the Army Signal Supply Section to arrange for its own truck and air transport from all Service of Supply Depots to Third U.S. Army units. Truck transport was organized from Third U.S. Army units to handle group loads from depots within travel spheres established after consideration of the geographical location of the organizations to be supplied. Air transport was provided by the Transport Command for all Signal equipment and supplies to those organizations based in Northern Ireland. Sea transport was also requested, but was not available.

After a study of the plans for the coming operations, the necessity for reviewing equipment and supplies of the units of Third U.S. Army became apparent. These studies by all elements of the Signal Service of the Army, from separate company to battalion, were made from an operational viewpoint. The resulting summary was submitted to Headquarters European Theater of Operations, for approval as an operational requirement for all Army units. The resulting project was verbally approved by Headquarters European Theater of Operations on 1 June.

The supply in the Army area was set at a seven-day level by the Theater. Summaries of all equipment in the hands of Third U.S. Army organizations, based on the latest Troop List, were made. Stocks required for the depot operation were determined by applying the War Department Maintenance Factors to the equipment in the hands of the Army. A thirty-day level of expendable items was obtained in the same manner.

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Requisitions were prepared for depot stocks to be delivered on the Continent. The period of D ∠ 30 through D ∠ 41 was covered by requisitions and phased into allotted delivery tonnages. The supply of Class II items was made the responsibility of the Communication Zone for the period of D ∠ 42 and on. Requisitions for Class IV requirements and special continental construction projects were made and phased into the operation for the period D ∠ 42 through D ∠ 90.

Spare part requirements for all Signal equipment were based on the Spare Parts Lists of the European Theater of Operations in effect at this time. Requisitions for spare parts were prepared, submitted and phased for all Signal Corps equipment of Third U.S. Army units.

The tonnages estimated to be required for the supply of Third U.S. Army for the period D ∠ 21 through D ∠ 41 are shown on the Tonnage Chart. Requisitions covering equipment and supplies within the tonnage allocation per day were prepared and submitted on 21 April.

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

Section I - General

After debarkation on the Continent, the Signal Section proceeded to the command post at HEBOU (T 19), north of ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (T 19), on the CHERBOURG PENINSULA. Instructions received indicated the Third U.S. Army would not become operational until the fall of AVRANCHES (T 21). The installation of communication facilities and officially contacting any operational units, was prohibited until we became operational.

The Signal Officers, First U.S. Army and Third U.S. Army, arranged the following matters:

a. The Third U.S. Army would check the CHERBOURG (O 12), ST MALO (S 71), and other German built lines, and inform VIII Corps and First U.S. Army of their location.

b. First U.S. Army to loan one complete radio link to the Third U.S. Army.

c. The retuning of our teletype machines to operate at British speed was considered and rejected.

d. The Signal Officer of First U.S. Army requested and received the use of one Storage and Issue Section of the 579th Signal Depot Company and one Platoon of the 187th Signal Repair Company to operate the Signal Dump at Utah Beach, also Photographic General Assignment Units from the 166th Signal Photo Company.

e. Pole line between ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (T 19) and VALOGNES (O 20) was rebuilt by Third U.S. Army Signal Construction Troops to form a ten-pin open wire lead with standard construction and transpositions.

It was directed that our axis of Signal Communication follow that of the VIII Corps as closely as possible during the latter's advance down the coast.

The following Signal arrangements were made with Advance Section Communications Zone:

a. Third U.S. Army to continue the ten-pair open wire build south of ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (T 19). Supplies would be furnished by Advance Section Communications Zone.

b. Two additional physical circuits were allocated the Third U.S. Army from Lucky Command Post north to XX Corps, thus giving Third U.S. Army one full ten-pin crossarm of pole line.

c. Spacing of arms on open wire leads would be twenty-four inches.

Agreement was reached on the responsibilities of Advance Section Communications Zone and the allocation of circuits to the Army area. Third U.S. Army had full jurisdiction of all circuits to Army rear boundary. Circuits within Army area were to be allotted to Advance Section Communications Zone as requested and as the tactical situation permitted, Advance Section Communications Zone agreed to bring supply lines (common user circuits) to Army rear boundary or to the nearest switching central. This agreement in no way affected previous arrangements made for three commercial news circuits to CHERBOURG (O 12). From information received, it was learned that Press Wireless and McKay Radio Organization had secured licenses for operation of fifteen kilowatt radio transmitters on the Continent to handle commercial dispatches direct to the United States.

The Chief of Staff directed that a continuous check be maintained of message traffic to prevent delays through the transmission of inconsequential messages by electrical means.

One hundred and sixty-four Third U.S. Army trucks were kept on the road hauling and placing Signal supplies. About fifteen percent of our needed supplies had been received, but we were unable to get spare radios either for stock or replacements. An acute shortage of batteries BA 38, used principally in the mine detector SCR-625 and in radio SCR-536, was encountered.

TONNAGE CHART

DAY	PERSONNEL		OPERATIONAL RESERVES						MAINTENANCE RESERVES					
	DAILY	CUMULATIVE	CLASS II		CLASS IV		TOTAL		CLASS II		CLASS IV		TOTAL	
			*L/T	#M/T	L/T	M/T	L/T	M/T	L/T	M/T	L/T	M/T	L/T	M/T
D∠24			.3	.8	.4	.6	.7	1.4	.3	.8	.4	.6	.7	1.4
D∠25			.3	.8	.4	.6	.7	1.4	.3	.8	.4	.6	.7	1.4
D∠26			2.2	5.6	2.5	3.8	4.7	9.4	2.2	5.6	2.5	3.8	4.7	9.4
D∠27			6.5	16.2	7.1	10.8	13.6	27.0	6.4	16.0	7.3	11.0	13.7	27.0
D∠28			11.3	28.3	12.8	19.2	24.1	47.5	11.4	28.5	22.7	34.1	34.1	62.6
D∠29	1424	1424	5.1	12.8	5.7	8.6	10.8	21.4	5.1	12.8	136.2	294.3	201.3	307.1
D∠30	5124	17373	6.9	17.3	7.8	11.7	14.7	29.0	6.9	17.3	98.3	148.2	105.7	165.5
D∠31	5253	24626	8.8	22.0	9.9	14.9	18.7	36.9	8.8	22.0	160.5	240.8	169.3	262.8
D∠32	12881	37507	13.2	33.0	15.0	22.5	28.2	55.5	13.4	33.5	82.1	123.2	95.5	156.7
D∠33	7573	45080	15.9	39.8	18.0	27.0	33.9	66.8	16.9	42.3	170.6	255.9	187.5	298.2
D∠34	7991	53071	18.8	47.0	21.2	31.8	40.0	78.8	13.0	47.5	231.0	346.5	250.0	349.0
D∠35	8424	61495	21.8	54.5	24.6	36.9	46.4	91.4	22.0	55.0	209.4	314.1	231.4	369.1
D∠36	8476	69966	20.2	50.5	22.9	34.4	43.1	84.9	25.4	63.5	216.0	324.0	241.4	387.5
D∠37	4722	74688	20.8	52.0	23.3	35.0	44.1	87.0	26.7	66.8	220.2	330.3	246.9	397.1
D∠38	5086	79774	22.0	55.0	24.9	37.4	46.9	92.4	28.5	71.3	374.6	561.9	403.1	633.2
D∠39	5468	85242	22.0	55.0	24.7	37.1	46.7	92.1	30.4	76.0	371.7	557.6	402.1	633.6
D∠40	5345	90587	25.9	64.8	29.0	43.5	54.9	108.3	32.4	81.0	362.9	544.4	395.3	625.4
D∠41	7052	97639	40.5	101.3	45.4	68.1	85.9	169.4	33.9	84.8	247.9	371.4	282.8	456.2
	87639	753297	262.5	656.7	295.6	443.9	558.1	1120.6	290.0	725.5	2975.2	4468.7	3265.2	5188.2

* L/T Long Ton, 2200 Pounds

\# M/T Measured Ton, 2000 Pounds

NOTE: Organizational Equipment Tonnages that cannot be carried in basic load will be taken from Maintenance Tonnages column. Adequate allowances have been made for this.

The Section was advised that the Twelfth U.S. Army Group and Third U.S. Army would become operational at 1200, Tuesday, 1 August. It was predicted that radios, and motor and air messengers, would be the principal agencies of Signal communication during the forthcoming operations. (See Circuit Diagrams and Line Route Map, Annexes 2 and 3)

Section II - Administration and Personnel

Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service (EEIS) Detachment #8, composed of four officers and six enlisted men, arrived on the Continent. The Detachment was attached to the Third U.S. Army.

Four French and four German linguists arrived from the United Kingdom. One each was immediately assigned to each Construction and Operation Battalion and one each to the Signal Section.

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Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

The following steps were taken to increase the effectiveness of Signal Intelligence:

a. A daily conference, for the exchange of intelligence, was held at the G-2 Section with representatives of the Signal Intelligence Service and 116th Signal Radio Intelligence Company.

b. To provide office space and communication facilities for Signal Intelligence Operations and Army Information Service a six-ton van was outfitted and located in the G-2, G-3 area.

c. Arrangements were made with prisoner of war and document examination teams to forward items of interest to Signal Intelligence Service.

d. Radio Intelligence and Radio Security Monitoring Directives were drafted for distribution.

e. Detailed plans were made for coordinating signal intelligence with higher, lower and lateral headquarters.

f. Although Third U.S. Army was not operational, interception of enemy traffic was begun, and the intelligence derived therefrom was reported to G-2.

A change to Signal Circular 122-1 was distributed permitting the majority of messages of secret or lower classification to be sent in the clear by teletype over Army wire lines.

A change of Signal Circular 44-1 was distributed making the Army Signal Office the office of record for all medium cryptographic material. Formerly, Corps had been sub-offices of record for such material. Under the change they were relieved of this responsibility and became only distribution agencies for such material. Signal Intelligence Service transferred records from Corps Signal Offices to its own files.

The Signal Intelligence Service was reorganized into the following subsections for operational purposes:

a. Signal Intelligence Operations (to coordinate the activities of Signal Intelligence agencies).

b. Documents and Research (to assist the Army Radio Intelligence Company and Corps Signal Service Companies (RI) by obtaining, condensing and disseminating technical data from captured documents and by conducting long-term research).

c. Security and Administration (to handle code and cipher distribution, signal security and administrative duties).

Section II - Communications

Prior to becoming operational as open wire axis, running generally north and south, was pushed south nearly to LESSAY (T 17). A former German naval wire installation was used after the cross arms and wire had been removed. U.S. type arms, wire and transposition were employed. The BRICQUEBEC (O 10) - CHERBOURG (O 12) section was constructed by the Advance Section, Communication Zone. This build provided ten circuits south from CHERBOURG (O 12), and insured communications between the Army Command Post, CHERBOURG (O 12) and cross-channel to the United Kingdom via submarine cable or radio link.

One spiral-four cable installed by the First U.S. Army to VIII Corps was extended by the Third U.S. Army as the Corps displaced. Material was furnished by the First U.S. Army and a supply dump was operated by the 334 Signal Construction Battalion.

During a heavy rain, trouble developed on several telephone circuits and investigation revealed the following points:

a. Spiral-four connectors were lying in water.

b. Test points were unprotected from the elements.

c. Improper clearance had been allowed for vehicular traffic.

These points, and the fact that trouble became stopped working on the circuits at dark, resulted in circuits being out of service for too long a period. Instructions were immediately issued to correct these conditions.

Open wire facilities available, western section of CHERBOURG PENINSULA allocated as follows:

	Maintained	Total Circuits	Allocation
CARENTAN (T 58)-(LA HAYE DU PUITS (T 18)	ADSEC	10	Pole group First U.S. Army 2 Groups, IX AF to XIX TAC 2 Groups - Advance Section Communications Zone
VALOGNES (O 20)-(ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (T 19)	TUSA	5	1 Group First U.S. Army Master Rear-Lucky; Lucky-Marathon Switch. 1 Group First U.S. Army Master Rear-Marathon Switch. Pole Pair Log Ckt terminate at Wire Chief Master Rear; Marathon Switch; Lucky.
MENOU (T 19) TEST-LA HAYE DU PUITS (T 18)	TUSA	10	Pins 1-4; 1 Group Lucky-Monreah Pins 7-10 1 Group Lucky-Comst (also for Forward Displacement Lucky CP) Pins 11-14 1 Group IX AF-XIX TAC Pins 17-20 1 Group XIX TAC-IX TAC Pins 5-6 1 pair Anaconda-Lucky; Lucky-Actor Pins 15-16 1 pair Anaconda-Actor
MENOU (T 19) TEST-MONTEBOURG (O 16)	TUSA	10	To be allocated between Advance Section Communications Zone and Third U.S. Army as required - no conflict in requirements at present or foreseen.

Section II - Supply

On 31 July the following equipment and supplies comprised the total stock in the hands of the Signal Supply Officer, Third U.S. Army.

Wire W-110	6000 miles
Rad Set SCR-300	1
Rad Set SCR-508	1
Rad Set SCR-510	1
Rad Set SCR-511	8
Standard Pole Line	10 miles
SWAL	80 miles
Spiral-four Cable	80 miles
31 Misc items in very small quantities.	

The Commanding General, Advance Section Communications Zone, was informed of the following Signal supply difficulties encountered by Third U.S. Army.

a. Long hauls for all of our supplies (pole line material, SWAL, etc).

b. Labor had to be sent with the trucks to load the supplies.

c. Signal Depots closed after 1800, without officers or top non-commissioned officers.

d. Delays in paper work occurred at the depots. Our personnel often had waited hours for the depots to open for business.

e. Errors in depot paper work once had resulted in sixty trucks out of 164, being returned empty in one day.

All of the above resulted in an excessive delay to Third U.S. Army. Corrective measures were taken immediately.

The following releases were obtained:

Reel Unit RL-26	15
Reel Unit RL-17	64
Converters M-209	50
Telephone EE-8	1000
Wire W-110	All available in depot
Wire W-130	All available in depot
Power Unit PE-175	12
Teletype EE-97	3
Radio Link, Complete 100-mile	1

Any supplies, appearing on our phased requisition, which could be released were released. Advance Section Communications Zone was now handling all supplies to us, furnishing all labor, and making every effort to assist us. Our problems eased somewhat due to the effective and aggressive actions of the Commanding General, and of the Signal Officer, Advance Section Communications Zone.

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

Section I - General

The Signal Officer assembled officers of the Communication Subsection and discussed the impending Third U.S. Army drive to the east, with three corps abreast, and the probable Corps axes, with the XII Corps on the right, the XX Corps in the center, and the XV Corps on the left. It was predicted that the Third U.S. Army axis would probably follow that of the XX Corps in the center, since an elaborate under-ground cable system followed this route towards PARIS (S 04). The shortage of Signal equipment and Signal Construction troops precluded the simultaneous build in divergent directions of Third U.S. Army wire axis behind each of the three Corps. The under-ground cable was planned to be opened at points along the Army axis, and rehabilitated open wire, spiral-four, or rapid pole line construction installed to successive Command Post locations of the XII and XV Corps.

The Third U.S. Army moved rapidly eastward soon after becoming operational. The selection and establishment of command posts was a continuous process. The distances involved, and the rapidity of command post displacements of divisions, corps and the army, at times made radio our primary means of communication. Practically ever night the Signal troops, by necessity, became veterans. Close liaison with corps was maintained. This enabled the Third U.S. Army Signal Service to keep abreast of contemplated command post displacements and of the associated wire line changes.

Existing open wire facilities were exploited to the maximum, but frequently it was found more expeditious to lay new circuits.

The axis of Signal communication in effect on 6 August was as follows:

a. THIRD ARMY: LE REPAS (T 23) - POILLEY (T 30) - CHATEAU GONTIER (J 71) - DISSAY SOUS COURCILLON (F 59) - CHATEAUDUN (M 26) - COURTALAIN (R 70).

b. VIII CORPS: VILLEDIEU (T 20) - DOL (S 90) -

c. XII CORPS: LARTILLY (T 22) -

d. XV CORPS: LES CHERIS (T 31) - ST PIERRE LA COUR (T 45) (at 5251, halfway between VITRE (T 35) and LAVAL (T 64) - LAVAL (T 64) - LE MANS (V 46).

e. XX CORPS: ST MARTIN DE LANDELLE (T 40) - VITRE (T 35) - SEGRE (J 50) - CHATEAUNEUF SUR SARTHE (J 80) - BAUGE (P 18).

Information of importance to the Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service (EEIS) that divisions uncovered was acted upon as soon as received. In the early stages of the advance the best sources of enemy equipment were block houses, dugouts, fortifications and command posts. When these fixed defense posts were passed, small scattered supply points and immobilized railroad trains were the most important collection points. One train located at VILLENEUVE SUR YONNE (X 65) yielded five cars of Signal equipment, including radio pack sets, carrier equipment, teletype, spare parts, etc. Items having an intelligence value were studied and reports submitted. Specimens were shipped to G-2, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces for further study and distribution. All other items were either utilized by the Third U.S. Army if needed or released to the Communications Zone.

The two Signal Battalions (Operation and Construction) previously requested by Third U.S. Army and approved by the Higher Headquarters, were not available at this time. In order to assist us, the Twelfth

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U.S. Army Group attached one-half of the 256th Signal Operation Company to the Third U.S. Army.

The Signal Troops of the XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC) were unable to provide operational circuits fast enough to keep pace with the Command Post displacements of the Third U.S. Army. Instructions were given that circuits between forward and rear echelons of the Third U.S. Army would be allocated as follows:

1st and third circuits	-	common user.
2d and fourth circuits	-	XIX Tactical Air Command.
All circuits in excess of four	-	common user.

To graphically illustrate the communication problem, photographs have been inserted to show the status of communication agencies prior to each displacement of the Command Post. (See Annexes 4 through 18)

It was emphasized that link radio equipment would be vital to the maintenance of Signal communication between Third U.S. Army and its three Corps in a rapidly moving situation. XV Corps was directed to retain its present link equipment. The next link equipment received was allocated to the XII and XX Corps in that order.

The following policy was announced by the Chief of Staff, Third U.S. Army: Wire will always be installed. When physically possible, telephone will be considered as the most important wire means of communication. The Chief of Staff emphasized that this did not mean that he was against teletype, but that his personal contacts over the phone to the Corps Commanders could not be adequately replaced by any other form of communication.

Another constructing company was requested for the temporary use of Third U.S. Army. The 267th Signal Construction Company was attached.

Signal Officers of the XV and XX Corps were informed of the following matters:

a. "A" Company of the 33d Signal Construction Battalion and the 267th Signal Construction Company would support the XX and XV Corps respectively.

b. The principal mission of these companies was to insure rapid establishment of communications with Army Headquarters, and that when this was accomplished they could be used by the Corps Signal Officer as he desired.

c. The company supporting XV Corps was responsible for maintaining a pool of 100 miles of spiral-four. The company supporting XX Corps had the same responsibility for 150 miles of spiral-four.

The predicted Command Post locations on our present axis, extended, were announced as follows:

JAWVILLE (W 67)
PITHIVIERS (W 96)
SENS (X 66)

The approved procedure for opening toll cables was outlined by Twelfth U.S. Army Group as follows:

a. Requests for necessary work would be made to the Twelfth U.S. Army Group liaison officers.

b. Opening of cables to be done by their crews.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group advised that we could shortly receive a 100-mile radio link system, with operating personnel and trucks. This would include two terminal and three relay stations. The remaining systems requested would be delivered as soon as possible.

On 31 August, wire communication was not established promptly after a command post displacement of the XX Corps. Upon investigation it developed that the reasons for slow installation were as follows:

a. The long move of the Corps Command Post from MONTEREAU (S 98) to LOUVOIS (T 36) was made with insufficient prior warning to the Corps Signal Officer.

b. XX Corps Headquarters vehicles were delayed in crossing the SEINE RIVER because of the destruction of many bridges.

c. Non-receipt of warning orders sent by XX Corps to the Executive Officer of Army Signal Service, who was forward with the advance echelon at the time. The measured distance from Third U.S. Army Command Post to the XX Corps Command Post over the shortest practicable route was 81.2 miles. The Signal Officer, XX Corps, telephoned soon after the Executive Officer returned to Third U.S. Army Headquarters and announced that the XX Corps Command Post would immediately displace again directly east to a point some fifty miles beyond its planned location.

A method was worked out to install a radio link station to span the gap of 120 miles between Command Posts of the Third U.S. Army and XX Corps.

Section II - Administration and Personnel

Moves of Rear Echelon for the month of August were as follows:

1. MENOU (T 15)-BEAUCHAMPS (T 25) 3 Aug 1944 59 miles
   BEAUCHAMPS (T 25)-PITHIVIERS (T 90) 10-11 Aug 1944 32 miles
   PITHIVIERS (T 90)-LA BARONCE (T 51) 17-18 Aug 1944 102 miles
   LA BARONCE (T 51)-COMPOST AUX LOGES (W 85)25 Aug 1944 139 miles

2. Average number of telephones installed per displacement: 70

3. Average cable and wire installed per displacement:

   Field Wire - 11 miles
   5-Pair Cable - 42,000 feet
   10-Pair Cable - 18,000 feet

Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

The Security and Administrative Subsection of Signal Intelligence Service was moved from the rear to the forward echelon when it was found codes and ciphers could not be distributed effectively from the rear echelon.

Due to the expansion of the Army Information Service detachment at Third U.S. Army Headquarters, the detachment moved from the Signal Intelligence Operations van and set up a separate installation at G-3.

On 25 August, Signal Intelligence Service assumed responsibility for direction of the message center. Until that date its only responsibility in connection with the message center was through the code rooms. Third U.S. Army Code Rooms handled an average of 10,000 code groups per day during August.

The following Signal Intelligence communications network was established:

a. Direct teletype circuits from the Army Radio Intelligence Company to each Corps Signal Service Company (R).

b. A parallel radio net for use when teletype circuits were inoperative.

c. A direct teletype and direct telephone line from the Army Radio Intelligence Company to Signal Intelligence Operations.

Signal Intelligence initially was passed by teletype along from the Army Radio Intelligence Company to Signal Intelligence Operations for delivery to G-2. Late in August, however, increased realization of the importance of signal intelligence led to extension of the direct telephone line to the G-2 situation section. The Radio Intelligence Company reported spot intelligence on this wire simultaneously to Signal Intelligence Service and G-2. Telephone reports were followed by teletype reports in greater detail.

(Note: Due to security restrictions prescribed by higher headquarters, results of Signal Intelligence may not be included in this report).

Section II - Communications

The drive of the Third U.S. Army developed so rapidly that it was impossible to establish the wire communication system outlined during the planning phase. Time usually prohibited laying more than one spiral-four to each Corps.

The open wire build completed to LE SAULT (T 17) was extended by spiral-four circuits to the new command post location in the vicinity of LE BIHOREAU (T 26). A switching central was established at this junction point. Construction of the open wire build was discontinued by Third U.S. Army at COUTANCES (T 25). The construction personnel was used to continue the Army axis with spiral-four cable, and to establish wire communications with the corps.

Spiral-four was only available in limited quantities for training. Problems in handling this cable correctly, became evident. Construction teams were instructed in the characteristics of this particular cable. It was emphasized that care must be taken to prevent breaking the inner insulation; connectors must be clean and dry; and each quarter mile section must be tested as layed.

Two SE-8y Repeaters worked satisfactorily over a fifty-five mile length of spiral-four. It was found that on a combination open wire spiral-four installation, this type of repeater would not give satisfactory results.

The Third U.S. Army received its first radio link equipment five days after becoming operational. During the month of August a total of four 100-mile systems were received. Due to the tactical situation radio link provided the most dependable means of communication between Army echelons and from Army to the Corps. Twenty-eight separate radio link circuits were installed and operated over distances totaling 1,175 miles.

Maximum use was made of all the equipment and it frequently was operated point to point without a relay over distances up to seventy-eight miles. Telephone carrier terminals were used in conjunction with radio link. Channels two and four were connected to the switchboard and two teletype circuits were placed on channel three. Channel one was used by the radio operators for engineering purposes. The radio stations were connected to the carrier terminals with spiral-four cable.

During August the Third U.S. Army received twenty-four trained radio link personnel from the Advance Section Communications Zone. Forty additional men from various Army Signal units were trained and used for the operation of radio link.

The Communication Subsection of the Army Signal Service was directly responsible for the installation and operation of this equipment. This action was necessary because the T/O of the Signal Operations Battalion fails to provide for radio link operators, or for frequency modulation repairmen. Using this method the Radio Officer of the Communication Subsection exercised direct supervision and was charged with full responsibility.

During the month of August the Army Command Post displaced eight times. The displacement distances involved were from twenty-three to eighty miles each. The average mileage was forty-eight miles.

On 1 August, CW (Continuous Wave) radio nets were opened to higher headquarters, all major subordinate units, and to the First U.S. Army.

A shortage of radio equipment and operating personnel made it necessary to put more stations into nets than was desirable. At times as many as five stations were netted which resulted in the following problems:

a. Units frequently became widely separated putting them beyond effective ground wave reception, yet too close for twenty-four hour sky wave operation.

b. It was also difficult for an NCS (Net Control Station) to use special antennas in all of the directions required by some nets. However, half wave doublets were used to an advantage.

Initially, several point to point radio nets were used. However, with the frequent moves of the Command Post, and with the time element keeping wire communication to a minimum, it became necessary to use a complete set of radio equipment and operating personnel for each Command Post displacement to insure continuous communication with other units.

Message centers routed a number of 1300 group messages via radio in the early stages of the operation. Most of these messages could have arrived at their destination sooner if they had been sent by motor messenger.

On 15 August the LAVAL (T 64) Wirehead was opened and operated by personnel of the 34th Signal Construction Battalion, a photograph of which is shown on page 7.

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Section II - Supply

Four truck companies arrived from the United Kingdom loaded with Signal equipment including considerable quantities of spare parts packed in SO-5 chests. Approximately 300 miles of German spiral-four was found in a cave near CHARTRES (S 30). Two-thirds of the wire was brought to our Depot immediately and the balance secured within thirty-six hours.

The 379th Signal Depot Company operated the Third U.S. Army Signal Depot. One depot was established in the vicinity of MONTGARVILLE EN BEAUMONT (T 09) and subsequent locations were at ST JORES (T 28), PONTAUBAULT (T 31), DOMFRONT DU CHEMIN (T 46), LE MANS (V 46), DARGEAU (W 27) and MENDRS (X 27). Using transportation furnished by the G-4 Section, the Signal storage and issue sections made the moves by leap-frogging.

Supplies were furnished from beach dumps and hauled to Third U.S. Army Signal Depots in transportation provided by Advance Section Communications Zone and Third U.S. Army. Requisitions were forwarded by telephone, teletype and messenger direct to the Signal Officer of the Advance Section Communications Zone. Close liaison maintained during this period between Signal Supply Sections of the Third U.S. Army and Advance Section Communications Zone, proved particularly effective in bringing forward the urgently needed items. Initial table of basic allowance shortages and combat replacements could only be partially filled. No spare parts for either radio or wire repair were received.

Signal Supply, excluding wire and spiral-four, was built up from one-half ton to approximately 3000 tons during the month. Fifty percent of this increase was made by Third U.S. Army Signal Supply shipping equipment and supplies direct from base depots in England through our own supply channels, using Third U.S. Army Truck Companies. The balance was furnished by Communications Zone depots on the Continent. The 187th Signal Repair Company was retained at the Signal Depot during the first half of the month because of the lack of parts and supplies necessary for the performance of their mission. During this time, captured enemy equipment was cannibalized. Sufficient spare parts were obtained from this and from cannibalization of our own Signal equipment to provide a minimum quantity for the operation of the Repair Company. The 168th Signal Repair Company was attached, from Advance Section Communications Zone, and with the 187th Signal Repair Company was attached throughout the Third U.S. Army as follows:

a. Thirteen radio repair sections were assigned to Ordnance Maintenance Battalions.

b. Two radio and one wire section were attached to VIII Corps for operation in the Brittany Peninsula.

c. One radio section was attached to the 6th Cavalry Squadron for ZIAN Service.

d. One radio and two wire sections were used to operate and maintain radio link telephone systems within Third U.S. Army.

e. Two radio and three wire sections were stationed at the Signal Depot to repair, rehabilitate, cannibalize, and salvage American and German Signal equipment.

During the first thirty days of operation, the following repair jobs were handled:

187 minor repair and adjustments
459 major repair jobs
10 cannibalization of equipment (American)
198 cannibalization of equipment (German)
11 salvage of equipment (American)
85 installations in armored vehicles

During August, approximately 2000 pieces of captured Signal equipment were processed. Disposition made of this equipment was cannibalization, salvage, or shipment to Communications Zone Depots. All this work was handled by the Repair Company.

Transportation was very critical. Difficulties encountered in maintaining depot installations within the rapidly advancing Army area were further increased by the necessity of providing transportation for hauling supplies from the Communications Zone Depots. Approximately 30% of all supplies received from the Communications Zone was handled by Third U.S. Army transport.

CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

Section I - General

Gasoline was again a critical item in September. Army Signal requirements, not including that used by Quartermaster truck companies for displacement of signal facilities, were as follows:

ORGANIZATION	GASOLINE IN GALLONS PER DAY
501st Sig Opn Bn	1500
534 Sig Const Bn	650
34th Sig Const Bn	1125
1186th Sig Mad Int Co	525
325th Sig Serv Co	175
Weather Detachment (2)	60
166th Sig Photo Co	165
ZIAIS	50
267th Sig Const Co	500
Army Signal Section	100
TOTAL	4850 Gallons per day

The rapid displacement of command posts, distances involved and terrain features encountered, resulted in the dispersion of trained personnel for Radio Link operation. (See Annexes 19 through 23) Teams that were normally composed of six technicians were forced to operate with two. The Twelfth U.S. Army Group was informed of our urgent need for more personnel.



A directive was issued by the Signal Officer, Third U.S. Army to the Signal Officer, XX Corps that four circuits be built or rehabilitated forward along their axis. Two circuits were to be used for the Army axis and two for successive displacements of Corps Rear Echelon. Army and Corps Signal Construction troops were utilized for this purpose. When four circuits could not be made available, due to the rapid displacement of command posts, arrangements were made for corps to have switching connections to their rear echelon over Army circuits.

The G-3 Section directed that Corps Headquarters would not displace to new locations until at least one talking circuit, either wire or radio link, had been installed and was working to Army.

There were two Army command post displacements, involving long distances, during the month of September and one additional move by the forward echelon from the field to winter quarters in ETAIN (U 47). The first move was to the vicinity of CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T 54), a distance of ninety miles. The second was to the vicinity of ETAIN (U 47, a distance of fifty-five miles. (See Annexes 24 through 26)

The proposed axis of the Third U.S. Army was: ETAIN (U 47) - NANCY (U 81) - SAARBRUCKEN (Q 57) - FRANKFURT (M 77).

The Army Signal Officer directed that open wire would be used as far as the supply situation permitted. With the advance slowing down it was possible to install a more permanent communication system.

Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service had considerable difficulty securing captured enemy equipment, particularly at depots, and trains. Either guards were not placed by the capturing units, or if placed, were not instructed as to what constituted proper authority for the removal of equipment. During the month of September sixty-nine cars of enemy Signal equipment and several large dumps and depots were located. Twenty-two items were shipped to G-2 for Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force disposition and five items shipped to Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Military Intelligence Branch. One hundred and thirty-five items were sent to the Air Technical Intelligence. Sixty-one items, 4,415 radio tubes, 1000 telephone poles, 1200 screwarms and several thousand miles of various types of wire were classified for utilization by the Third U.S. Army. Twelve hundred and fifty-nine additional items of equipment were classified for utilization and released to Communications Zone.

The SCR-160 has been put in production. This artillery set replaces the SCR-600 and SCR-610. The basic difference, between this new set and those it replaces, was that wet cells have been used and it was designed to use a new battery charger. The packaged weight of the SCR-160 is approximately forty-three pounds.

In order to speed the delivery of official war photographs to the rear, advantage was taken of the ADLS, Air Delivery Letter Service. Two flights to PARIS (S 04) at 1015A and 1545A assured fast service. The 1015A plane made connections with the LONDON plane in PARIS (S 04).

The Signal Officer, XX Corps, suggested the use of a coded map, similar to that used by the Commanding General, to enable Corps and Army Signal Officers to talk more freely over the phone. It was felt that the SC-58, facsimile equipment, might be used for this purpose over a simplex circuit.

Section II - Administration and Personnel

At CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T 54) the rear echelon was located about seven miles from the forward.

Due to the volume of encoded traffic, fourteen additional SIGABA (Converter M-134) Code Clerks for the 501st Signal Operation Battalion were requested from Twelfth U.S. Army Group. This request was based on twelve-hour shift for the men. The Twelfth U.S. Army Group informed us that the additional personnel were not available. It was recommended that a command channel letter be initiated requesting a Table of Organization increase to handle this need. This would be based on statistics of this campaign to date and Twelfth U.S. Army Group would favorably indorse such a letter.

A clarification was made regarding responsibility for the relay of teletype traffic. Several instances were reported where relay traffic was not accepted by Twelfth U.S. Army Group for the Communications Zone, even though our direct line was not operative. The responsibility of Twelfth U.S. Army Group to relay this traffic was accepted.

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Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

Increased attention was paid to radio security. Twenty-six friendly radio nets were monitored for periods of twelve hours to three days. Signal Intelligence Service analyzed the monitoring work, made reports of violations to the units concerned and kept the Chief of the status of radio security and of corrective action taken.

During September the message center cleared [illegible] incoming and [illegible] outgoing messages, exclusive of official mail. The precedence of the messages was as follows:

	Incoming	Outgoing
Urgent	752	[illegible]
Operational Priority	75	[illegible]
Priority	[illegible]	[illegible]
Routine	[illegible]	[illegible]
Deferred	0	0

It was found that the code room at forward echelon could not be operated at maximum efficiency in an [illegible] due to lack of working space. Consequently, the forward echelon code room was moved to a six-by van. Two additional [illegible] were obtained from Twelfth Army Group on 30 September and installed in the forward echelon code room. This gave four CIPHERS to forward echelon and two to rear echelon. The code room cleared a total of [illegible] groups during the month.

The 777th Signal Pigeon Company arrived on [illegible] to provide pigeon communication to Third U.S. Army. The Signal Intelligence Service was made responsible for its activities. Advance lofts were established near the Command Posts of [illegible] and XX Corps, but birds had not been settled sufficiently by the end of the month to begin tactical communication.

Arrangements were made with Seventh U.S. Army for exchange of Signal Intelligence by radio between it and Third U.S. Army. Daily exchange by liaison officers of technical intelligence data and such Periodic Reports also were arranged.

Signal Intelligence derived in September was particularly fruitful. Details of results obtained may not be reported at this time due to security restrictions.

Section II - Communications

On 4 September the command post of the Third U.S. Army moved from the FORET-DE-HANCY to a woods about eight miles east of CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T 54). Wire communications between the old and new command posts consisted of two combination systems. The first was composed of rehabilitated French open wire, and spiral-four through TROYES (T 57), then underground cable from that point to CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T 54) and spiral-four to the command post. The second was rehabilitated French open wire direct from the FORET-DE-HANCY to CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T 54). A switching central was established at what remained of the commercial repeater station at CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T 54), after demolition had been carried out by the enemy. Alternate routes were employed in routing the spiral-four cables from DUCKY CHARLIE switching central at CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T 54) to the command post.

Plans were made to displace to the vicinity of VERDUN (U 26) as soon as wire circuits could be established. Spiral-four cable was laid to VERDUN (T 26) via VALMY (T 05) - CLERMONT (U 05) and French open wire was rehabilitated along the same route. A repeater station at VALMY (T 05) provided terminals for underground cable from VERDUN (U 26) and from REIMS (T 57). Open wire was rehabilitated between CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T 54) via VALMY (T 05) and REIMS (T 57). On 15 September the new command post of the Third U.S. Army opened in a woods south of ETAIN (T 47) about twelve miles east of VERDUN (U 26). The command post of the rear echelon moved to a location about five miles north of ETAIN (T 47). Communications between the two echelons was maintained by two spiral-four cables with carrier on one of the cables. When the forward echelon moved to a quarters in the town of ETAIN (T 47) two spiral-four cables provided eight voice and one teletype circuit to Rear Echelon. This was accomplished in the following manner.

a. FIRST CABLE:

Circuits one and two phantomed--two circuits.
Teletype simplexed on the phantom--teletype.
Phantom connected to German carrier equipment
TFB-1 and TFB-2--two carrier and one phantom circuit.

b. SECOND CABLE: Circuits one and two phantomed--three circuits.

Rehabilitated French open wire lines were extended south through SOMMESOUS [illegible] to a new switchboard central in [illegible] and serviced our Northern Corps, the XX and XV. The XX Corps, in the vicinity of [illegible] was reached by eight rehabilitated French open wire circuits and two spiral-four cables.



REHABILITATING FRENCH OPEN WIRE

With the concentration of Army Service Units in the vicinity of COMMERCY (U 42), FOUG (U 51) and TOUL (U 61), additional circuits became necessary. Six rehabilitated open wire circuits from VERDUN (U 26) were terminated at FOUG (U 51) and a spiral-four cable was laid from ETAIN (U 47) to the same point. Long range field wire, W-143, was also tried over this route (ETAIN (U 47)-FOUG (U 51) but poor results were experienced due to grounds caused by poor insulation and also to attenuation. Numerous methods were employed in working this circuit, but none of them proved completely satisfactory. Some of the methods were as follows:

a. Line loaded using C-114 loading coils every five-eighths of a mile. Transmission weak due to attenuation of the line (sixty miles).

b. EE-89 repeater placed at the midpoint of the line. A slight improvement was noted.

c. EE-99 repeaters tried at both terminals in conjunction with CF-7 hybrid coils. No appreciable gain in the speech circuit.

d. EE-89 repeaters were installed at the one-quarter and three-quarter points. No improvement over the single EE-89 repeater at the midpoint.

The W-143 circuit was finally abandoned due to the high maintenance factor involved.

On the VERDUN-FOUG (U 26-U 51) open wire line constant maintenance was necessary. Other Signal units, working on the same pole line, were constantly interfering with working circuits. Close coordination with the Advance Section Communications Zone and the Twelfth U.S. Army Group finally eliminated this trouble.

Early in September a CW radio circuit was established with the Seventh U.S. Army which was coming up on our south flank. Complete plans were made to establish a radio link circuit between the two armies and thus provide telephone and teletype communication. Shortly after the initial patrol contact had been made, radio link and carrier terminal equipment was transported to the Headquarters, Seventh U.S. Army and the circuits established. This was the first telephone or teletype communication between any of the units of the two armies. It also provided lateral communication between the Sixth and Twelfth U.S. Army Groups.

A CW radio circuit was also established between the Third U.S. Army and Headquarters Eighth Airforce in LONDON. A total of 64,208 code groups were transmitted and received by CW Radio during the month and fifteen radio link relay circuits were installed and operated over 4402 miles.

Section II - Supply

Third U.S. Army Signal Depot Number 3, at SOMPUIS (T 46), was in operation at the start of the month. Subsequent depots were opened and operated at LE MANS (V 46), SROU (W 17), NEMOURS (A 27), and STE. MENEHOULD (T 95).

Total tonnage received from Communications Zone Depots during the month was as follows:

Requisitioned		1557 Tons
Received - By Com Z Truck	422 Tons	
By Third U.S. Army Truck	380 Tons	
Total Tonnage:	802 Tons	

Continued difficulties of transport and no stock in the Communications Zone Depots of the fast moving items, created serious shortages in the units in the line. Delays in transport often built up the requirements of the organizations to a point where waiting units immediately took all of the incoming load off trucks. Confusion throughout all supply channels was evident and increased by the rapid consumption of wire, batteries, radio losses, and the assumption of supply functions by the Communications Zone from the Advance Section Communications Zone.

On 8 September, Communications Zone cancelled or suspended all current and pending requisitions of the Armies in the field. The loss created by this suspension was never recovered during the month. Shortages became serious and only through the continued assistance and forced operation of the Advance Section Communications Zone Supply Agencies were the Armies supplied.

Repairs to all Signal equipment were continued by the 187th Signal Repair Company. Radio Teams of this unit were attached to Divisions and Ordnance Maintenance Units. Cannibalization and salvage of equipment was continued in order to maintain the equipment in service. No spare parts were received during the month. During the month, the following repair jobs were completed:

389 ea	Minor Repairs and Adjustments
459 ea	Major Repair Jobs
38 ea	Cannibalization of Equipment (American)
5 ea	Salvage
57 ea	Installation in Combat Vehicles
1532 ea	Captured Equipment Processed
1357 ea	Captured Equipment Evacuated to Communications Zone
37 ea	Captured Equipment Cannibalized for Parts
100 ea	Captured Equipment held for Utilization or Parts
457 miles	Spiral-Four Cable Repaired
721 miles	Field Wire, W-110 Serviced

The entire operation during the month was conducted in constant rain and mud. The Depot and Repair Company areas were usually a sea of mud, yet the production of both organizations increased and kept up with the tempo of the Third U.S. Army.

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CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

Section I - General

With the displacement of the Third U.S. Army command post from ETAIN (U 47) (See Annex 29) to NANCY (U 81) existing commercial telephone facilities were utilized to supplement the normal Army communication network. The Postes Telephones Telegraphes system at NANCY (U 81) was composed of a Strowger dial office and a complete underground cable network.

During this month extensive work was carried out on proposed T/O and E changes based on battle experience. All types of Signal units were canvassed for comments and recommendations. It was felt that only a complete expression of opinion by the actual using organizations would give a true indication as to the adequacy of our T/O's and E's and the changes necessary for operational improvement. Most of the comments of similar organizations were basically in agreement and recommended changes are currently being consolidated for the information and action of higher headquarters.

It was decided that telephone circuits of the VHF Radio Link channels would continue to be plugged out of service except for emergency use when wire circuits were not available. However, the circuits would be tested periodically and shown on our logs as being in service. This would prevent a possible communication channel from being overlooked in an emergency.

The Third U.S. Army Signal Service instituted a weekly information letter. This letter was confined to signal communication and supply items of an administrative nature, and was distributed directly to Corps and Division Signal Officers and Commanders of Third U.S. Army Signal troops.

The Signal Officer of the Communications Zone advised this headquarters that a Film and Equipment Exchange Detachment would be made available to Third U.S. Army. This detachment was composed of one officer and six enlisted men. Their primary mission would be to operate a class "B" film library, and a repair and issue service for 16mm and 35mm projectors. The need for a service of this type had become increasingly apparent. The stable situation of our lines has increased the demand for training films and projectors. Our only source of films had been the Communications Zone Film Library in PARIS (S 04) and the time, distance, and transportation elements involved had materially reduced its value.

During the period 1 October to 31 October the Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service obtained very little captured enemy equipment as no important enemy communication centers were taken by our troops. However, the following items were located and turned over to the Third U.S. Army for utilisation:

1000 ea.	Reels of field wire (single strand, black).
180 ea.	Rolls of open wire #10 or #12 (iron), approximately 1000 ft. per roll.
50 ea.	Reels of cable (lead covered) 12 conductor, approximately #18 wire.
1000 ea.	Reels for field wire peak units (empty spools).
6500 ea.	Telephone poles located at ST. FLORENTIN (T 04), France.
4 ea.	Carloads of #6 steel messenger wire.

Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

By 1 October the birds of the 277th Signal Pigeon Company were settled at the lofts of platoons in III and XX Corps areas. Pigeon communication was handled initially as follows:

a. Birds were supplied to using units through message center.

b. When messages were received at the loft they were telephoned to message center, where they were deciphered and delivered.

c. The original copy of the message was forwarded to message center by scheduled messenger.

The message center handled 8982 messages by electrical means. These were broken down as follows:

Means	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Radio	679	163	842
Teletype	4388	3752	8140
Total:	5067	3915	8982
Precedence			
Urgent	428	506	934
Operational Priority	3357	1072	4429
Priority	1059	996	2055
Routine	523	1261	1784
Deferred	0	0	0
Total:	5067	3915	8982

The code room handled 109# messages. On an average it required one hour per message in the code room. A total of 420,783 groups cleared the code room. These were divided into 183,142 incoming groups and 223,641 outgoing groups.

Radio nets of Army Information Service were monitored extensively, since the 3-5 information passed on the Army Information Service nets would provide a concentrated source of information to enemy signal intelligence. When some weaknesses were noted, the Commanding Officer of the 6th Cavalry Group (which operated Army Information Service) was approached directly and the following program was worked out:

a. Army Information Service set up its own monitoring stations to maintain a constant check on security.

b. Signal Intelligence Service loaned one traffic analyst to 6th Cavalry Group to assist in setting up its monitoring system and to explain need for security to operators.

c. Signal Intelligence Service decryptographed a week's M-209 traffic of Army Information Service and pointed out cryptographic violations found.

d. Army Information Service instituted intensive training of personnel on security.

Almost immediate improvement in security was noticed; and by the end of October the Army Information Service nets were rated as very secure.

In all, Signal Intelligence Service analyzed logs obtained from the monitoring of fifty-four radio nets in Third U.S. Army zone. Violations were reported to the responsible organizations for corrective action and nets with frequent violations were re-monitored to insure that proper corrective action was being taken.

Due to the more static type of operations the detachment "A" of Signal Intelligence Service at the Army Radio Intelligence Company was consolidated with the remainder of Signal Intelligence Service when Third U.S. Army moved to NANCY (U 81). This arrangement permitted better coordination of activities of Signal Intelligence Service under the tactical conditions that prevailed.

Signal Intelligence Division, Communications Zone, made two SIGCUM cryptographic machines (for automatic and direct encipherment and decipherment of teletype traffic to Paris headquarters) available. A six-ton van was obtained for the 304st Signal Operation Battalion and the machines were installed in this. The SIGCUM's were expected to speed up secret text traffic and remove some of the heavy load of traffic from the code room.

Due to tactical conditions, more signal intelligence was derived during the first half of October than during the second half. Details of the month's signal intelligence will be given in a subsequent chapter, after security restrictions have been relaxed.

Section II - Communications

The command post of the Third U.S. Army displaced to NANCY (U 81) on 11 October. Prior to that time two construction centers were installed in NANCY (U 81) and were known as the EAST and WEST wireheads. These wireheads were also used as dispatch points for maintenance teams.

Arrangements had been made to use the facilities of the Postes, Telephones Telegraphes. The commercial telephone system in NANCY (U 81) consisted of a "Strowger, Step by Step" 7000-line dial office. The Germans had isolated a 1000-line group for the exclusive use during the occupation of NANCY (U 81). This group was thoroughly checked to insure complete disconnection from the rest of the system and then put into service for the military installations. The local telephone system had a complete underground cable distribution system that was in fairly good condition with the exception of two sections across the CANAL DE LA MARNE AU RHIN and LA MEURTHE RIVIERE which had been blown out. These cables were repaired and an additional 5000' of 22#-pair cable was laid from the command post to a nearby commercial underground cable run. The 22#-pair commercial cable, which ran from the Postes Telephones Telegraphes office to the west wirehead at LAXOU (U 81), was intercepted and split between Lucky and Lucky Rear command posts. This provided 112-pair in each direction to each command post. All the material needed for this project and also the dial subsets needed were furnished by the Postes Telephones Telegraphes.

Third U.S. Army Signal personnel handled the work in connection with the installation and maintenance of all dial lines used for military purposes including those used by the XIX Tactical Air Command, XII Corps and miscellaneous Army and Corps troops. A Postes Telephones Telegraphes employee was assigned to each installation team during the initial phase of this work to assist in locating cable terminals and cross-connect boxes and to familiarize the army personnel with the French cable systems. These teams completed 202 work orders during the period 1 October to 8 November. The maintenance of the dial central office equipment serving the military 1000-line group was taken over by Third U.S. Army Signal personnel in mid-October. Army maintenance personnel, dispatchers and an interpreter were kept on duty at all times in the equipment room of the Postes Telephones Telegraphes building.

In this particular office, individual line message registers were the only method available for recording calls handled by the dial equipment. Since these registers only record the completed outgoing calls on each line the totals given below cannot be directly compared with peg counts which also consider "Busy Lines" and "Don't answer".

TOTAL COMPLETED CALLS

ALL MILITARY LINES 1 October to 6 November 52,260

TOTAL OUTGOING COMPLETED CALLS

On LUCKY TRUNKS 1 October to 6 November 10,104

On LUCKY REAR TRUNKS 1 October to 6 November 5,140

In addition to the automatic exchange the headquarters of the Third U.S. Army was served by a four-position TC-10 switchboard which handled local calls and a three-position TC-10 switching central called LUCKY TOLL for switching trunk calls.

During the months of September and October 1,375 miles of W-110B and 742 miles of spiral-four were laid by Headquarters Third U.S. Army Signal troops.

Few changes were made in VHF Radio Link circuits during the month due to the stable situation. (See Annexes 30 and 31) Five new circuits were installed and operated over 204 miles.

CW radios at Army transmitted and received a total of 140,191 code groups during the month. All stations at Army Headquarters were remoted from a central point and up to five transmitters were operated by one power unit. The practice was developed of running a PE-75 for four hours and then switching to another power unit. This has not only extended the life of the unit, but also made sets available for emergency use. Another result attained by central point remoting was the closer grouping of transmitters with no interference from key clicks.

Section II - Plans and Operations

A definite shortage became evident in communication personnel replacements for all branches, and of those received many were not fully qualified in their particular specialty. A conference was held with officers of the Personnel Division, Signal Section, Communications Zone to determine their policy and the existing facilities available for technical training [illegible] that the only radio operators

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school on the Continent was a small one operated by the Ground Force Replacement System. As far as known there were no school in operation for training linemen.

A command channel letter was initiated by this headquarters to European Theater of Operations U.S. Army requesting a quota at this school for untrained men already assigned to the Third U.S. Army. It was further requested that provisions be made for training linemen and radio operators to fill our estimated monthly shortages.

Section II - Supply

Third U.S. Army Signal Depot Number 6, at STE. MENEHOULD (T 96), was in operation at the start of the month. Subsequent depot locations were at JEANDELIZE (U 56) and TOUL (U 61).

Tonnages received from Communications Zone Depots during the month as follows:

Requisitioned		2100 Tons
Received - By Com Z Transportation	2189	
By Third U.S. Army Trucks	498	
Total Tonnage:	2687	

The above tonnage figures include pole line hardware and bulk shipments of wire, D.I., and copper, for line work. Operational supplies for troop units, such as radio tubes, batteries, spare parts, mast sections, etc., were seventy-five percent back ordered. The emphasis placed on the tonnage delivered to the army, completely distorted the Signal Supply picture in the Communications Zone, inasmuch as one ton of radio spare parts were on occasion, worth XXXX tons of pole line hardware. The use of tonnage figures for Signal Supply Statements of Delivery and Status of Stocks constituted an erroneous picture of the Army status of Signal Supply.

Inadequate stocks of fast moving items and the supply of these items on a day-to-day basis proved entirely inadequate. On four occasions during the month, we held but a one-day level on items of this nature and at no time did we reach a ten-day level.

Transportation difficulties continued to harass the supply operation. Tonnages allocated for the delivery of Signal supplies confused the picture and rail transport became uncertain.

Repairs to all Signal equipment were continued in the field by the Signal Repair Company. At the end of the first week we lost the services of the 156th Signal Repair Company when it was assigned to the Ninth U.S. Army. Radio Repair Teams of the 187th Signal Repair Company were attached to Divisions and Ordnance Maintenance Units in the field and stationed at the Signal Depot. No spare parts were received during the month. Salvage and cannibalization continued to produce the necessary items for repair work. The repair activity for the month is as follows:

401 ea Minor Repairs and Adjustments
284 ea Major Repair Jobs
45 ea Cannibalization of Equipment (American)
31 ea Salvage
21 ea Installation in Combat Vehicles.



CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

Section I - General

The offensive drive of the Third U.S. Army which started 8 November, was supported by the best wire communication network available since the opening of the campaign in August. During the month of October the Section had utilized all time available in strengthening communication, planning, and in training Signal troops. During this time open wire leads had been constructed and carrier circuits were in operation to each corps. As the troops advanced during the month of November 442 miles of field wire and 226 miles of spiral-four cable were laid by Third U.S. Army Signal troops. Nine hundred sixty-six wire miles of open wire were placed. It may be said that during the month of November communications facilities were working at their highest peak of efficiency since the opening of the campaign in August.

The Signal Supply situation continued to be a major problem. Of 3100 tons of essential equipment requisitioned, 2382 tons were received. Nearly one-half of the tonnage released to us from the Communications Zone Depots was transported in Third U.S. Army vehicles. Items of radio equipment were in critical supply, but the shortages of these items were partially, and in some instances, completely overcome by modification of other items on hand, and by manufacturing done by our Signal Repair Company. These manufacturers, together with spare parts received from the Spare Parts Depot which had been established in PARIS (S 04), considerably eased the supply problem.

Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service reported that it had been found generally throughout the territory liberated during the November offensive that no equipment of value, either for utilization or intelligence, had been left behind. The enemy, while engaged largely in defensive operations to provide time for withdrawal of troops into Germany, had removed all Signal Equipment that might possibly have been of value to us.

The 166th Signal Photo Company was mentioned in a message from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Public Relations Division, and was congratulated for its excellent still picture and newsreel coverage of the launching of the November drive.

Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

On 11 November the following requirements were established for teletype lines over which secret messages could be sent in the clear:

a. Printer circuits must be worked over CF-2, which, in turn, would be working on channels 2, 3 or 4 of the CF-1.

b. Lines must be patrolled frequently at irregular intervals and checked thoroughly for evidences of tapping.

c. Terminal points must be operated by Allied military personnel.

d. Main frames, repeater stations and other such points must be kept under constant military supervision.

Early in November the Signal Intelligence Officer inspected the 3325th Staff Information and Monitoring Company (SIAM), which had just arrived in the United Kingdom for training before taking over the functions of Army Information Service in Third U.S. Army. It was found that there were virtually no radio operators in the Company, and that it would require at least three months of training before the unit could be put into the field. Following is a resume of events leading up to the presence of the 3325th SIAM Company in the United Kingdom:

SIAM Service was first used in the Seventh Army in Sicily. Although it was improvised, it was very successful. For the past twelve months efforts had been made in the European Theater of Operations to develop an authorized SIAM Service for each field army. After much discussion regarding an appropriate T/O and T/A the War Department on 25 May 44, approved a T/O and T/E which was similar to the Fifth Army SIAM Company, though somewhat modified. At this time the European Theater of Operations was advised that personnel for these companies could be available only if certain other troop listings of an equal number of troops were removed from the troop list. Twelfth U.S. Army Group chose to strike off certain Cavalry units. The four SIAM Companies for use in this theater were activated from two Cavalry Groups. Inasmuch as First U.S. Army and Third U.S. Army desired their companies as soon as possible, request was made by the Theater to the War Department to send two of these companies over to the United Kingdom immediately. This was done and the personnel of the SIAM companies in the United Kingdom consisted for the most part of tank drivers, and gunners. A very small percentage of radio operators existed against a total requirement based upon a company consisting of four corps platoons, eight division platoons, and four armored division platoons. Four hundred radio operators and forty code clerks were required.

As Third U.S. Army approached Germany and also began to use French commercial telephone facilities, telephone security became of greater importance. Signal Intelligence Service began recording telephone conversations in the headquarters and made reports of security violations to the Chief of Staff and G-2.

Sixty-eight radio nets were monitored, but due to the tactical situation only twelve were active enough for complete checks of their security. Violation reports were made on six of these.

The code room required an approximate time of forty-five minutes per message to handle 1701 messages, which include 458,355 code groups. There were 144 outgoing messages, which required 114,240 code groups, 1337 incoming messages which required 345,766 code groups.

Due to general radio silence during early November radio intelligence was not active with the exception of one special mission, but toward the end of the month a more active tactical situation brought about intelligence of importance.

Detachment "G" of the 21st Weather Squadron began making monthly climatical studies to be published in the G-2 Periodic report. The purpose of this study was to furnish commanders with data on weather conditions for long range planning.

The 477th Signal Pigeon Company made its first displacements of lofts since beginning operations. Lofts were moved on 18 November from TOUL (U 61) to MAIRANCE (Q 24), and on 25 November from a point west of NANCY (U 81) to CHATENOIS (U 98). After these moves it was ascertained that lofts could be displaced and birds settled, ready for use, in approximately one week.

During the month of November, Third U.S. Army Message Center handled a total of 8250 messages by electrical means. The precedence of these was as follows:

Precedence	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Urgent	307	482	789
Operational Priority	2681	1035	3729
Priority	1056	960	2016
Routine	547	1149	1696
Deferred	0	0	0
Total:	4604	3626	8250

Of these, 3655 incoming and 4925 outgoing were handled by teletype. Radio was used for 371 incoming and seventy-nine outgoing messages.

Section III - Communications

Headquarters Third U.S. Army remained in NANCY (U 81) during November. Advance Section Communications Zone was building an open wire lead from NANCY (U 81) north to DOMPAIRE (U 06) through FLAVIGNY (U 80), ABAINCOURT (P 69), ANCERVILLE (P 52), then to LIEGE (K 42), Belgium. The 834 Signal Construction Battalion, part of Third U.S. Army Signal troops, assisted in the building of this lead by placing the second arm from NANCY (U 81) to DOMPAIRE (U 06) to FLAVIGNY (U 80). This terminal lead was shared by Advance Section Communications Zone, XIX Tactical Air Force, Twelfth Army Group and Third U.S. Army. Third U.S. Army used the six positions seventeen to twenty as far as MARS LA TOUR (P 66). Between MARS LA TOUR (P 66) and FLAVIGNY (U 80) the entire second arm was available for Third U.S. Army use. On these two circuits (seventeen to twenty), two carrier systems were operated with the use of two CF-7 hybrid coils at the terminal in NANCY (U 81) and two CF-7 hybrid coils at a new switch established at DOMPAIRE (U 06) called LUCKY STRIKE. LUCKY STRIKE switch was established in order that a good system of wire communication could be had from NANCY (U 81) to the III Corps located in LIGNY (U 47), and the XX Corps which, although located in DOMPAIRE (U 06) at the time, was to move northeast

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to envelop LUCKY (U 85). This switch also served some Army units located in the vicinity of CONFLANS (U 66). Spiral-four cable that was previously laid between METZ (U 47) and NANCY (U 81), was intercepted and another carrier system was installed using this cable between LUCKY CHARLEY and LUCKY at NANCY (U 81). This resulted in three carrier systems working between NANCY (U 81) and LUCKY CHARLEY plus twelve physical circuits without repeaters or carrier routed as follows: Six on the underground cable between NANCY (U 81) and LUCKY CHARLEY and six on the underground cable between NANCY (U 81) and ABREVILLE (U 76) and then over French rehabilitated open wire to CONFLANS (U 66).

Army Corps axes were extended by building new open wire leads. A one-arm open wire build started at PLAPPEVILLE (U 84); intercepted the second arm of the Advance Section Communications Zone lead at this point, and was built east to LANTEFONTAINE (U 67) then northeast through PONTOY (U 78), ABREVILLERS (U 78), and then southeast to THIONVILLE (U 66) and was serviced by carrier circuits over this open wire lead between LUCKY CHARLEY and COMET.

As the XII Corps moved northeast from NANCY (U 81) a two-arm open wire build was constructed northeast from NANCY (U 81) to CHATEAU SALINS (U 14). XII Corps Headquarters was located in this town and carrier circuits were operating to this Corps over the open wire lead. This lead was extended northeast along the main highway and by the end of November reached FAULQUEMONT (U 14), which was beyond the most proposed move of the XII Corps Headquarters Command Post, located in MORHANGE (U 14) at this time. This second arm of the two-circuit open wire lead served the various Army units in that vicinity in addition to serving the XII Corps Headquarters.

The north axis serving the XX Corps was also extended east towards MOULINVILLE (U 17), which was the anticipated next location of the XX Corps Command Post.

About the 21st or 22nd of November the city of METZ (U 47) was taken and plans were immediately initiated to set up a switchboard in this city to serve any Army units which might move in this vicinity. Although many German forts were still active west of the city, spiral-four circuits were under construction into METZ (U 47), approximately the city from the east. A reconnaissance of the Postes Telephones Telegraphes building in METZ (U 47) disclosed that although the building has been damaged considerably, the Signal installation was worth test and cable could be used after major repairs have been completed to the cable itself.

During the month of November there one hundred forty-six miles of field wire and two hundred twenty-six miles of spiral-four cable were laid by Third U.S. Army Signal troops. For the same period four hundred forty-five miles of field wire and one hundred ninety-four miles of spiral-four cable was recovered by Third U.S. Army Signal troops. Nine hundred sixty-six wire miles of open wire were placed. This consisted of forty-five miles of pole line of which thirty miles were two-arm and fifteen miles were one-arm builds. Two-hundred miles of one-arm build were placed on existing poles. Wire diagrams for the month of November are contained in Annexes 3A and 3B.

Section II - Supply

Third U.S. Army Signal Depot Number 7, at [illegible] (U 84), was in operation at the start of the month. Subsequent depots were opened at METZ (U 61), VAUCOULEURS (U 40), and FLORANGE (U 50).

Tonnage received from the Communications Zone depots during the month were as follows:

Requisitioned	SIGC Tons
Received - By Com. - Trans.	1137
By Third U.S. Army Trans.	11%
By Com Z Air	6%
Total Tons:	2456

During the first four days of the month, one hundred twenty trucks from Third U.S. Army were sent to the Communications Zone and picked up seven hundred thirty-eight tons of selected items, such as dire Assay, batteries, [illegible], and 3 Patch tanks, etc., which enabled all units to fulfill their requirements. Although this shipment was small, created a little reserve for [illegible] during the following fifteen days, all Communication zone depots [illegible] and the reserve accumulated was exhausted. Shortages of most critical items, tubes, batteries, Radio SCR-536 and [illegible] were serious. Wire W-110 and W-130 was being received in [illegible] hundred miles at a time and [illegible]

Communications Zone was issuing wire to Third U.S. Army on the basis of four hundred miles of W-110 and one hundred miles of W-130 per day. Consumption in the field forces exceeded this allocation and averaged four hundred seventy-five miles per day for W-110 and one hundred fifty miles per day for W-130 when both were available for issue.

Transportation continued to be the major problem. Supplies were sporadic and spotty in delivery, and on a day-to-day basis. Third U.S. Army stocks were below a ten-day level on the fast moving items. Shortages of radio tubes for the SCR-284, Radio, mast sections for the SCR-284, 500, 508, 536, and 193 Radios, Adapters, M-399, for the 600 series radios, Batteries, Radio, for the rocket Launcher, Battery, BA-227, for the Flame thrower and miscellaneous items were partially, and in some instances completely overcome by modification of other items and manufacturing processes of the 157th Signal Repair Company. Fifty-two Radios, SCR-284, were stripped of radio tubes, mast sections, power packs, and fuses. One hundred Transmitters, BC-604, were stripped of tubes and fuses. Three hundred Control Boxes, BC-605, were stripped of plugs. All material obtained was issued to troop units for maintenance of their radio equipment.



DEPOT NO 10 AT FLORANGE

Third U.S. Army obtained the supporting services of the 157th Signal Repair Company during the month. This organization and the 157th Signal Repair Company performed all of the repair and maintenance work on radio and wire equipment of the army. Radio Repair Teams were attached to Divisions and Ordnance Maintenance Units. During the month, the following repair jobs were completed.

691	Minor Repairs and Adjustments
174	Major Repair Jobs
212	Cannibalizations of Equipment
75	Installation in Combat Vehicles
1	Salvage

Spare parts were received for the first time since this campaign started. The installation of a Spare Parts Depot in PARIS (U 04), which was ably operated by Communications Zone, enabled the Repair Company to obtain the parts needed for immediate repair and replacements on most of the equipment of the organizations. This supply, however, was not adequate to meet all of the needs of the units and rehabilitation increased to [illegible] equipment.

The operation and ably directed employment of the repair Company [illegible] to the full extent of the technical ability and ingenuity of the personnel, has enabled Third U.S. Army Signal Service to maintain a satisfactory radio and Wire, Point [illegible] Relay, Carrier and Open Wire, on a basis of ninety percent service ability. This has been accomplished only by constant attention to the needs of the service by all members of the Repair Company. Lack of spare parts were partially overcome by cannibalization. The ability to get material and [illegible] to the repairs required always a major problem.

CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

Section I - General

The Signal Supply situation was, in general, growing worse during the month of December. A satisfactory solution of the problem seemed to hinge on the use of the port of ANTWERP (U 17). In view of the large capacity of this port and the fact that great quantities of equipment were in shipments, the supply strain was expected to be eased in the near future.

[illegible] were extensive use of facsimile transmissions (Wi-LEN) was started as an [illegible] means of communication.

[illegible] December XII Corps became operational and displaced its command post from ETAIN (U 47) to METZ (U 61) on the following day.

There were various postponements and changes in projected displacements of Army command posts due to difficulties encountered in locating suitable command post and building sites. By mid-December [illegible] installations had practically been completed at 8th [illegible] Army. [illegible] the proposed command post site for this headquarters. However, the German counter-offensive, which got under way on 16 December, caused a radical change in Third Army's tactical situation. The advance party of headquarters, Third Army was instantly recalled from [illegible] and the Third Army Forward Echelon subsequently displaced to [illegible] on 19 December. At the same time, as a result of the tactical situation, XII Corps reverted to Third U.S. Army. With the aid of existing [illegible] lines, [illegible] additional, and local network in [illegible] Metz area, communications were quickly established with [illegible] headquarters, lateral and subordinate units.

Section II - Administration and Personnel

Twenty-four wire recovery teams were requisitioned from Communications Zone. Three of these teams were expected to arrive shortly.

A plan was evolved to recover Third U.S. Army Headquarters personnel for reindoctrinement of Third U.S. Army infantry units. The Signal Section furnished three enlisted men for this purpose.

Section III - Signal Intelligence Service

Early in December a detachment of the 310th Signal Service Battalion consisting of one officer and twenty-eight enlisted men was [illegible] to Third U.S. Army by Twelfth U.S. Army Group for extensive security monitor duty of Third U.S. Army facilities. The detachment maintained amplitude modulated nets from a site near a corps headquarters and monitored frequency modulated nets from a mobile team located near forward positions. Lists of violations were given daily to signal officers concerned and duplicate logs were forwarded to Signal Intelligence Service for analysis. As a result of this monitoring:

a. Three thousand eight hundred and eighty-one transmissions and seventy-two messages were analyzed.

b. Analysis of a total three thousand three hundred and sixty security violations of all types (since even transmission might contain several violations, a direct comparison of the number of violations with the number of transmissions would present a false picture).

c. The most common violations were found to be excessive and unnecessary transmissions.

d. Reports of the analysis of logs were forwarded through technical channels for the information and corrective action of signal officers concerned.

[illegible] traffic [illegible] by [illegible] a total of 18 messages was deciphered in

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which 276 cryptographic violations were found. These consisted chiefly of stereotyped beginnings and endings. Units were notified of the violations and directed to train cryptographic technicians more thoroughly in writing messages.

Capture of prisoners of war who had served in the German Signal Intelligence organization gave interrogators from Signal Intelligence Service an opportunity to learn of the organization which opposed it. The "Regimental Chart", it was learned, had an extensive organization for intercepting, analyzing and evaluating allied traffic. A full report on this organization was made to higher headquarters.

Two officers of the Signal Intelligence Service, and one officer and one enlisted man of the 115th Signal Radio Intelligence Company were awarded the Bronze Star on 3 December for work on one outstanding signal intelligence mission. The 110th Signal Radio Intelligence Company was awarded the Meritorious Service Plaque on 3 December for its consistently excellent performance in producing signal intelligence.

The German counter-offensive late in December caused a period of rapid planning. A request was made for the attachment of one extra pigeon platoon to the 277th Signal Pigeon Company; 3000 additional birds were requested for expected heavy demands on pigeon communication. Requests were also made for the following: A high priority for bringing the 3259th Signal Service Company to France for III Corps; the addition of another messenger team for the message center, and stepped-up training of the Signal SIAM Company in England to replace the Army Information Service, which was disbanded when Sixth Cavalry Group was employed tactically.

Due to increased tactical traffic as Third U.S. Army met the German counter-offensive, and the reduction in classification of wire lines due to enemy agents operating behind our lines, the code room on 25 December handled its heaviest load since Third U.S. Army became operational. On that day the code room handled 174 messages. Code groups totaled 45,615. The average time a message was in the code room was sixty-one minutes.

The code room record for the month was as follows:

	Incoming	Outgoing	Total
Number of messages	2278	547	2825
Number of Code Groups	570290	103755	674045

The message center record for the month was as follows:

Means	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Radio	46	516	562
Teletype	5581	6473	12054
*Messenger	62	18	80
Total:	5689	7007	12696
Precedence	**Outgoing**	**Incoming**	**Total**
Urgent	324	859	1183
Operational Priority	3317	2218	5535
Priority	1361	2124	3485
Routine	685	1795	2478
Deferred	2	3	5
Total:	5689	7007	12696

* Represents only messages prepared for possible electrical transmission, but delivered by messenger for various reasons. Does not include packages and official mail.

Section II - Communications

On 1 December the LUCKY LOG switching central was placed in operation in METZ (U 85). This switching central was taken over by the III Corps and renamed CLUTCH on 7 December, at which time the III Corps command post opened in METZ (U 85) and closed in ETAIN (U 47).

During this period the Headquarters Third U.S. Army was located at NANCY (U 81). A special "Red Line" wire telephone system was set up by the Twelfth U.S. Army Group which functioned as a command network. The purpose of this network was to establish quick telephone communication between the Commanders of the Twelfth U.S. Army Group and the Commanders of the subordinate armies, and between Army Commanders. Calls to and from this network received "clear the line" precedence.

The two-arm open wire pole line projected northeast from NANCY (U 81) was extended to ST. AVOLD (Q 25) and was to extend further forward along the army axis consistent with the tactical situation. The installation of communications for a Third U.S. Army advance command post in ST. AVOLD (Q 25) was begun on 16 December. Twelfth U.S. Army Group was also extending a two-arm open wire pole line from VERDUN (U 26) to ST. AVOLD (Q 25). This lead was to connect with the East-West open wire pole line that existed between VERDUN (U 26) and a point west of METZ (U 85). The final juncture of these two leads could not be effected because the area just west of METZ (U 85) was not cleared of German resistance. Some German fortifications were still occupied in this area in the early part of December. Wire communication to the advance Third U.S. Army command post at ST. AVOLD (Q 25) was constructed rapidly. By mid-December there existed the NANCY (U 81) - ST. AVOLD (Q 25) two-arm open wire lead, the NANCY (U 81) - MERLEBACH (Q 56) open wire lead, the METZ (U 85) - ST. AVOLD (Q 25) two-arm open wire Eagle lead (approximately 50% complete), a CONFLANS (U 66) - THIONVILLE (U 88) - BOUZONVILLE (Q 17) one-arm open wire pole line and sixteen underground cable pairs, METZ (U 85) - ST. AVOLD (Q 25). The internal telephone system of the proposed command post at ST. AVOLD (Q 25) had been practically completed. Wire communications had been established between the advance command post and all corps; the XII Corps Headquarters located at SARALBEN (Q 44), the XX Corps Headquarters located at THIONVILLE (U 88), and the III Corps Headquarters located at METZ (U 85).

A major German counter-offensive was launched on the First U.S. Army front which extended eventually to include the following salient:

HALMEDY (K 80) - STAVELOT (K 60) - LAROCHE (P 47) - MARCHE (P 28) - ROCHEFORT (P 27) - BEAURAING (P 07) - ST. HUBERT (P 36) - BASTOGNE (P 55) - ECHTERNACH (L 03).

On 19 December the advance party and communication troops operating at the advance command post in ST. AVOLD (Q 25) were recalled. On 20 December a small command group, which included a limited number of Signal Staff and operating personnel, left NANCY (U 81) to establish a LUCKY TAC command post in the city of LUXEMBOURG (P 81). Initial circuits to this new command post were quickly established by the use of existing facilities furnished by Twelfth U.S. Army Group. Underground cable circuits were extensively used to connect LUCKY TAC Headquarters with LUCKY CHARLEY switch at CONFLANS (U 66) and extended from there to NANCY (U 81) via carrier. Other circuits were rerouted through XX Corps at THIONVILLE (U 88), then to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) via underground cable. Two additional open wire circuits were obtained from Advance Section Communications Zone for use from NANCY (U 81) to AUBANGE (P 61) to include a complete CF-1 carrier system. This made available three additional talking circuits from NANCY (U 81) to AUBANGE (P 61) and then to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) via underground cables. The other channel was used for CF-2 teletype carrier terminals which were located at NANCY (U 81) and LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) respectively. Twelfth U.S. Army Group Tactical Headquarters, located in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81), established a switching central called Bastille Switch in the Postes Telephones Telegraphes building in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) in order to handle the overflow of circuits which were rapidly being routed to this city. It was apparent that the communication system was growing rapidly and that the small force of Signal personnel operating at LUCKY TAC would be unable to efficiently handle this new situation. Therefore, on 21 December the remainder of the Communication Section moved to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) leaving an officer and one enlisted man in NANCY (U 81) to coordinate the work at this point. The communication installation at ST. AVOLD (Q 25) was not used. The personnel and equipment were moved to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81).

LUCKY TAC was located in a school building on the north side of the city of LUXEMBOURG (P 81). Preparations were immediately effected for the establishment of a Third U.S. Army Command Post in larger quarters. The underground cable within the city was used extensively for local, long local, and trunk circuits. One hundred fifty pairs of an underground cable leading from a point close to the command post to the Postes Telephones Telegraphes building were used. From the Postes Telephones Telegraphes building underground circuits radiated in all directions and in many cases to the outskirts of the city where they were connected to rehabilitated open wire or field wire circuits serving various units. The wirehead was located in the basement of the building from which point many spiral-four cables and other field wire circuits were constructed on suspension wire supported by poles to a test point called "Round Point Test" located on the northwest corner of the command post site. From there these cables radiated in three major directions to the outskirts of the city and were also suspended on messenger wire. Local telephone service to establishments within the city were serviced by underground cable pairs terminating in the Postes Telephones Telegraphes building and thence connected to pairs of the one hundred fifty pair cable terminating in the wirehead. LUCKY TAC closed on 28 December and the main command post of LUCKY

closed at NANCY (U 81) and opened on the same date in the new headquarters building in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81). Corps Headquarters was serviced by spiral-four cable, using carrier. Third U.S. Army's drive was to the north with the VIII Corps at the extreme west, the III Corps in the center, the XII Corps in the northeast and the XX Corps on the southeast protecting the southeast flank. The VIII Corps was assigned to Third U.S. Army. Its headquarters was located at FLORENVILLE (P 22). III Corps Headquarters was located at ARLON (P 50), the XII Corps Headquarters was located in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81), and the XX Corps Headquarters remained in THIONVILLE (U 88). A signal construction platoon of the 33d Signal Construction Battalion was attached to each corps for the purpose of establishing and maintaining the respective Army-Corps axes, as the tactical situation permitted. The new tactical problem was studied and plans were made for the extension of the possible army axis.

During the month of December two hundred seventy-four miles of field wire and six hundred thirty-six miles of spiral-four cable were laid by Third U.S. Army Signal troops. For the same period four hundred fifty-five miles of field wire and sixty-two miles of spiral-four cable were recovered by Third U.S. Army troops. Three hundred and six wire miles of open wire were placed.

Thirty-four radio relay circuits were installed, covering a total distance of 1045 miles. VIII Corps had eight VHF terminals in operation to divisions, XII Corps four, and XX Corps two. VHF communications were maintained through the month with III, XII and XX Corps. On 22 December, contact was established and maintained with VIII Corps for the remainder of the month. (See Annexes 34 through 36)

Continuous wave radio communication was maintained throughout the month with XII and XX Corps, Twelfth U.S. Army Group, Twelfth U.S. Army Group TAC, Eighth Air Force, First French Army, First, Ninth, Seventh U.S. Armies and Advance Section Communications Zone. Contact was further established and maintained from 28 December on, with III and VIII Corps and Third U.S. Army Rear Echelon. Total code groups handled for the month was 97,767.

Section II - Supply

Third U.S. Army Signal Depots Number 8, at TOUL (U 61), Number 9, at VAUCOULEURS (U 40), Number 10, at FLORANGE (U 88), Number 11, at MERZARGE (Q 24) were in operation during the month. All four depots were in operation at one time, an unusual disposition for only one depot company, and a distribution of supplies was made through all depots to the troops in that area.

The extensive front of Third U.S. Army required supply coverage. This was met by spreading these depots over the area and using Depot Number 9, at VAUCOULEURS (U 40), as a receiving and storage point to serve the installations forward. This procedure proved its value in the operations under way and no forward depot was left with unbalanced stocks of any supplies that were available.

Teletype communication was inaugurated during the month in the Signal Supply system. Teletype channels were established between the Army Signal Supply Office, Depot Number 8, Depot Number 10 and Depot Number 11. This system was used to distribute and balance stocks as the tactical picture changed. Rail transportation was available to all depots. Through the medium of rail and teletype communication it was possible to shift critical items of supply and equipment to the areas needed on short notice.

Receipt of supplies from the Communications Zone during the month totaled 3329 tons against 3800 tons requisitioned. The shortages of fast moving expendable items became acute as transportation delays became frequent. Truck transportation was held to a minimum due to a tire shortage and only the emergency requirements available at Communications Zone Depots were handled by Third U.S. Army truck transport.

There were many items in critical supply during the month. Manufacturing undertaken by the 187th Signal Repair Company and the arrangement of contracts with local French industries enabled us to overcome serious deficiencies in most sections, certain type radio tubes, slip ring brushes for radar sets, adapters for 500 and 600 series radios, batteries for flame throwers and rocket launchers and many small items that were not available from other supply sources. The following were produced through the efforts and abilities of the personnel of the 187th Signal Repair Company:

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Radio Tube, VT-246	800
Radio Tube, VT-247	600
Radio Tube, VT-223	600
Adapters, M-534	500
Rocket Launcher Batteries	8000
Flame Thrower Batteries	100
Radar Slip Ring Brushes	1400
Radar Brush Holders	50
Mast Sections	1500

During the month, the general level of Class II items was estimated at two days. Class IV items were estimated at five days. Receipts of substantial shipments from Communications Zone Depots during the last half of the month stabilized our position and increased our levels by one to two days. However, shortages of operational items increased and in order that equal distribution be made to all the Armies from the limited quantities on the Continent, Twelfth U.S. Army Group assumed the responsibility of allocating thirty-eight of these critical items between the Armies. At the end of the month, this plan was in operation and materially aided in balancing certain stocks.

A new spare parts service was started. The Communications Zone established a Spare Parts Depot S-891, at PARIS (S 34), an officer from the Maintenance Branch, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, was named as the Liaison Officer for this work. Requisitions were delivered to this office weekly and the items available were delivered to the Army the following week. The procedure operated well. Third U.S. Army received approximately sixty percent of all items requisitioned.

A separate Radar Supply Section was organized. All radar parts were divorced from other supply items. An officer was placed in charge of this unit and given full responsibility to operate the section. Five enlisted men, all radar technicians, were assigned from the personnel of the Depot Company. Contacts were made direct with the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion and requisitions were made direct upon the Spare Parts Depot in PARIS (S 34). All radar spare parts were handled by personnel properly trained in recognizing and handling these items. The radar spare parts situation improved rapidly.

Radar repair work increased during the month. The 179th Signal Repair Company was attached to Third U.S. Army and further attached to the 187th Signal Repair Company. Sixteen radio repair units worked directly with Infantry and Armored divisions and Ordnance Motor Maintenance units in the forward areas. The remaining units were stationed at the Signal Depot. The following work was completed:

691	Minor Repairs and Adjustments
1549	Major Repair Jobs
85	Cannibalization of Equipment (American)
221	Installations in Combat Vehicles
21	Salvage of Equipment
1450	Wire Miles Serviced for Stock

Transportation of supplies from the Communications Zone to the Armies remained a problem. Continued use of Third U.S. Army truck transportation was necessary for all critical items.



CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

Section I - General

During the month of January Third U.S. Army maintained its headquarters in the city of LUXEMBOURG (F 81). Throughout this period communications were established to follow roughly a north-south axis which would eventually link up with the first U.S. Army in the north (ST. VITH - F 48) and with the Advance Section Communications Zone communication lines in the south (CONFLANS - U 00). The northern arm of this axis was built first from LUXEMBOURG CITY (F 31) to ETTELBRUCK (F 03) and thence to BASTOGNE (F 55) while the BASTOGNE-ARDENNES bulge was being reduced. When the tactical situation permitted, steps were taken to extend the axis north through CLERVAUX (F 76) to ST. VITH (F 58); however, construction of this project could not be completed as fighting was still in progress in this area. For the southern arm of the north-south axis, wire circuits were established between LUXEMBOURG CITY (F 81), through ESCH (F 74) to ANGEVILLERS (U 78). (See Annex #2)

The Rear Echelon of Third U.S. Army moved from NANCY (U 81) to ESCH (F 74) during the early part of the month. Communications between forward and rear echelons were established.

It was impossible to project a firm axis of Signal communications by the end of the month. There was a tendency, however, to favor a curving axis towards KOBLENZ (L 89), as follows:

LUXEMBOURG (F 81) - ETTELBRUCK (F 03) - WILTZ (F 75) - CLERVAUX (F 76) - PRUM (L 07) - KREBERG (L 48) - MAYEN (L 69) - KOBLENZ (L 89).

During the BASTOGNE (F 55) Battle Signal Intelligence activities were at their peak. Much valuable information was gained during this period. Due to unfavorable weather conditions, however, pigeon communication was reduced to a minimum.

In spite of intensification of the wire recovery program the results obtained during the month were not up to expectations. Wire recovery was handicapped by heavy snowfall and snow drifts. Thawing, rain, and freezing caused central portions of long spans to be weighted down to the ground where the wire soon became buried under heavy layers of ice and snow. In many instances the same conditions applied to existing wire circuits. The additional weight of snow and ice and swaying of the wires caused large numbers of shorts where the insulation had broken down. Snow plows further aggravated the situation by cutting the wires.

The supply situation in general was improving during the month of January. This was largely due to increased tonnages of Signal equipment being unloaded at the port of ANTWERP (J 79).

Signal supply depots and repair companies were confronted with unusually heavy demands for replacement, maintenance, repair and replenishment of Signal equipment lost as a result of the German breakthrough in LUXEMBOURG and BELGIUM. Approximately 85% of all battle losses sustained by elements of the First and Third U.S. Armies, which were estimated at 90% of the total Signal equipment carried by these units, were replaced by 15 January.

Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

A pigeon platoon of the 265th Signal Pigeon Company arrived on 3 January in response to the Army Signal Officer's request in December for additional pigeon personnel and equipment. This platoon was attached to the 277th Signal Pigeon Company, giving the company a combat platoon for each of Third U.S. Army's four corps. In order to provide pigeon communication for all echelons, a platoon was placed at the disposal of each Corps Signal Officer for use by the corps and its divisions. One section of each platoon, however, was left at the Company Headquarters at Army to provide Army communication and birds for breeding.

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Since LUXEMBOURG (F 81) was a center of pigeon breeding by [illegible] was considered the possibility of the use of pigeons for espionage activities in the Duchy. Consequently, Signal Intelligence Service and G-2 worked out a program for systematic inspection of all civilian pigeon lots by the 277th Signal Pigeon Company. The company inspected 341 lofts during the month, and either requisitioned the birds or clipped the wings of all homing pigeons found. Suspicious lofts were reported to the Counter Intelligence Corps for further investigation.

Due to extremely unfavorable weather conditions and a tactical situation where other means of communication were adequate, the tactical use of pigeons was reduced to a minimum. Birds trained while snow was on the ground had to be retrained as if for a new loft when the snow melted. Similarly, birds which were trained before snow fell had to be retrained after the earth was covered with snow.

Radio intelligence was at a higher level during the battle around BASTOGNE (F 55) than at any period in France. To increase the tactical effectiveness of radio intelligence, the 3256th Signal Service Company was temporarily attached to III Corps, but it reverted to XX Corps after the intense activity in the III Corps zone had abated. Details of the intelligence gained during this period will be reported at a subsequent date.

Representatives of the 3325th SIAM Company visited Third U.S. Army for orientation that was believed would enable them to adapt the final phases of the company's training program to actual combat needs. Tentative plans for the employment of the company were discussed further during the visit. It was estimated that at least another month would elapse before the company would be ready for action.

Radio security showed improvement during the month, despite the heavy tactical use of radio under conditions of great pressure.

Monitoring logs analyzed by Signal Intelligence Service showed that obvious violations had been eliminated in all but low echelon nets. During the month the Third U.S. Army Monitoring Team covered the AM nets of approximately two and one-half corps and the FM detachment of the team covered the nets of almost six divisions. Towards the close of the month, a security analyst of Signal Intelligence Service spent twenty-four hours at the Net Control Station of one net, correcting violations as they occurred and showing operators how such violations would help enemy signal intelligence.

Three photographers attached to Signal Intelligence Service for reproducing captured signal documents and photographing G-2 and G-3 war maps were awarded the Bronze Star Medal on 12 January for superior performance and for developing new photographic techniques in the performance of their duties.

On 27 January the responsibility of supervising the Army message center was transferred from Signal Intelligence Service to the Communication Sub-section. Signal Intelligence Service continued to be responsible for operation of the code room.

The code room record for the month was as follows:

	Incoming	Outgoing	Total
Number of messages	2564	613	3177
Number of Code Groups	561911	126423	691334

The message center record for the month was as follows:

Means	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Radio	39	875	914
Teletype	6669	6404	12853
Total	6708	7279	13767
Precedence			
Urgent	341	847	1188
Operational Priority	4076	1983	6059
Priority	2269	4564	3833
Routine	600	2077	2677
Deferred	2	8	10
	6708	7279	13767

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Section II - Communications

Headquarters Third U.S. Army Forward Echelon was located in the city of LUXEMBOURG (F 81) throughout the month of January.

On 1 January the 292th Signal Construction Battalion, loaned to Third U.S. Army by Advance Section Communications Zone, started construction of a two-arm, ten circuit, open wire lead from the city of LUXEMBOURG (F 81) to [illegible] (F 91). The tactical situation was fluid and although the axis of Signal Communication at that time was [illegible] this line was subject to change. However, it was felt that the building of an open wire lead as far north as possible, would provide the most satisfactory axis along which to construct a spur leading east at any point, whenever tactical developments would so justify.

The construction platoons of the 3rd Signal Construction Battalion, that were attached to the Corps, extended the Army-Corps axes as the corps advanced. In general, two spiral-four cables were laid between Third U.S. Army and each Corps. One spiral-four cable was used for direct communication while the other had carrier equipment superimposed upon it. Teletypewriter service was furnished each corps by CP-2 carrier.

Third U.S. Army Rear Echelon Headquarters moved from [illegible]CY (U 81) to ESCH (F 74) during the early part of the month. Two spiral-four cables were laid between the forward echelon and the rear echelon. In addition, eight underground cable trunks were placed in operation between the two echelons. The rear Echelon Headquarters was also furnished direct channels of communication with other major headquarters and installations by means of underground and spiral-four cables, this included two circuits to the Advance Section Communications Zone Headquarters and four circuits to Twelfth Army Group Headquarters. The policy was adopted of providing the Rear Echelon switchboard with direct trunks to such installations as are essentially associated with the rear echelon headquarters. This improved the service considerably, as the necessity for switching through the switchboard of the forward Echelon was eliminated.

Third U.S. Army had a one-arm open wire lead between CONFLANS (U 66) and [illegible] (U 46) and a radio section Communications Zone had an open wire [illegible] south from [illegible]. Therefore it was desirable to provide an open wire lead between [illegible] (F 81) and the build. Construction of a two-arm open wire lead was undertaken from [illegible] (F 74), to a point where the east-west lead between [illegible] was intersected, the point of interception being [illegible]. There the east-west lead was cut in, connected with the one arm of the north-south build leading towards [illegible] and with the other arm leading in the direction of [illegible].

On 20 January the open wire build to [illegible] was completed, at which time Advance Section Communications Zone relieved the 292th Signal Construction Battalion. It then became necessary to extend this wire lead north through [illegible] to [illegible]. The 292th Signal Construction Battalion was directed to proceed with this work. At the same time First U.S. Army was building an open wire lead south to join the Third U.S. Army lead at [illegible].

Two spiral-four cables were laid from [illegible] to [illegible] as an alternate route paralleling the open wire lead. Four spiral-four cables were constructed between [illegible] and [illegible] in anticipation of Corps headquarters moving to the east. All spiral-four cables were constructed as messenger strand. The cables between [illegible] and [illegible] were under construction while there was still considerable artillery fire in the vicinity. As a result [illegible] had to be replaced. Each trouble occurred at these cables phenomenally, due to shell fragments that penetrated the rubber but could not be seen.

At the end of the month the rear Echelon of Third U.S. Army planned to move to [illegible]. Plans were under way to open the rear echelon switchboard at [illegible] communication network that was at that time in existence at [illegible].

For the month of January a total of [illegible] miles of field wire, [illegible] miles of spiral-four cable, and [illegible] miles of open wire was laid by Third U.S. Army Signal troops. For the same period [illegible] miles of field wire and fifty-eight miles of spiral-four cable were recovered by Third U.S. Army Signal troops.

On 30 January, a new air messenger run was started by Twelfth Army Group. Stops were made daily at the LUXEMBOURG (F 81) airfield.

Fifty-eight radio relay circuits were installed during the month covering a total of 1144 miles. III Corps had four terminals in operation to divisions, VIII Corps ten, XII Corps six, and AA Corps ten. Radio contact was maintained between Third U.S. Army and Corps throughout the month. (See Annex 36)

Continuous wave Radio communication was maintained throughout the month of January with all stations in the following radio nets:

FA-1 NET	FA-14 NET
First U.S. Army	First French Army
Ninth U.S. Army	Seventh U.S. Army
COMZ Advance Section	
FA-33 NET	**FA-16 NET**
Twelfth Army Group	Twelfth Army Group ZAC
EIGHTH AF NET	**FA-15 NET**
Eighth Air Force	Third U.S. Army Rear
FA-12 NET	**FA-17 NET**
III Corps	III Corps Artillery
VIII Corps	VIII Corps Artillery
XII Corps	XII Corps Artillery
AA Corps	Third U.S. Army Photo Center

Total code groups handled for the month of January was 139,768.

Section II - Supply

Following the German breakthrough in Luxembourg and Belgium during the latter part of December, three of the four Third U.S. Army Signal Depots were closed, Depot number 6 at [illegible] (U 61), Number 7 at [illegible] (F 40), and Number 11 at [illegible] (U 62). All Third U.S. Army Signal Supply operations were centralized in Third U.S. Army Signal Depot Number 13 at [illegible] (F 62) and at Advance Section Communications Zone Signal Depot S- 67, located at [illegible] (F 81), Luxembourg. In accordance with agreement reached with the Signal Officer, Advance Section Communications Zone, the latter depot was operated as Third U.S. Army Signal Depot Number 12, under joint management by Third U.S. Army and Advance Section Communications Zone. Signal Depot Number 10 at [illegible] (U 66) (see Illustration Page 11) carried approximately sixty-five percent of Third U.S. Army Signal stores and was located in a most advantageous position to support the new front of Third U.S. Army. Stocks were moved from the three closed depots to Signal Depot Number 10, an operation which required only eight days.

Heavy demands were made on Signal Supplies as the German counter-offensive caused severe losses to units then operating in the invaded area. It is estimated that as much as 40% of their Signal equipment was turned in by these units for salvage, repair and replacement. Due to the haste with which troops of Division HQs and other units moved into the area, it was not possible for these units to recover wire, replenish equipment, etc., from their former locations. Many units picked up the necessary Signal Supplies as they passed the Signal Depot on the LUXEMBOURG (F 81) road.

All battle losses sustained by the elements from First U.S. Army, including the VIII Corps, consisting of three Divisions, fifteen artillery battalions, seven engineer battalions and miscellaneous units, were replaced to approximately eighty-five percent of their total requirements before 15 January. During this same period two additional armored divisions, two airborne divisions and two additional infantry divisions were assigned to Third U.S. Army for operations and supply. In all, a total of seventeen Div slots were supplied through Signal Depots Number ten and Number 11 and a replacement of eighty-five percent of all battle losses was made during the period.

Receipt of supplies from Communications Zone during the month improved as the tempo of unloading at the new port of ANTWERP (U 74) increased. Shortages of fast moving expendable items remained critical most of the time. The hauling of Signal supplies for Third U.S. Army continued to be a major problem. Transportation was unreliable and shipments were frequently delayed.

The situation as regards spare parts, both radar and radio, was much improved. The operation of the Communications Zone Spare Parts Depot and the special expediting service of the Maintenance Branch, Communications Zone, proved highly successful for Third U.S. Army Signal operations.

An extensive campaign to recover and service all field wire had been under way. Approximately 5100 miles of field wire were returned to the Signal Depots for servicing and salvage, of which approximately 3,000 miles were reclaimed during the month.

Radio repair work increased during the month. The burden was somewhat relieved by the attachment of elements of the 179th Signal Repair Company and one radio team of the 180th Signal Repair Company. Eighteen radio repair units worked directly with Infantry and Armored divisions and Reinforce AA units in the forward area. The remaining units were stationed at Signal Depot Number 10. The following work was completed:

1000	Minor Repairs and Adjustments
2179	Major repair Jobs
35	Rehabilitation of Equipment (Amerisam)
103	Installations in Combat Vehicles
12	Salvage of Equipment
3000	Wire Miles Serviced for Stock

The month was characterized by extensive replacement of equipment for units involved in the German counter-attack, as well as by the repair, maintenance and replenishment of Signal equipment for eighteen divisions and the large number of field artillery battalions, tank destroyer battalions, engineer battalions, anti-aircraft battalions, etc., employed by Third U.S. Army.

Allocations of thirty-eight operational critical items were made by Twelfth Army Group. The issue of sixteen items in short supply was controlled through the Signal depots. Field wire consumption for the month amounted to 16,400 miles.

To meet pressing requirements for vehicular mine detectors, 125 detectors AN MKJ-1 were requisitioned from Communications Zone through Twelfth Army Group. The release of these items in this Theater was expected in the near future.



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CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

Section I - General

Long range planning for army communications necessarily concerned itself with future RHINE RIVER crossings. Information was obtained regarding specifications for special submarine telephone cable which First U.S. Army was planning to use for the crossing of the RHINE RIVER. There were under manufacture in Belgium at the Atelier De Construction, CHARLEROI (P 71), three six-meter lengths of fifteen-pair armored cable for which First U.S. Army furnished approximately 50,000 pounds of copper, 50,000 pounds of lead and 400 tons of coal. The copper and lead were obtained from the Eupen Cable Works in EUPEN (P 53), Belgium. It was further learned that a similar cable was to be manufactured for Ninth U.S. Army upon the completion of the First U.S. Army cable. As the availability of copper and lead in sufficient quantities was doubtful, Twelfth Army Group was investigating the possibility of securing standard seven-quad armored cable from Communication Zone for use by Third U.S. Army. In the meantime Twelfth Army Group suggested that Third U.S. Army consider the advisability of recovering certain sections of Postes Telephones Telegraphes underground cable existing between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and [illegible] (P 54). As a communication link between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and [illegible] (P 54) this cable was no longer suitable because long lengths of it had been severely damaged or were missing altogether.

During the month technical experts representing commercial firms visited Third U.S. Army for observation and advice on Signal Corps matters. These visits from technical observers were beneficial in that much assistance and information was obtained specifically with regard to facsimile equipment and its operation.

A request was made by certain divisions for a four-line teletype switchboard suitable for field use. Members of the Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service designed and built such a switchboard which received highly favorable comments from users.

Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

An event unique in the cryptographic history of Third U.S. Army took place on 7 February when all high grade cryptographic systems were simultaneously compromised, due to the loss of an entire code room of a unit in another army. This compromise virtually halted the encryptographing of messages from division level through corps, army and higher headquarters. Classified teletype items and messengers had to be utilized exclusively for communication, with the exception of messages which could be encipphered in a system that had just been distributed through the chain of command as far down as corps and which was put into effect on an emergency basis in advance of its effective date. Reserve cipher systems were immediately obtained from Twelfth Army Group and these were quickly distributed throughout Third U.S. Army by special messenger. Cryptographic operations had returned to almost normal within twenty-four hours after the compromise was reported.

Toward the end of February pigeon communication came into greater tactical use as weather and tactical difficulties made the use of pigeons feasible and advisable. A total of twenty-three tactical messages was delivered by pigeon during the month, most of these being delivered during the last two weeks of February. A "trap loft" was set up on an experimental basis near LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) to ascertain if birds used by enemy agents could be lured into it by the attraction of birds settled in such a loft. Several U.S. Army pigeons and one pigeon, possibly German, carrying no message were "trapped". A report was made to Twelfth Army Group that a "trap loft" would be feasible in areas where use of pigeons by the enemy was anticipated. It was pointed out that an Army pigeon company does not have enough men and birds to maintain "trap lofts" and communications simultaneously, and recommendation was made that an Army Group pigeon company be detailed for this activity. At the end of February the "trap loft" was closed to release more birds for communication.

Analysis of monitoring logs by Signal Intelligence Service during February revealed better radio transmission security, and a sharp decline in excessive transmissions. FM nets were monitored extensively due to the infrequent use of FM nets in the static tactical situation. The chief security threat on FM nets was the passage of messages in the clear by Artillery Fire Control nets. During the last seven days of February Army MP nets were monitored on a 24-hour basis at the request of Twelfth Army Group. Only minor security violations were found.

The Executive Officer and two other officers of the 514th Company visited Third U.S. Army on an orientation tour of the front preparatory to the movement of the company to France for its operational role with Third U.S. Army.

Motion picture films of radio intelligence activities were taken to LONDON for development under proper supervision in accordance with their security restrictions. Motion pictures of pigeon activities were developed at the same time.

Radio intelligence activity was intensive at the beginning of February, but declined toward the end of the month.

Monitoring of headquarters telephone conversations by Signal Intelligence Service was suspended temporarily 21 February 1945, since telephone security had improved to such an extent that continuous monitoring was no longer necessary. Monitoring equipment was left in place, however, for subsequent spot checks of telephone security.

During the month the Third U.S. Army code room record was as follows:

	Incoming	Outgoing	Total
Number of Messages	2816	972	3788
Number of Groups	569779	224938	794717

In addition to the encryptographed traffic handled in the code room systems, 284 messages comprising 23,156 groups were handled by SIGCUM equipment.

The message center record for the month was as follows:

Precedence	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Urgent	459	568	1027
Operational Priority	3478	1662	5140
Priority	2840	1699	4275
Routine	1352	1923	3275
Deferred	7	1	8
Total	8202	5813	14015

Number of messages and groups handled by electrical means:

Messages	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Radio	121	798	919
Teletype	7362	7541	14903
Total messages handled:	7486	8336	15822
Groups			
Radio	16305	129516	145821
Teletype	1348455	1118814	2517269
Total groups handled:	1414760	1248330	2663090

Messenger service:

Pouches transmitted by motor messenger	3229
Pieces transmitted by motor messenger	14,107
Total number motor messenger miles travelled	45720
Total number of pouches by air messenger	30

Section II - Communications

The forward echelon of Headquarters Third U.S. Army maintained its command post in the city of LUXEMBOURG (P 81) during the month. On 7 February the rear echelon moved from its location in ESCH (P 74) to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81). Their switchboard included circuits to supply installations and trunks to major installations, including Headquarters Advance Section Communications Zone, 12th Army Group. Advantage was taken of the availability of civilian underground cable facilities of the Postes Telephones Telegraphes to furnish communication service to military installations within the city of LUXEMBOURG (P 81). The switching central at ESCH (P 74) was maintained and operated by Third U.S. Army troops.

On about 12 February III Corps was relieved from the command of Third U.S. Army and was attached to First U.S. Army. At the time of this transfer, III Corps maintained its headquarters at MARTELANGE (P 53). As the switchboard operated by III Corps serviced many other Third U.S. Army units, this change in status necessitated the installation of another secondary switchboard north of MARTELANGE (P 53), at BASTOGNE (P 55), which was connected with Headquarters Third U.S. Army by means of spiral-four cable to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81), and by a radio link circuit. During the month Third U.S. Army maintained and operated the following switching centrals: "Lucky Fox" at BASTOGNE (P 55), "Lucky Easy" at ESCH (P 74), "Lucky Dog" at ARLON (P 52). The switching central in COURTRAI (U 66), named "Lucky Charlie" was taken over by Advance Section Communications Zone on 7 February and renamed "Courtrai Switch". However, Third U.S. Army maintained a carrier terminal and wirehead personnel at this point.

The tactical situation throughout the month did not offer any definite clues as to where the breakthrough of the Siegfried Line would materialize. Wherever penetrations into the enemy lines resulted in consolidated gains of territory, communication axes were extended as quickly as possible to such points. It remained therefore essentially a matter of conjecture where the main army communication axis was to be projected. It was realized that violent action would soon erupt at one or several points on the otherwise stagnant front which might quickly result in deep thrusts into Germany followed by enveloping flanking maneuvers, quite possibly involving a wide area. With this possibility in mind, the tactical situation was under continuous study and analysis.

During the month every effort was made to plan, project, and construct tentative axes and to prepare a hypothetical network of communications whose tentacles might one day carry the basic flow of command communications necessary to successfully conduct operations in an easterly direction. As the emphasis was thus placed on the West-East trend toward the RHINE River, six communication axes leading east were projected during the month. They were either extended from previously built leads, or newly constructed, with some still in the stage of development until the tactical situation would justify their completion. These six axes were linked up with the firmly established North-South axis and coordinated with communication demands imposed by Twelfth Army Group supply installations (Advance Section Communications Zone) and flanking armies. From Third U.S. Army point of view, the center of this network was in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) with its converging underground cable network of the Postes Telephones Telegraphes.

The North-South axis was developed as follows:

Prior to the month of February there existed leads and underground cables, from NANCY (U 81) in the south (former Third U.S. Army Command Post), through METZ (U 65), THIONVILLE (U 86) (Where XX Corps was located) to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81). North of LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) the existing two-arm ten-circuit open wire lead to ETTELBRUCK (P 85) was extended further to HOSCHEID (P 75), during the month. This construction was undertaken by the 34th Signal Construction Battalion. A further extension north from HOSCHEID (P 75) was made to a point where the West-East highway passing through CLERVAUX (P 76) was reached. In accordance with the general plan to have a continuous two-arm open wire lead from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) to ST. VITH (P 88), Twelfth Army Group assigned to one of their Signal units, the 36th Signal Construction Battalion, the construction of the portion beginning with the point on the CLERVAUX (P 76) West-East highway to ST. VITH (P 88). Difficulties were encountered in the construction of this lead from HOSCHEID (P 75) on north and temporary delays caused due to the bad condition of the road and artillery fire, the area in question being at that time in a division zone. The road itself was particularly exposed to enemy observation, earning the name of "sky-line drive" due to its high location. While the portion LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) to HOSCHEID (P 75) was completed on 17 February, the remainder of the lead was not ready at the end of the month. During the month Headquarters VIII Corps displaced to TROIS VIERGES (P 77). Communication between this Corps and Third U.S. Army Headquarters was established by taking advantage of the above mentioned open wire lead to HOSCHEID (P 75), from which point two spiral-four cables were laid north and west to TROIS VIERGES (P 77).

The six eastern [illegible] in the above were [illegible]

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[illegible] the north of Third U.S. Army territory, a telephone wire line was [illegible] Third U.S. Army Signal Depots Number 10, at Kitzbühel (U.S.), and Number 11 at St. Johann (U.S.). Equipment were [illegible] during the month. Three of these [illegible] Advance Section Communications Zone, with the exception of one, were received by Signal Depot Number 10. All shipments from Advance Section Communications Zone 3-405 were received at Depot Number 10. The volume of operations was handled by Depot Number 10.

The Signal supply situation during the month improved greatly and Third U.S. Army was able to replace nearly all battle losses encountered during the month, and in addition, could save all remaining shortages of battle losses suffered during the December-January German breakthrough. The critical items of Third U.S. Army were in the decline all during the month and although it was still necessary to retain many items, the situation was generally relieved. At the end of the month there remained only approximately forty items on the critical item list.

Field Wire, W-110-B, continued to be the greatest source of difficulty for Signal Supply. A total of [illegible] miles was issued during the month and this figure was only kept to such a low level by strict rationing. This rationing did not, however, impair the communication efficiency of any combat unit, as it was intended rather to insure to those units actually engaged in combat a preference of issue over those units not so engaged. During the month of February there were nine



EXPERIMENTAL VEHICULAR VHF INSTALLATION

Section II - Supply

Total mile [illegible] handled for month of February was [illegible].

FA-1 MRT	FA-2 MRT
Twelfth Army Group	Twelfth Army Group, Tac
FA-2 MRT	FA-3 MRT
[illegible]	Third U.S. Army rear
[illegible]	FA-17 MRT
FA-3 MRT	[illegible] Corps Arty
Twelfth Army Group Main	[illegible] Corps Arty
	[illegible] Arty
	XX Corps Arty
	Third U.S. Army Photo Center

Infantry Divisions, five armored divisions and the usual number of supporting troops serviced by Third U.S. Army Signal Depots. Although [illegible] were actually engaged during the month, this period was also [illegible] an excellent opportunity was afforded to rest units to completely refit themselves.

The tank-infantry communication situation of the separate tank battalions was partially solved during this month by the installation of the telephone headset on the shirt of the tank and by the installation of the [illegible] SCR-508 in the tank. This was accomplished during the month in all separate tank battalions. Another new feature of interest in armored forces communication was that steps had been taken to place a transmitter in each tank. Two separate tank battalions were converted with other separate battalions and armored divisions to future suit in the immediate future. No new item of equipment was [illegible] or received during the month. However, additional radio line and carrier equipment was received to further strengthen Army and Corps communications, new items appearing on the recent T/E began to arrive, initial distribution of which was expected to be made in the early part of March. They were mostly new Test Sets and Test Units, TS-47 TSM, TS-48 TSM, and I-176. Modification of fluorescent panels for air-ground identification was completed and a complete changeover of all Third U.S. Army units was made during the month.

Receipt of supplies from Communications Zone during the month improved and a total of [illegible] was received. Toward the end of the month a new standard operating procedure for supplies from Communications Zone was initiated, known as SOP 5. It represented a fundamental departure from the old procedure in so far as requisitions from Third U.S. Army were to go directly to an issuing depot rather than to Advance Section Communications Zone or Communications Zone headquarters for forwarding, prior to their entrance to an issuing depot. As the new procedure had not been in operation long enough to evaluate its effective results, it was felt that during the initial phases of this operation difficulties would be experienced in the receipt of supplies. This anticipation was mainly based on the fact that there was no balance of stock in any Advance Section or Communications Zone Depot, whereas the plan specifically called for balance of stocks. Both Advance Sections and Communications Zone were fully aware of this fact and were making every effort to balance their stocks in the depots which operate in immediate support, or base support of the Army.

The spare parts situation continued to be satisfactory during the month. [illegible] miles of radar, radio and telephone parts were also maintained in satisfactory quantities, but during the month an extreme critical shortage of major generator parts occurred. However, this was overcome by turning to an exchange of unit basis with the Communications Zone Base Maintenance Depots. This practice is still in full operation and will be continued until adequate spare parts of motor generators are received.

The campaign on the recovery of all field wire and spiral-four cable continued, approximately [illegible] miles of wire being picked up during the month. The good results of last month decreased somewhat because of greater combat commitments of our divisions.

Repair and maintenance work increased during the month. Two radio repair teams of the 17th Repair Company were lent to Ninth U.S. Army. The following work was completed:

1,[illegible]	Minor Repairs and Adjustments
2,[illegible]	Major Repair Jobs
[illegible]	Demobilization of Equipment (Americas)
123	Installations in Combat Vehicles
3	Salvage of Equipment
806	Wire Miles Serviced for Stock

Allocation of thirty-eight critical items was continued by Twelfth Army Group. This allocation system has proven to be the most satisfactory from our standpoint, because it affords an equitable distribution of those items that are short in supply.

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CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

Section I - General

Third U.S. Army Headquarters moved from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) to OBERSTEIN (L 72) on 27 March to follow as closely as possible the rapidly advancing divisions and corps. By the end of the month the increasing rate of advance and the swift crossing of the RHINE secured a possible breakthrough into Germany to rival the historic dash through France last summer.

The three corps displaced directly eastward during the first week of March. The two-arm standard open wire lead from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) through ECHTERNACH (L 03) to BITBURG (L 15) was used to maintain communication with XII and XX Corps, while the two-arm two-wire open lead from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) to ST. VITH (P 88) served the VIII Corps. A four-wire one-arm open wire lead was extended from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) east to SAARBURG (L 11) to further serve the XX Corps. In each case the open wire leads extended by spiral-four cable and repeator stations.

The proposed displacement of the Third U.S. Army Command Post to TRIER (L 22), Germany, required that LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and TRIER (L 22) be connected by carrier over spiral-four cable. The rapid advance, however, made this move unfeasible and the Forward Echelon displaced directly to OBERSTEIN (L 72), while the rear echelon moved to TRIER (L 22) on 21 March. (See Annex 50) The entire communication network left behind in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) was taken over by Twelfth Army Group TAC.

The supply situation was more favorable than at any other time in the campaign. Seventy-five percent of all requisitions were available at Advance Section Communications Zone Depots. To make these supplies accessible to advancing units, forward dumps were set up along the entire line, supplemented by a Mobile Signal Depot mounted in seven K-36 trailers.

The rapid movement increased the tactical use of radio. To permit complete coverage by monitoring personnel it was necessary to procure one additional radio monitoring team from Twelfth Army Group. By the end of the month radio nets of all corps and divisions had been monitored, showing a decrease in transmission security. Violations were brought to the attention of all concerned.

Among the thousands of German prisoners enveloped in the Saar triangle were a large number of PW's from the 9534 Short Range Intercept Company. Interrogation of these prisoners lead to a confirmation of the suspicion that radio-telephone transmissions employing Sliders were furnishing the enemy with much tactical information.

Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

Rapid advance into Germany and wide-flung disposition of Third U.S. Army troops resulted in increased tactical use of radio communication. Additional radio monitoring personnel and equipment to augment the radio monitoring team already in use was necessary if transmission security was to be maintained. Upon request, Twelfth Army Group provided an additional radio monitoring team which arrived on 17 March. With the additional personnel and equipment, nets of all corps and divisions of Third U.S. Army were monitored during the month. Analysis of monitored radio traffic by Signal Intelligence Service revealed a decided decrease in the level of transmission security over the previous month due primarily to the fast moving situation and the need for speed.

The need for pigeon replacements was critical during the first week of March and request was made to Communications Zone for birds to be shipped either from lofts in the United Kingdom or other lofts on the Continent. Communications Zone advised that pigeon replacements from the United Kingdom were being held up due to the four-week quarantine placed on young birds after pox vaccination. To relieve the shortage, 1200 birds were obtained from Twelfth Army Group lofts, and on 25 March 500 young pigeons were received via air shipment from the United Kingdom. The total strength of the Army Pigeon Company on 31 March was 3466, 1332 birds below T/E strength. A total of seventeen tactical messages was flown by pigeons of the 277th Signal Pigeon Company during the month, all of which were to divisional lofts.

Interrogation of German prisoners of war proved especially fruitful during March due to the capture of a large number of German PW's from the 9534 Short Range Intercept Company (Radio Intelligence). Statements of four PW's from this company considered to be reasonably reliable, confirmed the belief that the use of SLIDEX for encoding radio-telephone transmissions was furnishing the enemy with much intelligence. Also, the policy of maintaining the same frequencies throughout long periods was allowing the enemy to maintain complete continuity on all Third U.S. Army units.

Processing of captured German film reached an all time level when over 600 reels were processed during the month. All reels were screened for immediate tactical intelligence and then evacuated to European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army for further study.

On 30 March the advance detachment of the 3325th SIAN Company, consisting of eight officers, arrived at Headquarters Third U.S. Army. This detachment began planning for the immediate operational use of the company upon its arrival on or about 15 April.

The movement throughout March of all Third U.S. Army units into Germany, and finally that of Headquarters itself, to OBERSTEIN (L 72), brought ever-increasing demands on our code room personnel. In accordance with a Twelfth Army Group directive, all teletype circuits crossing or terminating in Germany were classified and all traffic passing over such circuits was cryptographed unless specifically authorized to be sent in the clear. Due to this fact, a total of 1,079,286 groups was handled by the code room, an increase of 35% over the preceding month. Detailed code room records for March follow:

	Incoming	Outgoing	Total
Number of Messages	4,215	754	4,969
Number of Groups	853,533	190,761	1,044,294

In addition to the encryptographed traffic handled in the code room systems, 257 messages comprising 34,992 groups were handled by SIGCUM equipment.

Section II - Communications

Although front line troops were making substantial gains through the Siegfried Line and the forward displacement of the three corps headquarters resulted in extremely long communication lines, Third U.S. Army Headquarters remained in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) since no suitable location could be found between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and TRIER (L 22) Germany. (See Annexes 43 through 46)

On 1 March the TRIER (L 22) - SAARBURG (L 11) underground lead cable was located by the 10th Armored Division as it sliced forward. The cable was believed to be in use by the enemy at this time and was severed by the 10th Armored Division at NIEDER ZERF (L 21). Headquarters VIII Corps moved from TROIS VIERGES (P 77) to BLEIALF (P 98) 5 March. Headquarters XX Corps moved from THIONVILLE (U 88) to SAARBURG (L 11) 7 March. Headquarters XII Corps moved from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) to ECHTERNACH (L 03) 4 March. The two-arm standard open wire lead from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) through ECHTERNACH (L 03) to BITBURG (L 15) was being constructed as rapidly as possible. Wire communication to the XII and VIII Corps was obtained by this lead with extensions of spiral-four cable. As an alternate route to these two corps spiral-four was laid from the corps to the closest point of intersection of the LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81)-ST. VITH (P 88) open wire lead. A one-arm rapid pole line lead was under construction from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) through SAARBURG (L 11) to TRIER (L 22). The communication to the XX Corps was obtained by means of this rapid pole line lead to SAARBURG (L 11). One company of the 448th Signal Construction Battalion built the section of the rapid pole line between SAARBURG (L 11) and TRIER (L 22). However, due to the rapid moving situation, this lead was not used for main line communications, but was later used for connecting units between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and TRIER (L 22).

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On 2 March Headquarters XII Corps moved to BITBURG (L 15). On 3 March Headquarters VIII Corps moved to SCHONECKEN (L 07). Each corps was connected to Army by at least two spiral-four cables. Carrier repeater stations established at PRUM (L 07) which served the carrier circuits to the VIII and XII Corps. On 10 March Headquarters VIII Corps moved to ADENAU (+ 49). On 12 March Headquarters XII Corps moved to MAYEN (L 69). As the Corps moved forward the wire lines were extended for great distances. On 13 March it was proposed that Headquarters Third U.S. Army move to TRIER (L 22) and immediately plans for an advance command post installation were under way. Twelfth Army Group completed their two-arm open wire lead plus four spiral-four cables between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and TRIER (L 22). Eight carrier systems were placed on the open wire lead by the use of hybrids CF-7 and four carrier systems were placed on the spiral-four cables. This resulted in a total of twelve carrier systems between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and TRIER (L 22). Existing underground cable was plentiful in, and radiating from, LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81). The first cable company, provisional, was already rehabilitating underground cable radiating east from TRIER (L 22). However, no underground cable existed between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and TRIER (L 22) and therefore the twelve carrier systems spanned this gap of non-existent facilities.

A switching central designated as Lucky George was established in the basement of the telephone exchange building in TRIER (L 22). This switchboard served all units in the immediate vicinity. The switch at ARLON (P 52), known as Lucky Dog, was discontinued on 19 March.

Headquarters XII Corps moved to SIMMERN (L 85) 19 March. CF-3 Carrier Repeaters were operating at OBER STADTFELD (L 37) and MAYEN (L 69). Headquarters XX Corps moved from SAARBURG (L 11) to ST WENDEL (Q 59) 20 March, and on the following day moved to KAISERSLAUTERN (R 09). On 22 March this Corps moved to WELLERNAF (M 21). On 22 March Headquarters VIII Corps moved to SIMMERN (L 85) and Headquarters XII Corps moved to BAD KREUZNACH (M 03). On the wire circuits to XII Corps, repeaters were operating at PRUM (L 07) and MAYEN (L 69). On the XII Corps wire circuits repeaters were in operation at OBER STADTFELD (L 37), MAYEN (L 69) and SIMMERN (L 85). On the XX Corps wire circuit repeaters were operating at SAARBURG (L 11), ST WENDEL (Q 59) and KAISERSLAUTERN (R 09). These wire circuits to the corps were the longest wire lines Third U.S. Army has operated to date. The circuit to the XII Corps was approximately 130 miles long. Thirty-four miles of this was open wire and the remainder was spiral-four cable. All spiral-four cable was suspended on #9 iron wire and the quality of the talking circuits was excellent.

Third U.S. Army Headquarters did not move to TRIER (L 22) but on 27 March opened at OBERSTEIN (L 72). The rear echelon command post moved to TRIER (L 22) 31 March. The same day Lucky Easy, the switch at ESCH (P 74), was closed. Five spiral-four cables were constructed between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and OBERSTEIN (L 72), two for the use of XIX Tactical Air Command, and carrier systems were applied to the three remaining cables which operated between Lucky Rear and Lucky. Twelfth Army Group did not initially furnish communication of their own by wire to OBERSTEIN (L 72). Two talking channels and one teletype channel were furnished Twelfth Army Group Headquarters by Third U.S. Army. Three teletype channels were also furnished Twelfth Army Group Main. These channels were part of the carrier systems and operated on the three spiral-four cables between TRIER (L 22) and OBERSTEIN (L 72). Twelfth Army Group was, however, rehabilitating underground cable between TRIER (L 22) and OBERSTEIN (L 72) via WITTLICH (L 35). (See Annex 50) Two circuits in this underground cable were later established between Headquarters Third U.S. Army and Headquarters Twelfth Army Group Main. The entire installation left behind in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) was taken over by Twelfth Army Group TAC.

During the operations of March, Third U.S. Army Signal troops laid 314 miles of W-110 field wire, 2086 miles of spiral-four cable and 720 miles of open wire. These troops also recovered eighty-one miles of W-110 field wire, and 154 miles of spiral-four cable.

The record number of at least 125 Radio Relay Circuits, covering a total of 3325 miles, was installed during the month. Each of the three corps, VIII, XII and XX, had ten terminals to division level. Communication was maintained between each of the corps and First U.S. Army over Third U.S. Army Radio Link. Two terminals of radio relay and carrier equipment, plus necessary operating personnel, were furnished the 4th Armored Division, for the purpose of maintaining communication to its Combat Command on the breakthrough to the RHINE. (See Annex 40 and 41)

Continuous wave radio communication was maintained throughout the month with all stations in the following nets:

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FA-1	S3-3
First U.S. Army	First French Army
Ninth U.S. Army	Seventh U.S. Army
COMZ Adv Sec	
FO-33	**FO-16**
Twelfth Army Group	Twelfth Army Group TAC
FA-12	**FA-15**
VIII Corps	Third U.S. Army Rear
XII Corps	
XX Corps	
FO-51	**FA-17**
Twelfth Army Group Main	VIII Corps Arty
	XII Corps Arty
	XX Corps Arty

THIRD U.S. ARMY MEDICAL NET	TOKA PHOTO CENTER
65th Medical Group	MISSION FOR ENGINEER SECTION
66th Medical Group	
92d Medical Gas Bn	1306th Engineer General Service Regiment
94th Medical Gas Bn	

The breakdown of traffic handled by the message center for the month of March follows:

Precedence	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Urgent	662	728	1390
Operational Priority	4621	2173	6794
Priority	3520	2339	5859
Routine	13406	5563	18969
Deferred	68	6	74
Total:	22617	11209	33826

Number of messages and groups handled by electrical means:

Messages:	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Radio	196	840	1036
Teletype	8457	7779	16236
Total messages handled:	8653	8619	17272
Groups			
Radio	36845	143941	180786
Teletype	1836736	1420800	3257536
Total groups handled:	1873581	1564741	3438322

Messenger service:

Total number of pouches by air messenger	205
Total number of motor messenger miles travelled	76840

Section II - Supply

The entire overall supply picture was better during the month of March than at any other time in Third U.S. Army's Signal history. Despite the rapid extension of the Army line as its troops raced beyond the RHINE River, accompanied by increased supply requirements, gratifying improvement was noted in the availability of all signal equipment and supplies in Advance Section Communications Zone Depots. Approximately 79% of the requisitions were made available. Shipment of items to Third U.S. Army Signal Depots through the 24th Regulating Station was accelerated and delivery time was reduced to an average of ten to twelve days.

Third U.S. Army Signal Depot Number 10, at FLORANGE (U 88), and Number 12, at STEINFURT (P 61), were in operation throughout the month. Signal Dumps 13 and 14, at RAIMERSBACH (L 58) and KIRCHBERG (L 74), respectively, were opened to support the XII Corps drive along the RHINE River, from the Moselle to KOBLENZ (L 89).

As the drive gained momentum, Depot Number 10, at FLORANGE (U 88), became a pivot point for all signal supply, as it had been during the December and January periods of the Ardennes offensive and subsequent German break-through. After Third U.S. Army boxed an oblong trap around the enemy by advancing east to the RHINE from ECHTERNACH (L 03), south from the Moselle to KOBLENZ (L 89) and east to the RHINE from SAARBRUCKEN (Q 47), the entire line was supplied by the tactical establishment of Forward Signal Dumps. To augment this source of supply, a Mobile Signal Dump was inaugurated. Seven trailers, K-36, were equipped with small parts and supplies and employed in the area. Wire and batteries were maintained at the dump on a daily basis, each day's issues being replaced the following day by Signal Depot Number 10. A constant daily level was maintained and successfully served the units in its area.

The radio and radar spare parts stock continued to be good as a result of deliveries from the Communications Zone Depots. The exchange of unrepairable equipment by the Signal Repair Company with the Spare Parts Depot in PARIS (S 04) has proven fruitful. Approximately sixty percent of the exchanges requested were made. Serious delays in restoring equipment to troops were averted by the exchange of power units during this period.

Manufacturing and conversion work by the Repair Company has been reduced to a minimum. Supplies of spare parts being made available from Communications Zone Depots have reduced shortages and eliminated the necessity of this type work.

Allocation of thirty-eight items in short supply is still being made by Twelfth Army Group. This allocation has proven most valuable and is, in a very large measure, responsible for the balancing of stocks of these items in Third U.S. Army Signal Depots.

Repair and rehabilitation work increased during the month. The necessity of recovering spiral-four cable became a priority assignment. Six wire pick-up teams from Twelfth Army Group assisted in recovery of the cable. These teams were attached to the Signal Supply Office for operations and the responsibility of recovery of all field wire and spiral-four cable in the Army areas was also assigned. The following units were engaged in servicing Third U.S. Army and its units during the month:

579th Signal Depot Company
187th Signal Repair Company
17yth Signal Repair Company (less two platoons)
189th Signal Repair Company Platoon
3172d Signal Service Battalion Detachment (six officers and sixty-five enlisted men)
577th Signal Depot Company Detachment (Radar Section)

Repair and maintenance work completed as follows:

EQUIPMENT:

549	Minor Repairs and Adjustments
2718	Major Repair Jobs
23	Cannibalization of Equipment (American)
187	Installations in Combat Vehicles
4	Salvage of Equipment (American)
259	Technical Inspections

WIRE:

2180	Miles Field Wire turned in by units
5617	Miles serviced during period
1380	Miles returned to Depot stock
4237	Miles returned to Communications Zone for salvage

SPIRAL-FOUR CABLE:

1020	Miles Spiral-Four turned in by units
1264	Miles serviced and returned to stock
695	Balance on hand to be serviced

Approximately 22,500 miles of Field Wire, W-110, and 2900 miles of spiral-four cable were issued during the month. Recovery was small due to the rapid advance of the Army.

CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

Section I - General

The crumbling German Army, unable to maintain a main line of resistance to withstand the deep and penetrating armored thrusts into the heart of Germany, rapidly fell apart as Third U.S. Army troops surged forward for the final blow. Maintenance of communications during this period of rapid tactical maneuver provided problems greater than at any time in the campaign. The month of April was featured by three command post displacements and a change of Army boundaries which required a rapid change in Signal plans. In this period, it was also necessary to provide communications across the RHINE River. If ever the fortitude, resiliency, and ability of the Signal troops was proven in the field, it was during this month.

Third U.S. Army Headquarters moved from OBERSTEIN (L 72) to FRANKFURT (N 07) on 1 April, and displaced further east to BRENFELS (N 35) on 11 April. When the Army axis was changed, installations at the contemplated command post site at WETZLAR (P 97) were halted and communications were hastily installed at BIEBERICH (O 51), where the command post opened 22 April. The displacement to FRANKFURT (N 07) from IDAR-OBERSTEIN (L 72) required communications across the RHINE River. (See Annexes 51 through 53)

Early in the month, preparations were made for the expected meeting with the Russian Forces opposite the Third U.S. Army front. Largely, these preparations consisted of providing photographic personnel with all armored spearheads in order to insure immediate and complete coverage.

The rapidity of the advance through an area heavily populated by large industrial concerns, provided the Signal Section with some of its richest supply targets of the campaign. Among these were the Zeiss Optical works at JENA (Y 66) and the Schmelder plant in BAD KREUZNACH (M 09). During the same period Third U.S. Army captured Dr. Holman, the German radar specialist, in the vicinity of OBERWITT (J 15), where two of his laboratories remained intact. Dr. Engles, also captured by Third U.S. Army during this rapid sweep, was the General Manager of the Telefunken Division for all Germany. These men were interrogated specifically in regards to possible targets within the Third U.S. Army area. They could provide no information concerning cooperation between the Germans and the Japanese in electronics or affiliated fields, and all indications pointed to individual research and development.

When the Army Axis was changed, Prisoners of War active in signal work in the German Army were questioned for possible information concerning signal installations in the National Redoubt Area and the supposed or intended locations of Staff Headquarters. Diagrams were made and furnished to interested offices. The Executive Officer of the Signal Section questioned the Inspector of Communications Troops of the German War Ministry regarding the possible use of German signal personnel for rehabilitation purposes. The information gained was considered both reliable and useful.

Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

On 10 April the 3325th SIAM (Staff Information & Monitoring) Company arrived in Third U.S. Army area. The advanced detachment of the company had, under the supervision of Signal Intelligence Service, arranged the administrative and operational details necessary to enable its immediate operational use, and by 15 April SIAM reports from Corps and Division levels were being furnished the Army G-2 regularly. In addition to furnishing Army G-2 with tactical information from monitored friendly traffic, violations of security noted in this traffic were reported on the spot to the units concerned.

Numerous and rapid displacements of Division and Corps Command Posts during the month of April prevented considerably the settling, training and offering for operational use the Army pigeons of the 277th Signal Pigeon Company. However, German civilian and Wehrmacht birds were confiscated, trained and made available to all units for communication purposes. A total of eleven tactical messages and two hundred and eight non-tactical messages were flown during the month of April.

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a large majority of which were to divisional lofts.

In spite of the large area of German territory occupied and the great number of PW's captured, very few signal documents of intelligence value were processed through signal intelligence channels during the month of April, evidencing the almost total disorganization of the German Army. However, a large number of captured German cipher machines and devices were evacuated through signal intelligence channels.

With the change in the Army Mission on 16 April, a need was realized for additional radio intelligence troops and equipment to cover the exposed left flank of the Army, and, upon request, the 226th Signal Service Company was attached to Third U.S. Army for operational use. Details of signal intelligence reported during the month of April will be published at a later date when security regulations may be lifted.

During the month of April the number of code groups handled in the Third Army code rooms reached the peak total of 1,421,177 code groups. Detailed code room records for April follow:

	Incoming	Outgoing	Total
Number of Messages	4,943	1,045	5,988
Number of Groups	1,145,197	270,065	1,415,262

In addition to the encryptographed traffic handled in the code room systems, 68 messages comprising 8,915 groups were handled by SIGCUM equipment. This indicated a decided decrease in the use of SIGCUM equipment.

An almost complete monitoring coverage of radio nets in Third U.S. Army for security purposes was accomplished during the first two weeks of April, but it was necessary to employ a large number of the personnel and equipment for monitoring the SIAN nets when this company became operational, thereby leading to a decrease in this activity during the latter part of April. As in March analysis of monitored radio traffic by Signal Intelligence Service revealed a decrease in the level of transmission security over previous months due to a great extent to the fast moving situation and the need for speed.

Section II - Communications

Headquarters Third U.S. Army was still located at IDAR-OBERSTEIN (L 72) on 1 April. The next command post location was to be FRANKFURT (M 67), Germany, which required a crossing of the RHINE River. As far back as five months previous to the actual crossing of the RHINE, plans were under way to construct wire circuits across the RHINE River. Data was obtained regarding the width of the river, the speed of flow of the water, the depth, etc., at various possible points of crossing that might be used by Third U.S. Army. One plan for the crossing required cooperation of the Engineers with the Signal Corps. This plan called for building a standard two-arm open wire lead across the river with poles spaced at the normal 150' spans and mounted on structures consisting of forty-foot pilings driven below the river bed. These structures, consisting of four pilings, were to furnish the foundations upon which standard poles could be attached in a manner that would afford a wire clearance of twenty-one feet above the mean water level of the river. The Engineers prepared drawings for these structures. Another plan was to span the river with submarine armored lead cable. The laying of this cable was studied thoroughly because it was believed that the swift currents in the river would present problems which would create great strain on the cable while it was being laid. The actual river crossing was made at MAINZ (M 35) and the difficulties that were expected were not encountered. Eight spiral-four cables were laid across the river, four of which were laid across a partially destroyed bridge which offered sufficient support for these cables. The remaining four cables were laid directly on the river bottom with no particular difficulties. The four spiral-four cables supported by the partially destroyed bridge were the ones used for the carrier circuits between IDAR-OBERSTEIN (L 72) and FRANKFURT (M 67). The four cables laid on the river bottom were to be used as spare cables in case of failure of the other four. These were tested regularly and were found to be in good condition. In addition to the spiral-four cables, ten-quad lead covered armored cable was also laid on the river bottom without any special difficulties. This armored cable was a portion of an aerial self-suspended civilian cable lead that was partially destroyed and which existed between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and TRIER (L 22), Germany. Six thousand feet in three two-thousand foot lengths were recovered in anticipation of the RHINE crossing during the month of February. However, after this cable was laid across the RHINE River it was used for long local circuits which, of necessity, had to cross the RHINE.

The Third U.S. Army Command Post opened at FRANKFURT (M 67) on 3 April and at that time the tactical situation was one of rapid movement. The corps displaced frequently and in many cases displaced each day or every other day, while communication to these corps was maintained by the extension of one spiral-four cable along the Army-Corps axes. As the cables increased in length, carrier repeater stations were established at intervals of from thirty to forty-five miles. It was not uncommon to have three repeater stations in these circuits. Some trouble was encountered with saboteurs cutting corps lines and army wire circuits. Line trouble was, however, rapidly cleared since a construction maintenance team was stationed at each repeater to maintain the circuits operating through the respective repeaters. (See Annexes 54 through 56)

On 6 April the command post of Lucky Bear moved from TRIER (L 22) to FRANKFURT (M 67). At that time all circuits that remained on the Lucky Bear switchboard at TRIER (L 22) were cut over to Lucky George Switch in TRIER (L 22). On 9 April Lucky Bee Switch, which was operating at MAINZ (M 35), was taken over by Advance Section Communications Zone and renamed MAINZ SWITCH.

The Third U.S. Army command post opened at HERSFELD (H 35) on 11 April and closed FRANKFURT (M 67) at the same time. Wire communication between FRANKFURT (M 67) and HERSFELD (H 35) was obtained by spiral-four carrier circuits. Four spiral-four cables were constructed between these points on number 9 iron messenger wire. Two of these cables were for Third U.S. Army's use and two for XIX Tactical Air Command. This construction was in accordance with a policy established between XIX Tactical Air Command and Third U.S. Army of a joint build. The Army-Corps lines were extended until each time as a forward Army wire axis was established or the Army command post moved forward. At this time the corps were tied into the Advance Army Hirehead or into the new Army command post.

The next move of Headquarters Third U.S. Army was to be to WEIMAR (J 57). This move was contemplated to be made about the 17th of April. However, a change in the Third U.S. Army Zone of Operations shifted the communication axis starting from FRANKFURT (M 67) and proceeding southeast through WURZBURG (N 53) - NURNBERG (O 40) - REGENSBURG (U 15) and STRAUBING (U 54). On 16 April work was discontinued on the installation of Signal requirements at WEIMAR (J 57), although four spiral-four cables had already been constructed on messenger wire to that point. (See Annex 52) All efforts were immediately transferred to obtaining circuits as quickly as possible between FRANKFURT (M 67) and ERLANGEN (O 31). (See Annex 53) Twenty quads in an underground lead cable between FRANKFURT (M 67) and IPHOFEN (N 82) were rehabilitated. From IPHOFEN (N 82) to ERLANGEN (O 31) four spiral-four circuits were constructed on messenger wire. Although the underground cable extended through IPHOFEN (N 82) to NURNBERG (O 40), it was thought that the rehabilitation of this section would require more time than was allowed to obtain working circuits. Therefore, the underground cable and four spiral-four cables were used jointly by Third U.S. Army and XIX Tactical Air Command. Four wire repeaters were placed on sixteen quads at FRANKFURT (M 67) by Third U.S. Army. XIX Tactical Air Command placed sixteen repeaters at IPHOFEN (N 82). CF-1 Carrier Equipment was placed in operation on the four spiral-four cables between IPHOFEN (N 82) and ERLANGEN (O 31). Eight of the underground repeatered circuits were cross connected to eight carrier channels at IPHOFEN (N 82) to furnish communication between Lucky Rear at FRANKFURT (M 67) and Lucky at ERLANGEN (O 31). The remaining eight circuits were used by XIX Tactical Air Command.

On 22 April, Headquarters Third U.S. Army opened at ERLANGEN (O 31) and closed at HERSFELD (H 35).

Lucky Rear closed at FRANKFURT (M 67) and moved to ERLANGEN (O 31) on 25 April. Circuits to FRANKFURT (M 67) were still needed to serve Army troops in that area. Advance Section Communications Zone took over the switch in FRANKFURT (M 67) and named it FRANKFURT SWITCH.

Underground cable was made good between NURNBERG (O 40) and BAMBERG (O 24). This was a 98-pair cable and circuits were assigned to units requiring service. A switch was established at BAMBERG (O 24) named Lucky King which served units in that vicinity. From NURNBERG (O 40) to ERLANGEN (O 31) a local cable consisting of one hundred pairs was also made good. This cable served units in the vicinity of NURNBERG (O 40), directly from the Lucky switchboard and also provided cross-connected circuits at NURNBERG (O 40) to BAMBERG (O 24). In the meantime Twelfth Army Group was in the process of rehabilitating underground cable from FRANKFURT (M 67) through FULDA (H 31) through IPHOFEN (N 82) to BAMBERG (O 24). Some of these circuits were cross-connected at BAMBERG (O 24) to Lucky via the underground cable passing through NURNBERG (O 40). (See Annex 57)

During the month of April Army Signal troops placed 459 miles of W-110 field wire, 2,394 miles of spiral-four cable, and 295 miles of open wire. One hundred and twenty-one miles of W-110 field wire and eighty miles of spiral-four cable was recovered by these Army troops.

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The number of [illegible] Third U.S. Army during the month of April was 75, [illegible] of 5,476 miles. Each of the corps in Third U.S. Army had ten terminals to division level. Communication was maintained between each of the corps and the First U.S. Army over Third U.S. Army radio link. (See Annexes 47 through 49)

CW Radio Communication was maintained throughout the month of April with all the stations in the following nets:

FA-33	FA-1
Twelfth Army Group	Advance Section Com Z Main Regulating Station
FA-12	**AA-3**
III Corps XII Corps XX Corps	First French Army Seventh U.S. Army
FA-51	**FA-14**
Twelfth Army Group Main	Twelfth Army Group TAC
FA-15	**FA-17**
TUBA Rear 65th Med Gp 66th Med Gp 92nd Med Gas Bn 54th Med Gas Bn	III Corps Arty XII Corps Arty XX Corps Arty TUBA Photo Center
	FA-16
	70th Inf Div 130th Engr Gbn Serv Regt

The breakdown of traffic handled for the month of April follows:

Precedence	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Urgent	1292	907	2199
Operational Priority	4650	2464	7114
Priority	5011	4065	9076
Routine	15229	7230	22459
Deferred	3	29	32
Total:	26185	14695	40880

Number of messages and groups handled by electrical means:

Messages	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Radio	640	1402	2042
Teletype	8784	7255	16039
Total messages handled:	9424	8657	18081
Groups			
Radio	829499	204179	287128
Teletype	2002512	1500332	3502844
Total groups handled:	2085461	1704511	3789972

Messenger service:

Total number of pouches by air messenger	337
Total number of motor messenger miles travelled	97436

Section II - Supply

The month of March saw our combat forces advance from the ETLL River line to the RHINE, thence south along the RHINE for a junction with Seventh U.S. Army. On 25 March, our forces crossed the RHINE River, thus throwing another fast advance on an already strained supply system. The advances of March and early April forced into operation all trucks that could be [illegible] depots and dumps within reach of the [illegible] to completion to the RHINE [illegible] set up to move all classes of [illegible] as possible. The bulk of rail transportation was [illegible] to the movement of Class I, III, and V, [illegible] II and IV with only a small rail movement. Truck transportation was therefore the only means for the fast movement of

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Signal supplies in the early part of the month. During the month however, bulk shipments were made by rail. It was also necessary during the month to call for air shipment on wire, spiral-four, and some batteries.

Third U.S. Army Signal Depots Number 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 were in operation during the month. At the beginning of the month, Depots Number 10, at FLORANGE (U 88), France and Number 14 at KIRCHBERG (L 74), Germany were in operation. Depot Number 10 was the main depot and it became imperative to move it forward immediately. Depot Number 15 was therefore established at MAINZ (M 35) for a main depot and shipments were started immediately. Initially only one truck company was available for this move, but as the rail became continuous, shipments were made by rail. We were also supported on this move with a bulk lift of 300 tons per day for a six-day period to be shipped by ten-ton trucks. Thus, we accomplished this movement of main depots in little more than two weeks. With the rapid advance made after the crossing of the RHINE River, it was again necessary to establish advance depots in the rear of the advancing forces. Depot Number 16 was then established at KIRCHHEIM (S 20) and later Number 17 south of ERFURT (J 36). In the establishment and re-supply of these depots, the RHINE River, with its few bridges, proved to be an extreme bottleneck. Reconnaissance showed that at OFFENBACH (M 76) a depot could be established which afforded excellent rail off-load and truck loading facilities. Depot Number 18 was then established at this point and all cars enroute to Number 15 were reconsigned, thus alleviating duplicate handling of supplies. Number 18, although opened as a General Depot, did not do the volume business as is generally done at the main depots. In the middle of the month, the mission of Third U.S. Army was changed from an easterly drive toward DRESDEN (P 29) to a southeasterly drive along the Czech border. After the troops had assembled and moved into their new positions, another Advance Depot, Number 19, was established in their immediate rear, at HAINSDORF (U 52), Germany to eliminate the NURNBERG (U 40) traffic bottleneck and to afford more space for the establishment of a main depot. During the month, Depots Number 10, 14, 15, 16, and 17 were closed when forward depots were set up to replace them.

Signal supplies, although available within the army area in good quantity, were not available to the troops because of transportation back-logs. However, the fast advances made battle losses on equipment small and the troops suffered little. Wire and spiral-four became so critical at one time that 4,000 miles of wire and 400 miles of spiral-four were flown to an advance air strip for immediate issue.

The Mobile Advance Depot set-up was continued in use and improvements were made through experience. There is conclusive evidence to show that during a rapid advance it is much more efficient to use these mobile depots rather than to attempt to maintain main depots far forward. There is little call for items other than wire, cable, and expendables and these items can be moved up much more rapidly when there is no movement of bulk equipment.

Repair and rehabilitation work continued on a scale comparable with March. Spiral-four cable pick-up remained at the top of the priority list and outstanding work was performed by the pick-up and service teams. Of the 20,000 reels used during the month, one-half was cable which had been picked up and serviced. The same units were engaged in servicing Third U.S. Army and the following repair data is their accomplishment:

EQUIPMENT.

975	Minor Repairs and Adjustments
2608	Major Repair Jobs
4	Cannibalization of Equipment
358	Installations in Combat Vehicles
0	Salvage of Equipment (American)
218	Technical Inspections

SPIRAL-FOUR CABLE.

872	Miles Spiral-Four Turned in by Units
1357	Miles Serviced and Returned to Stock
0	Balance on Hand to be Serviced

Allocation of the thirty-eight most critical items of supply was continued by Twelfth U.S. Army Group.

A total of 19,560 miles of Wire, W-110-B was issued during the month for a daily average of 652 miles. Spiral-four cable issues were 5,290 miles.

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

Section I - General

Third U.S. Army forward troops pushed further into the National Redoubt Area in the first few days of May, and Third U.S. Army Headquarters displaced rapidly forward behind them. Enemy opposition continued to be light and sporadic and with the capture of SALZBURG (Z 90), BERCHTESGADEN (Z 50) and LINZ (V 88), Austria, the mission of the Third U.S. Army appeared to be completed. However, a further mission of liquidating the last remaining pockets of resistance in Czechoslovakia was announced and Third U.S. Army troops continued operations until the unconditional surrender was announced on 8 May.

On 2 May the Command Post moved from ERLANGEN (U 31) to REGENSBURG (U 15). (See Annex 60) This displacement was made with two days notice, a factor which, of necessity, limited the signal facilities of the headquarters. Wire trunks were in operation to XX Corps, and Radio Relay was used for communications with Lucky Rear, Lucky Baker, III Corps and XX Corps Advance. Ninety-seven locals were installed within the command post at the time of opening. Within the next twenty-four hours, however, other trunks and locals were installed and within forty-eight hours after the opening of the Command Post, normal communications had been installed. This confirmed previous estimates that a total of four days was required for the installation of communications for a new command post under covered accommodations.

Headquarters Third U.S. Army remained at REGENSBURG (U 15) until the cessation of hostilities.

V Corps was transferred from the First U.S. Army to Third U.S. Army on 4 May and communication was established to its headquarters at GRAFENWOEHR (P 03) by means of a spiral-four cable between ERLANGEN (U 31) and GRAFENWOEHR (P 03), abandoned earlier by III Corps. When the V Corps displaced to PILSEN (L 04), Czechoslovakia, communications were established by means of spiral-four cable between REGENSBURG (U 15) and that city.

The Army Communications Axis was being extended in the direction of PILSEN (L 04), which was to be the next command post of Third U.S. Army. Four spiral-four cables were under construction to the proposed site and had reached as far as CHAM (U 58), when the announcement was made that the war was over.

Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

During the period 1 May to 9 May, the 277th Signal Pigeon Company continued to furnish pigeons to all units within Third U.S. Army desiring them for communication purposes from confiscated German civilian and Wehrmacht lofts. This method proved to be most successful during a fast armored operation when there was not sufficient time for settling and training Army pigeons.

The Army SIAN Company had succeeded to a great extent in working out a majority of the difficulties common to initial operations, and were beginning to prove their value as an informational service to the Army Commander and Army G-2 when the war ended on 8 May 1945.

Code room records for the period follow:

	Incoming	Outgoing	Total
Number of Messages	1,601	350	1,951
Number of Groups	385,815	91,603	415,518

No message, were encrypto-graphed by SIGCUM equipment during this period.

Analysis of radio traffic of Third U.S. Army nets monitored during the first eight days of May continued to indicate a decided decrease in the level of transmission security over that of previous traffic monitored during more static periods. SIAN traffic monitored during this period revealed a high level of transmission security within the organization.

Details of radio intelligence activities during the last eight days of the war in Europe will be reported at a later date when security regulations have been relaxed.

Section II - Communications

On 1 May Headquarters Third U.S. Army was still at ERLANGEN (U 31). The wire axis consisting of four spiral-four cables was extended from ERLANGEN (U 31) to REGENSBURG (U 15), two of which were to be used by Third U.S. Army and two by XIX Tactical Air Command. Simultaneously twenty quads of the underground cable between NURNBERG (U 40) and REGENSBERG (U 15) were also rehabilitated. Lucky moved to REGENSBURG (U 15) on 2 May. The corps were served by repeatered spiral-four carrier circuits from REGENSBURG (U 15) (one spiral-four cable per corps). At this time Army consisted of the III, XII, and XX Corps. The V Corps was transferred from First U.S. Army to Third U.S. Army on 4 May. Initially this Corps was located at GRAFENWOEHR (P 03). Wire communication was established to V Corps by the use of an abandoned XII Corps spiral-four cable which existed between ERLANGEN (U 31) and GRAFENWOEHR (P 03). Service was established to Lucky Rear. (See Annex 60)

On 5 May Company "A" of the 66th Signal Battalion was assigned to Third U.S. Army. One platoon of this company was immediately attached to the V Corps to provide Army-Corps communication.

The next move of this Corps was to PILSEN (L 04), Czechoslovakia at which place the Corps was served by a spiral-four cable constructed between REGENSBURG (U 15) and PILSEN (L 04) and operating from the Lucky Switchboard (Carrier). The wire axis consisting of four spiral-four cables was extended from REGENSBURG (U 15) to STRAUBING (U 54). It was completed to STRAUBING (U 54) on 4 May.

The Army axis was again changed, this time to the northeast. Four spiral-four cables were under construction through CHAM (U 58) to PILSEN (L 04), which was to be the next command post of Third U.S. Army. These cables were completed to CHAM (U 58) when word was received of a possible German surrender.

On 7 May unconfirmed radio reports were that Germany had surrendered unconditionally and this surrender would be effective 0-0001B May 1945.

In the period 1 May to 8 May, Army Signal troops placed 301 miles of W-110 Field Wire, 249 miles of spiral-four cable, and forty-nine miles of open wire. Eleven miles of spiral-four cable was recovered for this same period.

The number of VHF Radio Relay circuits installed within Third U.S. Army during the early part of May was thirty-eight, covering a total of 1310 miles. During this period each of the corps in the Army had ten terminals to division level. Communication was maintained to each of the corps and the First U.S. Army by Third U.S. Army Radio Link circuits. (See Annexes 58 & 61)

Continuous wave radio communication was maintained during the period in the following nets (See Annex 59):

FO-33	FO-1
Twelfth Army Group Main	Advance Spe Com Z 2d,7th Regulating Station
FA-12	SO-3
III Corps V Corps XII Corps XX Corps	First French Army Seventh U.S. Army
FO-51	FO-16
Twelfth Army Group Main	Twelfth Army Group TAC
FA-15	FA-17
Third U.S. Army Rear 65th Medical Gp 66th Medical Gp 90d Med Gru Bn 91th Med Gru Bn	III Corps Arty XII Corps Arty XX Corps Arty Third U.S. Army Photo Center

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The breakdown of traffic handled for the first eight days of May follows:

Precedence	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Urgent	351	265	616
Operational Priority	1148	657	1805
Priority	1001	1328	2329
Routine	4871	2504	7375
Deferred	1	0	1
Total:	7372	4754	12726

Number of messages and groups handled by electrical means:

Message	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Radio	251	387	638
Teletype	2597	2531	5128
Total messages handled:	2848	2918	5766
Groups			
Radio	40504	52203	92707
Teletype	550810	511689	1062499
Total groups handled:	591314	563892	1155206
Messenger service:			
Total number of pouches by air messenger			66
Total number of motor messenger miles travelled			27182

Section II - Supply

At the beginning of May Third U.S. Army Signal Depot Number 18 was located at OFFENBACH (N 70), Germany and Number 20 at FISCHBACH (N 31) The combat forces had driven southeast along the Czech border to LINZ (V 88), Austria and beyond. The mission of Third U.S. Army fimally appeared to be over. It was then that a permanent depot for occupation operation was planned. This was to be placed in the NURNBERG (O 40) area and a suitable location was found at SCHWABACH (T 38), Germany which was to be established as Number 22. However, before shipment could be made to this occupation depot, Third U.S. Army was given the additional mission of driving into Czechoslovakia into the last remaining German force. It was then found necessary to establish an advance depot on the Czech-German border at POSCHERLSREID (U 95), Germany. This was to be Depot Number 21. This depot was established and before it could be resupplied the unconditional surrender was announced.

The War in Europe was now over and the supplies and equipment on hand were to be collected into the occupation depots. All advance depots and rear depots were immediately closed out and shipped into the two depots in the NURNBERG (O 40) area, Numbers 20 and 22. There was still a sizeable backlog of some 200 rail cars outstanding and had the war not ended when it did, additional air shipments of wire and spiral-four would have been necessary.

During the first eight days of May the Signal Repair Companies were in the process of setting up for operation in SCHWABACH (T 38). The wire pick-up teams were engaged in cleaning up the northern army and Corps axis and a sizeable quantity of spiral-four cable was picked up and serviced.

Captured war material dumps were being guarded and inspected as they were found. No inventory was taken because the primary mission was the supply of our troops and no personnel could be spared for such inventories. However, plans were being made for an inventory and collection of all German war material in the days following the cessation of hostilities.

During this eight-day period, a total of 3038 miles of wire, W-110-B was consumed for a daily average of 380 miles. Spiral-four issues totalled 879 miles.

CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

1. Throughout the operation eighteen officers were on duty in the Signal Section with from one to three officers attached during short periods. These numbers were inadequate as evidenced by the long working hours necessary for the proper completion of assigned tasks. This was especially true in the administrative, Communication, Signal Intelligence, and Supply Subsections. During a fast-moving operation, the Signal Section must operate on a twenty-four hour basis.

2. Signal communication planning and maintenance of records provide only a portion of the duties of officers of the Army Signal Section. All Signal Staff Officers must make frequent visits to various subordinate units and installations to check upon the execution of assigned tasks. These visits cannot be delegated to officers of assigned Signal Corps units.

3. All enlisted members of the Army Signal Section must possess knowledge and techniques far in excess of normal clerical and administrative requirements. They must often function as junior officers and must be familiar with all operational details of the Signal Corps troops operating under the Army Signal Officer.

4. Under fast-moving combat conditions which result in a shortage of rail and motor transport, field wire and cable is often in short supply in forward areas, due to low transportation priorities. As a result, wire and cable recovery and rehabilitation must be stressed. This recovery is often impossible when wire teams are being worked to full capacity to extend wire axes in rear of advancing troops. Additional wire recovery and wire servicing teams are required under such conditions.

5. The guarding of VHF radio relay terminals and repeater sites, wire repeater stations, CW radio center locations, and overrun enemy signal installations provided a major problem throughout the campaign. Necessary guards were usually difficult, if not impossible to obtain since the Military Police and other security units were committed in many places over an extensive area.

6. During periods of long and frequent Signal Depot displacements, a minimum of one Quartermaster Truck Company was always needed by the Signal Supply Officer. The Signal Depot frequently moved to points in advance of railroad rehabilitation and motor trucks provided the only means for movement of signal supplies and equipment. In addition trucks were needed for the establishment of advance signal distribution points and for the collection of captured signal supplies and equipment.

7. In the establishment of initial command post installations, some confusion resulted, due to lack of clearly-defined functions and jurisdiction of the operation and construction troops. This confusion was eliminated by the issuance of a signal circular which outlined the functions and duties of the Chief Switchboard Operator, the Wire Chief, the Wiremad Chief, and Maintenance Team Chiefs. All of this personnel was placed under a Wire Operation Officer in the Signal Center for coordination and supervision.

8. One signal operation battalion and two signal construction battalions, indicated in T/O & E 200-1 as normal organic troops, are inadequate to meet the demands of the Army Signal Service during a rapid advance. In order to maintain a minimum level of wire communication facilities, these troops must be employed far beyond normal working hours.

9. The principles set forth in FM 24-5 are sound and must be applied forcefully during the training period. This applies even to a greater degree to reinforcements who join Signal Corps units during combat. During the later phases of combat, there were numerous instances where troops failed to apply such fundamental techniques in making field wire splices, servicing messages for transmission, tuning radio transmitters, giving first echelon maintenance to power units, etc.

10. As the Army advanced, the wire system constructed by Third Army troops was taken over in whole or in part, by the Army Group or the Advance Section Communications Zone. This, to a large extent, was similar to the method by which the Army took over the Corps communications systems as the Corps moved forward. However, Army assisted in the construction of [illegible] Corps elements, while only in a few instances was aid received from [illegible] or Communications Zone for the construction of Army systems.

11. The associated Tactical Air Command did not possess signal troops of the proper quantity and type to maintain a wire axis of its own behind a rapidly advancing Army. Therefore the Army had to usually provide wire channels to supporting air units from the limited number available.

12. A pool of trained CW radio, VHF radio relay, switchboard operation, cable splicing, and wire construction teams, as organized and equipped by T/O & E 11-500 must be available and under the direct command of the Army Signal Officer. When the need for such teams develops, there is insufficient time to assemble the required personnel, equipment, and vehicles from other sources.

13. Signal Corps troops do not possess as organic equipment weapons of the proper type for anti-aircraft defense and close-in defense of bivouacs and installations. As a result it was necessary to acquire machine guns and mounts on a project or loan basis after entry into combat.

14. During initial combat operations, wire communication service was often disrupted by sudden displacements of Corps Command Posts to points where no wire circuits had been installed. Displacements were also made to areas before VHF radio relay equipment had been moved and placed in operation.

15. Training received by signal troops in the United States was largely concerned with communication networks for use at division level. Personnel were not familiar with the installation, rehabilitation, maintenance, and operation of large fixed installations and commercial equipment. Army signal troops require a high degree of technical skill and commercial communications experience in special fields.

16. In general, T/BA and/or T/E equipment of the operation and construction battalions is inadequate for their mission as Army troops. It is necessary to supplement such equipment with project material and also. The project equipment is rarely available at the outset of the campaign in which it is to be used. This imposes undue hardships on the Signal troops, and materially curtails communications.

17. In order to plan and construct communications forward along the Army axis, and to be prepared for CP displacements, it is imperative that all officers of the Communication Subsection be kept fully informed regarding proposed tactical operations and probable locations of CP's.

18. Full exploitation of existing facilities was impossible because wire reconnaissance personnel were not available in the Communication Section. A minimum of two wire reconnaissance officers is necessary in order to properly plan the re-use of such military or commercial lines as are available.

19. All wire lines must be installed so as to require the least possible maintenance. All wire should be kept off the ground and substantially supported. Spiral-four cable cannot be treated like field wire. It must be carefully handled and should never be laid on the ground. Spiral-four should be suspended on messenger wire. Each section should be tested for continuity and electrical characteristics as it is placed. Couplings should be supported so as to be readily accessible for test. Cable should be supported in such a manner as to eliminate the possibility of abrasion against trees and buildings. It is important that cable connectors be kept clean and dry. The proper construction of spiral-four circuits requires time. They cannot be hastily installed and expected to stay in service. Trouble-free circuits are attained only through careful installation. Initial readings of capacitance and resistance should be made when the circuit is completed. These will prove valuable for future maintenance of the circuits.

20. At least one wire team should be stationed at repeater stations on air or cable routes to maintain the circuits passing through the stations. Repeater stations should also be provided with an EE-8 test set to locate troubles. A standard operating procedure is necessary for the installation, operation and maintenance of carrier and repeatered circuits.

21. The attachment of Army Construction troops to each Corps to extend the Army-Corps axis results in more rapid establishment and more effective maintenance of such circuits. In past operations a construction platoon was attached to each Corps. This proved inadequate in fast moving tactical situations.

22. All Signal and Communication [illegible] trained and equipped [illegible]

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24. Army Signal Construction troops must be responsible for the construction and maintenance of trunk lines. This requires that personnel of the construction battalions be trained to operate construction centers and test equipment. Local testing is handled by the Operation Battalion Wire Chief. Toll testing is handled by the personnel at the Construction Center, often called the Wirehead.

25. The TC-10 Switchboard is an inadequate substitute for a rugged, van-mounted multiple switchboard of commercial design. A switchboard similar to the Western Electric Company's Number 10W, arranged for 300 local-trunk circuits on a four-panel multiple basis and capable of expansion to six, eight or ten positions would greatly improve Army communications.

26. Liaison Officers from the Army Signal Service to each corps are a vitally important link in the communication system. Platoon leaders or Company Commanders of Army construction troops attached to each corps performed this function in an outstanding manner. It is felt, however, that the officer assigned to such duty should be of field grade. He could supervise the activities of all Army Signal troops working with corps, such as radio relay teams, carrier teams and construction personnel.

27. Construction Liaison Officers from Army Group and Communication Zone should be furnished to Army, together with Army Group or Communication Zone Construction personnel, in order to extend Army Group - Army circuits.

28. The Air Liaison Squadron should normally be assigned to the Army Signal Officer as a part of his operating personnel. Air Messenger Service is an essential part of the Army communication system and should not be divorced from it. It is necessary, however, to have an Air Operation Officer assigned to the Communication Subsection in order to supervise the allocation of planes.

29. A Radio CW Net is not capable of handling large amounts of traffic. All CW Radio Circuits between Army and Corps Headquarters should be point to point.

30. The available CW Radio frequencies are so few that shifts of frequencies within units are almost impossible. Under such conditions the employment of daily changing code signs is of little or no security value. The employment of such daily changing code signs with their attendant limited distribution of callsign sequence charts, code sign books and row registers make it impossible for message center routing clerks and radio operators to rely, traffic without deciphering it in order to determine the proper addressee.

31. At least six vehicular radio sets and operators should be kept available at all times for dispatch on special missions.

32. All CW Radio operators should be trained in the selection of desirable transmitting and receiving sites and must understand the theory and construction of antennae.

33. The selection and allocation of radio and radar sites within the Army area must be controlled by the Army Signal Officer.

34. The use of an Army SOI item to assign frequencies is entirely too slow. Assignments and changes should be made by the use of messages dispatched by teletype or messenger, with confirmation by the usual SOI item.

35. There are too many different types and sizes of radio sets, which materially complicates supply, repair and frequency allocation. It is felt that standardization of VHF and AM radio sets into three or four groups would materially reduce supply and maintenance problems.

36. The present number of messenger personnel in the Signal Operation Battalion is inadequate. Personnel equivalent to a motor messenger company is necessary in order to perform the gruelling twenty-four hour a day, seven day a week stint required by the modern field army in a rapid advance.

37. The provision of direct tape relay full duplex teletypewriter circuits between Army and each corps, in addition to circuits on the teletype switchboard, facilitates the handling of traffic. This is true particularly in multiple address and book messages. Standard Ocean Tape Relay Procedure is employed.

38. The most stable teletypewriter circuits were found to be those operating on carrier channels.

39. The CF-1 carrier system was proven to be rugged and adaptable for corps and army use, providing excellent speech circuits on toll spiral-four cable and VF equipment. Ample provision should be made in projects so that carrier terminals may be provided down to and including divisions.

39. The rear echelon has signal communication problems just as pressing and sometimes even more complex than those of the forward echelon. It is imperative that additional communication officers and men be provided from the Communication Subsection to adequately meet the communications requirements of the rear echelon. The Communication Subsection in general is undermanned to perform the important task of directing the Army communication system. All of the officers of the section have generally operated on a seven-day week and sixteen-hour day throughout this operation. The Table of Organization should provide for additional personnel to supervise communication on a twenty-four hour basis.

40. Radio Intelligence agencies should be centralized under one headquarters, preferrably at Army Group, and units detached to Army and Corps for operational use.

41. G-2 personnel should receive training in signal intelligence or an officer from Signal Intelligence Service should be in the G-2 Section.

42. Direction Finding equipment should be more sensitive and accurate than that now in use. All direction finding personnel should be trained for radio control of direction finding.

43. Call signs and frequency changes should take place simultaneously. Changing one without changing the other decreases signal security.

44. A central agency should be created in the War Department charged with the responsibilities and equipped to execute the functions enumerated below:

a. Standardization, unification, and thorough dissemination of security and procedure regulations which are adequate for employment by both high echelon and combat unit radio nets, to include investigation and employment of the opinions of radio operators who have operated in combat units.

b. Monitoring of one-fourth of the radio nets of the units in its command simultaneously, including analysis of logs and submission of detailed reports of both transmission security and net operating efficiency to the units concerned.

c. Thorough investigation of all infractions of regulations.

d. Thoroughly acquainting operators with the capabilities and limitations of signal intelligence agencies, to include cryptanalysis, traffic analysis, and direction finding.

e. Establishment of unit self-monitoring, to include checking of the units' reports and the effectiveness of corrective action taken by the unit to prevent recurrence of violations.

f. Liaison with unit S-3's and S-3's to coordinate operations and security for future plans and operations.

g. Direct contact with local radio counter-measure organizations for mutual exchange of information and close coordination of operations.

45. Without a central, authoritative agency to direct and maintain security, transmission security will be so inconsistent as to be more a hindrance than an asset to operations.

46. Captured signal documents must be handled with utmost speed at all echelons in order to obtain maximum results. A channel must be set up for their expedient handling, preferably special messenger service furnished by signal intelligence agencies at Corps, Army and Army Group levels.

47. Interrogation of PW's can be very helpful with regard to counter-signal intelligence, in obtaining intelligence of value regarding enemy codes and ciphers, and in helping to identify otherwise meaningless captured documents.

48. Army Headquarters requires a minimum of eight SIGABA's.

49. Operators require intensive training in SIGABA operation within training areas in the States or operational theater before entering combat, with emphasis placed on the breaking of garbles.

50. The SIGABA should be redesigned to permit the cutting of tape simultaneously with the printing operation.

51. Each signal organization charged with the operation of SIGABA's must have at least one qualified SIGABA maintenance man as a member of the organization before entering combat.

52. Mobile SIGABA repair teams should be readily available to Corps and Divisions, and should work from Army level, rather than from Army Group level.

53. Armored Divisions should be supplied with a suitable conveyance for the transportation of the SIGABA to avoid rough handling during displacements.

54. There is an excessive number of special purpose SIGABA systems and stand-by and emergency systems, including strips. The majority of these systems should be withdrawn, as they only increase accountability records, and take up much-needed space in code rooms.

55. The principles for preserving physical security of cryptographic systems are sound and should be continued in effect.

56. Signal Corps personnel have been adequately trained in the provisions of cryptographic security.

57. There is definite need for further training in basic cryptography and security principles for code clerks in Artillery, Engineer, and Anti-Aircraft units, as well as in units within divisions.

58. Suitable and practical map coordinate and low grade codes should be made available to lower echelon units, and should be uniform throughout the Theater command.

59. The pertinent security principles and operating procedures for the M-209 Converter should appear in one single publication, which should be made available to all units holding this device. This publication should not be changed unless current regulations are proven insecure.

60. The responsibility for avoiding stereotypes should be vested in the cryptographic personnel rather than in the originator of the message. These should be avoided by bisection, rather than by changing the message.

61. The Army Operations Battalion should include teams equipped to instruct units in combat in cryptographic and transmission security.

62. Signal units of this Army suffered continuously from a shortage of personnel with the following SSNs:

039 - Cable Splicer, Telephone and Telegraph
097 - Installer-Repairman, Telephone and Telegraph
187 - Repairerman, Telephone
237 - Teletypewriter Operator
238 - Lineman, Telephone and Telegraph
641 - Field Lineman
650 - Switchboard Operator, Local Battery
706 - Radio Operator, High Speed
770 - Radio Operator, Low Speed

Of these, the Lineman, Telephone and Telegraph; Field Lineman; Radio Operator, High Speed; and Radio Operator, Low Speed, were the most critical specialties. It was seldom that the Army and Corps signal units of this Army had their authorized number of these personnel, which hindered these units in the performance of their missions.

63. Even though many non-battle casualties were returned to their parent organizations, many were deferred to other units thereby causing training and readjustment problems. This practice resulted in an additional loss of time which could have been prevented if personnel had been returned to the organizations from which they were evacuated.

64. All signal units in this Army have received many reinforcements whose records showed them to be Lineman, Telephone and Telegraph; Radio Operators, High Speed; Radio Operators, Low Speed, etc., but who were not qualified in these specialties. This condition resulted in the unit having to conduct a training program while engaged in operations. If this training program had been conducted in the Communication Zone, time could have been saved.

65. Many qualified radio operators, high and low speed, were received by the signal units of this Army. However, a number of these men were trained in the infantry and could not operate the radio sets SCR-193 and SCR-193. These operators were qualified in code speed only. Personnel who are earmarked as radio operator reinforcements must be trained to operate more than one type of radio.

66. The level of signal personnel in depots supporting the Third U.S. Army during the post operation was not sufficient to meet emergencies. This was especially apparent during the campaign of the Third U.S. Army in Germany. Few reinforcements were available during this period and many units were under-strength. This shortage of personnel seriously hampered the installation and maintenance of communication systems.

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67. An Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service (EEIS) Detachment should be assigned or attached to the Army Headquarters during the organization and planning stage to insure that EEIS activities are properly understood and provided for prior to the start of operations, and to enable the Detachment to establish proper contact with the Army Staff and units expected to serve under the Army. (EEIS Detachment No. 6 joined Third U.S. Army in Normandy just prior to the Army's becoming operational, 25 July 1944, and while contacts were made as promptly as possible, valuable time and equipment was lost in the early stages)

68. a. EEIS Detachments should include general service personnel especially a stenographer, and a platoon for guards and drivers.

b. Also, a source of additional personnel should exist at higher headquarters to be called upon during times of increased activity.

c. In general, at least one forward team consisting of an officer and enlisted man should be on duty with each corps.

69. a. Throughout most of the campaign on the Continent, no additional personnel was available to the EEIS Detachment and it was necessary for technicians to serve as clerical personnel and drivers. Further, the only available guards for equipment was from combat personnel, which was extremely difficult to obtain.

70. The value of captured enemy equipment to the Service should be brought home to all troops during the training period. All personnel should be taught to report immediately the existence of such equipment when found. (Much valuable equipment was lost to the Service either because it was not promptly reported to the EEIS or because it was destroyed prior to our arrival).

71. A suitable channel for prompt evacuation of enemy equipment having intelligence value should be well established by higher headquarters prior to operations. (During the early part of operations on the Continent, definite channels for the evacuation of enemy equipment having intelligence value were not fully understood. The EEIS Detachment actually made contact with Advance Section Communications Zone and Army depots, outlining the mission of EEIS and explained to them their mission concerning the evacuation of equipment. In many cases, such shipments were either delayed or lost in transit. In March 1945 a system was set up by SHAEF, directing evacuation by express train to Paris. This system of evacuation has proven very satisfactory).

72. The EEIS Detachment should not be expected to handle large quantities of captured equipment classified for utilization, but should locate and report such equipment to Signal Supply. (In the early stages of the campaign the EEIS evacuated all captured signal equipment, but as time progressed it became apparent that the task was too large for the Detachment, and interfered with the primary mission of locating and reporting on new types of equipment).

73. Each Army needs two Signal Repair Companies.

74. Signal Depot Companies need an additional Storage and Issue Section.

75. A Signal Depot Company must have practical training before entering into operations.

76. Commanding officers and officer personnel must have thorough training in supply operations in the field; not simply training in ASF fixed installation operations. Recommend training in Post, Camp, or Station Signal Supply Offices where the activity is great.

77. Equipment allocations made by higher headquarters of items that are critical in supply must be made throughout the entire operation. This issue must be equitable, with full consideration of the tactical situation.

78. A requisition made on a ten-day basis is satisfactory only when time delay in delivery of supplies to Army is ten days or less.

79. Erroneous or incomplete information must not be furnished Armies on supply matters.

80. The line of supply from the port to the army passes through too many hands. It is necessary that deliveries be made as directly as possible. Every effort must be made to reduce the number of intermediate handlings.

81. The Army Signal Supply Section should set up a simple set of records showing; losses of equipment of all troops, reports of items in the depot by daily inventories, items on requisition, and information showing when items requested are delivered.

82. Army advance signal depots should be kept as far forward as possible, but should not be loaded down with non-essential items. Wire, batteries, tubes, spiral-four, wire tags, cable stubs, and some other items are all that have proven necessary in forward dumps.

83. VHF and CF carrier equipment, if in adequate supply, should be issued down to and including corps, with a basic setup being made for Army and Corps. Corps changing armies should keep this basic allowance. Additions to this basic allowance should be made by Army when necessary and allowances should be made in Army pool to have enough for these issues. However, these additional issues should be withdrawn when no longer needed or when a Corps leaves Army.

84. Requests for excess communication equipment for tactical units, i.e., divisions, tank battalions, FA battalions, etc., are not adequately screened. All requests, whether necessary or desired items ultimately end in the Signal Supply Office for action and determination of the issue. Analysis of the basic sets, employment and proposed use, limitations of the equipment, and adaptability of other equipment are nearly always made by the Signal Supply Officer. This campaign has seen the Signal Supply Officer acting as assistant engineer and research agent on all communication problems of divisions and lower units which are accompanied with requests for additional and excess equipment.

85. Transportation, as much as the availability of equipment, has been the bottleneck of signal supply. At least one Quartermaster Truck Company should be assigned for the exclusive use of the Signal Supply Office.

86. The Signal Depot Company should have three each Crane, Whitaker, (Engineer Equipment) on T/O and E.

87. Ten each Trailers, 2-2 (Ordnance) 12½-ton capacity, with five each tractors, 4 x 5, are needed for the Signal Depot Companies.

88. Recommend the elimination of the radio and radar repair sections of the Signal Depot Company and the reinforcement of the Signal Repair Company by the same personnel.

89. Radar supply and spare parts must be removed from the responsibility of the Signal Depot Company. It has been found necessary to establish a separate section for these under the supervision and operation of trained personnel of the Signal Repair Company.

90. Army signal depots should not be required to carry pole line material, but arrangements should be made to have an adequate amount to meet any Army needs in Communications Zone depots, near the Army rear, to be made available on call of Army.

91. Army should be set up with at least one construction company for the sole purpose of picking up spiral-four cable and field wire in the Army rear areas. This organization should have massing facilities for at least three groups.

92. The Army Signal Supply Section does not have sufficient officer personnel to efficiently handle the personal attention to Corps and Divisions on requirements. Signal Supply Section should be augmented by two officers.

93. The Signal Depot Company should be provided with fifteen each K-35 trailers or semi-vans for transporting small items used in setting up advanced mobile depots.

94. Excess authorization should be made and approved by the theater, and issued to all units prior to their assignment to the Army. Any additional excess for specific operations should be made when necessary by the army, but should be withdrawn when no longer needed or when the unit leaves that particular Army.

95. The Army Signal Section, as organized in the latest edition of T/O & E 200-1, provides sufficient officer personnel for normal operations. Special types of operations will require augmentation as recommended by the Signal Officer.

96. The present T/O, dated 26 October 1944, of the Army Signal Section provides only forty-six enlisted men. This number is insufficient. It is recommended that six additional enlisted men be included in the Army Signal Section.

97. One wire recovery battalion, consisting of one wire servicing company and two wire recovery companies should be included among the signal troops organically assigned to an Army.

98. One guard company should be assigned to the signal troops of an Army to guard VHF radio relay terminals, radio and wire repeater stations, and overrun enemy signal installations.

99. Signal troops should be organically assigned to [illegible] for the purpose of administration, discipline, housing, and supply. In addition, one or more separate Signal Battalion Headquarters should be assigned to an Army to handle similar matters for the numerous separate companies.

100. One Quartermaster Truck Company should be assigned to duty with the Army Signal Section at all times.

101. Two Signal Operation Battalions and three Signal Construction Battalions should be assigned to the Army as normal organic troops. This will insure the availability of required troops without the constant danger of having these troops removed from the Army on short notice by higher echelons.

102. Signal Corps enlisted reinforcements who join signal units during combat must have completed a minimum of twenty-six weeks of individual and specialist training. The completion of this training could be accomplished in the theater provided a proper administrative and training organization were set up for this purpose.

103. Both the Army Group and Communications Zone should be represented at Army Headquarters by competent signal liaison officers of wide experience and technical background.

104. A minimum of Signal Construction Company should be maintained in the vicinity of Army Forward Echelon at all times by the Army Group in order to extend the Army Group wire axis forward behind successive displacements of the Army Forward Echelon Command Post.

105. One Composite Signal Battalion, containing cellular teams as listed in T/O & E 11-500, should be assigned to the Army as an organic unit. This battalion should contain CF radio, VHF radio relay, switchboard operating, cable splicing, and wire construction teams.

106. All Army signal troops should possess as organical equipment a suitable number of machine guns and associated mounts to permit proper AA defense and close in defense of bivouacs and other installations.

107. Boards of officers consisting of experienced officers of signal operation and construction battalions, should be convened in each theater with the mission of preparing fully adequate T/O & E's for their respective units. The recommendations for each theater should then be studied and consolidated by the War Department in order to prepare T/O & E's which are fully adequate to meet normal operating conditions.

108. A chapter covering the approved methods of installing spiral-four cable circuits should be included in the next revision of FM-25, "Signal Communication".

109. A technical manual covering the operation of construction centers and associated test equipment should be prepared and issued by the War Department.

110. A rugged multiple switchboard of commercial design, similar to Western Electric Company No. 12-B, and arranged for 300 local-trunk circuits on a four-panel multiple basis, and capable of operation to 6, 8, or 10 positions should be designed and adopted as standard equipment for the Signal Operation Battalion.

111. One Air Liaison Squadron should be assigned under the jurisdiction of the Army Signal Officer as a part of the Army signal communication troops.

112. The procedure for changing radio call signs and shifting radio frequencies for security purposes should be revised in order to insure simplicity in its design.

113. The number and types of radio sets allotted to ground force units should be reduced and sets should be so designed as to permit their use by several different arms of the service.

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



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SIGNAL SUPPLIES ROLL IN.



....ARE CHECKED OUT.



SIGNAL SUPPLY DUMP.





....AWAIT TRUCKS.



RADIO SMALL PARTS AT TOUL.

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N ARMORED DISPATCHER AND MOTOR MESSENGER.



A FAMILIAR SIGHT DAY OR NIGHT - IN ALL KINDS OF WEATHER.



MOTOR MESSENGERS IN ARMORED PEEPS ALWAYS GOT THE MESSAGE THROUGH



PIGEON ARMED WITH MESSAGE BEING RELEASED.



"CHARLIE" WITH PURPLE HEART FOR WOUND SUSTAINED NEAR METZ



HUNGRY, FOR ACTION.

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RADIO LINK SETS UP.



RADIO VAN.



RADIO CENTER IN THE WOODS.



COLD AND LONELY HERE.



SHORTENING COMMUNICATION LINES.



SET UP IN TUNNEL.

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REHABILITATING CIVILIAN WIRE.



LEARNING CODE.



"GROUND" FROM ICE.



REPAIRING FIELD PHONES.



TROUBLE SHOOTING.



FIELD SPLICE.



RADIO REPAIR.

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

We USE EXISTING LINES.



A TYPICAL WIRE SET UP.



TELETYPE.



LINE CHECKS CLEAR.

Digitized by Google



[illegible] A RADIO SET.



[illegible]



RADIO PHOTO EQUIPMENT (GERMAN) IN FOR INSPECTION.



[illegible] AND RAIN AND SLEET.





BRIDGING THE MOSELLE.

Digitized by Google



POLE LINE CONSTRUCTION.



GETTING THEM OFF THE GROUND.



RAILS FOR ROADS.



POLE CONSTRUCTION.

Digitized by Google



[illegible] WIRE.



WE FOUND SOME INTACT.



TYING FIELD WIRE TO THE HOWITZER'S TUNE.



Sig C
32

TERMINAL BLOCK IN LUXEMBURG.



YANKEE INGENUITY.



WEASEL LAYING WIRE.

Digitized by Google



THIRD ARMY COMBAT PHOTOGRAPHER.



LAB OFFICER CHECKS QUALITY OF PRINTS.



THIRD ARMY PHOTOGRAPHERS WERE ALWAYS UP FRONT.

Digitized by Google



DRUM DRYER TURNS DAY AND NIGHT.



UTILIZING GERMAN COPY CAMERA.



THE MOVIE CAMERAS WERE MAINTAINED BY EXPERT TECHNICIANS.



THOUSANDS OF NEGATIVES AT THE COST OF MANY CASUALTIES.

Digitized by Google



SIGNAL SECTION, LUCKY FORWARD, HERSFELD, GERMANY. APRIL 1945



FIELD WIRE STRANGLES NAZI WAR BIRD.



COMBATING THE WEATHER ENEMY.

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ANNEXES

CROSS CHANNEL COMMUNICATION PLAN



REPRODUCED BY CO B, 942nd ENGR AVN TOPO BN USSTAF/IC US ARMY

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Sig
1

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ANNEX NO. 2

CIRCUIT DIAGRAM

1800B 31 JULY 1944



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LINE ROUTE MAP

1800B 31 JULY 1944

ANNEX NO. 3

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

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ANNEX NO 4

LINE ROUTE MAP

18008 6 AUGUST 1944



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LINE ROUTE MAP

1800B 10 AUGUST 1944

ANNEX NO. 5



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LINE ROUTE MAP

ANNEX NO. 6

1800B 13 AUGUST 1944

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

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LINE ROUTE MAP

1800B 18 AUGUST 1944

ANNEX NO. 7



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ANNEX NO. 8

LINE ROUTE MAP

1800B 24 AUGUST 1944

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

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LINE ROUTE MAP

ANNEX NO. 9

291800B AUGUST 1944



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ANNEX NO 10

CIRCUIT DIAGRAM

1800B 24 AUGUST 1944



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TELEPHONE AND TELETYPE TRAFFIC DIAGRAM

1200B 25 AUGUST 1944



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VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

ANNEX NO. 12

051800B AUGUST 44



ANNEX NO. 13

121800B AUGUST 44



XII



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ANNEX NO 15

VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

181800B AUGUST 44



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VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

231800B AUGUST 44

ANNEX NO. 16



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ANNEX NO. 17

VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

241800B AUGUST 44

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

ANNEX NO. 18

VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

271800B AUGUST 44



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

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ANNEX NO. 20

VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

041800 SEPTEMBER 44



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

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

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

ANNEX NO. 24

LINE ROUTE MAP

031800B SEPTEMBER 1944

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

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LINE ROUTE MAP

ANNEX NO. 25

141800B SEPTEMBER 1944

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

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

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ANNEX NO. 27

CW RADIO NETS

ANNEX NO. 28

211800B SEPTEMBER 1944



211800B OCTOBER 1945



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ANNEX NO. 29

LINE ROUTE MAP

091800B OCTOBER 1944



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VHF Radio Relay Circuits

ANNEX NO. 30

031800B OCTOBER 1944



ANNEX NO. 31

091800B OCTOBER 1944



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VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

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ANNEX NO. 32

141800B NOVEMBER 1944



ANNEX NO. 33

291800B NOVEMBER 1944



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ANNEX NO. 34

VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

141800B DECEMBER 1944



ANNEX NO. 35

241800B DECEMBER 1944



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

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LINE ROUTE MAP

191800B DECEMBER 1944

ANNEX NO. 37



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ANNEX NO. 38

VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

131800B JANUARY 1945



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VHF Radio Relay Circuits

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ANNEX NO. 39

281800B FEBRUARY 1945


GERMANY
FRANCE
BELGIUM
LUXEMBOURG
Scale
Kilometres
Miles
XXXX FIRST
XXX
XXXX THIRD
XXX
XXX
XXX

ANNEX NO. 40

VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

161800B MARCH 1945


XXXX
FIRST
XXXX
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VIII
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XII
XXX
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VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

241800B MARCH 1945

DECLASSIFIED

ANNEX NO. 41



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ANNEX NO. 42

LINE ROUTE MAP

261800B JANUARY 1945



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

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ANNEX NO. 44

TELEPHONE TRAFFIC DIAGRAM

231800B MARCH 1945



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TELETYPE TRAFFIC DIAGRAM

231800B MARCH 1945

ANNEX NO. 45



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CIRCUIT DIAGRAM

261800 B MARCH 1945

ANNEX NO. 46



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

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ANNEX NO 48

VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

061800B APRIL 1945



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

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ANNEX NO. 50

LINE ROUTE MAP

011800B APRIL 1945



Sig XLIV

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LINE ROUTE MAP

101800 B APRIL 1945

ANNEX NO. 51



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

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LINE ROUTE MAP

191800B APRIL 1945

ANNEX NO. 53

DECLASSIFIED



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TELEPHONE TRAFFIC DIAGRAM

ANNEX NO 54

081800B APRIL 1945



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TELETYPE TRAFFIC DIAGRAM

081800B APRIL 1945

ANNEX NO. 55



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ANNEX NO. 56

CIRCUIT DIAGRAM

101800 B APRIL 1945



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LINE ROUTE MAP

011800B MAY 1945

ANNEX NO. 57



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ANNEX NO 58

VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

011800 B MAY 1945



CW RADIO NETS

051800B MAY 1945

DECL ANNEX NO. 59



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LINE ROUTE MAP

081800B MAY 1945

ANNEX NO. 60



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V H F RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

081800B MAY 1945



ANNEX NO. 62

TELEPHONE TRAFFIC DIAGRAM

081800 B MAY 1945



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TELETYPE TRAFFIC DIAGRAM

081800B MAY 1945

ANNEX NO. 63

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

LEGEND

U – UNCLASSIFIED
R – RESTRICTED
C – CONFIDENTIAL
S – SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

W CIRCUITS
RADIO CIRCUITS

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ANNEX NO. 64

CIRCUIT DIAGRAM

081800 B MAY 1945



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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Special Service Section

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal.

TO : Commanding General,
Third U. S. Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Special Service Section, Third U. S. Army Headquarters, beginning with March, 1944 and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapters.

2. This report outlines the efforts made by this section and subordinate units to maintain a high state of morale in the command and to increase the military effectiveness of officers and enlisted men through planned programs of athletics, recreation and welfare activities prior to and throughout actual operations.

Kenneth E. Van Buskirk
KENNETH E. VAN BUSKIRK
Lt. Col., F. A.
Special Service Officer

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SPECIAL SERVICES SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart

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

CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

Owing to the nature of its purpose and function, the Special Service Section, Third U. S. Army found itself in both the planning and operational stages in the UNITED KINGDOM. To meet this situation two programs were issued: One an improvised program of athletics and recreation, using no standard equipment furnished in the "A" (Athletic equipment and games of all types) and "B" (Containing radio, phonograph, records and books) Kits. As officially published the program was as follows:

IMPROVISED

Touch football - use canteen for football.
Softball - stuffed sock and pick handle.
Speedball - sandbag.
Miniature terrain games - use of #10 can.
Irish pool - pole, wire and ration can.
Tests of strength - pick handle, rope, etc.
Track and field - rock for shot put, home made javelin.
Cross country relays.
Swimming - life saving courses, beginners courses.
Small group games - pencils, knives, etc.
Large group games - body contact.
Theatricals - group singing, amateur skits.

The memorandum read: "Emphasis will be on combining physical fitness with athletics. Squad and platoon type athletics will be stressed. Unit and organization Special Service Officers will be responsible for motivation and instruction of the program down to and including the smallest group. Active leadership in the program is absolutely necessary."

The second phase of the program - in which standard equipment was to be used - was outlined as follows:

STANDARD

Large group athletics - touch football, volleyball, soccer, softball, basketball, speedball. Small group athletics - badminton, horseshoes, boxing, wrestling, track and field events. Recreation "B" Kit, containing radio, phonograph, 100 library books, records. Small games, cards, checkers, darts, dominoes, and so forth. 16mm movies, soldier skits, live shows with local talent, band and orchestra concerts.

In addition, unit Special Service Officers were instructed to coordinate with the Medical Department (venereal control) and Chaplains Section and to provide the following information for their troops: location of American Red Cross Clubs, Special Service and American Red Cross movies, local points of interest, churches and hours of service, bathing beaches, gymnasiums, baths and showers, post exchanges, "Stars and St[illegible] American Red Cross Welfare Officers, Expeditionary Fo[illegible]

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Master of ceremonies [illegible] U.S.O. [illegible] and special service [illegible] with entertainment [illegible] Africa. [illegible] Special Service Company [illegible] Special Service Company [illegible] Special Service Company

CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

The billeting of the majority of Army units in October caused a greater demand for entertainment and recreational supplies than at any other period in the campaign. Every facility was used to the utmost to meet this demand successfully.

Typical of the installations set up for entertainment was the "Garrison Theatre", seating capacity 1,200, in the Rear Echelon area of Army Headquarters. Both movies and live entertainment were shown here.

To meet increased requirements, two allocations of athletic and recreational supplies were hauled from METZ and LONGWEVILLE to Army Headquarters. This equipment, including such items as playing cards, counsil books, "A" and "B" Kits, bulk athletic goods, records and phonographs, was broken down to Corps and distributed to troops.

An additional 540 Special Service radios were picked up in Paris and given the usual distribution.

On 17 October, Marlene Dietrich arrived for a nine week tour among Army troops. Miss Dietrich was sent immediately to front-line Divisions.

From 24 October to 1 November 45, six movie teams from 3rd Special Service Company, complete with supplies of athletic equipment, books and games, were sent to the 79th Infantry Division, pulled back for a rest period.

On 25 October a Red Cross "Rest Dugout" was opened in NANCY (U 61) through the combined cooperation of the Third U.S. Army Special Service Officer, XII Corps Special Service Officer, Clubmobile "F" and Clubmobile "L". The recreational equipment for this club was furnished by the Special Service Sections of XII Corps and Third U. S. Army.

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

Distributing supplies, running USO Camp Shows and insuring a steady supply of entertainment films were the chief activities of the section during November.

Radios, games, athletic equipment and books and magazines were distributed to Army troops through both the section and the 3rd Special Service Company supply room.

The following USO Camp Shows were obtained and released to the units indicated during the month: Ruth Ateraus, world champion ping-pong player (XII Corps); "Bronx Family" (XII Corps); "Five Pips and A Drip" (Third U. S. Army). Shows presented at the Garrison Theatre throughout the month were Marlene Dietrich, "Bronx Family", and "Heroes of the Century".

In addition to the regular supply of films, three prints of the picture "Conflict", starring Humphrey Bogart, were obtained to be shown as world premieres. These prints were loaned to the 5th Infantry Division, 6th Armored Division and 35th Infantry Division Special Service Sections who showed them to enthusiastic audiences a short distance behind the front lines. Film supply was satisfactory during the month.

On 24 November, the 328Jrd Signal Service Detachment set up with this Headquarters for the purpose of servicing, repairing and exchanging motion picture projectors. A library of training films was also carried by this unit. This new arrangement lessened the load placed on the repair shop operated by this section which, during the previous month, had repaired almost fifty projectors, most of them from infantry regiments. These repairs had been effected by only three men.

CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

The outstanding event of December's operations was the establishment of the NANCY Rest Center at NANCY (U 61), FRANCE, for the rest and relaxation of front-line troops of units in XII Corps. Original plans for setting up similar installations in each Corps of the Army were temporarily suspended by the change in the tactical situation later in the month.

The Center was opened on 5 December with the assistance and supervision of the Special Service Section, Third U. S. Army. During the month 1064, enlisted men and 89 officers enjoyed the advantages of the Center. Men were brought directly from combat for a four day period, given showers and a complete change of clothing and a pass to town daily. There was no work or training for any of these soldiers. The NANCY Thermal Baths and Swimming Pool, adjoining the Rest Center building were given over to the returning troops.

Entertainment conducted directly by this section included the operation of the Empire Theater (next door to NANCY Red Cross Club), daily movies at the Garrison Theatre and presentation of the following USO Camp Shows at the Garrison Theatre: "Five Pips and A Drip" (1 Dec), and big league baseball players Mel Ott, "Dutch" Leonard, Frank Frisch, and "Rusky" Walters (24 Dec). Both shows were later sent to XX Corps. The Grace Drysdale show was sent to XII Corps on 15 December. All shows which played at Headquarters were also presented at the NANCY Red Cross Club.

A new entertainment feature, "Jeep Shows" consisting of three man soldier teams was received and three teams were sent to each Corps. The units were attached for a period of a month. They were made up of the most talented soldiers available in the United States and were designed to get entertainment to small units that were not large enough to warrant the scheduling of USO Shows.

The teams were equipped with a jeep and trailer and for the most part had singers and musicians for entertainers. General reaction to the shows was excellent.

Film supply during the month was satisfactory and one world premiere, "Saratoga Trunk", starring Gary Cooper was presented to the 4th Armored and 90th Infantry Divisions.

Two surveys were initiated by the section to determine the number of motion picture films and projectors in the Third U. S. Army and to ascertain the availability of 35mm theatres in the months to come.

The 3rd Special Service Company sent out 14 movie teams to Army divisions in the week 11-18 December to supplement service already being given by Corps. The teams went to the 26th Infantry Division and the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions, showing to approximately 60,000 troops.

To meet an emergency caused by the change in the tactical situation in the middle of the month, fifteen tons of supplies were requisitioned and shipped to Third U.S. Army Divisions operating in the "Bostogne Bulge" area. The supplies were to make up battle losses and to meet the extra demands on Special Service caused by the situation.

On 27 December, the 3rd Special Service Company, attached to Third U. S. Army Headquarters was reattached to III Corps.

A system of service by geographical locations was set up, permitting any unit to go to the nearest Corps Special Service Company to arrange movies and shows.

Throughout the month personnel of this section arranged numerous shows and other forms of entertainment at the NANCY Red Cross Club. One of the outstanding events was the recording of a program, in cooperation with the Signal Corps and Third U. S. Army Public Relations Section, which was sent back to the United States for radio broadcast. Features included were Christmas messages to home from front-line soldiers, selections by the 61st AGF Band and solos by soldier artists. On Christmas day, Joe McKinnon's "Keep 'Em Rollin'" USO Camp Show played to 2,000 troops at the Club.

CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

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The outstanding [illegible] Special Service activity in Third U.S. Army during January was the successful operation of a plan to service units on a geographical basis. Under this system troops went to the nearest Corps Special Service Section to schedule movies, "U. S. Shows" or USO entertainment. This arrangement was made to obtain maximum use of the four Special Service Companies attached to Corps. Army troops continued to draw their supplies at Army Headquarters.

A total of approximately 1,900,000 troops saw movies during the month. One third of this number saw pictures shown by teams from the Special Service Companies. The balance were shown movies through the use of unit-owned projectors and films borrowed from libraries operated by Corps and Army Headquarters.

On 11 January front-line troops of the 4th and 35th Infantry Divisions saw the fourth world premiere received by Third U. S. Army: "Rhapsody In Blue". In both units, showings were held far enough forward to be within range of enemy artillery. Early in the month theatres operated by the Army Special Service Section at TOUL (U 61), NANCY (U 61) and PONT-A-MOUSSON (U 77) were closed, and the Kleinee Theatre METZ (P 70), LUXEMBOURG opened for all troops in the area.

Two allocations of recreational supplies were received in January, including such items as public address systems, battery-type radios, magazines, small musical instruments, phonographs and records. The supplies were distributed to Corps with instructions to give top priority to infantry divisions, particularly on the battery radios.

On 27 January approximately 20,000 maps of the Pacific and European battle areas were received from the Information and Education Branch of Special and Information Services, European Theater of Operations. Distribution of these maps was begun immediately. These colored maps were waterproof making them well suited to field conditions that had made previous issues impracticable.

Coordinating with G-3, the Special Service Section began distribution of the film "Subject: Germany" dealing with the Army's non-fraternization policies. Prints of the film were loaned out through Corps and Army libraries starting 28 January. By the end of the month the schedule was well under way.

One of the most popular entertainment features ever presented through Special Service, the "Jeep Shows", left Third U. S. Army on 17 January for duty with the First U. S. Army. These two and three man units of soldier entertainers played to approximately 100,000 troops in isolated areas in the period 31 December to 17 January. They went to relief camps, gun positions and reserve positions with attendance at the performances varying from 100 to 700 and in all cases received an enthusiastic reception. With few exceptions, the shows were given forward of regimental command posts and in a few instances in terms not completely taken by our troops. The success of these shows prompted a recommendation from the Army Special Service Officer to Special and Information Services, European Theater of Operations that four of the teams be attached to each Special Service Company.

The rest center operated by 90th Infantry Division outside of THIONVILLE (U 88) was turned over to the 94th Infantry Division with the approval of the Army Special Service Officer. XX Corps Special Service Section opened a Corps Artillery rest center in METZ (U 85), with a capacity of 400 on 24 January.

A report from the [illegible] Section, XII Corps, showed [illegible] officers [illegible] 18 different combat units [illegible] XII Corps [illegible] (U 61) during the month.

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CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

The opening of several facilities for the entertainment and recreation of troops in the Luxembourg area was among the outstanding activities of the Special Service Section, Third U.S. Army.

On 9 February a large American Red Cross Club was installed in the former "Casino" in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81). Capable of handling 4,000 troops daily, the club was fully equipped by this section with radios, phonographs, books, magazines and small games. A movie team was installed and showed twice daily.

Three weeks later an Officers' Red Cross Club was opened in the city and was similarly equipped with the exception of the movie team. Both clubs gained immediate popularity with visiting troops.

On 11 February a program of movies and USO entertainment was set up in the Municipal Theater, LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81) for all troops in or visiting the city. All arrangements were made jointly by the Special Service Sections of Third U. S. Army and XII Corps. The movie teams operating in the theater were supplied alternately by the 3rd and 4th Special Service Companies.

During the week 21-28 February, this section opened the Bains Municipals in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81). This installation had forty eight shower baths and a 75-foot heated swimming pool and proved an outstanding success. Civilian employees operated the pool and sanitary conditions were checked by two soldiers supplied by the Medical Section. The pool and showers were open six days a week and serviced hundreds of soldiers daily.

Following the movement of III Corps to First U.S. Army in the middle of the month, the 3rd Special Service Company, formerly attached to that unit, was attached to VIII Corps. This attachment was for administrative purposes only. The company was used to service Army troops. The following week, however, the company was attached to First U.S. Army.

On 10 February the XII Corps Rest Center was moved from NANCY (R-61) to NEUFCHATEAU (P-70), after having served 504 enlisted men and 47 officers in the first nine days of the month. The center went into operation again on 15 February and ended the month with a total of 1,883 enlisted men and 136 officers having been served. The purpose of the Rest Center as stated by a XII Corps letter embodied the principles of all such installations conducted by units of Third U.S. Army: "The . . . . . Rest Center is intended to provide rehabilitation, rest and recreation to specially selected personnel of combat units. Preference will be given to men and officers who have been actively engaged in actual combat, to those most physically exhausted, and to those whose mental conditions indicate need for release from battle tension. The Center is not intended to serve as a recreation center for service troops or troops in rear areas. It is not to serve as a substitute for medical evacuation although it is felt that timely selection of borderline personnel may prevent later evacuation".



The operation of swimming pools wherever available was an important function of Third U. S. Army Special Service throughout the campaign. Vernon Grant, famous illustrator on tour for USO Camp Shows gives his impression of a soldier preparing for a plunge.

The training film "Subject: Germany" continued to be scheduled by this office throughout the month. Headquarters, European Theater of Operations lifted the deadline on the film from 26 February to "indefinitely". This section retained 11 of the 22 prints of the film originally allocated to it.

The Adjutant General, Third U. S. Army, forwarded to Commanding General, European Theater of Operations the plan for showing the War Department film "One Down And Two To Go" previously submitted by the Special Service Officer. The Ninth Air Force submitted to this Headquarters a list of their units for whom service was requested in showing of this film when released.

The Special Service Officer conferred during the month with two representatives of the War Department: Colonel Frederick Warburg and Dr. Daniel A. Poling, prominent Protestant churchman. These conferences covered the status of morale within this command.

The chief item of supply received during the month was public address systems, nine of which were distributed to Corps.

On 26 February, enlisted athletic technicians from the 4th, 30th and 35th Special Service Companies were sent to the Army Athletic Staff School in PARIS for one month's training in anticipation of the post-war athletic program.

Reports submitted by Special Service Companies and by the film library of this section showed that an average of about 2,000,000 men a month saw movies in Third U. S. Army. Typical reports, those for the week ending 3 February showed that in four Corps movies were shown to approximately 146,500 troops. Approximately 179,000 saw films borrowed from Special Service Companies' libraries. Between 150,000 and 175,000 saw pictures borrowed from the library of this section. The grand total for the week approached the 500,000 mark.



A "candid" shot taken during a performance by the Bing Crosby troupe in September 1944. The Crosby Show played exclusively to Third U. S. Army troops while on the continent.

CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

In March, the Special Service Section continued to increase and develop existing recreational facilities for the many hundreds of troops passing through LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81) on pass. Assisted by Special Service and Army Exchange, a mobile exchange unit of Advance Section, Communications Zone established a "G.I. Beer Garden" in the city. Soldiers stationed outside the city were provided with free food and entertainment and beer and soft drinks at a nominal price. This section furnished magazines, playing cards, phonographs, "Stars and Stripes" and other items, as well as transportation to haul the beer.

To meet the needs of over 500 combat troops using the LUXEMBOURG railroad station on pass to PARIS, the section installed a movie projector and a public address system in the station. Also supplied were magazines, books and newspapers. Other facilities continuing successfully were the Municipal Showers and Swimming Pool and the American Red Cross Club.

Troop Assignment No. 57, Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, 7 March, attached the 2nd Platoon, 3rd Special Service Company to this Headquarters. This addition made possible a full program of Special Service in the city and provided more movie service for Army units not possessing projectors.

The fifth moving picture world premiere shown to Third U. S. Army troops, "My Reputation" starring Barbara Stanwyck, was presented to the 6th Armored, 80th and 90th Infantry Divisions. As in previous instances, the premieres were shown to front-line troops, as far forward as military conditions permitted.

As requested by Headquarters European Theater of Operations, the Special Service Officer reported that Third U.S. Army troops had on hand one hundred (100) 16 millimeter movie projectors. Based on the Army strength at that time (4 March) sixty four (64) machines were required and a request was made for an issue of that number.

In anticipation of the great program of athletics to be begun after cessation of hostilities in Europe, the Special Service Officer of XX Corps was chosen to represent Third U.S. Army at the first class of the Army Athletic Staff School in Paris.

An inspecting officer, WAC, reported from Headquarters, European Theater of Operations on 6 March for an inspection tour of Third U. S. Army rest and recreation centers. Among the units visited were the XII and XX Corps Rest Centers, the 9th Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions.

On 9 March, a large supply of recreational equipment was hauled from PARIS and distributed to Corps and Divisions. Among the outstanding items were musical instruments, playing cards, phonograph records, small games and radios.

The USO Show, "Capers of 1945" reported on 10 March and was sent to XX Corps. The "Keep 'Em Rolling" Show was returned from XX Corps for a short schedule with Army troops before returning to the United States. The Roscoe Ates Show finished its tour with Third U. S. Army and left for Italy.

Reports from Army and Corps Special Service units showed that in the last three weeks of March, approximately 1,253,000 troops saw movies. This was accomplished in 6,049 showings.



The American soldier wants his sports anytime and anywhere. Vernon Grant, USO illustrator catches the spirit "of do or die for old Siwash" in one of the numerous sketches for which he is famous.

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CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

On instructions from Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, the Special Service Officer submitted his requisitions for athletic and recreational supplies for the months of May, June, July and August.

Approximately 5,000 captured enemy radios were turned over to the Special Service Section by the Ordnance Section. The radios, confiscated by the enemy from Dutch civilians, were generally old and all in need of repair. Units were permitted to draw several machines and attempt to construct serviceable ones from the tubes and spare parts. The radio repair section of Headquarters was not in a position to do any repair work on these radios.

Upon request of the 4th Armored Division, the Army Special Service Officer took immediate steps on 3 April to obtain 100 Russian language guides for the use of the Division. The books were eventually flown from England and delivered to 4th Armored Division on 21 April.

A large warehouse full of enemy special service and post exchange supplies was captured at MEDIAR (2103) early in April and turned over to Army by XII Corps. Among the items found were musical instruments, writing paper, souvenirs, phonographs, needles, ping-pong equipment, toilet articles and glassware. Large amounts of the supplies were given to the Army Exchange Service and American Red Cross and the balance distributed to lower units through Third U. S. Army Special Service Section.

USO Camp Show activity showed an increase during the month of April. Marlene Dietrich reported to the Army on 15 April and began a series of personal appearances in Army Hospitals. Vernon Grant, famous artist, also began a tour of hospitals on 20 April. The "Hocus Focus" revue reported on 28 April and was sent to XII Corps. Notification of assignment of the "Covert and Reed" show was received on 25 April. On an emergency call from the 4th Armored Division, 11 April, the show "Capers of 1944" was borrowed from XX Corps and sent immediately to the Division. On 30 April, the Special Service Officer wrote, Headquarters European Theater of Operations requesting five (5) additional USO variety shows for Third U.S. Army..

On 18 April, the Special Service Section was notified by Advance Section, Communication Zone that the May requisition for athletic and recreational supplies had been approved and would be forwarded by rail.

On 27 April the Commanding Officer of the XII Corps Rest Center received a commendation from the Corps Commander for the operation and results of the Center.

The Army Athletic Staff School at PARIS (SOL) notified the Third U.S. Army Special Service Officer that 23 officers from this command had successfully completed the course during the month.

Reports from Army and Corps cinema sections showed that 1,387,500 troops saw movies during the month. This was accomplished in 4,876 showings.

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

In the final week of the war, Third U.S. Army Special Service consisted chiefly of the regular movie, USO and soldier-show entertainment. The rapid movement of all troops prevented the undertaking of any other entertainment or recreational programs. Requisitioned athletic equipment for the month of May was still enroute from Paris by rail.

In this period movies were shown to approximately 600,000 troops. This was accomplished in 6[illegible] showings by movie teams of Corps Special Service Companies and by films loaned to units having their own projectors.

Three (3) new USO Camp Shows reported to the Army between 1 May and 8 May. A total of fifteen (15) shows were given to approximately 6500 troops.

Soldier-show teams from Corps Special Service Companies played to approximately 111,000 troops in 40 shows.

CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

The following are the lessons learned and the conclusions therefrom by the Special Service Section:

Movies and Projectors

1. Initial film supply of seventeen (17) features for Special Service Companies did not take into consideration films in transit. The company libraries should be increased to thirty four (34) films to get the maximum number of shows daily.

2. Projector repair kits and spare sets of projector and exciter lamps should be issued with every projector.

3. All Army and Corps Special Service Sections should be equipped with their own projector repair teams. The present arrangement, with one repair teams for the entire Army is not sufficient.

4. As far as practicable, combat divisions should be equipped with the same make projectors to simplify repair and parts supply.

5. All projectionists in all units should be licensed after a technical test in operation, care and maintenance of machines. Unskilled operation resulted in too much damage to projectors and films.

Special Service Companies

1. Transportation for Special Service Companies proved inadequate. T/E should give a company two (2) additional 2½ ton trucks for kitchen and ration requirements.

2. Skilled personnel of companies were often kept from best use of their abilities by guard and fatigue details. T/O of a Special Service Company should be increased by twenty four (24) men to handle these details.

3. "Jeep Shows", groups of three or four soldier-entertainers, proved to be the most successful type of entertainment because of mobility and ease with which they were handled. These shows should be attached to companies for operation.

Supply

1. During combat the quickest and most efficient way of distributing supplies to Divisions and Corps troops was through Special Service Companies.

2. Athletic equipment should be issued according to seasonal conditions to avoid wastage.

3. Supplying units with reading material by mail was not satisfactory owing to difficulties with mail during combat. It should be distributed through regular supply channels.

4. Communications Zone base of supply was at too great a distance as the Armies moved forward. It should be as near to Army boundaries as possible. One liaison officer from the base of supply should be with each Army during combat.

5. Bulk Special Service supplies were not handled through Quartermaster Class II and IV Depots until after combat. They should have been handled through these depots from the start of operations.

General

1. Great difficulty was encountered in trying to service isolated units. Mobile Special Service Sections should be established by parent organizations to bring these isolated troops movies, athletics supplies and libraries.

2. Use of Special Service Companies as housekeeping troops for rest centers negates their purpose. Unskilled troops should be used for this detail.

3. Corps and Division Special Service Sections functioned best when they operated from their forward echelons. Division Special Service Section should be located with the Division Control Point or Quartermaster Service dump which they share daily, [illegible] with all their units.

4. Many emergencies arose during lulls in combat for divisions. T/O of Division Special Service Section should be increased to include four (4) movie teams to meet these emergencies.

5. Hospitals constituted a large and important problem for Special Service. A Special Service Section exclusively for the 30 to 35 hospitals should be set up in each Army to include film libraries, radio repair, magazines and books, and crafts hobbies.

6. Reinforcement Depots had difficulty in keeping contact with their supply bases. They should come under Army Special Service for supplies, live shows and similar items. Army allotments should be increased accordingly.

7. Aiding the prevention of battle fatigue among the infantry during combat, particularly in the winter months was the most important function of the Special Service Section. Provision should be made to include in the Army Special Service Section a sub-section suitable for the expansion of rest centers under all conditions.

8. To obtain maximum efficiency, all AGF and Division orchestras should be placed under Special Service for supply of instruments and orchestrations. Emotional anthems of all allied nations should be issued on V-Discs.

9. Live shows and "big-name" stars should not be brought in unless the same allotment of time is given to all major commands.

10. For an exact and widespread knowledge of the Special Service program, all TM's and guides should be distributed down to companies.

11. Reductions in T/O of Special Service Sections (e.g. 360-10, Oct. 44) during combat hinder the proper operation of the Special Service program.

12. The Army Special Service Section should be operational as well as administrative.

13. T/O of Division Special Service Sections should include one skilled technician for the preparation of soldier shows.

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TANK DESTROYER SECTION
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY

SUBJECT: After-Action Report.

TO : Commanding General, Third US Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Tank Destroyer Section, Third US Army Headquarters, beginning with May, 1944, and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapters.

2. On the 22d May 1944, the 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company was designated as the Tank Destroyer Section, Third US Army. Prior to Third US Army's entry into combat, the Tank Destroyer Brigade Headquarters supervised the training and equipping of all tank destroyer units assigned to the Third US Army. After Third US Army become operational, Tank Destroyer Brigade Headquarters, as a special staff section, advised the Army Commander on tank destroyer employment and attachments; made frequent staff visits to all Third US Army tank destroyer units; assisted these units in obtaining and maintaining equipment and in securing personnel.

Logan C. Berry

LOGAN C. BERRY
Colonel, Cavalry
Chief of Section

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TANK DESTROYER SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

Introduction: When Third United States Army began forming in England, no Tank Destroyer Special Staff Section was included in the staff organization. Realizing the great potential combat value of tank destroyers and the obstacles which this comparatively new organization would have to surmount, the Army Commander decided to attach the 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company to Third Army Headquarters. Shortly after the Brigade joined Army Headquarters, Operations Memorandum Number 6, 22 May 1944, directed that the Brigade, in addition to other duties, be designated as the Army Tank Destroyer Section. The Commanding General was given the dual role of Army staff officer and Commander of tank destroyer units assigned to Third United States Army and not otherwise attached.

Troops: During the period of planning and organization the following tank destroyer units were assigned to the Army and arrived in the United Kingdom:

Groups		Battalions		
4th	603	630	705	802
5th	607	644	771	813
6th	610	654	773	814
7th	628	704	774	818
9th		825		

Advance detachments from the 8th Group, 602, 614, 631, 691 and 807 battalions also reported to the Army during this period.

Training: Many of the battalions had been in England for many months and were undergoing extensive training under Brigade supervision before being assigned to Third Army, particularly in the tactics and technique of indirect fire in preparation for carrying out their secondary mission of reinforcing artillery fires. Due to limitations of time no effort was made to provide a comprehensive training schedule for the units which arrived in the latter part of this period, however range facilities were provided for use of battalions in doing "refresher" direct fire in order to maintain the high standard of gunnery which is all important to tank destroyers. The Army tank destroyer training directive established the following objectives:

Draw and prepare equipment for battle.
Maintain proficiency in primary mission.
Stress development of tank destroyer units for secondary mission as reinforcing artillery.
Combined training with infantry--artillery--tanks.

The Tank Destroyer Section participated actively in this training; securing training areas, ranges for both direct and indirect firing, training aides, field artillery instructors for tank destroyer units and coordinating the training of all battalions attached to the Army as well as lower units.

Equipping: Depots were widely scattered and the enormous amount of material and special equipment which tank destroyer battalions had to accumulate introduced difficult problems for the supply officers, many of which the Brigade S - 4 solved to the mutual benefit of the supply services and the units.

Staff Functions: Some activities of a purely staff nature were:

Coordinating billeting of tank destroyer troops.
Recommending attachments of units.
Recommending phasing of units for movement to Continent.
Investigating new equipment and recommended changes in Tables of Organization and Equipment.
Recommending and developing the tank destroyer doctrines for the Army.
Staff inspections of Army units, and visits to units attached to lower echelons, to determine training, equipment and personnel status.

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

The Commanding General, 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade, with a small officer and enlisted detachment accompanied the Forward Echelon of Third Army Headquarters to the Continent 6 July and established a Command Post with the other special staff sections at the Army Command Post near Blandamour, France. The remainder of the Brigade Headquarters crossed the Channel 10 July and joined the advance detachment.

The period prior to 1 August when the Army became operational was principally taken up with receiving and bivouacking tank destroyer units arriving at Utah and Omaha beaches. Suitable areas were selected within the Army area for incoming units and a liaison officer from the Tank Destroyer Section was maintained at the beach to orient these units. It was during this period that a general regrouping of arriving troops took place and many units originally assigned to Third Army passed to control of other headquarters.

The Commanding General and a few members of his staff were enabled to visit tank destroyer units which had already been in combat for several weeks and obtain first hand information as to the problems of tactics, supply, equipment and most important the technique of close support which was being employed. The lessons learned were quickly passed on to the new units not yet tested under fire.

The Brigade, being a tactical unit in addition to its status as the Army Tank Destroyer Section, was engaged in readying itself for possible combat missions, preparing tentative plans for possible tactical use and completing multitudinous details which appear prior to combat.

On 30 July the Army Commander approved, in general, a plan prepared by the S - 3 under direction of the Commanding General for operation of an armored Task Force in Brittany Peninsula, in which the Brigade as Headquarters, Task Force "A", subsequently participated.

As a result of this operation the Brigade was absent from Army Command Post during months of August and September and Tank Destroyer Staff functions were handled by the Artillery Section, a tank destroyer [illegible] being placed on temporary duty with that Section.

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CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

As of 1 October, the organization for combat of the tank destroyer units of Third US Army is shown in the following table:

UNIT	TYPE	DIVISION OR GROUP	CORPS
1st TD Brig			Third US Army
8th TD Gp			Third US Army
651 TD Bn	Towed	MP Duty	Third US Army
637 TD Bn	Towed	Com Z Duty	Ad Gen Com Z
94th TD Gp			XII Corps
610 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	94th TD Gp	XII Corps
602 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	4th Armd Div	XII Corps
610 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	94th TD Gp	XII Corps
634 TD Bn	SP (M-10)	26th Inf Div	XII Corps
691 TD Bn	Towed	4th Armd Div	XII Corps
704 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	4th Armd Div	XII Corps
808 TD Bn	Towed	80th Inf Div	XII Corps
4th TD Gp			XX Corps
607 TD Bn	Towed	90th Inf Div	XX Corps
809 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	4th TD Gp	XX Corps
774 TD Bn	Towed	5th Inf Div	XX Corps
602 TD Bn	Towed	95th Inf Div	XX Corps
607 TD Bn	Towed	83rd Inf Div	XX Corps
818 TD Bn	SP (M-10)	5th Inf Div	XX Corps

Throughout the month of October, the absence of a serious armored threat in the Army zone, complex with the acute ammunition rationing, resulted in the tank destroyers being employed on their secondary mission of reinforcing field artillery fires almost exclusively, except for a small amount of direct fire against pillboxes, gun positions, and in support of limited objective attacks. During the month, tank destroyer units of Third US Army expended 67,404 rounds on indirect fire and 3,104 rounds on direct fire missions. Because of the relative absence of enemy armor, only 7 tanks and 1 self-propelled gun were destroyed. However, numerous pillboxes, machine gun nests, and targets of opportunity were either neutralized or destroyed.

Representatives of the Tank Destroyer Section visited all units weekly. And, at the close of the period, all units were in excellent condition as to personnel and material. The employment of the units on their secondary mission permitted a continuous program for rotation of platoons within companies, companies within battalions, and also battalions, in some cases, in both Corps zones. This resulted in completion of an excellent maintenance program and some rest and recreation for personnel.

The Tank Destroyer Section prepared plans for converting five towed battalions and one self-propelled (M-10) battalion to self-propelled (M-36, 90mm gun) battalions as rapidly as Third US Army's pro-rata share of this equipment became available. The status of tank destroyer units at the close of the month is shown by the following table:

ATTACHMENT	SELF-PROPELLED M-10	M-18	M-36	TOWED	TOTAL
Third Army	0	0	0	1 *	1 *
XII Corps	1	2	1	3	7
XX Corps	2	1	0	4	6
TOTAL	3	3	1	7	16

* MP duty Army Headquarters

At the close of the period the enemy was considered capable of tanking 180 tanks and assault guns against Third US Army within a 48-hour period. In addition, the enemy was engaged in constituting an armored reserve of approximately 450 tanks in Province of WESTPHALIA which would be capable of commitment against Third US Army.



CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

As of 1 November, the tank destroyer units assigned to Third US Army were organized for combat as indicated in the following table:

UNIT	TYPE	DIVISION OR GROUP	CORPS
1st TD Brig			Third US Army
651 TD Bn	Towed	MP Duty	Third US Army
8th TD Gp			XII Corps
94th TD Gp			XII Corps
610 TD Bn	SP (M-36)	94th TD Gp	XII Corps
602 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	4th Armd Div	XII Corps
634 TD Bn	SP (M-10)	26th Inf Div	XII Corps
691 TD Bn	Towed	26th Inf Div	XII Corps
602 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	26th Inf Div	XII Corps
704 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	4th Armd Div	XII Corps
808 TD Bn	Towed	80th Inf Div	XII Corps
4th TD Gp			XX Corps
774 TD Bn	Towed	4th TD Gp	XX Corps
807 TD Bn	Towed	4th TD Gp	XX Corps
809 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	4th TD Gp	XX Corps
773 TD Bn	SP (M-10)	95th Inf Div	XX Corps
702 TD Bn	SP (M-10)	2nd Cav Gp	XX Corps
818 TD Bn	SP (M-10)	5th Inf Div	XX Corps
607 TD Bn	Towed	90th Inf Div	XX Corps
614 TD Bn	Towed *	99th Inf Div	XX Corps

* Enroute from Communications Zone.

During the first week of November, the lack of offensive activity in the Army zone was reflected on tank destroyer operations. Tank destroyers of both Corps continued to fire large numbers of indirect fire missions of all types. This fact is substantiated by the following record of rounds fired:

	Indirect	Direct
XII Corps	8,319	274
XX Corps	6,279	28

Expenditures of three-inch ammunition were restricted at the direction of the Army due to shortages at the ammunition supply points. The general employment of tank destroyers on their secondary mission of reinforcing the fires of the field artillery was justified by the fact that there were 540 tank destroyer guns of three-inch or larger caliber in the Army. This constituted a considerably larger number than all enemy tanks and assault guns which Third US Army might expect to be committed against it. During the latter part of the week, tank destroyer units of XX Corps were regrouped in preparations for coming offensive operations.

From 8 November to the end of the month, tank destroyer missions were indicative of the current offensive operations at that time. Indirect fire missions during this period consumed less than half the ammunition used for indirect fire in October, whereas more than two and one-half times as many rounds were used for direct fire than in October.

	Indirect	Direct
XII Corps	10,406	8,450
XX Corps	24,741	3,422

The absence of a serious armored threat in the Army zone permitted the employment of tank destroyer battalions in small units in close support of attacking infantry and armored forces. Engagements with enemy tanks were local and on a small scale. Tank destroyers were frequently used as assault guns against forts, pillboxes, buildings, machine guns and anti-tank guns. In XII Corps zone tank destroyers supported the crossing of the SEILLE River, the breaching of the MAGINOT Line and the crossing of the GARDE River in the south portion of the Corps zone. In XX Corps zone tank destroyers supported the crossing of the MOSELLE River, the attack of the METZ forts, and the breaching of the SIEGFRIED Line. The enemy materiel and installations credited to Third US Army tank destroyer units during the month of November is shown in the following table:

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CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

As of 1 January 1945, tank destroyer units assigned to Third US Army were organized for combat as follows:

Unit	Type	Attached to Unit	Type
1st [illegible]			Third US Army
[illegible]	Towed		
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	SP M36	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	SP M36	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]

CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

As of 1 February 1945, tank destroyer units assigned to Third US Army were organized for combat as follows:

UNIT	TYPE	DIVISION OR GROUP	CORPS
1st TD Brig			Third US Army
631 TD Bn	Towed		Third US Army
6th TD Gp			III Corps
603 TD Bn	SP (M18)	6 Armd Div	III Corps
7th TD Gp			VIII Corps
602 TD Bn	SP (M18)	87 Inf Div	VIII Corps
607 TD Bn	SP (M36)	95 Inf Div	VIII Corps
610 TD Bn	SP (M10)	4 Inf Div	VIII Corps
706 TD Bn	SP (M18)	7 TD Gp	VIII Corps
773 TD Bn	SP (M10)	90 Inf Div	VIII Corps
811 TD Bn	SP (M18)	11 Armd Div	VIII Corps
9th TD Gp		78 Inf Div	XII Corps
691 TD Bn	Towed	78 Inf Div	XII Corps
692 TD Bn	Towed	80 Inf Div	XII Corps
807 TD Bn	SP (M10)	5 Inf Div	XII Corps
808 TD Bn	Towed	2 Cav Gp	XII Corps
4th TD Gp			XX Corps
704 TD Bn	SP (M18)	94 Inf Div	XX Corps
774 TD Bn	Towed	94 Inf Div	XX Corps
818 TD Bn	SP (M10)	26 Inf Div	XX Corps

During the period 1 February to 28 February 1945, tank destroyers were very active while giving support to the Third US Army attacks that crossed the OUR, SAUER, PRUM and KYLL Rivers, breached the SIEGFRIED LINE, cleared the SAAR-MOSELLE triangle, and took the towns of PRUM (L 0679), BITBURG (L 1052), and TRIER (L 2129).

During February, III, VIII, and XII Corps had similar missions and fought on similar terrain, so that tank destroyers with these three Corps were all employed in generally the same manner. Throughout the month these tank destroyers gave direct fire support to attacking units, destroying large numbers of pillboxes, machine gun nests, anti-tank guns, nebelwerfers, field fortifications and houses containing enemy personnel. In short, tank destroyers placed direct, high velocity fire on all enemy installations and equipment that impeded the progress of our infantry and armored forces. Early in the month there were heavy engagements with enemy tanks, but as the German moved his armor to counter both the Russian offensive and build-up in the north, tank destroyer contacts with hostile armor became almost non-existant. In only one of the three Corps was any quantity of indirect fire missions executed; on the east flank of XII Corps tank destroyers executed considerable numbers of indirect fire missions, reinforcing artillery fires.

For the first three weeks of February, XX Corps tank destroyers had their only action in executing indirect harassing fires in the SAARLAUTERN (Q 2880) area. The latter part of the month tank destroyers supported the attack which cleared the SAAR-MOSELLE triangle and crossed the SAAR River. The attack was opened with an artillery barrage which was reinforced by indirect tank destroyer fire. As the attack progressed, it was supported by direct tank destroyer fire on pillboxes, machine gun nests and anti-tank guns.

During February, Third US Army tank destroyers expended 8,796 rounds direct fire and 28,467 rounds indirect fire. Enemy materiel and installations destroyed by tank destroyer units in Third US Army during the month were:

Tanks	23
Self-Propelled Guns	22
Anti-tank Guns	20
Artillery Pieces	3
Machine Guns	15
Pillboxes	198
Miscellaneous Vehicles	33

Representatives of the Tank Destroyer Section visited all units frequently and maintained close check on personnel, materiel and equipment. At the first of the month Third US Army tank destroyer units were still under-strength a total of 750 men as a result of losses suffered in the ARDENNES break-through and subsequent action to reduce the "bulge". During the month, 150 tank destroyer reinforcements were received through normal channels. In addition, Army G-1 made available to tank destroyer units 450 men from a special armored force reinforcement allocation. At the close of February, Third US Army tank destroyer personnel shortages had been reduced to 350. From an equipment standpoint the February highlight was the conversion of three battalions to M-36 (90mm self-propelled) units. The units converted and their equipment prior to conversion were:

803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion - M-10 (3" self-propelled)
818th Tank Destroyer Battalion - M-10 (3" self-propelled)
806th Tank Destroyer Battalion - M-8 (3" towed)

The period closed with the status of tank destroyer battalions assigned to Third US Army as follows:

	M-10	M-18	M-36	Towed	Total
Third US Army				1	1
VIII Corps	1	3	2		6
XII Corps		1	2	1	4
XX Corps		2	1	1	4
TOTAL	1	6	5	3	15

During the latter part of January and throughout the month of February the enemy shifted the major portion of his armored strength from the Third US Army zone to the Eastern Front and to other sectors of the Western Front. The 116 and 130 Panzer and 15 Panzer Grenadier Divisions moved north to the First Canadian Army zone. The 9 Panzer and elements of 11 Panzer Divisions were contacted on the Ninth US Army front, and the 3 Panzer Grenadier Division was in contact on the First US Army front. The 1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, 10 SS, 12 SS, and 21 Panzer Divisions, and 25 Panzer Grenadier Division were reliably reported to have moved to the Eastern Front. The 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division remained in contact on the Seventh US Army front.

At the close of the month the 2 Panzer Division and elements of 11 Panzer Division were the only major armored units in contact on the Third US Army front. The 11 Panzer Division was reported to have moved north, but the identifications of elements of the division in the TRIER (L2129) area indicated the movement was not completed. The total enemy tank strength in the Third US Army zone was estimated to be 60 tanks.

CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

As of 1 March 1945, tank destroyer units assigned to Third US Army were organized for combat as follows:

UNIT	TYPE	DIVISION OR GROUP	CORPS
1st TD Brig			Third US Army
631 TD Bn	Towed		Third US Army
7th TD Gp			VIII Corps
603 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	7 TD Gp	VIII Corps
602 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	6 Armd Div	VIII Corps
607 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	87 Inf Div	VIII Corps
610 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	4 Inf Div	VIII Corps
706 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	11 Armd Div	VIII Corps
773 TD Bn	M-10 (SP)	90 Inf Div	VIII Corps
9th TD Gp		2 Cav Gp	XII Corps
691 TD Bn	Towed	2 Cav Gp	XII Corps
803 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	5 Inf Div	XII Corps
800 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	78 Inf Div	XII Corps
811 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	80 Inf Div	XII Corps
4th TD Gp			XX Corps
609 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	10 Armd Div	XX Corps
704 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	94 Inf Div	XX Corps
774 TD Bn	Towed	94 Inf Div	XX Corps
818 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	26 Inf Div	XX Corps

During the period 1 March to 31 March 1945 Third US Army broke through the last of the SIEGFRIED LINE defenses and drove to the RHINE north of the MOSELLE, turned south, crossed the MOSELLE and dashed to the RHINE in the vicinity of MAINZ (M 3456), forced a crossing of the RHINE and MAIN Rivers and moved on some 100 miles farther to the northeast to the FULDA (C 2470) area. Tank destroyers supported the entire operation, working closely with infantry and armored units.

Early in March, VIII Corps tank destroyers delivered assault fire on pillboxes, towns and field fortifications in the Corps zone of operations from PRUM (L 0679) to the RHINE. There were scattered contacts with tanks and self-propelled guns. In the middle of the month there was little activity in VIII Corps and the Corps tank destroyer strength dropped from six to two battalions. Late in the month an additional battalion was given the Corps and the three tank destroyer units supported the Corps crossing of the RHINE with direct fire. 607th Tank Destroyer Battalion Headquarters commanded a task force of combined arms which spearheaded the 87th Infantry Division attack east of the RHINE.

XII Corps played the most spectacular part of the Army's March operations and tank destroyers were very active in supporting the Corps' sweeping advances. XII Corps began the month by dashing to the RHINE north of the MOSELLE. Tank destroyer activity in this phase consisted of frequent engagements with hostile tanks and self-propelled guns and of placing direct fire on pillboxes, field fortifications and road blocks that impeded the advance of infantry and armored units.

The middle of the month saw XII Corps cross the MOSELLE, sweep to the southeast and on to the RHINE in the MAINZ (M 3656) - WORMS (M 4010) area. For this operation the Corps tank destroyer strength was increased by two battalions. XII Corps advance was so rapid and the enemy so disorganized that tank destroyer employment was light. However, all tank destroyer battalions took quantities of enemy equipment and captured large numbers of prisoners. 774th Tank Destroyer Battalion Headquarters was in command of a task force of combined arms that spearheaded the 90th Infantry Division drive to the RHINE.

During the last week of March, XII Corps crossed the RHINE and the MAIN Rivers and drove to HERSFELD (M 3864). There was only one tank engagement, but tank destroyers were kept busy placing direct fire on the self-propelled guns, anti-tank guns and machine guns with which the enemy attempted to slow our drive. All tank destroyers units took large numbers of prisoners.

For the first three weeks of March XX Corps was fighting through the SIEGFRIED LINE from TRIER (L 2128) to SAARLAUTERN (Q 8028). Tank destroyers placed direct fire on pillboxes and field fortifications of the SIEGFRIED LINE to neutralize them for infantry and cavalry assault. Tank destroyers also executed indirect fire missions to harass enemy rear areas.

During the last ten days of the month, XX Corps broke out of the SIEGFRIED LINE, drove to the RHINE, crossed the river and advanced rapidly to the KASSEL (C 2203) area. XX Corps tank destroyer battalions supported infantry and armored units, placing direct fire on self-propelled guns, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns and machine guns which sought to oppose our forces.

During March, Third US Army tank destroyers expended 14,775 rounds direct fire and 6,994 rounds indirect fire. Enemy materiel and installations destroyed by tank destroyer units in Third US Army during the month were:

Tanks	68
Self-Propelled Guns	21
Anti-Tank Guns	89
Artillery Pieces	44
Machine Guns	85
Pillboxes	129
Miscellaneous Vehicles	280

Representatives of the Tank Destroyer Section visited all units frequently and maintained close check on personnel, materiel and equipment. From the equipment point of view, the March highlight was the conversion of the 774th Tank Destroyer Battalion from a 3-inch towed unit to a 90mm self-propelled unit.

The period closed with the status of tank destroyer battalions assigned to Third US Army as follows:

	M-10	M-18	M-36	Towed	TOTAL
Third US Army				1	1
VIII Corps		1	2		3
XII Corps	1	2	1	1	5
XX Corps		2	1	1	4
TOTAL	1	5	4	3	13

During the month of March all Panzer Divisions on the Western Front were seriously mauled in a futile attempt to halt the Allied advances. The remnants of all the Panzer Divisions that were salvaged from the west side of the RHINE River were committed against the Allied bridgeheads on the east bank. At the close of the month the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division was committed against the Second British Army front; [illegible] against the Ninth US Army front; the 9th, [illegible] against the First US Army front; the 2d and elements of the 11th Panzer Division against the Third US Army front; and the 17th SS in the Seventh US Army zone. The total enemy tank strength in the Third US Army zone as of 31 March was estimated to be 70 tanks and/or assault guns.

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CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

As of 1 April 1945, tank destroyer units assigned to Third US Army were organized for combat as follows:

UNIT	TYPE	DIVISION OR GROUP	CORPS
1st TD Brig			Third US Army
4th TD Gp			Third US Army
631 TD Bn	Towed		Third US Army
7th TD Gp			VIII Corps
602 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	89 Inf Div	VIII Corps
607 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	87 Inf Div	VIII Corps
808 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	78 Inf Div	VIII Corps
9th TD Gp		G - 6	XII Corps
635 TD Bn	Towed	71 Inf Div	XII Corps
704 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	4 Armd Div	XII Corps
705 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	11 Armd Div	XII Corps
773 TD Bn	M-10 (SP)	90 Inf Div	XII Corps
818 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	26 Inf Div	XII Corps
603 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	6 Armd Div	XX Corps
691 TD Bn	Towed	65 Inf Div	XX Corps
803 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	5 Inf Div	XX Corps
811 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	80 Inf Div	XX Corps

During the period 1 April to 30 April 1945 Third US Army drove east to the CZECHOSLOVAKIA border, turned south, crossed the DANUBE and ISAR RIVERS and entered AUSTRIA. Tank destroyers supported the Army's advance by delivering direct fire on enemy installations and by destroying enemy tanks and self-propelled guns that were committed against our forces. Indirect fire missions were almost non-existent.

III Corps came under Third US Army control the latter part of the month and brought with it the 9th Tank Destroyer Group, 629th, 643th and 807th Tank Destroyer Battalions. These units implemented the Corps drive across the DANUBE and ISAR RIVERS by knocking out road blocks, strong points, and machine guns with direct fire. Tank destroyer units took numbers of prisoners.

Early in April in the VIII Corps zone there was a heavy fight at STEYR (S 7994) and eight enemy assault guns were destroyed in a single engagement by the 808th Tank Destroyer Battalion. As the Corps then drove east to ZWICKAU (X 3040) resistance was light and the only tank destroyer activity was had in delivering assault fire on strong points and enemy installations in villages. The latter part of the month VIII Corps passed to First US Army control and with it went the 7th Tank Destroyer Group, 602d, 603d, 607th, 691st and 704th Tank Destroyer Battalions.

XII Corps drove rapidly to the CZECH border and then pushed southeast into AUSTRIA. Tank destroyers supported these operations by destroying tanks and self-propelled guns that counterattacked our infantry and armored forces. Tank destroyers also eliminated anti-tank guns, machine guns and strong points that sought to slow the Corps advance and placed fire on houses containing enemy personnel. Large numbers of Allied prisoners were liberated and Germans were taken prisoner by the hundreds. There was considerable enemy harassing activity in the Corps rear areas and tank destroyer reconnaissance companies were employed to wipe out enemy pockets and convoy division supply trains. In the middle of the month the 818th Tank Destroyer Battalion was assigned to XII Corps; the battalion passed to First US Army control at the end of the month. At the end of the period the 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion was assigned to XII Corps.

In the first week of the month XX Corps took KASSEL (L 5020) and the tank destroyers had daily engagements with the largest numbers of tanks and self-propelled guns encountered east of the SIEGFRIED LINE. Ten tanks and thirty-seven self-propelled guns were destroyed. The Corps next advanced to CHEMNITZ (B 8040), turned south and drove across the DANUBE and ISAR RIVERS. Tank destroyers in the Corps supported these advances with direct fire on centers of resistance in small towns and the destruction of anti-tank guns, machine guns, and small numbers of hostile tanks.

During April, Third US Army tank destroyers expended 8819 rounds direct fire and 28 rounds indirect fire. Enemy material and installations destroyed by tank destroyer units in Third US Army during the month were:

Tanks	29
Self-Propelled Guns	59
Anti-Tank Guns	35
Artillery Pieces	2
Machine Guns	41
Pillboxes	10
Miscellaneous Vehicles	226

Representatives of the Tank Destroyer Section visited all units frequently and maintained close check on personnel, material and equipment. From the equipment standpoint, the April highlight was the conversion of the 691st Tank Destroyer Battalion from a 3-inch towed unit to a 90mm self-propelled unit.

The period closed with the status of tank destroyer battalions assigned to Third US Army as follows:

	M-10	M-18	M-36	Towed	TOTAL
Third US Army		2		1	3
III Corps		1	1	1	3
XII Corps	1	1	2		4
XX Corps	_	2	1	1	4
TOTAL	1	6	4	3	14

During the month of April, the enemy was unable to cope with our deep armored penetrations which subsequently developed into battles of pockets. Enemy armor suffered heavily in these pockets, particularly in the RUHR. In this pocket alone, the 9th, 116th, 15?th Panzer Divisions, the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, and the 106th Panzer Brigade were destroyed. All the other Panzer Divisions committed on the Western Front also suffered heavy losses.

The history-making juncture during the latter part of the month of the Russian and American forces north of DRESDEN (F 2090) created two tremendous pockets. This juncture made the characteristic north-south shuttling of enemy armor impossible. However, as the distance between Eastern and Western Fronts grew ever smaller, the enemy's capability of shuttling armor from his Eastern Front gained currency. This became increasingly evident by the identification during the latter part of the month of elements of the 2d SS Panzer Division, formerly committed as part of the Sixth Panzer Army in the VIENNA (X 6095) area, on the southeast portion of the Third US Army zone.

The enemy's lack of available armored reserves for the Western Front was demonstrated by the curtailment during the month of an important "loaned" Panzer Division and miscellaneous armored units, most of which were virtually destroyed upon commitment.

The Panzer Order of Battle at the end of the month was as follows:

21ST ARMY GROUP: Remnants 18 Panzer Grenadier Division

12TH ARMY GROUP:
Ninth US Army: Panzer Division CLAUSEWITZ
First US Army: No major armored unit
Third US Army: 11 Panzer Division
Remnants 2 Panzer Division
Elements 2 SS Panzer Division
17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division

6TH ARMY GROUP: No major armored unit

The total enemy tank strength in the West at the close of the period was estimated to be 200 tanks and/or assault guns, 100 of which were believed to be in Third US Army zone of advance.

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

As of 1 May 1945, tank destroyer units assigned to Third US Army were organized for combat as follows:

UNIT	TYPE	DIVISION OR GROUP	CORPS
1st TD Brig			TUSA
4th TD Gp			TUSA
631 TD Bn	Towed		TUSA
603 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	16 Armd Div	TUSA
8th TD Gp			III Corps
629 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	99 Inf Div	III Corps
643 TD Bn	Towed	8 TD Gp	III Corps
807 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	86 Inf Div	III Corps
9th TD Gp		G - 6	XII Corps
704 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	4 Armd Div	XII Corps
705 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	11 Armd Div	XII Corps
773 TD Bn	M-10 (SP)	90 Inf Div	XII Corps
802 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	5 Inf Div	XII Corps
818 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	26 Inf Div	XII Corps
635 TD Bn	Towed	71 Inf Div	XX Corps
801 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	13 Armd Div	XX Corps
808 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	65 Inf Div	XX Corps
811 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	80 Inf Div	XX Corps

During the period 1 May to 8 May 1945 Third US Army drove to LINZ (V 8548), AUSTRIA and to PILSEN (L 3642), CZECHOSLOVAKIA, striking the final blow at the last remnants of the German Army.

Early in the period III Corps drove south from the ISAR RIVER and tank destroyers supported the action by knocking out machine gun nests and strong points that impeded our forces, large numbers of prisoners were taken. The latter part of the week the Corps was "pinched out" and there was no tank destroyer action. The 86th Infantry Division, with the 807th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, was relieved of assignment to III Corps and passed to Seventh US Army control; the 4th Infantry Division, with the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, was assigned to III Corps.

In the middle of the period the V Corps was assigned to Third US Army and with it came the 3d Tank Destroyer Group, the 612th, 634th, 656th and 813th Tank Destroyer Battalions. The 16th Armored Division, with the 603d Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, was then assigned to V Corps. At the end of the period the Corps was advancing rapidly into CZECHOSLOVAKIA against little opposition. Tank destroyers in the Corps had their only activity in taking large numbers of prisoners.

XII Corps drove south to LINZ (V 8568) and east into CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Tank destroyers were very active, delivering assault fire in support of infantry and armored units. Numbers of machine guns, strong points and general purpose vehicles were knocked out; there were two tank engagements; and prisoners were taken in large quantities.

XX Corps crossed the INN RIVER and pushed on to the south. Considerable resistance was met and tank destroyers were kept busy destroying machine gun nests and anti-tank guns. There were two engagements with tanks. Prisoners surrendered by the hundreds.

During the period Third US Army tank destroyers expended 985 rounds direct fire. Enemy material and installations destroyed by tank destroyer units in Third US Army were:

Tanks	6
Anti-Tank Guns	7
Artillery Pieces	3
Machine Guns	8
Miscellaneous Vehicles	15

The period closed with the status of tank destroyer battalions assigned to Third US Army as follows:

	M-10	M-18	M-36	Towed	TOTAL
TUSA				1	1
III Corps			2	1	3
V Corps	1	3	1		5
XII Corps	1	2	2		5
XX Corps	_	2	1	1	4
TOTAL	2	7	6	3	18

Prior to the dramatic close of the period on 8 May, enemy tank activity in the Third US Army zone was limited to minor, but brisk, defensive action by groups of two to three tanks. Throughout the period the over-running gap between the Russian and Allied forces caused a mass migration of enemy units, including armor, toward Third US Army lines. This resulted in the identification, along Third US Army front during the closing days of the period, of the Panzer Division "GROSSREICH", the 2 SS, 3 SS, 7 SS, 10 SS, 2, and 11 Panzer Divisions. Except for movements of units into assembly areas, all enemy tank activity ceased upon the declaration of the unconditional surrender of all the German forces.

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CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

TANK DESTROYER EMPLOYMENT

As a result of operations on the European Continent during 1944 and 1945, the following lessons were learned and conclusions were drawn:

1. The towed tank destroyer gun was found to be unsuitable for any missions other than that of static defense. All towed tank destroyer battalions should be converted to self-propelled.

2. Small unit tank destroyer tactics, as conceived and taught in the United States have proved sound. At least two destroyers must work together to take full advantage of their mobility and high velocity fire power. The only satisfactory method of selecting destroyer positions was foot reconnaissance. Small unit training for future operations should be based on the principles which were taught for this operation.

3. In the employment of the tank destroyer battalion, tactics as taught in the United States were changed in this theater because our forces were usually not faced by large numbers of German armored vehicles in mass. The employment of tank destroyers by company or platoon was, with one exception, found to be entirely satisfactory. This one exception was that after months of combat against small elements of German armor, tank destroyer units were thoroughly scattered when the Ardennes breakthrough occurred and, as a result, no one battalion in Third US Army could be committed against the bulge as a massed unit. It should not be forgotten in future operations, if the enemy possesses the capability of massing his armor and if we continue to use divisional tank destroyers by company and platoon, that there should be more tank destroyer battalions available than the present allotment of one battalion per division.

4. As an accompanying gun in close support of infantry, cavalry, and armored forces, tank destroyers proved more efficient and were used to a greater extent than had ever been envisioned in the planning stages in the United States. Future training should lay more emphasis on the tank destroyer as a close support gun, so that tank destroyers will not be idle when there is no threat from enemy armor.

5. Frequently the small unit leaders of an infantry division, newly committed, did not understand armored employment. Most new infantry outfits insisted on directing every movement of the attached tank destroyer unit, rather than assigning the tank destroyer commander a mission and allowing him to make use of his special knowledge and experience. There should be an intensive program of combined training to acquaint small unit commanders with the capabilities and limitations of arms other than their own, in order to avoid the needless mistakes and losses of the past operation.

THE TANK DESTROYER

Lessons learned and conclusions drawn about the self-propelled tank destroyer were:

1. The 76mm Gun Motor Carriage, M - 18, suspension and power system and the mobility resulting therefrom made this vehicle the finest piece of tracked equipment in the US Army. The ideal tank destroyer should have a suspension and power system similar to that of the M - 18.

2. The three-inch gun with its present highest velocity ammunition is inadequate. A 90mm or larger (not to exceed 105mm) gun with a higher velocity ammunition (at least 3600 to 3700 feet/seconds) is needed.

3. Armor heavier than that now on tank destroyers is not necessary, but a cover for the turret is a definite requirement. Future destroyers should be modified to have a turret top which will give overhead protection, but, at the same time, permit horizontal vision in all directions.

4. Although the M - 18 was frequently the only combat tracked vehicle which could negotiate mud during the bad weather of the past winter, its tracks are still not wide enough. Rubber tracks were found ideal for long distance movements and ordinary weather; however, cleated tracks are a "must" for icy weather. Track width should be increased to give minimum ground pressure, but the track should not be made so wide that the destroyer's high maneuverability is materially reduced. All vehicles should come equipped with rubber tracks. For icy weather, complete replacement sets of cleated steel tracks or a better type of grouser should be provided.

5. Because tank destroyers were so frequently used in close support of infantry, the lack of a bow machine gun is the greatest single deficiency of any type tank destroyer at the present time. All tank destroyers should be equipped with a bow machine gun and, in addition, a mount for the anti-aircraft machine gun which will enable that gun to fire forward at ground targets.

EQUIPMENT

Lessons learned and conclusions drawn on the equipment other than the tank destroyer itself were:

1. The ammunition trucks and trailers provided by the present tank destroyer tables of equipment were intended for three-inch ammunition. There is not sufficient carrying capacity for 90mm ammunition. Battalions equipped with a 90mm or larger gun should be given additional trucks and trailers to provide the carrying capacity for this larger sized ammunition.

2. Tank destroyer gun companies and reconnaissance platoons, when attached to infantry and armored units, have frequently been separated from battalion headquarters by large distances, and have been without adequate means to communicate with tank destroyer battalion headquarters. A SCR 506 radio is needed for each tank destroyer gun company and each tank destroyer reconnaissance platoon.

3. Tank destroyers habitually work closely with infantry or armored units, but have no means of communicating with these other arms. In addition to the SCR 600 series radios now organic with each tank destroyer battalion, there should be three SCR 508 and twelve SCR 510 radios issued to each tank destroyer battalion operating with an armored division; and twelve SCR 300 series radios issued to each tank destroyer battalion with an infantry division.

4. Tank destroyer gun and reconnaissance platoons frequently were engaged in fire fights with enemy infantry and had no high angle of fire weapon to drive the enemy from emplaced positions. In addition, tank destroyers have no means of sending up illuminating flares to detect enemy patrols or enemy tanks at night. Each tank destroyer platoon, both gun and reconnaissance, needs one 60mm mortar as a support weapon against enemy infantry by day and as a means of illumination at night.

5. The Car, Armored, Light, M - 8, and the Car, Armored, Utility, M - 20, have proved entirely unsatisfactory for the purposes for which they were provided. A half-track or a light full-track vehicle is needed to replace the M - 8 and the M - 20.

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



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